1nc

Interpretation—Reduce and should mean that reductions of arm sales have

to be immediate, permanent, and certain
 Should” means “must” and requires immediate legal effect
Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse
of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?
CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)
¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order
connotes futurity or may
be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of
grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To
determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro
ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a
disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16

[CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]
13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various
shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND
STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914).
For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction
of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury
instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the
plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App.
79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the
request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment);
State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in
an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In
praesenti means literally "at
the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which
in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become
effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

Reduce means to make smaller in size, amount, or number.

Dictionary.com, 18
(Dictionary.com,  “Reduce”, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/reduce, 6/29/18, NS)
Reduce: verb (used with object), re·duced, re·duc·ing. to bring down to a smaller extent, size, amount,
number, etc.: to reduce one's weight by 10 pounds. to lower in degree, intensity, etc.: to reduce the speed of a car. to bring down
to a lower rank, dignity, etc.:

Violation: The aff is neither a certain or immediate reduction in arm sales

Voter for limits and ground—aff can impose infinite
conditions and processes on arm sales which explodes neg research
burden—allows aff to spike out of core disads by claiming the plan would
result in virtually no reduction in arm sales
 

Effects T is a voter—destroys limits and ground by using infinite processes

the neg cant predict
 1nc
Life is a manifestation of the Will, a constant metaphysical striving which
sustains itself only on its own motion and contrasted from the perishability
of all things in evanescent particularity—theirs is a politics of desire which
sustains The Will, which results in constant warfare, instability, and
violence.
[Book]

Thus, we must turn away from desire.

Troxell, philosophy professor at Boston College, no date
[Mary, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Arthur Schopenhauer (1788—1860)”, https://www.iep.utm.edu/schopenh/, 6/24 dwrs]

Schopenhauer’s pessimism is the most well known feature of his philosophy, and he is often referred to as the philosopher of
pessimism. Schopenhauer’s pessimistic vision follows from his account of the inner nature of the world as aimless blind striving.

Because the will has no goal or purpose, the will’s satisfaction is impossible. The will objectifies itself in a hierarchy of gradations
from inorganic to organic life, and every grade of objectification of the will, from gravity to animal motion, is marked by
insatiable striving. In addition, every force of nature and every organic form of nature participates in a struggle to seize matter from
other forces or organisms. Thus existence is marked by conflict, struggle and dissatisfaction.

The attainment of a goal or desire, Schopenhauer continues, results in satisfaction, whereas the frustration of such attainment
results in suffering. Since existence is marked by want or deficiency, and since satisfaction of this want is unsustainable,
existence is characterized by suffering. This conclusion holds for all of nature, including inanimate natures, insofar as they are at
essence will. However, suffering is more conspicuous in the life of human beings because of their intellectual capacities. Rather
than serving as a relief from suffering, the intellect of human beings brings home their suffering with greater clarity and
consciousness. Even with the use of reason, human beings can in no way alter the degree of misery we experience; indeed,
reason only magnifies the degree to which we suffer. Thus all the ordinary pursuits of mankind are not only fruitless but also illusory
insofar as they are oriented toward satisfying an insatiable, blind will.

Since the essence of existence is insatiable striving, and insatiable striving is suffering, Schopenhauer concludes that
nonexistence is preferable to existence. However, suicide is not the answer. One cannot resolve the problem of existence
through suicide, for since all existence is suffering, death does not end one’s suffering but only terminates the form that one’s
suffering takes. The proper response to recognizing that all existence is suffering is to turn away from or renounce one’s
own desiring . In this respect, Schopenhauer’s thought finds confirmation in the Eastern texts he read and admired: the
goal of human life is to turn away from desire. Salvation can only be found in resignation.

The reduction of Evil to misfortune is the birth of ressentiment;

assessment is the death of naïve belief which facilitates the vanishing act
of the Good itself.
Jean Baudrillard, 2006, philosopher, The Intelligence of Evil, “Evil and Misfortune” (139…)
Of evil in the pure state it is impossible to speak.
What one can speak of is the distinction between evil and misfortune, the reduction of evil to
misfortune, and a culture of misfortune that is complicit with the hegemonic culture of
happiness. 27
The ideal opposition between good and evil has been reduced to the ideological opposition
between happiness and misfortune. The reduction of good to happiness is as baneful as that
of evil to misfortune, but this latter is more interesting because it shows up our humanistic
vision more distinctly, that vision  which sees man as  naturally  good, and evil  and misfortune  as
mere accidents.
It is here, in the idea that man is good, or at least culturally perfectible, that we encounter
our  deepest imaginary conception, and with it our most serious confusion. For if misfortune
is an accident and, ultimately, like sickness and poverty, a reparable accident (from the
technical standpoint of integral happiness even death is no longer irreparable), evil, for its
part,  is not  an accident. If misfortune is accidental, evil is fatal..28 It is an original power and, in
no sense, a dysfunction, vestige or mere obstacle standing in the way of good.
The sovereign hypothesis, the hypothesis of evil, is that man is not good by nature, not because
he might be  said to be  bad, but because he is perfect as he is.
He is perfect in the sense that the fruit is perfect, but not more perfect than the flower, which is
perfect in itself and is not the unfinished phase of a definitive state.
Nothing- is definitive - or rather everything is. Every stage of evolution, every age of life, every
moment of life, every animal or plant species, is perfect in itself. Every character, in its singular
imperfection, in its matchless finitude, is incomparable.
This is what  evolutionary  thought tends to suppress in the name of  a finality that can only be
that of  Good, to the - perfectly immoral- advantage of some particular species, for it is in
evolutionism, in the idea of a progressive succession, that all discriminations are rooted.
If one takes each term in its singularity - and not in its particularity, referred to the
universal - then each term is perfect; it is itself its own end.
In this way every detail of the world is perfect if it is not referred to some larger set.
In this way everything is perfect if it is not referred to its idea.
In this way the nothing is perfect since it is set against nothing.
And in this way evil is perfect when left to itself, to its own evil genius.
Such is man before being plunged into the idea of progress  and into the  technical imagining of
happiness: he is both evil and perfection -like the Cathars, who, while recognizing the singular
power of evil and its total hold over creation, called themselves perfect: the 'Perfecti' Ceronetti,
in L'occhiale malinconico, writes: ‘I find the philosophical idea of the fundamental misfortune of
the human race quite alien. In Leopardi, the inalterable innocence of the victim is always
presupposed and nature then strikes them down as though with some malignant tumour. I do
not see innocence anywhere. I know men are base by nature and not  by  accident, but when
I think "human condition”, I lose any notion of happiness or misfortune - the night carries it away,
all that remains is a hopeless puzzle.
At bottom, the dogma of  misfortune is too clear  and  too verifiable  an idea  to be
fundamental. Evil is  a confused,  impenetrable  idea. It is  enigmatic in  its very  essence. Now, a
tiny confused idea is always greater than a very big idea that is absolutely clear.
 
The idea of  misfortune is, then, an easy solution.
Just as the idea of freedom is the easiest solution to the impossibility of thinking destiny and
predestination, just as the idea of reality is the easiest solution to the impossibility of thinking the
radical illusoriness of the world, so the idea of misfortune is the easiest solution to the
impossibility of thinking evil.
This impossibility of thinking evil is matched only by the impossibility of imagining death.
Hence the question how an entire people was able to follow the Nazis  in their enterprise of
extermination  is one that remains hopelessly insoluble for  a rational thought, an Enlightenment
thought that is incapable of thinking beyond an ideal version of man, incapable even of
envisaging the absence of a response to such a question.
Unintelligence of evil, absence of insight into things by evil and therefore always the same
discourse on the 'foul beast' and the same naïveté in the analysis of present events.
 
Our  whole  system of values excludes this predestination of evil.
Yet all it has invented, at the end of its burdensome therapy on the human species,  is another
way of making it disappear, that is to say, of ironically carrying the possibility of happiness to its
opposite term, that of the perfect crime, that of integral misfortune, which was somehow waiting
for it just at the end. For you cannot liberate good without liberating evil, and that liberation is
even more rapid than the liberation of good.
 
It is, in fact, no longer exactly a struggle between good and evil.  It's a question of transparency.
Good is transparent: you can see through it.
Evil, by contrast, shows through: it is what you see when you see through.
Or alternatively, evil is the first hypothesis, the first supposition. Good is merely a transposition
and a substitute product: the hypostasis of evil.
Good definitively scattered among the figures of evil. Anamorphosis of good.
Evil definitively scattered among the figures of good. Anamorphosis of evil.
It is only through the distorted, disseminated figures of evil that one can reconstitute, in
perspective, the figure of good. It is only through the dispersed and falsely symmetrical figures
of good that one can reconstitute the paradoxical figure of evil.
As it is only through the dispersion of the name of God in the labyrinth of the poem that you can
sense the original figure running through it.
This way evil has of showing through in all the figures of good, this occult presence, is the
matrix of all perverse effects and, singularly, of the fact that everything which stands opposed to
the system today is merely an involuntary mirror to it.
So it is with all these developments in human rights, humanitarianism and all these things ‘Sans
Frontières’ that merely hasten the circulation of the New World Order for which they stand
surety. Without that being anyone's strategy.
In this sense, the hypothesis of evil is never that of a determined ill-will, but the hypothesis of a
rational concatenation of normality on the move - a teleonomy that is particularly tangible in all
the recent wars where the right of humanitarian intervention clearly takes over the role of
extending that New Order. The Kosovans were not just human shields for the Serbs; the whole
refugee drama served as a humanitarian shield for the West.
An entirely synchronous disconnect: the refugee drama was treated as a 'humanitarian'
catastrophe, while the ‘surgical’ air strikes were unfolding just as implacably. Thus the
apotropaic figures of good ensure the continuation of evil, just as (in Macedonio Fernandez's
writings) the vicissitudes of meaning and value keep the Nothing in being.
As Ceronetti says, 'Concrete salvation takes the form of an accelerated destruction.' But, in a
way, it is not evil, but good that is manifestly at the controls of the suicide locomotive.
 
Thinking based on evil is not pessimistic; it is the thinking based on misfortune that is
pessimistic because it wants desperately to escape evil or, alternatively, to revel in it.
Thought, for its part,  does not cure  human  misfortune,  the terrible obviousness of which it
absorbs for purposes of some unknown transformation. Pessimism excludes any depth that
eludes its negative judgement, whereas thought wishes to penetrate magically beyond the
fracture of the visible. The rays of the black sun of pessimism do not reach down to the floor of
the abyss.
Absolute depth knows neither good nor evil.
Thus the intelligence of evil goes far beyond pessimism.
In reality, the only genuinely pessimistic, nihilistic vision is that of good since, at bottom,  from
the humanist point of view,  the whole of  history is nothing but crime. Cain killing Abel is already
a crime against humanity (there were only two of them!) and isn't original sin already a crime
against humanity too? This is all absurd, and, from the standpoint of good, the effort to
rehabilitate the world's violence is a hopeless exercise. All the more so as, without all these
crimes, there simply wouldn't be any history.
'If the evil in man were eliminated,' says Montaigne, 'you would destroy the fundamental
conditions of life.'
 
Everything comes from this confusion between evil and misfortune.
Evil is the world as it is and as it has been, and we can take a lucid view of
this. Misfortune is the world as it ought never to have been - but in the name of what? In the
name of what ought to be, in the name of God or a transcendent ideal, of a good it would be
very hard to define.
 
We may take a criminal view of crime: that is  tragedy.  Or  we may take  a recriminative view  of
it: that is  humanitarianism; it is  the pathetic, sentimental vision, the vision that calls constantly
for reparation.
We  have  here all the Ressentiment that comes from the depths of a genealogy of morals
and calls within us for reparation of our own lives.
This retrospective compassion,  this conversion of evil into misfortune, is the twentieth century's
finest industry.
First as a mental blackmailing operation, to which we are all victim, even in our actions,
from which we may hope only for a lesser evil- keep a low profile, decriminalize your existence!
- then as source of a tidy profit, since misfortune (in all its forms, from suffering to insecurity,
from oppression to depression) represents a symbolic capital, the exploitation of which, even
more than the exploitation of happiness,  is endlessly profitable: it is a goldmine with a seam
running through each of us.
Contrary to received opinion, misfortune is easier to manage than happiness  - that is why it
is  the ideal solution to the problem of evil.  It is misfortune that is most distinctly opposed to evil
and to the principle of evil, of which it is the denial.
Just as freedom ends in total liberation and, in abreaction to that liberation, in new servitudes,
so the ideal of  happiness leads to a whole culture of misfortune, of recrimination, repentance,
compassion and victimhood.
 1nc
This is a test!
Baudrillard 81 [Simulacra and Simulation - Hypermarket dwrs]
At the deepest level, another kind of work is at issue here, the work of acculturation, of confrontation, of examination, of the social
code, and of the verdict: people go there to find and to select objects - responses to all the questions they may ask themselves;
or, rather, they themselves come in response to the functional and directed question that the objects constitute. The objects are no
longer commodities: they are no longer even signs whose meaning and message one could decipher and appropriate for oneself,
they are tests, they are the ones that interrogate us, and we are summoned to answer them, and the answer is included in the
question. Thus all the messages in the media function in a similar fashion: neither information nor communication, but referendum ,
perpetual test, circular response, verification of the code.
 1nc
There is no independent relationship between subjects and objects
that we can attribute moral causality to - voting aff doesn’t equate to
affirming the speech act of the 1AC there is only risk of offense as part of
them utilizing the linguistics of ressentiment
Rickels 90 (Looking After Nietzsche: Interdisciplinary Encounters with Merleau-Ponty Front Cover Laurence A. Rickels
Laurence Arthur Rickels (born December 2, 1954) is an American literary and media theorist, whose most significant works have
continued the Frankfurt School's efforts to apply psychoanalytic insights to analysis and criticism of modern mass media culture.
SUNY Press, 1990 - Philosophy - 265 pages-BRW)

Language separates the event from itself, even if by no other means than by simple doubling. It dissolves an occurrence into
imaginary constituent parts; it disintegrates the occurrence into a grammatical relation between a subject and predicate,
into a complementary causal relation between cause and effect. In this way it abstracts inductively from the factual event and
its traumatic experience; "seduction of language" is a topos of Nietzsche's epistemological reflections. By articulating the
occurrence, language masks it. The sentence "The lightning bolt flashes" can make no claim to correspondence with its object; for
lightning is the non-referential and meaningless identity of its appearance and its being, while the sentence is a referential structure,
an appearance that refers to a being outside of itself. By splitting the event, separating it out into subject and predicate,
language suggests behind one world a second world of ideal, unmoved, self-enclosed, constant essences and first
principles. Language immobilizes becoming into being, and reduces the former's action to the latter's appearance. In short:
language extricates (legt auseinander) what belongs together and explicates (legt aus) by fabricating what does not exist (BCE,
II, § 34; 111, § 52; Tl,"Reason in Philosophy," § 5). Freedom itself has no substantial being. It attains this only after the fact by
its linguistic explication as freedom, i.e., only when and where it is already past, by means of "that sublime self-deception . . .
that interprets and explicates weakness itself as freedom and its mere being-so-and-so as merit" (GM, I, § 13). The spirit of
ressentiment is not the origin of this idealism of language, but it is the origin of its stubborn survival. For with the aid of this
language's grammar and the "fundamental errors of reason ossified in it," ressentiment can articulate its "No," its "No to what is
'outside,' to what is 'other,' to what is 'not itself' " (GM, I, § 10). Nietzsche's "lightning bolt" is an example of "driving, willing, acting
(and) becoming" (GM, 1, § 13), of the immediate self-affirming Yes. It also serves as an example of his agents in the pseudo-
historical history of it that Nietzsche writes, that is, of "any pack of blond beasts of prey, who come like fate without cause,
reason, consideration, or pretext, who are simply there like lightning, too terrible, too sudden, too persuasive, too 'other'
even to be hated" (GM, II, § 17). Against this lightning bolt of the Yes and the sheer alterity of becoming and disappearing, a
"No" must be raised which inhibits, delays, defers, and differentiates the bolt so that the lightning itself is at least
"something" and so that everything does not disappear under its flash. The speculative grammar of ressentiment is the
apotropaic interpretation and explication of the lightning bolt; its sentence is the articulated and articulating No to the essentially
unarticulated, undivided Yes of the will. The "self-affirming Yes-saying" (GM, I, § 10) is incapable of sense or meaning since it refers
without mediation to itself and never to an object external to itself. It is the speech act par excellence that glows and fades in the
punctual intensity of the lightning bolt, since in it there is no difference between doer and doing, deed and effect, outer
and inner, no restraint and no precondition, no reserve and no precedent. The No that interprets and explicates this Yes,
however, doubles, splits it into a deed of a deed, and imposes its deed like an exchangeable mask upon it, rendering it a
fixed subject-substratum. In this way the Yes is dissolved into a linguistic relation even though it cannot strictu sensu belong
to language as a conventional system of meaning, since it means the very sphere of pure speaking. The individual members
of this relation are equipped with a sturdy function and meaning, but because of their constitution they fall short of whatever
it is they are speaking about. As a result of its disjunction into a will and (an act of) willing, willing which in itself is actually
already an act, becomes reduced to the mere possibility of willing. By being expressed in language, willing is differentiated into
a will and (an act of) willing of which the will is capable, yet to which it should not be compelled. But the will does not will. It is the
simple tautology of willing—without subject, intention, or object . If language makes (the act of) willing into a mere predicate
of the will that can be either attributed to or removed from it, then language is the locus not of the will, but of ressentiment
against the will. It is language which isolates the will from (the act of) willing and, in this way, uses the interpretative and
explicative fiction to make the will independent. Itself unfree, the fiction liberates the will. And only where the will is free of its own
(act of) willing can it raise itself as will to law and subjugate itself freely to this law. The free will is the will of ressentiment. By
differentiating the will, the inability of ressentiment to unite will and deed is interpreted and explicated as the ability not to will this
identity. The incapacity to will thereby bestows a will unto itself by means of this interpretation. The hermeneutics of
ressentiment—the hermeneuein of language—is the art of interpreting and explicating the absolute otherness of (the act of)
willing as the will of the other. It distances and fixes the movement of (the act of) willing from an outside of itself and
reinterprets the will's deficit as will. This interpretation and explication, itself subjectless and unfree, is the invention of the
subject, of freedom, and of meaning. To the same extent, however, that the will is betrayed by this interpretation and
explication, it is saved by them. The sheer alteration, which announces itself in the speech act of the Yes, is also at work in its
explication; for the alteration takes no consideration of the explication's "own, proper" structure. Alteration subjects explication, as
the act that it is, to a violent change and has no explanation or reason. Explication is the alteration to which alteration must
surrender itself if it does not want to stop being absolutely other.
case
 deterrence
the death of everyone alive is already inevitable – the possibility of
extinction is the only way out of the cycle of dying and suffering one at a
time and forever which means it’s better now than later
--life is better off having never been – suffering, dying, tragedy

--there’s no secret, hidden meaning to all of this – that’s actually an incredibly unintuitive position; rather, the universe is meaningless and it was never
designed to be another way

-- every person who will die in the nuclear winter will eventually die, it’s only a question of whether or not you want all of their friends, family, and
acquaintances to suffer in the mean time and whether or not it’s ethical to bring in future generations to suffer (it’s not – Benatar, Ligotti, Schopenhauer,
the K); random, capricious death is worse

-- and, the radical confrontation with death means that it’s not scary anymore, once, at least, it’s inevitable: nuclear winter.

Dolan 2 [John Dolan, American essayist, poet, and author, and co-editor of the eXile. The eXile. April 21, 2002. “The Case for
Nuclear Winter”. http://exiledonline.com/feature-story-the-case-for-nuclear-winter/ dwrs 8/21]

There are no nihilists — but suppose there were. What would they say?

Once you dare to consider this question, the answer seems obvious: if there were any real nihilists, they would praise nuclear
weapons as the means to bring an end to the world via nuclear winter. They would sing hymns to the warheads, seeing in them the
first weapon we have ever obtained against the universe which has brought us into being to suffer and die. Even if these imaginary
nihilists were too squeamish to advocate nuclear winter outright, they would be compelled to praise nuclear winter as the first real
CHOICE any organism has ever had about whether to continue in the fated cycle of birth, pain, and death.

But of course no one has said anything like this — because there are no nihilists. The confrontation at the bowling alley at the end of
Big Lebowski summarizes ethical philosophy at the end of the twentieth century: brainless Americans confronting even stupider
Germans, one of whom brandishes his great-grandfather’s cavalry saber, a slapstick relic of the mad daring with which the
Europeans entered the twentieth century. The Germans mouth nihilist cliches (“Ve beliefs in nossink!”), while the Americans say
simply “What’s mine is mine!” The Americans win because they, at least, mean what they say: their chump change is theirs, and
they’ll fight to the death for it. The Germans don’t even understand, let alone mean, their nihilist bluster; they are “laughable, man!”
as the Jesus-Man would put it, their claims merely a cover for their pitiful state as parasites on the culture which wrested the world
away from them. It’s not that they believe in nothing; they ARE nothing.

There are no nihilists any more. That fact is the most damning evidence of a great betrayal which has happened in the last half
century. In 1945, when the Bomb gave us the option of quitting this dirty, rigged game of Darwinian strip poker, we learned that
not one of the anti-life artists meant what they said. In a few years, all the anti-life art of the early twentieth century vanished. The
artists who had made their careers documenting the horrors of life on earth and denouncing the cycle of animal existence yelped
away like scared puppies the moment a real chance to end the suffering appeared.

They saw that magnificent mushroom cloud and instead of falling down to worship it, they ran to the nearest church or Christian
Science Reading Room or Socialist meeting hall. After convincing thousands of adolescents to kill themselves in the name of holy
despair, these sleazy careerists ran to hug the knees of GAIA, the bloody mother. They Chose Life — the swine!

Go ahead, pick a culture, any culture! Any culture you can name, during any historical period you choose, will furnish hundreds of
examples of anti-life rhetoric which was taken very, very seriously — up until the moment when it actually meant something. Take,
say, Europe in the nineteenth century, that cheery and bustling period. OK; here’s its greatest philosopher on the subject:

“If you imagine…the sum total of distress, pain and suffering which the sun shines upon, you will be forced to admit that it would
have been better if the surface of the earth were still as crystalline as that of the moon….For the world is Hell, and men [humans]
are on the one hand the tormented souls and on the other the devils in it.”

That was Schopenhauer, telling the Germans in their bristly abstract way what Darwin told the English in their fussier, more detailed
language: there is no point but suffering. There is no hidden redemptive meaning in any of this. It’s just an unfortunate
industrial accident, organic life.

Both Schopenhauer and Darwin resorted to animal examples to convey the horror which summed up the world. They were trying
to overcome the popular heresy that somehow, it all must “balance out” somehow. It doesn’t, because it was never designed to
do so: “compare the pleasure of an animal engaged in eating another animal with the pain of the animal being eaten.”

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Schopenhauer and Darwin were in play in the higher European circles, mixing and
strengthening each other. It was the bravest moment in the history of our species; something truly dangerous, a final anti-life
epiphany, seemed ready to happen. This is what poor sweet Nietzsche meant with his heartbreaking faith in “the men who are
coming.”
Nihilism’s one great weakness was that it had always been an elite cult, not considered transmissible to the masses. This was in
fact why Buddhism was replaced by a mindless demotic cult like Hinduism in India: Nirvana was too cold a doctrine for peasants who
equated fecundity with happiness.

[image omitted]

Man craftily hunts the last of the great Mammoths into extinction.

But in the early twentieth century, a demographic anomaly appeared: the elite was big, and getting bigger. They brought their cult
with them; art began serving as the propaganda wing of Nihilism. What we call “Modernism” was actually a multimedia offensive
which was beginning to make Nihilism palatable to the masses. The fuzzy “Modern/Postmodern” distinction is best seen as a
change in popular religion: from 1910-1945, art did an honorable job of preparing the masses to abandon their attachment to the
biosphere; from 1945 to the present, art borrows Nihilist images, diction and narrative without the least intention of employing them
to free us from attachment to organic life.

The echoes of that dangerous early twentieth-century art are still audible:

“I’ve always been surprised by everyone’s going on living.”

Birth, and copulation and death.

That’s all the facts when you come to brass tacks:

Birth, and copulation, and death.

I’ve been born, and once is enough.

You don’t remember, but I remember,

Once is enough.

It’s sad for the dog. He lives only because he was born, just like me….

So they sang. And many believed them. Maybe a few of them really meant it — Schopenhauer especially. What would
Schopenhauer have said about nuclear weapons? My guess is he’d be all for them; he was a serious man, an honorable man. But
the rest — they never meant it, and only talked so grandly against Life because they knew there was no alternative, no way to end
the world. When the cat’s away, the mice will ham it up.

But since 1945, they self-censored themselves, to the effect that no matter how many Nihilist images you may borrow, you will do
nothing truly dangerous — nothing that could make anyone press that nuclear trigger. You can wear all the black you want; you can
worship suicide — individual suicide, that is — ; you can write songs about how life sucks; but you can’t mean it.

Of course, not everybody’s in on the double-talk scam. Those dangerous anti-lifers are still floating around, infecting those naive
enough to listen to them. Cobain and Courtney are the classic example: both wore the rags, the scowls, the sulk; both screamed
and ranted against life; but only one of them ever believed it. He, poor bastard, took it all seriously; she, a much more typical
representative of the treacherous 20th-century avant garde, knew better.

When you think of poor Cobain now, it all seems inevitable, from the moment he chose that fatal name for his band. “Nirvana”: a
quaint Buddhist term, taken by most American bohemians to mean something like “nice peaceful feeling.” But that’s not what it
means at all: “nirvana” means, literally, “the blowing out of a candle.” Extinction, a return to stillness. Poor Cobain! He took it
seriously, and made Nirvana for himself…and Courtney inherited, pouting all the way to the bank.

They’re all Courtneys, the ones who still live. Lou Reed, who invented black, wrote hymns to heroin as the best available anti-life,
and provided the soundtrack for God knows how many thousands of adolescent suicides, showed up recently at a memorial service
for John “All You Need Is Love” Lennon. There he was, up on the stage with a dozen other rich old popstar vampires, singing treacly
Beatles songs. They were praying, really — praying to be granted another few years of life. “Choose life!” That’s a vulture’s favorite
proverb, and these wrinkled undead were singin’ it with feeling.

The ones who meant it, even a little — they die. Sid died because he believed it; John Lydon said so, giggling at his dead comrade’s
stupidity in a recent interview. Sid, he explained, took all the punk stuff seriously, and died of it. Lydon knew better, he explained
from poolside. He looked over at his pool frequently during the interview — scanning his LA mansion, just overjoyed with his good
sense and deriving an especially piquant satisfaction from the thought of poor old Sid. Johnny chose life.

It’s not hard to see why a popstar chooses life; his life comes at the expense of everyone else’s. A vampire universe feels great —
to a vampire. But what about the rest of us, the nobodies? The feeding cows? What do we have to lose?

There’s always been a lot of preaching against suicide. In some way, any choice to choose non-life frightens the ruling vampires.
Their favorite argument is, of course, guilt: “Think of the pain you leave behind you!” I remember a scraggly hippie mystic on Sproul
denouncing suicide as “a slap in the face to everybody who loves you,” and adding, “Even the worst bum on Skid Row has
somebody who loves him.” It impressed me at the time; I thought he must have had some special knowledge of the affectional
backgrounds of bums which I didn’t possess. It was several years before I knew for certain that he was simply preaching, another
damn Christian-without-Christ babbling the ruling vampires’ cliches.

Suicide is unpatriotic; that’s why it offends them. It deprives the vampires of a jugular to sip. How can you not like this boneyard?
This is the finest torture-chamber in the universe! How dare you opt out of it! But since 1945, the vampire lords have had another,
much stronger reason to fear the idea of suicide: individual suicide is only Nuclear Winter writ small. Nuclear Winter is universal
Nirvana.

And that makes it utterly different from individual suicide — because there will be no survivors to mourn and grieve . There
will be no mourning and grief at all, ever again.

Thus nuclear winter offers a true cure for suffering — which the sermons against suicide do not. OK; you decide not to kill
yourself because it will hurt your parents, friends, pit bull, roommates, chess club pals, whatever. So what? You’re gonna go
anyway, and in some way much more agonizing than a bullet to the head: cancer, car wreck, genetic glitch, rafting accident, heart
valve pop. And when you do, that suffering of the survivors will begin, the ten billionth wail of grief heard on Earth.

And the grieving die in their turn, and when they go another wail sets up….It’s not just horrible — it’s silly. Just plain dumb.
Squint at it — draw your head back just a little and squint at it — and it’s truly “laughable, man”: these creatures whose life consists
of a ride down a conveyor belt towards a meat grinder, making a continual wail of surprise as another one goes over the edge.
Every one a surprise. “Oh! He went in! How could this happen?” “Ah, she fell! My God!” Well Duh. What’d you expect?

That’s what suffering is: going over the edge one at a time. The experience of individual death while the world grinds on. What
would happen in the Nuclear Winter scenario is utterly different: all jump into the meatgrinder at once. No one is left to suffer
or mourn. When some die and some live, there is suffering; when all die, blown out like a candle, there is no suffering. There is
something else, something for which we have no name. But one thing is clear: it is not suffering. “We shall not suffer, for we shall
not be.”

the only relevant consideration is the existence or non-existence of future

humans – suffering is inevitable, but no nonexistent person is suffering
over their nonexistence – anything else is affirming the consequent
Ligotti 12 [Thomas Ligotti, author, The Conspiracy against the Human Race, Hippocampus Press, available online:
https://s3.amazonaws.com/arena-attachments/1590452/29b1e623953914bf0b0ae8b363b4b746.pdf?1515783635 dwrs 8-15 – 65]

When people are asked to respond to the statement “I am happy—true or false,” the word “true” is spoken more often than “false,”
overwhelmingly so. If there is some loss of face in confessing that one is not happy, this does not mean that those who profess
happiness as their dominant humor are lying through their teeth. People want to be happy. They believe they should be happy. And
if some philosopher says they can never be happy because their consciousness has ensured their unhappiness, that philosopher
will not be part of the dialogue, especially if he blathers about discontinuing our species by ceasing to bear children who can also
never be happy even though, to extend the point, they can also never be unhappy given their inexperience of existing. Ask
Zapffe.

So you ask whether I would choose to be unborn? One must be born in order to choose, and the choice involves
destruction. But ask my brother in that chair over there. Indeed, it is an empty one; my brother did not get so far. Yet ask
him, as he is traveling like the wind below the sky, crashing against the beach, scenting in the grass, reveling in his
strength as he pursues his living food. Do you think he is bereaved by his incapacity to fulfill his fate on the waiting list of

the Oslo Housing and Savings Society? And have you ever missed him? Look around in a crowded afternoon
tram and reflect whether you would allow a lottery to select one of the exhausted toilers as the one whom you put into this
world. They pay no attention as one person gets off and two get on. The tram keeps rolling along. (“Fragments of an
Interview,” Aftenposten,1959)

The point that in the absence of birth nobody exists who can be deprived of happiness is terribly conspicuous. For optimists, this fact
plays no part in their existential computations. For pessimists, however, it is axiomatic. Whether a pessimist urges us to live
“heroically” with a knife in our gut or denounces life as not worth living is immaterial. What matters is that he makes no bones about
hurt being the Great Problem it is incumbent on philosophy to observe. But this problem can be solved only by establishing an
imbalance between hurt and happiness that would enable us in principle to say which is more desirable—existence or nonexistence.
While no airtight case has ever been made regarding the undesirability of human life, pessimists still run themselves ragged trying to
make one. Optimists have no comparable mission. When they do argue for the desirability of human life it is only in reaction to
pessimists arguing the opposite, even though no airtight case has ever been made regarding that desirability. Optimism has always
been an undeclared policy of human culture—one that grew out of our animal instincts to survive and reproduce—rather than an
articulated body of thought. It is the default condition of our blood and cannot be effectively questioned by our minds or put in grave
doubt by our pains. This would explain why at any given time there are more cannibals than philosophical pessimists.

For optimists, human life never needs justification, no matter how much hurt piles up, because they can always tell themselves
that things will get better. For pessimists, there is no amount of happiness—should such a thing as happiness even obtain for
human beings except as a misconception—that can compensate us for life’s hurt. As a worst-case example, a pessimist might refer
to the hurt caused by some natural or human-made cataclysm. To adduce a hedonic counterpart to the horrors that attach to such
cataclysms would require a degree of ingenuity from an optimist, but it could be done. And the reason it could be done, the reason
for the eternal stalemate be-tween optimists and pessimists, is that no possible formula can be established to measure proportions
and types of hurt and happiness in the world. If such a formula could be established, then either pessimists or optimists would have
to give in to their adversaries.

One formula to establish the imbalance at issue has been tendered by the South African philosopher of ethics David Benatar. In his
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence (2006), Benatar cogently propounds that, because some amount of
suffering is inevitable for all who are born, while the absence of happiness does not deprive those who would have been born but
were not, the scales are tipped in favor of not bearing children. Therefore, propagators violate any conceivable system of
morality and ethics because they are guilty of doing harm. To Benatar, the extent of the harm that always occurs matters not.
Once harm has been ensured by the begetting of a bundle of joy, a line has been crossed from moral-ethical behavior to immoral-
unethical behavior. This violation of morality and ethics holds for Benatar in all instances of childbirth.
 Solvency
The Pentagon has 49 different programs with no oversight that can
circumvent the aff
Lumpe, Open Society Foundations advocacy director and former UN
Department of Disarmament consultant, 10
[Lora, October 2010, Open Society Foundations, “U.S. Military Aid to Central Asia, 1999–2009: Security Priorities Trump Human
Rights and Diplomacy”, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/f405dbbf-18c6-470e-a4fa-505313014346/OPS-No-1-
20101015_0.pdf, pg. 25]

The DOD’s Walking around Money—The Uncounted Aid

Gordon Adams, former associate director for international affairs and national security programs at the Office of Management and
Budget, estimated that 15 different Pentagon programs would provide $8.6 billion in military aid worldwide during 2009—outstripping
the similar programs that operate under State Department authority.36 It turns out he was undercounting. A 2009 DOD handbook on
“security cooperation” identifies at least 49 programs and authorities (read: pots of money) that the DOD can now utilize to arm
and train foreign forces.37 The military committees of Congress, acting at the behest of the Pentagon, include in their annual DOD
funding bills provisions that grant the Pentagon the right to use certain amounts of DOD Operations and Maintenance funds for
foreign military aid programs.38 Many of the new DOD-funded programs that Congress has authorized in the past decade directly
parallel State Department–funded programs . But with these, the Pentagon is “the decider ” (in President Bush’s words) about
who gets aid, as well as the implementer.

While U.S. law caps these authorities at certain amounts, there are no public reports on most of these programs, so determining
actual expenditure levels and programming is difficult.39 As a result, piecing together the entire picture of U.S. military aid to,
and involvement with, Central Asia is very complex and perhaps not even possible. This opacity also means that such funds
could be used when Congress directs a cessation of other military aid accounts for a particular country.

In addition to the specific and constantly growing budgetary discretion that regional combatant commanders have obtained in the
past two decades, there are numerous nonspecific funds that they can use to reward friends and allies and/or buy or maintain
access to local ports, bases, and logistics depots. Because there is no public reporting required on the expenditures of most of
these funds, meaningful public oversight is not possible , and even Congressional oversight is questionable.40

Congress has applied some human rights provisions to the new military aid programs funded by the DOD laws and budget. Namely,
since 1999, Congress has included a version of the “Leahy Law” in each of the annual DOD appropriations acts. This provision
requires that the Pentagon have a process for background vetting that is intended to ensure that U.S. forces are not training any
units of a foreign security force that have been credibly alleged to have committed a gross violation of human rights. The DOD,
however, does not consider many of the programs whereby it conveys skills, equipment, or resources to foreign militaries to be
“assistance” and, therefore, does not vet participants in those programs.41

Key parts are moved to the commercial listing to circumvent the plan –
and, weapons already on the commercial listing cause the impact
Stricker, Institute for Science and International Security Proliferation
expert, and Albright, Institute for Science and International Security
Founder, 17
[Andrea and David, May 2017, Institute for Science and International Security, https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-
reports/documents/Export_Control_Reform_Initiative_Review_and_Recommendations_May_2017_Final.docx]

The ECR Initiative involved the transfer of thousands of items from the United States Munitions List (USML) under the Arms
Export Control Act’s (AECA) International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and administered by the State Department’s
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), to the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR), which is administered by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The EAR is
maintained by the president’s annual renewal of the state of emergency under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) following the expiration in 2001 of the Export Administration Act (EAA). The CCL allows for the more
flexible export of former USML items that the government deemed to be not worthy of the strictest control. The EAR also
allows for the unlicensed export of certain categories of goods to country groups, whereas the ITAR does not specify this
ability. The ITAR as administered by the State Department usefully allows the Secretary of State to weigh in on transfers of
the most sensitive military items as to their impact on foreign policy and national security objectives.
A substantial part of the ECR Initiative involved an elaborate bureaucratic and time intensive process of reviewing and moving
individual goods from the USML to the CCL. This process was thorough, technically rigorous, and involved what is often pointed to
as unprecedented interagency collaboration. The effort required the entirety of six years of the reforms, or from 2010 to 2016.

Nonetheless, on balance, we find that the transfer of goods from the USML to the CCL represented a weakening of controls. This
is due in part to the number of licensing exceptions, or terms under which an entity does not have to obtain a U.S. government
license, that are available on the CCL. In addition, some of the exceptions include well-known countries of transit concern such as
Turkey. Overall, there is a broad conception that goods on the CCL are controlled less effectively than those on the USML. An
example of this is the fact that categories 1-3 of the USML covering firearms, artillery, and ammunition were not transferred to the
CCL due to concern that doing so could lead to the proliferation of firearms internationally. Federal law enforcement agencies
vehemently opposed the transfer of these items to the CCL due to fears that they would spread more rapidly or be re-transferred to
unintended end users. Overall, they feared that the transfers would complicate national and international security objectives.

In addition, some of the firearms prepared for transfer are inherently deadly weapons that should not be in the hands of U.S.
adversaries or those who would use them for their own nefarious objectives, including in civil wars or to violently put down
domestic uprisings. It is worth noting that Turkey is in the midst of an authoritarian crackdown and may be seeking weapons and
other sensitive items for such use. The planned list transfers include high caliber sniper rifles and weapons that could be later
modified to render them even more deadly. They could also be exported to actors that would seek to use them against U.S. troops
in conflict situations. The new administration needs to ask: What beneficial purpose would the transfers serve? Some have argued
for the transfers as export promotion, but we would urge the administration to ask what security risk this poses.

We understand that the categories 1-3 transfers appear imminently prepared for completion by the State Department. We would
urge Congress and the administration to quickly become involved and halt the effort, given the extent of concerns. Moving forward
with the transfers appears risky and it would also diminish the State Department’s ability to weigh in on the security impact of arms
related transfers. At the very least, if they are transferred, some of the most deadly weapons should require stricter controls and not
be granted eligibility for license exceptions on the CCL.

A major objective of the Obama administration was to reduce the number of items on the USML in order to allow more time and
resources for officials to scrutinize export requests for the remaining goods on that list. More scrutiny is a worthwhile goal. However,
as stated above, it is difficult to see how the administration’s pledge to erect “higher fences” around those remaining “crown jewels”
has been accomplished. In fact, the administration appears to have devoted little effort to developing enhanced protection of the
items remaining on the USML. Nothing in practice was done to strengthen the controls on the USML side, or for that matter, controls
for those goods already on the CCL, while placing more goods on the CCL has led to an increase of exports of thousands of
sensitive items that alone are typically innocuous but have dual uses in outfitting military systems and equipment. The effects of
this deregulation are still not adequately understood. Some loopholes in the form of general licensing and other exceptions also
could have been addressed, but were not, under the reforms.

1Everett presumption,

The plan creates new universes in which the impacts still happen – they
don’t save anyone – vote on presumption
BY DEAN ZIMMERMAN MARCH 2, 2017 Dean Zimmerman is a professor of philosophy at Rutgers University. Evil
Triumphs in These Multiverses, and God Is Powerless How scientific cosmology puts a new twist on the problem of evil.
http://nautil.us/issue/46/balance/evil-triumphs-in-these-multiverses-and-god-is-powerless ferris-david sposito

The many-worlds interpretation arises from a problem in quantum mechanics. The Schrödinger equation, the fundamental law of
quantum theory, is a description of the evolving states of particles. But some of the states it predicts are combinations
—“superpositions”—of seemingly incompatible states, such as a coin landing both on heads and tails. We can wonder: What
explains the fact that we don’t ever observe the combined incompatible states, but only observe coins that land on heads
or tails? One answer many theorists provide is that there is more going on than the Schrödinger equation describes. They add a process called “the
collapse of the wave function,” which results in a definite outcome of heads or tails. But in the 1950s, Everett proposed a bold alternative. His
theory has no collapses, but instead holds that all the parts of these combined—or “superposed”—states occur as parts of equally
real but relatively isolated worlds. There are some complete copies of the universe in which the coin lands heads, and in others tails.
And this applies to all other physical states—not just flipping coins. There are some universes where you make the train and get
to work on time, and others where you don’t, and so on. These slight differences create multiple overlapping universes, all
branching off from some initial state in a great world-tree.