EVIDENCE – SET D

CASE #7

HEIRS OF URETA
vs.
HEIRS OF URETA
657 SCRA 555
G.R. No. 165748
September 14, 2011

FACTS:

Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso for brevity) had fourteen (14) children. He owned several
properties including the six parcel of lands which is in questions, and was also engaged in buying
and selling copra. The eldest, Policronio Ureta, however opposed the rest of Alfonso’s children
and their heirs.
Sometime in 1969, his four children met at the house of one, while Francisco, a
municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce inheritance tax, they should make it appear
that the properties where already sold to Alfonso’s heirs. Four Deed of Sale were executed to
which Policronio begot six parcels of land.
Policronio died, except from the portion of a parcel, he nor his heirs took possession of
the subject lands. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son
represented his co-heirs. Believing that, the subject lands belonged to Policronio, they filed a
Declaration for Ownership and recovery of possession.
RTC dismissed the complaint, finding that the Deed of Sale was null and void. The CA,
on appeal, partially affirmed yet modified the decision, annulling the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition. As a consequence, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for the proper
partition of the estate. With regard to the claim for damages, the CA agreed with the RTC.

Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, which were denied by the
CA for lack of merit. In their Motion for Reconsideration, the Heirs of Policronio argued that
the RTC violated the best evidence rule in giving credence to the testimony of Amparo
Castillo (Amparo) with regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale, and that prescription had set
in precluding any question on the validity of the contract.
 They argued that based on the parol evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso and,
specifically, Amparo Castillo, were not in a position to prove the terms outside of the
contract because they were not parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of Sale in
question. Thus, it is argued that the testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the parol evidence
rule.

ISSUE/S:
WON the CA violated the parol evidence and hearsay evidence in ruling that the Deed of
Sale was void and in giving credence to the testimony of the witness..

HELD:

No, the CA did not violate the parol evidence and hearsay evidence in ruling that
the Deed of Sale was void and giving credence to the testimony of Amparo.

The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper
time, as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent, and if not so made, it will be
understood to have been waived. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be
made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer. In this case, the Heirs of
Policronio failed to timely object to the testimony of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed
to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.

Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely objected to the testimony of Amparo
Castillo, their argument would still fail. As provided for under Section 9 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. (See notes) The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties was clearly put in issue in the Answer of the Heirs of Alfonso to the
Complaint.  It was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the payment of estate
and inheritance taxes and not meant to transfer ownership.
The exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to enable the court to ascertain the true
intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over what the document
appears to be on its face. As the true intent of the parties was duly proven in the present case, it
now prevails over what appears on the Deed of Sale.
The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and was precisely
one of the issues submitted to the RTC for resolution. The operation of the parol evidence rule
requires the existence of a valid written agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a
proceeding where the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a
contract may be void for lack of consideration. Considering that the Deed of Sale has been
shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for lack of consideration, the Heirs of
Alfonso are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement.

NOTES:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. -- When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution
of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills.

Paragraphs (b) and (c) are applicable in the case at bench.

CASE #8
SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
ELOISA ESPEJO, et al, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168387
August 25, 2010

FACTS:

Espejos (Respondents) were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural
land, with an area of two hectares each. The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural
Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the
mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated title to
the properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI.
 In 1985, Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed of Sale did not
mention the barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title which title
corresponds to the Murong property.
There is no evidence, however, the Espejos took possession of the Murong property, or
demanded lease rentals from the tenants, Marquez and Dela Cruz (Petitioners), or otherwise
exercised acts of ownership. 
In 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20 and 21 of Republic Act (RA) No.
6657(COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN ACT), executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz. In 1997, respondents filed a
Complaint before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for the cancellation of
petitioners’ CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and
the execution of a deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi
Fernandez.
The complaint was based on respondents’ theory that the Murong property, occupied by
the petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented in
the Deed of Sale. 
ISSUE/S:
WON the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the
contracts.

HELD:

Yes, the CA erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule
states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is
the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral
evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance
of undetected tampering with the document.

In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because
there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that
the respondents’ Deed of Sale referred to Murong Property as its subject; while the
petitioners’ Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to Lantap Property, which is
further described as located in Barangay Murong.

The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties. The CA, however, refused to look beyond the
literal wording of the documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the
actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it
appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement .

The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks
to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument.
Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look
beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule.