234 6.

Human error

6.3.5.2 Alarms
Another failing of many HMI is that alarms cause nuisance to the control room operator
and sometimes overload them with data. Kletz highlighted this problem [2].

Text Box 6.21

Increasing the number of alarms does not increase reliability proportionately.
Suppose an operator ignores an alarm on 1 in 100 of the occasions on which it sounds. Installing
another alarm (at a slightly different setting or on a differ parameter) will not reduce the failure rate
to 1 in 10,000. If the operator is in a state in which he ignores the first alarm, then there is a more than
average chance that he will ignore the second. (In one plant there were five alarms in series. The
designer assumed that the operator would ignore each alarm on one occasion in 10, the whole
lot on one occasion in 100,000!).

It has become very easy to add alarms to the control system and this has meant too many
have been configured on most systems. Before any alarms are considered a clear philosophy
should be developed that explains that alarms should only be used to warn of potentially crit-
ical situations requiring timely intervention by the control room operator. Any other events
and indications, including where the operator cannot respond in time or the event has already
happened (including process trips) should not be an alarm. Alarms should be prioritised
according to the potential consequences of no response and the time available to respond [3].

6.3.5.3 Alertness and motivation

Kletz identifies another potential problem in control rooms, that being task underload [2].

Text Box 6.22

Reliability falls off when people have too little to do as well as when they have too much to do. It
is difficult for night-watchmen to remain alert.
During the Second World War, studies were made of the performance of watch-keepers
detecting submarines approaching ships. It was found that the effectiveness of a man carrying
out such a passive task fell off very rapidly after about 30 min.
Copyright © 2021. Elsevier. All rights reserved.

It is sometimes suggested that we should restrict the amount of automation on a plant in order to
give the operators enough to do to keep them alert. I do not think this is the right philosophy. If
automation is needed to give the necessary reliability, then we should not sacrifice reliability in
order to find work for the operators. We should look for other ways of keeping them alert. Similarly
if automation is chosen because it is more efficient or effective, we should not sacrifice efficiency or
effectiveness in order to find work for the operators.
In practice, I doubt if process plant operators often suffer from task underload to an extent that
affects their performance. Although in theory they have little to do on a highly automated plant, in
practice there are often some instruments on manual control, there are non-automated tasks to be
done, such as changing over pumps and tank, there is equipment to be prepared for maintenance,
routine inspections to be carried out, and so on.

Brazier, Andy, et al. Trevor Kletz Compendium : His Process Safety Wisdom Updated for a New Generation, Elsevier, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sheffield/detail.action?docID=6461868.
Created from sheffield on 2021-03-22 06:02:10.