NAME: 201910880

SECTION: BLOCK C

CASE TITLE: FERNANDO A. GAITE, vs. ISABELO FONACIER, GEORGE KRAKOWER, LARAP

MINES & SMELTING CO., INC., SEGUNDINA VIVAS, FRNACISCO DANTE, PACIFICO ESCANDOR
and FERNANDO TY,  G.R. No. L-11827, July 31, 1961

FACTS OF THE CASE

By a “Deed of Assignment”, Isabelo Foncier, owner and/or holder, either by himself or during a

representative capacity, of 11 iron lode mineral claims, referred to as the Dawahan Group, Fernando Gaite was
constituted and named as his real and lawful attorney-in-fact to enter into a contract with an individual or legal
entity for the discovery and advancement of the mining industry, claims aforementioned on a royalty basis of not
but P.50 per ton of ore that may be extracted therefrom
Gaite successively executed a general assignment conveying the event and exploitation of said mining
claims into the Larap Iron Mines which he owned .Thereafter, Gaite proceeded with the event and exploitation of
the mining claims,and in time extracted therefrom what he claim and estimated to be approximately 24,000
metric plenty of ore. Inc., its assigns, administrators, or successors in interests.
Fonacier signed a surety bond with himself as principal, the Larap Mines and Smelting Co., to ensure
the payment of P65,000, and its stockholder as sureties. Hence a second bond was produced with Far Eastern
Surety as a further surety, provided the liability of Far Eastern would only prosper when there had been an actual
sale of the iron ores of not but the agreed amount of P65k,moreover, its liability was to automatically expire on
December 1955.
When Fonacier and his sureties did not pay as demanded by Gaite, the latter filed this complaint against
them within the Court of First Instance of Manila for the payment of the P65,000.00 balance of the value of the
ore, consequential damages, and attorney's fees.

ISSUES:

When the defendants refused to renew the surety bond underwritten by the Far Eastern Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc., which expired on December 8, 1955, the duty of Fonacier and his sureties to pay Gaite
P65,000.00 became due and demandable.

RULING OF THE COURT:

Yes, The particular reason for this circumstance is that Gaite was within his rights in demanding
payment and bringing this action one year after the contract was signed, either because the appellant debtors had
tampered with the original securities and thus forfeited any further time to pay; or because the payment term was
originally set at one year, and the balance of P65,000 became due and payable after that time.
While as to Fonacier's right to demand the Gaite wait for the mine to be sold or shipped before
receiving payment; or, in other words, whether or not they are entitled to take full advantage of the payment time
allotted to them.
Since the appellant failed to renew the Far Eastern Surety Company's bond or substitute it with an equal
pledge, they had forfeited their ability to force Gaite to wait for the selling of the mine before obtaining payment
of the balance of P65,000.00. since they failed to renew the Far Eastern Surety Company's bond or exchange it
with a comparable assurance The bonding company's undertaking expired on December 8, 1955, significantly
reducing the protection of the vendor's rights as borrower for the unpaid P65,000.00, a security that Gaite found
necessary and had insisted upon when he executed the deed of sale of the ore to Fonacier .
Nonetheless, the appellants' contention that Gaite's approval of the surety company's bond with full
awareness that it would immediately terminate after one year on its face was a waiver of its renewal after the
expiration date has little validity.
No such waiver may have been planned because Gaite stood to lose and had nothing to gain; and if
there was, it could only be rationally justified if the appellants promised to sell the ore and pay Gaite until the
surety company's bond expired on December 8, 1955. However, in the above case, the defendants'-appellants'
duty to pay became absolute one year after the ore was transferred to Fonacier, owing to the firstbond.
CASE TITLE: CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REMEDIOS FRANCO, FRANCISCO N. LOPEZ, CECILIA P. VDA. DE
LOPEZ, REDAN LOPEZ AND REMARENE LOPEZ, G.R. No. 112127 July 17, 1995

FACTS OF THE CASE

CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Court of
Appeals' ruling, which overturned the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City's order ordering petitioner to relinquish
the land donated to it by their predecessor-in-interest to private respondents.

In 1939, late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr. signed a deed of donation of a parcel of land to Central Philippines
University (CPU) with the following conditions:

 The property would be used solely for the purpose of establishing and operating a medical college.

 The land shall not be sold, transferred, or conveyed to any third party or in any manner by CPU.

 The property will be known as the "Ramon Lopez Campus."

However, in 1989, the respondents, who are Don Ramon's heirs, filed an action against CPU seeking an
annulment of the donation, re-conveyance, and damages, alleging that the University had failed to comply with
the terms of the donation since 1939, and that the University had negotiated with the National Housing Authority
(NHA) to exchange the donated land for another land.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Petitioner violated the terms of the donation, causing it to be revoked

RULING OF THE COURT:

No, The Supreme Court finds that, since the documents are plain and the facts are undisputed,
petitioner has refused to comply with its duty as performed from the execution of the deed of donation until
the filing of the instant action. Since CPU has failed to fulfill its duty for an inordinate amount of time, it is
only fair and equal to consider the donation unsuccessful.

- Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, the retention of rights, as well as the extinguishment or
deprivation of those that have already been obtained, is based on the occurrence of the circumstance that
constitutes the situation. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter build a
school on the land, the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition, but a
resolutory one
-If the condition was not fulfilled or complied with, as is the case here, the donation may now be
revoked and all rights that the done may have acquired under the donation may now be revoked.

Thus, The Supreme Court ruled that the donation's conditions were resolutory requirements,
meaning that if the conditions are met, the duty is discharged.
CASE TITLE: HEIRS OF ANTONIO F. BERNABE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TITAN
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 154402 : July 21, 2008

FACTS OF THE CASE

Respondent Titan ConstructionCorporation (Titan) lodged a Complaint for Clear Results against
petitioners, who are co-owners of an undivided 1/2  share in two parcels of land in La Huerta, Paraaque, Metro
Manila. Titan and the defendants entered into an undated Deed of Sale of Real Estate in which the latter sold
their 1/2  share of the assets to Titan for P17,700,00.00 to be paid in the following manner: ONE MILLION
PESOS upon the signing of the DEEDOF SALE by the VENDORS, and the remainder within, but not later than
60  days. Titan requested an injunction requiring defendants to fulfill their contractual commitments and pay
restitution, claiming that it had already paid a significant part of the down payment.
Jose died on December 26, 1991, when the lawsuit was still pending, leaving no heirs but his co-
defendants.
Titan and the other claimants then reached a settlement deal, in which the latter agreed to sell their 1/2
share of the assets to Titan and waived all claims for losses they may have against each other. Respondent Titan
as vendee and defendants Patricio, Cecilia, and Antonio, who is represented by his attorneys-in-fact, as vendors
of their undivided shares in the two properties entered into identical Deeds of Conditional Sale dated 3 March
1994 as a result of the settlement deal. The three deeds were all equally worded and featured the same terms and
conditions, with the selling price being the only exception.
The RTC directed the heirs to execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale over Antonio's one-third
(1/3) share of the property protected by TCT No. 86793 of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque, in accordance with
the Deed of Conditional Sale, upon Titan's payment to them of the remainder of the purchase price of
P3,431,058.42. The Court of Appeals heard the petitioners' appeal of the RTC ruling. The appeal was turned
down. As a result, this motion for review has been filed.

ISSUES:

-Is it possible for the vendee to force the vendors to sign a registerable deed of sale?

-May the vendors in a deed of contractual sale apply for the deal to be canceled if the seller fails
to pay the agreed-upon consideration in full?

RULING OF THE COURT:

The Deed of Conditional Sale has superseded the Deed of Sale of Real Estate, which was the initial
deal, as a result of the settlement arrangement reached by Titan and petitioners.
A perfected contract of sale is embodied in the first contract, also known as the Deed of Sale of Real
Estate.
These deeds, both titled Deed of Conditional Sale, are all for the purpose of selling something.
Petitioners pleaded in front of the trial court that their father Antonio, his co-owners, and Titan did not
enter into a consummated sale; that the Deed of Sale of Real Estate represented only an unconsummated
agreement; and that the Deed of Conditional Sale, which petitioners Shirley Anne and Jose III signed on behalf
of their father, embodied only an unconsummated negotiation.
They contested the contracts' legality, but also called for rescission based on Titan's inability to meet its
contractual obligations. With the trial court ruling that the parties had entered into a legal deal for the selling of
the land, petitioners harped on Titan's alleged inability to meet its commitments under the contract to sell in their
brief before the Court of Appeals, and requested rescission of the contract on that basis. This court is presented
with the same claims.
Moreover, the rescission request is based on New Civil Code Article 1191. This essay discusses the
application of torescission to mutual responsibilities.
Reciprocal obligations are those that derive from the same source, in which each party is a debtor and a
borrower of the other, and in which each party's obligation is contingent on the other's obligation.
While the word "rescission" is used in Article 1191. Article 1124 of the old Civil Code, on which the
article was based, used the original expression. The original term which was used in Article 1124 of the old Civil
Code, from which the article was based, was the word "resolution."
Resolution is a primary intervention focused on a party's or the other party's loss of confidence, and
breaches the reciprocity amongst them.
CASE TITLE: VIRGILIO R. ROMERO, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ENRIQUETA CHUA VDA. DE
ONGSIONG, G.R. No. 107207, November 23, 1995

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner Virgilio R. Romero was a civil engineer who worked in the perlite filter supports, permalite
insulation, and refined perlite ore industries. Petitioner and his international associates agreed to construct a
central warehouse on 2,000 square meters of land in Metro Manila in 1988. Except for the presence of squatters
in the city, petitioner considered the property of private respondent Enriqueta Chua vda. de Ongsiong to be
suitable for a central warehouse.
Both petitioner and private respondent, a contract called a "Deed of Conditional Sale" was signed, with
the following clause: "It is hereby agreed, covenanted, and stipulated by and between the parties hereto that if the
VENDOR shall not be able to remove the squatters from the property being purchased after 60 days from the
date of this contract, the down payment made by the b
In accordance with the deal, private respondent lodged an eviction case with the MTC against Melchor Musa and
29 other squatter families. The accused were ordered to vacate the property by a judge. The announcement was
made after the 60-day deadline had expired. Private respondent asked for the P50,000.00 she got from petitioner
to be returned because she couldn't "get rid of the squatters" on the property, she stated. In his reaction,
petitioner's attorney, Sergio A.F. Apostol, rejects the tender and offers that his client evict the squatters himself,
provided that all costs incurred as a result of the eviction will be charged to the land's purchasing price.
Meanwhile, the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (“PCUD”) has requested a 45-day grace
period from the MTC to evacuate and relocate the squatter families. This request has been approved. Mr.
Attorney. Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr. was represented by Joaquin Yuseco, Jr., counsel for the private respondent.
Apostol claimed that his client's refusal to expel the squatters from the property during the agreed-upon 60-day
time frame made the Deed of Conditional Sale null and void. He went on to say that the private respondent had
"decided to keep the house."
Private respondent lodged a rescission of the deed of "conditional" sale, plus damages, and for the
consignment of P50,000.00 cash with the RTC, followed by petitioner's continuing failure to consider the return
of the P50,000.00 advance payment.
Respondent has little power to revoke when she "violated her duty to evict the squatters from the
relevant land," according to MTC.

ISSUES:
Is it permissible for a seller to claim the revocation of a lease for the selling of a parcel of land because
he failed to get the squatters on the subject property evicted within the contractually stipulated time frame?

RULING OF THE COURT:

No, The decision of CA is reversed and set aside. Due to the fact that A perfected contract of sale can
be either unconditional or conditional, depending on whether there are certain conditions put on the passing of
title to the thing to be transferred or on the responsibility of one of the parties. When possession is maintained
until a positive condition is met, the failure to meet the condition merely prevents the obligation to express title
from being compulsory. If a provision is levied on a party's commitment that is not met, the other party has the
option of refusing to continue or waiving the condition (Art. 1545, Civil Code).
The title granted to the contract by the parties is less important than its content in deciding its true
nature. If title to the property sold is not vested in the vendor or if the vendor is not given the power to arbitrarily
void the contract based on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the specified condition, a
deed of sale, while being designated as a deed of conditional sale, may be considered as absolute in nature.
In the form of a mastered contract of sale, the term "position" refers to one party's conformity with an
obligation, the satisfaction of which would beckon the demandability of the mutual prestation of the other party.
The shared duties in question will usually be the payment of the negotiated sales price by the vendor and the
execution of such express warranties by the vendor (which, in the case at bench is the timely eviction of the
squatters on the property).
The parties are committed not only to the execution of what has been specifically stipulated, but also to
any effects that, by their design, may be in accordance with good faith, use, and statute, from the moment the
contract is perfected. The arrangement requires the private respondent to remove the squatters from the premises.
The eviction of the squatters is a requirement, the operative act of which begins the time within which the
applicant must fulfill his own duty, namely, to pay the balance of the purchase price. In accordance with Article
1545 of the Civil Code, if the private respondent fails to "strip the squatters from the premises" within the
specified time, petitioner has the option to continue to comply with the arrangement or to waive the condition.
CASE TITLE:UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, in his capacity as JUDGE of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE IN
QUEZON CITY, et al., G.R. No. L-28602, September 29, 1970

FACTS OF THE CASE

According to Act 3608, the University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a logging agreement with
ALUMCO, giving the latter logging rights over a piece of land owned by UP. ALUMCO, on the other hand,
accrued debts that were not paid.

ALUMCO signed a "Acknowledgement of Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments" after receiving
notice from UP that it would cancel the deal, pledging to settle its accrued debts and agreeing that if it did not,
UP will consider the logging arrangement as rescinded without the need for legal action.

ALUMCO accrued new debts despite the document's implementation. As a result, UP notified
ALUMCO of its decision to cancel the deal. ALUMCO, on the other hand, resumed its activities, opting to file a
temporary injunction and a preliminary attachment for the settlement of ALUMCO's debts.

UP was willing to enter into another logging deal with another firm while the lawsuit was pending. ALUMCO,
on the other hand, secured a temporary injunction against UP and the new company, allowing them to resume
logging operations. ALUMCO said that UP could not unilaterally terminate the deal without a court order. As a
result, this petition has been established.

ISSUES:

Whether or not UP can extra-judicially rescind the logging agreement with ALUMCO

RULING OF THE COURT:

Yes, actually. “There is nothing in the statute that forbids the parties from entering into an
arrangement that a breach of the contract's terms would result in its termination, even without court
intervention,” the Court previously ruled in Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Company. To put it another
way, it is not necessarily appropriate for the affected party to seek rescission of the contract in court.”

The ALUMCO is barred from arguing that UP cannot rescind the contract without judicial
intervention until the "Acknowledgement of Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments" is signed. ALUMCO
clearly acknowledges UP's ability to revoke the deal without resorting to legal action in the
acknowledgement. As a result, they are unable to argue otherwise under the theory of estoppel.
CASE TITLE:  DY-DUMALASA, vs. FERNANDEZ, et al, G.R. NO. 178760 : July 23, 2009

FACTS OF THE CASE

Former Helios Manufacturing Corporation (HELIOS) employees Domingo Fernandez and others filed
a lawsuit alleging wrongful firing or company termination, non-payment of wages, and other financial charges
against HELIOS. The Labor Arbiter determined that the closing of the Muntinlupa office/plant was a ruse, as
HELIOS merely moved its operations to a new plant in Carmona, Cavite, under the new name of Pat & Suzara,
in reaction to the newly formed local union. HELIOS, the Board of Directors, and its stockholders were also
found accountable.

The NLRC overturned the Labor Arbiter's Order, ruling that Dumalasa is not jointly and severally
responsible with HELIOS for Fernandez, et allawsuit .'s because there is no evidence that she behaved in bad
faith or that HELIOS is unable to meet its obligations. Dumalasa filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
rejected, but she took her case to the Court of Appeals.

Moreover, The NLRC Resolution was revoked and set aside by the appellate court, which held that
what the NLRC actually changed was the Labor Arbiter's Decision, not the Order dismissing the Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution. This is an illegal act because the Decision has since been definitive and executory,
and hence cannot be overturned or changed.

Nonetheless, The appellate court held that the NLRC's finding that Dumalasa was not jointly and
severally liable was superfluous because there was no argument, either in the main case or in the Writ, that the
responsibility was solidary. As a result, Dumalasa is only joint and severally responsible for the judgment award.
Dumalasa asked for the appellate court's decision to be reconsidered, but it was rejected. As a result, this petition
has been established.

ISSUES:

- Whether or not the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over Dumalasa

-Whether or not Dumalasa jointly and severally responsible for the judgment award with HELIOS

RULING OF THE COURT:

No, Despite the fact that there was allegedly no legitimate service of summons, the Labor Arbiter
acquired authority over Dumalasa's citizen, contrary to Dumalasa's assertion. Clearly, the counsel hired by
HELIOS properly advised Dumalasa in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. The fact that Dumalasa
and her fellow Board members choose to ignore the summons and avoid taking advantage of the chance to
protect themselves by hiding behind the corporate curtain does not exclude them from the enforcement of
labour laws. Dumalasa will no longer challenge the Writ of Execution's execution on the grounds that
authority over her body was not properly obtained or that HELIOS has a different and distinct personality
as a corporate agency.

On Carmen's liability, a review of the Labor Arbiter's Decision reveals that, beyond the finding of
management's bad faith, the dispositive section of the decision did not directly name the officers and Board
members, like Dumalasa's, solidary liability. In reality, the Court believes that the current case is
Dumalasa's last-ditch effort to get out of her share of the judgment responsibility and to discuss the
defenses that she neglected to raise when given the chance. About the fact that Dumalasa asserts that she is
not contesting the Labor Arbiter's final and executory decision and accepts shared responsibility, she
continues to assert the defenses that authority was not acquired over her person and that HELIOS has a
distinct legal identity. Dumalasa conveniently ignores the fact that her house and lot are simply conjugal
property belonging to her and her husband as she questions the levy on them.
CASE TITLE: PRYCE CORPORATION (formerly PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION), 
vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 157480 May 6, 2005

FACTS OF THE CASE

Pryce Properties Corporation officials met with the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation in
the first half of 1992 to discuss the prospect of opening a casino in the Pryce Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro City.

They included an addendum to the deal that included the leasing of an extra 1000 square meters of hotel
property as living granters and a playground for casino employees.
On December 18, 1992, PAGCOR announced the commencement of their casino operations.
Because of the protest, PAGCOR was forced to halt casino activities.

The rally was ultimately called off due to an understanding reached between PPC and PAGCOR, as
well as rallyist representatives.
The Sangguniang Pang lungsod of Cagayan de Oro City passed Ordinance No. 3375-93, which
prohibits the activity of casinos and imposes penalties for violations.

PPC then lodged a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction in the Court of Appeals against
then-public respondent Cagayan de Oro City, requesting that the Ordinance be declared unconstitutional.
PAGCOR reopened its casinos, but due to ongoing protests, the company agreed to close its operations
in Cagayan de Oro City.

In the event of a lease pre-termination, PPC sent PAGCOR to recover the entire rent.
PPC alleged that PAGCOR was consistently breaking their contract, so the lease was terminated.

ISSUES:

Whether or not PPC’s act of terminating the contract of lease with PAGCOR refers to a
valid rescission or simply termination of contracts.

RULING OF THE COURT:

Yes, In conclusion that .If the clause of the Contract is not contrary to statute, morality, good
order, or public policy, Pryce Corporation has the freedom to receive future rentals. “Obligations resulting
from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith,” according to Art. 1159 of the Civil Code. In deference to the parties' interests, the constitution
permits them to enter into whatever stipulations, provisions, terms, and conditions they see fit, as long as
they are not in violation of the statute, morality, good customs, public order, or public policy.”

In order to return the parties to their initial condition prior to the contract's inception, mutual
restitution is expected in a rescission. Applying this idea to this situation, PPC would reclaim ownership of
the rented property, and PAGCOR would be reimbursed for the hotel room rents it paid to the former. In a
case of dissolution, however, the parties are not returned to their former positions, nor is the contract
handled as though it never existed. The parties are required to fulfill their mutual commitments prior to its
termination. They will be free from their commitments only after the deal has been canceled.