Realpolitik vs.

Moralpolitik: Analysing the Bilateral-Multilateral Binary in

the South China Sea Dispute from a Philippine Perspective

JOSEPH MARI I. FABIAN1

Divergent policy approaches between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea dispute have only
resulted in a protracted and complex geopolitical impasse, notwithstanding the clear asymmetry in power
relations between these two countries. In the distribution of political and economic power, China
undoubtedly is at the advantaged end of the spectrum. Viewed from such context, although the
Philippines cannot directly engage China, especially militarily to protect its own sovereign interests, it
found recourse to international law by pursing international arbitration in the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA). I argue that this track taken by the Philippines is the more judicious manoeuvre as it
emphasises on the broader implications of the dispute for all stakeholders to ponder on. In thorough
consideration of their respective legal and historical bases, I contend that China’s bases are deeply flawed
to the point of fabrication. For instance, China’s ‘9-dash line’ map rests on flimsy grounds, as opposed to
the Philippines’ bases which are reinforced by concrete evidence such as centuries-old cartographic
documents (i.e., Pedro Murillo Velarde map). Moreover, China’s unilateral actions in the South China
Sea are a clear affront to freedom of navigation and overflight in the region and a threat to regional
connectivity and sea-borne trade. More than seeking to uphold its legitimate maritime entitlements, the
Philippines contends that China’s island building in the South China Sea leads to the destruction of vital
flora and fauna endemic only to the region and consequently, a direct threat to the world’s ecological
security. This environmental facet is often neglected especially by China as it only labours for its political
self-preservation and hegemonic aspirations. But invoking this crucial facet is imperative to infuse in
other states, regardless of geographic proximity, a sense of urgency to collectively demand a halt to
China’s destructive territorial re-engineering. Hence, it is important that the Philippines maintains this
multilateral stance against China’s bilateral posturing as the ramifications of the dispute transcend inter-
state relations; they are not only international but global in nature – a collective cause. The South China
Sea is not exclusive for a state’s sole utilisation; it is res communis to be responsibly explored and
enjoyed by members of the community of states.

****

Overview
Situated at the maritime heart of Southeast Asia, the South China Sea is one of the
world’s most engaged waterways where $5 trillion or one-third of global sea-borne trade passes
annually, 20% of which emanates from US economic activity alone2 and is traversed by some of
the most vital international sea lines of communication (SLOC). In addition, it measures at 3.5
1
Seminar paper in PS 268 Philippine Relations with East Asia / Prof. Henelito A. Sevilla Jr., Ph.D. / University of
the Philippines Diliman / December 2015
2
Laura Schwartz, “Competing Claims in the South China Sea: Potential Paths Forward and Implications for the
United States”, The National Bureau of Asian Research (2014): 1-6. Accessed September 7, 2015.

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million km2, is home several island groups, reefs, and atolls, and is presumed to harbour massive
reserves of oil and natural gas, rendering it crucial geopolitical and strategic value. The mere fact
that the United States maintains a commanding presence (i.e., politically, economically, and
militarily) in the South China Sea and in the surrounding states is sufficient justification of the
core interests that prevail in the region, regardless of who holds them. Owing to this importance,
inevitably, this sea remains subject to a series of protracted territorial and maritime disputes
among the littoral states that enclose its waters, namely: China, Viet Nam, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, and Taiwan (although Taiwan’s claim is occasionally integrated
with that of China, and vice versa, in view of the One-China Policy). Basically, this stems from
the states’ conflicting interpretations over land and maritime claims --- which is entitled to what?
And up to what extent? To wit, the most important questions include the exercise of sovereign
rights over the islands and other land features that dot its waters, as well as exclusive rights on
the utilisation of the marine resources, particularly, the breeding grounds of fish, the protected
areas, conduct of scientific research, amongst others.
Although the dispute involves several states, there is a prevailing fact that China, as the
regional hegemon, is unilaterally changing the already volatile status quo, apparently to its
favour. This has raised alarm bells, particularly from Viet Nam and the Philippines, as to what
they perceive as China’s ‘21st century territorial expansionism’ through coercive measures, and
at the great cost of the sovereign rights of other states and regional security in broad. China
claims nearly 90% of the South China Sea, resulting from its strict interpretation of the 1947 ‘9-
dash line’ map; that is, everything within such demarcations is considered Chinese territory and
under its jurisdiction. Inevitably, the interplay between power politics, identities, history, to
name a few, become manifest as respective claimants reinforce their interpretations of what is
due them. With China’s emergence as a global power, and the concomitant advances in its power
projection capabilities, the other claimants’ threat perception of the former are only being
reinforced, much more their dimming hopes for a more equitable solution to this decades-old
bone of contention.
The Philippines and China’s standpoints are given prominence as this dispute drags on,
due to their contrasting and clear-cut versions of resolving (or at least managing) this dilemma.
While China consistently and strongly calls for a bilateral solution in its official rhetoric, the
Philippines advocates for a multilateral path. China sees this as a private concern to be resolved

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only by the direct parties; the Philippines views this as a common interest of all responsible
members of the international community.
I focus and limit the scope on the [I] particular competing claims between China and the
Philippines over the land and maritime features in the South China Sea. This is however, not a
comprehensive cataloguing of all contested features involved and the specific details (i.e., size,
no. of civilian population, no. of military fortifications). It only accentuates and examines the
flashpoints of highest potential regarding sovereign and jurisdictional matters: the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG), Scarborough Shoal, and rights over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Certainly, there will be consequent [II] geopolitical and strategic implications as the dispute
progresses (or even idles), i.e., the chances of the regional architecture being re-configured, to
use an example, and the manner in which other stakeholders will respond such as the ASEAN
and the United States. Ultimately, the [III] bilateral-multilateral question is analysed, arguing
nonetheless that the Philippines’ multilateral course of action and ultimately submitting the
matter to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCS) is the more prudent track and this is
substantiated in the succeeding parts. The consequent policy implications for both countries are,
nevertheless, evaluated later on. Hence, I ask:

Why should the Philippines uphold its multilateral position vis-à-

vis China’s bilateral stance in approaching rival claims in the
South China Sea?

In terms of policy implications, I ultimately inject a sense of urgency to an often

neglected facet of this dispute --- the environment --- and attempt to assimilate it to the
Philippines’ policy on this geopolitical dispute. It should be kept in mind that despite the
strategic value of the South China Sea, it also a sanctuary to one of the world’s most diverse
marine ecological systems, although this strand, as noted, is often overridden by the more salient
matters of consequence such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the balance of power. More
importantly, the formulation of analyses for these three crucial dimensions are guided by select
theories of international relations such as Offensive Realism by John Mearsheimer and Social
Constructivism by Alexander Wendt to help us comprehend such issues more systematically and
be more circumspect of the information to be processed. These two frameworks form part of the
entire structure of explanation herein.

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Keywords: geopolitical; international law; bilateral; multilateral; interests

South China Sea vs. West Philippine Sea

Before proceeding to the main source of this dispute, the rival claims, it is instrumental to
first understand what exactly are the geographic features --- land or maritime --- being contested,
what they pertain to and their scopes, where they are located, and where they stand in
international law. This can facilitate for a better understanding and conceptualisation of the
nature of the dispute since it helps us locate the points of contention. In The West Philippine Sea:
The Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino Perspective, Baviera and
Batongbacal provide operational definitions of what is the South China Sea and the West
Philippine Sea3. These two bodies of water tend to be used interchangeably when different
vantage points are used, but in strictest interpretation, they denote relatively different geographic
entities. In the aforementioned article, the South China Sea is defined as:

“(….)the much broader expanse of water, often described as a semi-

enclosed sea, bounded by China/Taiwan in the north, by the
Philippines in the east, and by Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia, and Brunei in the west and south. The Gulf of Tonkin
and Gulf of Thailand also abut the South China Sea. Scattered over
the South China Sea are various geographic features, the most
prominent of which are known internationally as the Spratlys, the
Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, and Pratas Island. There are
overlapping claims by various countries to these features and to the
waters surrounding them, including the West Philippine Sea.”

In contrast, the West Philippine Sea specifically refers to:

“(…)the part of the South China Sea [emphasis added] that is

closest, and of vital interest to the Philippines. On September 5,
2012, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III issued
Administrative Order No. 29, with Section I stating that the
“maritime areas on the western side of the Philippine archipelago
are named as the West Philippine Sea.” It includes “the Luzon Sea,
as well as the waters around, within and adjacent to the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG), and Bajo de Masinloc also known as
Scarborough Shoal.”
3
Aileen Baviera and Jay Batongbacal, “The West Philippine Sea: The Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes
from a Filipino Perspective”, The Asian Center and Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, University of
the Philippines (2013): 1-81. Accessed September 7, 2015.

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 From the preceding definitions, it is clearly understood that the West Philippine Sea is
where the core maritime interests of the Philippines are situated, particularly the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG), Scarborough Shoal, its respective entitlements to its own Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), and is not a parallel term for the South China Sea. Moreover, labels and names can
be politically charged, depending on whose vantage point is considered; for example, the South
China Sea (China), the West Philippine Sea (Philippines) and also the East Sea (Viet Nam). That
is why it is necessary to judiciously put things into perspective first before resorting to any
interpretation. Presently, there are around a hundred territorial features being disputed in the
South China Sea, a considerable number of which are occupied by certain claimant states (some
are militarised, others commercialised) and where the occupants exercise varying degrees of
effective control.4

I. Rival claims in the South China Sea: What is it all about?

The Philippines protests that the Kalayaan Island Group (some parts of which overlap
with the Spratlys), Scarborough Shoal (not a part of the Spratlys) and its rights to its own
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are being encroached on by external actors, particularly China.
For its part, China refers to the Spratlys as Nansha Islands and places it under the direct
administration of Hainan5. On the other hand, the KIG is directly administered from the province
of Palawan. In accordance with its internationally recognised boundaries and its adoption of
customary international law, the Philippine legislature explicitly stated that the KIG and
Scarborough Shoal form an integral part of Philippine jurisdiction and sovereignty. Furthermore,
the Philippines has acceded to and ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) in 1984, entitling it to particular rights such as exploitation of the marine resources
within its 370 km (200 nautical miles) EEZ. China followed suit in 1996.
In international law, the doctrine on the EEZ states that it is “an area extending not more
than 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline” wherein the coastal state can utilise the economic
resources of the sea, as well as the seabed and subsoil. 6 However, these privileges (and duties)
4
Laura Schwartz, “Competing Claims in the South China Sea: Potential Paths Forward and Implications for the
United States”, The National Bureau of Asian Research (2014): 1-6. Accessed September 7, 2015.
5
Mei Jingya, “China sets up Sansha City to administer South China Sea islands”. Accessed September 7, 2015.
http://english.sina.com/china/2012/0621/479131.html.

6
Joaquin Bernas, Introduction to Public International Law, (Manila: Rex Book Store, 2009), 127-129.

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accorded to concerned states to maximise the marine resources responsibly should not impede on
the freedom on the high seas, particularly of navigation and overflight by other states. It is
therefore proper to reckon that the exercise of these freedoms is a litmus test if international law
is indeed, in effect with respect to state-level relations.
Scarborough Shoal (native names: Bajo de Masinloc/Panatag Shoal), a major fishing
ground, is another constitutive part of the Philippine memorial when it lodged the arbitration
case against China at the PCA in 2013. China and Taiwan refer to it as Huangyan Island and in
2012, (China) has stationed surveillance and patrol vessels in the area and cordoned off the
lagoon to prevent Filipino fishermen from venturing its waters. In effect, the economic
implications continue to be felt, particularly by the fisher folk of Zambales who greatly rely on
this generations-old source of livelihood. Thus, their economic activities have since been
significantly disrupted owing to this external interference and power play.
At this juncture, it is imperative that China’s and the Philippines’ specific competing
claims are juxtaposed with one another to provide a platform for comparison. Supreme Court
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio released in 2014 what is presumed to be the most
comprehensive compilation to date of historical and cartographic (map) evidence of the
Philippine’s claims over Scarborough Shoal. In Ancient Truths and Lies: Scarborough Shoal in
Ancient Maps, Carpio primarily contends that Hainan has always been China’s southernmost
land territory. Scarborough Shoal is the central matter in this compilation; nonetheless, he
provides a very powerful argument that undermines China’s massive and incomprehensible
claim over the South China Sea. This is supplemented by the research of other scholars studying
the same. The following are the principal rival claims:
China’s premises: First, a Chinese astronomer visited Nanhai (Scarborough Shoal) in
1279 and supposedly established an observatory there. In China’s interpretation, this corresponds
to acquisition through the ‘Discovery and Occupation’ principle of international law, wherein
territory with no prior occupant or belonged to no state (terra nullius) can be acquired by the
entity that discovered it. Second, as the ‘legal’ successor to the Kuomintang (Nationalist)
government of Chiang Kai-shek that ruled the Republic of China (present-day Taiwan), the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) is therefore entitled to adopt the ‘9-dash line’ map of the
former which indicates the maximum extent of its claims in the South China Sea. Following the
Chinese Civil War which ended in 1950, with the ROC re-establishing its government in the

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island of Taiwan, and the PRC taking over the Chinese mainland, the latter has since resolutely
asserted its territorial claims using this ‘inherited’ legacy of the Kuomintang. Furthermore, given
that majority of sovereign states presently recognise the PRC over the KMT in view of the One
China Policy; China is ‘legitimised’ into implementing the demarcation lines depicted in the map
to its advantage. In China’s principle, every feature, regardless if it is land or maritime domain,
which falls within the scope of the 9-dash line map is effectively considered Chinese territory
and under its area of jurisdiction. Third, through its use of an amalgamation of a string of
‘historical evidence’ --- from the Chinese ‘discovery’ of Scarborough Shoal, inheritance of the
Kuomintang map, to assumed ‘effective control’ of the South China Sea by the succession of
dynasties of Ancient China --- the Chinese claim is grounded on ‘indisputable sovereignty’,
wherein no other country can assail its declarations.
Fourth, it can be inferred that China’s ‘indisputable sovereignty’ is the predominant
reason why it does not recognise the Exclusive Economic Zones of the other claimant states; for
it owns the South China Sea’s entirety, practically rendering it a personal lake. The practice of
sovereignty, thus, is attendant to this ownership, similar with how it conducts its sovereignty
over the mainland. In relation to sovereignty, China, in addition to its non-participation in the
international arbitration, does not recognise the legitimacy of the Philippines’ case at the PCA
because this international court is not mandated to adjudicate on matters of sovereignty;
sovereignty-related matters are under the purview of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The Philippines’ premises: In conjunction with Carpio’s arguments, a series of
historical and cartographic bases indicate that Scarborough Shoal is historically an inalienable
part of the Philippine territory. For instance, from 1636, that is, 311 years even before the ‘9-
dash line’ map of the Kuomintang was created, Scarborough Shoal already forms part of the
Philippines as illustrated by 15th to 16th century expedition maps. In 1734, Pedro Murillo Velarde
(1696-1753), a Jesuit priest and respected cartographer at the time, published a document
originally called Carta Hydrographica y Chorographica de las Islas Filipinas which formally
delineates all the contours of the Philippines coast, the islands under its control, and even the
names of the townships at the time; that is, from 1636-1940s, Scarborough Shoal is constitutive
of the Philippine landmass for more than 300 years 7. In addition, the similar map also depicts

7
Louie Navarro, “Philippines fortifies sea claim with 300-year old map”, CNN Philippines, Accessed September 16,
2015.

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that Hainan, as Carpio asserted, has always been China’s southernmost territory and even
incorporates the exact coordinates of other island groups in the vicinity: the Paracels (historically
administered by the French), Spratlys, and prominent reefs and atolls. The Murillo map is
considered the most authoritative source yet of the Philippines’ claims. Second, the ‘9-dash line’
map of the Kuomintang was simply a hurried attempt to pursue its claim in the South China Sea
during the period when the Nationalists were being quashed by the Communist forces of Mao
Zedong at the last years of the Chinese Civil War. More importantly, the map does not have any
fixed coordinates of any kind which should accurately state where the ‘dashes’ are supposed to
be located using a map or radar. There are no latitudinal or longitudinal measurements of any
kind. Furthermore, it also vacillates as to being a 9, 10, or even 11-dash line map, depending on
how the PRC government uses it in its official rhetoric, and also probably owes to the ‘bipolar
identity’ of China, i.e., PRC versus the ROC.
As the Philippines submitted its memorial to the PCA in 2013 to clarify the maritime
entitlements of each country surrounding the South China Sea, the Philippine government
deemed most disconcerting China’s ‘blatant’ disregard for the law of the sea. Correspondingly,
the merits of the case specifically tackle ‘maritime entitlements’ and not sovereignty issues,
contrary to what China argues. Therefore, the PCA is the proper venue to address such concerns.
It should be kept in mind without fail that both China and the Philippines are parties to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and both have ratified the agreement in 1984
and 1996, respectively (note: On October 30, 2015, the PCA decides it has jurisdiction over the
case). Going back to entitlements to the 370 km (200 nautical mile) Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) granted to each country-party, in which the marine resources can be responsibly utilised
by the adjacent littoral state, China does not recognise such rights and encroaches on as near as
the coastline of other states to consolidate its claims. For example, the distance of
Scarborough Shoal from the nearest Philippine baseline which is Zambales, is 241 km, well
within the 370 km provision. In contrast, the distance between Scarborough Shoal to the
nearest Chinese landmass, Hainan, is 947 km. For this straightforward reason, China’s
ratification of the UNCLOS legally bars it from exploiting Scarborough Shoals shoal’s
marine resources.
Not least is China’s massive island reclamation in the South China Sea which unsettles
most other claimants. In relation to UNCLOS provisions, no state is allowed to appropriate any

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land feature that would be prejudicial to the sovereignty, sovereign rights, and territorial integrity
of other states, but China’s actions demonstrate otherwise. It has pursued sand dredging activities
of a number of surrounding reefs and atolls in South China Sea in order to make these originally
submerged features ‘rise’ above sea level, in addition to prohibiting any other proximate coastal
state from getting anywhere near them. From this, China has unilaterally declared that the newly-
formed islands can consequently generate their own territorial seas and all its attendant
‘sovereign rights’ to be directly administered from Hainan province. However, it is
unambiguously stated in Article 121: Regime of islands of the UNCLOS that an island “is a
naturally formed [emphasis added] area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high tide.” By view of this logic, we can validly infer that the island reclamations being
embarked on by China do not in any way change the nature of the previously submerged reefs
into being ‘naturally formed’. They are, as cited in Article 60 [4] and [5] of the aforementioned
regime, “not islands in the sense of Article 121.” They are reclaimed, artificial installations
which are manufactured by way of human intervention.

II. Politics in the context of geography and its influence of state-society and
state-state dynamics
Given the expanse of the South China Sea (at 3.5 million km 2), it is understatement that it
possesses colossal geopolitical and strategic value, not least because it is situated at the maritime
heart of Southeast Asia, believed to harbour massive reserves of oil and natural gas, and is one of
the fastest developing regions in the world. As mentioned, 1/3 of sea-borne trade passes through
the sea per year, which is valued at $5 trillion, and should there be an eventual disruption of free-
flowing trade, the economic affects can be unimaginable. Notwithstanding, China’s recent
aggressive efforts to consolidate its control in the South China Sea only exacerbate the fragile
regional architecture of which other states ceaselessly labour to preserve. The following are the
defining courses-of-action prevailing in South China Sea:
Power politics and gunboat diplomacy: There are several strategies China is prudently
employing in order to enforce its claims. First, it uses ‘Anti Access/Area Denial’ strategies
(A2/AD), a common term in Strategic Studies, which basically prohibits another state from
entering contested territory through power projection. In this case, the power projection is naval
in nature. China specifically does this using ‘salami-slicing’ tactics wherein it gradually

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establishes effective control over the area until it accumulates to its advantage; that is,
incrementally ‘slicing’ the territory to its favour. Likewise, it sends fleets of fishermen, which
are apparently escorted by military and civilian surveillance vessels, and replicates this
manoeuvre in multiple layers, thereby wrapping the area like a ‘cabbage’ (also: ‘cabbage
strategy’). The Philippines has experienced this strategy for itself when it was eventually
expelled from Scarborough Shoal in 2012 by a much more powerful naval contingent from
China despite the fact that both have agreed to vacate the area to de-escalate the flare-up of
tension between the different flag vessels. Understandably, the Philippines naval power is ill-
equipped to confront China’s undeniably more formidable and modernised naval assets. Another
instance of this coercive strategy can be seen in China’s gradual encircling of the BRP Sierra
Madre stationed at the Ayungin Shoal, another contested feature. The Philippines ran aground
the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting military hospital ship, in 1999 to mark the end of its territory at
the tip of Palawan. Here, China gradually sends its naval vessels and secures the area until such
point comes when the Filipino contingent boarding the BRP Sierra Madre can no longer hold
their ground. There was even an incident wherein Chinese patrol vessels attempted to prevent a
re-supply mission by the Philippines by blocking the waterway leading to the BRP Sierra Madre
--- undeniably a coercive tactic.
In addition, although the claimant states have respective occupied islands under their
effective control --- as ceaselessly raised by China --- it is by no means comparable to the scale
and scope of China’s island reclamation undertaken in this strategic waterway. As noted earlier,
China is actually appropriating previously submerged land features through sand dredging so that
it can better support new Chinese infrastructure and military personnel to be stationed there.
Moreover, these maritime features are all located in the high seas, and the law of the sea
unequivocally proclaims that the high seas are public domain --- res communis. Bernas, quoting
the particular provision, contends: “Beyond the territorial sea, the waters are high sea and are not
subject to the sovereignty of the coastal state 8.” This is to say that it is only up to the full extent
of a country’s territorial sea, which extends up to 22 km (12 nautical miles), that sovereignty can
be exercised. More importantly, China cannot even be considered a ‘coastal state’ relative to the
features being contested due to its significant distance from the area. To boot, the high seas are
subject to certain freedoms such as of navigation and overflight. The waterways in the South
8
Joaquin Bernas, Introduction to Public International Law, (Manila: Rex Book Store, 2009), 127-129.

10
China Sea are regularly traversed by naval vessels, be it commercial or military. But with
China’s imposition of effective control over certain areas, freedom of navigation is unavoidably
impeded, as China regards this as ‘unlawful’ intrusion into its ‘sovereign territory’. Furthermore,
China intends to institutionalise an ‘Air Defence Identification Zone’ (ADIZ) over the areas it
claims, requiring all types of aircraft to first report to Chinese authorities before entering what
the former considers its own airspace. This is another facet of China’s realist tendencies
manifesting in its choices-of-action.
Consequently, power politics enter the picture as other stakeholders who do not perceive
their own countries giving in to Chinese pressure try to provide a counterweight to China’s
power projection, which in realist terms is referred to as ‘balancing’. Notably, they are the
United States and Japan who have asserted their rights to navigation and overflight in the
airspace and waterways of the South China Sea. The United States, as the war-wearied
superpower, maintains a significant naval fleet in the region as part of the Obama
administration’s ‘rebalance to Asia’, where it will commit 60% of all its naval and military assets
to the Asia-Pacific region at decade’s end. While China accuses the United States of involving
itself in a geopolitical issue of which it is not a direct party to, the US constantly reminds China
that its aerial patrols are regular reconnaissance flights covered by the freedom of overflight, and
its naval vessels operating in the seas seek to uphold the freedom of navigation. In one of the
most direct statements from the US yet, Defence Secretary Ash Carter proclaimed in October
2015 that US vessels will sail whenever international law allows it. For its part, the ruling party
in Japan, regarded a middle power, under the command of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is
attempting to pass in the National Diet of Japan a bill that will re-interpret Japan’s pacifist
constitution wherein the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) mandate will then cover coming
to the aid of an ally under the attack. For decades, Japan’s armed forces are solely committed for
its own protection, resulting from its defeat after the Second World War; the United States
helped craft its pacifist stance originally intended to prevent Japan from reverting to its
imperialist posture. But, as the regional architecture continues to be shaped by the South China
Sea dispute, it is no surprise that the decades-old postures of respective states are driven to
evolve. I also reckon that this can be considered a ‘spill over’, given that this Southeast Asian
geopolitical issue precisely provides political stimuli to certain states in Northeast Asia to re-
calibrate their foreign policy configurations. Moreover, whether the United States, Japan, and

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even the Philippines establish a credible and formal counterweight (e.g., trilateral alliance)
against China’s geopolitical prowess is a prospect remaining to be realised.
At the earlier stages of this dispute, China has only stationed ‘fishing huts’ in the
contested reefs and islands, but as time progressed, it is startling to learn that the hitherto fishing
huts have transformed into militarised and fortified garrisons. This militarisation of the dispute,
regardless if lines of communication are kept open between the claimants, only increases the
impetus for armed conflict to break out. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), a think-tank based in Washington D.C., constantly monitors the island reclamation of
China, of which it has called a ‘human feat of engineering’, owing to the sheer scale of its land
construction in the high seas. The islands being occupied by China are now the most militarised
in the region, housing several critical infrastructures: military garrisons, radar and satellite
equipment, airstrips that can accommodate even the largest aircraft, and ports for its expanding
fleet of aircraft carriers. More importantly, with China’s rapid rise as an economic power, it is
guaranteed the wherewithal to undertake these region-altering mechanisms, and ineluctably, the
broader conduct of relations between states.
State engagement: There have already been a series of inter-state cooperation in order to
address the South China Sea dispute, most noted of which is 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea. Fundamentally, the agreement calls on all
claimant states to exercise maximum restraint, and to resort to constructive dialogue through the
means provided by the regional grouping in order to dispose of mutually destructive armed
confrontation. But in the case of this dispute, the saliency of realpolitik is unassailable. Despite
the fact that China and the ASEAN have agreed to craft this agreement tailored to the mutual
interest of all, interests defined in terms of power, as Morgenthau observes, always finds its way
to establish the facts on the ground. ASEAN’s power and leverage vis-à-vis China is, from how I
analyse the situation, questionable at best. This is due to the fact that China possesses massive
economic and political leverage toward many ASEAN countries, particularly Burma, Lao PDR,
and Cambodia. If the ASEAN unanimously crafts a document directly condemning China for its
aggressive actions in the South China Sea, then it is logical to assume that there will be an
economic and political backlash to be felt by China’s ‘satellite states’ in the Indo-China; for they
are inextricably bound to its external financing and political support. In 2012, the ASEAN was
not able to execute a communiqué for the first time, for as noted, indicting China for its

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expansionist actions will only backfire in its satellite states. These political realities render the
consensus-building mechanism of ASEAN practically ineffective given that China is able to
substantially influence the voting behaviour of its member states under duress.
Thus, it is prudent to ask: is the Philippines left with the United States and Japan? --- A
trilateral coalition, perhaps? As the US fully commits 60% of its military assets to the Asia-
Pacific region by the end of the decade, the Philippines in one way or another may in fact benefit
from this since it can find refuge in the relative re-alignment of interests between the three of
them. Moreover, the US is a staunch advocate of adherence to international law and the
settlement of disputes through dispute settlement mechanisms available in international courts.
However, its moral authority is being questioned, especially by China, when it comes to the
South China Sea dispute. This stems from the fact the US is not a signatory to the UNCLOS,
which is why China accuses it of employing double standards. Sceptics also continue to hound
the alliance between the Philippines and the US, as enshrined by the 1951 Mutual Defence
Treaty (MDT). They incessantly ask why such security pact has not been activated even when
China’s island reclamation and harassment of Filipino vessels continue. Resulting from this
scepticism, the implementation of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), a re-
invigoration of the 1951 MDT which permits a 10-year US troop rotation and positioning of
materiel in several key points in Philippine soil, remains all the more controversial. The question
whether the United States will ever come to the Philippines actual succour in response to China’s
coercion remains unanswered. For its part, the US always states in its pronouncements that it
does not intend to take sides in this particular dispute and will continue this neutral stance.
The Philippines is one of the first to acknowledge with a positive tone Japan’s plan to re-
interpret its pacifist constitution. In one the most concerted developments between the two
countries’ relations, Japan participated in a military exercise involving the Philippines and the
US in June 2015. This development can be viewed using a Constructivist lens. Essentially,
Social Constructivism explains that identities and interests are not fixed; they change over time
as socialisations between states continue9. This is in contrast with Realist assumptions wherein
structural identities are mechanically pre-ordained and are programmed to be perpetually
survival-seeking10. While (Offensive) Realism is much concerned about the influence of material

9
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1-44.
10
John Mearhsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, (New York and London: W.W. Norton and
Company, 2008), pp. 1-28.

13
incentives such as fire power and sovereign interests, Constructivism emphasises on the
normative aspect of state relations; that is, the socially-constructed norms, values, and identities
between them. Emmott provides an instructive example:

“The United States certainly exhibits a sense of entitlement in the

way it treats its neighbors. But neither Canada nor Mexico
currently feel encroached upon or bullied in the way that many of
the countries surrounding China do.11”

This only illustrates that identities between countries are not always antagonistic; they
will materialise on the basis of their interaction first. Thus, the degree of identity re-construction
depends on the depth of socialisations between states as time progresses and to what extent this
interaction actually endures12. Given that there are different strands of realism (i.e., offensive,
defensive, classical), I employ the Offensive Realism variant since I personally construe China’s
highly aggressive posture vis-à-vis the Philippines as a direct (and calculated) threat to the
latter’s national security and territorial integrity. Going back and to put into context, Japan in a
way has achieved ‘re-construction’ of its identity, relative to the Philippines, from an imperialist
image to pacifist, to pro-active pacifism today. The same principle applies to its relations with
the US. While the two were sworn rivals during the middle of the 20 th century, present-day
cooperation between them remains substantial and is in stark contrast with what manifested
between them hitherto. However, China sees otherwise because it comprehends this re-
interpretation of Japan’s pacifist stance as retrogression to its imperialist past. This is due in large
part to their own territorial dispute in the East China Sea over the Senkakus/Diaoyus --- a
significant element in their protracted war-wearied relations --- on top of their centuries-old
regional rivalry. On the contrary, the Philippines does not see this facet as an affront to its
sovereign interests. From this, we can see the effect of the levels of socialisation between states
on a case-to-case basis and how it can affect their interests, be it individual or mutual. The
potency of historical content between their relations will definitely perform a great part in the re-

11
Bill Emmott, “Challenging China”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 5, 2015. Accessed November 5, 2015
http://opinion.inquirer.net/90048/challenging-china.
12
Amitav Acharya, “Discovery and Dialogue: In Search for International Relations Theories Beyond the West”,
Millennium – Journal of International Studies (2011): 1-20. Accessed September 19, 2015,
doi:10.1777/0305829811406574.

14
construction (or even de-construction) of their identities. Hence, the Philippines’ and Japan’s
supposed alliance formation in the South China Sea is yet to be tested by the new circumstances.
Manifestations of this re-alignment of strategic interests are not exclusive between the
relations of the Philippines, Japan, and the United States --- its formal ‘strategic partners’. On
September 14, 2015, a Philippine delegation of senior officials met with their Vietnamese
counterparts to discuss what is touted to be the Philippines’ fourth formal strategic partnership
under the aegis of the 8th Philippine Joint Commission on Bilateral Relations and the 2 nd
Philippines-Viet Nam Joint Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs 13. This is a curious but
not an astonishing development in Viet Nam’s re-orientation from being China’s prized ally to
cautiously siding with the Philippines. It should be noted that Viet Nam also has a rival claim in
the South China Sea, particularly the Paracel Islands of which China similarly claims (and
effectively administers) in whole. From a Constructivist standpoint, as Viet Nam’s strategic
interests are being re-shaped by its current ‘socialisation’ with China, it is given impetus to seek
new bilateral relations with potential country allies since its relations with China continue to
deteriorate. Wendt argues that state relations may fall in one or overlapping parts of a social
spectrum --- enmity, indifference, friendship --- depending on the interests and identities formed
during socialisation. In China and Viet Nam’s case, it can be inferred that their relations remain
ambivalent due to overlaps in their socialisations in different points of the spectrum.
Hegemonic ambitions and alternate futures: Ultimately, the question of who is to
conclusively dictate the dispute’s trajectory is of great importance to all claimant states. Given
that China is undoubtedly the preponderant force in the South China Sea dispute, most of the
claimant states are left with no other option but to see how the events will unfold since they are
not politically and militarily capable to directly engage China. China’s unprecedented island
building also comes with a string of geopolitical achievements that the Philippines can only
marvel at. Such is the establishment of Chinese power projection bases deep in the maritime
heart of Southeast Asia via the reclaimed reefs and islands which awards it de facto control over
the area. Moreover, the United States apparent ‘passiveness’ toward China’s aggression only
raises more questions and even doubts as to how the US will actually provide a ‘hedge’ for its
allies in the region. Not least in this dispute is China’s tremendous political and economic clout
over many ASEAN states, particularly in the Indo-China region. This only undermines the
13
Nina Calleja, “PH, Vietnam firm up relations”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 23, 2015, 5.

15
prospects of ASEAN being unison against China’s blatant disregard of the sovereign rights of
other littoral states in the South China Sea. How much more is the dimmed possibility of creating
a Code of Conduct (COC) between China and the ASEAN amidst these realities?
But, being circumspect, it is also noticeable that China shows no intention of driving this
dispute to the point of conclusive war, at least as of this writing. This can be understood using
the framework of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ wherein two parties mutually involved in an issue,
with all things equal, choose not to cooperate even though doing such can leave both of them in
a worse state-of-affairs than participating in a mutual decision-making process. Acting in their
own best interests, both choose to protect themselves at the expense of the other. If you can
notice, China’s actions relative to the Philippines does appear alarmingly aggressive, as
evidenced by its expulsion of Filipino fishermen at Scarborough Shoal and its salami slicing
strategies to cite examples. However, a decisive and total game-changer by China does not yet
appear on near the horizon. Yes, the possibility of direct engagement through armed conflict will
always hound them, and this is justified, but China does not seem intent in employing this as
first option. In fact, it can be said that this indecisiveness could then be the game-changer with
respect to China’s currently advantaged position. For all, China seems to benefit from this
‘strategic patience’ (a foreign policy restraint) by doing the ‘waiting game’; who gives in first?
The resulting dynamics between the two is a volatile status quo significantly reined from China’s
side, with the strain felt by the Philippines; that is, an asymmetric status quo, for the lack of a
better term --- a ‘prisoner-prison guard’s dilemma’, perhaps.
Notwithstanding, this dispute is undeniably inextricable from which power emerges
superior in the region. Using the accounts, China may actually solidify its burgeoning ‘regional
hegemony’ in East and Southeast Asia resulting from its relatively unchallenged actions in the
South China Sea. Especially in proportion to the Philippines, China has established a ‘fait
accompli’ (i.e., things are accepted even before being decided on) given that it renders the other
claimants with no other option but to acquiesce to its territorial yields. Power gaps can be
uncompromising. We should note, however, that although China’s power is ripe for its
hegemonic ambitions, its influence is considerably of a lesser extent in East Asia. This should be
pointed out because of the obvious parity in power vis-à-vis China, Japan, and South Korea than
the bigger power gap between China and the ASEAN countries.

16
 Nonetheless, China’s actions may also invite a post-Cold War policy of containment, as
depicted by the United States’ rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. I have noted in parts that the United
States’ commitment to this dispute and more importantly, to the Philippines, is not without
stringent scepticism. Regardless, I argue that the South China Sea and the region in broad will be
in a more acceptable predicament with the US holding the security umbrella against China’s
aggressive actions. Foreign policy is never perfect and will never be comfortably tailored to cater
to all interests and the US is no stranger to this. But, there remain clear examples of US efforts to
maintain a status quo in the South China Sea instead of leaving the other claimants completely
fending for themselves. One reassuring practice of this, as noted, is US maintenance of regular
conduct of reconnaissance flights and deployment of naval vessels to protect freedom of
overflight and navigation. It has been noted that there were multiple episodes wherein China’s
actions have threatened the right of freedom of navigation of other flag vessels, which translates
to political and economic losses. Hypothetically, if the United States were to renounce (or at
least dilute) its presence, one is led to ask what will be the dynamics in the South China Sea. Of
more importance, what will sea-borne trade’s future be like? Owing to globalisations state-
transcending capacity, states are now highly intertwined to the international economy, regardless
of wealth distribution. One is warranted, therefore, for exaggerating when drawing inferences
from this dispute, but it is quite inevitable that there will be matters of grave consequence should
armed conflict break out. Even China is certainly aware of this plausibility, as Mearsheimer
forwards, that the effects will cascade in an interlinked manner and reverberate to all states. 14
China’s export-driven economy is tied to the world the same way the world is tied to China’s
manufacturing capacity. Thus, there is a grounded correlation between the how the stability of
the South China Sea holds and fate of international trade.
As one systematically follows this dispute, there will always be alternate futures to be
drawn apart from the actual set-up. From my modest interpretation, China’s foreign policy, and
its consequent worldview resembles that of a tributary system retrofitted to contemporary times.
This is where history again plays an influential part in the conduct of state relations. Approached
from an interpretivistic (post-positivist) standpoint, the potency of norms, historical content, and
values are truly evident in China’s foreign policy decisions in the South China Sea. As China

14
John Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”, The Chinese Journal of
International Politics (2010): 7-16. Accessed September 19, 2015, doi:10.1093/cjip/poq106.

17
attempts to rise from the ashes of its ‘century of humiliation’, their worldview is to re-construct
its empire of antiquity that covered vast swathes of land and sea and to again, seize the glory of
what was once a ‘great China’ This is elaborated in the proceeding sub-issue.
Nationalism-policy-legitimacy nexus: Apart from material incentives such as territorial
acquisition and sovereignty, the dispute is also loaded with nationalist baggage, especially on
China’s side. If China’s policy is assessed to be more ‘inward-looking’; that is, for its self-
preservation and territorial integrity as an end, the Philippines’ policy resembles a more
‘outward-looking’ trajectory; thus, is for the preservation of mankind’s heritage as enshrined in
international law.
The re-construction of a ‘great China’ that I have mentioned earlier is evident in the
current foreign policy of the PRC under Xi Jinping who assumed office in 2013. It has been
argued by analysts of the subject, and I concur, that the trajectory and aggressiveness of China’s
acts in this dispute are substantially driven by the worldview of the current Chinese leadership.
Moreover, the nationalist undertone of Chinese rhetoric in asserting its ‘indisputable sovereignty’
is nonetheless influenced by domestic factors. In light of China’s deteriorating domestic
conditions --- in environment, curtailment of political and civil liberties, a stagnating economy
--- the diversion of the nation’s scrutiny away from these problems toward external concerns
seems a tactical manoeuver for the PRC leadership to maintain its legitimacy. Absent these
foreign threats, the PRC is all the more subjected to increasing resentment from the Chinese
people and this is an unwelcome development for their government since the intensification of
dissident forces and social unrest can undermine its grip on power (regardless of the instituted
forms of censorship).
The same principle applies to the Philippines although to a lesser extent. Nationalist
rhetoric is increasing among the population as to what they perceive as China’s ‘bullying’ of a
smaller country. While nationalist sentiments are an inevitable occurrence, particularly from civil
society movements, the Philippines’ official policy approach is more of an ‘internationalist’
stance given the magnitude of implications it perceives for other stakeholders. In its
pronouncements on its South China Sea policy, the Philippines consistently advocates for
adherence to customary norms and international law as ‘responsible members of the international
community’. As noted, this can be seen in its multilateral approach and submitting the dispute to
international arbitration.

18
III. The bilateral-multilateral riddle: Realpolitik vs. Moralpolitik
As mentioned in the early parts, while China pushes for a bilateral solution since it
perceives this a concern only to be resolved by the direct parties, the Philippines emphasises the
international implications this dispute betokens. From these profound differences, I hence argue
that the multilateral position of the Philippines’ is the more prudent track to tread. In arriving at
this determination, I invoke the economic, normative, and environmental dimensions which are
in the long term (if one is to deeply contemplate on this matter), what will decide the ultimate
fate of this dispute, the region, and the world, for the years to be.
One ramification, as noted earlier, of the standoff over Scarborough Shoal is the
disruption of the economic life in the province of Zambales, particularly for those whose lives
are inextricable to the local fishing industry. Given that the Philippines is without the necessary
wherewithal to defend its fishermen from sustained external harassment by China, the heft of
economic losses for this sector will only increase. Hence, the induction is comprehensible: With
all sovereign and jurisdictional concerns set aside, the world’s food production is at severely
stake if the island reclamation by China endures. Borton and Hoi concur:

“Approximately 300 million people depend on the South China

Sea’s marine resources for their livelihoods; should China continue
on its current course, the risk of massive economic dislocation will
grow. But the South China Sea is an important body of water for
the entire world, not only for countries that border it.15”

Reasonably, given that the Philippines also does not have a ‘minimum credible defence
posture’ as admitted by its government, recourse to international courts is a matter of policy
(with respect to the Benigno Aquino administration). Moreover, it is expected that the Enhanced
Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed between the Philippines and the United States,
as treaty allies, will at least provide the ‘minimum’ acceptable strength in the former’s
incapacitated defence mechanisms. In connection, I assert that the content of the Philippines’
memorial to the PCA is well-substantiated and grounded on universally-recognised principles of
international law. From this, we can opine that the Philippines is attempting to balance and
maximise its arsenal of limited hard power and the preservation of international law. However,
15
James Borton and Nguyen Chu Hoi, “China and the deep blue sea”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 13,
2015.

19
the caveat lies with the newly-instituted facts on the ground versus the prior state-of-affairs in the
South China Sea, surmises Professor Jay Batongbacal of the UP Institute of Maritime Affairs,
quoted by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI):

“There is little doubt that the China’s reclamation activities in the

South China Sea are among its direct responses to the legal
challenge launched by Manila. While the legal status of the
contested features as described and presented in the arbitration
case are not affected, their physical alteration effectively “tampers
with the evidence”: the existence of the new islands will now cast
doubt on whether the features were originally mere low-tide
elevations or rocks above water at high tide. This makes future
agreement over their nature and effect on delimitations even more
difficult to reach.16”

Hence, even the time component in deciding the merits of the case is of crucial
importance to the Philippines’ side. China has since announced that its reclamation activities are
nearing completion and full operational capacity; how will this translate then with regard to the
integrity of the Philippine case? In adjudicating this case, the court therefore should take into
great consideration the human-induced island formation that is irrefutably evident in China’s
South China Sea policy. As noted, China intends to make previously submerged features such as
reefs and atolls rise above sea-level so they can ‘transform’ into full-fledged islands capable of
generating their own EEZs to be administered through the southern Chinese province of Hainan.
On top of that, another important facet in this case in the enforcement or un-enforcement of the
resolution to handed down by the PCA. Although the PCACis mandated to continue the
proceedings without the respondent (China), ultimately the decision is not binding when one of
the parties do not agree to be bound. But, the mere fact that a judiciously crafted resolution
would be handed down, irrespective of the bound parties, it should send a signal to all
stakeholders that there the court is fulfilling its mandate. This should also send a strong message
and lead to a formation of normative practice that states can incorporate into their own domestic
laws, similar with how the Philippines integrated recognised principles of international law in its
Constitution.
16
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Reclamation in the South China Sea: Legal Loopholes,
Practical Impacts”, Centre of Strategic and International Studies, Accessed September 19, 2015.
http://amti.csis.org/reclamation-in-the-south-china-sea-legal-loopholes-practical-impacts/.

20
 Of paramount significance is the ultimate preservation of the environmental integrity of
the contested areas. If the environmental destruction by China of the critical ecological habitats
is not halted, such as the Coral Triangle, then there is a great possibility these vital ecosystems
would cease to provide mankind’s sustenance. UP Maritime Science Institute Professor Edgardo
Gomez supports this by noting that China’s island reclamation and sand-dredging activities are
virtually “burying ecosystems”, and such indiscriminate ruination and burying of hundreds of
hectares of coral reefs and other shallow marine ecosystems will take ‘millennia or eons’ to
regenerate. Thus, it is not our lifetime or even a multitude of succeeding generations that these
centres of biodiversity will again breathe new life. Borton and Hoi continue:

“Moreover, China’s bellicose stance, together with the undefined

ownership of the region and its fish stocks, has led to destructive
overfishing, degrading the marine ecosystem and threatening the
endangered species, including sea turtles, sharks, and giant clams.
Since 2010, the fishery reserves in the Spratly Islands and the
western part of the South China Sea have been reduced by 16 per
cent17 [emphasis added].”

It should be kept in mind as well that a hectare is 10,000 square metres. From this logic,
one can approximate the scale of destruction of millennia-old features caused by China’s
territorial engineering. In addition, Gomez argues that 25 per cent of our marine fisheries
production emanates from this region and approximately $100 million worth of ecological
services is lost annually due to China’s island reclamation; that is, around $352,000 worth of
marine products per hectare per year. As the Philippines is an archipelagic country, marine
resources are inevitably woven deep into its socio-economic and even political activities. This is
exemplified by the fishermen of Zambales province who have for generations, treated
Scarborough Shoal as their traditional fishing grounds. It is therefore reasoned to say that
restricting these fishermen suddenly from fishing in their generations-old fishing grounds will
not only burden their individual families, but all those who are bound to such crucial industry.
Undoubtedly, the invocation of the environmental aspect of this dispute is not only
imperative but will determine the fate of these, in the words of Gomez, life-sustaining ‘biogenic
geological structures’ in the years to come. It is also crucial that the Philippines ceaselessly treats
17
James Borton and Nguyen Chu Hoi, “China and the deep blue sea”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 13,
2015.

21
this as a multilateral concern given the ramifications of China’s aggressive acts that will certainly
cascade to other states, be it in political, economic, or social consequences in due time. In this
bilateral-multilateral dilemma, the accounts lead us to understand that China is ultimately geared
toward the protection of its own sovereign interests, while the Philippines (with great
consideration to its own sovereign interests all the same) glances outward to underscore that the
oceans are a global concern and mankind’s common heritage. Furthermore, these assertive
geopolitical re-calibrations by China are blind to the fact that it, too, will not be spared by the
eventual negative ramifications of its policies. For all that, the South China is res communis; it is
public domain to be utilised and explored responsibly by the international community.
As noted, it is necessary that the Philippines capitalise on the international arbitration it
had initiated against China because even though the resolution is not binding on the other party,
the formation of world opinion can be a thrust toward normative practice by states. International
law provides equal footing between states, without deference to powerful or powerless states. If
the Philippines, through championing the rule of law, can sway world opinion to its favour in
indicting China for environmental destruction in the South China Sea, then it should convey to
other states that China is exhibiting ‘rogue state’ inclinations unworthy of international
recognition --- regardless if the latter is a burgeoning power. Yes, the facts on the ground
indicate that China will remain preponderant politically and economically, but it is bound to
become ‘ideological outlier’ in the community of states. Buzan supports this by noting that for a
state to fully assume great power status, it must command international prestige not through
subjugation, but through establishing ties of reciprocity with other states 18. Thus, a country with
great power ambitions must first demonstrate that it is deserving of being accorded state-level
legitimacy through co-option and not coercion. Ultimately, this dispute serves a litmus test for
China’s international legitimacy --- which remains questionable in light of the above
circumstances --- and eventual assimilation in community of states and its established culture.

****

Bibliography:

18
Barry Buzan, “A World Order Without Superpowers: A Decentred Globalism”, International Relations (2011): 3-
25. Accessed September 24, 2015.

22
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23
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24