Definitions of Conflict and the Legitimation of Resources: The Case of Environmental Risk

Author(s): Thomas Dietz, Paul C. Stern, Robert W. Rycroft

Source: Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Mar., 1989), pp. 47-70
Published by: Springer
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Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1989

Definitions of Conflict and the Legitimation

of Resources: The Case of Environmental Risk'
Thomas Dietz,2 Paul C. Stern,3 and Robert W. Rycroft4

This paper examines the social construction of conflict over environmental

health and safety issues (i.e., environmental risk). Four explanationsfor such
conflict are commonly offered in the environmental policy literature. We
examine the interestsserved by each. We hypothesize that environmentalpoli-
cy professionals hold definitions of conflict consistent with the values and
interests of the organizations for which they work and the professions of
which they are members. These definitions enhance the legitimacy of the
resources those groups possess in relative abundance. Data from a survey
of risk professionals are generally consistent with these hypotheses. We con-
clude by generalizing beyond environmentalconflict to identify ways in which
disputes about the nature of a social problem or conflict are often at the
same time struggles to determine the value of the resources available to so-
cial movements and their opponents.
KEY WORDS: social construction; conflict; environmental policy; definitions; resource mobili-
zation.

'An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 1984 annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association. The views expressedherein do not necessarilyrepresentthose of George
Mason University, George Washington University, or the National Research Council or any
of its constituent units.
2Department of Sociology/Anthropology, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22030.
3Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council,
Washington, D.C. 20418.
4Center for International Science and Technology Policy, Elliott School of International Af-
fairs, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. 20052.
47

0884-8971/89/0300-0047$06.00/0 ( 1989 Plenum Publishing Corporation

48 Dietz, Stern, and Rycroft

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1970s, the social construction approach has been a major
source of insights into conflicts over social problems (Schneider, 1985; Spector
and Kitsuse, 1977). When issues are matters of intense social conflict, the
social constructions offered by participants in the conflict are critical ele-
ments in political struggles. Each definition of a problem embodies presump-
tions about who or what caused the problem and who or what must change
(or be changed) to solve it. Each definition ties substantive positions to sym-
bols of shared cultural values. Thus definitions can influence the positions
of uncommitted citizens and shape their judgments about the legitimacy of
different positions. And each definition has implications for the power to
make decisions about the problems at issue.
Over the last decade, scholars of social movements have used the so-
cial constructionist approach to considerable advantage, and recently this
perspective has begun to appear in the policy literature. For example, Stern
and Aronson (1984: ch. 2) explore the policy implications of defining energy
either as a commodity, a social necessity, or a resource with ecological im-
plications. They show how each definition of energy legitimates the position
of a different set of actors, points to a different course of action, and lends
power to different interests.
In the environmental policy literature, much of the debate is about the
character of controversy as well as about the nature of the problems. This
paper, then, focuses initially on social constructions of conflict. We believe
such a focus provides insight into the dynamics of environmental policy.
Defining a conflict is a means of legitimating, and thus according value to,
resources that may be mobilized in the struggle between actors. Just as ac-
ceptance by key actors of a particular definition of a problem may deter-
mine how a problem is to be solved, acceptance of a particular explanation
of conflict can determine who legitimately participates in debating solutions
to the problem and who gains or loses power.
Here we examine conflicts over environmental threats to human health
and safety, or environmental risk. We begin by identifying four views of the
causes of environmentalconflict prevalentin the contemporaryenvironmental
policy literature. Each tends to legitimate different resources and thus lends
advantage to different actors in the system. We hypothesize that participants
in environmental policy debates tend to subscribe to definitions of the con-
flict that legitimate resources that they value or that are possessed in relative
abundance by groups whose values and interests they share. For people ac-
tive in such debates, the relevant groups are their employers and the profes-
sions of which they are members. Using data from a survey of individuals
prominent in environmental policy conflicts, we appraise those hypotheses.
We then generalize our argument by discussing three generic characteriza-
Definitions of Conflict and Legitimation of Resources 49

tions of social problems in industrial capitalist societies and the ways in which
each of these views legitimates a particular set of resources.

CURRENT DEFINITIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT

The environmental policy literature reveals a pervasive dissensus about

the nature of conflict over environmental threats to human health and safe-
ty. We found four prevalent characterizations of those conflicts: differen-
tial knowledge, vested interest, value conflict, and mistrust of expert
knowledge. (For a related set of distinctions that has influenced our think-
ing, see National Research Council, 1984.)

Differential Knowledge

One view of environmental conflict emphasizes that the issues involved

are complex, fraught with uncertainty, and hard to understand. It holds that
detailed and quantitative analysis is necessary to assess risks; that most peo-
ple understand neither the technologies that generate, control, or monitor
pollution, nor the theoretical and methodological bases of risk analysis; and
that as a consequence the great majority of the general public is ignorant
at best, and at worst, is prone to unreasonable fears and expectations. In
short, this view emphasizes an uninformed public as the root cause of con-
flict. For example, a report of the National Research Council states, without
citing evidence:
Public attitudes toward hazardous industrial wastes and their disposal reflect a num-
ber of misconceptions. Among these are the beliefs that hazardous waste generation
can be eliminated, that waste discharges can be avoided, that waste disposal can be
made risk free, and that hazardous waste disposal technologies are equally risky to
the local environment and health. (National Materials Advisory Board, 1983:15)

Proponents of this view sometimes derogate their political opposition

as irrational. For instance, the editor of Science wrote in the context of de-
bate over "so-called hazardous wastes .... Those people who depend on the
media for information and guidance have been frightened, some to the point
of hysteria" (Abelson, 1983:1003).
Implicit in this line of thought is the belief that experts understand the
risks well, have realistic expectations, and are in a better position than most
people to make judgments about how safe is "safe enough." The implication
is that if ordinary people were better informed, they would make the same
judgments as the experts. Although public perceptions of risk often do not
coincide with the judgments of scientific or technical professionals (Slovic
et al., 1980), expert judgment is sometimes systematically biased (Kemeny,
50 Dietz, Stern, and Rycroft

1980; Slovic et al., 1982). For many of the most controversial risks, there
is insufficient empirical basis for any clear expert judgment (Zinberg, 1983).
Thus the differences between expert and public views of risk may not always
mean the experts know better. At any rate, perceptions of risk almost al-
ways involve matters of judgment as well as knowledge.
Defining risk conflicts as disagreements between the knowledgeable and
the uninformed increases the value of technical expertise as a resource, and
therefore the power of those individuals and institutions with access to it.
This view of environmental conflict usually lends advantage to corporations
that earn profit from risky activities and to their representatives. They pos-
sess substantial expertise "in house" and also have ample financial resources
with which to hire expertise. In contrast, environmental organizations have
strong support from the public but limited access to scientific expertise. (For
evidence of the unequal distribution of such expertise between industrial and
environmental groups, see Dietz and Rycroft, 1987.)

Vested Interest

Another view of environmental conflict emphasizes that the risks and

benefits of science and technology are rarely distributed evenly throughout
the population. In this interpretation, conflict over environmental health and
safety risks is an example of the familiar political struggle between the poten-
tial winners and losers from a policy under consideration. This view is illus-
trated by this analysis of the acid rain debate:
The current unregulated acid rain situation produces certain benefits to some and
uncertain costs to others. Proposed regulation of acid-causing emissions, however,
promises certain costs for those who presently enjoy certain benefits but uncertain
benefits for those who presently incur the uncertain costs. (Rhodes and Middleton,
1983:7)

Casting environmental conflict in terms of vested interest legitimates

any actor that stands to gain or lose, regardless of scientific expertise; it thus
increases the value of people-based resources compared with the differential
knowledge formulation. The view may benefit different interests under differ-
ent conditions. It implies the need for bargaining, and some participants (in-
dustry in particular) are usually in strong bargaining positions in our society.
But raising equity issues in environmental disputes sometimes works to the
advantage of traditional risk bearers (the poor, aged, etc.).5 Thus the vested

5Schnaiberg(1983, 1986) notes that environmental and appropriate technology movement or-
ganizations have sometimes raised equity issues while advocating policies that do not have strong
or clear equity impacts.
Definitions of Conflict and Legitimation of Resources 51

interest definition of environmental conflict may be a double-edged sword,

used to cut down claims that any particular position represents the public
interest or high moral principle.

Value Differences

A third view of environmental conflict emphasizes underlying value

judgments. It holds that because environmental policy choices almost always
involve trade-offs and uncertainties, value systems are the only basis for mak-
ing choices. Consider a debate over siting a hazardous waste facility. Any
decision about the facility must weigh potential economic expansion against
possible exposure to toxic chemicals. Therefore, differences between people
in how much they value economic growth or in how averse they are to en-
vironmental hazards will cause conflict. The uncertainty that characterizes
environmental issues serves to magnify these value conflicts.
Value judgments even enter into scientific analyses. For example: Neither benefits
nor risks can be identified, let alone quantified, independently of the values and/or
philosophical outlook of the assessors .... The identification and assessment of risk
necessarily turn upon conclusions as to the adequacy of existing knowledge, and the
significance and weight, pessimistic or optimistic, that is given to uncertainty. These
are consequencesof the value systems and philosophic outlook of the assessors. (Green,
1980:35)

Emphasizing value differences as a cause of conflict implicitly ques-

tions the legitimacy of arguments based on supposedly value-free risk ana-
lyses, especially if the analyses do not pay attention to some of the major
values at issue. This emphasis usually serves to legitimize minority perspec-
tives because it puts the technical analyses usually used by government and
industry to promote potentially hazardous technologies on the same footing
as the admittedly value-based arguments most often raised by environmen-
tal, consumer, and labor activists.

Mistrust of Expert Knowledge

The final view of environmental conflict is related to the explanations

based on values and interests, but emphasizes the effects of these forces on
knowledge. It argues that conflict occurs because people have learned to mis-
trust expert knowledge as interest serving. They realize that industry's scien-
tists almost invariably support their employers' positions and that
environmental groups' scientists do the same, and they mistrust even public
agencies' scientific findings as possibly distorted by economic or political in-
fluence.
The following quotation illustrates this view:
52 Dietz, Stern, and Rycroft

From June to September, 1981, EPA has been conducting a series of secret "science
courts." . . Excluded from EPA's science courts were not only the traditional public
interest groups, but the entire scientific and public health community as well. Regu-
lation of toxic chemicals is not a matter to be hashed out in a star chamber pitting
EPA scientists against industry scientists. The daylight of public and scientific com-
munity scrutiny gives integrity to EPA's scientific and regulatory processes. If the
current occupants of EPA's highest positions do not understand that, then they will
surely lose all right to claim that they can be trusted to act to protect public health.
(Sandler, 1982:4-5)

This sort of mistrust threatens not only the technological projects of

corporations and government agencies, but also the credibility of the scien-
tific establishment. The emphasis on mistrust goes beyond the vested interest
view of environmental conflict. It holds that interests affect knowledge as
well as opinion, and that even knowledge developed by purportedly disin-
terested parties, such as government, is not immune.
The view that experts and the institutions for which they work cannot
be trusted to act in the public interest has ambiguous implications for the
legitimacy of different participants. Some observers, who believe the mis-
trust of expert judgment is without legitimate reason, see it as a public rela-
tions problem. The remedial strategy is to regain trust. This strategy can be
distinguished from the educational approach implied by the "public ignor-
ance" view in that the emphasis of education is on conveying facts, whereas
the emphasis in public relations is on changing attitudes.
Other observers believe that public mistrust of expert knowledge has a
legitimate basis and conclude that major public policy decisions should be
made by the citizens ratherthan by any elite. They suggest as a remedialstrate-
gy policies to further increase people power, such as the use of public funds
for research conducted by environmental and consumer organizations. They
argue that because no single source of expertise can be trusted, public deci-
sion making is best served by a process that makes expertise available to all
concernedparties:Truth emergesfrom a discoursein which all sides, informed
by expertise, participate actively.

Social Construction and Social Reality

It is appropriate to ask which of these views of environmental conflict

is most correct. But the question is difficult to answer because the scientific
analysis of conflict is part of the conflict's social construction (see Schnaiberg,
1977, 1980; Stern and Aronson, 1984). Each definition of a conflict carries
an implicit hypothesis about where truth is to be found and thus sets a differ-
ent agenda for research. Different lines of research not only flow from but
also tend to validate different theories of the conflict.
Our concern in this paper is not to find the most correct definition of
environmental conflicts or simply to delineate competing definitions. Rather,
Definitions of Conflict and Legitimation of Resources 53

it is to examine the political functions of alternative definitions of environ-

mental conflict. The above discussion implies one conclusion: Each defini-
tion tends to legitimate a particular set of participants and a particular set
of resources in the conflict, and to delegitimate other actors and resources.
If social definitions are important in these ways, those immediately engaged
in the conflict should differ not only in their substantivepositions (e.g., Lynn,
1986) but also in how they characterize the conflict. Interested individuals
can be expected to subscribeto definitions that are consistent with their values.
The differences should be most profound among "risk professionals," those
individualswhose daily work focuses on environmentalconflict and who must
mobilize resources to achieve their organizational goals. Risk professionals
may choose to work for organizations whose values correspond to their own
or may come to espouse certain positions publicly because they are speaking
for their organizations. In either instance, these individuals will be sensitive
to definitions of conflict that legitimate or delegitimate resources easily avail-
able to their organizations. Similarly, risk professionals have career trajec-
tories that are linked, at least in part, to the policy relevance of their expertise
(Dietz and Rycroft, 1987; Schnaiberg, 1977, 1980). Thus we would expect
them to view the causes of conflict in a manner consistent with their profes-
sional interests as well as their organizational values.
Our position is not that of pure social constructionists. Although we
believe societies and individuals can label things and activities as clean or
polluting more or less as they choose (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; for a
critique, see Abel, 1985), the freedom to socially construct reality is con-
strainedby the reality of environmentalthreats. A selection process ultimately
links the reality of events to their social constructions: A society that treats
as clean a water supply with high concentrations of typhoid bacteria, pesti-
cides, or heavy metals will suffer a high toll of illness and death; a society
that sees an implacable enemy as benign is likely to fall victim in war. So
a construction discrepant with reality may prove very costly.
Also, reality sometimes constrains social construction because techno-
logical limits, physical laws, and natural processes make some things impos-
sible. For instance, although it is possible to consider the earth'sclimate as an
economic good, it is not possible for individualsto buy their way out of global
climatic changes. Global climate is a nearly pure public good and, unless
it becomes possible to escape to other habitableworlds, it would be a sophistry
to treat it as a commodity. Few things in the world put such strong constraints
on social construction, but many constrain it to some degree and an impor-
tant constraint is the publicness of goods. There is a continuum from nearly
pure public goods to nearly pure private ones, where the continuum is de-
fined by the ease with which the goods are divisible and the extent to which
people may be excluded from benefiting. Near the public end of the con-
tinuum are found such issues as the greenhouse effect, depletion of the ozone
54 Dietz, Stern, and Rycroft

layer, "nuclear winter," acid deposition, the destruction of ecosystems, and

the clear-cutting of air-restoring tropical forests. The inherently public na-
ture of such problems is undoubtedly one reason that the environmental
movement has been so successful gaining support for state interventions.
Our focus on the ideological aspect of environmental debates and on
the way those debates affect the political fortunes of the various actors is
not meant to suggest that only ideas and social processes are at issue. The
way a society thinks about environmental problems has real consequences
for human lives and welfare, and may also affect the earth's physical and
biological life-support systems. Much more is at stake in debates about the
environment than the success of movement groups and their opponents, or
even the economic interests of individuals and corporations.

Interests, Values, and Definitions

The competing definitions of environmental conflicts differ strikingly

in that the differential knowledge view tends to legitimate scientific exper-
tise vis-a-vis public concern and, for the most part, the other views do the
reverse. We offer two specific hypotheses for exploration. First, we expect
that people who work in environmental movement organizations are likely
to see environmental conflicts as based on vested interests or value differ-
ences, views that are consistent with the democratic and participatory norms
of the environmentalmovement (Milbrath, 1984;Morrison and Dunlap, 1986)
and that also increase the legitimacy and value of the wide public support
the environmental movement enjoys. We also expect them to reject the
differential knowledge formulation of environmental conflict, which sup-
ports an elitist philosophy and also increases the value of scientific exper-
tise, a resource they lack. This group may also be inclined to endorse the
mistrust formulation. In contrast, people who work for industry groups will
tend to endorse the differentialknowledge formulation, which legitimatestech-
nical knowledge and also labels their antagonists as badly informed or irra-
tional. People who work for institutions that are not strongly tied to single
interests may have more diverse views about the nature of environmental
conflict. In terms of our taxonomy of conflict definitions, these hypotheses
seem most congruent with the "vestedinterest"and "value conflict" positions.
Second, we expect that beliefs about the nature of environmental
problems and conflicts are related to an individual's professional identity.
For example, natural scientists are trained to use technical analysis to solve
environmentalproblems. The view that environmentalconflict is due to public
misunderstanding or fears tends to give scientists opportunities to use their
training and validates the importance of their findings. Attorneys are ex-
Definitions of Conflict and Legitimation of Resources 55

perienced in adversarial systems. The view that environmental conflict is due

to vested interests is consistent with the political and adversarial terms most
familiar to them. It also increases the importance of adversarial processes
and thus gives attorneys opportunities to practice their trade.

DATA AND METHODS

Sample

Our data are from face-to-face interviews conducted in 1984 with in-
dividuals who were active participants in the U.S. environmental-risk policy
system. A snowball sample of 228 individuals was drawn, beginning with
30 individuals whom we knew, as a result of two years of ethnographic work
within the policy system, to be key actors in conflict over environmental poli-
cy. During each interview, we asked respondents to nominate 5 other people
whose "professional activities are centered on assessing environmental risks
or debating policies intended to avert or mitigate risks." The list of all in-
dividuals nominated in interviews constituted our sampling frame. As inter-
viewing proceeded, we added nominations to the frame and periodically drew
names at random. Individuals were listed in the frame once for each time
they were nominated, so the probability of appearing in our sample is a func-
tion of prominence in the risk policy system. Our response rate was slightly
over 800%o. In the analyses that follow, we have restricted the sample to in-
dividuals with a college degree (980%o of the total sample) who work for the
federal executive branch, Congress, law or consulting firms, environmental
organizations, corporations or trade associations, or universities or think
tanks. Seventeen individuals who worked for other kinds of organizations
were excluded from the analysis because of insufficient representation of any
one type of organization. Cases with missing data on any of the variables
used were also discarded, leaving a working sample of 190 individuals.
We believe our sample to be representative of professionals working
in the U.S. risk-policy system, but it is not a simple random sample from
an infinite population. It is likely we have sampled a substantial fraction of
the total population, which should reduce sampling error, but snowball sam-
ples, like cluster samples, tend to have larger sampling errors than simple
random samples (Goodman, 1961; Sudman, 1976:210-212). As a result, the
standarderrorsand statisticaltests reportedbelow should be considered rough
guides to sampling uncertainty rather than precise probability statements.
(For further details, see Dietz and Rycroft, 1987:117-121.)
56 Dietz, Stern, and Rycroft

Variables

Sources of Environmental Conflict

Respondents were asked which of several causes of environmental con-

flict was most important (the interview guide is in Dietz and Rycroft,
1987:125-144). The relevant survey items, along with the general rubricunder
which they fit, are as follows:
1. Knowledge differentials: "Misunderstandingand fears on the part of
the public."
2. Vested interests: "An uneven distribution of net risks and benefits
in which those who benefit from a situation don't bear the risks."
3. Value differences: "Differences in individual values regarding risk-
taking and uncertainty."
4. Mistrustof expert knowledge: "Publicmistrustof government";"Pub-
lic mistrust of industry."
In addition to asking each respondent to identify one source as most impor-
tant, we asked respondents to rate each source as a "major source of con-
troversy, a minor source of controversy, or not a source of controversy."
Analysis of the rating produced results very similar to those from analysis
of the forced choice, so we report results only for the latter.

Background and Institutional Affiliation

Our hypotheses concern two key characteristics of individuals-

education and institutional affiliation. Since our sample is highly educated,
we have focused on the field in which respondents earned their highest degree
and aggregated fields into six categories: humanities and social sciences; law;
biology and environmental science; medicine and public health; economics
and business; and the physical sciences, mathematics, statistics, and en-
gineering.
Institutional affiliation is an indicator of the interests a respondent
represents. Members of the risk-policy system work for a variety of organi-
zations. We limit our analysis to six categories of institutions: the federal
executive branch, Congress, law or consulting firms, environmental organi-
zations, corporations or trade associations, and universities or think tanks
(e.g., Resources for the Future, Brookings Institution, National Research
Council, Electric Power Research Institute). We have aggregated law and
consulting firms into a single category because they play a similar function
in the risk-policy system, serving as "expertise for hire." Trade associations
function as representativesof corporations or groups of corporations, so their
Definitions of Conflict and Legitimation of Resources 57

function is much like that of the government affairs offices of many private
firms. Think tanks, at least ostensibly, play a neutral role as providers of
research and expertise. While some think tanks are far from neutral, there
is no clear a priori way of assigning them to other categories.
In addition, we have grouped our respondents into three age/cohort
groups: those under 30, those 30-44, and those 45 or over at the time of
interview. These three groups would have been under 16, 16-30, and over
30 in 1970, a critical year in the development of the environmental move-
ment. Thus these categories are designed to capture any cohort effects that
might result from being a high school or college student at that time, or from
being otherwise influenced by publicity about environmentalproblems at crit-
ical points in the life cycle. Finally, we have included gender as a dichoto-
my. We include these variables as controls because they often correlate with
general environmental attitudes (Borden and Francis, 1978; Honnold, 1984;
Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980).

Methods of Analysis

The "source-of-controversy" variable is a polychotomous dependent

variable. In large, simple random samples, multinomial logit analysis is the
most appropriate method for analyzing such variables (McFadden, 1973,
1976; Manski, 1981). But because of the character of our sample, we do not
believe that use of maximum likelihood estimates from a multinomial logit
model offers any advantage over the use of multivariatenominal scale (MNA)
analysis, in which each category of the dependent variable is treated as a
dichotomy to be predicted by the independent variables using ordinary least
squares (Andrews and Messenger, 1973). For a simple random sample, the
multiple nominal scale analysis yields inefficient parameter estimates, in con-
trast to maximum likelihood estimates of the logit model (Goldberger, 1964).
But since our sample is not a simple random sample, nor particularlylarge,
the properties of the multinomial logit estimator are not obvious. In con-
trast, ordinary least squares methods are quite robust against violation of
assumptions, given even moderate sample size (Gillespie, 1977; Knoke, 1975).
In addition, MNA coefficients have a number of properties that facilitate
their interpretation, while multinomial logit analysis requires interpretation
of a complex, nonlinear function. Thus we have chosen MNA over logit
analysis.

RESULTS

Table I displays the results of a multivariate nominal scale analysis

(MNA) of explanations for environmental controversy. The grand means in
58 Dietz, Stern, and Rycroft

Field
Beta, Place Table
Law Law Grand
of F, of I.
Biology, or Federal
Medicine, Congress
p(F)University
Humanities,
mean
or Corporation
or Environmental
public education executive
social think consulting
employment Multivariate
trade
group
environmental
health tank firm branch
sciences Nominal
science
association Scale

Analysis
ployment,
of
48 11 23 28 15 35 26 30 24 60 N
Beliefs
0.31, Educational
-
About
0.00 -0.07
0.00 -0.29 3.8, 0.21
-0.04 -0.19 0.02 0.43
0.26
0.10
knowledge
Differential
0.00 Sources
Background,
of

0.34, Age,
- -
and
0.05
0.00 0.12 4.2, 0.05
-0.12 0.11
0.07
0.00 Vested
-0.10 0.19interest
0.30
0.00 Environmental
Gendera

0.25, Conflict
- as
a
0.08
0.06 0.09 2.3, 0.00
0.09 -0.13
-0.02
0.10 0.12 0.18 Value
0.02
differences
0.05
Function
of
0.16, of
-
Place
-0.08
0.00 0.08
0.08 0.9, -0.01
0.01
0.15 -0.05 0.20 Mistrust
0.07
0.02 of
experts
0.47 Em-
Definitions of Conflict and Legitimation of Resources 59

R
F, of 2
Age
45
an aGrand Gender Beta,
and Beta, Male Beta, 30-44
Under
F, Female F, and F, Physical
matics,
p(F) 30
means over Economics,
p(F) p(F) p(F)
independent
values science,

are represent business

engineering
forvariable mathe-

the
proportion
represent
of
overall

effects
deviations
of respondents
from 35 155 63 1225 18 62
each
the
selecting
0.01, 0.07, 0.29,
-
grand
each
1.2, 0.08
0.02 0.5, -0.03 0.19 2.8, 0.06
0.01 0.14
0.182
independent
mean
source 0.28 0.63 0.02
of
variable.
correcting0.03, 0.08, 0.18,
conflict -
foras
0.1, -0.02
0.00 0.5, 0.03 -0.15 1.2, 0.05
0.01 0.02
the 0.131
effects 0.74 0.62 0.29
of most
the
0.03, 0.09, 0.21,
other -
important.
0.1, 0.02
0.091
0.01 0.7, 0.00 -0.20 1.4, 0.01
0.00 -0.11
0.71 0.50 0.23
independent
Coefficients
for 0.05, 0.07, 0.21,
a -
variables. 0.3, 0.01 0.4,
0.04 0.00 0.16 1.6, -0.13
0.00 -0.05
0.089
Beta,
category0.56 0.66 0.17
60 Dietz, Stern, and Rycroft

the first row in the table represent the proportion of respondents selecting
each explanation of conflict as "most important." About two-fifths of our
respondents selected knowledge differentials as most important, while about
one-fifth selected each of the other three explanations as most important.
When respondents were asked whether each source of conflict was a major
source, a minor source, or not a source of controversy, each explanation
was considered a major source by the majority of respondents. Nearly three-
quarters labeled public misunderstanding a major source, nearly two-thirds
considered public mistrust a major source, while inequities and value differ-
ences were each considered a major source by just under 60Woof respon-
dents. Thus, our respondents see each of these explanations as important,
but as expected, there is little consensus about their relative importance.
In the MNA reported in Table I, the coefficients for any single category
of an independent variable sum across categories of the dependent variable
to zero. Thus the results of this analysis can be summarizedby looking across
equations, as well as by examining each equation separately. In addition,
this property of MNA means that the coefficients for any one equation can
be calculated from the other equations, so that one equation, corresponding
to one category of the dependent variable, is redundant. Because of the na-
ture of our sample, conventional hypothesis tests of the statistical significance
of individual coefficients do not provide an adequate guide to substantive
importance. As a rule of thumb, we consider any MNA coefficient of mag-
nitude greater than 0.10 (a 10o difference between individuals in that
category and the grand mean, net of other independent variables) substan-
tively important. Although this rule is arbitrary, using other rules would not
lead to theoretically important changes in our interpretations of the data.
We hypothesized that individuals working for environmental organi-
zations would endorse other definitions. Environmentalists in our sample
strongly reject knowledge differentials as an explanation, while dispropor-
tionately endorsing mistrust of expert knowledge as the greatest source of
conflict. Corporateemployees endorse knowledge differentials, while rejecting
either value differences or vested interests as explanations. These results are
consistent with our hypotheses. Congressional employees join environmen-
talists in rejectingignorance as a cause of controversy and differ sharply from
corporate representatives in identifying vested interests as important in en-
vironmental controversy. Since Congress is explicitly a forum for political
conflict and is openly lobbied by various interests, this set of effects is not
surprising. Other institutional affiliations, about which we also offer no a
priori predictions, show substantially weaker relationships to beliefs about
the sources of controversy. Executive branch employees reject vested interests
as an explanation, perhaps in response to controversies about corporate in-
fluence on environmentalpolicy during the Reagan administration. They also
endorse value differences as an explanation, which may be a response to the
Definitions of Conflict and Legitimation of Resources 61

intractability of their position in the middle of regulatory controversies or

to a view of themselves as mediators rather than actors. Law and consulting
firm employees endorse knowledge differentials while rejecting value differ-
ences, a view consistent with their position as sellers of expertise.
The effects of professional identity are weaker than those of institu-
tional affiliation. Individuals educated in the humanities or social sciences
reject knowledge differentials as the most important source of controversy,
while supporting to some extent each of the other three explanations. Physi-
cal scientists, as expected, endorse knowledge differentials and reject value
differences. Also, individuals trained in business or economics reject mis-
trust of expert knowledge, and biologists and environmental scientists reject
vested interests as the greatest causes of controversy.
Gender and age/cohort have effects that are weak and insignficant by
conventional standards. Other cut points for the age/cohort categories
produce relationships that are still weak and quite similar to those reported
in Table I.
In sum, the results are consistent with our hypotheses. In particular,
employees of corporations and their associations are most likely to assert
that the most important source of environmental conflict is knowledge
differentials between experts and the public, whereas environmental organi-
zation employees reject knowledge differentials as the most important source
of controversy. The effects of professional identity are considerably weak-
er, but roughly consistent with a view that perceptions of conflict are shaped
by professional socialization and interests. Age/cohort and gender have very
weak effects controlling for the other variables.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings support the contention that environmental conflict is de-

fined in ways that parallel the values and political interests of different ac-
tors in the conflicts. Each definition seems to advance a set of political actors
by lending legitimacy to the resources it commands in abundance relative
to others. While we have examined in detail only conflicts around environ-
mental risk, we believe the argument can be generalized. We elaborate be-
low, focusing on major types of resources and the ways they may be
legitimated by particular definitions of social problems.

Types of Resources and Types of Conflicts

Expert authority and public opinion or "people" are two types of

resources that can be mobilized by a social movement or its opponents in
62 Dietz, Stern, and Rycroft

a wide range of social conflicts. Material resources and money constitute a

third important type. We suggest that in the general case one effect of con-
flict over the definition of controversiesis to influence the relative legitimacy
of such types of resources.
Each type of resource is a very broad category. For instance, "people"
may show their support by responses on a survey, votes, expressions of moral
outrage, or actions ranging from letter writing to guerrilla warfare. And one
type of resourcecan be exchanged for another to some degree. Members(peo-
ple) pay dues (money), experts can be hired, and so on.
Corresponding to each resource type, we can identify an ideal type of
conflict in which one type of resource is considered especially legitimate. In
capitalist democracies, conflicts that are defined as "economic" are those in
which the use of material resources is considered more legitimate than the
use of other resources, conflicts that are defined as "political" are those in
which public support is considered the most legitimate of resources, and con-
flicts that are defined as "scientific"or "technical"are those in which exper-
tise is consideredthe most legitimateof resources.6 Thus the choice to consider
a social problem as essentially or primarily economic, political, or scientific
has implications for the use of resources in the attendant conflicts.
Actual conflicts rarely match these ideal types exactly. But problems
and conflicts are often seen as falling into these categories, and these defini-
tions affect the legitimacy and value of resources. In this way, disputes about
the nature of a social problem can affect the relative strength of the con-
tending actors. If an issue becomes defined as essentially or primarily eco-
nomic, then money is a legitimate resource in conflict about it, and public
opinion may not be; if such an issue is redefined as primarily political, then
public opinion and values become more important resources, and money may
become illegitimate. The classic example is slavery in the United States, where
the abolition movement was successful in redefining what had been seen by
many as in large part an economic issue into a mainly political one, thus
shifting the character of the conflict.
Legitimacy affects the value of a resource. For instance, material
resources are important in political conflicts, but when an issue is socially
defined as political, the legitimate role of money, and therefore its value in
conflict about the issue, is circumscribed. Financial campaign contributions
are essential in choosing American governments, but while it is legitimate
for a politician to take positions that are popular in order to gain votes, it

6These categories are not all-inclusive. Some conflicts, which might be called "institutional,"
are by social construction relegated to the "normal" processes within a particular institution
such as the church, the school, the community, or the family. What is defined as institutional
is sometimes contested, as indicated recently by the successes of movements to redefine "fami-
ly" conflicts such as spousal and child abuse as political and thus subject to legal sanction.
Definitions of Conflict and Legitimation of Resources 63

is not legitimate to take positions favored by wealthy interests to maximize

their campaign contributions. Contributions that are too large, or from the
wrong sources, are legally proscribed and can cost candidates the support
of voters who see them as violating democratic norms.
There are also, of course, social definitions of appropriate ways to use
each legitimate resource. In U.S. domestic politics, public opinion, lobby-
ing, and peaceful demonstrations are broadly perceived as legitimate ways
to use popular support, but assassinations, riots, and other violent actions
are not. Donating to a political campaign is a legitimate use of money, but
buying votes through bribes is not. That is not to say that riots and bribes
have no effect on the political process, nor that there is unanimity about
their legitimacy, bur rather that they violate widely held norms for political
action in American society and thus have negative as well as positive effects
for those involved.
The social definition of an issue influences not only the relative value
of resources in attendant conflicts but also the kinds of arguments that are
considered appropriate and relevant. In conflicts over issues considered to
be economic, decisions are justified in terms of economic efficiency or profit.
In political conflicts, notions of justice, morality, or equity are seen as legiti-
mate criteria. In scientific controversies, justifications are stated in terms of
objective truth.

Dynamics of Legitimation

Social definitions of issues are always contestable and subject to change

as the result of active efforts to reconstruct them by social movements and
their opponents.7 We believe definitional struggles are often important fac-
tors in the dynamics of social change. Consider the historic conflict between
labor and capital. Early in the industrial revolution, relations between labor
and capital were usually defined as economic transactions between persons,
and the legitimate role of the state was to protect property rights and en-
force contracts. But the labor movement, as part of its struggle for power,
worked to define labor-capital conflict as political as well as economic, as
involving issues of justice and right as well as of exchange. The success in
promoting that view legitimated state intervention to provide minimum stan-
dards for wages and working conditions, and to structure the conflict be-

'Although we emphasize conflict between social movements and their opponents, we do not
presume that the state or other actors are passive. In some cases the state seems to operate
as an agent of political actors who have a preferred definition of a social problem at issue.
For instance, characterizations of energy and environmental issues made by U.S. government
officials changed markedlyafter the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 (Kashand Rycroft, 1984).
64 Dietz, Stern, and Rycroft

tween labor and capital through various formal mechanisms of union

certification. The new definition also legitimated public opinion, labor lob-
bying, strikes, boycotts, and other people-based resources available to the
labor movement. In short, by increasing the value of people as resources,
a definition of labor-capital conflict as political gives labor more power than
it has when its only recourse is to outlast the company being struck. The
struggle to define the boundaries between the politics and the economics of
labor-management issues is ongoing, with labor recentlyarguingthat workers
and communities ought to be fully informed about the hazards of industrial
processes and to be consulted on plant closings, changes that would widen
the domain of the political. At the same time, capital is pushing to "deregu-
late" in the area of occupational safety and health, which would move that
type of conflict out of the political arena.
Even when there is consensus that an issue is political, disputes about
its nature influence the value of resources and determine the legitimacy of
various ways of using them. For example, there seems broad consensus that
abortion is essentially a political issue, with rights and morality the foci of
debate. But the social construction of the conflict can still influence whose
participation is considered legitimate. Thus Luker's (1984) argument that
the debate over abortion is a conflict of values between childless, wage-earning
women and housewives for whom motherhood is centralto their self-concepts
legitimates both sides as stakeholders. However, in Petchesky's (1985) view,
the conflict is a power struggle over women's sexuality between the affluent
old men who finance anti-abortion groups and young women who have not
yet made their career choices. Thus, Petchesky questions the legitimacy of
the anti-abortion position on the ground that its main adherentswould illegiti-
mately interfere with other people's lives.
The recent history of environmental conflict provides a good illustra-
tion of the dynamics of social construction and the attendant struggles over
the legitimacy of resources. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, con-
flicts over environmental hazards were usually considered as economic. They
were typically treated as matters of land or water rights and of civil damages,
and resolved through contract, property, and tort law (Covello and Mum-
power, 1985; Hutt, 1978). But in recent decades, scientific studies began to
show that human activities, through their effects on the envrionment, might
have consequences of a sort that Western industrialized societies usually
manage through the political system (Hays, 1987). The studies raised the spec-
ter of serious "public bads," shared disamenities from which individuals can-
not easily escape by their own action. Among the most serious and most
widely shared were alterations of the global climate sufficient to inundate
population centers and to dry major agricultural regions, and alterations of
the atmosphere or water supply sufficient to cause millions of cancers. In
Definitions of Conflict and Legitimation of Resources 65

response to news of such possibilities and other problems that were more
localized in their effects, an environmental movement developed, dedicated
to addressing the problems. The accumulating scientific evidence, brought
to public attention by scientists and the emerging movement, created broad
awareness of the adverse effects of pollution and led to a reconstruction of
environmental problems. Trespass and nuisance laws no longer seemed ap-
propriate mechanisms for dealing with the issues; instead, the relevant prece-
dents seemed to come from treatment of threats from major epidemics,
foreign enemies, or organized criminal elements, all public bads that were
addressed through political action at the national level. Thus what had been
treated as economic issues came to be seen as political, with regulatory ac-
tion added to tort law as appropriate methods of resolution. The success of
the transformation is demonstrated by broad public support for the environ-
mental movement and by the emergence of large new federal agencies to deal
with environmental problems.'
The reconstruction of environmental problems from economic to po-
litical has posed a challenge for the opponents of the environmental move-
ment. When environmental regulation is weak or absent, many industries
benefit in that they keep the profits of production but share the costs of pol-
lution widely with the whole society. It has therefore been in industry's in-
terest and consistent with a free-market approach to public policy to define
pollution problems as essentially economic. Attempts to develop the con-
cept of marketable "pollution rights" can be seen as supportive of such a
definition, and the resistance to implementing proposals based on that con-
cept is an indication that it is no longer socially acceptable to leave envi-
ronmental decisions so fully to the market (Hays, 1987). Recognition of the
public-good aspect of environmental protection promotes a participatoryap-
proach to public policy and works to the advantage of the environmental
movement. It sanctions appeals to public opinion, which supports the move-
ment, and it implicitly portrays environmental movement organizations as
working in the public interest.
In this social climate, it is generally in the interest of opponents of the
environmental movement to define enviromental issues as scientific or tech-
nical ratherthan as political (Dickson, 1984: ch. 6; Mazur, 1985; Schnaiberg,
1980: ch. 6). Such a definition would offer substantial advantages to indus-

8We have argued elsewhere that support for the environmental movement often comes from
people who believe their action is required to prevent or ameliorate a social ill (Stern et al.,
1986). Success in constructing environmental problems in terms of their social consequences
and in focusing attention on responsibility for them induces people to see the problems as moral
issues and increases their willingness to participate in the environmental movement. Raising
moral issues helps define environmental problems as political, and thus tends to advantage
environmentalists and their political values; diffusing moral issues has the opposite effect.
66 Dietz, Stern, and Rycroft

try because corporate material resources, which far outstrip those of the en-
vironmental movement, are easily translatedinto scientific expertise by hiring
consultants and funding research.9 Such a definition would at the same time
devalue public opinion and, by implying that there is a correct answer that
scientists can furnish, would suggest that those who oppose the majority of
scientists are misinformed. The notion of environmental problems as essen-
tially technical is also compatible with a pejorative characterization of en-
vironmental groups as working in pursuit of "special interests" rather than
the common good. A technical perspective presumes that optimal policies
can be attained through unbiased analysis yielding increasingapproximations
to a single truth. At present, scientific/technical and political definitions com-
pete to characterize most environmental conflicts and produce the specific
arguments about the reason for environmental conflict we have found in the
policy literature.At stake in this continuing debate is the value of the resources
available to the interests concerned. Any shift in the construction of the con-
flict can change the relative value of resources and can therefore affect poli-
cies, including allocations of the state's resources, and alter the placement
of issues on the public agenda.

Resources, Ideology, and Attitudes

Our analysis suggests a link between resource mobilization theory

(Jenkins, 1983; Olson, 1965) and the work of both European "identity the-
orists" and American environmental sociologists who emphasize ideological
factors in social movements. Some European scholars have argued that the
"new social movements,"including the environmentalmovement, are engaged
in "the social contestation around the reinterpretation of norms, the crea-
tion of new social meanings and a challenge to the very boundaries between
public, private and political domains of action" (Cohen, 1985:694; see also
Eder, 1985; Habermas, 1981; Offe, 1985; Touraine, 1985; Touraine et al.,
1983). Similarly, many environmental sociologists have emphasized the im-
portance of worldviews, or definitions of the relationship between humans
and their environment, in environmental politics (Catton and Dunlap, 1980;
Cotgrove, 1982; Dunlap and Van Liere, 1984; Dunlap and Olson, 1984;
Milbrath, 1984). Our analysis shows that such ideological or value positions

9Thereare exceptions to this generalization. Opponents of the environmental movement some-

times benefit from political arguments, for instance, the argument that environmental regula-
tions endanger public goods such as economic growth, employment, or competitiveness in
international markets. And environmentalists sometimes benefit from an emphasis on scien-
tific evidence. An instance may be the problem of acid precipitation, which came to public
attention and remains a topic of concern largely because of scientific research from noncor-
porate sources in affected geographic areas (Regens and Rycroft, 1988).
Definitions of Conflict and Legitimation of Resources 67

become politically significant through their effects on resource mobilization:

when "social meanings" and values change, the balance of power in social
conflict shifts because of changes in the values of the resources available to
be mobilized. Social movement organizations and their opponents do more
than work to acquire resources-they also engage in ideological struggle to
legitimate the use of those resources and to delegitimate the resources avail-
able to opponents (see also Downey, 1986; Gamson, 1975; Gamson and
Modigliani, 1987; Touraine et al., 1983).
This study also begins to define connections between macrolevel dy-
namics of social change involving movements and their opponents and micro-
level psychological processes that determine individuals' support for those
groups. In a previous study (Stern et al., 1986), we examined the psycholog-
ical factors that lead individuals to lend support to a social movement that
seeks a collective good. Here we discuss the ways collective-goods movements
and their opponents attempt to achieve their goals by shaping socially shared
conceptions. Although both argumentsare presentedin a static form, catching
individuals and social conflicts at a single point in time, they provide a
mechanism for the type of dynamic analysis called for by many students of
social movements (e.g., Snow et al., 1986; McAdam, 1983). Social move-
ments and their opponents attempt to legitimate resources and influence be-
liefs and attitudes. As beliefs and attitudes change, support for various sides
in a conflict and the relative legitimacy of resources shift; the actors respond
by altering their arguments and strategies. In short, the strategies of move-
ments and their opponents coevolve. Each side works to define the issues
and conflicts in ways that both advance its ideological position and lend it
tactical advantage by increasing the value of its most abundant resources.
Writers on social movements since Marx have discussed the efforts of
political actors to influence definitions of issues and conflicts. Gramsci (1957)
theorized at length about the "war of position" -the struggle for ideological
hegemony. If his is a strategic analysis, ours is an attempt to look at tactics
and to map the battlefields.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was sponsored in part by grants from the Russell Sage
Foundation ("The Washington Danger Establishment"),the National Science
Foundation (PRA-84-13069), and the William and Flora Hewlett Founda-
tion ("George Mason University Problem Solving Project"). Computing
resourceswere provided by the Center for Academic and AdministrativeCom-
puting of The George Washington University and the Academic Computing
Service of George Mason University. We thank Kevin Avruch, Frederick
68
Buttel, Lee Clarke, William Gamson, Lois Horton, Mark Jacobs, Denton
Morrison, Robert Mitchell, Dorothy Nelkin, and Victoria Rader for their
suggestions,and CynthiaBoiter for her assistancein this research.This is Report
89-03 of the Northern Virginia Survey Research Laboratory.
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