The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan

Author(s): M. Rashiduzzaman
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 7 (Jul., 1970), pp. 574-587
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642956 .
Accessed: 17/06/2014 10:40

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian
Survey.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE AWAMILEAGUEIN
THE POLITICALDEVELOPMENT
OF PAKISTAN
/ M. Rashiduzzaman

In thekaleidoscopicpoliticsofPakistanseveralpoliticalpartieshaverisen
and fallen.Althoughnone of themhas been reallyeffective, theirrole has
beensignificant.WhiletheWestPakistanpoliticalscenewas largelydomi-
natedbycertaininfluential personsor families(Pirs,Zamindars,Khansand
Nawabs), East Pakistanpresenteda different picture.Here,partypolitics
first
crystalizeditselfundertheleadershipoftheEast PakistanAwamiMus-
lim League,1whichplayeda prominent role in thelanguagemovement of
theprovincein 1952, and in the defeatof theMuslimLeague in the 1954
electionsbyforming an electoralalliancewiththeminorparties.The Awami
Leaguewas a constituent oftheUnitedFrontcabinetin 1954 whichwas dis-
missedby theCentralGovernment afteronlytwomonthsin office and it led
a coalitioncabinetforabouttwoyearsin East Pakistanuntilthe promul-
gationof martiallaw in October1958. Its leader,H. S. Suhrawardy, also
servedas PrimeMinisterof Pakistanin the Awami-Republican cabinetat
the Centerin 1956-57.But its mostdistinguished contributionwas made
whilethepartywas in opposition, by arousingthepeopleof East Pakistan
againstthemaladministration of theMuslimLeague cabinet.
WhiletheAwamiLeague claimsto be an All-Pakistan partyit has been
primarily based in the EasternWing and its successin the West is still
limited.The AwamiLeague leader,SheikhMujiburRahman,gave a new
turnto Pakistanpoliticswhenhe put forwarda six-pointprogramwhich
wouldallocatemaximum powerto theprovince, and at thesametimereduce
thestrength oftheCentralGovernment.2 The entireweightof thepartywas
thrownin favorof theanti-Ayub movement whichspreadthroughout the
country in theearlymonthsof 1969 and it is likelythattheAwamiLeague
willplay an evenmoreactiverole in the future.
The purposeof thispaperis to examinethecircumstances whichled to
theemergenceof theAwamiLeague in East Pakistan,its role in building

'In 1955,the name of the organizationwas changed fromEast Pakistan Awami Mus-
lim League (EPAML) to East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL) and it was opened to
all communities.
2SheikhMujibur Rahman,6-PointFormula,Our Rightto Live, Dacca, March,1966.

574

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 575

up opposition,itsorganizational theextentofitsmobilization
character, and
electoralsupportand its rolein thedemandsforregionalautonomy in Pak-
istan.These are thevitalqueriesrelatingto any politicalparty,but an ex-
haustivetreatment is notyetpossible.The inadequacyof thematerialson
to give as detailedan
thepoliticalpartiesof Pakistanhas made it difficult
analysison severalaspectsof theAwamiLeague as will be possiblein the
future.
BUILDING UP AN OPPOSITION

If anyonemanshouldbe givencreditfortheriseofan oppositionin East

Pakistan,it is Maulana AbdulHamidKhan Bhasani.Maulana Bhasanibe-
came a popularfigurein the 193O'swhenhe organizedthe peasantmove-
mentin East Bengaland Assam.Later,in the1940's he gave his supportto
thePakistanmovement led by theMuslimLeague. Maulana Bhasani was
frustratedbytheclosed-door policyoftheMuslimLeague in Pakistan,how-
ever,and eventually, it was underhis leadershipthat the East Pakistan
AwamiMuslimLeague was bornat Dacca, on June23, 1949.3The political
climateforan oppositionpartywas notfavorablein Pakistanat thattime.
Onlya fewmonthsafteritcameintobeingan AwamiLeagueprocessionand
meetingin Dacca was lathi (baton) chargedand teargasedby the police.
Afterthisincident,nineteen AwamiLeague leaders,includingMaulanaBha-
sani,werearrestedunderthePublicSafetyOrdinance(an emergency provis-
ion authorizing thepoliceto arrestanybody).In 1951, theAwamiLeague
publicmeetingscheduledto be addressedby H. S. Suhrawardy couldnotbe
heldas thegovernment imposedSection144 (a specialpowerwhichbans the
assemblyof morethanfivepersons) in certainareas of the city.4 This re-
pressivepolicytowardsthe oppositionwas the naturalconsequenceof an
attitudetypefied by a statement of Liaquat Ali Khan, the PrimeMinister
of Pakistan,at Mymensingh, East Pakistan,in December1950: "Pakistan
has been achievedby the MuslimLeague. As long as I am alive no other
political party will be allowed to work here.",5
Although the popularity of some of the individual Awami League lead-
ers such as Bhasani and Suhrawardy was undoubtedlygreat, the party re-
mained weak in organizational strengthduring its initial years. It professed
to be more progressive than the Muslim League, but in structurewas now
fundamentallydifferentas, until 1955, both parties had restrictedmember-
ship to Muslims. There was a sharp cleavage betweenthe secular elementsof
theAwami League who wantedto make it a non-communalorganizationand
those who insisted on retaining a Muslim character. The firstdraft of the
Awami League Manifestopublished by its General Secretary,Shamsul Huq,

3AtaurRahman Khan, Two Years of Ministership (an autobiographyin Bengali),

(Dacca, 1965) p. 24. See also Shamsul Huq, East-PakistanAwami Muslim League Draft
Manifest,(Dacca) p. 11.
'The Azad, December20, 1951.
'The Sainik, December20, 1950.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
576 THE AWAMI LEAGUE OF PAKISTAN

clearlystatedthatthemainobjectiveof thepartywas to establishan Isla-

micsocialorder.0The seculargroup,led by SheikhMujiburRahman,came
to prominence whenShamsulHuq was in jail as a politicalprisoner.The
confusionwithintheAwamiLeague on thisissue,however,continuedfor
severalyears.
Onlya fewmonthsbeforethe1954 electionsin East Pakistan,A. K. Faz-
lul Huq, theformer PremierofundividedBengal,revivedhis old Proja Par.
tywiththenomenclature of KrishakSramikParty (workersand peasants
partyor KSP).7 Political activitiesin the provincehad greatlyincreased
on the eve of elections.Withthe blessingsof Fazlul Huq, a new political
party,theNizami-i-Islam, also was formed,withtheobjectiveof establish-
ing an administration based on theprinciplesof Islam. A leftwingparty
calledtheGanatantri Dal (DemocraticParty) had also emergedwitha pro-
gramcallingforsecularpoliticsand theeconomicemancipation ofthepeo-
ple.9On theeve of electionsin East Bengal,theAwamiLeague appearedto
be thestrongestoftheparties.The MuslimLeague'sfearthata UnitedFront
of all theoppositionpartieswouldbe formedin theprovinceto contestthe
impending electionssoon becamea reality.The KSP was not as strongas
theAwamiLeague organizationally but the popularityof its leader,A. K.
Fazlul Huq, was a decisivefactorin the opposition.Soon the two leaders
oftheKrishakSramikPartyand theAwamiLeague,Fazlul Huq and Mau-
lana Bhasani,respectively came to termsand decidedto forma United
FrontagainsttheMuslimLeague on thebasis of a "commonprogram."'0
The decisionoftheAwamiLeague to enteran electoralalliancewiththe
weakeroppositionpartiesis stilla matterofcontroversy. The idea of a joint
frontwithotheroppositionpartieswas suggestedby Maulana Bhasani,1"
who had been persuadedby someleftistelementsto make thismove,(the
leftwingorganizations wereveryweak at thattimeand it was not possi-
ble forthemto contesttheelectionson theirownstrength). Moreover,Bha-
sani was notparticularly confidentabouttheAwamiLeague'schancesas an
independent politicalorganizationin the elections,as the MuslimLeague
was busymobilizingall its resourceson the eve of elections.On theright
wing,HamidulHuq Choudhury and YusufAli Choudhury-bothof whom
had been expelledfromthe MuslimLeague-were also eager for a joint
frontagainstthe governingparty.

'See also Shamsul Huq, op. cit.

'The Azad, August 23, 1953. The full textof the originalKrishak Sramik PartyPro-
gram (typescript)was made available to the authorby Syed Azizul Huq, DeputyLeader
ofthePartyfrom1954 to 1958.
8TheAzad, August2, 1953.
"Ibid.,Novermber28, 1953.
'?The Azad, December6, 1953.
"Related to the author by Tajuddin Ahmed, the present General Secretaryof the
East Pakistan Awami League who was also a prominentAwami Leaguer in 1953.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 577

MOBILIZATION AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT

The 21-pointelectoralprogramannouncedby the UnitedFrontof the

AwamiLeague and KSP strucka popularresponseamongthestudents, the
intellectuals,
theworkersand thepeasants.It providedan alternative to all
thosewhowantedto see theendoftheMuslimLeague administration. While
thepro-government elementsdescribedtheelectoralprogramas utterly im-
practicaland impossibleof implementation,12 thepublicconsideredit to be
a "Charterof Freedom"forEast Pakistan.13
Soon theelectioncampaigntooktwodistinct patterns.
The MuslimLeague,
as usual,emphasizedits contribution towardsthe achievement of Pakistan
and called upon thepeopleto voLefour it in orderto maintainthe integrity
of thenascentstate.The UnitedFrontleaders,on the otherhand,empha-
sized heirprogram.Theydecidedto contestall theMuslimseatsoftheEast
PakistanAssemblyand top leaderslike Bhasani,Fazlul Huq and Suhra-
wardytouredtheremotest partsoftheprovinceto mobilizesupporton their
behalf.'4The strategyoftheUnitedFrontleaderswas to hammeruponthe
failureof theMuslimLeague administration in variousfields,and particu-
larlyon thelanguageissue.Publicfeelingsranhighon thisquestionand it
was easyto mobilizesupport.Anotherimportant issuewas thelow priceof
jute whichcaused frustration amongthejute growersoftheprovince.Cen-
ter-provincerelationsalso figuredprominently in theelectioncampaignal-
thoughin 1954 it was not as sensitivean issue as it becamelater.15
The top leadersof theUnitedFrontand MuslimLeague werekeptbusy
in whirlwind toursthroughout thelengthand breadthof theprovincead-
dressingbig public gatheringsand meetingimportant local leaders.The
actualcampaigning was doneby ordinary partyworkers.AmongtheUnited
Frontcampaigners, therewas a largenumberof students workingthrough-
outtheprovince.The twomainstudents'organizations of theprovince,the
East PakistanStudentsUnion (reputedfor its leftistleanings) and the
East PakistanStudents'League,combinedto supporttheUnitedFrontcan-
didates.Studentsfromthecitiesspreadoutin theruralareas and mobilized
pupilsin thevillageschoolsto workfortheUnitedFrontelectioncampaign.
The resultsof1954 electionsin East Pakistanwereconclusive.The United
Frontwon210 of the237 Muslimseatsin theprovincialassemblyand ob-
tainednearly64% of thevotes.In contrasttheMuslimLeague won only9
seatsand securedless than27%oof thevotespolledin thecontestedconsti-

"2AbulMansur Ahmed,FiftyYears of Politics (a political authobiographywrittenin

Bengali) (Dacca, 1968) p. 256.
3Ibid.,p. 258.
"4Thisimpressionis gatheredfroma diary of A. K. Fazlul Huq recorded in 1954
whichwas made available to the authorthroughthe courtesyof his son Faizul Huq.
"5Thefeelingsagainst the Centerwere not so high in 1954. Regionalismas a political
phenomenabecame moreprominentat a subsequentstage.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
578 THE AWAMI LEAGUE OF PAKISTAN

tuencies.16Among themost excitingaspects of the electionwas the defeat of

several ministersincludingNurul Amin, the Muslim League Chief Minister.
This spectacular United Front victory,however,has been interpretedin
differentways. According to the Muslim League, the people of East Pakis-
tan had been swayed by passions which the United Front was able to rouse.
On the otherhand, fromthe opposition point of view, it was a revolt of the
East Pakistanis throughthe ballot box,'7 was a clear and emphatic verdict
of the province against the Muslim League and a positive expression of sup-
portforthe 21-pointprogram.
POOR ORGANIZATIONALCHARACTER

The Awami League in opposition had been a more disciplined and orga-
nized body. Internaldeteriorationstartedwhen the partygained officeat the
provincial level and then at the center in the autumn of 1956. For some
time,the Awami League had provided an umbrella for all kinds of politi-
cal elementswho were inclined to oppose the Government.Having achieved
power, the party now had to divert its activities towards the consolidation
of its position. There was, however, a strong group of left wing agitation-
ists among the Awami Leaguers, led by Maulana Bhasani, who refused to
accept this new role.
The firstclash between the Awami League administrationand the Mau-
lana took place over the question of the pro-westernpolicy pursued by H.
S. Suhirawardy,the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. In spite of his long
career in politics, Maulana Bhasani appeared not to understandthe spirit
of parliamentarypolitics which assumes thatthe cabinet should be leftalone
to make its own decision. The firstseeds of conflictbetweenSuhrawardy and
his colleagues in the provincial cabinet on the one hand and Maulana Bha-
sani and his followerson the otherwere sown at the Kagmari conferencein
February 1957. Maulana Bhasani's predilectionfor giving directivesto the
cabinet was disliked by many of the ministersin the central and provincial
governmentsalthoughtheydid not formallyprotestthis at the time in order
to maintain the solidarity of the party.'8
The differenceswhich startedat Kagmari took a serious turna fewweeks'
later. In March 1957, the Organising Secretary of the Awami League
was suspended by General Secretary Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for his
alleged activities"against the interestof the party."'9 In protest,nine mem-
bers of theAwami League WorkingCommitteetenderedtheirresignations.20

"6Basedon the electionresultspublished in Statistical Year Book, 1954-55, (Dacca:

Government ofEast Pakistan Press).
"Abul ManusrAhmed,op. cit.,p. 260.
"8See Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, East Pakistan Awami League Special
Council Session, (Kagmari, 1957). Several Awami League leaders confirmedthis view
in theirconversationswiththe author.
'9ttefaq, March 31, 1957.
20Ibid.,May 22, 1957.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 579

PrimeMinisterSuhrawardy triedto patchup the splitin thepartyduring

itstwo-daysessionsin Dacca, butfailed.2'The East PakistanAwamiLeague
Councilsessionheld in June1957 was dominatedby thefollowersof Suh-
rawardyand his foreignpolicywas approvedby morethansevenhundred
Awami League Councillors.22Maulana Bhasani had earlier submittedhis
resignationfromthe Presidentship
of the partyand came out withpub-
licly criticized Suhrawardy's policy.23 The attitude of Maulana Bhasani
and his followersalso hardenedbecauseof thehostility
shownby thepro-
Suhrawardygroupin theAwamiLeague. EarlierSheikhMujiburRahman
had proposedan amendment to thepartyconstitution
curbingthepowersof
thePresidentto nominateall the membersof the WorkingCommittee.24
The semblenceof his associationwiththe partywas finallyseveredwhen
Maulana Bhasaniresignedfromevena.primarymembership in theAwami
League2.5

The resignation of Maulana Bhasaniwas a real set-backforthe Awami

League. A fewweekslaterthe EPAL lost "organizationalcontrol"in the
of Faridour,Pabna, Rangpur,Bogra and Dinajpur,in whichmost
districts
of the AwamiLeaguersdefiedministerialinstructions and alignedthem-
selveswithBhasani.26In Dacca itself,theBhasaniteshad somehowcaptured
the cityAwamiLeague.27It appearedthatthe supportersof Suhrawardy
werenot as dedicatedto organizational workas the followersof Bhasani.
WhiletheAwamiLeague workerswerechasingtheirministers to get "per-
mits"and otherfavors,thefollowers ofBhasaniwerepreparingto establish
a new politicalparty,theNationalAwamiParty (NAP).28
The weakorganizational characteroftheAwamiLeague in East Pakistan
was furtherdemonstrated in the personalclashesbetweenChiefMinister
AtaurRahmanKhan and SheikhMujiburRahman,the GeneralSecretary
oftheparty.29 theAwamiLeague
The latterhad takenthelead in separating
fromtheUnitedFrontin 1955 and had made a major contribution towards
thedevelopment of theorganization.ButthereweremanyAwamiLeaguers
who feltthatSheikhMujiburhad damangedthe interestof East Pakistan
bydestroying theUnitedFront.30 The partingbetweentheSheikhand Chief
MinisterAtaurRahmanKhan occurredwhentheformer tenderedhis resig-

"MorningNews,June13, 1957.
22Ibid.,June14, 1957.
23Ibid.
"MorningNews, June7, 1957. See also Constitutionand Regulationof East Pakistan
AwamiLeague (Dacca) p. 8.
"Ibid., July25, 1957.
28Ibid.,July8, 1957.
27Ibid.
28TheNAP was formedfollowingthe DemocraticWorkersConventionwhichwas con-
vened by Maulana Bhasani fromJuly25 to 26, 1957.
29MorningNews,September7, 1957.
30AbulMansurAhmed,op. cit.,p. 456.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
580 THE AWAMI LEAGUE OF PAKISTAN

nation,31 on the plea that he should devote more time to organizational ac-
tivities to strengthenthe Awami League. Sheikh Mujibur's love for the
organizationappeared to many suspicouslylike a love forpower. He wanted
to strengthenhis hold over the organization it was felt,in order to dictate
termsto the Awami League administration.32
AlthoughSheikh Mujibur Rahman was expectedto strengthenthe Awami
League, he was not successfulin checking organizational weakness at vari-
ous levels of the party.The Awami League at the districtand sub-divisional
levels was seriously sufferingfrom factionalism,and there were instances
in which two separate executive committeeswere found in one branch of
the party.33When the Awami League assumed office,businessmenbegan to
enterthe party and soon became prominentand cornered the old workers
of the party.34Gradually, the Chief Minister Ataur Rahman found himself
in open clash withthe General Secretaryof the party.H. S. Suhrawardytook
note of the internal feud of the party and tried to settle the differences
throughthe good officesof Abul Mansur Ahmed, an Awami League minis-
ter of the central cabinet, but his effortswere not successful.33
The internalconflictsin the Awami League were furtheraggravated when
the working committeeof the party recommendedthe resignation of two
Awami League Ministersfromthe East Pakistan cabinet. This was a direct
affrontto the Chief Minister,who made a strong protestto the President
of the EPAL (Maulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish) and demanded that
proof should be given by the working committeeof the allegations brought
against two of the ministersin his cabinet.36 Eventually the matter was
dropped on behalf of the organization but the fear of party pressures from
outside continued to haunt the ministers.Ataur Rahman Khan, the Chief
Minister,held thatthe Awami League executivehad no rightto exerta uni-
lateral influenceon his cabinet, which rested on the coalition of several par-
ties.37 The feud withinthe Awami League was ripeningwhile the fate of its
cabinet was hanging in the balance. Some independentsupportersmoved
away fromthe coalition for purely personal considerations. But it was the
factionalfeuds in the Awami League which lowered the prestigeof the party
in the eyes of the public, and eventallythe Awami League cabinet collapsed
whentheNAP decided to oppose it.38

3Ittefaq,May 31, 1957.

"2AbulMansurAhmed,Ibid.
3"AtaurRahmanKhan, op. cit.,p. 248.
34Ibid.
"5Seealso Abul MansurAhmed,op. cit.
30AtaurRahmanKhan, op. cit.,p. 310.
37Ibid.
38TheAwami League Governmentin East Pakistan headed by Ataur Rahman Khan
resignedon June19, 1958 whenit lost a vote on a cut motionin the budget.The Awami
League Government was, however,restoredin August afterabout two monthsof Gov-
ernor'srule in the provinceand this was the ninthand the last cabinet in East Pakis-
tan under parliamentarygovernmentfrom1947 to 1958. Mr. Khan himselfwas now
headingtheAwamiLeague coalitionforthe thirdtime.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 581

With.thepromulgation of MartialLaw in October1958 thepoliticalpar-

ties were banned and all politicalactivitieswere suspendedin Pakistan
untiltheintroduction of thenew Constitution in 1962. The AwamiLeague
is yetto recoverfromthesetbacksit has suffered sinceitsrevivalin January
1964.
The AwamiLeague lentitssupportto theCombinedOppositionParties'
presidentialcandidate,Miss Fatima Jinnah,in 1964 and therewas little
scopeto consolidateitsownposition.The 1965 warwithIndia also brought
manifolddifficulties foroppositionpoliticsin Pakistan.In real terms,the
firstattempt to mobilizetheAwamiLeague was onlymade in 1966 when
a 6-pointprogramwas announced.From1966 to 1969, theAwamiLeague
sufferedorganizationally because most of its top leaders were in j ail.
The so-called"AgartalaConspiracycase" againstSheikhMujiburRahman
and othersin 1968 madesomepeopleapprehensive aboutjoiningtheAwami
League.Sinceits revival,theAll PakistanAwamiLeague Councilhasnever
met,39and the onlyactiveunitis theEast PakistanAwamiLeague which
has heldthreeCouncilsessionssince1964.40 Lastly,theimpositionof Mar-
tial Law on March25, 1969 had a generalset back on the activitiesof all
thepoliticalpartiesinPakistan.

DEMANDSFORREGIONALAUTONOMY

TheMuslimLeaguein EastPakistanhadfacedthedilemmaofservingtwo
loyalties-theEast Pakistanipeople and theAll-PakistanMus-
conflicting
lim League coupledwiththe centraladministration. Withits claim to be
a nationalparty,the AwamiLeague faced a similarsituationwhenit as-
sumedoffices in the 1950s. But beingan oppositionpartyformanyyears,
theAwamiLeague was morefreeto ventilatethegrievancesof East Pakis-
tan.The East PakistanAwamiLeague,startedin 1949 as a purelyprovin-
was subsequently
cial organization, mergedwiththeJinnahAwamiLeague
in WestPakistanorganizedby H. S. Suhrawardy.Nevertheless, the East
PakistanAwamiLeaguecontinuedto retainitsprovincialcharacter, and the
firstmanifestoof the AwamiLeague clearlystatedthatit stood for "the
rightof self-determinationof theregionalunits,"and had also demanded
thatEast Pakistanshouldhave its own defenseforces.41
AwamiLeague pressurein supportof regionaldemandsincreased.After
theassassinationofLiaquat Ali Khan,Khawaja NazimuddinbecamePrime
MinisterofPakistanand it was duringa visitto Dacca thathe declaredthat

"9Preparationsare being made to hold the firstAll-PakistanAwami League Council

Session at Dacca in thenear future.
'0Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is now simultaneouslythe Presidentof the East Pakistan
AwamiLeague and theAll-PakistanAwami League.
4"ShamsulHuq, East Pakistan Awami Muslim League DraftManifesto,p. 13, 17. The
Manifestodid notelaboratetherightofself-determination.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
582 THE AWAMI LEAGUE OF PAKISTAN

Urdushouldbe thesole statelanguagein Pakistan.42A sharpreactionfol-

lowedthisspeech.On January31, 1952, an All-PartiesActionCommittee
was formed--consistingof representativesof the oppositionsuch as the
Awami League, TamaddunMajlis, the Islamic brotherhood, the Youth
League and thestudentbodies of variousschools,collegesand Dacca Uni-
versity-43 to launch a province wide movementin support of Bengali as
a statelanguage.In theFebruary1952 languagemovement in theprovince,
some studentswerekilled,and manyleadingAwamiLeaguers,including
Maulana Bhasaniand SheikhMujiburRahman,werejailed.
The 21-pointelectoralprogramofthe1954 UnitedFrontalso includeda
categoricaldemandforthe recognition of Bengalias one of the statelan-
guagesin Pakistan.Later,Maulana Bhasaniwentevenfurther withhis de-
mandthatBengalibe introduced at all stagesof educationand administra-
tion,and thattheCentralGovernment's powersshouldbe restricted to three
subjects-i.e., defense,foreignpolicyand currency-andthat othersub-
jectsshouldbe leftwiththeprovincegovernments.44
The AwamiLeague had to moderateits demandforEast Pakistan'sau-
tonomywhile Subrawardywas Prime Ministerof Pakistan.While this
situationprovidedsomeprotection forthe AwamiLeague cabinetin East
Pakistanagainstthe centralgovernment's interferencewiththe provincial
administration, theAwamiLeagueministry in East Pakistanalso couldnot
pressits demandstoo farand thusembarrassits AwamiLeague colleagues
at theCenter.45 Pressureforregionalautonomy, however,continuedat the
partylevel.At theKagmarisessionof theAwamiLeague Councilin 1957,
Maulana Bhasani bluntlystatedthatthe EasternWing shouldsay "good
bye" to WestPakistanif thelatterfailedto concedeher demands.46 In his
letterof resignationfromthe Awami League, Maulana Bhasani charged
thatthe AwamiLeague government had failedto give autonomyto East
Pakistan.47
The draftmanifestoof theAwamiLeague afterits revivalin 1964 de-
mandedfullautonomyforthe regionsof Pakistan,as well as the removal
of disparitiesbetweenthetwowingsof Pakistanin theeconomic,adminis-
trativeand politicalspheresby treatingthetwo wingsof Pakistanas two

2The Azad, January28, 1952. Quaid-e-AzamM. A. Jinnahmade the firstannounce-

ment in 1948 to the effectthat Urdu alone should be the state language of Pakistan
whichwas protestedin East Pakistan.
"Ibid., February2, 1952. See also Historyof Language Movement(a Bengali pamph-
let), (Dacca, 1952).
44Addressof Maulana Bhasani at EPAML's Council Session, Dacca, 1955.
4"Onone occasion Prime MinisterSuhrawardyclaimed that98% autonomyhad been
given to the provincesunder the 1956 Constitution.This statementput the East Pakis-
tanAwamiLeague cabinetintoa veryawkwardposition.
6lttefaq,February15, 1957.
"7ThePakistan Observer,July25, 1957.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 583

separate economies.48 The culmination of the Awami League demand for

regional autonomy came in March 1966 when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
put forwardhis Six-Point Program which may be summed up as follows 4
(1) The constitutionshould provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its
true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and the parliamentary
formof governmentwith supremacyof a Legislature directlyelected on the
basis of universal adult franchise.
(2) The federal Governmentshould deal with only two subjects, Defense
and Foreign Affairs,and all otherresiduary subjects shall be vested in the
federatingstates.
(3) Two separate but freelyconvertiblecurrenciesfor two wings should
be introduced; or if this is not feasible, there should be one currencyfor
the whole country,but effectiveconstitutionalprovisions should be intro-
duced to stop the flightof capital fromEast to West Pakistan. Futhermore,
a separate Banking Reserve should be established and separate fiscal and
nmonetary policy be adopted for East Pakistan.
(4) The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the
federatingunits and the federal centerwill have no such power. The federa-
tion will be entitledto a share in the state taxes to meet its expenditures.
(5) There should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange
earnings of the two wings; the foreignexchange requirementsof the federal
governmentshould be metby the two wings equally or in a ratio to be fixed;
indigenous products should move free of duty between the two wings and
the constitutionshould empower the units to establish trade link with for-
eign countries.
(6) East Pakistan should have a separate militia or paramilitary force.
The im-pactof the six-point demand of the Awami League was felt far
and wide. The central governmentdubbed it as a demand for the separa-
tion of the Eastern Wing fromthe rest of the country,and launched a prop-
aganda campaign which called for a strong central government and
decried the autonomists.On June 6, 1966, therewas a province-widehartal
(strike) in East Pakistan sponsored by the Awami League to press the de-
mands embodied in the six-pointprogram.50Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, along

48SheikhMujibur Rahman,East Pakistan Awami League DraftManifesto,Dacca, p.

5. The real purposeof the Awami League demand forregional autonomyis to establish
a balance of power for East Pakistan which would introducefastereconomic develop-
ment in the province.It has been argued repeatedlythat West Pakistan has been the
beneficiaryof the CentralGovernmentexpenditure,and this imbalance can be set right
only by givingthe East Wing greaterautonomy.See also K. B. Sayeed, The Political
SystemofPakistan, Chapter8 (Boston: HoughtenMifflin Company,1967) and Unhappy
East Pakistan, (a pamphlet) (St. Peter: Jersey,1962).
4"SheikhMujibur Rahman,6-PointFormula, op. cit. See also Tajuddin Ahmed,East
Pakistan AwamiLeague Manifesto,(Dacca, 1969).
"0Therewere severalclashes betweenthe police and the strikersduringwhichten per-
sons werekilled. The Pakistan Observer,June8, 1966.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
584 THE AWAMI LEAGUE OF PAKISTAN

withseveral of his lieutenants,were again put into the prison.51The govern-

mentalso blamed "foreigninterests"in the agitation led by the six-pointers.
Afterabout a year several East Pakistani civil servants and militaryoffi-
cers were arrestedon the charge thattheyhad conspired to separate the East
Wing by violent means in collusion with India. Eventually, the so-called
"Agartala Conspiracy case" was initiated against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
and 34 othersfor alleged high treason. The trial was opened at the Dacca
Cantonmentby a special tribunalconsistingof senior judges of the Supreme
Court and High Courts of Pakistan. Eleven of the accused turned approver-
witnesson behalf of the government(they were pardoned by the Govern-
ment) but the rest,including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, denied the charges
brought against them. The "Agartala Trial" was soon synchronisedwith
the country-widemovementagainst the Ayub regime which also demand-
ed greaterautonomyfor East Pakistan. The opposition leaders met at Dacca
and formedthe Democratic Action Committee(DAC) which demanded the
restorationof parliamentarydemocracy and a direct franchise.
The formationof the DAC was warmly welcomed by the studentcom-
munityof East Pakistan who spearheaded the anti-Ayubmovementin the
province. Two leading studentparties in East Pakistan, the East Pakistan
Students'League (aligned with the Awami League) and the East Pakistan
Students'Union (aligned with the NAP), formed a Students' Action Clom-
mittee (SAC). The political demands incorporated in the lipoint pro-
gram formulatedby SAC included: parliamentarydemocracy on the basis
of adult franchise; full autonomyfor East Pakistan and also autonomy for
the formerprovinces of West Pakistan; restrictionof the Federal Govern-
ment to only three functions, defense, foreign policy and currency. It
also proposed that East Pakistan be given the power to form a militia or
paramilitary force and that the headquarters of the Navy be trans-
ferredto the province.52For all practical purposes, the eleven-pointstudent
programwas an expanded version of the Awami League's six-pointdemand
for autonomy.
Under great pressure, President Ayub was compelled to withdraw the
"Agartala Conspiracy" case against Sheikh Mujibur Rabman and his co-
defendants.He also agreed to meet the opposition leaders at a Round Table
Conferenceto discuss the constitutionalproblems of the country. Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman emerged from being the primary defendantin a treason
trial to the status of a leader dominatingnational opinion. The feelings in
the East Wing ran high against West Pakistan and the central administra-
tion. During the political turmoil,the army (mostly fromWest Pakistan)

"While Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was in jail, the Awami League became a divided
house, with two clear divisions-the six-pointersand the pro-PDM (Pakistan Demo-
cratic Movement,an alliance of the major opposition parties in Pakistan formedin
1967 to fightthe Ayub regime). Undoubtedly,the six-pointersformedthe majorityfac-
tionin theparty.
52PakistanObserver,January6, 1969. Also 11-PointPrograrrme(a pamphlet).

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 585

had been used to put down agitationsand manyhad been killedin East
Pakistan.In West Pakistan,the politicalagitationturnedagainst Ayub
because of his "failure"in the 1965 war withIndia, but East Pakistan
lookeduponhis politicalsystemas theinstrument ofWestPakistan'sdomi-
nation.The politicalconcessionmade by PresidentAyub did not satisfy
thepeople in theEast wherethe agitationsand violencegraduallyspread
into the rural areas. In this context,SheikhMujibur Rahmancould not
moderatehis demandfor regionalautonomywithoutriskinghis political
future.At theRoundTable Conference, he demandedfullautonomyforthe
EasternWing and representation in the centrallegislatureon thebasis of
population(whichwouldgive a majorityto East Pakistan).53
Afteragreeingat theconference table to introducea parliamentary sys-
temand directadult franchise, PresidentAyubis reportedto have asked
SheikhMujiburRahmanprivately(over dinner)notto pushhis demands
forregionalautonomyand proportional representation untilthesetwobasic
reformshad been passed in the NationalAssembly.54 Only fourdays be-
foreMartialLaw was again imposed,SheikhMujiburRahmansubmitted
draftconstitutional amendments to the President,whichenvisageda fed-
eral parliamentary systemwithregionalautonomybased on the six-point
programof the Awami League and SAC's eleven-point demand.55Presi-
dentAyubwas shockedto learnthatSheikhMujiburRabmanwas in fact
planningto place beforetheNationalAssemblyhis own draftbill. He ap-
prehendedthatRahman'samendment mightjust be carriedwiththe sup-
portof Sindhis,Bengalis,Pathansand Baluchimembersor thattheprivate
bill wouldcreateanotherstalemate in theAssembly itself.Eventually,
Presi-
dentAyub handed over powerto the ArmystatingthatSheikhMujibur
Rahman's amendment"would liquidate the Central Governmentand
Army."56
On November28, 1969, PresidentGeneralMohammedYahya Khan an-
nouncedthatPakistanwould go to the polls in October1970 to elect a
NationalAssemblywhichwill framea constitution for the country.Since
this announcement was made,the martiallaw restrictionson politicalac-
tivitieshave been relaxedand the politicalpartiesare now propagating
theirviews freely.The Awami League has launcheda vigorouselection
campaignin East Pakistanwiththe six-pointprogramas theirelection
manifesto.Later, on March 30, 1970 PresidentYahya Khan announced
the Legal FrameworkOrderwhichwould governthe conductof elections
as wellas theroleofthefutureNationalAssembly(consistingof 313 mem-
bers of whom169 willbe fromEast Pakistan) in framinga Constitution.

"3See Address by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the Round Table Conferenceheld at

Rawalpindi, (Dacca, 1969).
6&TheTimes,April9, 1969.
"5Acopyof the Draftof the Bill was made available to the authorby Tajuddin Ahmed,
Secretaryof EPAL. See also Pakistan Observer,March 25, 1969.
"6TheTimes,April9, 1969; see also Pakistan Observer,March 26, 1969.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
586 THE AWAMI LEAGUE OF PAKISTAN

The Orderdeclaredthatthefutureconstitution of Pakistanmustpreserve

fivefundamental principles:an Islamicideology;territorialintegrity;
free
electionsand theindependence of judiciary; a federalsystemensuringau-
tonomyto theprovincesas well as adequatelegislative,administrative and
financialpowersfortheCentralGovernment; and fullopportunities
to the
peopleof all regionsforparticipation in nationalaffairs.The Orderstipu-
latesthatif the Presidentrefusesto authenticate the constitution,
the Na-
tionalAssemblywouldstanddissolvedand thathe wouldbe thesole arbiter
in interpretingthe Order.
The AwamiLeague as wellas someotherpoliticalpartiesin East Pakis-
tanhavechallengedtheseprovisionsofLegal Framework Orderwhichthey
argueamountto thenegationof democratic principles.The AwamiLeague
is particularly
apprenhensive of thefactthatthe Legal FrameworkOrder
maybe utilizedby the Presidentto refuseauthentication of any Constitu-
tionwhichwouldgivemaximumautonomyto East Pakistanin conformity
withtheparty'ssix-pointelectionmanifesto.
CONCLUSION:

One conclusionwhichemergesfromtheabove is thattheAwamiLeague

is notyeta strongpartyin organizational terms.Its main contribution in
the1950's had been thebuildingup of oppositionin thecountryand also
in the politicizationof the masses.The Awami League can rightlyclaim
thatit gave thefirstlessonsin agitationalpoliticsto Pakistan.Nevertheless,
its organizationalloyaltieswerenot significantly betterthanthose of the
MuslimLeague whichwas routedin the 1954 elections.
It is noteworthythatthe AwamiLeague has been able to cultivatethe
loyaltyofthestudentsand it is throughthemthatit has been able to main-
tain contactwiththe people. Duringthe languagemovement in 1952 the
AwamiLeague was able to wintheconfidence of thestudents'community
whichalso playeda significant role in all otheranti-government agitations
in East Pakistan,as wellas in theanti-Ayub movement in early1969. The
East PakistanStudents'League (EPSL) is campaigningfor the Awami
League six-pointprogram,57 and it is well-known thattheLeague is now
workingcloselywiththe AwamiLeague on all otherimportant political
issues.
The real strength of theAwamiLeague in Pakistanis thepopularityof
itsleader,SheikhMujiburRahman,whoreceiveda hero'swelcomeat Dacca
and elsewhere in theProvincewhenhe was releasedin 1969 aftertwoyears
in jail. A volatileand a fieryspeaker,his approachto politicsis stillper-
sonal and he is essentiallyguided by politicalinstincts.He feelsthathe
can help the people throughhis sufferings. He wantsto communicate di-

"7Theleft wing National Awami Party (NAP) is also supportedby a student's or-
ganization,the East Pakistan Students'Union (EPSU), whichat the momentis sharply
dividedintopro-Moscowand pro-Pekingfactions.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
M. RASHIDUZZAMAN 587

rectlywiththepeoplethroughpublicmeetings.Since he was releasedfrom

prison,SheikhMujibur Rahmanhas been touringthe provinceto bring
his partycloserto thepeople.But thispersonalapproachto partybuilding
is likelyto be replacedby one placinggreateremphasison organizational
skillin thenear future.The mostseriouschallengeto theAwamiLeague
comesfromtheleftist NationalAwamiPartywhichhas demonstrated better
organizingabilityat thegrassroots level.58To many,theAwamiLeague is
an organizationof the middleclass in East Pakistan.While it fightsfor
regionalautonomy, theyargue,theAwamiLeague onlyproposesto replace
thenon-Bengali bourgeoisby a Bengalibourgeois.To meettheNAP's chal-
lenge,however,theAwamiLeague has recently startedorganizingLabour
Leagues as componentelementsin theparty.
The real strengthof theAwamiLeague is notits organizationalskillbut
the growingpopularityof its programof regionalautonomywiththe 70
millionBengalisin East Pakistan.We have alreadynotedthata popular
movement startedin East Pakistanfollowingthe announcement of Awami
League six-point programand thechangingpatternof Pakistanpoliticshas
eventually led to whatis undeniablya separatistmovement.Even themost
stringent repressivemeasuresand centralizedadministration cannothalt
theprocess.As thechampionof thecause ofregionalautonomy, thefuture
of the Awami League lies in its capacityto sustainand strengthen the
-movement.

"8Thereis no studyof the NAP as yet,but this impressionis gatheredfromits ef-

fortsto bring the workersand peasants withinthe fold of the organization.Maulana
Bhasani, the NAP leader has recentlystartedorganizingthe peasants in the rural areas
of East Pakistan.

M. RASHIDUZZAMAN is a Reader in Political Science at the Universityof Dacca,

East Pakistan.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.208 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:40:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions