Sexual violence in armed conflict: why, who and when?

Characteristics of differently motivated forms of sexual violence in armed conflict,

with regard to gender of the perpetrators and victims, and the type of conflict

Quita Muis
ANR: 129554

Master’s Thesis
Victimology and Criminal Justice
Tilburg University

Supervisor: L.M.C. Ruiz

Second reader: dr. P.G.M. van Eck-Aarten

24 November 2016
Abstract
Since the end of the 20th century, a shift in perception regarding sexual violence in armed conflict
has been noticeable. Whereas sexual violence was first perceived as an inevitable part of warfare
and therefore received little attention from the public, scholars, and security sector institutions, it
was later acknowledged as a worldwide problem and an integral part of armed conflicts: used as
a weapon of war. With the aim of adding to the understanding of this problem, especially with
regard to underreported cases that include male victims and/or female perpetrators, the
relationship between the following factors is investigated: reasons for armed actors to engage in
sexual violence, the gender of the perpetrators and the victims of conflict-related sexual violence,
and the different conflicts in which sexual violence occurs. In order to do this, reasons to engage
in sexual violence are divided into three categories (opportunistic, strategic or practice), and are
linked to the gender of the victims and perpetrators on the basis of instances that occurred in
different conflicts all over the world. These conflicts are categorized on the basis of International
Humanitarian Law (NIAC and IAC) and its general causes (ethnicity/religion,
secession/independency or political/governmental power). Due to the interrelatedness of the
reasons and categories, the (still) limited information available on cases regarding male victims
and female perpetrators, and the fact that often more than one reason to engage in sexual
violence is present within one conflict, no unambiguous conclusion could be drawn. A couple of
general trends were found, such as the presence of ethnic hatred and unit cohesion in conflicts
related to all three causes, the fact that investigated cases of forced marriage and sexual slavery
only include male perpetrators and female victims, and that torture and punishment in detention
occurred in conflicts related to all three causes, and was only perpetrated by men, against both
men and women. However, several exceptions to these trends exist and therefore this topic needs
to be researched more thoroughly so that policies, prevention measures and responses of
security sector institutions can be made more effective and will be applicable to all involved parties.

Keywords: sexual violence, armed conflict, reasons, strategic, opportunistic, practice, gender,
victims, perpetrators, (non-) international armed conflict, ethnicity, religion, secession,
independency, political power, governmental power

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Table of contents

Introduction................................................................................................................................... 1

1. Reasons to engage in sexual violence categorized................................................................. 6

1.1 Categories.............................................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Reasons................................................................................................................................. 8

2. Gender of victims and perpetrators........................................................................................ 16

3. Types of conflicts.....................................................................................................................32

Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 41

Bibliogaphy..................................................................................................................................43

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Introduction
For a long time, sexual violence during armed conflict was neglected and ignored, as it was
perceived as an inevitable part of war by both the public and scholars, as well as by security
sector institutions (Henry, Ward & Hirshberg, 2004; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010; Cohen, 2013).
However, since the end of the 20th century, more research concerning this topic has been
conducted, especially with regard to defining sexual violence, the prevalence of conflict-related
sexual violence, and the different contexts and types of conflicts in which sexual violence occurs
(Henry et al., 2004; Baaz & Stern, 2009; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010; Cohen, 2013; Cohen & Nordås,
2014; Wood, 2014).
The awareness of and interest in sexual violence during armed conflict was mainly
influenced by the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina that started in 1992 (Henry et al. 2004; Cohen, 2013;
Jurasz, 2014). The sheer number of sexual violence victims in this conflict triggered a strong
feminist movement that advocated for the establishment of international tribunals. Eventually, the
established International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ruled that the sexual
abuse of Bosnian Muslim women by Bosnian Serb forces should be categorized as a crime
against humanity, as it was so systematic and widespread (Wood, 2006). Additionally, together
with feminist scholars, changes in international law regarding this topic were also influenced by
practitioners, activists, and some of those active in the landmark case against Jean- Paul Akayesu
before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) (Van Schaack, 2008; Jurasz, 2014).
The reason for its influence is the fact that this case resulted in the first conviction of genocide in
an international court, and that rape was considered a component of genocide. In the Akayesu
case, feminist advocacy eventually forced the prosecution to charge rape and therefore amend
the initial indictment, as charges of rape were not filed initially (Van Schaack, 2008). The
international prosecution of sexual violence and the work of (feminist) activists made the
occurrence of sexual violence in armed conflicts more visible to the public, scholars, and security
sector institutions. In turn, this helped showing that sexual violence is not just a side issue, but
that it is an integral part of armed conflicts; used as a weapon of war (Hayden, 2002; Baaz &
Stern, 2009; Wood, 2009; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010; Cohen, 2013; Cohen & Nordås, 2014).
This shift in perception has made visible that sexual violence is an ongoing problem that
occurs very often in conflicts all over the world. Cohen and Nordås (2014) conducted research
into the prevalence of sexual violence during war, based on The Sexual Violence in Armed
Conflict (SVAC) dataset that covers 129 active conflicts, and the 625 armed actors that were
involved in these conflicts during the period 1989–2009. Their research has shown that there are
between 1000 and 2000 victims of sexual violence worldwide in a given year (depending on the

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way the different kinds of sexual violence are categorized) (Cohen & Nordås, 2014). While in
some armed conflicts sexual violence is used on a large scale, in other armed conflicts the
prevalence of sexual violence is remarkably limited. Despite the fact that armed groups come into
contact with civilians frequently during war, not all of these groups or all armed actors engage in
sexual violence. This is/was the case in, for example, the conflicts in Israel/Palestine and Sri
Lanka (Wood, 2006; Wood, 2009; Cohen, 2013; Cohen & Nordås, 2014; Wood; 2014).
As more and more research into sexual violence is conducted, it appears that this problem
not only occurs in different countries, but also in different types of conflicts and for different
reasons. The prevalence of sexual violence varies across inter-state wars, both ethnic and non-
ethnic wars, civil wars, secessionist conflicts, and across other forms of intrastate and non-state
wars (Hayden, 2000; Wood, 2006; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010; Cohen & Nordås, 2014; Wood, 2014).
Some researchers claim that it is most likely to occur in ethnic wars, as indigenous people or
people from specific population groups are the target in many conflicts because of their ethnicity
(Plumper & Neumayer, 2006; Bastick, Grimm & Kunz, 2007; Cohen, 2013). Wood (2009) supports
this claim by labeling ethnic cleansing as the classic setting for widespread rape. However, it
should be taken into account that this is not always the case. The earlier mentioned
Israel/Palestine conflict is a conflict regarding ethnicity and religion, but sexual violence relatively
occurs to a much lesser extent there, than in other conflicts in which ethnic hatred is present.
Besides (ethnic) hatred, armed groups can have other reasons for engaging in sexual violence
as well. Motives such as lust, domination and power, greed, gender inequality, aggression,
revenge, destruction of an opponent’s culture, punishment and torture, humiliation, and strategic
advantage are often mentioned by scholars as driving forces of sexual violence during war
(Hayden, 2000; Moser & Clark, 2001; Henry et al., 2004; Wood, 2006; Bastick et al., 2007; Baaz
& Stern, 2009; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010; Cohen, 2013; Wood, 2014). These reasons will be
further elaborated throughout this thesis.
Most reported cases of sexual violence during armed conflict include male perpetrators
and female victims. This seems to be in line with the generally accepted picture of perpetrators
and victims of sexual violence and their gender (Moser & Clark, 2001; Plumper & Neumayer,
2006). This narrative is related to Christie’s (as cited in Pemberton, 2011) concept of the “ideal
victim”. He characterized victims as, among other things, weak in relation to the offender, and the
offender is typified as unambiguously big and bad. However, it is suspected that a lot of cases of
sexual violence during armed conflicts are underreported, especially when it comes to male
victims and female perpetrators (Wood, 2006; Bastick et al., 2007; Wood, 2009; Cohen & Nordås,
2014; Dolan, 2014). This could be due to the minimal focus on male victims and female

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perpetrators by NGOs and policy makers, as well as to the stigma that is associated with it. Men
often feel ashamed to report sexual assault by men or women (Sivakumaran, 2007; Cohen &
Nordås, 2014; Dolan, 2014), and women are not often perceived as “unambiguously big and bad”
(Christie, as cited in Pemberton, 2011, p. 10). Because much less is known about these kind of
cases, there sometimes exist misconceptions about the gender aspect of sexual violence and
about the different goals it could serve when perpetrated by and against men or women. Thus,
sexual violence against women is often associated with domination and power, or could be used
as a way of shaming the culture to which the woman belongs (Moser & Clark, 2001; Plumper &
Neumayer, 2006). Yet, sexual violence against men is also an act of domination and power, and
is not only used as humiliation of the male victim himself, but can be used as a way of shaming
his religion, ethnicity, race and/or nationality as well (Hayden, 2000; Sivakumaran, 2007; Baaz &
Stern, 2009; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010). Additionally, sexual violence against men or women,
perpetrated by men or women, can be perceived as gender-based violence, as in all cases it is
in some way related to the societal role expectations associated with each gender (Dolan, 2014).
Even though more and more scholars are now looking beyond the classic victim-
perpetrator relationship in their research, and more information is available about the reasons to
engage in sexual violence, still little is known about the relation between these factors.
Furthermore, not much research has been conducted yet into the question if these differently
motivated forms of sexual violence and differences in gender occur in different types of conflicts.
The gaps in knowledge about these topics help maintaining the incompleteness and
ineffectiveness of the policies and prevention measures regarding sexual violence in armed
conflicts. Therefore, the goal of this current research is to take another step in understanding the
problem better, and this will hopefully add to the improvement of policies, prevention activities
and responses of security sector institutions. In order to do this, the following research question,
consisting of several sub-questions, will be answered in this paper:

What are the characteristics of differently motivated forms of sexual violence in armed conflict,
with regard to gender of the perpetrators and victims, and the type of conflict?

- What are the reasons for armed actors to engage in sexual violence during armed conflict?
- Do the perpetrators of the differently motivated forms of sexual violence differ in gender?
- Do the victims of the differently motivated forms of sexual violence differ in gender?
- Do the differently motivated forms of sexual violence occur in different types of conflicts?

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In order to answer the research (sub-) question(s), a literature study will be conducted. Due to the
lack of time and space for this Master’s thesis, it is not possible to execute an empirical study or
experiment. Nevertheless, this literature research and its results could be used as guidance for
other scholars who are planning on conducting empirical research on this topic.
The use of the concepts of sexual violence and gender-based violence in this thesis is
based on the definitions used by the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes (2000).
According to the ICC, sexual violence1 includes rape, sexual torture and mutilation, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, forced pregnancy, and other forms of sexual violence,
and can be defined on the basis of the following elements (ICC, 2000, p.10):

“The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or
caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by
threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s
or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.”

Important here are the facts that this definition is sex and gender neutral, so no distinctions are
made between male or female victims and perpetrators (except for forced pregnancy), and that it
includes “other forms of sexual violence”, so that it is not limited to the forms that are explicitly
listed. Although the definition of rape varies across international courts and tribunals, according
to this most recent definition of the ICC, both men and women could be perpetrators as well as
victims. Thus, by rape2 is meant: “the penetration of the anus or vagina with any object or body
part or of any body part of the victim or perpetrator’s body with a sexual organ, by force or by
threat of force or coercion, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or against a person
incapable of giving genuine consent”. Furthermore, by gender-based violence, the Office of the
Prosecutor of the ICC (2014, p.3) means: “crimes committed against persons, whether male or
female, because of their sex and/or socially constructed gender roles. Gender-based crimes are
not always manifested as a form of sexual violence. They may include non-sexual attacks on
women and girls, and men and boys, because of their gender”. The use of the term gender is also
built on the description of the ICC (2014, p.3), namely “males and females, within the context of

1 Elements of Crime (9 September 2002), UN Doc., PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2. Articles 7(1) (f), 7(1) (g)-1,
7(1) (g)-6.
2 Elements of Crime (9 September 2002), UN Doc., PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2. Article 7(1) (g)-1.

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society. This definition acknowledges the social construction of gender, and the accompanying
roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes assigned to women and men, and to girls and boys”.
This definition in the ICC’s policy paper (2014) is in accordance with the somewhat more restricted
statutory definition of gender3 in the Rome Statute (1998) that reads: “the two sexes, male and
female, within the context of society. The term "gender" does not indicate any meaning different
from the above”. Reasons to use these definitions and descriptions of the ICC are, first of all, the
gender neutrality of the concept of sexual violence. This is useful for the current research,
because the focus lies on the differences in motives for men and women to engage in (the same
kind of) sexual violence. In this way, it is not necessary to use different terms for sexual violence
when it comes to male or female perpetrators or victims, as it is applicable to both genders.
Secondly, by following the Rome Statute that is ratified by the majority of states all over the world,
definitions are used that are agreed upon by most states and therefore, different types of conflicts
all over the world can be used as study material in this research.
Throughout this thesis, the focus will solely lie on sexual violence in armed conflict,
perpetrated by armed actors. The use of these terms in this thesis is based on the definitions
used by the ICRC (2008). The ICRC distinguishes two forms of armed conflict, namely
International Armed Conflict (IAC) and Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC). An IAC will exist
“whenever there is a resort to armed force between States” (ICRC, 2008, p. 2), and there exists
a NIAC “whenever there is protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State” (ICRC, 2008, p. 4). In this context,
armed actor will mean “State actors (military, police, paramilitary organizations under the direct
command of other State actors) and non-State actors (rebel and militia organizations) (Wood,
2014, p. 458). Sexual violence that occurs in the preamble or aftermath of an armed conflict, will
not be take into account in this research. The same goes for sexual violence that is perpetrated
in the domestic context or by intimate partners, peacekeepers, aid workers, or civilians during an
armed conflict (Cohen & Nordås, 2014; Wood, 2014). Reasons for this are that the research area
will otherwise be too broad for the context of this thesis, and it will not fit the organizational
structure concerning reasons to engage in sexual violence.
This organizational structure contains three categories into which studied reasons to
engage in sexual violence will be divided. These categories, reasons, and divisions will be
discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. The second chapter will be devoted to the gender of
the perpetrators and the gender of the victims of the differently motivated forms of sexual violence

3Rome Statute A/CONF.183/9 of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998), Crimes against
humanity. Article 7(1).

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discussed in chapter 1. In chapter 3, different conflicts will be discussed in which these differently
motivated forms of sexual violence have occurred. This to see whether or not reasons and gender
vary between different types of conflicts. Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the findings to
answer the main research question, to point out limitations of this study and to make
recommendations for further research.

1. Reasons to engage in sexual violence categorized

To get a clear overview and eventually make clear conclusions, the reasons to engage in sexual
violence that will be discussed in this chapter, will be divided into three categories, following Wood
(2014) in her research. The three categories will be: strategic, opportunistic, and practice. Some
researchers have used other ways to categorize reasons to engage in sexual violence, such as
opportunism/greed, ethnic hatred, and gender inequality (Cohen, 2013), and domination
(concerning gender roles), torture and punishment, and strategy (Bastick et al., 2007). However,
Wood’s way of organizing gives room to study the gender aspect within these motivations, instead
of labeling just one particular category as gender-based in itself. Additionally, the categories are
broad enough to cover all kinds of motives, and fit the context of armed conflict and armed actors
very well. The three categories will be elaborated first in this chapter, followed by different reasons
to engage in sexual violence and the division of these reasons into the categories.

1.1 Categories
Strategic
First of all, strategic sexual violence is explained by Wood (2014, p. 470) as “purposefully adopted
in pursuit of organization objectives. In its extreme form, it is ordered (not necessarily by top
commanders)”. It is unlikely for a leader of an armed group to encourage and/or command sexual
violence against civilians when the armed organization aims at governing the civil population, out
of fear of losing their support. Moreover, strategic sexual violence is also less likely to occur when
an armed organization is dependent on the services and provisions of the civilians (Wood, 2006).
However, there are a number of reasons for leaders of armed groups to encourage and/or
command their combatants to engage in sexual violence, which will be elaborated later on.
Whether sexual violence is commanded is mostly depending on the organizational structure and
the goals that are pursued by the armed organization (Wood, 2014). For a military commander,
the task of both producing and controlling violence can be challenging, especially when a
combatant’s view on the use of (sexual) violence differs (Wood, 2006; 2009; 2014). Therefore, it

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is important that the hierarchical structure within an armed organization is clear, so that soldiers
will not turn against higher officers (Wood, 2009). Whether or not combatants follow these
commands (despite personal differences) depends on the strength of the hierarchical structure,
and the strength of disciplinary and internal intelligence institutions within the organization. This
influence seems to be so strong that Wood (2014, p. 469) claims the following: “if the
organization’s internal institutions are strong, it is possible to conclude that if sexual violence
occurs, it is ordered, except for isolated incidents”.

Opportunistic
Some of these isolated incidents could then be related to opportunistic sexual violence, which is
defined as “carried out for private reasons, rather than organization objectives” (Wood, 2014, p.
470). This motive is based on the individual preferences of involved armed actors, but can, again,
be influenced by the armed organizations (Wood, 2014). Namely, they can recruit soldiers of
whom they know to have their own private reasons to engage in sexual violence or those who are
at least more likely to do so. This recruitment can be based on the cultural norms and beliefs of
the soldiers or their belonging to a particular sub- or criminal population (Wood, 2009).
Furthermore, the occurrence of opportunistic sexual violence can also be related to the substitute
argument of Enloe (2000). According to this argument, combatants will turn to rape if they do not
have regular access to prostitutes, camp followers, or willing civilians. However, as stated by
Wood (2014), this argument does not account for the sometimes excessive use of violence, the
occurrence of sexual torture, or for situations in which combatants have much interaction with
civilians and little contact with prostitutes, but still not engage in sexual violence. It can be hard to
distinguish the different categories for engaging in sexual violence, yet there is one factor that
makes identifying opportunistic sexual violence somewhat easier. If an instance or pattern of
sexual violence is punished by the chain of command, it is opportunistic, unless it is a show trial
(Wood, 2014). Nevertheless, when sexual violence is not punished by higher officers, it does not
automatically mean that it was not opportunistic, as the incident might not be known by the
commanders.

Practice
The third category, practice, arises from Wood’s (2014) idea that strategic and opportunistic
motives do not cover all the cases of sexual violence in armed conflict. Sometimes, it is claimed
that when sexual violence occurs frequently and/or has large scale consequences, it is
strategically used as a weapon. However, this motive is, in some cases, inferred rather than

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demonstrated (Wood, 2014). When, for example, widespread sexual violence in a conflict causes
the majority of the civilians to flee, it might seem that this sexual violence was ordered as a
strategy, even though there is no evidence for this claim. Therefore, sexual violence as practice
will entail: “Violence that is not ordered (even implicitly) but is tolerated by commanders” (Wood,
2014, p. 471). This form of sexual violence can derive from a situation in which military leaders
consistently and knowingly fail to punish sexual violence by their combatants, despite this
behavior being against the norms of the armed organization. It can also be a consequence of
peer pressure and group conformity effects (Wood, 2006; 2014). When a small armed unit
frequently engages in sexual violence during the conflict, a combatant who does not have
personal motivations to engage in this behavior, may still participate out of concern for his or her
status within the group. This conformity effect often results from the organizational and group
cohesion that is learned when the soldiers are trained for combat, because their commitment to
their primary group or fellow combatants makes them “hold fast under fire” (Wood, 2009, p. 138).
While Wood (2014) earlier claimed that if an organization’s internal institutions are strong, the
occurrence of sexual violence is almost always ordered, with the addition of the third category
she suggests that “when armed organizations engage in frequent rape, they often do so as a
practice rather than as a strategy (Wood, 2014, p. 458) (be aware that this is stated for rape in
particular, not necessarily for all kinds of sexual violence).

1.2 Reasons
Ethnic hatred and clearing an area
As stated before, one of the most frequently mentioned reasons to engage in sexual violence is
ethnic hatred (Plumper & Neumayer, 2006; Bastick et al., 2007; Wood, 2009; Cohen, 2013).
According to Plumper and Neumayer (2006), reports on systematic rape, rape-related murder,
forced impregnation, and forced abortion are particularly abundant during ethnic wars. It serves
as a means of ethnic cleansing, terrorization, and humiliation of the opposing ethnicity. Sexual
violence can be seen as a way of ethnic cleansing, because often the mere threat of widespread
sexual violence is already enough to make civilians flee elsewhere. Bastick et al. (2007) support
these statements and add to this that in some places, sexual violence has been part of an act or
attempted act of genocide, intended to destruct a particular ethnic group. Even though Cohen
(2013) agrees with the statement that sexual violence often occurs in ethnic wars, she claims that
it is not more likely to occur in these kind of wars, than in other types of conflicts.
In order to categorize this reason to engage in sexual violence, I look at Wood (2009, p.
143), who claims that ethnic cleansing is “the classic setting for rape as a strategy”. This seems

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a logical choice, as sexual violence is, in this context, often used to fulfill organizational goals,
such as gaining land over the opposing ethnicity and even worse, destruct it. Nevertheless, it is
also possible to divide ethnic hatred under the category of opportunistic sexual violence. An
individual combatant can have personal hatred against a specific ethnicity, and therefore engage
in sexual violence against people of this community when possible during the particular conflict.
This personal characteristic might have been a reason for the armed organization to recruit this
combatant as well, as they know his or her intrinsic motivation to join the war. Additionally, it
is also possible that the clearing of a civilian population from an area is the purpose of engaging
in sexual violence in itself, without the motivation of ethnic hatred (Bastick et al., 2007; Wood,
2006). It is then used as a means of advancing military objectives (such as controlling resources
or territory without interference), and would therefore only be categorized under strategic sexual
violence (and not opportunistic).

Unit cohesion
Another reason for the occurrence of sexual violence is unit cohesion that promotes bonding of
its members, and group conformity and solidarity (Wood, 2006). Baaz and Stern (2009) explain
this phenomenon on the basis of the ethos of the military, of which group conformity, hierarchical
structures, and the dictates of loyalty are integral parts. In different studies of Cohen (2007; 2013;
2013), this process is called “combatant socialization” (Cohen, 2013, p. 391), and arguably
happens most often in armed organizations that recruit new members through conscription or
abduction. These kind of armed organizations face the task of creating a strong coherent group
out of a collection of strangers in circumstances of fear and distrust (as a result of being forced
into participating), and with new members regularly joining the armed force. When this is the case,
engaging in (sexual) violence can help the process of integrating new members, maintaining
social order among existing members, and cutting ties to a combatant’s previous life (Cohen,
2013). This feeling of belonging to a group facilitates collective action and makes individuals feel
less accountable, and is called the internal state of “deindividuation” (Henry et al., 2004, p. 550).
Deindividuation entails reduced self-awareness and self-evaluation, and diminished concern for
the well-being of others. Research suggests that the influence of deindividuation is stronger when
armed actors wear uniforms (Henry et al., 2004).
Looking at the definitions and explanations of the three categories, the reason of unit
cohesion is best categorized under sexual violence as practice. This kind of sexual violence is
not ordered by commanders, but neither is it punished. It is tolerated to serve a particular goal,
namely that of group cohesion, and this goal is reached by peer pressure and learned group

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conformity. Even though unit cohesion is a goal of higher commanders in order to make an armed
group perform better in combat, reaching this goal through sexual violence is not directly pursuing
strategic, organizational objectives, and would therefore not fit the category of strategic sexual
violence. Besides, there are also differences between obedience (strategic) and conformity
(practice) which explain the categorization of this reason for sexual violence even better. Frésard
(2004) states that obedience and conformity both refer to handing over initiative to an external
source, but describes that they differ in the following important ways (Frésard, 2004, p. 79):

“1.Hierarchy. Obedience to authority occurs within a hierarchical structure in which

the actor feels that the person above has the right to prescribe behavior. Conformity
regulates the behavior among those of equal status; obedience links one status to
another.
2. Imitation. Conformity is imitation but obedience is not. Conformity leads to
homogenization of behavior, as the influenced person comes to adopt the behavior of
peers. In obedience, there is compliance without imitation of the influencing source.
A soldier does not simply repeat an order given to him but carries it out.
3. Explicitness. In obedience, the prescription for action is explicit, taking the form of
an order or command. In conformity, the requirement of going along with the group
often remains implicit. (...) Indeed, many subjects would resist an explicit demand by
group members to conform, for the situation is defined as one consisting of equals
who have no right to order each other about.
4. Voluntarism. The clearest distinction between obedience and conformity, however,
occurs after the fact – that is, in the manner in which subjects explain their behavior.
Subjects deny conformity and embrace obedience as the explanation of their actions.”

So, this explanation shows that unit cohesion should be categorized under sexual violence as a
practice in the following ways: the behavior performed to reach unit cohesion: includes a
relationship among combatants that is based on equality; is a result of the imitation of peers and
leads to homogeneous behavior (combatant socialization and deindividuation); and seems
voluntary, without explicit order. On the contrary, if unit cohesion fitted the category of strategic
sexual violence, it should have included a higher authority, which explicitly ordered behavior that
was not performed by the authority itself, and that is executed by the combatant on an involuntary
basis.

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Reward, forced marriage, sexual slavery
In some settings, the allowance of rape is an (institutionalized) form of compensation or reward
for a combatant’s participation in the armed conflict. It is often not only allowed, but implicitly
ordered by higher commanders, so that combatants can find their ‘needed and well deserved
relieve’ (Henry et al., 2004; Wood, 2006; Bastick et al., 2007; Baaz & Stern, 2009; Cohen, 2013;
Wood, 2014). Other armed organizations do not allow the occurrence of rape in any situation, as
they believe it to be strategically unbeneficial, or even a cause of military disadvantages and
should therefore be prevented as much as possible (Bastick et al., 2007; Cohen, 2013; Wood,
2014). Yet, some of these organizations still want to recognize the needs they believe the
combatants to have. A possible way of doing this is the institution of forced marriage and sexual
slavery. In this way, forced marriage and sexual slavery are linked to the earlier mentioned
substitution argument (Enloe, 2000; Cohen, 2013), that is used to explain that combatants turn to
rape if they do not have regular access to sexual encounters.
As mentioned in the introduction, according to the definition of the ICC (2000), forced
marriage and sexual slavery are forms of sexual violence. Even though these two kinds of sexual
violence seem similar to each other, except for the marital status, legally speaking these crimes
are seen as separate (Cohen, 2013). Initially, trial judges of the Special Court in Sierra Leone
ruled that forced marriage and sexual slavery were the same crimes, but the Appeals Chamber
decided that forced marriage involved harm beyond forced sex (Cohen, 2013). The differences
mainly include the conjugal status forced on the victim, and the social stigma that is associated
with being the partner of a perpetrator, which in some cases causes significant mental suffering.
Therefore, these crimes are seen as separate crimes against humanity (Bastick et al., 2007). By
institutionalizing these two forms of sexual violence, armed organizations can not only try to avoid
opportunistic rape by individual combatants (Bastick et al., 2007), compliance to set rules
regarding sex can also be strictly regulated and monitored (Wood, 2014). This can happen in an
organized way by, for example, setting up brothels and forcing individuals to work as prostitutes
(Tanaka, 2002; Burds, 2009).
For the categorization of these reasons to engage in sexual violence, I use Wood’s (2014)
explanation of strategic sexual violence. When rape, forced marriage or sexual slavery is
institutionalized, “the organization has purposefully adopted that form of sexual violence in pursuit
of organization objectives, and it is therefore a strategy” (Wood 2014, p. 472). However, I find it
debatable whether rape as a reward is always strategic. When rape is not explicitly or implicitly
included in organizational objectives, but neither is it punished in the ‘spirit’ of reward or

11
compensation, it can also be categorized as sexual violence as practice.

Torture and punishment in detention

In some cases, sexual violence occurs in the form of sexual torture against detainees to obtain
information (Wood, 2006, Bastick et al., 2007). Sexual torture is often mentioned together with
mutilation (Carpenter, 2006; Wood, 2006; Bastick et al., 2007; Wood, 2014). This kind of sexual
violence can sometimes be related to the idea of military masculinity. In this case, it is assumed
that the military is masculine and tough, and has a misogynistic culture. According to this idea,
male detainees are sexually tortured to “soften up” (Wood, 2006, p. 327), or “feminize” (Carpenter,
2006, p. 94) to get ready for interrogation for the attainment of information. The military masculinity
approach will be further elaborated in the paragraph about gender inequality. Besides obtaining
information, sexual torture can also be used as a way of punishment or sending a message (Wood,
2014). This idea is supported by Leiby (2012) who analyzed sexual torture as a counter-
insurgency strategy of States that are engaged in irregular warfare with rebel forces. When these
rebel forces are actively fighting, but when they are not strong enough for the State to engage in
regular combat, the State will use other ways (instead of fighting), such as sexual torture, to punish
alleged insurgent supporters and to send a message to other armed rebels (Leiby, 2012).
Sexually torturing detainees during armed conflict is in most cases an institutionalized way
to obtain information or to punish the prisoners and send a message to the armed organization
they belong to. Because this kind of sexual violence is often included in the objectives of the
organization, I will categorize it as strategic sexual violence.

Domination, power, terror

The most general reasons for combatants to engage in sexual violence during an arm conflict are
dominating the enemy, having power over them (as some kind of revenge), and terrorizing the
population (Hayden, 2000; Henry et al., 2004; Carpenter, 2006; Plümper & Neumayer, 2006;
Wood, 2006; Bastick et al., 2007; Cohen, 2007; Sivakumaran, 2007; Baaz & Stern, 2009; Wood,
2009; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010; Cohen, 2013; Cohen, 2014). The context of an armed conflict
gives room for the association of sexual gratification with domination, and the idea that sexual
violence is a form of control and power (Wood, 2006; Baaz & Stern, 2009; Wood, 2014). The
feeling of power gained through sexual violence can provide a psychological benefit to the
perpetrators (Cohen, 2007). Moreover, engagement in sexual violence for the purpose of
terrorizing the population often occurs, despite the fact that it might undermine military
effectiveness (Wood, 2006). Yet, sometimes the terrorization of a population can be beneficial in

12
light of organizational goals, namely when civilians eventually leave strategically important areas,
or obey the armed force when staying in the area. Sexual violence is then strategically planned
on key locations and specific times (Cohen, 2007).
The term ‘strategic’ has been used a couple of times to describe the above reasons to
engage in sexual violence. Also Wood (2006; 2009; 2014) and Cohen (2007; 2014) often
mentioned the strategic aspect in terrorizing a population, especially in ethnic wars. Additionally,
an armed organization can support the terrorization of civilians, still there are decisions to be
made on how (allow, or prohibit sexual violence), who, and when (Wood, 2014). The fact that
terrorizing civilians through sexual violence is often part of the strategy of an armed organization,
and that higher commanders can call place and time, categorizes this kind of sexual violence
under strategic sexual violence. Although domination and power are in most contexts closely
linked to terrorization as a strategy, it can also occur as a motive for individual combatants to
engage in sexual violence, as feelings of power and domination can strengthen their
psychological well-being. It would then be divided into the category of opportunistic sexual
violence.

Gender inequality
First of all, it has to be clear that, even though gender inequality is discussed under a separate
heading, sexual violence always seems to be gender-based. In all cases, it seems to involve the
dynamics and constructions of masculinity and femininity and the stereotypes associated with this
(Sivakumaran, 2007). For male victims, being sexually violated often means purposive
emasculation and it can be an attack on their sexual identity, as they are normally perceived as
tough and dominant (Dolan, 2014). On the contrary, women are generally perceived as weaker
and more vulnerable, which is reinforced by the dominant and powerful perpetrator of sexual
violence (Moser & Clark, 2001; Plumper & Neumayer, 2006). These gendered aspects of power
and weakness present in sexual violence are also important factors in an armed conflict, because
dominating the enemy will always be the ultimate goal. This is the reason why not just violence,
but explicitly sexual violence often occurs in armed conflicts (Wood, 2006; Wood, 2009).
Besides the always present, but sometimes implicit gender inequality in sexual violence,
there also exist some explicitly gendered reasons for engaging in sexual violence. The first is the
earlier mentioned “militarized masculinity approach” (Wood, 2014, p. 462). This approach means
that a society that is at war develops norms and institutions that promote a militarized masculinity
that is based on distinctions between genders: if boys want to become men, they have to become
warriors (Cohen, 2007; Baaz & Stern, 2009; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010; Wood, 2014). Due to this

13
approach, combatants often feel pressured to conform to such masculinity notions, and therefore
engage in sexual violence, often gang rapes, to prove themselves to other men (Henry et al.,
2004; Cohen, 2013; Cohen, 2013). They participate in such activities out of fear for rejection, even
though they may not be motivated by hostility towards women. Henry et al. (2004) only mentioned
female victims in this context, as the difference between men and women plays the most
important role in militarized masculinity. If this feeling of differences in gender is also induced for
female combatants, and whether or not this has motivated women as well as men to engage in
sexual violence in past conflicts (against the opposite gender), will be explored in later chapters
of this thesis, as well as cases in which sexual violence is perpetrated for militarized masculinity
against same-gender victims. Furthermore, engaging in sexual violence to affirm a combatant’s
masculine status within the armed group can also be explained in another way (Cohen, 2007).
The combination of the violent nature and the personal risks of sexual contact, shows fellow
combatants and the enemy that they are “big men” (Cohen, 2007, p. 8). Because of the physical
contact involved in sexual violence, the personal risks include the risk of getting diseases and that
of emotional suffering by the perpetrator.
However, this reason (of masculine conformity) does not account for situations in which
hostility toward women is certainly evident, and in which the goal was not merely gendered
dominance. An example of this is given by Henry et al. (2004), who describe a situation in which
a woman’s breasts were cut off, her stomach slashed open, and her vagina torn apart with a
weapon after the rape. Yet, this could be a result of (male) combatants’ individual interpretation
of misogynistic training practices (Wood, 2009; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010). Baaz and Stern (2009,
p. 495), and Wood (2014, p. 474) call the kind of rape that often includes serious injuries or even
killing “evil rape”, as an opposite of “lust rape”. The latter sometimes occurs because combatants
have not seen their romantic or sexual partner for some time and/or because of the mere fact that
people from the opposite gender are now ‘freely’ available (Baaz & Stern, 2009; Wood, 2014).
In order to categorize these reasons to engage in sexual violence, I look at the similarities
between militarized masculinity and unit conformity. As explained, militarized masculinity
pressures combatants to act in conformity with group norms, and causes combatants to want to
prove their masculinity to the unit they belong to and the armed organization they are fighting for.
Hence, I divide this reason into the category of sexual violence as practice, just like the unit
cohesion motive. However, engaging in sexual violence as some kind of status symbol (being a
‘big man’), can arguably also be categorized under opportunistic sexual violence. It is possible
that an individual combatant feels the need, on the basis of personal motivation, to show his
strength and toughness to the enemy, without being pressured into the act of sexual violence.

14
Yet, the former case seems most likely to me. The motive of lust and/or availability seems to be
opportunistic, as the drive for engaging in sexual violence comes from within the combatant him-
or herself.
Furthermore, sexual violence can also serve the goal of humiliation and shaming of the
enemy. First of all, being sexually violated is in itself often experienced as humiliating and
shameful by both men and women (Sivakumaran, 2007; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010; Cohen &
Nordås, 2014; Dolan, 2014). Moreover, sexually violating women in the presence of their
husbands or other male civilians does not only harm the women who are attacked, but is also
used as a way of demonstrating the men’s failure to protect ‘their’ women (Carpenter, 2006). It is
a way of giving an important signal “from man to man”, by attacking their masculinity and
competence (Plümper & Neumayer, 2006, p.735). Further, specifically targeting women with
sexual violence can be a strategy because of their central role in culture, family structure, and the
bearing of offspring (Plümper & Neumayer, 2006).
The categorization of this kind of motivation for engaging in sexual violence is not that
straightforward. First of all, it could be opportunistic, as individual combatants can engage in this
kind of sexual violence because the opportunity arises, or because of personal motivations.
Secondly, humiliating the enemy in this way can also be an order of higher commanders, for
example in ethnic wars, where shaming the identity and culture of the ethnic enemy can be a part
of the organization’s objectives (Plümper & Neumayer, 2006; Sivakumaran, 2007; Chun &
Skjelsbæk, 2010). In the latter case, this reason for engaging in sexual violence would be
categorized as strategic. When this kind of behavior is neither ordered, nor punished, or when
combatants join under group pressure, this form of sexual violence can be seen as practice. On
the basis of the given explanation about shaming the enemy in a gendered way, it is not possible
to categorize this reason into one of the three categories. It will differ per incident and type of
conflict whether this form of sexual violence is opportunistic, strategic or practice. This will be
elaborated in further chapters. Even though shaming and humiliating are not easily categorized,
it seems clear that specifically targeting women because of their special role in society can be
categorized under strategic sexual violence, as it serves the goal of disrupting or even destructing
the growth of a certain population.

In summary, the following reasons to engage in sexual violence could be categorized under
strategic sexual violence: ethnic hatred, clearing an area, reward, forced marriage, sexual slavery,
torture and punishment in detention, domination, power and terror, and some forms of sexual
violence that are explicitly based on gender inequality. Moreover, ethnic hatred, domination,

15
power and terror, and gender inequality could also fall under the category of opportunistic sexual
violence. Lastly, the category of sexual violence as practice covers unit cohesion, reward, and
some forms of sexual violence motivated by gender inequality. For a clarification of this
categorization, see Table 1.

Table 1. Reasons to engage in sexual violence categorized into types of sexual violence

Strategic Opportunistic Practice

Ethnic hatred X X
Clearing an area X
Unit cohesion X
Reward X X
Forced marriage X
Sexual slavery X
Torture and punishment in X
detention
Domination, power, terror X X
Gender inequality X X X

2. Gender of victims and perpetrators

In this chapter, the gender of the victims and perpetrators of the differently motivated forms of
sexual violence will be analyzed. This will be done on the basis of the paragraphs created in the
first chapter. Every reason for engaging in sexual violence during armed conflict will be discussed
separately, together with its occurrence in different conflicts and the gender of the victims and
perpetrators in these conflicts. Note that not all conflicts in which the differently motivated forms
of sexual violence have occurred can be discussed. Only those conflicts and instances are
mentioned of which extensive and detailed information is available. The same goes for multiple
motives for sexual violence that existed in one and the same conflict.

Ethnic hatred and clearing an area

The first conflict that will be discussed in which ethnic hatred played an important role in the
commission of sexual violence, is the Rwandan genocide of 1994. During this genocide, the Tutsi

16
(and moderate Hutu) minority was subjected to sexual violence by the Hutu majority on a massive
scale (HRW, 1996). Sexual violence occurred in a variety of forms, but particularly (gang-) rape
and mutilation of Tutsi women were extremely widespread (HRW, 1996). During the writing
process of this thesis, I visited Rwanda to learn more about the genocide and the transitional
justice in this country. Among other visits, the visit to the Gisozi Genocide Memorial Site taught
me more about how and why sexual violence happened, and about the gender of the victims and
perpetrators. Some Tutsi women were raped by known HIV/AIDS infected men, because the Hutu
enemies were determined to ensure that a new generation of Tutsi would never emerge (Sharlach,
2000). For that reason, also sexual mutilation, of both men and women, happened on a large
scale. Additionally, rape did not only occur in the context of male perpetrators and female victims
(although this was the most common form during the genocide). I found the case of Faustin
Kayihura after Usta Kaitesi, who wrote a book about genocidal gender and sexual violence (2013),
told me about similar instances. Faustin Kayihura was a thirteen year old Tutsi boy who was raped
by a Hutu woman three times a day over the course of three days (De Brouwer & Chu, 2009;
Kaitesi, 2013). After the genocide, he stated (De Brouwer & Chu, 2009, p. 91):

“I don’t know of any other men who experienced sexual violence during the genocide,
but I know they wouldn’t talk about it if they had. It was a very difficult experience, and
not all men are brave enough to talk about it. It is considered shameful to be raped by
a woman.”

There are also cases known about women who raped women. One of the examples is the case
of Spéciose (Jones, 2002). She was gang-raped by several Hutu women with the use of sticks.
Eventually, she was murdered and looted from her clothes and other belongings. One of the
perpetrators undressed Spéciose and put on her clothes (Jones, 2002). As Usta Kaitesi explained
to me, this could have happened out of jealousy. She talked about how Hutu women wanted to
exterminate Tutsi women who looked nice and dressed sexy, because beauty and nice men
would only be available when these Tutsi women were not there. Lastly, there seems to be almost
no evidence or literature on male perpetrators raping men during the Rwandan genocide.
Although such reports are rare, this does not mean that it did not occur (Kaitesi, 2013).
Other conflicts including sexual violence that are related to ethnic hatred are those that
are called the Yugoslav wars. During several conflicts between 1991 and 2001 on the territory of
the former Yugoslavia, sexual violence occurred on a large scale. According to Cohen (2013. p.
467), the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia can be called some of the worst “mass rape wars”,

17
just as the Rwandan genocide described above. First of all, estimates show that at least 20.000
Muslim Bosnian women and girls were subjected to organized and systematic rape by Serbian
military men during the Bosnian war from 1992 to 1995 (Plumper & Neumayer, 2006). Both
Sharlach (2000) and Wood (2014) even claim that this number ranges from 12.000 to 60.000. For
some perpetrators, the purpose of these rapes was to impregnate the female victims, which was
also told to the victims themselves before they were being raped (Sharlach, 2000). In many cases,
the raped women were intentionally held captive until abortion was no longer possible. This notion
is sometimes called “rape plus” (Sivakumaran, 2007, p.264): the ‘plus’ of the rape being forced
pregnancy. Another example of rape plus is rape by HIV/AIDS infected perpetrators (as described
for the Rwandan genocide), which occurred in the Kosovo War as well (Sivakumaran,
2007).There are also numerous reported cases of gang rape, both oral and anal, by persons and
with objects (Sivakumaran, 2007; Cohen, 2013). According to Sharlach (2000), Bastick et al.
(2007), and Wood (2014), gang rape of both men and women, perpetrated by both men and
women, occurred in the context of campaigns of ethnic cleansing that were clearly ordered.
Furthermore, in the Kosovo war, men were sexually humiliated by being forced to strip naked in
public. They had been made to repeatedly undress, dress, and undress and stand naked in front
of a group of women for a long period of time (Sivakumaran, 2007). In respectively the Bosnian
and Kosovo war, Bosnian men were hit in the testicles with metal hampers and metal bars, and
kicked with boots, and in some cases, the penises of Albanian men were put on a table and
beaten with wooden clubs. In these cases, the sexual violence was perpetrated by men
(Sivakumaran, 2007), but also women engaged in public forms of sexual violence, other than
rape. Oosterhoff, Zwanikken and Ketting (2004), discussed a case in the Croatian War in which
one man was held down on the street by four other men, while a woman castrated him with a
scalpel. Bystanders were forced to watch. In Kosovo, a lot of families left their homes before they
could fall prey to sexual violence. The mere threat of widespread rape made them flee elsewhere
(Plumper & Neumayer, 2006). A lot of the instances of sexual violence in the Yugoslav wars
occurred in the context of detention, and will therefore be discussed in in the paragraph ‘Torture
and punishment in detention’. Yet, it has to be noted that most victims of sexual violence in
detention were detained on ethnic grounds in the first place.

Unit cohesion
According to Humphreys and Weinstein (2006), unit cohesion and discipline best explain the
patterns of sexual violence during the civil war in Sierra Leone (“rather than the level of
contestation, social structure such as community or ethnic ties, or the existence of a local

18
economic surplus” (Wood, 2009, p. 139)). During this war that took place between 1991 and 2001,
sexual violence was primarily committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and to a much lesser extend by the Civil Defense Force
(CDF) (Bastick et al., 2007). This could be due to the fact that this armed organization believed
that the power of its combatants depended upon sexual abstinence, and therefore prohibited
sexual intercourse before combat (Bastick et al., 2007). That sexual violence was a part of the
combatant socialization process also shows in the number of reported rapes that were committed
by groups of people instead of single perpetrators, namely 75.0% (Cohen, 2007). In his interviews
with ex-combatants, Cohen (2007) was told that the combatants felt a strong social pressure to
commit rape, and that those who had raped many women obtained a legendary status within the
unit. Combatants who refused to commit such acts were mocked heavily. Moreover, Cohen (2007,
p. 9) provides a couple of facts about the occurrence of rape during the Sierra Leone Civil War
that explain that it was perpetrated as a practice (a socialization tool), rather than a military
strategy:

“ 1. Combatants did not seem to target particular types of victims in Sierra Leone;
2. There were both female and male victims of rape;
3. There were both female and male perpetrators of rape.

The act of rape, rather than the punishment of the victim, served the central purpose
in the strategy. Because rape was the costliest form of civilian torture perpetrated by
the combatants, it was arguably the best signaling device available to group members.”

So, in the context of unit cohesion, both men and women were perpetrators and victims of (gang)
rape in the civil war in Sierra Leone (Carpenter, 2006; Cohen, 2007). According to Cohen (2013),
women were often pressured to participate in the sexual violence, but sometimes chose
themselves to join as well. A reason for this could be that they believed that by encouraging and
participating in the rape of other(s) (women), they themselves would be safe from being sexually
victimized.
During my visit to Rwanda, Usta Kaitesi made me think about another form of unit
cohesion. She explained to me that during the Rwandan genocide, a lot of Hutu people (both men
and women) engaged in sexual violence against the Tutsi because they believed that by doing
so, they would be a part of (Hutu) society. So although this motive has little to do with combatant
socialization or military peer pressure, it is related to a feeling of belonging to the group you are

19
fighting for. As explained earlier, this feeling could cause the internal state of deindividuation,
facilitates collective action, and makes individuals feel less accountable (Henry et al., 2004).

Reward, forced marriage, sexual slavery

In the Vietnam War that started in 1954, the increased presence of American combatants turned
the unspoken military idea of women’s bodies as a reward and necessity into a routine practice
(Brownmiller, 2013). Rape was compared to and explained as “a necessary provision like soda
pop and ice cream, to keep our boys healthy and happy” (Brownmiller, 2013, p. 92). Even though
the U.S. military had regular access to prostitutes, they still engaged in the rape of Vietnamese
girls and women (Wood, 2009). An explanation could be that the occurrence of sexual violence
was also partly ethnically motivated. This is shown in the massacre near a small village called My
Lai in 1968 (Wood, 2006). Hundreds of civilians were killed by the American combatants of Charlie
Company, and at least twenty girls and women were raped before they died. The combatants
later claimed that they understood “the destruction of all infrastructure and food” to also include
the elimination of all residents (Wood, 2006, p. 316). On the contrary, the involved Vietnamese
combatants engaged in relatively little rape during the war (Brownmiller, 2013). This could be due
to the fact that their families were allowed to stay at the basecamps, and so the presence of the
wives gave them regular access to sex. Besides, it was highly probable that the combatants knew,
or were even related to, the girls and women in the villages they passed through. These family
relations prevented a lot of opportunistic rape (Brownmiller, 2013). In the literature on sexual
violence during the Vietnam War, only instances of male perpetrators raping female victims can
be found. Additionally, sexual violence as a reward also occurred during World War II, and was
based on the same kind of reasoning of necessity and health. Because German leaders explicitly
linked this to masculinity, this will be elaborated in the paragraph ‘Gender inequality’.
In the insurgency of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda that started in 1986,
opportunistic rape was prevented by the institution of forced marriage and sexual slavery (HRW,
2003; Cohen, 2013; Wood, 2014). Male combatants were forced into sexual partnerships with
abducted women, so that non-combatants would not become targets of opportunistic rape and
compliance with the rules could be monitored and regulated (Wood, 2014). Women and girls that
were abducted for the purpose of sexual slavery and forced marriage were protected from being
raped, as the LRA believed that it would prevent exposure to sexually transmissible diseases. In
this way, they would be free from infection when assigned to their “husbands” (Bastick et al., 2007,
p. 66). Forced marriage and impregnation of girls started at the age of fourteen (HRW, 2003).
Many young boys were abducted as well, but for a different purpose, namely that of functioning

20
as child soldiers (HRW, 2003). Kinyanda et al. (2010) published a study on sexual violence during
the war in Uganda. They reported that 6.7% of the male respondents suffered at least one of the
studied forms of sexual violence (in comparison with 28.6% of the female respondents), with the
highest percentage accounting for rape perpetrated by men. However, in the context of reward,
forced marriage and sexual slavery, no other reports can be found on male victims or female
perpetrators of sexual violence in the Ugandan conflict.
Forced marriage and especially sexual slavery also occurs on a large scale within the still
active and armed jihadist organization called the Islamic State (IS) (Wood, 2014), which obtained
worldwide notoriety in 2014. Several reports on the functioning of IS show that, up until now, its
members abducted thousands of men, women, and children, and subjected them to rape, some
to forced marriage, and most to sexual slavery in particular (UN, 2014; Wood, 2014; Amnesty
International, 2014; HRW, 2014). Most of the victims of sexual slavery are Yezidi women and
young girls, but also females from other ethnic minorities, such as Christian, Turkomen and
Shabak have been targeted (UN, 2014; OHCHR, 2015). According to Loken and Zelenz (2016),
rape is prohibited and punished by IS when perpetrated against Muslims. Moreover, IS itself
released a pamphlet on female slaves in response to the uproar caused by the reports mentioned
above (Memri’s JTTM, 2014). In the form of questions and answers, IS explains its interpretation
of the position of Islamic law on several issues. Question 2: what makes it permissible to enslave
a woman, was answered by IS as follows (Memri’s JTTM, 2014):

“What makes al-sabi permissible [i.e., what makes it permissible to take such a
woman captive] is [her] unbelief. Unbelieving [women] who were captured and
brought into the abode of Islam are permissible to us, after the imam distributes them
[among us].”

According to IS members, Islamic law permits enslaving non-Muslim women, having sex with
them/ raping them, beating them, and trading them.
Forced marriage was also present in the earlier discussed conflict in Sierra Leone. After
women were attacked and taken captive by members of the RUF, they joined the armed
organization and became so called “bush wives” to their “bush husbands” (Cohen, 2013, p. 408).
Again, even though the women were most often pressured into marriage or forced into sexual
relationships with many men within a day (MacKay, 2004), some chose to become bush wives
themselves in order to escape from being sexually victimized in worse ways (Cohen, 2013).
Additionally, being a bush wife also had other advantages, such as greater security, and some

21
women eventually even gained authority within a force (McKay, 2004). In order to show which
women belonged to the armed group, the letters ‘RUF’ were tattooed on their bodies, mostly
across their breasts (McKay, 2004). This shows that even though some women became bush
wives voluntarily, the relation of ownership still existed.
An example of sexual enslavement perpetrated by a woman, occurred during the genocide
of Rwanda. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko became notorious for her leading role in the commission of
widespread rape during this genocide, and she was the first woman ever to be found guilty of
sexual violence before an international tribunal or court (ICTR, 2011; Smeulers, 2015). According
to Jones (2002), Nyiramasuhuko held the daughters of a Tutsi businessman captive in her house,
in order for her son to rape them. Along with other Hutu women, she wanted younger Tutsi women
to accept their designated fate as sex-slaves for Hutu men (Jones, 2002).
During World War II, the sexual violation of Jewish detainees by German guards of the
concentration camps was so widespread, that Heinrich Himmler set up camp brothels in 1943
(Burds, 2009). This is a case of sexual violence in the form of sexual slavery, as Jewish women
and girls were forced to work in these brothels on a large scale. In one concentration camp alone,
for example Ravensbrück, around 35.000 Jewish women and girls worked in such brothels during
the war (Burds, 2009). Yet, the Germans did not want to support sexual relations between Aryans
and non-Aryans, and therefore avoided to make brothels with Jewish prostitutes official (Bruds,
2009). Also Japanese combatants in World War II could ‘enjoy’ such services with the so called
“comfort women” (Tanaka, 2002, p. 5). Instead of using women of their own race, the Japanese
forced women and girls of the, for example, Chinese or Korean enemy to work as prostitutes
(Tanaka, 2002; Burds, 2009). Compared to the German motive, the victims of the Japanese army
were picked based on a more strategic motive rather than an ethnic one. Prostitution was
organized in such a way that the comfort women were available at every location the Japanese
combatants were active.

Torture and punishment in detention

A lot of the sexual violence that occurred in the Yugoslav wars took place in concentration camps,
of which some were even known as “rape camps” (Sharlach, 2000). In one such camp in Doboj,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, between 2000 and 2500 women and girls were detained and frequently
raped by male soldiers (Sharlach, 2000). Further, the Yugoslav wars are characterized by having
one of the highest recorded numbers of sexual violence against men. For example in the Omarska
Camp and the Keraterm Camp in Bosnia-Herzegovina, sexual violence against detained men
happened on a large scale: around 4000 former male detainees of these camps reported being

22
raped during the conflict (ICTY, 1997; Askin, 1999; Mudrovčić, 2002). The Muslim and Croatian
male prisoners were also sexually mutilated by castration or circumcision, and in many cases,
they were forced to perform sexual acts on guards or other prisoners (Carpenter, 2006). Some
other incidents included biting off the testicles of other prisoners, being lined up naked in front of
undressing Serb women: whoever got an erection would lose his penis, suffering electric shocks
to the scrotum, and being orally and anally raped (Askin, 1999; Carpenter, 2006; Bastick et al.,
2007). There are even cases known of the Bosnian war in which fathers and sons who were
detained together, were forced at gunpoint to anally rape each other (Carpenter, 2006). Not only
male, but also female camp guards were perpetrators of sexual violence. Reports exist on two
sisters, Marina and Gordana Grubisić, who regularly forced male prisoners to perform oral sex on
another, undressed male prisoner (Helsinki Watch, 1993). Additionally, Biljana Plavšić, the co-
President of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time of the conflict, was prosecuted before the ICTY for
international crimes, including the indirect perpetration of sexual violence (ICTY, 2003). A male
survivor of a concentration camp in Croatia claimed that the strategically planned nature of the
mass rapes was visible in the identical layout most camps had (Sharlach, 2002, p. 97): “a
rectangle of guards and minefields surrounded another rectangle where soldiers raped and
inflicted other forms of torture”. Yet, Serbian leaders deny the fact that (mass) rape was
implemented in their military strategy (Sharlach, 2002). Also Hayden (2002) claims that it is
improbable that a general authority actually ordered or directed rape.
In the context of the Ugandan conflict, I only spoke about sexual violence perpetrated by
members of the LRA (in the form of forced marriage). However, the national army of Uganda, the
Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF), engaged in sexual violence as well (Akumu, Amony
& Otim, 2005; Bastick et al., 2007). Many Ugandan civilians were forced into the Pabbo IDP Camp
(for Internally Displaced People) by the UPDF, so that a distinction between civilians and fighters
could be made more easily. In cooperation with UNICEF, Akumu et al. (2005) published a report
on Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in this camp, and demonstrated that, together
with child (sexual) abuse and physical assault, rape and marital rape were the most common
forms of SGBV. The latter two were perpetrated by soldiers of the UPDF, husbands and strangers.
Their research also showed that the men in Pabbo did not regard marital rape as an offence.
Additionally, women claimed to be sexually abused by soldiers when they got out of the camp to
collect firewood or to visit the garden (Akumu et al., 2005). The report also includes a case of
soldier who had sexual interaction with a five-year old girl. Especially women and girls were
targeted with sexual violence, as they were offered food, shelter, and protection in exchange for
sex (Bastick et al., 2007). Yet sometimes also adult males and/or adolescent boys were targeted

23
as an act of dominance, and young boys in foster care arrangements often became victims as
they entered the camp unaccompanied (Akumu et al., 2005). In this context, only male
perpetrators are mentioned. Further, it has to be noted that sexual violence in the Pabbo camp
did not occur for the reason of punishment or torture, but rather seems an act of opportunistic
sexual violence or sexual violence as a practice. Yet, I wanted to include this example, as the
civilians were forced to stay in the camp and were sexually violated by the people who ‘detained’
them.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, during World War II, Jewish detainees of
concentration camps were sexually violated on such a large scale that camp brothels with,
sometimes Jewish, prostitutes had to be established for the military. This contradicts the
assumption that sexual relations with Jews were strictly prohibited because of “racial mixing”
(Burds, 2009, p. 43). However, before the establishment of the brothels, having sexual relations
with camp detainees was already punished in some cases. Punishments in the East were usually
milder than in the West, with the exception of the case of a German guard in a Croatian camp,
who got a relatively long prison sentence of six months for “desecration of the race”, because of
raping Jewish detainees (Burds, 2009, p. 43). Besides rape, other forms of sexual violence took
place in concentration camps as well, such as sexual humiliation of forced undressing and (sexual)
violence against homosexuals in the form of sexual mutilation for medical experiments (Wood,
2006). Furthermore, just as in the above discussed Pabbo IDP Camp in Uganda, necessities such
as food or shoes were often only offered to the Jewish detainees in exchange for sex or sexual
acts (Goldenberg & Shapiro, 2013).
An interesting addition to this paragraph comes from the findings of Wood’s (2009)
research into conflicts where wartime rape was rare. She mentions the relatively little occurrence
of rape during the Sri Lankan Civil War that started in 1983, but argues that State forces did use
sexual torture with the goal of obtaining information, punishing detained Tamil Tigers, and sending
a message to other Tamil Tigers that were waging a secessionist nationalist insurgency. Most
victims were displaced Tamil women and girls who were subjected to gang rape and rape with
objects, because of the suspicion of participation in the insurgency (Wood, 2006). Yet, also Tamil
men were sexually tortured by state agents during detention, as a way of punishment and to
humiliate the group of Tamil Tigers as a whole (Oosterhoff et al., 2004). Sexual violence against
men in detention included forced nudity, verbal sexual threats and taunting, genital mutilation,
sticks (mostly with chilies rubbed on it first) pushed through the anus, and forced sexual acts,
such as masturbating a soldier manually or orally and raping friends in front of soldiers (Peel et
al., 2000; Stemple, 2008). Although mentioned with caution, the relatively low levels of sexual

24
violence during the war in Sri Lanka could be related to the relatively high levels of female
insurgents participating in the war (Wood, 2009; Cohen, 2013).

Domination, power, terror

The drive to obtain power and domination was present during the Rwandan genocide, and
resulted from the desire for revenge. Years of feelings of unequal treatment of Hutu people led to
acts of sexual violence by both Hutu men and women, against both Tutsi men and women. In a
report of Human Rights Watch (1996, citation 15), a female journalist stated:

“Tutsi women were made for sexuality and beauty, for royal courts. That's how we
were educated. People from the north, where there were few Tutsi, wanted to take
Tutsi as mistresses because they were forbidden to have them. Tutsi women were
seen as spies because they know how to present themselves to whites and to Hutu
men, so they became an arm of the RPF. Hutu understood the propaganda. It was
time for revenge…”

In the same report (HRW, 1996, citation 63), the general incentive for most Hutu men was
mentioned as well:

“In Kigali, the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi ["Those who have a common
purpose"] had tended to recruit mostly among the poor. As soon as they went into
action, they drew around them a cloud of even poorer people, a lumpenproletariat of
street boys, rag-pickers, car-washers and homeless unemployed. For these people,
the genocide was the best thing that could have happened to them. They had the
blessings of a form of authority to take revenge on socially powerful people as long
as these were on the wrong side of the political fence. They could steal, they could
kill with minimum justification, they could rape . . . This was wonderful. The political
aims pursued by the masters of this dark carnival were quite beyond their scope.”

Through the widespread use of sexual violence, feelings of domination and power rose. Simply
killing the Tutsi was not enough: inflicting a protracted death upon them with the use of sexual
violence was preferred, as stated by genocide survivors (Sharlach, 2000).
Another instance for which terrorizing and dominating the population seemed to be the
main reason for the occurrence of sexual violence, is the “rape of Nanking” (Wood, 2006, p. 311).

25
This massacre in the Chinese city of Nanjing, that started in 1937 and lasted eight weeks, is seen
as a part of World War II. Before being brutally executed by Japanese soldiers, between 20.000
and 80.000 female civilians were raped: young, old, pregnant or highly religious (Wood, 2006).
Men were also widely targeted with sexual violence that included rape, forced intercourse with
family members or dead bodies, and forced intercourse of celibate men (Wood, 2006;
Sivakumaran, 2007). After these acts of sexual violence, they were slaughtered as well. Moreover,
revenge as a motivation for domination, power, and terror also resulted in sexual violence in other
episodes during World War II. So did the Red Army seek revenge on the Germans by (mass)
raping and torturing German women in 1945 (Wood, 2006; Baaz & Stern, 2009). Earlier, I
categorized domination, power, and terror as reasons for either strategic or opportunistic sexual
violence. However, on the basis of the following two quotes of Stalin himself, I believe that it can
occur as a practice as well (Wood, 2006, p. 310): “We lecture our soldiers too much. Let them
have some initiative” and “In every family there is a black sheep… I will not allow anyone to drag
the reputation of the Red Army in the mud”. These were reactions to complaints from others
countries about the Soviet commanders tolerating sexual violence against civilians (Wood, 2006).
The former quote shows the internal structure of the Red Army that is imposed on subordinates,
whereas the latter is concerned with the image of the army as perceived by other countries. So,
the occurrence of sexual violence in the Red Army was not ordered, yet known and tolerated
without punishment. Therefore, it fits the category of sexual violence as a practice.
Rape as a form of terror to seek revenge also occurred in the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). Although there has been a conflict in the DRC for many years, acts
of sexual violence have mainly been committed since 1996 (Bastick et al., 2007). Moreover,
sexual violence during this conflict was so widespread, that terms such as “sexual terrorism” and
“the war within the war” were used to describe them (Bastick et al., 2007, p. 41). Perpetrators
sought revenge for previous acts of sexual violence (Bastick et al., 2007; Chun & Skjelsbæk,
2010), and struggled with deep-seated frustration about poverty, neglect, lack of support, and the
continuous state of war in the country (Baaz & Stern, 2009). Men and women became both victims
and perpetrators of sexual violence, although cases of female perpetrators are underreported
(Gettleman, 2009). According to Johnson et al. (2010), 39.7% of the victims of sexual violence
was female, whereas 23.6% was male. Women were accountable for 41.1% of the sexual
violence perpetrated against women, and for 10.0% of that perpetrated against men. Sexual
violence that occurred during this conflict included rape, public rape (while family or community
members were forced to watch), forced rape between victims, rape with objects, pouring melted

26
rubber into women’s vaginas, shooting women in the vagina, inducing abortion using sharp
objects, and beating men’s genitalia with rifles (Bastick et al., 2007, p. 42).
Although the LRA that operated in Uganda institutionalized forced marriage and sexual
slavery in order to control the occurrence of sexual violence and to prevent the opportunistic rape
of non-combatants, sexual violence still occurred as a part of the military strategy to terrorize
civilians (Bastick et al., 2007; Chun & Skjelsbæk, 2010; Wood, 2014). Strategic sexual violence
by the LRA against civilians included: rape, sexual abuse, and forced incest. There are reports
on one of the opponents of the LRA during the insurgency; the Karamojong warriors, who, besides
women, also targeted men with rape (Bastick et al., 2007).

Gender inequality
The earlier explained military masculinity approach was present during the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Baaz and Stern (2009) interviewed Congolese soldiers
about their reasons to engage in sexual violence and the way they experienced this when they
were members of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC); one
of the main perpetrators of rape during the conflict. As discussed in the previous paragraph, the
bad condition in which the country found itself was of influence on the occurrence of sexual
violence. According to the interviewed soldiers, they linked the expectations of their (heterosexual)
masculinity to the failure to embody this masculinity in daily life (providing for the family etc.), due
to the bad circumstances in the DRC. This gendered discourse was primarily imposed by the
military and institutional framework of the armed forces (Baaz & Stern, 2009). The soldiers
explained the rapes through the masculine ideal of a (hetero) sexually potent male fighter, who
has sexual needs that have to be satisfied by women, whose task it is to do so.
In order to not threaten this idealized idea of military masculinity, the presence of female
soldiers was justified by denying their femininity, perceiving them as men, or denying them to be
real soldiers (Baaz and Stern, 2009, p. 506). According to Bastick et al. (2007), women who enter
a masculine environment will often adapt to the performed masculine behavior, and will
sometimes act even tougher than men when perpetrating sexual violence in order to prove
themselves. This could be an explanation for the high number of female combatants that engaged
in sexual violence during the Congolese conflict, despite the risks and consequences of such acts.
So resulted the sexual violation of men by women sometimes even in a pregnancy for the
perpetrator, as reported by three male survivors of sexual violence (Johnson et al., 2010).
Noteworthy here is that the high number of female perpetrators of sexual violence during the DRC
conflict is contradictory to what was earlier stated about the Sri Lankan Civil War, namely that the

27
low levels of sexual violence might be ascribed to the high number of female combatants.
Furthermore, the explanation of heterosexual needs accounts for the earlier discussed
“lust rapes” (Baaz and Stern, 2009, p. 495; Wood, 2014, p. 474). However, the fact that men were
also being targeted with rape by men during the Congolese conflict does not fit this framework.
According to Gettleman (2009), the amount of male victims grew after a long period of primarily
female victims, as the urge for terror, humiliation, and revenge increased. These kinds of rape
can be specified as “evil rapes” (Baaz and Stern, 2009, p. 495; Wood, 2014, p. 474). In his report
on interviews with male rape victims, Gettleman (2009, p. 3) states “And in a place where
homosexuality is so taboo, the rapes carry an extra dose of shame.” This to introduce the following
statement of one of the victims: “I’m laughed at. The people in my village say: ‘You’re no longer
a man. Those men in the bush made you their wife’ ” (Gettleman, 2009, p. 3). Interestingly, only
the men who have been raped are associated with homosexuality, but not the men who committed
the rape. The victims are seen as weak and feminine, whereas the perpetrators are seen as
strong and masculine. So, the interaction between power and weakness that is associated with
respectively male and female gender plays the most important role, rather than the actual sex of
both the victim and perpetrator of the sexual violence.
When previously discussing the Rwandan genocide, the gender stereotyped view on Tutsi
women has already come up a couple of times. Through genocide propaganda, Tutsi women
were portrayed as “calculated seductress-spies bent on dominating and undermining the Hutu”
(HRW, 1996, citation 14). Hutu men wanted to have sex with them because they expected them
to be special sexually, whereas Hutu women wanted to sexually degrade them out of jealousy.
Also men were targeted with sexual violence in an explicitly gendered way. During a conversation
I had with Usta Kaitesi in Rwanda, she explained to me that the purpose of using sexual violence
against men was to make them lose their masculinity; their ‘divine power’, as she described.
Killing men by using a weapon such as a gun with bullets would sustain their manhood, whereas
using sexual violence against them, especially perpetrated by women, would degrade it. Men
were forced to, for example, have sex with animals or masturbate in a hole in the ground they dug
themselves, where after they would be killed and buried.
Jihadist organization IS also engages in sexual violence (primarily in the form of sexual
enslavement and forced marriage) on the basis of gender stereotypes, which are closely related
to religion. According to them, being a wife to your husband is the greatest responsibility for a
woman. In the modern, non-Islamic world, women would not be able to fulfill their natural roles,
and men would be emasculated (Loken & Zelenz, 2016). Female recruits of IS also agree with
this notion, as they perceive marriage in IS-controlled territory as more “religiously fulfilling”

28
(Loken & Zelenz, 2016, p. 16). Not only (forced) marriage of Muslim women, but also the rape of
female, non-Muslim sex slaves is accepted. Loken and Zelenz (2016, p. 19) explain this in the
following way:

“The fatwa dictates the circumstances in which men can rape women held as slaves
and includes provisions concerning menstruation, pregnancy, lineage, and release.
We find that not only are female recruits aware of this violence when joining the
organization, but muhajirat openly admit and accept Daesh’s rape of women and girls
held as slaves. They explicitly note that rape is a punishable offense when the victim
is a Muslim but conversely encourage slavery and rape of Yazidis.”4

So, both male and female members of IS perceive several forms of sexual violence (forced
marriage, sexual slavery, and rape) as permissible, or even necessary, but distinctions are made
between ‘victims’ on the basis of religion and ethnicity.
In World War II, not religion but racial superiority was the driving force behind ideas of
German leaders about (militarized) masculinity. It was believed that soldiers strengthened from
sexual encounters which would enable them to fight better (Timm, 2002). Himmler was convinced
that the best soldiers were most likely to visit prostitutes for sexual relief, because they had the
strongest masculine energies. Those men would also represent the most productive citizens of
‘das Reich’, once they returned to their wives after the war. So, it was believed that the vitality of
the soldiers depended on sexual encounters, but sexual gratification in itself was not the goal
(Timm, 2002). Just as feminine maternal instincts, masculine sexual drives “were to be channeled
into the purpose of achieving the racial state” (Timm, 2002, p. 227). This belief justified sexual
violence on the front and as a form of reward for military service. In this context, only male
perpetrators and female victims are mentioned.

In summary, in the above discussed conflicts, sexual violence motivated by ethnic hatred is
perpetrated by both men and women, against both men and women. Men and women are also
both perpetrators and victims of sexual violence for unit cohesion. Further, sexual violence as a
reward is only discussed in the context of male perpetrators and female victims, just like sexual
violence in the form of sexual slavery and forced marriage. One exception was provided for the

4
In this quote, fatwa means the legal opinion or ruling according to Islamic law; muhajirat includes the
women who moved to IS-occupied territory to join the war; and Daesh is another way of referring to the
Islamic State jihadist organization.

29
Rwandan genocide, where a woman enslaved other women for the sexual pleasure of her son.
Sexual violence as torture and punishment in detention was perpetrated by both men and women
against both genders in the Yugoslav Wars. However, during World War II, and the conflicts in
Uganda and Sri Lanka, only male perpetrators and both male and female victims are mentioned.
A reason for this could be that, in general, more men than women occupy high positions in such
a hierarchy. The same goes for sexual violence for domination, power and terror: in World War II
and the Ugandan conflict, sexual violence with this motivation was perpetrated by men, against
both men and women. Yet, during the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in the DRC, both
genders were perpetrators and victims. In the context of gender inequality, male and female
perpetrators and victims existed in the Rwandan genocide and the DRC conflict, whereas only
women are mentioned as victims and men as perpetrators for IS’s jihad and World War II. For a
clarification of this categorization, see Table 2.
These divisions already show that it is hard if not impossible to ascribe gender to the
broader categories of strategic, opportunistic and practice. For example: both ethnic hatred and
reward are motivations for strategic sexual violence, but ethnically motivated sexual violence is
generally perpetrated and experienced by both men and women, whereas sexual violence as a
reward is only discussed for male perpetrators and female victims. An explanation for why this
division in broader categories seems to be more unclear than helpful could be the fact that it is
often not clear (to armed actors themselves, as well as to victims and researchers) to which
category a certain reason belongs. For example, sexual violence in detention was generally
categorized as strategic sexual violence, and this was confirmed for the Yugoslav Wars by a male
survivor of a Croatian concentration camp who explained that the camps were designed for
strategic mass rapes. However, Serbian leaders as well as some scholars claim that there was
no authority that ordered and directed rape as a military strategy. Furthermore, sexual violence
that occurred in detention in the Ugandan conflict does not fit the description of ordered or military
strategic, but rather was opportunistic or performed as practice. Similarly, the rape of Jewish
detainees by camp guards during World War II was punished, and is therefore rather classified
as opportunistic sexual violence, and definitely not as strategic sexual violence. Additionally,
motivated by Stalin’s quote “we lecture our soldiers too much. Let them have some initiative”, I
have already argued that sexual violence for the purpose of domination, power and terror should
not only be categorized as strategic and opportunistic, but also as sexual violence as a practice.
Moreover, when I told Usta Kaitesi about these categories in Rwanda, she already argued that I
would have a hard time making these divisions as clear-cut as I envisioned. According to her,
different contexts facilitate different forms of sexual violence, and orders (strategic) can make it

30
possible for personal reasons or desires (opportunistic) to evolve. In other words: even when
orders are given in the light of military strategy, the way these orders are carried out by armed
actors is personal or context related, rather than invented by higher commanders. So, the
categories are somewhat interrelated and therefore hard to distinguish.
Furthermore, many cases of sexual violence during armed conflict are underreported,
especially regarding male victims and female perpetrators. As shown in the results, for each
conflict and reason, cases of male perpetrators and female victims can be found, but cases
regarding female perpetrators and male victims are not studied thoroughly, or research on these
cases does simply not exist. Yet, this does not automatically mean that such incidents did not
occur. At most, they occur(red) to a lesser extent. However, neither conclusions can be drawn
(yet), nor excluded from further investigation. The lack of information shows the importance of
further research into these cases to get a reliable view on the problem of sexual violence
perpetrated by both genders, against both genders.

Table 2. Reasons to engage in sexual violence in relation to gender of the victims and perpetrators, per
conflict

Reasons Conflict Male Female Male Female

victims victims perpetrators perpetrators
Ethnic hatred Rwandan genocide X X X X
Yugoslav Wars X X X X
Unit cohesion Sierra Leone Civil War X X X X
Rwandan genocide X X X X
Reward Vietnam War X X
Forced LRA insurgency in Uganda X X
Marriage and IS’s jihad X X
sexual slavery Sierra Leone Civil War X X
Rwandan genocide X X X
World War II X X
Torture and Yugoslav Wars X X X X
punishment in LRA insurgency in Uganda X X X
detention World War II X X X
Sri Lankan Civil War X X X

31
 Domination, Rwandan genocide X X X X
power, terror World War II X X X
Congolese Wars X X X X
LRA insurgency in Uganda X X X
Gender Congolese Wars X X X X
inequality Rwandan genocide X X X X
IS’s jihad X X
World War II X X

3. Types of conflicts
In this chapter, the conflicts that are most thoroughly discussed in the previous chapter will be
discussed briefly. It will be determined what kind of conflict has taken/ is taking place, and whether
this is an International Armed Conflict (IAC) or a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) (ICRC,
2008). The conflicts will be discussed in the order in which they were mentioned in the previous
chapter.

Rwandan Genocide
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was related to the division made between the ethnic Hutu and
Tutsi communities. This division was based on Belgian colonialists’ preferences for the Tutsi
minority, and was reinforced in almost every aspect of the daily lives of the Rwandans since 1916
(Bastick et al., 2007; De Brouwer & Chu, 2009). The oppression of the Hutu caused a revolution
in 1959, in which many Tutsi were killed or forced into exile (HRW, 1996; Van Schaack; 2008).
Even though Rwanda was declared independent from Belgium in 1962, Tutsi refugees were still
kept from returning, despite many peaceful efforts (De Brouwer & Chu, 2009). Some Tutsi who
had fled to Uganda eventually established an armed organization, the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF), in order to overthrow the Hutu regime (HRW, 1996; Bastick et al., 2007; Van Schaack,
2008). Smaller massacres of Tutsi between 1990 and 1993 resulted in the signing of the Arusha
Accords, a peace treaty primarily focused on the conflict between the Rwandan government and
the RPF (HRW, 1996; Bastick et al., 2007). However, it ignored the ongoing preparations for the
genocide. The occasion that directly ignited the genocide was the shooting down of the plane that
transported Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana in 1994 (HRW, 1996; Bastick et al., 2007; Van
Schaack, 2008; De Brouwer & Chun, 2009). Many Hutu people, including those close to
Habyarimana and those who worked for Radio RTLM, blamed the RPF for this attack, but it has

32
never been determined who actually was responsible for his death (HRW, 1996). Nevertheless,
with the help of mass propaganda distributed primarily through radio, it was a starting sign for
slaughter of and (sexual) violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutu; the Rwandan genocide.
So, a long period of ethnic conflict in Rwanda led to what can be seen as a civil war
between 1990 and 1993. Eventually, the built up tensions led to the 1994 genocide, which is seen
as a conflict on itself (Sharlach, 2000; Kaitesi, 2013). The complex nature of this conflict also
shows in the way the Rwandans themselves perceive the conflict. According to Rwandan civilians
I spoke to during my visit, calling the conflict an ethnic war or civil war is a misinterpretation: “there
was no ethnic or civil war, but there was genocide”. According to the definitions of the ICRC (2008),
it is anyway possible to state that the conflict in Rwanda was a Non-International Armed Conflict,
as governmental authorities fought against organized armed groups.

Yugoslav Wars
Although the term ‘Yugoslav Wars’ concerns more than three conflicts, only those three
mentioned in previous chapters will be discussed in this paragraph, namely the conflicts in Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia (Kosovo). First of all, before 1991, the year of the declaration of
independence of Croatia from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Helsinki Watch, 1993; Bastick
et al., 2007), disagreement about the independence existed between Croatian Serbs and Croats.
The former wanting a Serb state, and the latter supporting the government of Croatia, and thus
the secession in order to become a sovereign country. In 1990, the Serbian protests against the
Croatian government became an armed insurgency, but violence increased in frequency and
intensity since the actual declaration of independence (Helsinki Watch, 1993). With the help of
the Yugoslav People’s Army, Croatian-Serb forces were able to occupy nearly one-third of
Croatian territory by expelling all Croats from this land in a short period of time. Then, from 1992
to 1995, Croatia became involved in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina by supporting Bosnian Croats
against Bosnian Serbs and later against Bosnian Muslims (Helsinki Watch, 1993; Bastick et al.,
2007). This resulted from the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in 1992, and the goal of the Serb forces to secure Serb territory. In the three years
that followed, an “inter-ethnic war” took place between Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs
(Bastick et al., 2007, p. 117). The (sexual) violence that occurred during this conflict was a part of
ethnic cleansing. In the war in Kosovo, Albanians became victims of a campaign of ethnic
cleansing. Again, forces were involved of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of which Serbia
was still a part in 1999. Violence between an Albanian armed group: the Kosovo Liberation Army,
and Serb forces increased after Kosovo tried to separate itself from Serbia in 1990 (Helsinki

33
Watch, 1993; Bastick et al., 2007). After a deal was rejected to end the persecution of Albanians
and the conflict in a whole in 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) targeted
airstrikes at Kosovo and Serbia. As a reaction, Serb forces started a campaign of ethnic cleansing
against Kosovo Albanians (Bastick et al., 2007).
The conflicts that are related to the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
are considered civil wars (Sharlach, 2000), or, as mentioned above, ethnic wars (Bastick et al.,
2007). The Yugoslav Wars are typified as Non-International Armed Conflicts, as violence was
used between governmental authorities and armed organizations, and between these armed
groups (ICRC, 2008).

Sierra Leone Civil War

After Sierra Leone was declared independent from Great Britain in 1961, the All People’s
Congress (APC) ruled the country (HRW, 2003; Bastick et al., 2007). Yet, corruption and the
ineffectiveness of the government (the primary focus laid on diamond trades instead of, for
example, health care and education) caused frustration and anger among civilians (HRW, 2003;
Bastick et al., 2007; Bellows & Miguel, 2009). As a result, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF),
backed by Liberian rebels and the Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor, was established in 1984
to overthrow the APC government (HRW, 2003; Bastick et al., 2007; Bellows & Miguel, 2009). As
their armed organization grew, the conflict reached all parts of the country in 1992. Even soldiers
of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) joined the RUF to stand up against the poor conditions: they
looted at night, and wore government uniforms during the day (HRW, 2003). According to some
scholars, not only the idealistic idea of fighting corruption, but also the access to Sierra Leone's
diamond wealth motivated the RUF and other armed groups to rebel (Bellows & Miguel, 2009).
Moreover, the armed forces did not target specific ethnic or religious groups. Victims of (sexual)
violence were targeted throughout the country and no ethnic or religious group was
overrepresented among all victims (Bellows & Miguel, 2009).
This armed conflict within the borders of Sierra Leone is called a civil war (HRW, 2003;
Bastick et al., 2007; Bellows & Miguel, 2009). Because several armed groups are fighting a
governmental force, the Sierra Leone Civil War can be classified as a Non-International Armed
Conflict, according to the definition of the ICRC (2008).

Vietnam War
The Vietnam War, also called the Second Indochina War or the American War by Vietnamese
people, was a conflict between Communist North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam)

34
and its allies such as the Soviet Union and China, and South Vietnam (the Republic of Vietnam)
together with its anti-communist allies such as the United States, Great Britain, and France (Shah,
2003; Kwon, 2008). After colonializing Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) in the late 1890s,
France lost control to Japan during World War II, and tried to regain it after the defeat of Japan
and the end of World War II (Red Cross, n.d.). In the attempt to do so, France encountered strong
opposition from especially communist nationalists from the northern regions, and was defeated
by the communist armed organization Viet Minh at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 (Red Cross,
n.d.; Shah, 2003). Two years later, the French withdrew and Vietnam was divided into a northern
and southern part, for which elections were scheduled to be held. However, these elections never
took place and Vietnam was controlled by northern communist forces (Viet Minh), and southern
anti-communist forces (Viet Cong) (Shah, 2003). The number of American military advisors in
Vietnam grew, and in 1964, the passing of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution allowed the actual start
of a war against North Vietnam (Red Cross, n.d.). In 1973, the war, including its (sexual) violence,
had spread over Laos and Cambodia as well, and eventually the United States withdrew its troops
as the attempt to defeat communism in Vietnam had failed. In 1975, the communist north
occupied Saigon and the rest of South Vietnam (Red Cross, n.d.).
The involved parties in the Vietnam War fought for different, but related reasons and
interests. What started for the Vietnamese people as a war for independency against the French,
ended in a conflict between the less popular, Western oriented south who wanted to maintain
governing status over their area, and the communist north who wanted to unify the country. The
other involved states were motivated by ideals of a (non-)communist world (Shah, 2003). As more
than one state was involved in this conflict, the Vietnam War is by definition an International Armed
Conflict (ICRC, 2008).

LRA insurgency in Uganda

After Uganda gained independence from Great Britain in 1962, a long period of moving back and
forth between several regimes started (Bastick et al., 2007). Control of the ethnic Acholi
government was taken by President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA)
in 1986 (HRW, 2003; Bastick et al., 2007; Branch, 2007). Supporters of the previous government
of whom many originated from the almost exclusively Acholi districts, fled into Northern Uganda
and South Sudan and formed the Ugandan People's Democratic Army (UPDA). Fights between
the government and the UPDA continued until 1988, and meanwhile, several rebel groups were
formed in Acholi-land (HRW, 2003; Branch, 2007). One of these groups was the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony, which included UPDA deserters, Ancholi youth, and

35
members of other rebel groups (HRW, 2003; Bastick et al., 2007). In 1995, the NRA was renamed
the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF), as it became the official army of the government.
In response to the widespread (sexual) violence of the LRA against civilians, the Ugandan
government had to place most of the civilians into the earlier discussed IDP camps, in order to
keep them safe (HRW, 2003; Branch, 2007).
The Acholi ethnicity plays an important role in the insurgency of the LRA and the ongoing
turmoil in Uganda. Additionally, many victims of (sexual) violence are ethnic Acholi, what can be
explained in the following way: as a result of LRA military failures and the governments brutal
counterinsurgency, support among Acholi civilians diminished. The LRA interpreted this as
collaboration with and support for the government, and started targeting Acholi people with
(sexual) violence (Branch, 2007). In general, the conflicts in Uganda can be seen as a civil war,
partly related to ethnicity. The conflict in Uganda is perceived as a Non-International Armed
conflict, as rebel groups use armed violence against governmental authorities (ICRC, 2008).

Islamic State’s jihad

First of all, IS members adhere to an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam and are currently
fighting a jihad: a war or struggle among Muslims (against nonbelievers) (BBC, 2015). The name
Islamic State was given to the jihadist organization in 2014, as, after gaining power over dozens
of cities, it proclaimed the creation of a worldwide caliphate: a state that is governed by the caliph
– the religious successor to the Islamic prophet Muhammad, and leader of the Muslim community
– in accordance with Islamic law (Sharia) (Atwan, 2015). Some years after its foundation by
Jordanian extremist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999, the organization was called the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and later became known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
as well (BBC, 2015). In 2004, IS pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden, leader of the terrorist
organization Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), who’s goal of an insurgency also included the establishment
of a caliphate (Saltman & Winter, 2014). After the death of IS founder Zarqawi in 2006, the power
of the organization weakened, but was regained in 2010, when new leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
started reinforcing its capabilities. By 2013, numerous attacks in Iraq had again taken place and
were still continuing (Atwan, 2015; BBC, 2015). Baghdadi also joined rebel groups in Syria that
were fighting the government led by President Bashar al-Assad, creating the al-Nusra Front.
When Baghdadi announced he wanted to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria into ISIS in 2013,
both the al-Nursa Front and AQI disassociated themselves from IS, as they rejected this move
and did not support some of IS’s other extreme actions (Sly, 2014). Some members of both
organizations left to join IS as they did agree with its methods (Saltman & Winter, 2014). Up till

36
now, IS still continues their holy war and demands Muslims all over the world to pledge allegiance
to Baghdadi, and to move to territory under his control. Other jihadist groups are told to accept
IS’s supreme authority and to collectively fight nonbelievers to eventually create a worldwide
caliphate (BBC, 2015). In order to “degrade and ultimately destroy IS”, other states got involved
and started a campaign led by the United States (Blanchard & Humud, 2016, p. 20). This
campaign entails frequent airstrikes and material, financial and humanitarian support.
So, this IS involved conflict forms a holy war based on religious and political goals and
ideas. In order to reach its goal, IS not only attacks governmental forces, but also civilians
(especially from other ethnic groups) who form a threat to the establishment of the caliphate, or
others, for example journalists, to cause terror in the world (Spark, 2014). Some problems arise
when labeling conflicts such as these under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) for a couple of
reasons. First of all, it is not clear whether these occurrences in fact even fall under IHL, and
secondly, IHL does not provide a definition of terrorism. In deciding on these two issues, I follow
Sassòli (2006). Thus, to be able to apply IHL on a conflict, the violence has to reach a certain
frequency and intensity, but more importantly, the involved parties have to have a military-like
formation with a certain level of organization and command structure (ICRC, 2008). According to
Sassòli (2006), IS can be seen as a transnational armed group, as it has such a structure and it
operates across national borders. On the basis of the assumption that IS is a legitimate armed
group under IHL, and that violence is used frequently and intensively between IS and other armed
groups and state forces, it can be concluded that this conflict is a Non-International Armed Conflict
(ICRC, 2008). Further, IS can be perceived as a terrorist organization, because it commits acts
that would be considered ‘terrorist’ under (inter)national law when committed in peacetime, and
these acts are prohibited under IHL. However, note that others can hold the idea that the current
conflict in which IS is involved is no armed conflict at all.

World War II
The major role of Germany in World War II can partly be explained on the basis of World War I.
Conflicting ambitions, rivalries, and ideologies caused international tension between world powers,
and eventually led to the first World War in 1914, which ended in 1918 (Weinberg, 1995; BBC,
2011). The war left Germany economically devastated, partly because of the full blame of the war
that was put on the country, together with high reparation payments that were demanded in the
Treaty of Versailles (Weinberg, 1995; BBC, 2011). While this disaster withheld Germany from
rebuilding itself technically and economically, the situation became even worse because of the
‘Great Depression’ that started in the late 1920s (BBC, 2011). Tension remained between

37
desperate Germany and other states, which resulted in the growth of popularity of more radical
political parties, such as the Communist Party of Germany and the National Socialist German
Workers’ Party (also known as the Nazi Party) of Adolf Hitler. Proclaiming the rebuilding of the
German military forces, Hitler started annexing neighboring countries in 1938. The direct cause
of World War II in Europe was the invasion of Poland by Hitler in 1939 (Weinberg, 1995; BBC,
2011). Two days later, Great Britain and France declared war against Germany, and because of
alliances, soon numerous countries were involved in the war. While rationing started and violence
continued in Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France were invaded in 1940. One year
later, also Russia was invaded, and German ally Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, causing the United
States to enter the war as well. Also different parts of Africa and Asia fell under attack (BBC,
2011).
So, the struggle for power and control between great world powers led to both the First
and Second World War. Because several governmental forces were fighting against each other,
this war is considered an International Armed Conflict (ICRC, 2008).

Sri Lankan Civil War

Tension and violence between the two largest ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese and the
Tamils, had been going on for ages, but the conflict between the government and the secessionist
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) started about three decades ago (Grobar &
Gnanaselvam, 1993; Bastick et al., 2007; HRW, 2013). During the incident in July 1983 that is
sometimes referred to as “Black July”, Tamil Tigers (members of the LTTE) ambushed an army
convoy, causing anti-Tamil riots in the city of Colombo that resulted in the dead of hundreds of
Tamils (Grobar & Gnanaselvam, 1993; HRW, 2013). This is seen as the beginning of more than
30-years of violence between the government and the LTTE, which wanted to create an
independent Tamil state: Tamil Eelam. Many attempts have been made to resolve the conflict,
what led to the signing of a ceasefire in 2002 by both parties, mediated by the Norwegian
government. Although this agreement formally continued until 2008, violence between the Sri
Lankan government and the LTTE resumed in 2006 (Bastick et al., 2007; HRW, 2013). The LTTE
were eventually defeated in 2009, which brought an end to the secessionist conflict.
The conflict in Sri Lanka is seen as a civil war with both secessionist and ethnic motivations.
Because armed groups were fighting against government forces, this conflict is typified as a Non-
International Armed Conflict (ICRC, 2008).

38
Congolese Wars
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) became independent in 1960. Since then,
numerous conflicts have taken place over natural resources and control of territory (Bastick et al.,
2007). In 1996, the first Congolese war broke out and rebels overthrew the Mobutu regime that
was in power from 1965 to 1997, in order to install Laurent Desiré Kabila as President (HRW,
2006). These rebels were primarily the Congolese Mai-Mai, Ugandan forces, and the Rwandan
Interahamwe that consisted of ethnic Hutu that fled Rwanda after the genocide of 1994 (HRW,
2000). Once President Kabila was in power, he changed the name of the country from Zaire to
Democratic Republic of the Congo and tried to get rid of the foreign forces that helped him obtain
his governmental status (HRW, 2006). Because Uganda and Rwanda were unwilling to lose their
importance in the DRC, they turned against the Kabila led government and started the second
Congolese war in 1998 (HRW, 2000; HRW, 2006; Bastick et al., 2007). Government forces were
backed by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, whereas the Ugandan and Rwandan forces were
supported by Burundi. This conflict was eventually named Africa’s First World War (HRW, 2006,
Bastick et al., 2007).
Both the first and second Congolese wars are sometimes perceived as parts of a
Congolese Civil War. However, with the involvement of neighboring countries, labeling these
conflicts is more complex. Both wars find its roots in the desire for governmental power and control
over resources and territory. Because not only rebel groups from other countries, but also several
state forces are fighting against each other, these conflicts can be categorized as International
Armed Conflicts (ICRC, 2008).

In summary, the above discussed conflicts can be broadly distinguished in the following ways:
the Rwandan genocide, the Yugoslav Wars, the LRA insurgency in Uganda, IS’s jihad, and the
Sri Lankan Civil War were/are all (partly) based on ethnicity or religion. Secondly, the goal of
secession/independency existed in the Yugoslav Wars, the Vietnam War, and the Sri Lankan Civil
War. Further, political motives, dissatisfaction with the government, and the desire for power can
be found in the causes of the Sierra Leone Civil War, the Vietnam War, the LRA insurgency in
Uganda, World War II, and the Congolese Wars. Additionally, the following conflicts fall under the
definition of a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC): the Rwandan genocide, the Yugoslav
Wars, the Sierra Leone Civil War, the LRA Insurgency in Uganda, IS’s jihad, and the Sri Lankan
Civil War, whereas the Vietnam War, World War II, and the Congolese Wars are International
Armed Conflicts (IAC). For a clarification of this categorization, see Table 3.

39
 When linking the reasons of sexual violence to the causes and types of conflicts, no
unambiguous conclusion can be drawn. This could be due to the fact that within one conflict, more
than one reason to engage in sexual violence can exist. For example, although the main reason
for the occurrence of sexual violence in the Rwandan genocide was ethnic hatred, this conflict is
also mentioned in the context of several other reasons. Furthermore, sexual violence during the
Yugoslav Wars is mainly studied and explained in the context of ethnic hatred and torture and
punishment in detention. Yet, in the research paper of Henry et al. (2004, p. 552), the following
explanation was given by an interviewed man who raped Muslim women during the Bosnia-
Herzegovina conflict: “Herak admitted that his superiors had given him women to rape as well as
wine and food as a reward for good behavior and to induce camaraderie with fellow soldiers”.
Herak also claimed that he raped the women out of fear for losing his house that was given to
him and for being send to the front line or even jail. So, within a conflict, armed organizations can
have different reasons to perpetrate sexual violence, and within an armed organization, units can
carry out acts of sexual violence based on their own motives. And even within a unit, an individual
can act based on personal reasons. Thus, many more factors play a role in why armed actors
engage in sexual violence, and these reasons all seem to be interconnected and influencing each
other. It is hard, if not impossible, to draw a general conclusion regarding motives that holds for
every armed actor within one (type of) conflict.
Even though distinctions between reasons, gender, and conflicts are vague, a couple of
general trends with regard to the main research question can be found, in the presence of some
exceptions. First of all, reasons of ethnic hatred and unit cohesion are present in conflicts related
to all three causes (ethnicity/ religion, secession/ independency, political/ governmental power).
Furthermore, forced marriage and sexual slavery occur in conflicts caused by ethnicity/ religion
and political/ governmental power (but not secession/ independency), and includes only male
perpetrators and female victims, with the exception of the ethnically motivated Rwandan genocide
(that also includes female perpetrators, although to a lesser extent than male perpetrators). All
conflicts in this context are Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIAC), with the exception of World
War II. Thirdly, with regard to torture and punishment in detention, conflicts related to all three
causes are represented. For all of these conflicts hold that there were male, but no female
perpetrators (except for the ethnically motivated Yugoslav Wars, that also included female
perpetrators), and both male and female victims. All of these conflicts, with the exception of the
Yugoslav Wars, are International Armed Conflicts (IAC). Further, in the context of domination,
power and terror, and gender inequality, the Rwandan genocide and the Congolese Wars,
conflicts in which sexual violence was extremely widespread, are exceptions, as these conflicts

40
include male and female perpetrators and victims. Yet, the Rwandan genocide is a NIAC, whereas
the Congolese Wars are typified as IAC.

Table 3. Cause and type of conflict, whereby NIAC = Non-International Armed Conflict, and IAC =
International Armed Conflict

Ethnicity/ Secession/ Political/ NIAC IAC

religion independency governmental
power
Rwandan X X
genocide
Yugoslav Wars X X X
Sierra Leone X X
Civil War
Vietnam War X X X
LRA insurgency X X X
in Uganda
IS’s jihad X X
World War II X X
Sri Lankan Civil X X X
War
Congolese Wars X X

Conclusion
In order to answer the main research question of this thesis: what are the characteristics of
differently motivated forms of sexual violence in armed conflict, with regard to gender of the
perpetrators and victims, and the type of conflict, these three aspects (reasons, gender, and type
of conflict) have been investigated. First of all, the discussed reasons for engaging in sexual
violence were divided into three categories. Yet, during the process of writing this thesis, it showed
that continuing this three-way categorization in relation to gender and kind of conflict is almost
impossible, and instead of clarifying, it makes things more unclear. A reason for this could be that

41
it is often not clear to which category a certain reason belongs, and that it could fit more than one
category, due to the interrelatedness of both the reasons and categories.
Secondly, it seems that for all discussed reasons to engage in sexual violence it can at
least be concluded that men are perpetrators of sexual violence, whereas women are the victims.
This also holds for all types of conflicts that were broadly categorized based on the causes of the
conflicts and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). However, with regard to female perpetrators,
male victims, and kind of conflicts there is no completely unambiguous answer to the research
question. This could be due to the fact that a lot of cases that include female perpetrators and
male victims are underreported. The lack of data does not mean that these cases do not exist,
rather does it indicate that more thorough research is necessary to draw reliable conclusions.
Additionally, the difficulty of assigning one particular cause to every conflict also added to the
ambiguous results, together with the fact that within one (type of) conflict more than one reason
to engage in sexual violence can exist. The reasons to engage in sexual violence seem to be
interconnected, to influence each other, and to differ between the levels within the hierarchies of
armed organizations.
Yet, there seems to be one trend that stands out. For every reason to engage in sexual
violence that was present in the Rwandan genocide, the Yugoslav Wars and/or the Congolese
Wars, several cases including both male and female perpetrators and male and female victims
are known and studied. There are two possible explanations for this. First of all, sexual violence
during these conflicts was so extreme and widespread that terms such as ‘the worst mass rapes’
and ‘sexual terrorism’ are used to describe the events. It could be that these conflicts received
more attention from scholars and other institutions because of this, and therefore there are more
reports on cases including all kinds of perpetrators and victims. The second explanation could be
that motives for sexual violence based on ethnicity, revenge, domination or hate are expressed
in the same way by both men and women, and that these motives drive them to (sexually) violate
both men and women, or rather: everyone from the opposite ethnicity, everyone they seek
revenge against, everyone they want to dominate or everyone they hate, regardless of gender.
This would be the tip of the iceberg of what I sought to investigate, but whether the latter
explanation is true should be explored in further research.
Lastly, although in this research the division of reasons into categories, and that of conflicts
into different types and causes did not result in clear-cut findings and conclusions, knowledge
about the different reasons, categories and conflicts is still useful in recognizing high risk
situations in which sexual violence is (or could be) frequently and largely present. It could help
improving prevention measures or measures to minimize the consequences, as well as policies

42
regarding punishment and aftercare programs for victims. For example, different motives to
engage in sexual violence could be tackled by educating both combatants and their higher
commanders: a case for which it is in turn useful to know in what circumstances sexual violence
is often ordered or rather opportunistic. In this way, more attention could be paid to higher
commanders so that they can improve their supervision on combatants, or they can be punished
themselves according to their involvement in the occurrence of sexual violence. Furthermore,
knowing that a lot of male victims do not dare or are ashamed to report their injuries resulting from
sexual violence, recognizing high risk situations and acting on such circumstances, both before
and after a conflict, can help minimizing the stigma (of especially homosexuality). By doing so,
the negative social consequences can be reduced and victims can be treated in time so that they
will not die from their injuries, or suffer from long lasting psychological problems. The same goes
for female victims of sexual violence who are rejected by their family or community after a conflict
and sometimes even carry a baby as a result of being raped. So, by taking into account different
patterns, reasons, conflicts, and all victims and perpetrators related to sexual violence in armed
conflict, high risk circumstances can be recognized earlier and this will hopefully add to the
minimization of the consequences, and eventually of conflict-related sexual violence in its entirety.

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