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Anscombe
Review by: L. Carl Brown
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1998), pp. 151-152
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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Arabia, beginning in the 1870s and end book the series of intelligence
explores
in failure accounts
ing by 1913.Most of and policy failures that prevented the
Arabia in these years have told the story U.S. government from comprehending
from the perspective of the British, the that North Korea was accommo
seeking
Saudis, or the Hashimites. But there was dation as early as 1991.Most senior Bush
another party?the Ottoman Empire, administration officials believed
incorrectly
which just happened to claim sovereignty that nuclear diplomacy with North
over most of the area. Anscombe Korea could not succeed, and hostility
presents
the Ottoman role and perspective while in Congress to dealing with North Korea
due attention to the activities of reinforced their reluctance to try. The
giving
the outside powers (essentially Britain) Clinton administration compounded
and the Arabs. Starting with the earlier these failures by initially embracing ends
Ottoman role in the Gulf, the book then that could not be attained and eschewing
describes Prime Minister Midhat Pasha's deal-making. Finally, the administration
bold to reassert Ottoman control had what one State Department official
plan
and mount an ambitious economic devel called a "gaping void at the top of the
opment program. Later chapters follow bureaucracy": there was no one in charge
events to the (unratified) 1913Anglo of policy toward North Korea. As a re
Ottoman accord recognizing Britain's sult, American diplomatic strategy was
position inKuwait. Why the Ottoman one of drift
punctuated by spasms of
failure? Imperial overstretch with too
zigzagging. This failure highlights a
many problems in too many
places, and critical weakness: the inability of the
that made United States to develop a balance of
rudimentary transportation
Arabia very far from Istanbul. carrots and sticks for adversaries who are
[152]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS-Volume 77No. 3