A.C. No. 11668, July 17, 2017 - JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant, v. ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 11668, July 17, 2017

JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant, v. ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated March 15, 2013, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
by complainant Joy T. Samonte (complainant) against respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil (respondent), praying that
the latter be disbarred for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and betrayal of trust.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal case, i.e., NLRC Case
RAB-XI-10-00586-12, filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana plantation.2 Consequently,
complainant engaged the services of respondent to prepare her position paper, and paid him the amount of P8,000.003 as
attorney's fees.4 Despite constantly reminding respondent of the deadline for the submission of her position paper,
complainant discovered that he still failed to file the same.5 As such, on January 25, 2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision6 based on the evidence on record, whereby complainant was held liable to the workers in the total amount of
P633,143.68.7 When complainant confronted respondent about the said ruling, the latter casually told her to just sell her
farm to pay the farm workers.8 Because of respondent's neglect, complainant claimed that she was left defenseless and
without any remedy to protect her interests against the execution of the foregoing judgment;9 hence, she filed the instant
complaint.

In an Order10 dated March 26, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed respondent to submit his
Answer to the complaint.

In his Answer11 dated April 19, 2013, respondent admitted that he indeed failed to file a position paper on behalf of
complainant. However, he maintained that said omission was due to complainant's failure to adduce credible witnesses to
testify in her favor. In this relation, respondent averred that complainant instructed her to prepare an Affidavit12 for one
Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who was intended to be her witness; nevertheless, respondent was instructed that the contents
of Romeo's affidavit were not to be interpreted in the Visayan dialect so that the latter would not know what he would be
testifying on. Respondent added that complainant's uncle, Nicasio Ticong, who was also an intended witness, refused to
execute an affidavit and testify to her lies. Thus, it was complainant who was deceitful in her conduct and that the
complaint against him should be dismissed for lack of merit.13

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation14 dated March 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD found respondent administratively liable and,
accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Essentially, the
IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.15
In a Resolution16 dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and
Recommendation, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however, as to the penalty in order to
account for his breach of the rules on notarial practice.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are
led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and accordingly, exercise the required degree of diligence
in handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all times, a high standard of legal proficiency,
and to devote their full attention, skill, and competence to their cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they
accept them for a fee or for free.17 To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful
objectives.18 These principles are embodied in Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR, which
respectively read as follows:

CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between complainant and respondent when the
latter agreed to file a position paper on her behalf before the NLRC and, in connection therewith, received the amount of
P8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services. Case law instructs that a lawyer-client relationship commences
when a lawyer signifies his agreement to handle a client's case and accepts money representing legal fees from the
latter,19 as in this case. From then on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to "serve his client with competence
and diligence," and in such regard, "not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."

However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly failed to file the necessary position
paper before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against his client, i.e., herein complainant. To
be sure, it is of no moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce any credible witnesses in support of her position
paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification for respondent to completely abandon his client's cause. By voluntarily taking
up complainant's case, respondent gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend the latter's interest therein.
Verily, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.20 In Abay v.
Montesino,21it was explained that regardless of a lawyer's personal view, the latter must still present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law to support his client's cause:

Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the
latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law
of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held administratively liable for
violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.

Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. Records show that he
indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he admittedly prepared23and notarized24 the affidavit of complainant's
intended witness, Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,25 the
Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer to not only obey the laws of the land, but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood, viz.:

The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any
falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer
is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by
others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are
emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."26 (Emphases supplied)

Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Section
4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:

SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. – A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person
requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral[.](Emphasis supplied)

On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document
into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity thereof. A
notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined."27

Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty.

The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v. Capistrano,28 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his
failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client. Similarly, in Conlu v. Aredonia,
Jr.,29 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer for his inexcusable negligence in failing to file the required pleading to
the prejudice of his client. Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by
the IBP and accordingly suspends respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, as in the
case of Dela Cruz v. Zabala,30where the notary public therein notarized an irregular document, the Court hereby revokes
respondent's notarial commission and further disqualifies him from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUlLY of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, his
notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIEDfrom being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record
as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 5987, August 28, 2019

VIDAYLIN YAMON-LEACH, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Vidaylin Yamon-Leach against herein
respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga on grounds of deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and gross violation of his
Oath of Office and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleges as follows:

xxxx

1. I know Atty. Arturo Astorga not only because he is a prominent legal practitioner, an incumbent Provincial Board
Member of Leyte, but also because he is a distant relative and our family lawyer.

2. During the month of September 2001, Atty. Arturo B. Astorga urged me to buy the "beach-front" property of Ms.
Villaflora Un in Baybay, Leyte. Although the price was P1.4 Million, he told me that it could be paid through installments.

3. Before I left for Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A., Atty. Astorga collected from me the amount of P110,000.00. He told me
that he would allegedly give the money to Ms. Un so that the property will not be offered to other persons. I did not
complain when Atty. Astorga did not give me a receipt because I trusted him being a distant relative and our family lawyer.

4. When I was in Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A., I sent the amount of P1,300,215.00 to Atty. Astorga intended to pay for the
remaining balance plus cost. A photocopy of the "Receipt For Money Remittance To PNB" (O.R. No. LV-067776 dated
September 19, 2001) is hereto attached as Annex "A."

5. In the month of December 2001, I returned to the Philippines because my father died. When I visited Atty. Astorga, he
told me that he has already paid Ms. Un and that he was allegedly working for the transfer of the title of the land to my
name. I reminded him to give me a copy of the deed of sale and he promised to do so.

6. In the latter part of December 2001, Atty. Astorga handed to me papers entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale of Portions of
Registered Land" and requested me to sign below the word "Conforme," which I did. After signing and while reading the
document, I noticed some strange features in the document, namely: it was undated; the sellers were a certain "Ariston
Chaperon and Ursula Gumba" (not Villaflora Un); it did not contain a description of the boundaries of the land subject of
the sale; and the number of the respective tax certificates of the sellers were not indicated. A photocopy of the said Deed
is hereto attached as Annex "B."

7. When I raised these matters with him, Atty. Astorga assured me that everything was alright as, according to him, he
would just make the necessary corrections later. Before we parted, Atty. Astorga reminded me that additional money was
needed for his attorney's fees, for processing as well as for taxes, fees and charges.

8. He gave a me a Tickler and a Statement of Account stating the expenses, his attorney's fees, some legal advi[c]e and
opinion and some other requests. A copy of said Tickler and Statement of Account [are] attached as Annexes "C" to "C-
3." Pursuant to the Tickler and Statement of Account, I sent the amount of P204,000.00 (or US$4,000.00) to Atty. Astorga
on January 9, 2002. A photocopy of the "Receipt for Money Remittance To PNB" (O.R. No. LV-079933) is attached as
Annex "D." Then on January 23, 2002, I sent another amount of P205,436.00 (or US$4,060.00) to Atty. Astorga. A
photocopy of the "Receipt for Money Remittance To PNB" (O.R. No. LV-080645) is attached as Annex "E."

9. A "Certification" issued by the PNB Remittance Centers Inc. showing that said amounts were indeed forwarded to the
PNB Baybay Branch under Account No. 451-504-6718 in the name of Atty. Arturo B. Astorga, is attached as Annex "F."

10. My brother, Vicentico R. Yamon Jr., verified from Ms. Villaflora Un the transaction and he was shocked when Ms. Un
told him that she did not receive a single centavo from Atty. Astorga. It turned out that the property subject of the undated
"Deed [o]f Absolute Sale [o]f Portions of Registered Land" was neither the land of Ms. Un nor a beach-front property.

11. Further verification revealed that the sellers' signatures in the subject Deed of Sale prepared by Atty. Astorga were
forgeries. Ariston Chaperon could not have signed the instrument of sale [in] December 2001 simply because he died
eight (8) years earlier on June 14, 1994 while Ursula Gumba followed him to the grave on the following year. A
Certification to this effect issued by the Local Civil Registry of Baybay, Leyte, is attached as Annex "G." (Please see also
the Affidavit of Angela Piamonte [Annex "M"]).

12. I immediately called Atty. Astorga and informed him that I discovered what he had done. Atty. Astorga apologized and
admitted that he has used the money. Thereafter, he made several promises to pay me back as follows: the end of the
month of May 2002; last week of June 2002; middle part of July 2002 and last week of September 2002. Atty. Astorga did
not fulfill his promises so I decided to go back home.

13. On or about the lat[t]er part of October 2002, I met Atty. Astorga at the house of my brother Vicentico R. Yamon, Jr. in
Brgy. Paguite, Abuyog, Leyte. I confronted him as to why he bought another lot whose sellers were already dead. Atty.
Astorga apologized saying: "Mao bitaw nay akong sayop, ngano naghimo ko adto." (That is my fault... why I did it...).
Thereafter, we made an accounting and he accepted the amount of P1,819,651.00 as the total money I gave him.

14. Later on, Atty. Astorga showed me two sets of documents which he had already signed and asked me to sign in the
space below the word "Conforme." In these documents entitled "Agreement" and "Deed of Real Estate Mortgage," Atty.
Astorga promised to pay me back on installment the amount of P1,819,651.00 and to mortgage to me his alleged
residential lots at Veterans Village, Quezon City. Photocopies of these documents are attached as Annexes "H" and "I,"
respectively.

15. When I refused to sign these documents, Atty. Astorga promised to make an initial payment of P1,000,000.00 on
November 4, 2002. However, and as what happened to his previous promises, he requested for the extension of the
period to November 8, 2002.

16. Finally, on November 7, 2002, I received a letter from Atty. Astorga informing me that he could not fulfill with his
promise citing various excuses. A photocopy of his Letter is attached as Annex "J."

x x x.1
On April 2, 2003, this Court issued a Resolution2 requiring respondent to file his comment to the above-mentioned
complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of the said Resolution. Respondent, however, failed to do so.

On November 9, 2005, complainant filed her Motions to Consider Respondent's Comment Waived and To Submit Case
for Resolution.3

Subsequently, this Court, noting that respondent still has not filed his comment to the complaint, issued a
Resolution4 dated February 8, 2006, requiring respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt for such failure; and to comply with this Court's Resolution of April 2, 2003 requiring him to file his
comment. Per Tracer5 sent to the Postmaster of Baybay, Leyte, respondent received the above Resolution on April 5,
2006. Nonetheless, despite receipt of the said Resolution, respondent still failed to file the required comment.

Thus, per Resolution6 dated July 22, 2009, this Court imposed upon respondent a fine of P1,000.00 and reiterated its
directive for respondent to file his comment to the complaint.

On July 29, 2009, complainant, again, filed Motions to Consider Respondent's Comment Waived and To Submit Case for
Resolution.7

On July 14, 2011, respondent submitted his Compliance8 to this Court's July 22, 2009 Resolution by paying the fine of
P1,000.00 imposed upon him. Respondent, however, did not file his comment and, instead, requested an extension of ten
(10) days within which to file the said comment.

Per Resolution9 of this Court dated August 24, 2011, complainant's Motions were noted and respondent's request for
extension often (10) days to file his comment was granted.

On October 17, 2011, complainant, again, filed Motions to Consider Respondent's Comment Waived and To Submit Case
for Resolution.10

In a Resolution11 dated February 29, 2012, this Court noted complainant's Motions and imposed upon respondent an
increased fine of P2,000.00 for his continued failure to file the required comment. The Court, likewise, reiterated its order
for respondent to file his Comment, but the latter still failed to comply.

On November 19, 2012, complainant reiterated his Motions to Consider Respondent's Comment Waived and To Submit
Case for Resolution.12
As of August 13, 2019, this Court has yet to receive respondent's comment to the complaint.

Thus, the Court deems it proper to consider respondent's right to file his comment to the complaint as waived and proceed
with the resolution of this case on the basis of the evidence presented by the complainant.

At the outset, this Court would like to address respondent's callous disregard of the various orders and processes it issued
which led to the unreasonable and inordinate delay in the resolution of the instant case. This Court has been very tolerant
of respondent's failure to comply with its directives as evidenced by the numerous opportunities which were given to him
to file his comment to the complaint. However, respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of this Court
without any justifiable reason, much less explanation, only shows his utter disrespect to the judicial institution. What
makes matters worse for respondent is the fact that he is not an ordinary litigant but is an officer of the court who is
particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes. As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know
that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and
completely13 and not partially, inadequately or selectively.14 Moreover, as the courts' indispensable partner in the sacred
task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer, like herein respondent, than any other to
uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to
obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the
exercise of disciplinary action against him.15

In the instant case, respondent's failure to comply with the Court's several directives to file his comment to the complaint
constitutes willful disobedience and gross misconduct.16 The Court defined gross misconduct as "any inexcusable,
shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is
prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause."17 It is a "conduct that is generally motivated
by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose."18In previous cases,19 this Court held that a respondent-lawyer's
failure to comply with the lawful orders of this Court constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect which,
alone, can merit the penalty of disbarment.

As mentioned above, respondent's willful disobedience of this Court's numerous orders has resulted in the extreme delay
of the instant proceedings. Thus, he is guilty of violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code),
which provides that "[a] lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice." He also violated Rules 12.03 and 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Code, which state, respectively,
that "[a] lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so" and "[a] lawyer shall not unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes."

To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the
courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code. Falling
short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based
on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in consideration of the surrounding facts.20

Thus, stated differently, judging from respondent's failure to file his comment after five (5) Resolutions issued by this
Court, nothing can be concluded therefrom but that respondent's acts, or inaction for that matter, were deliberate and
manipulating, which unreasonably delayed this Court's action on the case. These acts constitute conscious and total
indifference to the lawful orders of this Court, which, not only works against his case as he is now deemed to have waived
the filing of his comment, but more importantly is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment pursuant to
Section 27,21 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.22

As to the merit of complainant's allegations, it is evident from the documents presented that: respondent was the one who
sought the complainant and encouraged her to invest in and buy what he represented as a "beach-front" property;
respondent volunteered to act as complainant's representative in the supposed purchase of the alleged property as well
as the processing of the documents necessary to transfer title to complainant; respondent not only received but even
solicited and demanded substantial amounts from the complainant in four separate instances totaling P1,819,651.00,
which he himself acknowledged to have received;23 he misrepresented that the said amount would cover, aside from the
purchase price, expenses for the payment of various forms of taxes, processing fees and his professional
fee;24 respondent misappropriated the money he received from complainant; respondent deceived complainant by making
it appear that he bought the "beach-front" property when, in fact, he did not; he defrauded complainant and made false
representations by showing a "Deed of Absolute Sale"25 of another property which appeared to have been executed by
the owners thereof, when in fact, the said owners died eight (8) years prior to the date that they supposedly signed the
said Deed;26 and respondent even went to the extent of making it appear that these dead people acknowledged the
execution of the subject Deed of Sale before him as a notary public.27
What respondent did to complainant was plain and simple trickery. His transgression would have been mitigated had he
simply acknowledged, at the first instance, that he pocketed the money given to her by complainant and made amends by
returning the same. What makes his act more deplorable is that he took advantage of complainant's trust in him and
actively and knowingly deceived the latter by making it appear that he bought a property in her name when, in fact, he did
not. To make matters worse, he did not content himself with the supposed purchase price agreed upon and even had the
gall to ask for additional amounts to allegedly defray the expenses for taxes and other processing fees. For a number of
times, respondent promised to indemnify complainant, but he never did.

Through the foregoing acts, respondent is guilty of violating the provisions of Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that
"[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith."

Respondent also breached his oath as a lawyer to, among others, "obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and "conduct
[him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion."

Respondent is, likewise, guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which states that "a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized
by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the
element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. To be dishonest means the
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in
principle, fairness, and straightforwardness, while conduct that is deceitful means the proclivity for fraudulent and
deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice
and damage of the party imposed upon.28 In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or
acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with the
intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false statement or deed in the
manner contemplated to his injury.29 Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary to
justice, modesty or good morals.30 It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.31

Respondent's calculated acts of deceit, dishonesty, abuse of complainant's trust and confidence as well as his
misappropriation of the funds he received from complainant constitute malfeasance and is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession but also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice
law.32 Good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law, but is a
continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar.33

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended
by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral
conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Thus, a
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
deportment unbecoming of an attorney.34 A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not
only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are, likewise, essential demands for his continued membership in
it.35

The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be meted out against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires
consideration of a number of factors. When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the
primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve
the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.36

In CF Sharp Crew Management Incorporated v. Atty. Torres,37 the Court disbarred the respondent for failing to account
for, and misappropriating, the various amounts he received from his client. In Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III,38 the
Court, likewise, disbarred the lawyer therein for misappropriating his client's money intended for securing a certificate of
title on the latter's behalf.

In addition, as mentioned earlier, this Court has previously imposed the penalty of disbarment upon respondent-lawyers
who willfully disobeyed lawful orders of this Court.39

Thus, in determining the penalty in the instant case, aside from taking into account the gravity of the infractions that
respondent has committed, i.e., deceit, gross misconduct, violation of the lawyer's oath, misappropriation of the various
amounts of money he received from complainant, the Court takes into consideration his wanton disregard of the
disbarment complaint against him, particularly in ignoring the notices sent to him to file his comment. Judging from his
actuations, particularly his continued indifference with respect to the Court's directives in the present case, respondent
failed to consider that an administrative case against him, which could very well result in the revocation of his license and
expulsion from the Roll of Attorneys, is neither pressing nor important enough to merit his attention.

Furthermore, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that respondent has been found guilty and penalized in two
previous administrative cases.

In Nuñez, et at. v. Astorga,40 respondent therein was found guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the bar for the use
of offensive language in the pleadings he filed which were directed against the complainants and their counsel, in
connection with an administrative complaint for misconduct filed against respondent. He was meted the penalty of fine.

Subsequently, in two consolidated administrative complaints for disbarment, both entitled Saladaga v.
Astorga,41 respondent was sought to be disbarred after he entered into a pacto de retro sale with the complainant in the
said administrative case involving a parcel of land which he previously owned but has, in fact, been foreclosed and
acquired by a bank nine years earlier. While he was subsequently able to repurchase the property from the bank, he
again mortgaged the same property to another bank and after his failure to pay his obligation, the second bank foreclosed
the property, obtained title in its name and took possession thereof from the complainant, thus, depriving the latter of the
enjoyment of the property. Similar to the present case, the Court, found respondent guilty of fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, bad faith, and dishonesty. The Court ruled, thus:
xxxx

Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the "Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it appear that the property was covered by TCT
No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the owner's copy of the said certificate of title, when the truth is that
the said TCT had already been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not
even care to correct the wrong statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No. T-7235
on January 4, 1982, or barely a month after the execution of the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed an act
of gross dishonesty and deceit against complainant.

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not
only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is moreover expected to inspire respect and
obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers.
xxxx

x x x The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly
fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They show a
disregard for Section 63 of the Land Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on respondent's
part. Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.

x x x.42
In addition, the Court also found respondent guilty of disregarding several directives of this Court and of the Investigating
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for him to submit various pleadings despite due notice. Thus,
taking into consideration his previous infraction in Nuñez, et al. v. Astorga,43 this Court imposed upon respondent the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years with a stern warning that a similar misconduct in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

Interestingly, it bears to note that, after a check of respondent's records with the Office of the Bar Confidant, nothing
appears therein to show that he has served the penalty of two-years suspension imposed upon him by this Court in the
above case.

As a last note, a copy of the latest Resolution issued by this Court, dated February 13, 2019, was returned unserved with
a notation on the face of the envelope which reads: "RTS - No One to Receive - Addressee is sick due to his old
age."44 However, given respondent's propensity of manipulating people and misrepresenting facts, the Court, in the
absence of competent evidence to prove respondent's real state of health, may not give credence to the claim that he is
ailing and unwell enough not to be able to receive notices from and respond to the directives of this Court. In fact, a
perusal of respondent's records in the Saladaga case shows that he, likewise, refused to receive a copy of this Court's
Decision in the said administrative case on the same alleged ground that he is sick.
In sum, respondent has shown that he has a penchant for violating not only his oath as a lawyer and the Code, but orders
from the Court as well. He had been fined and warned that a similar violation will merit a more severe penalty, and yet, his
reprehensible conduct has, time and again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the legal profession. The Court
cannot, thus, allow respondent to continue his blatant disregard of the Code and of his sworn duty as a lawyer.

Considering all of the foregoing, the Court deems it fit to impose the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of
law upon Atty. Astorga. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and whenever it is made to appear that an
attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also
the duty of the Court to withdraw the same.45

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga GUILTY of deceit, gross misconduct in office, violation
of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and willful disobedience of lawful orders of the
Supreme Court. He is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
remove the name of Arturo B. Astorga from the Roll of Attorneys.

This Decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against respondent.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record
as a member of the Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

A.C. No. 8380 November 20, 2009

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H. MIJARES III, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted to him by his client.

The Facts and the Case

The facts are taken from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Sometime in January 2004, complainant Arellano University, Inc. (the University) engaged the services of respondent
Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, for securing a certificate of title covering a dried up portion of the Estero de
San Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was the subject of a Deed of Exchange dated October
1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the University.

In its complaint for disbarment against Mijares, the University alleged that it gave him all the documents he needed to
accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was given ₱500,000.00 on top of his attorney’s fees,
supposedly to cover the expenses for "facilitation and processing." He in turn promised to give the money back in case he
was unable to get the work done.

On July 5, 2004 Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the titling of the property, meaning
that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to approve it and that the documents had
already been sent to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The University requested Mijares
for copies of the MMDA approval but he unjustifiably failed to comply despite his client’s repeated demands. Then he
made himself scarce, prompting the University to withdraw all the cases it had entrusted to him and demand the return of
the ₱500,000.00 it gave him.
On November 23, 2005 the University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally terminating his services in the titling
matter and demanding the return of the ₱500,000.00. But the letter could not be served because he changed office
address without telling the University. Eventually, the University found his new address and served him its letter on
January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did not return the money asked of him.

In his answer to the complaint, Mijares alleged that he and the University agreed on a number of courses of action relating
to the project assigned to him: first, get the University’s application for a survey plan which the DENR-NCR approved for a
"facilitation cost" of ₱500,000.00; second, get a favorable MMDA endorsement for a "facilitation cost" of another
₱500,000.00; and, third, the titling of the property by the Land Registration Authority for a "facilitation cost" of still another
₱500,000.00.

Mijares also alleged that the DENR-NCR Assistant Regional Director told him that he needed to get a favorable
endorsement from MMDA and that the person to talk to about it was Undersecretary Cesar Lacuna. Mijares later met the
latter through a common friend. At their meeting, Mijares and Lacuna allegedly agreed on what the latter would get for
recommending approval of the application. Later, Mijares said, he gave the ₱500,000.00 to Lacuna through their common
friend on Lacuna’s instruction.

Mijares next alleged that, after he received the money, Lacuna told him that the University filed an identical application
earlier on March 15, 2002. Mijares claimed that the University deliberately withheld this fact from him. Lacuna said that,
because of the denial of that prior application, he would have difficulty recommending approval of the present application.
It appeared that Lacuna endorsed the previous application to the Mayor of Manila on July 23, 2003 but the latter did not
act on it.

Mijares finally alleged that he and Lacuna wanted to bypass the Mayor of Manila in the paper work but they were unable
to arrive at a concrete plan. Mijares claimed that the University gave him only ₱45,000.00 as his fees and that it was with
the University’s conformity that he gave the ₱500,000.00 to Lacuna.

The IBP designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the complaint. Despite
numerous settings, however, Mijares failed to appear before the Commissioner and adduce evidence in his defense.

On October 17, 2008 Commissioner Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation1 in the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Phillippines’ Board of Governors. The Report said that the University did not authorize Mijares to give ₱500,000.00
to the then MMDA Deputy Chairman Cesar Lacuna; that Mijares had been unable to account for and return that money
despite repeated demands; and that he admitted under oath having bribed a government official.

Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05,
Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and meted out
the penalty of disbarment; b) that he be ordered to return the ₱500,000.00 and all the pertinent documents to the
University; and c) that Mijares’ sworn statement that formed part of his Answer be endorsed to the Office of the
Ombudsman for investigation and, if warranted, for prosecution with respect to his shady dealing with Deputy Chairman
Lacuna.

On December 11, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XVIII-2008-631, adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but modifying the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension from
the practice of law and ordering Mijares to return the ₱500,000.00 and all pertinent documents to the University within six
months from receipt of the Court’s decision.2

The Question Presented

The only question presented in this case is whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty of misappropriating the
₱500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing the titling of a property
that it claimed.

The Court’s Ruling

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for the
following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.3
Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he must promptly account
for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of said money or property, he
must hold them separate from that of his own and make sure that they are used for their intended purpose. If not used, he
must return the money or property immediately to his client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to
have misappropriated the same in violation of the trust reposed on him.4 A lawyer’s conversion of funds entrusted to him
is a gross violation of professional ethics.5

Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence on record that the Court
can consider is the University’s evidence that he got ₱500,000.00 from complainant for expenses in facilitating and
processing its title application; that he undertook to return the money if he did not succeed in his purpose; that he falsely
claimed having obtained the MMDA approval of the application; and that he nonetheless refused to return the money
despite repeated demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the finding of guilt of the Investigating Commissioner and
the IBP Board of Governors.

Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid out in his answer, the same does not rouse
sympathy. He claims that he gave the ₱500,000.00 to Undersecretary Lacuna, with the University’s conformity, for a
favorable MMDA endorsement to the Mayor of Manila. He also claims that, in a complete turnaround, Lacuna later said
that he could not provide the endorsement because, as it turned out, the MMDA had previously given such endorsement
of the University’s earlier application and the Mayor of Manila did not act on that endorsement.

But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the University and make it see that it had no cause for
complaint, having given him clearance to pass on the ₱500,000.00 to Lacuna. Instead, Mijares kept silent. He did not
deny that the University went all over town looking for him after he could not return the money. Nor did he take any action
to compel Lacuna to hand back the money that the University gave him. More, his not showing up to testify on his behalf
at the investigation of the case is a dead giveaway of the lack of merit of his defense. No evidence exists to temper the
doom that he faces.

Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed a government official to act favorably on his
client’s application to acquire title to a dried-up creek. That is quite dishonest. The Court is not, therefore, inclined to let
him off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another way of saying he can resume his practice after a time if
he returns the money and makes a promise to shape up.1avvphi1

The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBP’s recommendation that the Court include in its decision an order
directing Mijares to return the ₱500,000.00 that the University entrusted to him. The University knowingly gave him that
money to spend for "facilitation" and processing. It is not naïve. There is no legitimate expense called "facilitation" fee.
This term is a deodorized word for bribe money. The Court will not permit the conversion of a disbarment proceeding into
a remedy for recovering bribe money lost in a bad deal.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, GUILTY of violation of Rules
1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. He is, in addition, directed to return to
complainant Arellano University, Inc. all the documents in his possession covering the titling matter that it referred to him.

Let the sworn statement of respondent Mijares, forming his Answer, be forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for
whatever action it deems proper under the circumstances.

Adm. Case No. 8383 December 11, 2012

AMPARO BUENO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. RAÑESES, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon Rañeses filed on March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Commissioner Agustinus V.
Gonzaga, and subsequently Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez- de los Reyes, conducted the fact-finding investigation on
the complaint.

Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation2 dated September 29, 2008 to the IBP Board
of Governors which approved it in a resolution dated December 11, 2008.

In a letter3 dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal transmitted to the Office of Chief
Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a Notice of Resolution4 and the records of the case.

Factual Antecedents

In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to

represent her in Civil Case No. 777. In consideration for his services, Bueno

paid Atty. Rañeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him

P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer

fee paid.

Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings. On several occasions, Atty.
Rañeses would either be absent or late.

Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00. This amount would allegedly be divided
between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing Civil Case No. 777, so that they would not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses
told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to raise the demanded
amount, and gave it to Atty. Rañeses.

According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in December 1988, because the amount she
had previously given was inadequate. Bueno then sold her sala set and colored television to raise the demanded amount,
which she again delivered to Atty. Rañeses.

Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment on the adverse party’s offer of evidence
and to submit their memorandum on the case, but Atty. Rañeses failed to comply with the court’s directive. According to
Bueno, Atty. Rañeses concealed this development from her. In fact, she was shocked when a court sheriff arrived
sometime in May 1991 to execute the decision against them.

Bueno went to Atty. Rañeses’ office to ask him about what happened to the case. Atty. Rañeses told her that he had not
received any decision. Bueno later discovered from court records that Atty. Rañeses actually received a copy of the
decision on December 3, 1990. When she confronted Atty. Rañeses about her discovery and showed him a court-issued
certification, Atty. Rañeses simply denied any knowledge of the decision.

In a separate affidavit,6 Bueno related another instance where Atty. Rañeses asked his client for money to win a case.
Sometime in June 1991, Atty. Rañeses allegedly asked her to deliver a telegram from Justice Buena of the Court of
Appeals to her aunt, Socorro Bello. He told her to tell Bello to prepare P5,000.00, an amount that Justice Buena
purportedly asked for in relation to Criminal Case No. T-1909 that was then on appeal with the Court of Appeals.

According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses went to Bello’s residence two weeks later. In her (Bueno’s) presence, Bello paid Atty.
Rañeses P5,000.00. Bello demanded a receipt but Atty. Rañeses refused to issue one, telling her that none of his clients
ever dared to demand a receipt for sums received from them.

Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly failed to attend the hearings scheduled by
Commissioner Gonzaga on March 20, 2000,[7] on May 11, 20008 and on October 2, 2000.9 During the hearing on October
2, 2000, Commissioner Gonzaga issued an Order10 declaring Atty. Rañeses in default. Bueno presented her evidence and
was directed to file a formal offer.
On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the Complaint and Supporting
Papers"11 (dated September 30, 2000) filed by Atty. Rañeses. Atty. Rañeses asked in his motion that the hearing on
October 2, 2000 be reset to sometime in December 2000, as he had prior commitments on the scheduled day. He also
asked for copies of the complaint and of the supporting papers, claiming that he had not been furnished with these. In the
interest of substantial justice, Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled a clarificatory hearing on November 16, 200012

Atty. Rañeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000. In the same hearing, Commissioner Gonzaga noted
that the registry return card refuted Atty. Rañeses’ claim that he did not receive a copy of the complaint. Commissioner
Gonzaga scheduled another clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2001. He stated that if Atty. Rañeses failed to appear,
the case would be deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant submits her memorandum.13

Atty. Rañeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day, Commissioner Gonzaga declared the case
deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant’s submission of her memorandum.14

At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who scheduled another hearing on March 14,
2003.15 During the hearing, only Bueno and her counsel were present. The Commissioner noted that the IBP-CBD
received a telegram from Atty. Rañeses asking for the hearing’s resetting because he had prior commitments. The
records, however, showed that Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer and the case had already been submitted for
resolution. Thus, Commissioner De los Reyes issued an Order16 directing Bueno to submit her formal offer of evidence
and her documentary evidence, together with her memorandum.

The IBP-CBD received Bueno’s Memorandum17 on May 27, 2003, but she did not file any formal offer, nor did she submit
any of the documentary evidence indicated as attachments to her complaint.

The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings

In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be absolved of
the charge of negligence, but found him guilty of soliciting money to bribe a judge.

Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and certifications that she indicated as
attachments to her complaint. These would have proven that Atty. Rañeses had indeed been negligent in pursuing her
case. Without these documents, which are not difficult to procure from the courts, Commissioner Limpingco concluded
that he would only be left with Bueno’s bare allegations which could not support a finding of negligence.

Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Bueno’s allegation that Atty. Rañeses solicited money to bribe judges to be
credible. According to Commissioner Limpingco, the act of soliciting money to bribe a judge is, by its nature, done in
secret. He observed that Bueno had consistently affirmed her statements in her affidavit, while Atty. Rañeses did nothing
to refute them.

Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Rañeses even made a false claim before the investigating commissioners,
as he alleged in his "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the Complaint and Supporting Papers" that he did not
receive the complaint against him, a fact belied by the registry receipt card evidencing his receipt.

Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be disbarred for failure to maintain his personal
integrity and for failure to maintain public trust.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, but
reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension from the practice of law.19

The Court’s Ruling

The Court approves the IBP’s findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Rañeses from the practice of law in accordance with
Commissioner Limpingco’s recommendation and based on our own observations and findings in the case.

The charge of negligence

According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should serve their clients with competence and
diligence. Specifically, Rule 18.02 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation." Rule 18.03, on the other hand, states that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable."

"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in them."20 A client is entitled to the benefit of all remedies and defenses authorized by law,
and is expected to rely on his lawyer to avail of these remedies or defenses.21

In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsel’s failure to file an appellant’s brief amounts to inexcusable
negligence.22 In Garcia v. Bala,23 the Court even found the respondent lawyer guilty of negligence after availing of an
erroneous mode of appeal. To appeal a decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the
respondent therein filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, instead of filing a verified petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. Because of his error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing his clients.

In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse party’s offer of evidence and to submit the
required memorandum would have amounted to negligence. However, as noted by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did
not support her allegations with court documents that she could have easily procured. This omission leaves only Bueno’s
bare allegations which are insufficient to prove Atty. Rañeses’ negligence. We support the Board of Governors’ ruling on
this point.

The charge of soliciting money

In Bildner v. Ilusorio,24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to get a favorable decision for his client.
He visited the judge’s office several times and persistently called his residence to convince him to inhibit from his client’s
case. The Court found that the respondent lawyer therein violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility –
the rule that instructs lawyers to refrain from any impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of
influencing, the court. The respondent lawyer therein was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below, he committed a fraudulent exaction,
and at the same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards
the IBP during the investigation of his case; he practically disregarded its processes and even lied to one of the
Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given him about the case.

While the only evidence to support Bueno’s allegations is her own word, the Investigating Commissioner found her
testimony to be credible. The Court supports the Investigating Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner
Limpingco succinctly observed:

By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily take place in secrecy with only
respondent Atty. Rañeses and complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant Amparo Bueno has executed sworn
statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in hearings held before the IBP Investigating
Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for his part, has not even seen it fit to file any answer to the complaint
against him, much less appear in any hearings scheduled in this investigation.25

Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners reveals his propensity for lying. It
confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that Bueno’s affidavits depict him to be.

Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Rañeses merits
the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by
his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer’s relations to the client, to the court and to the
Integrated Bar.

First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent.1âwphi1 It is false because no
bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the
exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that
court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means – a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last
but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.

From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an
institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass
unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all – to all lawyers, their clients and the general public – that the Court will not
hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the
institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the
Bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the respondent.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, be notified of
this Decision.

A.C. No. 8494, October 05, 2016

SPOUSES EMILIO AND ALICIA JACINTO, Complainants, v.ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer shall observe candor, honesty and fairness in dealing with his clients, and shall only charge fair and reasonable
fees for his legal services. He should not excessively estimate the value of his professional services. In drawing up the
terms of his professional engagement, he should not practice deceit. The clients are entitled to rescind the written
agreement on his professional fees if the terms thereof contravened the true agreement of the parties.

Antecedents

This administrative case stems from the complaint brought on December 8, 2009 by the Spouses Emilio and Alicia
Jacinto, then 81 and 76 years of age, respectively, against Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr. for the latter's unjust and dishonest
treatment of them as his clients. They hereby seek that he be sanctioned for his actuations.1chanrobleslaw

The complainants averred that a private survey team had conducted a survey of Cad. 237 Lot No. 1351 on October 10-
11, 2008 pursuant to the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, in Cagayan de Oro City in connection with the
reconstitution of the lost certificate of title of said lot by the owners; that after conducting the perimeter survey, the survey
team had tried to enter the premises owned by them but they had prevented the team from doing so because their
premises had already been segregated by virtue of the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-3387; that their land
covered by OCT No. P-3387 had already been subdivided into nine lots; that the survey team had then desisted from
proceeding with their survey of their land but had nonetheless informed them that they would return another time for the
survey; and that this had forced them to consult a lawyer on the legal remedies to prevent the intrusion on their
property.2chanrobleslaw

The complainants further averred that they had then consulted with the respondent, briefing him on their concern, and
delivering to him the documents pertinent to their land; that after scrutinizing the documents, he had told them that he
would be initiating a case for certiorari in their behalf to nullify the order for the reconstitution of the lost title covering Cad.
237 Lot No. 1351; that he had then insinuated that one of their lots would be his attorney's fees; and that they had not
initially agreed to the insinuation because the lots had already been allocated to each of their seven children, but they had
ultimately consented to giving him only a portion of Lot No. 37926-H with an area of 250 square meters n.3chanrobleslaw

It appears that soon after t he respondent unilaterally prepared the document so-called Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryI, ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR., of legal age, married and a resident of Lot 13, Block 1,
Xavier Heights Subd., Upper Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City, hereinafter referred as the FIRST PARTY;
and cralawlawlibrary

WE, SPOUSES EMILIO JACINTO AND ALICIA JACINTO, both legal age, and residents of Cagayan de Oro City, herein
referred as the SECOND PARTY;
 WITNESSETH:

1. That the FIRST PARTY shall be the counsel/lawyer of the SECOND PARTY, regarding their parcel of land formerly
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-3387 with an area of 4,138 sq. m., located at Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro
City, presently subdivided into 8 lots with individual certificate of titles (sic);

2. That the First Party shall get 300 sq. m., from Lot No. 37925-G covered by TCT No. 121708

3. That this agreement shall take effect immediately upon the signing of the parties (sic) cannot be revoked, amended or
modified by the Second Party without the consent of the First Party.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The complainants recalled that on October 17, 2008 the respondent requested them to proceed to his law office. What
thereafter transpired and that led to the signing of the MOA were set forth in their complaint, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On October 17, 2008, my wife received a phone call from the office of Atty. Bangot directing us to go to his office to sign
documents they have prepared. The phone call was relayed to me by my wife so we immediately proceeded to his office
arriving thereat at exactly 4:00 PM. The daughter of Atty. Bangot handed to us two sets of documents for our signatures.
Because of full trust to Atty. Bangot, we did not bother reading the contents of the documents. Per instruction, we brought
the papers to their friend lawyer for notarization and after the notarization returned to the office where we were given our
personal file, without reading every detail of the documents.

Upon arriving at our residence, I read the contents of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Said MOA was not signed
by Atty. Bangot and did not bear the signature of witnesses. I was surprised to know that the terms of the (MOA) did not
reflect the true intentions being contemplated in our previous discussions. Contrary to what I have told him, a different
area which is 37925-G under TCT No. 121708 was written. I already told him that my other lots including the lot written in
the MOA could no longer be. disposed of because these lots were already committed to each of my children. The lot area
was also increased from 250 sq. m. to 300 sq. m. Because of this situation, I called my wife and children and told them
about the problem. My daughter whose share was involved reacted badly and she was hurt because she will then be
deprived of her place to live in, in the future. We continued our discussion and we decided to see Atty. Bangot to have the
MOA be revoked because we felt that we were deceived, Atty. Bangot took advantage of our old age, thus breaking the
trust and confidence the client[']s and lawyer should uphold at all times in the exercise of one's profession.

As a gesture of acknowledging his efforts, we offered to pay him in cash, fair enough for the services he had rendered to
us. However, he refused to revoke the MOA because accordingly, he would consult his wife which finally did not
materialize because his wife was not amenable which in effect showed that they have vested interest on the property and
they are bent on taking the property at any cause. He even challenged us to file an appropriate case in court against him
rather than agree with our pleading for payment of cash. Likewise, he refused our offer to pay his services in cash alleging
that he already filed a Manifestation in court and claimed that our possession would not be disturbed and that he will be
filing a case for Certiorari as promised.

To our surprise though, we came to know that the Manifestation filed by Atty. Bangot is not a preparatory pleading
for certiorari. No way could it even stop the intrusion into our property. Basically, we were deceived by Atty. Bangot into
believing that the Manifestation he filed would stop any legal disturbance on our property and the same is preparatory
for certiorari.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Feeling aggrieved, the complainants decided to bring their complaint against the respondent.

On his part, the respondent denied the allegations of the complainants. He insisted that the complaint against him was a
harassment tactic designed to intimidate him from seeking judicial remedies to settle their dispute on the validity of the
MOA;6 that the MOA was valid; that the Manifestation for Information he had filed in court prevented the intrusion into the
complainants' land; that the administrative complaint was designed to insure the derailment of his application for a
judgeship position, and to cover up the negligence of the complainants' counsel as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2008-
302 (for annulment and/or rescission of agreement), which case was dismissed for failure to comply with the requirement
for the prior barangay conciliation proceedings; and that they had voluntarily signed the MOA without intimidation, fraud or
undue influence.7chanrobleslaw

On August 23, 2010, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.8chanrobleslaw

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In due course, IBP Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero submitted his Report and Recommendation9 finding the complaint
against the respondent meritorious, and recommending that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year for his unfair and injudicious treatment of the complainants as his clients.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-71,10 the IBP Board of Governors increased the duration of the respondent's recommended
penalty to suspension from the practice of law for two years, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules and considering that Respondent breached his duty of candor and fairness to his client, Atty. Emelie P.
Bangot, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Through its Resolution No. XXI-2014-315,11 the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for
reconsideration.

Issue

Did the respondent violate his ethical duties as a member of the Bar in his dealings with the complainants?

Ruling of the Court

We find and hold that the respondent grossly violated his Lawyer's Oath and his ethical duties as an attorney because he
did not observe candor and fairness in his dealings with his clients.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Cachapero, which sufficiently described the violations of the respondent, provide an
irrefutable insight into the gravity of the violations by the respondent, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The question to ask is, "Was the MOA fair to the parties and entered into by them in goodfaith?"

The undersigned resolves in the negative. To begin with, the conduct of Respondent had evinced an instinctive interest in
the property of Complainants. He had the MOA executed at the same time he filed the Manifestation for Information
before the court that was hearing LRC Case No. 98-010. Not only that, Respondent's proposal to have a MOA executed
between him and the Complainant was meant to impress that his supposed attorney's fees would be paid on contingent
basis, however, a perusal of the MOA indicates that the payment of Respondents' fee by way of a real property is being
made immediately effective upon execution of the agreement.

As to the agreement of the Complainant and the Respondent, the undersigned gives full faith to the allegation of
Complainant that the payment of Respondent's attorney's fees by way of a real property would come from TCT No.
121709 and not T-121708. Complainants explained that the latter lot had already been committed to their seven (7)
children especially because this lot is situated in a prime location thus they could not have picked the same over Lot No.
121709. The Respondent knew straightforwardly that lot 121708 was a better lot yet Respondent gave a different account
of their agreement and took advantage of the frailty and advance ages (sic) of his clients.

But, the most shocking of all, is the apparent inequity or disproportion between the amount of attorney's fees (measured
from the value of the property taken by Respondent) and the effort or service already performed or still to be performed by
him. The Complainants were not made parties to the LRC case or any other case and Respondent filed a mere two-paged
Manifestation for Information in court which he did almost effortlessly. It is not clear how the court had reacted to the
manifestation but Respondent did not follow it up with [any] other action. Despite the same, Respondent stuck to his tale
that the Complainants had signed [the] MOA and despite his minimal representation of the Complainants in court, he held
on to his idea that he had taken from his clients valid title to a million [pesos] worth of real estate in payment of his fees.

The undersigned does not see fairness and judiciousness to Respondent's treatment of his clients, 81 and 76 years old,
respectively, and he need not add to his brief disquisition in this regard.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We adopt the findings and note the insights thus expressed.

We must, therefore, highlight the following reasons why the findings and insights should be sustained.

To determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees, the following factors as enumerated in Rule 20.1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility may serve as a guide, to wit: (a) the time spent and the extent of the services rendered or
required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill
demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the
customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs; (g) the amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service; (h) the contingency or certainty of
compensation; (i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and j) the professional standing of
the lawyer.

It was not disputed that only the filing of the two-paged Manifestation for Information constituted the respondent's rendition
of professional services for the complainants. Although he did claim that the filing of the Manifestation for Informationhad
prevented any intrusion on their property, thereby fulfilling his end of the contract,13 the worth of such minimal effort was
exaggerated and disproportionate when taken in the context of the attorney's fees being Lot No. 37925-G with 300 square
meters in area. The two-paged Manifestation for Informationwas not even the procedural precursor of the promised
petition for certiorari. Moreover, he did not actually file the petition for certiorari as he had promised. And, lastly, he did
nothing more after filing the Manifestation for Information. He certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving
property of a substantial value from the complainants after having made them believe that he could ensure their land from
intrusion by third parties. He took advantage of them who had reposed their full trust and confidence in his ability to
perform the task by virtue of his being a lawyer. He was definitely bent on obtaining Lot No. 37925-G than in protecting
the complainants' interest in their property. He exhibited this zeal by refusing their offer to give cash for his attorney's fees
instead of the land. We sadly note in this connection that his changing the property ostensibly agreed upon with the bigger
lot as payment for his legal services14reflected his deceit at the start of the relationship. He maintained the deceit by
ultimately enforcing the MOA against them through the action for specific performance.

Surely, the totality of the respondent's actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession. On the basis of his
acts and actuations, the attorney's fees in the form of the lot he charged from them were unconscionable and
unreasonable, and should be struck down for failing to pass muster under the aforestated guidelines.

The respondent appears to have impressed on the complainants at the time of their negotiations that the attorney's fees in
the form of the lot would be delivered to him only on a contingent basis. Again, he had misrepresented himself to them
because the express terms of the MOA stipulated that "this agreement shall take effect immediately upon the signing of
the parties [and] cannot be revoked, amended or modified by the Second Party without the consent of the First Party."

As worded, the agreement was not a contingent fee arrangement. Indeed, a contingent fee arrangement is a contract in
writing in which the fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the
success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right.15 The amount of the contingent fee agreed upon by the parties
is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much
higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing should the
suit fail. Such arrangement is generally recognized as valid and binding in this jurisdiction but its terms must be
reasonable.16 Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethicsstates that "a contract for a contingent fee, when sanctioned
by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." A contract of this
nature is permitted because it redounds to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the client
has a meritorious cause of action but has no means with which to pay for the legal services unless he can, with the
sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, such
arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and have their
rights vindicated.17chanrobleslaw

Considering that a contingent fee arrangement is susceptible to abuse, the courts should closely scrutinize it to protect the
client from unjust charges. The court looks in large measure at the reasonableness of the stipulated fee under the
circumstances of each case.18 Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. -- An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of
the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be
bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be
paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. (Emphasis ours)
All the foregoing circumstances established that the respondent was deceitful, dishonest and unreasonable in his dealings
with the complainants as his clients. He thus violated his Lawyer's Oath, whereby he vowed, among others, to do no
falsehood, and not to consent to the doing of any falsehood, as well as not to delay any man's cause for money or malice
but to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion "with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to [his] clients. He also breached the following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.

Canon 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Canon 20- A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Rule 20.4 A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients
concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
We have said time and again, and this we cannot overemphasize, that the Law is neither a trade nor a craft but a
profession whose basic ideal is to render public service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. If the Law has to
remain an honorable profession and has to attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its
tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets and principles.19 The
respondent's behavior and deceit demonstrated a preference for self-gain that transgressed his sworn duty of fidelity,
loyalty and devotion to his clients' cause. His betrayal of his clients' trust besmirched the honorable name of the Law
Profession. These considerations justify suspending him from the practice of law.

Moreover, the respondent made the following allegations in his motion for reconsideration filed with the IBP Board of
Governors, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
9. It is quite disturbing that to cover up Atty. Palasan's negligence and reckless filing of Annulment and/or Rescission of
Agreement titled Spouses Emilio Jacinto and Alicia Jacinto vs. Atty. Emelie P. Bangot docketed as Civil Case No. 2008-
302 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City where the subject matter was the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) between the complainant and respondent, said counsel resorted to another forum by filing this
administrative case where his chance of oppressing and harassing respondent is far greater because when he filed said
administrative case Atty. Roan Libarios then one of the Officers of the IBP National Chapter and member of the Board of
Governors, representing Eastern Mindanao, was holding office at IBP, Ortigas Center, Pasig City as such, his officemate
or law partner at Butuan City (sic). Unfortunately, for respondent, Atty. Libarios eventually became the IBP National
President;

xxxx

18. The statement by Commissioner Cachapero in his Report and Recommendation, 1st sentence, 2nd par., thereof that:
"On October 10 & 11, 2008, a survey was conducted on Cadastral Lot No. 1351 situated at Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro
City in connection with the reconstitution of the lost title of the lot which was then pending before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39, R-10, Cagayan de Oro City." is quite confusing and designed to put down respondent probably at any cost and
probably by an "unseen but influential hands (sic)";20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The aforequoted allegations indicated that the respondent had readily attributed the filing of the administrative charge to
the lawyer representing the complainants in the suit against him to annul or rescind the MOA, as well as to "unseen but
influential hands" in the hierarchy of the IBP. The attribution was bereft of factual and legal justifications, however,
because he did not even attempt to establish it with satisfactory proof. We cannot but dismiss the attribution as malicious
and unfounded in view of the record establishing his serious ethical violations. He displayed an unmitigated lack of
professionalism by casting aspersions against his peers, and exhibited a dangerous propensity to disparage others, which
should move us to consider his violations as aggravated.

To be now considered, therefore, is the condign penalty of the respondent. A review of precedents shows that the penalty
of suspension, or even disbarment, has been meted on similar violations and transgressions. In Santeco v. Avance,21 the
respondent attorney was suspended for five years for abandoning the cause of her client without notice despite her having
collected her legal fees. She also failed to account for the money of the client and constantly refused to submit herself to
the proceedings of the IBP. In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.,22 this Court disbarred the respondent attorney who did not promptly
account for the funds he had received for the benefit of his client, and for his deceit in dealings with his client.
In Overgaard v. Valdez,23the respondent attorney was disbarred for assuring the complainant that his property involved in
a civil case would be safeguarded, and then collecting the full amount of legal fees amounting to P900,000.00, only to
desert the complainant after receiving the fees. The respondent attorney had further failed to submit an answer as well as
to attend the proceedings before the IBP.

Although the complainants appeared to have initially bound themselves to give a part of their land as the respondent's
professional fees, they did so apparently because he had misrepresented to them the gravity and extent of their legal
matter. His misrepresentation was undeniably calculated to make them part with their valuable asset in lieu of cash. He
did not thereafter render any worthy professional legal service in their favor. Verily, as the cliche goes, they did not get
their money's worth from him. Even if this charge was his first infraction, the grossness of his violations of the Lawyer's
Oath and the various relevant canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted earlier absolutely warranted his
suspension from the practice of law for five years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with warning of sterner
sanctions should he hereafter commit a similar offense. This duration of suspension was the penalty we prescribed in the
recent case of Mercullo v. Ramon24 where the respondent lawyer had deceived the complainants into parting with the
substantial sum of P350,000.00 as her attorney's fees but did not subsequently perform her professional undertaking.

In addition, the respondent should not be entitled to receive any attorney's fees in view of the worthlessness of the
professional services he supposedly rendered. There is no question, as ruled in Sanchez v. Aguilos,25cralawred that every
attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance
and request of his client; and that for as long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the
interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. Yet, equally without question is that
the attorney should not accept the engagement that is way above his ability and competence to handle, for there will then
be no basis for him to accept any amount as attorney's fees; or that he should at least begin to perform the contemplated
task undertaken for the client to entitle him to be compensated on the basis of quantum meruit.26chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, this Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR. guilty of violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility; SUSPENDShim from the practice of law for five (5) years
effective upon notice of this decision, with warning that sterner sanctions will be meted on him for a similar offense;
and DECLARES that he is not entitled to recover any attorney's fees from the complainants.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the
Office of the Court Administrator.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to all courts of the Philippines.

A.C. No. 11059, November 09, 2016

JOSE ANTONIO F. BALINGIT, Complainant, v. ATTY. RENATO M. CERVANTES AND ATTY. TEODORO B.
DELARMENTE, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This resolves the administrative complaint1 filed by Jose Antonio F. Balingit (complainant) against Arty. Renato M.
Cervantes and Atty. Teodoro B. Delarmente (respondents).

Facts

Complainant is a former Filipino citizen who subsequently became a naturalized British citizen.2 On July 9, 2011,
complainant's two (2) sons, Jose Antonio Balingit, Jr. (Jose Antonio, Jr.) and Carlo Balingit (Carlo), who were on board
their respective motorcycles, figured in a head-on collision with the car driven by David A. Alizadeh (David). Carlo
sustained serious physical injuries, while Jose Antonio, Jr. was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. Kristopher
Rocky Kabigting, Jr. (Kristopher), Jose Antonio Jr.'s passenger, also suffered physical injuries. As a result, on July 13,
2011, an information3 for criminal negligence was filed against David with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Antipolo City.

Subsequently, complainant, together with Carlo, Kristopher, and the heirs of Jose Antonio Jr., engaged the legal services
of respondents in filing a separate civil suit for damages and an administrative case with the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) against David, who recently passed the physician board exam at that time.4 Thus, on August 8, 2011,
Atty. Cervantes sent a demand letter5 to David for payment of P2,000,000.00 plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Also,
on August 22, 2011, Atty. Cervantes sent a letter6 to the PRC informing the latter of the pending criminal case against
David and requesting that the issuance of David's license to practice medicine be deferred or suspended until the
termination of David's criminal case. On September 16, 2011, the PRC replied7 and informed Atty. Cervantes of the
requirements in order to file an administrative case against David.

Meanwhile, Atty. Cervantes prepared and signed an Agreement8dated August 18, 2011 embodying the terms of
respondents' engagement. Addressed to Kristopher, Carlo, and the heirs of Jose Antonio, Jr., the Agreement
provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This will formalize our agreement whereby our law firm shall represent you in the civil case for damages to be filed
against DAVID A. ALIZADEH, et al., relative to that tragic incident on July 9, 2011that occurred in Antipolo City. We
hereby confirm the terms for the handling thereof, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. Acceptance Fee. Treating you as a most favored client, our acceptance fee is only Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) to be paid upon the signing hereof;
2. Appearance Fee. Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) for every appearance by any of our lawyer/s before the court;

3. Success Fee. Twenty Percent (20%) of any amount that may be actually collected by reason of the successful
handling of the case;

4. Official and other Fees, such as docket fees, transcript of stenographic notes, expenses for messengerial, mailing,
photocopying services and expenses for representation shall be for your account.9 (Emphasis in the original.)
Kristopher, Carlo, and the heirs of Jose Antonio, Jr. did not sign the Agreement.10 Just the same, complainant paid the
sum of P45,000.00 as partial acceptance fee for the filing of the civil suit for damages as evidenced by a handwritten
receipt issued by Atty. Delarmente.11 In addition, Atty. Cervantes allegedly received P10,000.00 from Imelda Balingit
(Imelda), complainant's daughter-in-law, without issuing any receipt.12However, despite respondents' receipt of the
P45,000.00 and complainant's submission to respondents of the necessary documents,13 as of December 19, 2011, when
the present complaint was filed, and until today, respondents have failed to institute the separate civil suit for damages
agreed upon.14chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, the criminal case was referred to mediation by the trial court for possible settlement of the civil aspect of the
case. During the negotiations, complainant and the representatives of David agreed to settle.15 Thus, on October 13,
2011, a Compromise Agreement16 was signed by complainant, one Anthony T. Balingit, Carlo, and the representatives of
David. David agreed to pay P1,000,000.00 in exchange for the execution of an affidavit of desistance in the criminal case
and dismissal and/or withdrawal of any civil case for damages.17 The Agreement was set for the consideration and
approval of the MTCC Antipolo City on November 9, 2011.18chanrobleslaw

Atty. Cervantes, upon discovering that complainant entered into a Compromise Agreement, attended the November 9,
2011 hearing and demanded 10% of the amount of the compromise as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as appearance fee
from complainant.19 Complainant refused on the ground that the compromise was entered into before the mediator.20 On
November 10, 2011, Atty. Cervantes sent a demand letter21 to complainant seeking payment of P100,000.00 as attorney's
fees, representing 10% of the amount of the compromise, and appearance fee of P5,000.00 for his attendance in the
November 9, 2011 hearing. As complainant still refused to pay, Atty. Cervantes filed a criminal
complaint22 for estafa against complainant, his wife, and his sons, as well as a complaint for deportation with the Bureau
of Immigration, on the ground that complainant and his family are undesirable British aliens.23chanrobleslaw

On December 19, 2011, complainant filed the present disbarment case against respondents before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).24 On even date, the latter required respondents to file their
answer.25cralawred Respondents filed separate motions for extension of time to submit their answers praying that they be
given until February 9, 2012 to file their respective answers.26chanrobleslaw

Atty. Delarmente failed to file his answer whereas Atty. Cervantes filed a motion to admit his verified answer27 only on
March 27, 2012.

Atty. Cervantes denies receiving P10,000.00 from Imelda and claims that he learned of complainant's payment of
P45,000.00 only later.28 As for his failure to file the separate civil suit for damages, Atty. Cervantes claims that he has not
received the acceptance and docket fees to file the case.29chanrobleslaw

Atty. Cervantes also argues that the Compromise Agreement has no legal effect since complainant is not a compulsory
heir of Jose Antonio, Jr., who was legally married with two (2) children. Hence, it should have been the heirs of the
deceased that entered into the Compromise Agreement. Just the same, Atty. Cervantes asserts that he should be paid his
portion of the settlement as his attorney's fees since it was due to the demand letters he sent to David and the complaint
he filed with the PRC that moved David's family to enter into a Compromise Agreement.30chanrobleslaw

Investigating Commissioner Atty. Peter Irving C. Corvera (Commissioner Corvera) set the case for mandatory conference
and required the parties to submit their respective mandatory conference briefs.31 Respondents, however, did not submit
their conference briefs and repeatedly failed to appeal in the mandatory conference despite notice. On motion of
complainant's counsel, Commissioner Corvera terminated the mandatory conference and required all parties to submit
their respective verified position papers.32 Complainant complied with the Commissioner's directive and filed his Position
Paper33 on October 11, 2012 but respondents again failed to submit their verified position papers.

In his Report and Recommendation34 dated January 2, 2014, Commissioner Corvera found respondents guilty of grave
misconduct and violation of Rule 1.03, Canon 15, Canon 20, and Rule 20.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) and recommended that they be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-88635 adopting and approving the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner but reducing the penalty to suspension from the practice
of law for three (3) months.

Ruling

We affirm the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD finding respondents guilty of being remiss in their duties as
counsels for complainant.

It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients' cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them. They are duty bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all their dealings and
transactions with their clients.36 Every case lawyers handle deserves their full and undivided attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether they accept it for a fee or for free, and to constantly keep in mind
that not only the property but also the life of their clients may be at stake.37Relevant provisions of the CPR
provide:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his profession.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Respondents clearly transgressed the foregoing rules when they failed and refused to file the separate civil action for
damages against David despite their receipt of payment and the relevant documents from complainant. We cannot give
credence to Atty. Cervantes' defense that because complainant did not pay the requisite filing and acceptance fees, he
was not able to file the separate civil case for damages. The receipt Atty. Delarmente issued clearly indicated that the sum
of P45,000.00 paid by the complainant covers the acceptance and filing fees for the civil suit.38chanrobleslaw

We have repeatedly held that when a lawyer accepts a case, he undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill, and
competence to it. His client has the right to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts,
learning, and ability to prosecute or defend his client's cause with reasonable dispatch.39chanrobleslaw

Worse, Atty. Cervantes demanded payment of P5,000.00 appearance fee and 10% of the settlement as success fee even
though the hearing was for the criminal case and the Compromise Agreement was entered in the course of the criminal
proceedings; thus, outside the scope of respondents' engagement. Indeed, it is highly improper for a lawyer to impose
additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement
of his services.40chanrobleslaw

Assuming respondents are entitled to additional payment of professional fees, their manner of enforcing it still warrants
disciplinary sanction. Rule 20.4 of the CPR advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning their
compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. This is because matters of fees
present an irreconcilable conflict of interests between a client and his lawyer.41 Suits to collect fees should be avoided and
should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it,42such as "when [a] conflict has reached such point
that it only becomes the lawyer's duty to withdraw from the action but to assert his right to compensation because of the
intolerable attitude assumed by his client, x x x."43chanrobleslaw

In these exceptional circumstances, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition as an
incident of the main action in which his services were rendered.44 Thus, in Malvar v. Kraft Food Philippines, Inc.,45 We
approved the filing of a motion for intervention as a measure to protect a counsel's right to the fees agreed upon with his
client. Alternatively, an aggrieved lawyer may also file an independent civil action against his client for the payment of his
fees. The former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.46chanrobleslaw

In the present case, when complainant refused to pay, Atty. Cervantes proceeded to file a criminal case for estafa and
deportation proceedings against complainant and his family, This we cannot countenance. In Retuya v. Gorduiz,47 We
suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for filing a groundless case for estafaagainst his own client when the latter refused
to pay his attorney's fees due to disagreements as to the amount. Relatedly, in Alcantara v. De Vera,48 We held that there
is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in
accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness.49 Here, We
find that the estafaand deportation proceedings filed against complainant and his family were meant to harass and compel
the latter to accede to respondents' demand for additional professional fees.

As for the appropriate penalty, Commissioner Corvera recommended that respondents be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months. The IBP Board of Governors reduced the recommended penalty to three (3) months. We observe
that the resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the bases for such modification in contravention of Section 12(a),
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which mandates that "[t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing
and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based." We frown on the unexplained change
made by the IBP Board of Governors in the recommended penalty. Absent any justification on the reduction of the
penalty, We sustain the IBP-CBD's recommended penalty.

Regarding the issue of whether respondents should be directed to return the filing fees they received from complainant,
We ruled in Anacta v. Resurreccion50 that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x If the matter involves violations of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court's disciplinary
authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an
inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is
understandably outside the purview of the Court's disciplinary authority. Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of
the inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity,
the issue of whether the respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed
within the Court's disciplinary authority.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, we have previously held that when a lawyer receives money from his client for a particular purpose and the
lawyer does not use the money for such purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client.52chanrobleslaw

In the present case, respondents received P45,000.00 to file a separate civil action for damages against David. Atty.
Cervantes also allegedly received P10,000.00 from complainant's daughter-in-law but no evidence was adduced to
support this claim. Thus, respondents should be ordered to return the amount of P45,000.00 to complainant.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Teodoro B. Delarmente and Atty. Renato M. Cervantes are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months. Both are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. They are also DIRECTED to return to complainant the amount of P45,000.00. Finally, respondents
are DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of their receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when their
suspension shall take effect.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents' personal records with the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.

A.C. No. 8371

SPOUSES GERARDO MONTECILLO and DOMINGA SALONOY, Complainants

vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO Z. GATCHALIAN, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a complaint1 filed by Spouses Gerardo Montecillo and Dominga Salonoy
(complainants) against Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian (respondent) before the Office of the Bar Confidant charging him of
grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for being negligent in handling complainants' case. In a
Resolution2 dated August 9, 2010, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.

The Facts

Complainants engaged the legal services of respondent for an ejectment case in which they were the defendants.3After
filing their Answer to the complaint, complainants received a notice from the court setting the preliminary conference on
March 25, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning. When complainants went to respondent's office to confer with him about it, the
latter told them that he did not receive the notice and that he could not attend the preliminary conference due to a conflict
in his schedule. Complainants expressed that they can attend the conference even without him. He allegedly advised
them not to attend anymore as he would arrange with the court for a new schedule when he is available. 4
Complainants relied on respondent's advice and did not attend the preliminary conference anymore. Thereafter, they
found out that respondent not only failed to attend the scheduled preliminary conference, but also failed to take any steps
to have it cancelled or reset to another date. They also learned that, contrary to respondent's representation, he did
receive the notice setting the date of the preliminary conference. Subsequently, complainant received an Order 5 dated
March 25, 2009 that deemed the ejectment case submitted for decision due to complainants' failure to appear during the
preliminary conference. When they approached respondent about it, he belittled the matter and told them not to worry as
he would take care of it.6

Subsequently, the trial court issued a Decision7 dated April 21, 2009 adverse to the complainants. Respondent received it
on May 4, 2009 but failed to inform complainants about the status of the case as to enable them to prepare the next
course of action. Complainants learned about the adverse ruling upon inquiring with the trial court only on May 13, 2009,
or nine (9) days after respondent's receipt thereof, when their period to appeal was almost about to lapse. 8

Complainants went to respondent's office wherein the latter prepared a Notice of Appeal. Afterwards, complainants
terminated respondent's legal services and engaged another lawyer to prepare their Memorandum of Appeal. On appeal,
the ejectment case was remanded to the court of origin.9

In sum, complainants assail respondent's negligent and complacent handling of their case. 10

In his Comment, 11 respondent contended that when complainants informed him about the scheduled preliminary
conference, he told them that he would be unable to attend due to a conflict in schedule, as he was committed to attend a
criminal case hearing in Quezon City. Nevertheless, he instructed complainants to attend the preliminary conference even
without his appearance and inform the court about the conflict in schedule. He denied having advised complainants not to
attend the preliminary hearing and belittled the Order dated March 25, 2009. Finally, he alleged that the Order dated
March 25, 2009 was complainants' fault, due to their failure to attend the preliminary conference, and upon telling this to
complainants, they terminated his legal services. 12

On June 22, 2011, while the case was pending before the IBP, complainants filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw
Complaint. 13

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In the IBP's Report and Recommendation14 dated August 29, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for breach of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). He explained that the submission of the ejectment case for resolution and the eventual adverse
decision against complainants were attributable to respondent's negligence. Knowing that he had a conflict in schedule,
respondent should have prepared and filed an appropriate motion to cause the cancellation and resetting of the scheduled
preliminary conference. Whether he advised complainants to attend the preliminary conference on March 25, 2009 or not
is immaterial. What was relevant was his course of action when confronted with a conflict of schedule in his court
appearances. 15

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found complainants' version of facts more in line with common experience as
opposed to respondent's version. Notably, there was no cogent explanation why complainants would dismiss his alleged
instruction to attend the conference without him. 16

In a Resolution17 dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied m a Resolution18 dated September 23, 2016.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Court's Ruling

The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.

Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost diligence and competence, and never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him. 19 A lawyer owes fidelity to the clients' cause20 and, accordingly is expected to exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. 21 Consequently, he is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of
legal proficiency, and to devote one's full attention, skill, and competence to the case, whether it is accepted for a fee or
for free. 22 The relevant provisions of the CPR read thus:

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer's duties of competence and diligence include not merely reviewing cases or giving
sound legal advice, but also consist of properly representing a client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings and conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting handled cases with reasonable
dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him to do so.23 A lawyer's
negligence in fulfilling these duties subjects him to disciplinary action. 24

Guided by these edicts, the Court rules that respondent failed to exercise the diligence required of lawyers in handling
complainants' case. Based on the records, he failed to file the necessary motion to postpone the hearing due to a conflict
in his schedule, and as a result, complainants lost their opportunity to present their evidence in the ejectment case. As
complainants' counsel in the ejectment case, respondent was expected to exercise due diligence. He should have been
more circumspect in preparing and filing the motion, considering the serious consequence of failure to attend the
scheduled preliminary conference - i.e. the defendant's failure to appear thereat entitles the plaintiff to a judgment,25 as
what happened in this case.

The Court likewise finds respondent liable for failing to immediately inform complainants about the trial court's adverse
decision. To emphasize, a lawyer has an obligation to promptly apprise clients regarding the status of a case as
expressed in Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR:

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client's request for information.

To be clear, a lawyer need not wait for their clients to ask for information but must advise them without delay about
matters essential for them to avail of legal remedies. In the present case, respondent failed to immediately notify
complainants about the adverse decision of the trial court. Had the complainants not inquired with the trial court, they
would have lost their opportunity to appeal. For this reason, respondent is also administratively liable for negligence under
Rule 18.04 of the CPR.

As regards the proper penalty, recent cases show that in similar instances where lawyers neglected their clients' affairs by
failing to attend hearings and/or failing to update clients about court decisions, the Court suspended them from the
practice of law for six (6) months. In Caranza V da.de Saldivar v. Cabanes,26 a lawyer was suspended for failure to file a
pretrial brief and to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. In Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag, 27 a lawyer was likewise
suspended for not attending pre-trial, failing to inform clients about the dismissal of their case, and failing to file position
papers. In Spouses Aranda v. Elayda, 28 a lawyer suffered the same fate when he failed to appear in a scheduled hearing
despite due notice, which resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Consistent with these cases, the Court
agrees with the IBP's recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian is found GUILTY of violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar.1âwphi1 Furthermore, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.