Leveraging OSINT To Track Cyber Threat Actors, Curtis Hanson

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Leveraging

OSINT to track
cyber threat
actors
SANS OSINT Summit
February 2021
Who is speaking?

Curtis Hanson
• Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst at PwC.

• Previous work includes enhanced due diligence investigations and KYC checks.

• Area of focus is Middle East and Africa, tracking mostly Iran-based threat actors.

Contact Info
curtis.hanson@pwc.com
@cybershtuff

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Today’s discussion

1. A look at using Twitter trends to attribute and timeline events.

2. Finding information not previously reported by the FBI.

3. Validating an anonymous source before it goes public.

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1 An
obstacle
is
inspiration
Who is Lab Dookhtegan?

Background
• Who: Lab Dookhtegan – an unknown entity.
• When: 26 March 2019.
• What: Leaks highly sensitive information on an
Iran-based threat actor called OilRig (e.g.,
technical details, victims, personnel).
• Where: Online via Telegram (initially Twitter but
account was shutdown quickly).
• Why: An intent to deny, disrupt, degrade the
Iranian government – hallmarks of an information
operation.

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Information on the periphery

Using Twitter trends for


attribution and timelining
• Social media accounts deleted
after being exposed, so limited
validation of authenticity (i.e., post
mortem social media analysis).
• Twitter trends are based on the
following:
– Location
– Likes
– Retweets
– Following #Norway, #Oslo, #trondheim, #MUFC, #Liverpool, #Oslo
– Followers #DJRG19, #ESNball, #debatten

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Second day of the
countering online
disinformation
symposium in Oslo.
#DJRG19

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Quick recap

Techniques Tools and Sources Applications


• Analyse the • Twitter trends data. • Timeline events.
background. • Seven days for current • Geolocate.
• Twitter trends and trends. • Assess motivations and
hashtags. • Historical data is intentions.
available.

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2 Leave
no
stone
unturned
FBI Most Wanted

Behzad Mesri
• Indicted twice (2017 & 2019).
• Stole GoT and attempted extortion.
• Targeted US intelligence personnel.
• Allegedly working for the IRGC.
• Typical details provided by the FBI:
– Alias (Skote Vahshat)
– Date of Birth (24 Aug 1988)
– Nationality (Iranian)

Which cyber activity does Mr. Mesri


most closely align with?

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Cross referencing information

Indictment and Sanctions


• 2019 indictment lists Mr. Mesri
registered a company on 23
December 2014.
• However, the company is only known
to the US government at the time.
• Until OFAC sanctions the company
and lists it as NET PEYGARD
SMAVAT.
• NET PEYGARD SMAVAT is a
transliteration from Farsi, so easy to
use Farsi keyboard to switch back to
native language.

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A goldmine of information

Incorporation Records
• Translate NET PEYGARD SMAVAT
to Farsi and look up in Iran’s
corporate registry records.
• Company record lists Mr. Mesri as
CEO, along with three other board
appointments.
• Mr. Mesri’s National ID number is
also listed.

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Missing from both the FBI & OFAC

Behzad Mesri
National
Identification
2909905624

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Trust but verify

Dates and Calendars


• Activity per the indictment aligns very closely with a
known cyber campaign between April – May 2014.
• 10/02/1393 is listed on the incorporation records,
but DOJ says December 23, 2014.
• Iran uses the Persian calendar, while the West uses
the Gregorian calendar.
• US uses date format (MM/DD/YY).
• Iran uses the international date format (DD/MM/YY).
• This leads to a mistake and NET PEYGARD
SMAVAT is actually registered in April 2014.

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Quick recap

Techniques Tools and Sources Applications


• Cross reference • Indictments. • National ID numbers of
information. • Sanctions entities.
• Trust but verify. announcements. • Identify corporate
• Use incorporation • Corporate registration appointments.
records. records in Iran. • Dates of incorporation.
• Link analysis tool
(Maltego).

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3 Hiding
in
plain
sight
A simple news article

What’s in the article?


• The Daily Beast reports on 22 October
2019 of an “Iranian Hacking Group”.
• Citing a sealed US indictment and an
anonymous source familiar with the matter.
• Allegedly M.R.S.CO and Iranian Dark
Coders Team are the threat actors.
• They targeted the satellite industry between
2016 and 2017.
• An alleged victim cited in the article is
Digital Globe.

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Thinking like a hacker

Spoofing the target’s domain


• Attempted different permutations of Digital
Globe
– dlgitialglobe[.]com (i → l)
– digitalglobe[.]tk (TLD change)
– digitalqlobe[.]com (g → q) – We have a
winner!

• Passive DNS records show ‘digitalqlobe’ is


registered/used around 2016-2017,
alongside other suspicious domains.

• Domain appears in a 2017 report on an


Iran-based threat actor, who has an HBO
hacker connection…sounds familiar!?

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The HBO hacker connection

Simple search to further the


investigation
• Online search for “M.R.S.CO”.
• Results include a public code written
by “M.R.S.CO” and a friend, which
includes the alias Skote_Vahshat.
• Skote Vahshat is Mr. Mesri’s alias
per his FBI Most Wanted Poster
• Can now assess with greater
confidence that the original news
story is valid, while furthering the
initial reporting.

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19
Iranian Hackers
Indicted for Stealing
Data from Aerospace
and Satellite Tracking
Companies
US Department of Justice
17 September 2020

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Quick recap

Techniques Tools and Sources Applications


• Read the news. • Search engines (try • Validate an anonymous
• Think like a hacker. them all). source.
• Use simple searches to • Passive DNS records. • Expand on the initial
further the • Indictments. report.
investigation. • Produce intelligence
before widely and
publicly reported.

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In closing

1. No need for fancy technical tools or capabilities to conduct


OSINT on cyber threat actors.

2. OSINT is more of a mindset than anything.


• Use an obstacle as inspiration.
• Leave no stone unturned.
• Information is hiding in plain sight.
3. There is a little cyber threat intel analyst in all of us and our
techniques are universal for all investigative professions:
• Journalists;
• Law enforcement;
• KYC/EDD, etc.

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Sources, Tools, etc.
Exercise caution and use proper cyber hygiene when visiting links; some of these links may no longer be valid; and note that some sources may or may not be free.

An obstacle is inspiration
• Background: https://www.wired.com/story/iran-hackers-oilrig-read-my-lips/
• Lab Dookhtegan Telegram Channel: https://t.me/lab_dookhtegan
• Twitter Trends and how they are determined: https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-trending-faqs
• Twitter Trends Data: https://www.trendsmap.com/, https://www.tweetbinder.com/blog/twitter-advanced-search/, https://getdaytrends.com/

Leave no stone unturned


• FBI Most Wanted Behzad Mesri: https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/copy_of_behzad-mesri
• Indictment: https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1131636/download
• Sanctions: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm611, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/
• Iran Corporate Registry: https://www.rrk.ir/News/ShowOldNews, https://opencorporates.com/
• Maltego (Link Analysis Tool): https://www.maltego.com/
• Persian Calendar Convertor: https://calcuworld.com/calendar-calculators/persian-calendar-converter/

Hiding in plain sight


• News Article: https://www.thedailybeast.com/iranian-hacking-group-targeted-us-satellite-companies
• Passive DNS Records: https://community.riskiq.com/, https://domainbigdata.com/
• Charming Kitten Report: https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf
• WebShell: https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/php/wsb/wsb.pl
• Indictment: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/state-sponsored-iranian-hackers-indicted-computer-intrusions-us-satellite-companies

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Thank you

pwc.com

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