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143a Take-Home Final Exam
143a Take-Home Final Exam
Answer all questions fully. You may refer to any course materials (including readings, class
handouts, and lecture recordings) in completing the exam. You may not confer with other
students in the class (or anyone else).
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(a) Convert the game tree into a game matrix. (5 points)
(b) Identify all the strategy pairs that are equilibria. (5 points)
(c) Using backwards induction, identify all the sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy pairs. (5
points)
C1 C2 C3
R1 7,1 0,0 0,0
R2 6,2 4,2 2,4
R3 10,0 2,4 4,2
For each of the following statements, say whether the statement is true or false and give a brief
explanation of your answer. (2.5 points each)
(a) (R2, C1) is better for Player 1 (the row player) than it is for Player 2 (the column player).
(b) (R3, C2) is an optimal strategy pair.
(c) R1 is strictly dominated.
(d) This is a zero-sum game.
3. Lewis on convention
(a) Are all coordination equilibria optimal strategy pairs? If yes, explain why. If no, provide an
example to illustrate why not. (5 points)
(b) Explain why, according to Lewis’s definition, a convention is not the same thing as a social
contract. Can there be a convention that is also a social contract? (10 points)
4. Both Gauthier and Axelrod suggest that we can see morality as in some way arising out of
game-theoretic rationality. Explain how each of them makes the case for this idea. In what
ways do their explanations of how morality can arise out of rationality differ? (20 points)
5. Choose four of the puzzles or paradoxes listed below. In two paragraphs (or so), explain, in
your own words, the puzzle/paradox and what it is supposed to show. (10 points each)