Eya Jemai

IR M1
Geopolitics
Competing Visions for Barry R. Posen and U.S. Grand Strategy
US four grand strategies: termed neo-isolationism; selective engagement; cooperative security; and
primacy. This chapter describes the four grand strategies (1) then offers our characterization and
critique of the evolving grand strategy of the Clinton administration- selective engagement,
cooperative security, and primacy (2) and finally speculates on what might cause the US to make a
clearer grand strategy choice. (3).

Selective Engagement Selective engagement endeavors to ensure peace among powers that have
substantial industrial and military potential. By virtue of the great military capabilities, great power
conflicts are much more dangerous to the United States than conflicts elsewhere. Like the new
isolationism, selective engagement emerges from the realist tradition of international politics and its
focus on large concentrations of power. It argues that the US has an interest in great power peace.
Selective engagement shares the neo-isolationist expectation that states balance, and that nuclear
weapons favor the defender of the status quo. However, it also recognize that balancing may be
miscalculated, and nuclear deterrence could fail. Advocates of selective engagement start from the
premise that U.S. resources are scarce: it is simply impossible to muster sufficient power and will to
keep domestic and international peace worldwide, or to preserve the United States as the
undisputed leader in a unipolar world. Global economic development will gradually reduce the U.S.
economic advantage, and demographics already limit U.S. capacity for intervention in labor-intensive
civil wars. Moreover, the people of the United States are unlikely to want to invest much money or
many lives either in global police duties-cooperative security-or in trying to cow others into accepting
U.S. hegemony-primacy.

Issues and instruments Selective engagement advocates are worried about nuclear proliferation.
The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is viewed as an instrument to permit those countries
without support to nuclear forces or ambition to need them, to find a refuge from a race that they
would rather not run. Selective engagement advocates may be willing to try to cajole India, Israel,
Pakistan, or Ukraine into surrendering their nuclear capabilities and joining the NPT, but they hold
that it would be absurd to turn neutrals or friends into enemies on this issue alone. In terms of how
to use force, advocates of selective engagement are always sensitive to costs; preventive attacks may
not be feasible. Selective engagement especially favors the preservation of NATO but not its
expansion. The rest of the world does not matter.

Force Structure A selective engagement policy probably requires a force structure similar to those
proposed by the late Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in 1992 as "Force B" or "Force C". A strong
nuclear deterrent is still needed to deter nuclear attack on the United States and to protect it.

Critique Selective engagement has problems. First, the strategy lacks a certain romance: will the
cool and quiet, steady, long-term exercise of U.S. power in the service of stable great power relations
win the political support of any major constituency in the United States? Second, the strategy
expects the United States to ignore much of the trouble that is likely to occur in the world. America's
prestige and reputation could limit its ability to persuade others on more important issues. Third,
selective engagement does not provide clear guidance on which "minor" issues have implications for
great power relations, and thus merit U.S. involvement. Fourth, selective engagement is not as
selective as its advocates would have us believe. Europe and Asia matter because that is where the
major powers reside; and the Middle East matters because of its oil resources. Finally, The United
States must maintain substantial military forces, threaten war, and risk war largely for preventing
war.