THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2007.

This article regards the question of the individuation1 of corporeal substances. It will also
deal briefly with the questions as to how accidents are individuated and how subsistent forms are

1
Studies on individuation: G. M. MANSER, Das thomistische Individuationsprinzip, “Divus Thomas,” 12 (1934),
pp. 221-27, 279-300 ; E. HUGUENY, Résurrection et indentité corporelle selon les philosophies de l’individuation,
“Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques,” 23 (1934), pp. 94-106 ; J. B. WALL, The Mind of St.
Thomas on the Principle of Individuation, “Modern Schoolman,” 1940-1941, pp. 41ff. ; DEGL’INNOCENTI, U., Il
pensiero di San Tommaso sul principio d’individuazione, “Divus Thomas (Piacenza), 45 (1942), pp. 35-81 ; A.
GAZZANA, La materia signata di s. Tommaso secondo le diverse interpretazioni del Gaetano e del Ferrarese,
“Gregorianum,” 24 (1943), pp. 78-85 ; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, Animadversiones in Caietani doctrinam de
corporum individuatione, “Divus Thomas (Piacenza), 51 (1948), pp. 19-45 ; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, Del Gaetano e
del principio d’individuazione, “Divus Thomas (Piacenza),” 52 (1949), pp. 202-208 ; A. F. DE VOS, L’aristotélisme
de Suárez et sa théorie de l’individuation, in Actas. Congreso Internacional de Filosofia, Barcelona, 1948, vol. 3,
Instituto Luis Vives de Filosofia, Madrid, 1949, pp. 505-514 ; J. ROSANAS, El principio de individuación según
Suárez, “Ciencia y Fe,” 6 (1950), pp. 69-86 ; J. R. ROSENBERG, The Principle of Individuation: A Comparative
Study of St. Thomas, Scotus, and Suarez, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1950 ; J. BOBIK, La
doctrine de saint Thomas sur l’individuation des substances corporelles, “Revue Philosophique de Louvain,” 51
(1953), pp. 5-41 ; J. LUKASIEWICZ, The Principle of Individuation, “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,” 27
(1953), pp. 69-82 ; K. R. POPPER, The Principle of Individuation, “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,” 27
(1953), pp. 107-112 ; J. BOBIK, Dimensions in the Individuation of Bodily Substance, “Philosophical Studies
(Maynooth),” 4 (1954), pp. 66-79 ; J. BOBIK, The ‘Materia Signata’ of Cajetan, “The New Scholasticism,” 30
(1956), pp. 127-153 ; C. DA ALTARI, Individuo e principio di individuazione in S. Bonaventura, “Studi
Francescani,” 58 (1961), pp. 264-286 ; J. KLINGER, Das Prinzip der Individuation bei Thomas von Aquin,
“Münsterschwarzacher Studien (II),” Vier Turme Verlag, Münsterschwarzacher, 1964 ; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, Il
principio d’individuazione dei corpi e Giovanni di S. Tommaso, “Aquinas,” 12 (1969), pp. 59-99 ; A. C. LLOYD,
Aristotle’s Principle of Individuation, “Mind,” 79 (1970), pp 519-529 ; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, Il principio di
individuazione nella scuola tomistica, Pontifical Lateran University, Rome, 1971 ; W. CHARLTON, Aristotle and
the Principle of Individuation, “Phronesis,” 17 (1972), pp. 239-249 ; H. VEATCH, Essentialism and the Problem of
Individuation, “Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,” 47 (1974), pp. 64-73 ; H.-N.
CASTANEDA, Individuation and Non-Identity, “American Philosophical Quarterly,” 12 (1975), pp. 131-140 ; L.
McCULLOUGH, The Early Philosophy of Leibniz on Individuation: A Study of the ‘Disputatio metaphysica de
principio individui’ of 1663, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1976 ; R. SPECHT, Francisco
Suárez. Über die Individualität und das Individuationsprinzip, 2 vols., Meiner, Hamburg, 1976 ; J. E. GRACIA,
Suárez’s Criticism of the Thomistic Principle of Individuation, in Atti. Congresso di S. Tommaso d’Aquino nel suo
VII centenario, Rome, 1977, pp. 563-568 ; S. P. SFEKAS, The Problem of Individuation in Aristotelian
Metaphysics, New York, 1979 ; J. E. GRACIA, What the Individual Adds to the Common Nature According to
Suárez, “The New Scholasticism,” 53 (1979), pp. 221-233 ; J. E. GRACIA, Suárez on Individuation, Marquette
University Press, Milwaukee, 1982 ; T. M. RUDAVSKY, Individuals and the Doctrine of Individuation in
Gersonides, “The New Scholasticism,” 51 (1982), pp. 30-50 ; J. E. GRACIA, Individuals as Instances, “Review of
Metaphysics,” 37 (1983), pp. 39-59 ; B. J. MARTINE, Individuation and Individuality, SUNY Press, Albany, NY,
1984 ; J. OWENS, Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quantity as Individuating Principle, “Mediaeval Studies,” 50
(1988), pp. 279-310 ; J. E. GRACIA, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages,
Philosophia Verlag, Munich and Vienna, 1988 ; J. E. GRACIA, Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of
Metaphysics, SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 1988 ; W. PARK, The Problem of Individuation for Scotus: A Principle of
Indivisibility or a Principle of Distinction?, “Franciscan Studies,” 48 (1988), pp. 105-123 ; W. PARK, Common
Nature and Haecceitas, “Franziskanische Studien,” 71 (1989), pp. 188-192 ; W. PARK, Haecceitas and the Bare
Particular, “Review of Metaphysics,” 46 (1990), pp. 375-398 ; J. E. GRACIA, Individuation in Scholasticism: The
Later Middle-Ages and the Counter-Reformation, SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 1994 ; T. B. NOONE, Individuation in
Scotus, “American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly,” 69 (1995), pp. 527-542 ; K. WHITE, Individuation in

1
individual. Now, the essences of beings (entia) exist only individualized. We do not find around
us universal species but rather singular and concrete individuals. We see dogs, for example, of
the same kind, running about us, but nevertheless they are distinct from one another. The dogs
possess the same specific essence, the same degree of substantial being which gives them a
certain mutual similarity, but nevertheless, the essence of dog has its own characteristics in each
of the dogs. Hence, essences do not exist as something general and abstract but are rather
‘individualized’ in each member of the same species. The species of dog does not subsist, but
only individual dogs do.

Thus, essences can remain specifically identical and yet be really diversified in a
multitude of individual beings. We know that act is multiplied by potency so, to begin, we affirm
that in the realm of the essence of corporeal beings, matter is the principle which multiplies the
forms. Form accounts for the specific similarity of things, since it determines a common degree
of being, which, in our above example, makes all dogs to be dogs. Matter, instead, as the
receptive subject of the form, renders plurality possible within one and the same degree of being.
It is because of matter, then, that there can be many dogs. And aside from multiplying the form,
matter also individuates or singularizes it. Not only are the individuals of a particular species
many (in our example, not only are individual dogs of the species dog many), but they are also
diverse from one another, as common sense tells us. “At first sight it is clear that the fundamental
principle of individuation must be an intrinsic constituent principle of the individual essence,
because the fundamental principle is an intrinsic principle. Now, an individual essence is
composed of two constitutent principles, matter and form. The form, however, cannot be the
ultimate root of individuation because of itself any form is common, and thus can be found in
several.2 If, for instance, Peter would be this man because he has the form of man, every man
would be Peter, because every man has the form of man. Moreover, individuation within a
species implies multiplication, and therefore also limitation. Form, however, of itself does not
imply any limitation; hence, again, we arrive at the conclusion that the form of an individual
cannot be the ultimate root of individuation.

“For the same reasons we must exclude the possibility that the fundamental principle of
individuation would be an additional form, or a combination of additional forms added to the
compound of matter and form. For, of itself any formal principle is communicable to many, and
thus cannot be the ultimate basis of incommunicability. ‘No matter how many forms are joined
together, no definite assignation of this singular thing will result, save accidentally inasmuch as
the collection of these forms happens to be found only in one thing.’3 Moreover, if such an
additional formal principle belonged to the essence, it would cause an essential difference, a new
species, and not a purely individual difference within the same species. On the other hand, if it
did not belong to the essence, it could not cause the individuation of this essence from within,
but, at most, would be something by which this essence could be recognized. Hence, by
exclusion, it follows that the root of individuation must be found in matter.”4

Aquinas’s Super Boethium De Trinitate, q. 4, “American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly,” 69 (1995), pp. 543-556
; L. DEWAN, The Individual as a Mode of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, “The Thomist,” 63 (1999), pp.
403-424 ; A. PAYNE, Gracia and Aquinas on the Principle of Individuation, “The Thomist,” 68 (2004), pp. 545-
575.
2
Quodlibet, 7, a. 3.
3
In VII Metaphysic., lect. 15, no. 1626.
4
H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, pp. 149-150.

2
 There are a number of erroneous and insufficient solutions to the problem of the
individuation of corporeal substances, as Henri Renard observes: “Note carefully that we are
seeking the ultimate reasons for individuation. It would not do, therefore, to say that Peter is
Peter and different from Paul because of the color of his hair, because of his height or weight,
because he dresses better than Paul, or because he lives in a different town. These are only
external signs manifesting his individuality. We are not seeking the external manifestations of
individuality, but the ultimate and most profound principle of it.

“It will not suffice to say: Of course the reason why they are different is because God
made them different. That is true; but to say that is to state only the extrinsic cause for their
actuation in the existential order. God is the agent. But that is not what we are looking for. Our
question is: what is it in the individual that makes it this individual? What is it in Peter that
makes him different from anybody else?

“Again one might say, this is an extremely simple question. Peter is Peter and
consequently not Paul nor John, because he has this particular soul, this particular body, namely,
Peter’s body and soul. In other words Peter is Peter because his whole being is his own being; it
is what it is. This is a beautifully simple answer, and true, too, no doubt; but alas, it says nothing
new, it explains nothing. Of course Peter is Peter because his soul is Peter’s and his body is his
own and not someone else’s. Who ever doubted it? But really that does not help one bit, because
what we want to know is precisely why it is that Peter has that particular body and soul, and
nothing else will satisfy our curiosity except that.”5

The true solution, Renard states, is that quantified matter, or matter marked or signed
with quantity (materia quantitate signata), is the principle of individuation: “In the De Ente et
Essentia,6 St. Thomas explains that matter is the principle of individuation, not, however, prime
matter as such, but ‘signate matter’ with its parts outside of parts (extension), with its order of
parts (situs), and considered under its ‘determinate’ dimensions.”7

Regarding the multiplication of the essence in individuals in light of the doctrine act and
potency applied to form and matter, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo state: “The plurality of
individuals of the same kind reveals that their essences are composed of two elements related to
one another as potency and act. As we have already seen, pure act at any given level is
necessarily unique. Therefore, an essence which would consist of the form alone (act in the
realm of essence) would not be multiplied in distinct individuals, but would be individuated in
itself as such.

“Hence, it is matter, which the form of the species is received, that makes the existence of
many individuals of the same species possible. For this reason, it can be said that matter is the
first principle of the numerical multiplication of the species, insofar as it is the subject in which
the specific form is supported and multiplied.”8

5
H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1950, pp. 217-218.
6
De Ente et Essentia, chap. 2.
7
H. RENARD, op. cit., p. 218.
8
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 100.

3
 As regards the singularization of the essence of corporeal substances, in light again of the
doctrine of act and potency as applied to form and matter, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain:
“The root of multiplication and therefore of the individuation of the essence is matter. However,
matter individuates essence insofar as matter itself is singular, that is, only to the extent that it is
specified by the accident quantity. Consequently, it is said that the principle individuation is
quantified matter (materia quantitate signata).9

“…Quantity enables matter to be in arranged different parts, giving it an extended

dimension and allow one part of matter to be distinguished from another. The different ‘pieces’
of quantified matter thus individuate the substantial form, restricting it to being the form of this
matter and not of that other matter.

“Even though its first principle is matter, individuation also requires the intervention of
the substantial form and quantity. Matter singularizes because it is affected by quantity, but this
is an accident received only by a complete being, i.e., it arises from matter insofar as the latter is
made actual by the form.

“Consequently, the process of individuation can be broken down into three stages, which
are not subsequent to one another in time but simultaneous. There is mutual influence of the
elements: matter, quantity, and substantial form:

“1. As it actualizes matter, the substantial form of a corporeal being causes the accident
quantity to arise in matter, since quantity constitutes the body as such; 2 As quantity gives
dimensions to matter, it makes some parts in it distinct from other parts, thus making it
individual.10 By virtue of its concrete dimensions, quantity limits matter to being this matter,
distinct from all the rest; 3. Matter, thus singularized by quantity, individuates the specific form.

“In the final analysis, matter is the principle of multiplication of the species, inasmuch as
it is an apt subject of the substantial form, which is its proper act; it singularizes the form to the
extent that it is itself singularized due to the effect of quantity. But since this requires the prior
actualization of matter by the form (which is, by nature, prior to matter), St. Thomas summarizes
this question by saying that ‘given the corporeity by virtue of the form, individuation arises on
account of the matter.’11”12

9
The commentators of St. Thomas Aquinas had various interpretations regarding the nature of the materia
quantitate signata. Cajetan, and later on John of St. Thomas, identified the principle of individuation with matter
inasmuch as it is the root of quantity; this means that what causes individuation is matter in potency, that is, still
devoid of the actuality of quantity. (cf. Comm. in Summa Theo., I, q. 29, a. 1). Sylvester de Ferraris rejected that
interpretation – due to the obvious divergence from St. Thomas’ doctrine – and affirmed together with John
Capreolus that the materia quantitate signata is not prime matter alone but matter that is already with the accident
quantity. (cf. Comm. in Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, c. 21).
10
Actualized quantity can be considered as either determinate or indeterminate. In every moment of its existence an
individual has some perfectly determined dimensions (a certain height, volume or weight, for example); however,
this type of quantity cannot be the contributing factor for individuation, since it varies continuously. For this reason,
St. Thomas Aquinas taught that the principle of individuation is matter, but under indeterminate dimensions, that is,
in its ‘unfinished’ state. This same matter makes possible the designation of a thing in time (nunc) and in place (hic);
it also explains why an individual remains the same notwithstanding the continuous changes that it undergoes in its
dimensions.
11
De Natura Materiae, ch. 3.

4
 Explaining the position of the Thomist commentator Sylvester of Ferrara (Sylvester
Ferrariensis) regarding what is meant by signate matter under its dimensions,13 Dougherty

12
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 102-103.
13
Renard explains Sylvester of Ferrara’s interpretation of the Angelic Doctor St. Thomas Aquinas on materia
quantitate signata as the principle of individuation as follows: “Ferrara asserts that this ‘signate matter’ under its
dimensions is to be understood as the matter actuated and existing with its quantity, under its actual
dimensions…Matter that is in act and extended by reason of its quantity (as a condition, not as a cause) will be
found to be this matter rather than that. For quantity is the only accident which because of its actual situs (order of
parts) individuates itself not as of this individual, but as this quantity (non huius sed hoc). Matter, then, because of
its extension, becomes this matter and is able in limiting the form to individuate it.
“Difficulty. There is, however, in Ferrara’s doctrine a formidable difficulty which may seem well nigh
insurmountable. Fortunately, this difficulty is due to our imagination and can be dissipated by serious reflection. The
difficulty is this: if matter is the principle of individuation, that is, if it makes the form become this form, then it
must first be this matter. But in order to be this matter, as we explained in presenting the doctrine of Ferrara, it must
not only be in act, but it must be ‘quanta’ or ‘signate matter’ as we call it, with its actual dimensions before the
coming of the form. This would seem to mean that matter must first exist alone without the form. For if matter
needed the form for its actuation, that is, for its ‘to be,’ and for all the other perfections, both essential and
accidental, such as quantity, which must follow, then the form would have to be an individual first, since whatever
exists is necessarily an individual. In either case, matter existing first and individuating the form, or form existing
first and individuating matter, we have a denial of the fundamental principle of the limitation of act by potency and
of the actuation of potency by act.
“Solution. Now this difficulty is really no difficulty at all. It is, as we have mentioned, merely due to our
imagination which portrays all causality in terms of efficiency; for it is only of the efficient cause that we can
indirectly have a sensible experience. Of the other causes, especially the intrinsic, the imagination knows nothing.
Now it is true we generally experience some priority of time in the agent, not, however, as agent (since it is
impossible for the cause to be actually causing without the effect taking place), but in the agent as a being in the
existential order. Applying this experience to the order of intrinsic causality, we demand that matter, ‘signate
matter,’ which we say is the principle of individuation, exist somehow before the coming of the form in order to be
able to individuate it. Else, we say, the form should be the principle of individuation, and exist first as an individual.
Our conjecture, however, is wrong on both counts! We forget that matter and form are in the order of intrinsic
causality, and therefore that there can be no question of priority of time as with beings in the existential order.
Matter and form are not beings, remember, but principles of being. We forget, moreover, that their causality is not
had by action, but by a mere communication of their own reality, and that the causality exercised is mutual and
simultaneous. Just as the form gives the ‘to be’ and the specific perfection (with the proper accidents emanating
from such a perfection), so matter at the same time limits and individuates. And, consequently, to say that the matter
must first exist in time and be quanta (signate matter) in order to individuate the form, or to say that the form must
exist first in order to actuate the mater is pure nonsense and in truth a denial of the very nature of intrinsic causality.
It is the form which gives matter ‘to be,’ actuates it, and by union with it makes the matter be a body; it is the matter
which limits and individuates the form. The causality of these two principles of being is mutual and simultaneous.
True, we cannot imagine such a thing, for such causality transcends all sense experience; with our intellect,
however, we can understand clearly why this must be.
“Order of the Perfections Received. In the mutual causality, then, there is no actual sequence in the order of time.
Since they are principles of being, the matter does not exist without the form nor the form without the matter. Their
union down to the ultimate pefection and properties of the essence is instantaneous. Still, as St. Thomas says, we can
with the mind consider (præintelligitur) a certain order. In the first place, we may consider the form giving the ‘to
be’ together with the actuation of the fundamental specific perfection. Consequently, just as we consider the same
substantial form giving the ulterior perfections according to the regular sequence (not in time) of the different grades
of specific acts, so must the proper accidents follow each specific perfection. Consequently, quantity will follow
corporeity. Now once the matter is quanta with its dimensions, it is individuated, for quantity having parts outside of
parts individuates itself. The matter then being quanta and consequently being this matter individuates the form.
And now the form gives its ulterior perfections.
“This difficult point is clearly explained by Father Charles Boyer in the following terms: ‘It is true that the
substantial form is one, and that it gives simultaneously all substantial determinations, which consequently are not
distinct. These determinations, however, or effects of the form have a definite order: animality, for example,

5
writes: “The great commentator on the Contra Gentiles does not say that matter exists without

supposes life, and this in turn requires corporeity. It is proper, therefore, for the mind to understand one effect before
the others. Now if we consider only the effect of corporeity, which is first, and from which flows quantity, it is clear
that by this effect matter receives interminate dimensions by means of which it individuates the form. This is the
solution of St. Thomas’(C. BOYER, Cursus Philosophiae, vol. 1, p. 487).
“This sequence, then, is perceived by the mind because of the logical order of generic and specific perfections;
but, let us repeat, this order or sequence is in no wise temporal, since the causality is intrinsic and mutual.
“This profound and satisfying doctrine is aptly expressed by St. Thomas in the following texts: ‘The more perfect
form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore, while remaining one and the same, it
pefects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual
being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that every genus is followed by its own proper
accidents. Therefore, as matter is first apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal,
and so of the other [generic perfections]; so those accidents which belong to being are understood first to exist
before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood first in matter before the form, not as regards all its effects,
but as regards the subsequent effect’(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 1).
“‘Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belong to the whole matter.
Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts,
and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the
same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection, as we have said, yet it is considered as different
when brought under the observation of reason’(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 2).
“Interminate Dimensions. What are these dimensions spoken of in the last question? The question of dimensions
has caused a great deal of confusion in the minds of those who did not understand the terminology of St. Thomas.
To understand the significance of Thomas’ words we must distinguish clearly between terminate, interminate, and
deteminate dimensions.
“The expression determinate signifies that the dimensions are definitely these, that is, distinct from any other.
Thus Paul’s dimensions are determinate since they are his, not Peter’s. Terminate is used to indicate the ultimate
dimensions of a body. Thus the terminate dimensions of Paul are that he is six feet tall, that he has a red face, a
square head, flat feet, weighs two hundred pounds, etc. On the contrary, when we speak of interminate dimensions,
we do not consider what the ultimate or terminate dimensions may be, but only that this object is in three
dimensions, that it has parts outside parts. Of course there are terminations to these dimensions, but they are not
considered. In other words, whether this individual is six feet or less, whether his eyes are brown or blue is not taken
into account. Now St. Thomas says that the dimensions which are necessary for individuation are the interminate.
He does not deny that these dimensions have their terminations; he simply points out that these terminations make
no difference in the question of individuation.
“It is clear from this that the term ‘determinate’ may be said indifferently of dimensions that are terminate or
interminate. And this St. Thomas does. At times as in the De Ente et Essentia he uses the word determinate
dimensions, to indicate the fact that they are these in contradistinction to any others. At other times, as in the
commentary of the De Trinitate of Boethius, he indicates the dimensions required for individuation are the
interminate and not the terminate. A careful reading of the text will do away with any ambiguity: ‘Since matter,
considered in itself, is indistinct [without division], it is impossible that it should individuate the form received in
itself, except in so far as it is divisible [distinguishable]. For the form is not individuated for the reason that it is
received in matter, but only in so far as it is received in this matter or that matter, distinct and determined for the
here and the now. Matter is not divisible unless it has quantity; wherefore the Philosopher in the First Book of the
Physics says that, if quantity is removed, matter remains an indivisible substance. And so matter is made this and
signate in so far as it has dimensions [terms]. Now these dimensions [terms] can be considered in two ways. On the
one hand, they can be considered according to a definite size and shape: and thus, as perfect beings, they are placed
in the genus of quantity: thus they cannot be the principle of individuation, because such a termination varies in the
individual, and it would follow that the individual would not always remain exactly the same. On the other hand, the
dimensions [terms] can be considered interminate only [without determination] in the nature of dimension, although
they can never be interminate [without termination], just as the nature of color cannot be without the determination
of white or black; and thus they are placed in the genus of quantity, but only as imperfect. From these interminate
dimensions is brought about this matter, signate matter; and thus it individuates the form. Thus though the matter is
caused a numerical diversity in the same species’(In Boeth. De Trinitate, IV, 2).”(H. RENARD, op. cit., pp. 218-
224).

6
form when he affirms that matter exists first and individuates the form. He is concerned here
with a mode of intrinsic causality. Causality in this order is mutual and simultaneous. The form
gives the specific perfection and the ‘to be,’ and the matter at the same time limits and
individuates. However, we should not attempt to imagine first of all something we call signate
matter as an existing entity to which we add form which is thereby individuated. It must be
realized that the principle of individuation cannot be imagined; rather it is conceived.
Imagination is limited to the sensible. Intrinsic principles of mobile being precede the sensible in
nature. The real sequence here is abstracted by the mind.

“Matter in act and extended by reason of its quantity under dimensions (as a condition) is
individual matter. St. Thomas explains what he means by the dimensions of quantity that bring
about this matter rather than that in the following passage of his Commentary on Boethius’s De
Trinitate: ‘…matter is made this and signate in so far as it has dimensions. Now these
dimensions can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, they can be considered according to
a definite size and shape: and thus, as perfect beings, they are placed in the genus of quantity:
thus they cannot be the principle of individuation, because such a termination varies in the
individual and it would follow that the individual does not always remain exactly the same. On
the other hand, the dimensions can be considered interminate only in the nature of dimension,
although they can never be without termination…and thus they are placed in the genus of
quantity but only as imperfect. From these interminate dimensions is brought about this matter,
signate matter, and thus it individuates the form.’14

“The principle of individuation, therefore, is found ultimately in the matter rather than in
the form; in the matter that is quantified rather than in prime matter considered by itself and in
matter that is quantified under interminate dimensions rather than in terminate dimensions. One
cannot identify individuation on a time scale as one can identify the actualization of some mode
of efficient causality of the mobile. We are dealing with a type of principle that is intrinsic and
which is conceived on the scale of the order of nature rather than on the time-scale of activity.

“For example, this man is this man not because of his substantial form, but rather because
of the material principle that is in him, which limits and individuates. But it cannot be the prime
matter of this man simply that individuates him in that prime matter is itself indifferent. Why
should pure potency have an order to this rather than to that quantity? It is in the quantified
matter that we must look for the principle of individuation, the matter that is in act and that is
divided from others, while it is actually undivided in itself. But it cannot be terminated matter
under this particular set of dimensions for the reason that such matter varies while the individual
man does not vary as an individual, which would have to be the case if terminated matter would
be the principle of individuation. This man, Peter, does not become another individual by
changes of height, weight, and so forth. Thus the principle of individuation of this man must be
found in matter under quantity of interminate dimensions which is conceived although not
sensibly perceived; for what is perceived is already the individual sensible mobile being.”15

What about the individuation of accidents? The Angelic Doctor in Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 29, a. 1, c., teaches that accidents are individuated by the substance into which they are

14
In Boeth. De Trin., q. 4, a. 2.
15
K. F. DOUGHERTY, Cosmology, Graymoor Press, Peekskill, NY, 1956, pp. 134-136.

7
received. Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo explain that accidents are individuated, not by prime
matter, but by their substance: “Accidents are individuated, not by prime matter, but by their own
subject, which is already in act (the substance), just as substantial forms are individuated by
prime matter, which is their own subject. It is clear that the individuating principle is always the
potency which multiplies and limits the perfection received. Thus, it is the substance, as the
proper subject of the accidents, that individualizes them…

“Within the context of individuation, quantity has a special character which distinguishes
it from the other accidents: through quantity, the rest of the material accidents inhere in the
substance. Hence, all the other accidents are multiplied to the extent that they are affected by
quantity. For example, two instances of whiteness of qualitatively equal intensity can only be
multiplied by being received in different parts of matter, and they cannot even be imagined
unless they are mentally located in two different places.”16

Finally, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain that subsistent forms are individual in
themselves: “In the world of the spirit, individuation clearly does not arise from matter. This,
however, does not hinder pure spirits from being individuals; otherwise, they would be abstract
realities. Since it cannot be received in matter which multiplies the form, each angelic form is
automatically an individual essence which exhausts its entire species, that is, there are no other
individuals of the same species, and the perfections of every angelic form are fully present in the
individual essence. Aristotle had said that ‘those things which have no matter are all absolutely
and essentially individuals.’17

“Finally, God differs from every creature precisely because He is Pure Act. His esse is a
perfection which is not received in any potency that would restrict it. God is an individual by
reason of His infinity: ‘Any act becomes limited only by being received in something distinct, a
potency which restricts it. In the divine essence, however, nothing is received in anything else,
since His act of being is the subsistent divine nature itself, and this does not happen in any
creature. For every reality outside God has a received (and therefore limited) act of being. The
divine essence is distinguished from everything else by not being received in anything else.’18”19

Erroneous Positions Concerning the Principle of Individuation: Scotus and Suarez

For Duns Scotus, there must be two requirements for the principle of individuation,
namely, 1. it must be a positive entity, since individuality adds something positive to the nature
as such (there is more perfection, for example, in Peter the individual than in the common nature
or natura communis of man); and 2. it must be individual in itself, because if it were common it
would not be the ultimate principle of individuation. Scotus calls this positive entity the
‘individual difference’ or ‘thisness’ (haecceitas). For Scotus, this individual difference or
‘thisness’(haecceity) is a positive entity or act, determining and perfecting a specific nature
thereby rendering it individual. ‘Thisness’ or haecceity adds nothing new in the essential order
but rather individuates a specific essence, causing it to be individual and really distinct from

16
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 104.
17
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, VIII, ch. 6, 1045b 23.
18
Quodlibetum VII, a. 1, ad 1.
19
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 105.

8
every other individual in the same species. In our example, of the individual named Peter, the
humanity of Peter is made, by ‘thisness’ (or haecceity) or the ‘individual difference,’ to be his
humanity, which is really distinct from the humanity of every other man.

Saranyana describes Scotus’ ‘individual difference’ or ‘thisness’ (haecceity or

haecceitas) as follows: “What, then, was Duns Scotus’ principle of individuation? It is what is
called haecceitas. It is an entitative perfection that is received by the natura communis or
specific essence, a new actualization or an ontological addition that determines the species, not in
the essential order but in the existential order. This is why the haecceitas’ relation with the
natura communis is different from that which form maintains with matter, since the haecceitas
does not act like an essential element; only matter and form give rise to the specific essence or
natura communis…”20

Gilson observes that, for Scotus, “the same common nature of the species is still found in
individuals, but, this time, determined by their principle of individuation. In accounting for the
possibility of individuals, Duns Scotus still had to start from the ‘nature’ or ‘common essence,’
neither universal nor particular, which the metaphysician considers. Solving this problem,
therefore, inevitably consisted for him in adding an individuating determination to the essence.
That determination could not be a form, for all form is common to the individuals of one species;
it must therefore be added to form from within. In fact, says Duns Scotus, it is its ultimate
actuality. The famous ‘hecceity’ of the Scotists is the ultimate act which restricts the form of a
species to the singularity of its individuals.”21

Gilson adds: “…Duns Scotus denies the composition of essence and esse, Op. Ox., IV, d.
11, q. 3, n. 46. The esse superadded to essence appears to him as a ‘fiction.’ The finite being is in
virtue of its composition of matter and form…Duns Scotus refuses to add an act of being to the
actual existent, but he, too, adds something to the form in order fully to constitute the singular.
He adds to it its individuating principle (hecceity). This principle cannot be found in matter,
Scotus says: since matter has its own entity and its own individuating principle, it cannot
individuate other beings. This principle cannot be a form, he says: since forms, as essences, are
indifferent to both singularity and universality, they cannot cause individuation. It is, in the form,
not an added form, but the ultimate reality of the form. It is an ‘ultimate difference’ of formal
being, beyond the order of formal being: Op. Ox., II, d. 3, q. 6, nn. 11-13. Note that, like the
quiddity, this ‘hecceity’ is in itself indifferent to both existence and non-existence. It is, in
created being, the ultimate determination and actuality which perfects its entity.”22

In Being and Some Philosophers, Gilson briefly contrasts Duns Scotus and St. Thomas’s
doctrines on the question of the ultmate act of the form in the existential order or the order of
being, the former erroneously placing it in ‘thisness’ or haecceitas (which is Scotus’ principle of
individuation, a wrong position, since it is materia quantitate signata which is the principle of
individuation of corporeal substances), while the latter, Aquinas, correctly places it in the act of
being (esse) the act of all acts and perfection of all perfections: “In Scotism as in Thomism, there
is an act of even the form in concrete reality, and, in both doctrines, that act of the form is not

20
J. SARANYANA, History of Medieval Philosophy, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1996, p. 236.
21
E. GILSON, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Random House, New York, 1955, p. 462.
22
E. GILSON, op. cit., pp. 766-767.

9
itself a form. In the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, it is the act of being (esse); in that of Duns
Scotus, it is ‘thisness’ (hecceitas) that is ultima actualitas formae. The Scotist ‘thisness’ is not
the cause of existence, but it is the unmistakable sign that the essence under consideration is now
fit to exist; then, as a matter of fact, it does exist. Be it in God or in finite things, existence is that
modality of being which belongs to a completely individualized essence. Whether they be such
by themselves, which is the case of God alone, or they be such by another one, which is the
cause of all creatures, fully individualized essences exist in their own right.”23

Renard’s Critique of Scotus on Individuation: “Having established his distinction

between formalities (distinctio formalis ex natura rei) which holds the middle position between
the real and the logical, and is therefore wholly unintelligible, Scotus proceeds to explain that in
each individual, besides the common nature, man for example, there is something more. Scotus
calls it by a barbarous word: haecceitas24 from the Latin ‘haec’ meaning ‘this.’ It is the ‘thisness’
which according to Scotus must determine each being to be this individual. Now the ‘thisness’
for each individual will have to differ; in Peter we shall call it ‘Petreity,’ in Paul, ‘Pauleity,’ and
we shall say that Peter is not merely man, but is Peter because of his ‘Petreity,’ and,
consequently, he is not Paul, since ‘Petreity’ is not at all like ‘Pauleity.’ This, no doubt, is a very
convenient way of treating the problem of individuation, but the truth is it really does not solve
anything. In the first place, the fundamental distinction of Scotus is not acceptable, since a
distinction that is more than logical (of the mind) and less than real is inconceivable. Moreover,
the fact that a nature (man, for example) exists in the individual and is individuated precisely by
the ‘thisness’ from which it is distinct would lead one to conclude that the nature ‘man’ in Peter
is not an individual nature. What then could it be? The only alternative is a universal nature. But
a universal nature actually existing as universal in different individuals is the supreme absurdity.
Finally, we might inquire, what of the ‘thisness’? If it is something, then it should have to be
individuated, for the reason that every nature, according to the doctrine of Scotus, needs to be
individuated. Hence, we should need another ‘thisness’ to individuate the first, a third for the
second, and for the rest of our days we should be looking for an infinite series of smaller and
smaller ‘thisnesses.’”25

Renard’s Critique of Suarez on Individuation: “Suarez, also, since he does not admit the
limitation of act by potency had, of necessity, to evolve his own theory of individuation. His
views are closer to those of Occam who denies that there is such a problem, than to those of
Scotus, who, with his usual subtlety, creates new little entities, the ‘thisnesses.’ With Suarez the
very being, the very entity of the individual is the reason for his individuality.26 We can only
agree with the Doctor Eximius, adding, however, that we should like to go a bit further in our
analysis of the individual, and to find the reason for the fact that the entity of the individual is
this entity. For it seems to us that to say that an individual is this individual because of his entity,
is merely to restate the problem of individuation.”27

23
E. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952, p. 94.
24
Cf. Report., II, dist. 12, a. 5, nos. 1, 8, 13, 14.
25
H. RENARD, op. cit., pp. 225-226.
26
“Unaquaeque entitas est per seipsam suae individuationis principium”(Disp. Metaphys., disp. V, sect. 6, n. 1).
27
H. RENARD, op. cit., p. 226.

10