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Quijano V DBP
Quijano V DBP
Quijano V DBP
FACTS:
A petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed by petitioners-
appellants (Gedeon G. Quijano and Eugenia T. Quijano) to compel respondentappellee (Development Ba
nk of the Philippines) to accept said petitionersappellants’ back pay certificate payment for their loan
from the said appellee Bank.
It further compelled the respondent-appellee to restrain the exofficio sheriff of the province of Misamis
Occidental from proceeding with the scheduled foreclosure sale of the real properties mortgaged by
appellant spouses to appellee Bank.That the petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-interest of the herein respondent-bank, in t
he amount of P19,500.That the petitioners’ urban real estate loan was approved per RFC Board Resolutio
n No. 2533 on April 30,1953.That the mortgage contract was executedby the petitioners in
favor of the respondent-bank on March 23, 1954.That the first release of P4,200 was made on
April 29, 1954, and the other releases were made subsequent thereafter.That on July 27, 1965,
petitioner (as holder of Acknowledgment No. 10181) wrote the respondent bank in Manila
offering to pay in the amount of P14,000 for his outstanding obligation with the respondent-bank.
That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised the petitioners of the non-acceptance of his off
er on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when Republic Act
897 was approved
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic
Act No. 897
RULING:
It is clearly stated that the provisions expressly require the obligations – for which certificates of
indebtedness may be accepted as payments of – must be subsisting at the time of the approval
of R.A. 897. Should back pay certificates be offered in payment to a government-owned
corporation of an obligation which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said
amendatory Act on June 20, 1953, the corporation may not legally be compelled to
accept such certificates.Although the appellants’ application for an urban real estate loan was approved by
appellee bank on April 30, 1953, the appellants only availed it when they executed the mortgage contract
only on March 23, 1954.
In the appellants’ case, the approved loan was availed only about nine (9) months after the enactment of R
epublic Act 897 and the corresponding releases were received only after the execution of the mortgage co
ntract dated March 23, 1954. Therefore, only after the corresponding amounts were released to appellants
after March 23, 1954 did such obligation attach thereby affirming that the said loan was not subsisting at t
he time of the approval of Republic Act 897 on June 20, 1953.
Despite the appeal by the appellants that a more liberal construction of the law would enable “many cripp
led or disabled veterans, or their wives and orphans, or those who had in one way or another unselfishly s
acrificed or contributed to the cause of war” which was the purpose of the said law, the Court ruled that th
ere is no room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the above-
quoted provision of law. The Court’s first and fundamental duty is the application of law according to its
express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. It must see
to it that its mandate is obeyed. Therefore, even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, the said law
still limited the applicability of the back pay certificates to “obligations subsisting at the time of the appro
val of this Act” and therefore obligations contracted after its enactment on June 18,1948 cannot be consid
ered.