22 People v. Vera (65 Phil 56)

[No. 45685.
November 16, 1937]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI

BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad interim of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
1. PROBATION ; AUTHORITY OF PROBATION COURT TO LOOK INTO

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENSE; SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR COURTS; LEGAL
RELATION AND ETHICAL STANDARD.—Probation implies guilt by final judgment.
While a probation court hearing a probation case may look into the circumstances
attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings
and conclusions of the Supreme Court, either directly or indirectly, especially where from
its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings
of the parties. As observed in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated
in subsequent cases," if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of
overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial
chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization
of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial
system of the nation.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE PRESIDENT AND HIS VETO POWER; PRESIDENT'S

VETO NOT BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT.—In vetoing a bill, the President may
express the reasons which he may deem proper, but his reasons are not binding upon the
Supreme Court in the determination of actual controversies submitted to it for
determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate
his opinion on a matter encompassed within his cons titutional pow er of ve to
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People vs. Vera.
but which happens- to be at the same time pending determination before the Supreme
Court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever
opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway the
judgment of the court one way or another and prevent it from taking what in its opinion is
the proper course of action to take in a given case.
3. ID. ; INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.—If it is ever necessary to make any

vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that the
judiciary is independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our
government—independent in the performance of its functions, undeterred by any
consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the
accomplishment of its sworn duty as it sees it and understands it.
4. ID.; WHEN CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED.—The constitutionality of an act of

the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised
and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i. e.,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
5. ID. ; ID. ; RESORT TO EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES; ADJUDICATED CASES.

—The question of the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature is frequently raised in
ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies,
particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law, even if available, are not
plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42 Phil., 818), the
Supreme Court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by
the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see also 12 C. }., p. 783); and in Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259, affirmed in
Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed.,
845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an" action of., quo
warranto brought in the name of- the Government of the Philippines. It has also been.
held "that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus
proceedings (12 C. 3., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there
are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under
the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even
on an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional
question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as
regards prohibition and certiorari. (Yu
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58 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Vera.
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059;
Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6
Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L, R. A. [N. S.], 843, and cases cited.)
6. ID.; ; ID. ; ID. ; PROHIBITION ; RULE WHERE JURISDICTION is EXCLUSIVELY

DERIVED FROM UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE.—The writ of prohibition is an
extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an
inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. The general rule, although there is a
conflict in the cases, is that the writ of prohibition will not lie where the inferior court has
jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned,
because in such cases the inferior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the
constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and
consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal
without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives
its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the
writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute.
7. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; LIMITED JURISDICTION IN

PROBATION CASES.—A Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a
court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by
Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.
8. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY; EXCEPTIONS.—As a general rule, the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily
it may be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal. But the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound
discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a
statute should be presented. Thus, in. criminal cases, although there is a very sharp
conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any
stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Even in civil cases, it has
been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised
for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary
to a decision of the case. And it has been held that a constitutional question will be
considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court
below.
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People vs. Vera.
9. ID.; ID.; PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF PARTY; RIGHT AND

INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES TO CHALLENGE
CONSTITUTIONALITY.—The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221
really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present
action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-
settled rule that 'the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
10. ID. ; ID. ; RELIANCE ON PROBATION ACT; BY FISCAL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE PEOPLE.—The mere fact that. the Probation Act has been
repeatedly relied upon in the past and all that time has not been attacked as
unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded
by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines
estopped from now assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional
question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact
that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to
be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and
treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
11. ID.; ID. ; WHEN DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

NECESSARY ; WAIVER IF CASE CAN BE DECIDED ON OTHER POINTS.—While the
court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the
part of wisdom, and a just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the
case in which it arises, can be decided on other points. (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F.
Cas. No 11,558; 2 Brock., 447, Vide, also Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has
been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is
essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a
statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C. J., p. 782.)
12. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL

INQUIRY.—The Supreme Court will take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is
a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by
the
60
People vs. Vera.
courts; that many persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have
applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will
likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent M. C. U,
has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All await the
decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent muItiplicity of suits, strong
reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved.
13. ID. ; THE JUDICIARY; ITS DUTY TO ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION.—Under a

doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the
Constitution. The Supreme .Court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2,
subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the
National Legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk
from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to
give effect to- the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of
the essence of judicial duty.
14. ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF

CONSTITUTIONALITY; RATIONALE OF PRESUMPTION.—All reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The
responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the
legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the
legislative department of the government itself." (U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10;
Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs. Joson [1913], 26
Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the
executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to
support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath
and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the
Constitution. Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to
reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an
elective Chief Executive. It follows that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of
the Constitution except in clear cases.
15. ID.; THE PARDONING POWER UNDER THE JONES LAW AND THE CON
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People vs. Vera.
STITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.—Section 21 of the Jones Law, in force at the time of

the approval of Act No. 4221, vests in the Governor-Gerieral of the Philippines "the
exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures." This
power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. The provisions of the Jones Law
and the Constitution of the Philippines differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive"
found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as
at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense,
either before or after conviction. The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus
empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of
his case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought this
undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning
power can only be exercised "after conviction". So too, under the new Constitution, the
pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally
followed in the United States.
16. ID. ; ID.; ROYAL PARDON UNDER ENGLISH LAW; POWER OF THE HOUSE OF
LORDS.—The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar
of an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly
heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained
or abridged." The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, judgment on
impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government" but extends to the whole
punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction
may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, fine or
imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with
removal from office and incapacity to hold office.
17. ID.; ID.; COMMUTATION AND AMNESTY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE

CONSTITUTION.—Our Constitution makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the
power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions,
restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the
President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly.
18. ID. ; ID.; EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE PARDONING POWER.—The benign

prerogative of mercy reposed in the Executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any
legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer
62

People vs. Vera.
or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the

pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one, of the departments can
exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided
for by the constitution. (20 R. C. L., pp. 540, 541.) Where the pardoning power is conferred
on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the
legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere
with or control the proper exercise thereof (12 C. J., pp. 838, 839).
19. ID.; PROBATION; POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A

PROBATION LAW.—The Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States,
may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and
all penal offenses. The legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in
the exercise of this power the legislature may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the
largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the
punishment, and whether it should be certain, or indeterminate, or conditional. Indeed,
the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their
violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts—
particularly the trial courts—large discretion in imposing- the penalties which the law
prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this
power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an
individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer.
20. ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION AND PARDON NOT COTERMINOUS; PROBATION

DlSTINGUISHED FROM REPRIEVE AND COMMUTATION.—Probation and pardon are
not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually distinct and different from each
other, both in origin and in nature. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in
pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the
entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case
is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. The probationer, during
the period of probation, remains in legal custody—subject to the control of the probation
officer and of the court, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of
probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence
originally imposed upon him. Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and
from commutation of the sentence.
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People vs. Vera.
21. ID. ; ID.; ID. ; PROBATION NOT IN CONFLICT WITH PARDONING POW-ER.—The
Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning
power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and
complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon
the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest
and imprisonment.
22. ID.; DIVISION OF POWERS.—Under our constitutional system, the powers of
government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs:
the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the
government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest
expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
23. ID. ; ID. ; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY; HISTORICAL

DEVELOPMENT.—The power to make laws—the legislative power—is vested in a
bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law and in a unicameral National Assembly by the
Constitution. The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its
duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any
attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas
delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators,
was introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a
principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions
forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an
enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the
principle of separation of powers.
24. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE FORBIDDING DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY NOT

INFLEXIBLE; EXCEPTIONS.—The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of
legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception
sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress is empowered
to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it
may select, Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at
large, though some authorities maintain that this may not be done. Doubtless, also,
legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of
Article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines ilippines provides that "The National As
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People vs. Vera.
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, -to fix within specified limits, tariff rates,
import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the Same
article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the
National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy."
25. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF UNDUE DELEGATION ; DETAILS OF EXECUTION.—In

testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is
usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it
left the hands of the legislature so -that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature. In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho {[1922], 43
Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule. The general rule, however, is
limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in
by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid
if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board
may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
26. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL SURRENDER OF LEGISLATIVE

POWER TO PROVINCIAL BOARDS.—The Probation Act does not, by the 'force of any of
its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the
exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving commission" which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the
legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to
the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to
determine. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
27. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRUE DlSTINCTION BETWEEN POWER TO MAKE LAW AND
DlSCRETION AS. TO ITS EXECUTION; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The true distinction
is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection
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People vs. Vera.
can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77,
88. See also,Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.) To the same effect are
decisions of the Supreme Court in the Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binañgonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil.,
660) ; and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234).
28. ID. ; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF A LAW; RELAXATION OF THE

DOCTRINE.—Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of
the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 118,
170172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, p. 227). In
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat, 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that the legisture may delegate a power not legislative which it may
itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be
delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common
to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the apparent tendency to relax the
rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising
from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox
pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds
restatement in Professor Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States
and is accepted.
29. ID.; ID.; ID.; OPERATION OF PROBATION ACT NOT CONTINGENT ON SPECIFIED

FACTS OR CONDITIONS; DlSCRETION VESTED IN PROVINCIAL BOARDS
ARBITRARY.—The legislature has not made the operation of the Probation Act contingent
upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial boards. The discretion
vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not
investigate conditions or find any- fact, or await the happening of any specified
contingency. It is bound by no rule—limited by no principle of expediency announced by
the legislature.. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it
may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason or have
any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary
of a. probation officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at its pleasure.
30. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LOCAL OPTION LAWS ; EIGHT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERN
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People vs. Vera.
MENT; SUSPENSION OF OPERATION OF A GENERAL LAW NOT COUNTENANCED.

—The legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to
other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed,
courts in many jurisdictions have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of
option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R. C. L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained
treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in
different localities placed under different circumstances. Without denying the right of local
self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands
of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon in matters of
general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the
general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and
absolute as provided in Act No. 4221.
31. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; PROVINCIAL BOARDS EMPOWERED TO SUSPEND OPERATION OF

PROBATION ACT.—The statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may
suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in
being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries
of probation officers they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or
not the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial
boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the
Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial
boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law
is not tested by what has been done, but by what may be done under its provisions.
(Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)
32. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LEGISLATIVE POLICY; EXECUTION THEREOF; CONSTITUTION
BOTH A GRANT AND LlMITATION OF POWER.—A great deal of latitude should be
granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative
policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would
become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said
that popular government lives because of the unexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It
is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives
of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system
than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular
provisions which by
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People vs. Vera.
clear intendment, have that effect. But it should be borne in mind that a constitution is
both a grant and a limitation. of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that,
subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
33. ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; CLASS LEGISLATION; CLASSIFICATION

ON REASONABLE BASIS.—" * * * nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws." This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the
three grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and
subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation
and eminent domain. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws
is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or
capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to
each member of the class.
34. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; RESULTANT INEQUALITY FROM UNWARRANTED

DELEGATION; PROBATION ACT PERMITS DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION.—In
the case of Act No. 4221, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards. While inequality
may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein
provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case,
it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination
and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities
requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before courts should assume the
task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances
considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of
the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a
law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may
appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and
illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes
may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the
effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.
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People vs. Vera.
35. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT; GOVERNMENT OF

LAWS; EQUALITY CLAUSE NOT "A ROPE OF SAND".—Under section 11 of the
Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in
force in the other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of a probation
officer of a given year—and have probation during that year—and thereafter decline to
make further appropriation, and have no probation in subsequent years. While this
situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here
indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a
government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of
the equality clause but "a rope of sand."
36. ID.; PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ; PRESUMPTION AGAINST MUTILATION

OF STATUTE.—In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any
mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an
unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so
independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional features and
purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process.
37. ID. ; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT INSEPARABLE FROM REST OF

ACT; PROBATION AND PROBATION OFFICERS.—Section 11 of the Probation Act (No.
4221) is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of
the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical
benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial results
of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination
of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the
affirmative action of the different provincial boards. If not one of the provinces—and this is
the actual situation now—appropriates the necessary fund for the salary of a probation
officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation
without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without a probation
system.
38. ID.; ID.; PROBATION ACT ANALYZED; SECTIONS 10 AND 11 OF ACT; RULE OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—The probation officers and the administrative
personnel referred to in section 10 are clearly not those probation officers required to be
appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula
singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10 are to act as such, not in the
various provinces, but in the central office known as the Probation Office established in
the Depart
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 69
People vs. Vera.
ment of Justice, under the supervision of a Chief Probation Officer, When the law provides
that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court; that "the
probation officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer; that the probationer shall
report to the "probation officer", shall allow "the probation officer" to visit him, shall
truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer"
concerning his conduct or condition; that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in
writing of the period and terms of probation, it means the probation officer who is in
charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been the
intention of the legislature, for instance, to require a probationer in Batanes, to report to a
probation officer in the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit
the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise
his conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such
other functions as are assigned to him by law.
39. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WlSDOM AND PROPRIETY OF LEGISLATION; PROGRESSIVE
INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.—That under section 10 the
Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are provinces or
groups of provinces is, of course, possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may
be or should be and not on what the law is.Between is and ought there is a far cry. The
wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better
otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and
judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law
matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose—not even to save a
statute from the doom of invalidity.
40. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS; APPOINTMENT OF PROBATION

OFFICERS BY SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JUDICIAL NOTICE.—The clear intention
and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray the salaries of
probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they
desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry
out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the salaries of
probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive
such compensation as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have
been included in the Appropriation Act". It was not the intention of the legislature to
empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of probation officers in the provinces or
later on. to include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that
70
People vs. Vera.

the sum of P50,000, appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries
of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount
can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the
provinces, We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines,
and we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos
appropriated for the central office, there can be in. each province, as intended, a probation
officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this is correct, the
contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable
thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that there can be a system of
probation in the provinces without probation officers.
41. ID. ; PROBATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PENOLOGY; PROBATION ACT

AS REPUGNANT TO FUNDAMENTAL LAW.—Probation as a development of modern
penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other
countries, to permit what modern criminologists call the "individualization of
punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of 'the criminal and the
circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the
rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in many cases, convicts may be
reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes
advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the
convict gives promise of reform. The welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit
to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while probation is commendable as a
system and' its implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, the law is set aside
because of repugnancy to the fundamental law.
42. ID. ; CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS; RULES OF STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION; DECISIONS OF UNITED STATES COURTS; LOCAL CONDITIONS
AND ENVIRONMENT.—The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State
governments of the United States and the dual character of the American Government is a
situation which does not obtain in the Philippines. The situation of a state of the American
Union or of the District of Columbia with reference to the Federal Government of the
United States is not the situation of a province with respect to the Insular Government;
the distinct federal and state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace
the integrated judicial system of the Philippines; "General propositions do not decide
concrete cases" and "to keep pace with * * * new
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 71
People vs. Vera.
developments of times and circumstances", fundamental principles should be interpreted

having in view existing local conditions and environments.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition,

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Solicitor-General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong &Shanghai Banking
Corporation. Vicente J. Francisco, Feria & La O, Orense & Belmonte, and Gibbs &
McDonough for respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of
the writs of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that
this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal
case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et
al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for
probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of
First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the
aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with 1
the final judgment of
conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). Petitioners herein, the
People of the Philippine Islands and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,
are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano
Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the
______________
1 35 Off. Gaz., 738. See also Resolutions of December 17, 1935.
72

People vs. Vera.
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila and G. R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon.
Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation in tervening in the case as private prosecutor, After a protracted
trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time
spent by the court as well as in the volume of the testimony and the bulk of exhibits
presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a
judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prisión correccional to
eight years of prisión mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the
offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the
court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five
years and six months of prisión correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-
seven days of prisión mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects, Mariano
Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial
which were denied on December 17,1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on
December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition
for certiorari in November, 1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition
subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for
reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of the judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 73

People vs. Vera.
for probation filed by the herein. respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27,
1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he
has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court
of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for
probation to the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same on
June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge
Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to' the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also
filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221,
assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is 'not
uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of said Act No. 4221 endows the
provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their
respective provinces, The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on
April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality of Act No. 4221, as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec.
1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private
prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality
of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution
with a finding that "las pruebas no han establecido de una manera concluyente la
culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son
74

People vs. Vera.
inconsistentes o incongruentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein

respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime for which
he stands convicted by this court in G, R, No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for
probation for the reason that:
" * * * Si este Juzgado concediera la probación solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social
que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolución, que hacen al peticionario acreedor "de la
misma, una parte de la opinion pública, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podría levantarse
indignada contra un sistema de probación que permite atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de
una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya recaídas al traer a la
superficie conclusiones enteramente diferentes, en menoscabo del interés público que demanda el
respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial."
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an
exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion
for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by
counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for
reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing
on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case
as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed with the
trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid motion
subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on
the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a
banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and
that he signed the same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy
to the person who invited me (him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed
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People vs. Vera.
a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of
this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 1, 1937, the private prosecution filed its- opposition to the motion for leave
to intervene as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for the hearing of
the same and that, at all events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain
attorneys signing the same who were members of the legal staff of the several coun-sel
for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera
issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici
curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the
Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of
judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon
objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for- the postponement of the
hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion
for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which
said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court
was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners
came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was
an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the
campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the
sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and
ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a
final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the
issuance of a temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
76

People vs. Vera.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and
prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng under probation for the following reasons:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said Act of the Philippine Legislature is
made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it
is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that
in the absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to
include the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general
application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application
because it is made to apply only to those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221
would not be applicable to it because it has not provided for the salary of a
probation officer as required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there
is an Insular Probation Office willing to act for the City of Manila, said
Probation Office provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and
distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the
application for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted
without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for
reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had
promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application
for probation, for the reason that:
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 77

People vs. Vera.
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to
the granting or denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for
probation on June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of Its
rendition.
(3) No right of appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to
modify or change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent
of the crime for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is
not only presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in
contempt of this court and a violation of the respondents's oath of office as ad
interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty,
which became Imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the
application for probation, to commit his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also aver that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine
Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over
who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of each province the
absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective
provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and Improper delegation to the provincial
boards of. the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section
8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the
National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives
78

People vs. Vera.
the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the
Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Courts of First
Instance of the different provinces without uniformity. In another supplementary
petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of
the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the
issues raised by the other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and
in the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that
probation is a f form of reprieve and therefore Act No. 4221 is an encroachment on the
exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves. On October 1,
1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221
not only encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive, but also constitutes an
unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the
Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel
f or the other petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one
sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and the other
contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, were presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on
the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it
denies the. equal protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawfull delegation of
legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is void; that the Commonwealth is not
estopped from questioning the validity of its laws; that the private prosecution may
intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as
unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in
prohibition proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument
and memorandums, challenge
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 79

People vs. Vera.
each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the
issuance of the writ of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the
petitioners is the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and
was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present petition was
filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of
judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying
probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of First Instance to decide the question as to whether or not execution will
lie, this court nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of
First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein
petitioners themselves.
(5) That the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the
trial court of "its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this
court, should not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the
trial court which court while sitting in probation cases is "a court of limited
jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the
question submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present
action would not lie because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is
appealable; for although the Probation Law does not specifically provide that an
applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the Court of First
Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdic
80

People vs. Vera.
tion that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to

the superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same had not yet become final and
executory for the reason that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion
for reconsideration and new trial within the requisite period of fifteen days,
which motion the trial court was not able to resolve in view of the restraining
order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the
resolution of the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable
when he presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to
the postponement of the hearing of the said motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is
not appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial
court, although it believed that the accused was entitled to probation,
nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because the accused is a rich
man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular exercise
of jurisdiction by the--trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
file a motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial
court could have an opportunity to correct or cure the same.
(10) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is not appealable,
the trial court retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or
modify it in accordance with law and justice; that this power to alter or modify
an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercised either motu
proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case taking
the form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as
respondents allege, said court
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 81

People vs. Vera.
cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal
would not be availing because the doors of probation would be closed from the
moment the accused commences to serve his sentence (Act Not. 4221, sec. 1; U.
S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain
that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the
petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not
infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the
pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional memorandum filed on the same
date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is
free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private prosecution
may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No.
4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning
the validity of the Act; that the validity of the Act cannot be attacked for the first time
before this court; that prohibition is unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of
Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was
admitted by resolution of this court and filed anew on November 5, 1937. This
memorandum elaborates on some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes
those brought up by the petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present
case, we noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying the said application assumed the task
not only of considering the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability
of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G. R.
No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation court hearing a
probation case may look into the
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People vs. Vera.
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to
reverse the findings and conclusions of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially
where from its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments,
and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this.court
in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if
each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions
of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would
result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the
position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial
system of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the
petitioners and the respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up
at once the two fundamental questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2)
in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional. Consideration of these
issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding
principles is necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly
raised\and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the
case; i. e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis motapresented.
(McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C.L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J.,
pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in
ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies,
particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not
plain, speedy and
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People vs. Vera.
adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42 Phil., 818), this court held that
the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in
mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine
Islands vs.Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs.Government of the
Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S.,189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of
the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo warrantobrought in the name of the
Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a
statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on
Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an
application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute
(mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg[1931], 56 Phil., 234) ; and even on an application
for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is
necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as
regards prohibition and certiorari. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad[1925], 47 Phil., 385;
[1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28
Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and
cases cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve
years ago was, like the present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The
constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law,
was there challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was met squarely
by the respondents in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the propriety of the
constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This court
decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held
that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the judgment of this court and held
that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S.,
84

People vs. Vera.
500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme
Court, though its Chief Justice, said:
"By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme
court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior
tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are
exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that)
the question of the validity of a criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the trial
court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber
Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192.) But in this case where a new act seriously affected numerous
persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the
Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue of the act's validity promptly before it
and decide it in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy
upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123; 52 Law. ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.], 932; 28 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Cas., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D,
545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed.,
755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas., 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the
jurisdiction was raised by demurrer to the petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the
respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of broad powers in prohibition
granted to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties."
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior
tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.) (High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 85
People vs. Vera.
is a conflict in the cases, is that the Writ of prohibition will not lie where the inferior
court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is
questioned, because in such cases the inferior court having jurisdiction may itself
determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review,
and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by
appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal
derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented
by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Roundtree
[1874], 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109
Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs.Godfrey [1903],
54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs.Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derive their jurisdiction
solely from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting
probation to accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they
have served their sentence. It is true that at common law the authority of the courts to
suspend temporarily the execution of a sentence is recognized and, according to a
number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and
Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874],
115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex
rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio
St, 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61
Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the
Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under the common law
the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the
contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White:
86

People vs. Vera.
"Indiputably under our conctitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws
and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be
conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess
ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their
authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since
it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets Inherently a discretion to
permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of
powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also
is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the
right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute,
elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority,- and
that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according' to the
methods by it provided belongs to the executive department."
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of
Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), -decided by this court in
1915, also reached the conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences
pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial function. "All are agreed", he
said, "that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not lie within the power of the
courts to grant.such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioners and respondents are
correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation
proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is
conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on
application for prohibition
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 87

People vs. Vera.
where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by
objection of some kind (Hill vs.Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex
rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is
unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before
this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution.
The respondent, Hon. Jose O. Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined
to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party
whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent
judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp.
760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743),
as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attack made on the
constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his
rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may
not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the
power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the
fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility"
(Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption that
Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While, therefore, the court a quo admits that the
constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely
because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterate this view. The
argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the
hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal
case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of
constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court, Al-
88

People vs. Vera.
though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the
constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since
the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of
the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality
will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons
interested in the effect to be given the statute. (12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we
were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper
party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of
certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court,
it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson
Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general
rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the
time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented.
(In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a
very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first
time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p.
786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the
constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a
determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x
vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co.[1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., ,892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis
Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit
Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional
question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the
jurisdiction of the court below (State vs.
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People vs. Vera.
Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870,) As to the power of this court to consider the
constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings,
we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the
constitutional question here—a point we do not now have to decide—we are of the
opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the
Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of Its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221
really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the
present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil, 259 (affirmed
in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed.,
845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted
in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889],
73 Mich, 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its
Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the
respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the
respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of
contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the
constitutionality of the statute was
90

People vs. Vera.
itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:
"* * * The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law
enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation
upon their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The
last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is a
statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action
under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests
the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow. * * * The legislature and the respondents are
not the only parties in interest upon such. constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr.
Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the
legislature: 'The people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional
limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers.' (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)"
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action
(mandamus) was brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the
constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question whether or not the
state may bring the action, 'the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
"* * * The state is a proper party—indeed, the proper party—to bring this action. The state is
always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
" 'lt has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not,
as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas
City, GO Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118]'). (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
"Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-
General, or county attor-
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 91
People vs. Vera.
ney, may exercise his best judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the matter
determined, either by quo warrantoto challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60
Pac., 1068; 49 L. R. A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82
Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its questionable
provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122)."
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry.
Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006; State vs.S. H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S.,
823; State vs. Walmsley[1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County
Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 221 N. Y.,
295; 116 N. E., 1020; Bush vs. State [1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N. E.,
417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana said:
"It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being
charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is
unconstitutional. In support of the argument, three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex
rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222) ;
State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans (41 La. Ann.,
156; 6 So., 592) ; and State ex rel. Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann.,
1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to
plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds it in conflict with one which it is his
duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was
that the judge should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be
unconstitutional, forbid the district attorney to file a bill of information charging a
person with a violation of the statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially
declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is tendered f or
decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine the right of a party
litigant. State ex rel.
92

People vs. Vera.
Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom
a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the
ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the
statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex
rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.
g., the state auditor and state treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties
imposed upon them by a statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is
unconstitutional.
"It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to
support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in
conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two
statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is
compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If it
were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in the
enactment of criminal laws."
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general
proposition that the state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any
authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In f act, they appear to have
proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no
application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the
People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that
the validity of the Probation Act cannot be attacked for the first time before this court,
that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not being
authorized to enforce laws outside of the City of Manila, cannot challenge the validity of
the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents,
October 23, 1937, pp. 8, 10, 17 and 23.)
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People vs. Vera.
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon in the past and all
that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the
contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for
considering the People of the Philippines estopped from now assailing its validity. For
courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona
fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is
not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are
justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the
courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No.
4221 is necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, "* * * while the court will
meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of
wisdom, and a just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case
in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas.
No. 11,558; 2 Brock. 447. Vide, also, Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has
been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is
essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev.
Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N. Y., 1; 105
N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U. S., 272] ; Hesse vs.Ledesma, 7
Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line
Co. vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a
party is? founded solely on a statute, the validity of which is attacked. (12 C. J., p. 782,
citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S.,
972; Cheney vs.Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N. E., 306). There is no doubt that the
respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now
being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, this court will
94

People vs. Vera.
also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our -statute
books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that many
persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation;
that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage
of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has
been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All await the
decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits,
strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now
resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law.
ed., 1059. See 6 R. C. L., pp. 77, 78; People vs.Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E.,
442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N. W.,
209, 211; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil.,
304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We
said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand
merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new
law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the
advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of
jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary
situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was
sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in
support of the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No.
4221 has been properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to
enforce the' Constitution. This
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 95

People vs. Vera.
court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10,
of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid
because in conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to
enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the
supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of
judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act
of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional
Iimitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution. .rests not on the courts
alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first
determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U. S. vs. Ten Yu,
[1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser[1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.
S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained
by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and. the Chief
Executive have taken an oath. to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that
they have been true to this oath-and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law
they, did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously
exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand
departments of the government. (6 R. G. L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political
philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed
through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore,
that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear
case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called
attention to the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his
opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation Act,
96

People vs. Vera.
adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone
conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and
independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his message
dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal
of the Probation Act (No. 4221) ; that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No.
2417 of the National Assembly repealing the Probation Act, subject to certain conditions
therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13,
1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the
Commonwealth a law * * * unfair and very likely unconstitutional."' It is sufficient to
observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised
his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem proper
for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of
actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive
should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within
his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending
determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or
determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however,
cannot sway our judgment one way or another and prevent us from taking what in our
opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. If it is ever necessary for us
to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it
is that we are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department
of our government—independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any
consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in
the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1)
That said Act encroaches
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People vs. Vera.
upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that it constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power; and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the
Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the
Probation Act, vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to
grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested
in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the
Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found
in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at
common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense,
either before or after conviction (VideConstitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In
reLontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus
empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts
of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought this
undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning
power can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the
pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule
generally followed in the United States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II,
sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar
of an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly
heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is further
restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421;
Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876],
29 Ohio St., 457; 23 Am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the distinction is obvious. In
England, judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from
98

People vs. Vera.
office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole
punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a
conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, fine
or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with
removal from office and incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our
Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the-
executive to impose, in the pardons he may grants such conditions, restrictions and
limitations as he may deem proper, Amnesty may be granted by the President under the
Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly. We need not dwell
at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is sufficient for our
purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained essentially the same. The
question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been
impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief
Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. " * * *
The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor
fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to
any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing
to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one of the
departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases
expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R. C. L,, pp. 540, 541, and cases cited.) "*
* * where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied
limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power
itself nor delegate It elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exer-
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People vs. Vera.
cise thereof, * * *." (12 C. J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers
any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But
does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of
the United States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentence was
void. (Ex parte United States [1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A. 1917E,
1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann, Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an
exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the opinion of the court that under the
common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and that the
right to suspend sentence absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive
branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to
establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice: " *
* * and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of
penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the
legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable
courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations
which may be presented to them for judgment, recourse must be had to Congress whose
legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things adequately complete."
('Quoted in Riggs vs.United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National
Probation Association and others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal
probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. at L.
1259, U. S. C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the
salaries and expenses of a certain number of probation officers chosen by civil service.
(Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U. S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep;., 146; 72 Law.
ed., 309), the Supreme Court
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People vs. Vera.
of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to
imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no
power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the
term at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the
constitutionality of the Probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The court
traced the history of the Act and, quoted from the report of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th
Congress, 2d Session) the following statement:
"Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a
form of probation either by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state
probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parteUnited States, 242 U. S., 27; 61 L.
ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court
denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentence. In the same opinion the court pointed
out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the
future. * * *
"Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation.
In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the. Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In 1920,
the Judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the House, but it was never
reached for definite action.
"If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference
to its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the
states of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve
states the law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders." (See, also, Johnson, Probation for
Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has

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People vs. Vera.
been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs vs.United States supra, the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
"Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration have
been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the
constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach upon the
pardoning power of the President. This case will be f found to contain an able and comprehensive
review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider, and to it and the
authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to
a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U. S., 10 F. [2d], 762),
likewise construing the Probation Act."
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and
unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact
probation laws, that a federal probation law was actually enacted in 1925, and that the
constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of
earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the
United States, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the
punishment of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other
authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac.,
698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of the Legislature to denominate
and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum
punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L, R. A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S.
E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative power to set punishment
for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general
102

People vs. Vera.
assembly may confer on trial judges, if it fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to
be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be
certain or indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455;
95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the
penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to
vest in the courts—particularly the trial courts—large discretion in imposing the
penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best
be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine
the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus,
while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking
into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty
provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such. cases to submit to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem
proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are attendant in the commission of a, crime and the law provides for a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances
to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the
penalty according to the result of such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal
Code; U. S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui[1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64,
paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the
limits of each period, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the
extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the
imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits
established by law, considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances,
but more
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People vs. Vera.
particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68,
paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed"
upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without
discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for
the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of
"incomplete self-defense", i. e., when the crime committed is not wholly excusable by
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt
from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12 of the Code,
"the courts shall Impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view
of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." And. in
case the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in
mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender," shall
impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59,
Revised Penal Code.)
Under our' Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive
imprisonment is deducted from the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases
expressly mentioned (art. 29) ; the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person
is more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the
Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting' as to the
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3) ; the death sentence is
not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the
sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age (art, 83)
; and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been
pronounced, or while he is serving his sentence, the execution of said sentence shall be
suspended with regard to the
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People vs. Vera.
personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of
the penal laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other- enactments, including the
probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No.
4103 and subsequently amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs.
5 to 10) and granting the courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law.
Section 1 of the law as amended provides: "Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished
by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain
classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The
Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was
subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the
amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No.
4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No.
99, of the National Assembly. Finally came the (Adult) Probation Act now in question.
In this Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal
laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed
by law by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of
the trial court, after due hearing and after investigation of the par-
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People vs. Vera.
ticular circumstances of the offense, the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his
social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no
punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation
are faithfully observed. If this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes
in conflict with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves,
because, to use the language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of
punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the
courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as announced by
legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes, with
which the executive can have nothing to do," (Ex
parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843), the court
upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the contention that
it attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in
the governor of the state and observed that "while the governor alone is vested with the
power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power of the
courts to impose any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by law and in
such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold
it unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of
a sentence, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning
power of the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis.( 354; 27 L. R. A., 356; 46 Am. St.
Rep., 846; 62 N. W., 177; 9 Am. Crim. Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran
[1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 103; 1 Okla.
Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac.,
650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 111., 287; 67 N. E., 23; 63 L. R. A., 82; 95 Am. St.
Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim.
106

People vs. Vera.
Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N, S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parteShelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;
111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State[1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175;
30 S. E., 858; State ex rel Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W.,
839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; State vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn.,
544; 72 S, W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F.
[2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926;
C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. State [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 3. W., 871; 48 A.
L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928],
89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac.,
874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69
Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370,
371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257
111., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E.,179; 23 L. R.
A., 859; St. Hilarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl.,
882; People vs. Stickle (1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914],
125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont, 541; 237 Pac.,
525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848;
State ex rel Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl, 875; State vs.Osborne [1911],
79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parteBates [1915], 20' N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A,
1285; 151 Pac., 698; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions[1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23
L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex
rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn[1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106' N. Y. Supp.,
928; People vs.Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn[1935], 245 App.
Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart[1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N.
W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781;
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People vs. Vera.
State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs.Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33

L. R. A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. State [1854], 34 Tenn.,
232; Woods vs. State [1814], 180 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State. [1913], 70
Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165
S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State
[1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A.,
24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S. E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911],
65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel Tingstad vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561;
206' Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to follow this long catena of authorities
holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence
by the establishment of a system of probation however characterized. State ex
rel. Tingstad vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393),
deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for
the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and
required that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer
during the term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held
constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional
provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the
state. (Vide,also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually
distinct and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex
relForsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R.
A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:
"* * * The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons,
as understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different
108

People vs. Vera.
in their origin and nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter
was always a part of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply
postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and
liability following it, and all civil disabilities, remain and become operative when
judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense
and the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all
his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity. (Exparte Garland, 71 U, S., 4 Wall, 333; 18 Law ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U.
S., 13 Wall, 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs.U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.)
"The framers of the federal and state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles
governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the
executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution were
used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in
the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How,, 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was
understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it
was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any
degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal courts had
so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were
still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and .the other by the
judicial department. We therefore conclude that a statute which, in terms, authorizes -courts of
criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction,—a power inherent in
such courts at common law, which was understood when the
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People vs. Vera.
constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since its adoption,
has been exercised by the courts, is a valid exercise of legislative power under the constitution. It
does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been
understood and practiced from the earliest times." (Quoted with approval in Director of
Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J.,concurring, at pp.
294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not

finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which
the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the
mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation
may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision
only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer
shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has
complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of
probation, remains in legal custody—subject to the control of the probation officer and of
the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of
probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence
originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)
"The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far from
it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in
substitution of the imprisonment and fine prescribed by the criminal laws, For this reason its
application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed
applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law,
which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no conflict
with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality
110

People vs. Vera.
of the Probation Act for this cause." (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the.
sentence. Snodgrass vs. State([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144;
150 S. W.; 16'2), is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support
of their contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested
exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the
legislature upon the courts by means of a probation law authorizing the indefinite
judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that case and found that although
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the state in
terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of
crime, it also distinguished between suspension of sentence on the one hand, and
reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through Harper, J.:
"That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant
reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction
between a 'reprieve' and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the
sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1
Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words &
Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be held in conflict with the power confiding in the
Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a commutation is but to change the
punishment assessed to a less punishment."
In State ex rel Bottomly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the
Supreme Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation
law of the state enacted in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of
1921. The court held the law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning
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People vs. Vera.
power of the executive. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court
said:
"* * * the terms 'pardon,' 'commutation,' and 'respite' each had a wellunderstood meaning at the
time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the
suspension of the execution of a judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 12078-12086. A
'pardon' is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws
which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640) ; It is a remission
of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex
County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). 'Commutation' is a
remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally
imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.], 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs.Chamberlain, 107 Mich.,
381; 65 N. W., 235). A 'reprieve' or 'respite' is the withholding of a sentence for an interval of time
(4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr.
R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler -us. State, 97 Ind., 373).
"Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section
12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole statutes
which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of pardon is
granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous
cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558, reported in L. R. A.,
1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)"
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the
Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary
sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation
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People vs. Vera.
don the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his-
rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the
executive and is not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as conrended,
an undue delegation of legislative power?
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among
three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive
and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from
the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has
exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere.
The power to make laws—the legislative power—is vested in a bicameral Legislature
by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution
(Art. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the
National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that
power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare
potest.This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into
English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency,
was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the
delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle
of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of
separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66'.) The classic statement of
the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the
power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have."
(Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the fol
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People vs. Vera.
lowing oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has
located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the Constitution itself is changed. The power to whose
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot
relieve itself of the- responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power
shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any
other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign
trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with
approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the
ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to
be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute
and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice
permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
(Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria[1918], 39
Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 256; State vs.Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system
of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general
affairs by the central authority; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the
power. to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of municipalities exercising local
self government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not
regarded as a transfer of general
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People vs. Vera.
legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations,
according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in
cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle,
Congress is empowered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories
of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to Congress
as a municipality or city to the state government. (United
States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742.; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11
Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U. S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49
Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative
power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C.
J., pp. 841, ,842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy[1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101
N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has
ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum
has been held not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co.
vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 224), and as the
constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by certain progressive
courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has been pretty well
drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A,.
113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 112 Pac., ',02; 37 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative
power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI
of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to
fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and
wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In
times of war or other
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People vs. Vera.
national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this
decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional
provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in
him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the
Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 is section 11 which reads as follows:
"This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which. the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officers shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office." (Underscoring ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not,
it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions
when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any
other appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In United
States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule
when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the
Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and
to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compañía
General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners[1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The
general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of
detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated
by executive
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People vs. Vera.
officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177179.)

For the purposes of the Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as
administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect
in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this
respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and
executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be
here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to
administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be
broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or -absence of a
standard or rule of action—or the sufficiency thereof—in the statute, to aid the delegate
in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is
sufficient; in others that it is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking.
As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down
any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided
in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United
States[1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A. L. R.,
947; People ex rel, Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co.[1936], 364 111., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.
L. R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec. 174.) In the
case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their
discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their
respective provinces ? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and
none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force
of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide
in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language
of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission"
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People vs. Vera.
which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the
Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various
provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to
their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If a provincial board does not wish
to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate
the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is
not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.Clinton
County Comrs. [1852] ; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also,Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.)
To the same effect are decisions of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs.Municipality of
Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547) ; Rubi vs.Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil., 660),
and Cruz vs.Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court sustained the
validity of a law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and
municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-
Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for
the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the
prohibition of the
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People vs. Vera.
importation of foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make
this advisable or if disease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and
livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple
transference of details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative
officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were,
recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias[1908], 11 Phil.,
327; U. S. vs. Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53
Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U.
S. vs.Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil.,
660.)
It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after
it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on
certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people
of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253),
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legislature may delegate a power
not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. (Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire
Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts
is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a
law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government.
(Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; ln re Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93
Wis., 616; 97 N. W., 1033; 33 L. R. A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.
W., 210; Field vs. Clark [1892], 143 U. S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.)
Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting
delegation of legislative authority on
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account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern
industrial age (Petitioner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of
Parliaments", Foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-
Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the
orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations
finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States
in the following language—speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative
agencies: "The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative
agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a
law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of
public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature.
In other words, the legislature, as it is its duty to do, determines that, under given
circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under
other circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the
administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy
demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case' require to be done
according to the terms of the law by which he is governed." (Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. III, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of
New York ([1883], 109 U. S., 385; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was
said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come
from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take
effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 G. J., p.
864; State vs. Parker[1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 358.)
The legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon the happening of
future specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to
determine when the specified contingency has
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People vs. Vera.
arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the
Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the
provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-
operation of the law upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary
because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions
or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no
rule,—limited by no principle of expediency announced by the legislature. It may take
into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any
purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason or have any reason whatsoever
for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This
is a matter which rests entirely at Its pleasure. The fact that at some future time—we
cannot say when—the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of
probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not
save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based
solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain
specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a
person or body other than the legislature itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of
suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some
jurisdictions, constitutions provide that laws may be suspended only by the legislature
or by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that
"No power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature";
and section 26, article I of the Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation of
the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet,
even provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the
legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature
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People vs. Vera.
may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended
as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension
must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities.
In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:
"By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it is
declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be
exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular
cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that declaration of
rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of rights passed in the
reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of
James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of
the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and
suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The first article
in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such power, by
regal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it
is further declared and enacted, that 'No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or any
part thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void and of no effect, except a
dispensation be allowed of in such statute.' There is an implied reservation of authority in the
parliament to exercise the power here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English
Constitution, 'that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere,' is
intrusted to the parliament: 1 BI. Com., 160.
"The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign
and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated
to them according to the constitution.
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People vs. Vera.
It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would be equally oppressive to the subject,
and subversive of his right to protection, 'according to standing" laws,' whether exercised by one
man or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general
principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by
implication on the general court one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient
kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural
justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges
and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that any one should be
subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are
exempted,"
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any
dog liable to the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without
proving a knowledge of its vicious disposition, By a provision of the act, power was given
to the board of supervisors to determine whether or not during the current year their
county should be governed by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted
a part. It was held that the legislature could not confer that power. The court observed
that it could no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a
county to abolish in such county the days of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend
the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman[1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute
in Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs. Field ([1853], 17 Mo., 529; 59
Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road system contained a
provision that "if the county court of any county should be of opinion that the provisions
of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the operation
of the same f or any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become
inoperative in such county for
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People vs. Vera.
the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads to be opened and kept
in good repair, under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: "* * * this act, by its
own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it, is left to
the county court to say which act shall be in force in their county. The act does not
submit the question to the county court as an original question, to be decided by that
tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation within the county; but it became
by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then,
require the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the law in the
county, and having by its provisions superseded and abrogated the inconsistent
provisions of previous laws, the county court is * * * empowered, to suspend this act and
revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the question is before the county
court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urged before us that
the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our
constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the
state. In the present case, the question is not presented in the abstract, for the county
court of Saline county, after the act had been for several months in force in that county,
did by order suspend its operation; and during that suspension the offense was
committed which is the subject of the present indictment * *
*." (See Mitchell vs. State[1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those
applicable to other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle
hereinabove expressed, courts in many jurisdictions have sustained the constitutionality
of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R. C. L., p. 171.) But option
laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive
different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. "They
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People vs. Vera.
relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large
of cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in different localities, and they
are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not
embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-Iaws and ordinances,
is nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper
that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed.,
p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the
propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or
for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general
legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general
subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and
absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the statute does not expressly state that the
provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular
provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not
the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute
discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their
respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature
to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held
in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the
necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what
may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and
Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. 3., p. 786.)
It is conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not
only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration
and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet
imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular
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government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is

unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives
of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system
than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular
provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz.,
1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a
limitation of power and one of these timehonored limitations is. that, subject to certain
exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates, the provision of our Bill of
Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Art.
III, sec. 1, subsec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three
grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and
subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation
and eminent domain. The equal protection of the laws, sententiously observes the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed.,
735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a
question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184 U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others
is prohibited. But classification on a
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People vs. Vera.
reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted.

(Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C.
& S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however,
to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs.Falk.
Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.],
489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co. [1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337;
Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242, U. 3., 375; 37
Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400;
30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas.,
1247; Truax vs. Corrigan[1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily
the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the
petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the
necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may
refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the
former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within
the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province
while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same
benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the
provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds
127
VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 127

People vs. Vera.
for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in
each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial
boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation
Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any
resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any
amount for the salary of the probation officer—which is the situation now—and, also, it'
we accept the contention that, for the purposes of the Probation Act, the City of Manila
should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not
made any appropriation for the salary of a, probation officer. These different situations
suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law
and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the
necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that section 11 of the
Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted
or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the
equal protection of the law before courts should assume the task of setting aside a law
vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the
opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221, permits of the denial of the equal protection of
the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which denies
equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on
its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. (By analogy, Chy
Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law, ed.,
550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia
[1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26
Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28
128

People vs. Vera.
Law. ed., 1145; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed.,
220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed.,
1012; Bailey vs.Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed.,
191; Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62
Law. ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of
their effect in operation (General Oil Co. vs.Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944;
Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law
it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs.Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47
Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R.,
948; 19 L. R. A,, 858.) Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in
force in one or several provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one
province may appropriate for the salary of a probation officer of a given year—and have
probation during that year—and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and
have no probation in subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of
discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act
sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how
easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of
sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis[1897], 165 U. S., 150, 154; 41 Law.
ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case
of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by
declining to uphold the contention that there was a denial of the equal protection of the
laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis) decided
129
VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 129

People vs. Vera.
in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not
require territorial uniformity,, It should be observed, however, that this case concerns
the right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by General
Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial
of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No.
612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2
thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the
defendant * * * shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case
where the prosecuting attorney after a due investigation of the facts * * * shall have
presented an information. against him in proper form * * *." Upon the other hand, an
analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the investigation by the
prosecuting attorney—although not in the form had in the provinces—was considered a
reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the
city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has
reference to a situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the
Supreme Court of the state from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in
certain counties for which counties the constitution establishes a separate court of
appeals called the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The provision complained of, then, is
found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that makes the apportionment
of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void
because it is also repugnant to the equal-protection clause of our Constitution. Section
11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated,
the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
130
People vs. Vera.
"In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the
courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a
statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the
constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process."
(Riccio vs.Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted
in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U. S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the
well-established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:
" * * * where part Of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to
do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could
not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs.Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916;
128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55
Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries
out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass, 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions must
be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary
to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou.,
969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 111., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L.
R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the
invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what
remains must express the legislative will, independently of the void part, since
131
VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 131

People vs. Vera.
the court has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S.,
839; Vide, also, U. S. vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust
Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R. C. L., 121.)"
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salaries
of probation officers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the
Act would still be valid and may be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the
suggestion but for the fact that said section is, in our opinion, so inseparably linked with
the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left
is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of
people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial results of that system. The clear
policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is
to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of
the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation
officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action
on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into
provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces—and this is
the actual situation now—appropriates the necessary fund for the salary of a probation
officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation
without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without a probation
system.
Section 2 of the Act provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the
probationer. Every probation officer is given, as to the persons placed in probation under
his care, the powers of a police officer.' It is the
132

People vs. Vera.
duty of probation officers to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court upon
the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those conditions, the following
are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
"That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
"(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;

" (c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
" (d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or
elsewhere;
"(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer
concerning his conduct or condition;
"(h) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly;
" (g) Shall remain or reside within a specified place or locality;
"(h) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses
caused by his offense;
"(i) Shall support his wife and children;
"(j) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
"(k) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation,
promulgated in accordance with law."
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of
probation. Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a
report of the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer
has complied with the conditions of probation that probation may be definitely
terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if
the court finds that there is non-compliance with said conditions, as reported by the
probation officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said
probationer may be committed
133
VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 133
People vs. Vera.
with or without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court
may revoke, continue or modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the
execution of the sentence originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation
officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on
probation under his supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their
probation, and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep informed concerning their
conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and admonition,
and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by the court
as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition;
to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over.said probationers at least once
every two months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work;
to make such reports as are necessary- for the information of the Secretary of Justice
and as the latter may require; and to perform such other duties as are consistent with
the functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may direct. The probation
officers provided for in this Act may act as parole officers for any penal or reformatory
institution for adults when so requested by the authorities thereof, and, when
designated by the Secretary of Justice, shall act as parole officer of persons released on
parole under Act Numbered Forty-one Hundred and Three, without any additional
compensation,"
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers may be
appointed in the provinces under section 10 of the Act which provides as follows:
"There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control, a
Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the Governor-
General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of four thousand
eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out the purposes of this Act, there is hereby
appropriated out
134

People vs. Vera.
of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos
to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint probation officers
and the administrative personnel of the probation office under civil service regulations from
among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience prescribed by the Bureau of
Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation officers and administrative
personnel until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act."
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing
section are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces
under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula, singulis, that the probation officers
referred to in section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces,
but in the central office known as the Probation Office established in the Department of
Justice, under the supervision of a Chief Probation Officer. When the law provides that
"the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4) ;
that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par.
d) ; that the probationer shall report to the "probation officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow
"the probation officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable
inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec.
3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period and
terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer who is in charge of a
particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been the intention of
the legislature, for instance, to require a probationer in Batanes, to report to a probation
officer in the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the
probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his
conduct, to instruct him concerning the
135
VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 135

People vs. Vera.
conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by
law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation
officers as there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course, possible. But this
would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not on what the
law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation
is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much .as
has been. said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to
amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which
are not there. Not for any purpose—not even to save a statute from the doom of
invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the
Insular Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to
make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply
thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out-the purposes of this Act", is to
be applied, among other things, for the salaries of probation offi-cers in' the central
office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive such compensations as the
Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in the
Appropriation Act". It was not the intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary
of Justice to fix the salaries of probation officers in the provinces or later on to include
said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000
appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the
administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can
hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the
provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the
Philippines and we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand
pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in
136

People vs. Vera.
each provin ce, as intended, a probation officer with asalary not lower than that of a
provincial fiscal. If this is correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221
said act is complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it
is conceded that in our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without
probation officers.
Probation as a development of modern penology is a commendable system. Probation
laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern
criminologists call the "individualization of punishment", the adjustment of the penalty
to the character of the criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides
a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed
that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and their development into hardened
criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and
avoids imprisonment so long as the convict gives promise of reform. (United
States vs. Murray' [1925], 275 U. S., 347, 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The welfare of society is its chief
end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we
believe that probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the
Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law
aside because of repugnancy to our fundamental law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects
presented by able counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their
oral argument. We have examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we
have been able to reach in the short time at our command for the study and deliberation
of this case. In the examination of the cases and in the analysis of the legal principles
involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is' supported
by better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to
137
VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 137

People vs. Vera.
the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad[1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the

conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases
brought to our attention, except where the point or the principle is settled directly or by
clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the
United States. This line of approach is justified because:
(a.) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of
the United States and the dual character of the American Government is a
situation which does not obtain in the Philippines;
(b) The. situation of a state of the American Union or of the District of Columbia
with reference to the Federal Government of the. United States is not the
situation of a province with respect to the Insular Government (Art, I, sec. 8, cl.
17, and 10th Amendments Constitution of the United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84
Fed. [2d], 871);
(c) The distinct federal and state judicial organizations of the United States do not
embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines
(Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317) ;
(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in
Lochner vs. New York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law, ed., 937, 949) and, "to
keep pace with
* * * new developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in
Pensacola Tel. Co. vs.Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed.,
708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental
principles should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions and
environments.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
VILLA-REAL and ABAD SANTOS, JJ.:
We concur in the result.

Act No. 4221 declared unconstitutional; writ granted.
138

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22 People v. Vera (65 Phil 56)

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[No. 45685.

November 16, 1937]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI

1. PROBATION ; AUTHORITY OF PROBATION COURT TO LOOK INTO

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE PRESIDENT AND HIS VETO POWER; PRESIDENT'S

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 57

People vs. Vera.

3. ID. ; INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.—If it is ever necessary to make any

4. ID.; WHEN CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED.—The constitutionality of an act of

5. ID. ; ID. ; RESORT TO EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES; ADJUDICATED CASES.

58 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

6. ID.; ; ID. ; ID. ; PROHIBITION ; RULE WHERE JURISDICTION is EXCLUSIVELY

7. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; LIMITED JURISDICTION IN

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 59

People vs. Vera.

9. ID.; ID.; PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF PARTY; RIGHT AND

11. ID.; ID. ; WHEN DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

12. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL

60 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

13. ID. ; THE JUDICIARY; ITS DUTY TO ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION.—Under a

14. ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 61

People vs. Vera.

STITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.—Section 21 of the Jones Law, in force at the time of

17. ID.; ID.; COMMUTATION AND AMNESTY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE

18. ID. ; ID.; EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE PARDONING POWER.—The benign

62 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the

19. ID.; PROBATION; POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A

20. ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION AND PARDON NOT COTERMINOUS; PROBATION

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 63

People vs. Vera.

23. ID. ; ID. ; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY; HISTORICAL

24. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE FORBIDDING DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY NOT

64 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

25. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF UNDUE DELEGATION ; DETAILS OF EXECUTION.—In

26. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL SURRENDER OF LEGISLATIVE

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 65

People vs. Vera.

28. ID. ; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF A LAW; RELAXATION OF THE

29. ID.; ID.; ID.; OPERATION OF PROBATION ACT NOT CONTINGENT ON SPECIFIED

30. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LOCAL OPTION LAWS ; EIGHT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERN

66 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

MENT; SUSPENSION OF OPERATION OF A GENERAL LAW NOT COUNTENANCED.

31. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; PROVINCIAL BOARDS EMPOWERED TO SUSPEND OPERATION OF

VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 67

People vs. Vera.

33. ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; CLASS LEGISLATION; CLASSIFICATION

34. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; RESULTANT INEQUALITY FROM UNWARRANTED

68 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

35. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT; GOVERNMENT OF

36. ID.; PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ; PRESUMPTION AGAINST MUTILATION

37. ID. ; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT INSEPARABLE FROM REST OF

People vs. Vera.

40. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS; APPOINTMENT OF PROBATION

70 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Vera.

41. ID. ; PROBATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PENOLOGY; PROBATION ACT

42. ID. ; CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS; RULES OF STATUTORY