USA College of Law

OCASO 1-F

Case Name People vs. Declaro

Topic Double Jeopardy

Case No. | Date G.R. No. 64362. February 9, 1989.

Ponente GANCAYCO, J.
Doctrine Dismissal with the consent of the accused

RELEVANT FACTS
 The case is a result of a traffic accident in Aklan. Edgar Ibabao was charged for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence by certain Crispin Cananam as the offended party.
 Three months later, an information for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against the same accused by an Eduardo Salido. The second case arose
from the same incident.
 The accused entered a plea of not guilty. Then the case was set for its first hearing, both the
offended party and the fiscal failed to appear despite notice.
 The counsel for the accused moved for dismissal for lack of interest on the part of the
prosecution after the accused has given his express consent to his counsel – Hon. Declaro
granted.
 Due to this the second case was dismissed as well on the ground of double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy

RULING: NO.

The dismissal with consent of the accused results a waiver on his right against double jeopardy. Thus,
dismissal of a case with the express consent of the accused will not bar another prosecution for the same offense
or appeal by the prosecution from such dismissal. It must be noted, the consent to be effected, must be express,
and this excludes mere silence or failure of the accused to object to the dismissal. The accused expressly
consented when his counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case, thus it must take effect. So, applying it to the case
at bar, he cannot question or invoke double jeopardy on the second charge against him for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence.

Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is made with the express consent of the accused, only if it
is predicated on either of two grounds, i.e., insufficient of the evidence or denial of the right to speedy trial. In
both cases, the dismissal will have the effect of acquittal. Since the dismissal in this case does not fall under either
of these two instances and it was made with the express consent of the accused, it would not thereby be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense.