PARTIES

The Law Firm

LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL, AND TIBAYAN, DANILO M. TUNGOL AND
ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ERLANDO A. ABRENICA
FACTS:
Petitioners Danilo Tungol and Abelardo Tibayan and respondent Erlando Abrenica are the
registered partners in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol, and Tibayan, aprofessional law
partnership duly organized under Philippine laws. On May 6, 1998, Tungol and Tibayan
filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint for accounting,
return, and transfer of partnership funds with damages and application for issuance of
preliminary attachment against their partner, Abrenica. Petitioners claim that a real estate
transaction entered into by defendant was a law partnership transaction.
Following several hearings SEC Hearing Officer Roberto Sencio, Jr. issued an order which
granted the preliminary attachment of Abrenica’s assets. After filing of a bond, a writ of
preliminary attachment. The writ directed that sufficient assets of respondent to be
attached to cover for P4,524,000.00 alleged to be partnership profits unaccounted and
unremitted by the such.
On September 17, 1991, the SEC issued an Order which discharged the attachment made on
personal properties of the respondent.
Dissatisfied with the Orders of the SEC, the petitioners filed on October 12, 192 a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners alleged that the SEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the SEC en banc has jurisdiction
and can take cognizance of the issue of excessive attachment
RULING:
It is elementary that a special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a court exercised its
jurisdiction and an error was committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. An error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctible through the original special civil action of certiorari.
Therefore, the SEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it addressed a non-jurisdictional issue in a special civil action
for certiorari. It sought to correct an error in the enforcement of the writ of attachment, an
error of judgment which is clearly a factual issue involving appraisal and evaluation of
evidence. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the SEC Hearing Officer/Panel
simply because of the alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. Erroneous factual
findings amount to no more than errors in the exercise of jurisdiction which are beyond the
ambit of the sole office of a writ of certiorari, namely, the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuses of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The 2 Orders of the SEC en banc are declared null and void.

Hontiveros
Hontiveros- Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential Decree No.
(P.D.) 11121 in order to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the collection
of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private sector.

On 3 January 2008, petitioners PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees

Union (PSCEU) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañ aque City, Branch 258 (RTC), a
complaint against respondents TRB, PNCC, PSC, CMMTC, and SOMCO. The complaint was
for injunction and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a
temporary restraining order, and sought to prohibit the implementation of the ASTOA and
the MOA, as well as the assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO.21 Petitioners PSCEU
and PTMSDWO also sought the subsequent nullification of the ASTOA and the MOA for
being contrary to law and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government.22 They
later filed an Amended Complaint23 dated 8 January 2008, additionally praying that PSC be
allowed to continue the toll operations. With the exception of TRB, all defendants therein
filed their Opposition.
Issue:
Whether petitioners have standing.
Ruling:
Standing is a constitutional law concept allowing suits to be brought not necessarily by
parties personally injured by the operation of a law or official action, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or voters who sue in the public interest.75 Determining the standing of
concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters requires a partial consideration of the substantive
merit of the constitutional question,76 or at least a preliminary estimate thereof.
Parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before seeking relief from this Court.
Observance thereof minimizes the imposition on the already limited time of this Court and
prevents delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases.126 We do not
appreciate the litigants’ practice of directly seeking recourse before this Court, relying on
the gravitas of a personality yet making serious claims without the proof to support them.

Divinagracia
MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, Petitioner, v. CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL
NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, AND MAUDE NOBLEZA, Respondent.
Facts:
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-square meter parcel of land located at
Cor. Fuentes-Delgado Streets, Iloilo City denominated as Lot 133-B-1-A and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12255 (subject land). During his lifetime, he
contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2)
children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and (b) the second was with Eusela Niangar
with whom he had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial,
Celedonio, Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3) illegitimate children,
namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and was
survived by his children Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord.
Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his father and was survived by his wife, Maude, and children
Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.

According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in
representation of his father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia,
Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective interests over the subject land to
Santiago for a consideration of P447,695.66, as embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated November 22, 1989 (subject
document), which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their
respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his
husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children). On December 22, 1989, the same parties
executed a Supplemental Contract whereby the vendors-heirs and Santiago agreed that out
of the aforesaid consideration, only P109,807.93 will be paid up front, and that Santiago
will only pay the remaining balance of P337,887.73 upon the partition of the subject
land. However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled and the subject
document registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal to surrender the
said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the
subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint dated January 3, 1990 for judicial
partition and for receivership.

Issue:
Whether Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are indispensable parties
to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition.
Ruling:
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s
interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all
persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable
parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.

In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and
illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely: Conrado,
Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr.,
Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased
Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules on representation under the Civil Code, their
respective interests shall be represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.:
Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.:
Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.

The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation of their

direct ascendant – have vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be
impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of
Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was
impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard
to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude,
when pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest
should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the
aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint
for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be
added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may
dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

Landbank
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, Respondent, 
Facts:
The instant case arose from two (2) loans (Subject Loans) entered into by the Municipality
with LBP in order to finance the Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza (Public
Plaza). Through Resolution Nos. 68-2005 7 and 139-2005,8 the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality (Sangguniang Bayan) authorized its then-Mayor Eufranio Eriguel (Mayor
Eriguel) to enter into a P4,000,000.00-loan with LBP, the proceeds of which were used to
construct ten (10) kiosks at the Public Plaza. Around a year later, the SB issued Resolution
Nos. 58-20069 and 128-2006,10 this time authorizing Mayor Eriguel to obtain a
P28,000,000.00-loan from LBP for the construction of a commercial center named "Agoo
People's Center" within the premises of the Public Plaza. In order to secure the Subject
Loans, the Municipality used as collateral, among others, a 2,323.75-square meter lot
situated at the south eastern portion of the Public Plaza (Plaza Lot).

However, a group of residents, led by respondent Eduardo M. Cacayuran (Cacayuran),

opposed the redevelopment of the Public Plaza, as well as the funding therefor thru the
Subject Loans, claiming that these were "highly irregular, violative of the law, and
detrimental to public interests, and will result to wanton desecration of the [Public
Plaza]."12 Further, Cacayuran requested the municipal officers to furnish him with the
various documents relating to the Public Plaza's redevelopment, which, however, went
unheeded.13 Thus, Cacayuran, invoking his right as a taxpayer, filed a complaint 14 against
LBP and various officers of the Municipality, including Mayor Eriguel (but excluding the
Municipality itself as party-defendant), assailing the validity of the aforesaid loan
agreements and praying that the commercialization of the Public Plaza be enjoined.

Initially, the municipal officers moved for the outright dismissal of the complaint, which
was denied, thus constraining them to file their respective answers. For its part, LBP
asserted, inter alia, that Cacayuran did not have any cause of action since he was not privy
to the loan agreements entered into by LBP and the Municipality.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of the Agoo People's Center was
completed. Later on, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-
2007 declaring the area where such building stood as patrimonial property of the
Municipality.
The RTC declared the Subject Loans null and void. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
LBP filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
denied LBP's petition, and accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the CA. Agreeing with the CA,
the Court held that: (a) Cacayuran had legal standing to institute a taxpayer's suit; (b)
Resolutions cannot be relied upon to validate the Subject Loans, as the LGC requires the
passing of an ordinance in order for any loan agreement to be valid; and (c) the
procurement of the Subject Loans are ultra vires acts of the municipal officers who
approved the same, and thus, liability therefor shall devolve upon them.

Undaunted, LBP moved for reconsideration, basically reiterating its earlier position that
Cacayuran had no legal standing to sue, and that Resolutions may be relied upon in
validating the Subject Loans.
Meanwhile, the Municipality filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene with Pleading-In-
Intervention Attached dated July 8, 2013 and a Motion for Reconsideration in-
Intervention of even date, praying that it be included as a party-litigant to the instant case.
It contends that as a contracting party to the Subject Loans, it is an indispensable party to
the action filed by Cacayuran. As such, there cannot be any "real disposition" of the instant
suit by reason of its exclusion from the same.
Issue:
Whether the Municipality should be deemed as an indispensable party to the instant case.
Ruling:
"An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's
interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable." 37Thus, the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be
added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may
dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that Cacayuran's complaint against
LBP and the municipal officers primarily prays that the commercialization of the Public
Plaza be enjoined and also, that the Subject Loans be declared null and void for having been
unlawfully entered into by the said officers. However, Cacayuran failed to implead in his
complaint the Municipality, a real party-in-interest 41and an indispensable party that stands
to be directly affected by any judicial resolution on the case, considering that: (a) the
contracting parties to the Subject Loans are LBP and the Municipality; and (b) the
Municipality owns the Public Plaza as well as the improvements constructed thereon,
including the Agoo People's Center. As the Municipality aptly points out.
Indeed, the Municipality whose lands stands and is found the Agoo Public Plaza, where the
Kiosks and Commercial Building were under construction and which constructions were
sought to be restrained] stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the case so
filed or the party entitled to the avails of the case and is, therefore, the real party-in-
interest.
Hacbang
Hacbang vs. Alo

Facts:
On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died leaving several
properties behind.
On 1 February 1999, petitioners Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo filed a petition to cancel
TCT No. 169342 on the ground that it was fraudulently secured.
In his Answer dated 18 August 1999, Basilio denied all allegations of irregularity and
wrongdoing. He also moved to dismiss the petition because the petitioners were neither
heirs nor devisees of Bishop Sofronio and had no legal interest in the subject lot.
On 7 January 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to
prosecute the case on the subject lot. The RTC noted that Bishop Sofronio's will had already
been admitted into probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in
question. Though the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already
designated his heirs: Bishop Sofronio's parents were compulsory heirs entitled to half of
his estate while the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo, was devised the remaining
half (the free portion). Thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor testamentary
heirs, are not real parties in interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it used Bishop Sofronio's will as basis to declare that
they are not real parties in interest.
Ruling:
NO, Bishop Sofronio's parents, Basilio and Maria Gaborny Hacbang, never acquired the title
over the subject lot. Thus, it never became part of their estate. Clearly, the petitioners - who
claim to represent the children of Basilio and Maria Gaborny in the spouses' estate -have no
legal right or interest over the subject lot.

Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action - an act or omission that
violates the rights of the plaintiff.17 A cause of action
requires:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(2) a correlative duty of the defendant to respect the plaintiffs right; and

(3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiffs right.18

Every action must also be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest:
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment.19 These fundamental
requirements are not merely technical matters; they go into the very substance of every
suit.

The petitioners came to the courts praying for the annulment of the respondent's title yet
they failed to show that they are entitled to even ask for such relief. They have no right over
the subject lot and the respondent has no legal obligation to them with respect to the
subject lot. Even if we assume that the respondent fraudulently or irregularly secured his
certificate of title, the bottom-line is that the petitioners have no legal standing to sue for
the cancellation of this title. This right only belongs to the rightful owner of the subject lot.

JOINDER OF INDESPENSABLE PARTIES

David
DAVID M. DAVID VS FEDERICO M. PARAGS, JR.
FACTS:
Sometimes in 1995, David, Paragas, and Lobrin agreed to venture into a business in Hong
Kong. They created Olympia International, Ltd. under HK laws. Olympia had offices in
charge of operations. In 1998, Olympia became the exclusive general agent in HK of PPI’s
pre-need plans through the General Agency Agreement. Three years after, it launched the
Pares Pares program by which planholders would earn points with cash equivalents for
successfully enlisting new subscribers. PPI authorized Olympia to accept the premium
payments, including the cash equivalent of the bonus points, and to remit the same, net of
commissions, to the PPI Philippines. In turn, Olympia was to pay the planholders’ bonuses
as well as the shares of profits for the directors. David was tasked to personally remit said
amounts to PPI as he was the only signatory authorized to transact on behalf of Olympia
regarding the RCBC accounts.
In June 17, 2002, the BOD stripped David of his position as a director. A Watch-List Order
was also issued against him pursuant to the letter sent by Paragas’ counsel to the Bureau of
Immigration. He then filed a complaint for Declaratory Relief, Sum of Money and Damages
before the RTC.
On May 21, 2003, the RTC granted David’s Motion to Admit the Supplemental Complaint.
Paragas then moved for reconsideration but the latter denied.
Paragas elevated the issue to the CA and was reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Olympia is not a party hence the dismissal of the complaint and
cumpolsary counterclaims are personal in nature to the parties and is within the purview
of section 2 or Rule 17.
RULING:
His contention is devoid of merit.
While David repeatedly claims that his complaint against Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy was
personal in character, a review of the causes of action raised by him in his complaint shows
that it primarily involved Olympia.  As defined, a cause of action is an act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another.  It requires the existence of a legal right on the
part of the plaintiff, a correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right and an
act or omission of such defendant in violation of the plaintffs’s rights. 30cralawlawlibrary

In his complaint, David raised three causes of action. The first one dealt with the alleged
omission on the part of the other venture partners to respect his right, being Olympia’s
beneficial owner and PPI’s principal agent under the GAA, over the income generated from
the sale PPI’s pre-need plans. The second dealt with his right over all amounts that the
venture partners disbursed in excess of those authorized by him, under the premise that he
remained Olympia’s beneficial owner. The third dealt with the acts of the venture partners
in causing undue humiliation and shame when he was prevented from boarding his
Singapore-bound plane pursuant to the  Watch-List Order issued by the Bureau of
Immigration at the behest of a letter sent by the counsel of Paragas.

Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries

Agrarian reform beneficiaries vs Fil-estate
Facts:
Respondents Kingsville and FEPI are the owner and developer of Forest Hills Residential
Estates Phase I in Brgy. San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 75.85978 hectares. The
land subject of these cases is a portion thereof, described as Lot No. „E,‰ covered by TCT
No. 164298, in the names of Raul Boncan, et al. and having an area of 136,501 square
meters. Respondent Ong is the President of Kingsville. In March 1996, ARBA, as
represented by its president, together with its members, filed before the Office of the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Region IV a complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) against
respondents, alleging that they are the actual occupants/farmers of the land. Respondents
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but was denied
by the Regional Adjudicator. Respondents moved for reconsideration which was granted
which was granted by the succeeding Regional Adjudicator. Petitioners appealed before the
DARAB, hence the reversal of the order of the PARAD and directed respondents to maintain
petitioners in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land and to cease from further
developing the same. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the DARAB. On May 31, 2002, Respondent FEPI appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 2,
2002, respondents Kingsville and Ong filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being a wrong mode of appeal and for
having a defective verification and certification against forum shopping. On October 22,
2003, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the DARABÊ s decision and
resolution and reinstating the RA RADÊ s order dismissing petitioner’s complaint ruling
that petitioners are not bona fide tenants of the subject property as there as neither
consent from the landowner nor evidence of sharing of harvests. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration, arguing that FEPI’s rights over the land are merely derived from and
dependent on Kingsville’s, which is its owner, FEPI’s rights cannot therefore rise higher
than the stream, and as such, the final ruling against Kingsville should also bind FEPI. Court
of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, in view of the
finality of DARABS decision, petitioners filed a motion for execution before the DARAB,
which the Board granted. Respondents then filed separate motions for reconsideration.
With the reversal of the DARAB’s decision, there was nothing left to execute FEPI, in
particular, insisted that the favorable decision in C.A.G.R. S.P. No. 70717 is also applicable to
Kingsville, whose interest is so interwoven with and inseparable from FEPI’s.

Issue:
Whether or not FEPI and Kingsville can raise different appeals independently

Held:
The SC hold that Kingsville, as the owner of Forest Hills Residential Estates Phase I, is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination can be had of the action. It
should have been joined as petitioner in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 70717 either by FEPI or by the
Court of Appeals at its own initiative. We rectify this defect now on the principle that the
omission to include Kingsville „is a mere technical defect which can be cured at any stage of
the proceedings even after judgment”; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable
parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life of the action, for
without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to
implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of
judgment by this Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their
identity and character as such indispensable parties.

Benedicto Munoz
774 SCRA 78, November 09, 2015
MARGARITA M. BENEDICTO-MUÑOZ, Petitioner, v. MARIA ANGELES CACHO-OLIVARES,
EDGARDO P. OLIVARES, PETER C. OLIVARES, CARMELA Q. OLIVARES, MICHAEL C.
OLIVARES, ALEXANDRA B. OLIVARES, AND MELISSA C. OLIVARES, Respondents. 

Facts:
The controversy arose from the Complaint for Damages and Revocation of Registration and
License of Broker, Dealer and Salesman7 ("Original Complaint") filed by respondents with
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") on August 20, 1997. Respondents filed the
Original Complaint against Abacus Securities Corporation ("Abacus"), Sapphire Securities,
Inc. ("Sapphire"), Margarita Benedicto ("Benedicto"), Joel Chua Chiu ("Chiu") [collectively,
the "petitioners"], Jose Maximo Cuaycong III ("Cuaycong"), Mark Angelo Cuaycong ("Mark
Angelo") [collectively, the "Cuaycong brothers"], Dharmala Securities Philippines, Inc.
("Dharmala"), Lippo Securities, Inc. ("Lippo"), Jeannette Que ("Que"), and Christine Litton
("Litton"), docketed as SEC Case No. 08-97-5744.

Respondents claimed that Cuaycong, a salesman in securities, had engaged in fraudulent

and deceitful activities with the complicity and knowledge of the defendant stock market
brokerage firms (Abacus, Lippo, Sapphire and Dharmala), and the other individual
defendants resulting in the loss of respondents' investments. They prayed that therein
defendants be held jointly and severally liable for: actual damages in the amount of Php
7,040,645.22; moral damages of Php 33,000,000.00; exemplary damages of Php
50,000,000.00; and attorney's fees of Php 10,000,000.00. 8 Upon the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 8799, or the Securities and Regulation Code, the case was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Parañ aque Branch 258 ("RTC of Paranaque"), and docketed as Civil Case No.
01-0059.9
Issue:
WHETHER THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AS AGAINST THE CUAYCONG BROTHERS
BENEFITS THE OTHER DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 02-1049.

Ruling:
We grant the petitions.

The dismissal of the case as against 

the Cuaycong brothers benefits the other 
defendants in Civil Case No. 02-1049.

Petitioners submit that the dismissal of the case as against the Cuaycong brothers inures to
their benefit because: (a) they were sued under a single and/or common cause of action
with the Cuaycong brothers; and (b) the Cuaycong brothers are indispensable parties,
without who no final determination can be had on the case.

We agree with petitioners.

The Original Complaint and the Amended and Supplemental Complaint allege the same
essential cause of action against the Cuaycong brothers and the petitioners-that is, stock
market fraud committed by Cuaycong principally through misappropriation, with the
complicity and indispensable cooperation of the defendant stock market brokerage firms
and the individual defendants. The Amended and Supplemental Complaint failed to allege
"different and separable acts" committed by the remaining defendants independent of the
acts and omissions of Cuaycong. Under both the Original Complaint and the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint, Cuaycong was the central actor in the series of wrongdoings that
led to the loss of investments of the respondents, while the defendants' alleged action or
inaction made such wrongdoings possible.

Frias
FRIAS VS. SORONGON
750 SCRA 345; G.R. No. 184827; February 11, 2015
The RTC issued an order denying the petitioners’ motion for leave to litigate as indigents.
Petitioners argue that respondent judge did not conduct the proper hearing as prescribed
under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. They claim that private respondents neither
submitted evidence nor were they required by respondent judge to submit evidence in
support of their motions on the issue of indigency of petitioners.
ISSUE: Was the hearing requirement complied with?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the hearing requirement, contrary to petitioners’
claim, was complied with during the hearings on the motions to dismiss filed by
respondents. In said hearings, petitioners’ counsel was present and they were given the
opportunity to prove their indigency. Clearly, their non-payment of docket fees is one of the
grounds raised by respondents in their motions to dismiss and the hearings on the motions
were indeed the perfect opportunity for petitioners to prove that they are entitled to be
treated as indigent litigants and thus exempted from the payment of docket fees as initially
found by the Executive Judge.
If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the
authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of
right.

PLEADINGS

Intestate Estate of Jose Uy

. Intestate estate of Jose Uy vs Maghari III
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari III (Maghari) with engaging in deceitful conduct and
violating the Lawyer’s Oath. Specifically, Maghari is charged with the use of information
that is false and/or appropriated from other lawyers in signing certain pleadings. On
February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofileñ a (Hofileñ a) filed a Petition before the Bacolod City
Regional Trial Court praying that she be designated administratrix of the estate of her
common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. This was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-241.
Hofileñ a was initially designated administratrix. However, a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order designating Hofileñ a as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy’s
children, on behalf of Jose Uy’s spouse and other children. Regional Trial Court designated
Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy’s estate. Subsequently, Hofileñ a’s claims in the
settlement of Jose UyÊ s estate were granted then filed a Motion for Execution. In Spec. Proc
No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy’s estate,
Hofileñ a was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El (Atty. Natu-el). In the
pleading filed in the course of this proceeding, Atty. Natu-el indicated his details (address,
PTR number, ibp number, roll number, MCLE number). In the course of the proceedings,
Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was
alleged to have been the treasurer of several businesses owned by Jose Uy. Magdalena Uy,
through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with
Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy. In signing this Motion,
Maghari indicated the details ( PTR number, ibp number, roll number, MCLE number)
identically the same with the details of Att. Natu-el. Wilson UyÊ s counsel noticed that based
on the details indicated in the March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari appeared to have only
recently passed the bar examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy to check the records of
Spec. Proc No. 97-241. Upon doing so, he learned that since 2010, Maghari had been
changing the professional details indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been
copying the professional details of Atty. Natu-el Wilson Uy then filed a Motion to declare
Magdalena Uy in indirect contempt (as by then she had still not complied with the
Subpoena ad Testificandum) and to require Maghari to explain why he had been usurping
the professional details of another lawyer. Hence the filing of Wilson UY before this court
Compliant for disbarment pointing to MaghariÊ s act of repeatedly changing and using
another lawyer’s professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer’s
Oath and acted in a deceitful manner.
Issue:
WON Maghari violated the clear legal requirements, and indicate patently false
information.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that a counsel’s signature on a pleading is neither an empty
formality nor even a mere means for identification. Through his or her signature, a party’s
counsel makes a positive declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he or
she has read the pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for
delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading is
such a solemn component of legal practice that this court has taken occasion to decry the
delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading;
that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by
affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters. The preparation and signing of a
pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not.
A counsel’s signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply with this
requirement reduces a pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of legal effect. Thus,
faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of satisfying a duty to a court
but is as much a matter of fidelity to one’s client. A deficiency in this respect can be fatal to
a client’s cause.
Apart from the signature itself, additional information is required to be indicated as part of
a counsels signature: 40 (1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsels address
must be stated; (2) In Bar Matter No. 1132,41 this court required all lawyers to indicate
their Roll of Attorneys number; (3) In Bar Matter No. 287,42 this court required the
inclusion of the „number and date of their official receipt indicating payment of their
annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year”; in
lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime membership number; (4) In
accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government Code,43 a lawyer must indicate his
professional tax receipt number; (5) Bar Matter No. 1922 required the inclusion of a
counsel’s Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption; and (6) This court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC44 required the inclusion
of a counsel’s contact details.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari III, having clearly violated his Lawyer’s
Oath and the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years,
effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.

Pp
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SALVADOR AROJADO
FACTS:
On June 1, 1996 in Roxs City and within this Honorable Court, the accused armed with a
knofe with intent to kill with treachery and evident premedidation did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab Mary Ann Arrojado on the
different parts of the body inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of her death.
The information was read and explained to accused-appellant in his native dialect, after
which he pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then ensued.
 this Court finds and declares accused Salvador Arrojado GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the heinous crime of murder, defined and penalized by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 7659, and, there being no aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentences him to imprisonment of thirty (30) years of reclusion
perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Mary Ann Arrojado in the amount
of P60,000.00, pay them moral damages of P80,000.00, and pay the costs of this action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a proof of evident premedidation since the requisites have not been
established.
RULING:
The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation since the
requisites therefor, to wit, (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination; and (c)
sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequence of his act, have not been established in this case.
Nor can the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated against accused-
appellant since the latter and the victim lived in the same house.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, however, is present in this case. For
this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between
the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some
advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a
means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the
offended partys belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. ] In this case, while
the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason she entrusted her
jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently allayed
as shown by the fact that she took back her personal effects from Erlinda. Thinking that
accused-appellant would not do her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, the
victim allowed accused-appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and left the
bedroom doors unlocked
The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31,
1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death
to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial
court should have imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant. However, on
December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that
every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled
rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence not having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be
appreciated to raise accused-appellants sentence to death.

Gonzales
. Gonzales vs GJH
Facts:
Petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales and Francis Martin D. Gonzales filed a Complaint for
Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order, Three (3)- and Twenty (20)-Day
Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Damages” against
respondents GJH Land, Inc. (formerly known as S.J. Land, Inc.), Chang Hwan Jang, Sang Rak
Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty. Roberto P. Mallari II before the RTC of Muntinlupa City
seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.Ê s shares which they purportedly bought from S.J.
Global, Inc, alleging that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by them in
full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc. but were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to
the corporation’s stockholders hence, their plea for injunction. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 11-077 and raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court.
Said branch issued a temporary restraining order, and later, in an Order dated August 24,
2011, granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out
that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the
designated Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City. RTC granted the motion to
dismiss filed by respondents on the ground that the case involves an intra-corporate
dispute that is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs designated as
Special Commercial Courts and pointed out that the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256
(Branch 256) was specifically designated by the Court as the Special Commercial Court,
hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction over the case and cannot law fully exercise
jurisdiction on the matter, including the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Accordingly, it dismissed the case. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
that they filed the case with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City
which assigned the same to Branch 276 by raffle that was beyond their control, they should
not be made to suffer the consequences of the wrong assignment of the case.
Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly
raffled to a regular branch. This error may have been caused by a reliance on the
complaint’s caption. Which, however, contradicts and more importantly, cannot prevail
over its actual allegations that clearly make out an intra-corporate dispute
Issue:
Either the caption or the allegation will give meaning to the pleading
Ruling:
The court ruled that According to jurisprudence, it is not the caption but the allegations in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading which give meaning to the pleading and on the
basis of which such pleading may be legally characterized. However, so as to avert any
future confusion, the Court requires henceforth, that all initiatory pleadings state the
action’s nature both in its caption and the body.
The Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a
Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure that is, an incident related to the
exercise of jurisdiction that is, an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction and, thus,
should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired.
In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be
dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge
for redocketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign
said case to the only designated Special Commercial Court in the station.
WHEREFORE, Branch 276’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 11-077 is set aside and the transfer
of said case to Branch 256, the designated Special Commercial Court of the same RTC of
Muntinlupa City is hereby ordered.

PCGG
765 SCRA 524, August 11, 2015
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, v. HON.
WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59,
MAKATI CITY AND UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB), Respondents. 
Facts:
The factual background of this case is gathered from the records and the decisions of this
Court involving the coconut levy funds.  We reproduce the pertinent portions of the January
24, 2012 Decision in COCOFED v. Republic3:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

In 1971, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment
Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8
thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Of the
PhP 0.55 levy of which the copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts,
PhP 0.02 was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut
producers declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration (PHILCOA, now PCA) as
having the largest membership.
Issue:
Non-compliance with the rule on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
which was signed by only one PCGG Commissioner;

Ruling:
The petitions are meritorious.

Alleged Lack of Authority of PCGG

Commissioner Vicente L. Gengos, Jr. 
to file the present petition  
Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping.19 A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.20  The party need not sign the verification.  A party’s
representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in
the pleading may sign the verification.21redarclaw

COUNTERCLAIM

Metrobank
Metrobank vs CPR Promotions
Facts:
CPR Promotions obtained loans from petitioners MBTC. These loans were covered
by 15 promissory notes all signed by respondents, Spouses Leoniza Reynoso and Cornelio
Reynoso, Jr. To secure the loans, the spouses Reynoso executed two deeds of real estate
mortgage on separate dates. Thereafter, the spouses Reynoso executed a continuing surety
agreement binding themselves solidarity with CPR Promotions to pay any and all loans CPR
Promotions may have obtained from the petitioner MBTC, but not to exceed 13,000,000.
Upon maturity of the loans, they defaulted, prompting MBTC to file a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages. Subsequently, MBTC submitted the
highest bid at the public auction. Notwithstanding the foreclosure, MBTC alleged that there
remained a deficiency 2,628,520 plus interest, as agreed upon. Thus, they filed an action for
collection of sum of money against respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim
Ruling: Yes.
According, a counterclaim is compulsory if, a) it arises out of or is necessarily
connected with the transaction which is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim, b)
it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction, and c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as
to its amount and nature.
Thus, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-à -vis the
amount due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery
of a deficiency filed by the mortgage against the debtor-mortgagor.
It is elementary that a defending party’s compulsory counterclaim should be
interposed at the time he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such
claim. In this case, respondents initially claimed for moral and exemplary damages.
Consequently, respondent’s claim for the excess, if any, is already barred.
Go

Lasala
ALBERTO T. LASALA VS THE NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY
FACTS:
Lasala, through his company PSF Security Agency, used to provide security guard services
to the NFA. Sometime in 1994, Lasala's employees who were deployed to the NFA filed with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for underpayment of wages
and non payment of other monetary benefits. The NLRC ruled for the employees and held
Lasala and the NFA solidarily liable for the employees' adjudged monetary
award.5 Consequently, the sheriff garnished the NFA's P383,572.90 worth of bank deposits
with the Development Bank of the Philippines.
Believing that it had no liability to Lasala's employees, the NFA filed with the RTC, Branch
220, Quezon City, a complaint for sum of money with damages and an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Lasala.
In response, Lasala filed an answer with counterclaim .
Initially, the trial court granted the NFA's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. However, this writ was eventually nullified when Lasala questioned it with the
CA.
The trial court did not accept the NFA's reasoning; thus, it denied the petition for relief for
insufficiency in substance.

Thus, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, the NFA, now through the
OGCC, filed with the CA a petition and an amended petition for annulment of judgment
(petition for annulment) of the trial court's decision which had granted a substantially
higher award than what Lasala originally prayed for in his counterclaim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lasala posits grave abuse of discretion is not a proper basis for granting a
petition for annulment of judgment.

RULING:
We do not agree with Lasala's position.

A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief that a defending party
may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the
jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred if not set up in the
answer to the complaint in the same case. 50

To determine if a counterclaim is compulsory, the following tests apply: (a) Are the issues
of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?; (b)
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?; (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs
claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim?; and (d) Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would
indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. 51 Otherwise, it is permissive.

In these lights, we rule that Lasala's counterclaim for wage adjustment against the NFA is
not a compulsory but a permissive counterclaim. The cause of action for this
counterclaim already existed even before the filing of the NFA's complaint against
Lasala. Thus, it did not arise out of, nor is it necessarily connected with, the NFA's
complaint for sum of money and prayer for preliminary attachment. Because it is not
an incident of the NFA's claim, it can be filed as a separate case against the NFA, unless
already extinguished.

Dio
VIRGINIA S. DIO AND H.S. EQUities, LTD. VS SUBIC BAY MARINE EXPLORATORIUM,
INC. REPRESENTED BY TIMOTHY DESMOND, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER
FACTS:
Petitioner H.S. Equities, Ltd., (HSE) is a foreign corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, with registered address at Akara Building, 24
De Castro Street, Wickhams Cay I, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands. It entered
into an isolated transaction subject of the instant case. It is represented in this action by
petitioner Virginia S. Dio (Dio).
Respondent Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBME) is a domestic corporation, duly
organized and existing under the Philippine laws and is represented in this action by its
Chief Executive Officer, respondent Timothy Desmond (Desmond).
In 2002, SBME decided to expand its business by operating a beach resort inside the
property administered by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). For the business
venture to take off, SBME needed to solicit investors who are willing to infuse funds for the
construction and operation of the beach resort project. HSE (formerly known as Westdale
Assets Limited) thru its authorized director, Dio, agreed to invest the amount of
US$2,500,000.00 with SBME by purchasing 750,000 common shares with a par value of
₱100 per share from the increase in its authorized capital stock. The agreement was
reduced into writing wherein HSE, in order to protect its interest in the company, was
afforded minority protection rights such as the right to appoint a member of the board of
directors and the right to veto certain board resolutions. After HSE initially paid
US$200,000.00 for its subscription, it refused to further lay out money for the expansion
project of the SBME due to the alleged mismanagement in the handling of corporate funds.
For lack of merit, RTC denied respondents’ motion and affirmed the dismissal in an Order.
Acting on the motions filed by the opposing parties, the RTC, in an Order 13 dated 3 April
2009 granted the motion of the respondents, thereby directing the dismissal of petitioners’
counterclaims but not on the ground of non-payment of docket fees. In disallowing
petitioners’ counterclaims to proceed independently of respondents’ complaint, the lower
court pointed out that in view of the dismissal of the main case, which has already been
affirmed with finality by the appellate court, it has already lost its jurisdiction to act on
petitioners’ counterclaim, the compulsory counterclaim being merely ancillary to the
principal controversy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the counterclaim is without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws.
RULING:
The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable
disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the
merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if
the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand
independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the
amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is
premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended
rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason
of the dismissal of the complaint. 26 Reviewing the vacated position, in Metals Engineering
Resources Corp., severance of causes of action was not be permitted in order to prevent
circuity of suits and to avert the possibility of inconsistent rulings based on the same set of
facts, viz:
For all intents and purposes, such proposition runs counter to the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim in that it cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
This is because a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit
and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom, inasmuch as it arises out of or is
necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
complaint. It follows that if the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the main action
of the case and dismisses the same, then the compulsory counterclaim, being ancillary to
the principal controversy, must likewise be dismissed since no jurisdiction remained for
any grant of relief under the counterclaim.
VERIFICATION/CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

Basan
Romeo Basan, et al. vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines
749 SCRA 541
Feb 14, 2015

Facts:
On February 18, 1997, petitioners Romeo Basan, Danilo Dizon, Jaime L. Tumabiao, Jr.,
Roberto Dela Rama,Jr., Ricky S. Nicolas, Crispulo D. Donor, Galo Falguera filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines,
alleging that respondent dismissed them without just cause and prior written notice
required by law. In their position paper, petitioners provided for the material dates.

Issue:
Whether or not the verification and certification of no-forum shopping must be signed by
all petitioners?

Held:
The petition is impressed with merit.
On the procedural issue, We hold that while the general rule is that the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the
signature of only one of them, petitioner Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be
deemed substantial compliance with the procedural requirement. Jurisprudence is replete
with rulings that the rule on verification is deemed substantially complied with when one
who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct.

Waterfront Cebu City

754 SCRA 400 , March 25, 2015
WATERFRONT CEBU CITY CASINO HOTEL, INC. AND MARCO
PROTACIO, Petitioners, v.ILDEBRANDO LEDESMA, Respondent.

Facts:
Ledesma sought the dismissal of the instant petition of Waterfront on the basis of the
following formal infirmities: (1) the presentation of Gaye Maureen Cenabre, the
representative of Waterfront, of a Community Tax Certificate before the Notary Public to
prove her identity, violated A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, and rendered the jurat in the verification
and certification on non-forum shopping of the petition as defective; and (2) no certified
true copy of the August 10, 2011 Board Resolution quoted in the Secretary’s Certificate was
attached to the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Waterfront’s petition executing Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping is meritorious?

Held:
The Court finds Waterfront’s petition to be meritorious.
The procedural infirmities23 pointed out by Ledesma are not adequate to cause the
dismissal of the present petition. Gaye Maureen Cenabre presented to the Notary Public a
Community Tax Certificate numbered 27401128 to prove her identity instead of a current
identification document issued by an official agency bearing her photograph and signature
as required by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. This rendered the jurat in the verification/certification
of non-forum shopping of Waterfront as defective.  Nonetheless, any flaw in the
verification, being only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement, is not a fatal defect. 24  In
like manner, there is no need to attach the certified true copy of the Board Resolution
quoted in the Secretary’s Certificate attached to the petition.  Only the judgment, order or
resolution assailed in the petition are the attachments required under Section 4, 25 Rule 45
of the Rules of Court to be duplicate originals or certified true copies.Lofranco to
masturbate him at the conference room of the hotel.

BOC
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS. DEVANADERA
770 SCRA 1; G.R. No. 193253; September 08, 2015
UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. was allowed to withdraw oil according to its earlier
request despite a Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the District Collector,
directing the BOC officials to seal and padlock the oil tanks/depots of OILINK. A complaint-
affidavit was filed against OILINK and UNIOIL, for unlawful importation and fraudulent
practice against customs revenue. The State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. The BOC
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which dismissed the petition due to procedural
defects, namely: (a) it contained no explanation why service thereof was not done
personally; (b) it had no proper verification and certification against forum shopping; and (c)
docket and other lawful fees were not fully paid. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: 2) Is there a need to relax the strict compliance with procedural rules on
verification and certification against forum shopping in this case?
RULINGS: 2. Yes, the procedural rules on verification and certification against forum
shopping in this case.
 As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. As to certification against forum shopping, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by
its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on
the ground of “substantial compliance” or presence or “special circumstances or compelling
reasons.”
The Court cannot simply ignore the CA's perfunctory dismissal of the petition on
such sole procedural ground vis-à -vis the paramount public interest in the subject matter
and the substantial amount involved. While the rule on perfection of appeals cannot be
classified as a difficult question of law, mistake in the construction or application of a
doubtful question of law, as in this case, may be considered as a mistake of fact, excusing
the BOC from the consequences of the erroneous filing of its petition with the CA.

Uy
UY v. CA
Facts
Naval-Sai acquired ownership of a parcel of land from her brother. The land was later
subdivided, with two of these being the subject of this case. She sold the two lots to a Bobby
Adil on contract to sell. Adil failed to pay the amortization, forcing him to sell his unfinished
building on the property to spouses Omandac. Naval-Sai borrowed money from Grace Ng.
As security, she delivered to the two lots. Ng, on the other hand, borrowed money from
petitioner and also delivered to the latter the two titles to guarantee payment. Naval-Sai
learned that petitioner filed a case for recovery of possession spouses Omandac. The RTC
ruled in favor of petitioner. Naval-Sai filed a motion for new trial before the CA, arguing
that her signature in the deed of sale in the case between her and petitioner was a forgery.
She also filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed before the RTC against petitioner. She
prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void because the alleged sale between her
and petitioner was a forgery. Petitioner raised an affirmative defense of non-compliance
with the requisite certification of non-forum shopping. He asserted that it was merely
signed by her counsel.
Issue
Whether there was substantial compliance with the requirements on certification for non-
forum shopping?
Ruling
Yes, it must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. The
original complaint contained a certification signed by Naval-Sai. The certification in the
amended complaint, on the other hand, was only signed by her counsel. However, there is
substantial compliance because it served the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of
the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues. Procedural rules
are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of justice which should be used
to achieve such end and not to derail it. The rules on forum-shopping are designed to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and "should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subve1i its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the
goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible."

DEFAULT

Manuel
738 vs 489, October 15, 2014
SPOUSES BENEDICT AND SANDRA MANUEL, Petitioners, v. RAMON ONG, Respondent.
Facts:
The assailed June 28, 2012 decision dismissed for lack of merit the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioners
Benedict and Sandra Manuel (the Spouses Manuel) and sustained the November 30, 2010
and February 16, 2011 orders of the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet. 4 The
assailed December 19, 2012 resolution of the Court of Appeals denied the Spouses
Manuel's motion for reconsideration. The Regional Trial Court's November 30, 2010 order
denied their motion to lift order of default, while its February 16, 2011 order denied their
motion for reconsideration.5

Issue:
Whether or not the Spouses Manuel may be granted relief from the order of default?

Held:
Rule 9, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for when a party to an
action may be declared in default. Further, Rule 9, Section 3(b) governs the grant of relief
from orders of default.

As valid service of summons was made on them, it was incumbent upon the Spouses
Manuel, pursuant to Rule 11, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 to file their
answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2011. Having failed to do so, they were
rightly declared to be in default.

BIR
BIR vs CTA, CBK Power Company Limited
Facts: Private respondent filed with the CTA a judicial claim for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate in the amount of ₱17,784,968.91, representing unutilized input taxes on its local
purchases and importations of goods.
Petitioner received summons requiring it to answer. Petitioner through counsel, Atty.
Christopher C. Sandico, complied and filed the Answer. On June 29, 2011, petitioner
received a notice of pre-trial conference set on July 21, 2011. Petitioner filed its pre-trial
brief.
Earlier, on June 28, 2011, private respondent filed another judicial claim for the issuance of
a tax credit certificate in the amount of ₱31,680,290.87.
Atty. Sandico, who was then assigned to handle the consolidated cases, filed his
consolidated pre-trial brief on November 15, 2011. However, on the December 1, 2011 pre-
trial conference, Atty. Sandico failed to appear, thus private respondent moved that
petitioner be declared in default.
The CTA issued a Resolution allowing the petitioner to present its evidence ex parte.
On January 6, 2012, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default. It was denied.
Issue: Whether the Public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it declared
petitioner in default as there was no intention on the part of petitioner to defy or refuse the
order of the public respondent.
Ruling: The petition is granted
The Court may, for good cause, extend the time for filing of the petition for review for an
additional period not exceeding fifteen days.
There is no showing that petitioner intentionally disregarded the CTA's authority. After
petitioner's receipt of the default Order, petitioner, immediately filed a Motion to lift the
order of default, i.e., 20 days before the scheduled ex-parte presentation of private
respondent's evidence on January 26, 2012. The CTA should have been persuaded to
reconsider its earlier order of default as its lifting would not in any way prejudice or
deprive private respondent of any substantive right, especially so considering that the
latter did not file any opposition or comment to petitioner's motion to lift order of default
or to the motion for reconsideration of the denial thereof.
It is not to say, however, that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with lightly, but
that, rather, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their
application. It is within the CTA's sound judicial discretion to give party-litigants every
opportunity to properly present their conflicting claims on the merits of the controversy
without resorting to technicalities.

Lui Ent
LUI ENTERPRISES v. ZUELLIG PHARMA
Facts
Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma entered into a contract of lease. Zuellig Pharma
received a letter from the PBCom. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property,
PBCom asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it. Zuellig Pharma informed Lui
Enterprises of the claim. Lui Enterprises wrote to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right
to collect the leased property's rent. Due to the conflicting claims, Zuellig Pharma filed a
complaint for interpleader. PBCom filed its answer. On the other hand, Lui Enterprises filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma's representative did not have
authority to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation. Zuellig Pharma argued that the
motion to dismiss should be denied for having been filed late since it should be filed within
the required time given to file an answer to the complaint. Considering that Lui Enterprises
filed its motion to dismiss beyond the 15-day period to file an answer, Zuellig Pharma
moved that Lui Enterprises be declared in default.
Issue
Whether or not Lui Enterprises should be declared in default?
Ruling
Yes, When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is
required to answer within 15 days from the day he or she was served with summons. The
defendant may also move to dismiss the complaint "[w]ithin the time for but before filing
the answer." Thus, a defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of
summons either presents no defenses against the plaintiff's allegations in the complaint or
was prevented from filing his or her answer within the required period due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its
default before the RTC rendered judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to set aside order
of default, raising the ground of excusable negligence. But Lui Enterprises never explained
why its counsel failed to file it on time. It just argued that courts should be liberal in setting
aside orders of default. Even assuming that it had a meritorious defense and that its
representative and counsel had to fly in from Davao to Makati to personally appear and
manifest in court its meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises must first show that its failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. This Lui Enterprises
did not do.

AMENDMENT OF PLEADING

City State Savings Bank

CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs. MAXIMIANO P. AGUINALDO
755 SCRA 64; G.R. No. 200018; April 06, 2015
Aguinaldo claimed that he is the owner and possessor of a certain property. He discovered
that Mojica had fraudulently obtained a certificate of title in the latter’s name. Aguinaldo
filed a complaint for the nullification of TCT against Mojica. RTC declared TCT of Mojica null
and void.7 However, before Aguinaldo discovered the existence of the fraud TCT, Mojica
had already executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of Citystate
Savings Bank, Inc. (Citystate). Citystate extrajudicially foreclosed the and consequently
consolidated its title to the subject property. Aguinaldo filed a Complaint10 for annulment
of title with the RTC against Citystate. Aguinaldo alleged that during the pendency of the
case, Citystate was able to secure a writ of possession; that Aguinaldo was thereafter
evicted from the subject property. He claimed that Citystate sold the subject property to
Syndica Phil. Corporation (Syndica). TCT was issued in the name of Syndica.16
In the Amended Complaint, Aguinaldo impleaded Syndica as Citystate's co-defendant and
added the following allegations: (a) that Citystate filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ
of Possession; (b) that a writ of possession was illegally issued which resulted in
Aguinaldo's ejectment and the demolition of the latter's house; (c) that the said ejectment
and demolition resulted in actual damages amounting to P3,500,000.00, moral damages
and exemplary damages to Aguinaldo; and (d) that Citystate sold the subject property to
Syndica who acquired the same in bad faith.17 Aguinaldo asserted that the amendments on
the complaint were necessary to afford complete relief to the parties.
RTC denied the motion to admit Aguinaldo's amended complaint on the ground that the
amendments substantially altered the cause of action and will only delay the resolution of
the case. CA allowed the amended complaint.
ISSUE: 1. WON the amended complaint may be admitted.
RULING: Yes. The petition is denied. The inclusion of Syndica as additional defendant is
necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all
parties the benefit of due process and fair play in just one proceeding. The non-inclusion of
Syndica, who has acquired rights or interest from the assailed title, will render the relief
originally sought incomplete, if not futile. Thus, the need to amend the complaint to
forestall any further need to institute other actions or proceedings.
It is well-settled that amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in
the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits
without regard to technicalities.

Yujuico
760 SCRA 610             January 29, 2007
ALDERITO Z. YUJUICO, BONIFACIO C. SUMBILLA, and DOLNEY S.
SUMBILLA, Petitioners, 
vs.
CEZAR T. QUIAMBAO, JOSE M. MAGNO III, MA. CHRISTINA F. FERREROS, ANTHONY K.
QUIAMBAO, SIMPLICIO T. QUIAMBAO, JR., ERIC C. PILAPIL, ALBERT M. RASALAN, and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 48, URDANETA CITY, Respondents.
Facts:
respondents filed an Amended Complaint dated September 2, 2004 further praying for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin petitioners from discharging their functions as directors and officers of STRADEC.
On September 22, 2004, they filed a Supplemental Complaint praying that the court (1)
direct Export Industry Bank, Cezar T. Quiambao and Bonifacio G. Sumbilla to surrender to
them the original and reconstituted Stock and Transfer Book and other corporate
documents of STRADEC; and (2) nullify the reconstituted Stock and Transfer Book and all
transactions of the corporation. Both pleadings were admitted by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the amendment of the pleadings are valid?
Held:
After a careful evaluation of the records and all the pleadings extant in this case as well as
the testimonies of the plaintiffs, this court is inclined to grant the plaintiffs’ application for
the writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction in order to restrain the respondents from
acting as officers of the corporation and committing further acts inimical to the corporation
and to the rest of the stockholders thereof. It is also evident from the pleadings that
defendants would not yield to the demand of plaintiffs for the maintenance of the status
quo until after the resolution of the merits of the instant controversy.

Ascano
Ascano-Cupino vs Pacific Rehouse
Facts:
The Ascanos entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale with Pacific Rehouse
Corporation. The latter obliged itself to purchase from the Ascanos a parcel of land. Pacific
paid down payment of 1,792,590 leaving a balance of 4,182,710 to be paid upon the
fulfillment of certain conditions. Subsequent, petitioners keep asking for additional
payments, wherein Pacific also paid. However, Pacific learned that petitioners were
negotiating the sale of the property with other buyers allegedly for a higher consideration.
Pacific filed a complaint for cancellation of contract, sum of Money and Damages before the
RTC. However, before pre-trial, Pacific discovered that petitioners had withdrawn the
1,005,180 it had deposited with Capitol Bank of General Trias. In view of petitioners’
action, Pacific filed an Amended Complaint changing its cause of action from cancellation to
specific performance.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC erred in deciding based on the original complaint
Ruling: Yes.
It is clear that the RTC erred in declaring the case based on the original complaint
and not on the Amended Complaint. Under Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, “an
amended pleadings supersedes the pleading that it amends,” With Pacific’s filing of the
Amended Complaint, the original are must be deemed to have been abandoned and to have
become funct us officio.
Thus this Court has rules; when a pleading is amended, the original pleading is
deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The
case stands for trial on the amended pleading only. Thus, the Amended Complaint, to which
petitioners filed an Amended Answer with Counterclaim, should have been the basis for the
RTC’s decision.

Jolover
JALOVER v. OSMEÑ A
Facts
Petitioners alleged before the COMELEC that Osmeñ a made material misrepresentations of
fact in the latter's COC and likewise failed to comply with the residency requirement.
Osmeñ a denied the these allegations. In his defense, he argued that even prior to his actual
transfer of residence to Toledo City, he had been able to establish ties with Toledo City in
view of his family's business interests and his political linkages. The COMELEC Second
Division dismissed the petition on the ground that Osmeñ a did not commit any material
misrepresentation in his COC. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that
the COMELEC showed no partiality by admitting Osmeñ a’s belatedly filed Answer to the
Petition, and his Amended Memorandum and Supplemental Amended Memorandum.
Issue
Whether the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of impartiality on the part of the
COMELEC in admitting Osmeñ a's Answer, Amended Memorandum?
Ruling
Yes, as Osmeñ a aptly pleaded in his motion for leave, the amendments consisted of mere
technical errors; the lower portions and the most crucial parts of the Memorandum were
omitted in its final printing because the printer was inadvertently configured to use an
incorrect paper size. Moreover, amendments are actually favored in order to allow the
complete presentation of the real controversies. It is a recognized rule of procedure that
pleadings shall be construed liberally so as to render substantial justice to the parties and
in order that actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined without regard
to technicalities and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rationale behind
the rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the
parties are presented, their rights are determined and the case decided on the merits
without unnecessary delay. When the situation is such that if the proposed amendment is
not allowed, another action would be instituted, thus making two actions, two trials, and
two appeals possible and probable, the said amendment should be admitted.

BILL OF PARTICULARS

Enrile
ENRILE v. PEOPLE
Facts
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila
Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the
Sandiganbayan. The Information reads:
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court’s
jurisdiction, above-named accused ENRILE and REYES, both public officers, committing the
offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with
NAPOLES, LIM, and DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass,
accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least (Php172,834,500.00)
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts.
Enrile filed a motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.
Issue
Is a Motion to Quash the proper remedy if the information is vague?
Ruling
No, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of
particulars. The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the
complaint or information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its
granting and order the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s
Constitutionally guaranteed rights. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill
of particulars. Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the
cause and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for
purposes of enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS

Lisondra
LISONDRA VS. MEGACRAFT
LILIOSA C. LISONDRA, petitioner, vs. MEGACRAFT INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION and
SPOUSES MELECIO and ROSEMARIE OAMIL, respondents.
777 SCRA 337; G.R. No. 204275; December 09, 2015
Petitioner filed against a case for illegal dismissal against Megacraft and Sps Oamil before
the NLRC. LA declared the constructive dismissal of complainant. NLRC dismissed appeal
but subsequently reversed its decision. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 657 before the CA. CA denied saying that the petition suffered from certain “congenital
infirmities” including: There was no proper proof of service of the Petition to the agency a
quo and to the adverse parties, among others.
ISSUE: Can registry receipts and an affidavit be considered as sufficient proof of receipt?
RULING: Petition is granted. “If the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall
consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of
which must be appended to the paper being served. In this case, the Court of Appeals itself
acknowledged that the petition was accompanied by the affidavit of service and registry
receipts. The Court notes that mails sent thru the post office are very rarely, if indeed they
even happen, received by the intended recipient on the same day they were posted. The
Rule itself acknowledges this, hence, the need to specify that “[t]he registry return card
shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender.” Affidavit of service and registry
receipt should be attached to the pleading and such would comply with the rule on proper
proof of service. However, a party is further required to submit the registry return card to
the court “immediately upon its receipt by the sender.”
Technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly interpreted and applied in a manner that
would defeat substantial justice or be unduly detrimental to the workforce.

Ong Lay Hin

Ong Lay Hin vs CA
Facts:
RTC of Cebu City convicted petitioner Ong Lay Hin and Leo Obsioma of estafa
punished under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Ong filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but the trial court denied. Ong filed a Notice of Appeal, which the trial
court gave due course. The trial court then transmitted the case records to the Court of
Appeals. On Nov. 29,2001, the CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. The CA then
issued an Entry of Judgment, declaring that the case became final and executory on May 15,
2003. The CA based the date of finality on the date of receipt indicated in the registry
return card corresponding to the mail sent to Ong’s dormer counsel, Zosa and Quijano Law
Offices. Based on the registry return card, their law office received on April 29, 2003 a copy
of the CA’s Resolution denying Ong’s Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court pending
judge ordered to arrested Ong. Ong filed before this court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus with application for issuance of preliminary and/or mandatory
injunction. He alleges that his counsel never received a copy of the CA’s resolution and that
CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing entry of Judgment.
Issue:
Whether there is a grave abuse of discretion in this case
Ruling: No.
Petitioner’s former counsel had notice of CA’s resolution as early as April 21,2004.
With petitioner failing to rebut this presumption, it must be presumed that his former
counsel received a copy on April 29, 2003. The 15-day period to appeal commenced from
this date. Since petitioner did not file an appeal within 15 days, the decision became final
and executory. As for the trial court, it likewise did not gravely abuse its discretion in
issuing the arrest warrant, since the CA had already issued the Entry of Judgment.
SUMMONS

National Petroleum Gas

NATION PETROLEUM GAS, INCORPORATED VS. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION
766 SCRA 653; G.R. No. 183370; August 17, 2015
Respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint for civil damages arising from estafa in
relation to violations of the Trust Receipts Law. After an ex parte hearing, respondent’s
writ of preliminary attachment was granted and issued. The Sheriff served upon
petitioners a copy of the summons, complaint, application for attachment, respondent’s
affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment.
Petitioners filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss asserting that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation since the summons was improperly
served upon a mere liaison officer and not one of the officers enumerated in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the Rules.
RTC and CA denies.
ISSUE: Was the summons properly served?
RULING: Petition is denied. RTC and CA affirmed. The SC that there was a valid and
effective service of summons upon petitioner corporation through its liaison officer who
acted as the agent of the corporate secretary.
When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein petitioner, service of summons
may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. The
enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and
exclusive following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
Substantial compliance cannot be invoked. Service of summons upon persons other than
those officers specifically mentioned in Section 11, Rule 14 is void, defective and not
binding to said corporation. Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules cannot be construed to apply
simultaneously and do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons which can
either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties.
To avail themselves of substituted service of summons, courts must rely on a detailed
enumeration of the sheriff’s actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be served
despite diligent and reasonable efforts. Since there were no actual efforts exerted and no
positive steps undertaken to earnestly locate the individual petitioners, there is no basis to
convincingly say that they evaded the personal service of summons and merely gave the
sheriff a runaround, thus, justifying substituted service upon them.
Despite improper service of summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary
appearance.
Manotoc
MANOTOC v. CA
Facts
Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court's judgment in Hawaii for wrongful death
of Archimedes Trajano committed by military officials of the Philippines under the
command of defendant Manotoc. The trial court issued a Summonsaddressed to petitioner.
The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon Macky de la Cruz,
an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit. When petitioner failed to file
her Answer, the trial court declared her in default. Petitioner, by special appearance of
counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over
her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons. The ground to support the
motion was, the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative,
employee, nor a resident of the place. The trial court rejected Manotoc's Motion to Dismiss
on on the presumption that the sheriff's substituted service was made in the regular
performance of official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the
contrary.
Issue
Was there a valid substituted service of summons?
Ruling
No. A scrutiny of the Return reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to
serve the Summons on Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return
why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has
become impossible or unattainable. The pertinent facts and circumstances on the efforts
exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in the Return. It cannot be
determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the
attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be
assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent
facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with more
particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service. Besides, it has not been shown that
Trajano or Sheriff Cañ elas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to
locate petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an
effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means.

Fortune
Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. vs COA
Facts:
Respondent and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning
the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the
former obligating 4,393,593.60 for the premium payment and subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA. The latter office disallowed the payment for
lack of legal basis under RA 7160. Respondent appealed but is appeal was denied. The
petitioner filed its petition for money claim in COA. COA issued its decision denying the
petition.
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner failed to comply with the rule on proof of service
Ruling:
The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt.
Section 13 requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service
shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt,
both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is
mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are to submitted.
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by
Marcelino T. Pascua. Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by
registered mail. The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their
reproductions. Hence, cut print outs did not substantially comply with rule. This was the
reason why the Court held in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not
comply with the requirement of proof of service.

MOTIONS

Acampado
ACAMPADO VS. COSMILLA
771 SCRA 535; G.R. No. 198531; September 28, 2015
The petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Document by
respondents against petitioners. In their Amended Complaint, respondents alleged that the
sale of their share on the subject property was done thru a forged SPA and is therefore
void.
RTC dismissed the complaint of the respondents for failure to prove by preponderance of
evidence that the signatures of the respondents in the SPA were forged.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration For failure to comply with the requirement
of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. However, the CA reversed its Resolution and
allowed the relaxation of the procedures.
ISSUE: Is the failure to comply with requirement of a notice of hearing a fatal defect that is
deleterious to respondents cause?
RULING: Yes. Petition granted. In keeping with the principles of due process, a motion
which does not afford the adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be
disregarded. Failure to comply with the required notice and hearing is a fatal defect that is
deleterious to respondents cause. A motion invariably contains a prayer, which the movant
makes to the court, which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose and in
the observance of due process, the other party must be given the opportunity to oppose the
motion.

Laude
Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde
Facts
Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude was killed allegedly by Joseph Scott Pemberton. A Complaint for
murder was filed by Jennifer's sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton. A warrant of
arrest against Pemberton was issued. Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Ginez-
Jabalde, and he was then arraigned. Laude filed a Motion to Compel the AFP to Surrender
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage.
According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton's counsel
through registered mail. Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners' Motion for lack of merit.
Petitioners argue that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she
dismissed the Motion on mere technicalities. In particular, they argue that the three-day
rule on motions under Rule 15, Section 4 is not absolute, and should be liberally
interpreted when a case is attended by exigent circumstances.
Issue
Whether the failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is justified?
Ruling
No. While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of
Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be
acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party
nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the
motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the
movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given
sufficient time to study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to
procedural due process. Even granting that Pemberton's counsel was able to comment on
the motion orally during the hearing, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study
and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-
Jabalde was correct to deny the Motion based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To
rule otherwise would be to prejudice Pemberton's rights as an accused.
NOTICE OF HEARINGS

Estate of Juan Guttierez

Estate of Juan Gutierrez vs. Heirs of Sps. Jose and Gracita Cabangon
Facts
The spouses Cabangon filed a suit for Specific Performance and damages against Juan
Guttierez after the latter refused to receive the remaining payment for the purchase of
three lots which were still in the name of one Fernanda Guttierez. Juan promised to
transfer the title in their name upon full payment, but changed his mind, offering instead to
sell only one lot to the spouses. When they refused, Juan also refused to accept payment of
the full price, hence, they were compelled to consign the amount with the RTC and file the
suit. The RTC considered the estate as having waived its presentation of evidence, and to
have rested its case. It rendered a decision in favour of the spouses, ordering the transfer of
ownership, possession and control of the lots to them. The Estate of Juan Guttierez filed its
Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial, which the RTC denied. It also denied the Estate’s
appeal since the motion filed was pro-forma, hence did not toll the reglementary period for
filing appeal. The Estate filed a petition for certiorari and it maintains that its motion was
not pro forma and that it did contain a notice of hearing, both addressed to the clerk of
court and the Spouses Cabangon.
Issue
Whether or not notice of hearing was properly set?
Ruling
No. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall
be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice. Since the Estate’s Motion did not contain the mandated notice of hearing, it becomes
pro forma or a mere scrap of paper. As such, said motion did not toll the reglementary
period for the filing of an appeal. The Estate even admits this but simply pleads for the
relaxation of the applicable procedural rules. Time and again, the Court has held that a
notice of time and place of hearing is mandatory for motions for new trial or motion for
reconsideration, as in this case. The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15
is mandatory and the lack thereof is fatal to a motion for reconsideration. Though
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities,
this does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be belittled to suit the
convenience of a party.

Anlud Metal
ANLUD METAL RECYCLING CORPORATION VS. ANG
766 SCRA 633; G.R. No. 182157; August 17, 2015
Petitioner lodged a Complaint for attempted estafa through falsification against
respondents.
The RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest against respondents. Respondent filed a Petition for
Reinvestigation and a Motion for Preliminary Investigation before the City Prosecutor. He
also filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending Reinvestigation
and to Recall Order of Arrest against respondent.
RTC denied the motion, however, it later dismissed the case against respondent for want of
probable cause. It explained that mere ownership of the trucks did not make respondent a
coconspirator for estafa.
Petitioner questioned the dismissal of case before the CA which gave due course despite
the appealed without the participation of the OSG, which was supposed to act on behalf of
the People.
ISSUE: Is the notice of hearing defective for addressing only the public prosecutor and the
clerk of court, and not the Petitioner?
RULING: Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court was substantially complied with.
A notice of hearing must be addressed to all the parties concerned; and that failure to
comply with this directive results in a motion that should be treated as a mere scrap of
paper. However, this general requirement of a valid notice of hearing is one of those
procedural rules that admit of various exceptions.
The real purpose behind the requirement of notice of hearing is to afford the adverse
parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. The test is the
presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.
In this case, Petitioner has filed a Comment/Opposition to oppose the supposedly defective
Omnibus Motion. Also, the RTC scheduled a hearing for the judicial determination of
probable cause. Petitioner also filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied in
its Order dated 3 October 2006.
Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that procedural due process
has substantially been complied with.