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Boiler Tube Failures:
Theory and Practice
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals

R. B. Dooley
Electric Power Research Institute

and

W. P. McNaughton
Cornice Engineering, Inc.

i
 About EPRI
Electricty is increasingly recognized as a key to societal progress throughout the world,
driving economic prosperity and improving the quality of life. The Electric Power Research
Institute delivers the science and technology to make the generation, delivery, and use of
electricity affordable, efficient, and environmentally sound.
Created by the nation’s electric utilities in 1973, EPRI is one of America’s oldest and
largest research consortia, with some 700 members and an annual budget of about $500
million. Linked to a global network of technical specialists, EPRI scientists and engineers
develop innovative solutions to the world’s toughest energy problems while expanding
opportunities for a dynamic industry.
EPRI . POWERING PROGRESS

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES

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ORDERING INFORMATION
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Electric Power Research Institute and EPRI are registered service marks of Electric Power Research Institute, Inc.

Copyright © 1996 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

ii
Preface

Boiler tube failures (BTF) have been the number one availability problem for utilities
with fossil plants for as long as reliable statistics have been kept in individual utilities
and by nations. The majority of BTF have been repeat failures, indicating that the
return to service of a unit has classically been more important than understanding
the mechanism and root cause of each BTF. Failures have emanated from poor initial
design, from poor operation and maintenance, harsh fireside and cycle chemistry
environments, and lack of proper management support. Sometimes it’s amazing to
consider that some tubes do last over 200,000 hours without failure. The aim of this
book is to provide the guidance necessary to accomplish this for the majority of
tubes.
Over the last twenty years, so many people have influenced my thinking on this very
diverse topic and it is appropriate to mention some of them in somewhat chronologi-
cal order.
My first serious interface with BTF was at Ontario Hydro in the early seventies, and it
was Syd Featherby who encouraged the initial coordinated attack; the first part of
this was to develop a BTF Reporting System, which was fully supported by the
upper management, next was to prioritize where the maximum effort should be
placed in terms of determining the mechanisms of each BTF and then providing
solutions which overcame the root causes. This basic credo of “understanding the
mechanism, understanding the root cause, and then providing permanent solutions”
has permeated all my BTF efforts ever since. Three other people at Ontario Hydro
were also key in developing and supporting this overall approach: Duncan Sidey,
Graham Stephenson, and Jim Westwood. Because the Ontario Hydro approach was
successful, the Canadian Electric Association supported the implementation of a
similar BTF Reduction System in all the Canadian Utilities in 1979; this was preceded
by the production of the first compilation of failure mechanisms with Jim Westwood,
and resulted in the reporting of the statistics from a much larger data base than one
individual utility.
This momentum was carried forward into the development of the EPRI BTF projects
with the initial BTF Manual and then a BTF Correction, Prevention, and Control
Demonstration Program with 16 host utilities, that improved the availability loss due
to BTF markedly from 1986 to the present. Mention here must be given to John
Dimmer and Gerry Lamping who helped develop the overall coordinated, company-
wide approach to BTF, to Otakar Jonas who assisted with integrating the optimum
cycle chemistry, and to Ron Niebo (NERC) who incorporated the BTF mechanism
categories into the NERC/GADS reporting system.
Over the last 10 years, tremendous international support has also been available
and assisted me in developing solutions to most of the known BTF and in demon-
strating the overall BTF approach. Particular mention should be made of some of
these people: Jim Davison (PowerGen in England), Dave Barnett (Pacific Power in
Australia), Allan Ellery and Peter Ford (State Electricity Commission, Victoria in
Australia), Co van Liere (KEMA in The Netherlands), Yuri Shtromberg (ORGRES in
Russia), and Yuri Hoffman (Sverdlovenergo, Russia).

iii
 EPRI has also conducted a number of BTF Root Cause projects and has held three
BTF Conferences, which have consolidated our thinking. Two important publications
have also contributed to our understanding of BTF: David French’s Metallurgical
Failures in Fossil Fired Boilers, and the NALCO Guide to Boiler Tube Failures. The
recent Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide, developed by Steve Paterson and his
colleagues at Aptech Engineering Services, has provided the distinct metallurgical
differences between failure mechanisms. Vis Viswanathan, my colleague at EPRI,
has dedicated his professional career to the better understanding of remaining life
techniques, and we have used this unabashedly. John Stringer, my boss at EPRI
suggested the development of this book and has enthusiastically supported all our
efforts over the last 18 months.
This book represents our attempt to bring together the information on all the mecha-
nisms in a form which separates the theory and the prevention. Clearly the latter
should be most useful to the operating engineers responsible for BTF within a utility,
while the former provides the necessary background knowledge of all failure types.
The BTF Reduction Programs have been very successful in reducing the availability
loss due to BTF over the last 15 years by coordinated management approaches. We
envision that this compilation of technical aspects should finally remove BTF as the
number one fossil utility problem.

Barry Dooley

Palo Alto, California

June, 1995

iv
Acknowledgments

This three-volume work is a compilation of what is currently known about boiler tube
failures in fossil-fueled power plants, fluidized-bed combustion systems and waste-
to-energy boilers. It is an integration of the work performed by literally hundreds of
researchers over the past twenty years and the authors have drawn extensively from
that work. We have had the rare privilege of working with an outstanding group of
experts and consultants worldwide who have provided review, comment, supporting
documentation, illustrations and figures for this book. We would like to acknowledge
the following key contributors in those regards:

Individual Organization Country

M. Ball Consultant England
W. Bakker EPRI U.S.A
D.A. Barnett Pacific Power Australia
J. Blough Foster Wheeler U.S.A.
A. Bursik Consultant Germany
P. Daniel Babcock & Wilcox U.S.A.
J. Davison PowerGen England
X. Du China Light & Power Hong Kong
L.B. Dufor KEMA The Netherlands
T. Flatley PowerGen England
D. French David N. French, Inc. U.S.A.
F. Gabrielli ABB/CE U.S.A.
T. Healy ESB Ireland Ireland
M.B. Henry AUSTA Electric Australia
J.J. Hickey ESB Ireland Ireland
Y. Hoffman Sverdlovenergo Russia
P. James PowerGen England
O. Jonas Jonas, Inc. U.S.A.
D. Kalmanovitch Riley Stoker U.S.A.
S. Kihara IHI Japan
D. Lopez Lopez IIE Mexico
L. McQueen Ontario Hydro Canada
E. Metcalfe National Power England
S. Paterson Aptech Engineering Services, Inc. U.S.A.
F. Pocock Consultant U.S.A.
R. H. Richman Daedalus Associates, Inc. U.S.A.
G.G. Stephenson Ontario Hydro Canada
Y. Shtromberg ORGRES Russia
H. Takaku CRIEPI Japan
E. Tolksdorf VGB Germany
F.H. van Zyl ESKOM South Africa
R. Viswanathan EPRI U.S.A.
J. Westwood Ontario Hydro Canada
I.G. Wright ORNL U.S.A.
K. Woolhouse FCA Australia

All the figures were drawn by Marilyn Winans of EPRI’s Visual Communications Group.

v
vi
Table of Contents Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals

Chapter Page

Acknowledgments iii

Preface iv

Table of Contents vi
1 Introduction and Background 1-1
1.1 Introductory Comments 1-1
1.2 Objectives of this Book 1-2
1.3 Organization of this Book and How to Use It 1-3
1.4 Introduction to the Water-Steam Cycle and Primary Components
in Conventional Fossil-Fuel Power Plants 1-16
1.5 Historical Developments in the Identification, Correction,
and Prevention of BTF 1-16
1.6 Recent Developments in the Identification, Correction
and Prevention of BTF 1-19
1.7 Today’s Situation and Challenges that Remain 1-20
1.8 References 1-22
2 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and Its Breakdown 2-1
2.1 Introduction 2-1
2.2 Basic Function and General Design Considerations 2-2
2.3 The Reaction of Iron and Water/Steam: Oxide Formation 2-6
2.4 Oxide Development and Breakdown in Water-Touched Tubes 2-8
2.5 Overview of Thermal-Hydraulic Regimes and Waterside BTF 2-12
2.6 Oxide Development and Breakdown in Steam-Touched Tubes 2-14
2.7 The Combustion Process, Coal Effects and Fireside BTF 2-21
2.8 References 2-25
3 Cycle Chemistry and Boiler Tube Failures 3-1
3.1 Introduction and Significance of the Challenge 3-1
3.2 Boiler Water Treatment 3-3
3.3 Feedwater Treatment 3-8
3.4 Developing Unit-Specific Guidelines 3-12
3.5 Instrumentation and Monitoring for Boiler Water 3-14
3.6 References 3-15
4 The Effects of Unit and Boiler Operation and Maintenance on BTF 4-1
4.1 Introduction and Background 4-1
4.2 Chemical Cleaning of Waterwalls 4-1
4.3 Chemical Cleaning of Superheaters/Reheaters 4-5
4.4 Chemical Cleaning in FBC Units 4-8
4.5 Start-Up, Shutdown, Cycling, and Unit Transients 4-8
4.6 Lay-Up 4-9
4.7 Commissioning 4-9
4.8 References 4-12

vii
Table of Contents Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals (continued)

Chapter Page

5 Company-Wide Programs for the Correction, Prevention

and Control of Boiler Tube Failures 5-1
5.1 Introduction 5-1
5.2 Formalizing a Program for Correction, Prevention and Control 5-1
5.3 Does It Work? Results from Field Application 5-3
5.4 References 5-6
6 Metallurgical Analysis 6-1
6.1 The Role of Metallurgical Analysis for
Analyzing Boiler Tube Failures 6-1
6.2-6.19 Step-by-Step Guide to Metallurgical Analysis 6-3
6.20 References 6-10
7 Distinguishing Features of Some Mechanisms
with Similar Appearances 7-1
7.1 Introduction 7-1
7.2 Waterside Underdeposit Corrosion Mechanisms: Hydrogen
Damage, Caustic Gouging, and Acid Phosphate Corrosion 7-1
7.3 Water-Touched Tubing: Short-Term Overheating (Three Grades) 7-5
7.4 Water-Touched Tubing: Corrosion Fatigue Versus
OD-Initiated Mechanical Fatigue 7-6
7.5 Failure Mechanisms in Economizer Inlet Header Tubes: Thermal
Fatigue, Erosion-Corrosion, and Flexibility-Induced Cracking 7-6
7.6 SH Tubing: Long-Term Overheating (Creep)
Versus Fireside Corrosion 7-6
7.7 SH/RH Tubing: Flyash Erosion Versus Sootblower Erosion 7-9
7.8 SH/RH Tubing: Graphitization
and Long-Term Overheating (Creep) 7-9
7.9 SH/RH Tubing: Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC),
Intergranular Creep, and Intergranular Corrosion 7-10
7.10 Secondary (Steam Impingement) Versus Primary Failures 7-11
7.11 References 7-11
8 Boiler Tube Remaining Life Assessment 8-1
8.1 Introduction 8-1
8.2 Assessment for Tubes Operating in the Creep Regime 8-1
8.3 Assessment for Tubes Operating in the Non-Creep Regime 8-7
8.4 References 8-8
9 Determining the Extent of Macroscopic Damage:
Overview of Inspection Methods, Monitoring, and Sampling 9-1
9.1 Introduction 9-1
9.2 Codes and Standards 9-3
9.3 Ultrasonic Testing (UT) 9-3
9.4 Other Standard Inspection Methods 9-7
9.5 Monitoring Temperatures 9-8
9.6 Monitoring Heat Flux 9-9
9.7 Monitoring Displacements and Strains 9-10
9.8 Sampling 9-10
9.9 Hydrostatic Testing 9-10
9.10 References 9-11

viii
Table of Contents Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals (continued)

Chapter Page

10 Determining the Extent of Microstructural Damage 10-1

10.1 Introduction 10-1
10.2 Microstructural Changes in Ferritic Materials 10-2
10.3 Microstructural Changes in Austenitic Stainless Steels 10-4
10.4 Assessment of Creep Damage in Boiler Tube Materials 10-5
10.5 Post-Exposure Testing 10-6
10.6 References 10-8
11 Repair and Replacement of Boiler Tubes 11-1
11.1 Introduction 11-1
11.2 General Strategies for Damaged Tubes 11-1
11.3 Pre-Repair: Confirm Materials to be Repaired 11-3
11.4 Applicable Codes for Weld Repairs 11-3
11.5 Specific Repair Procedures 11-4
11.6 Documentation 11-7
11.7 Welding Co-Extruded Tubing 11-7
11.8 References 11-8
Index I-1

ix
x
 HP
turbine
LP
Chapter 1 • Volume 1
Feed
IP turbine
turbine
Attemperation Condenser
Introduction and
Makeup
Deaerator
Boiler
HP heaters
Background
Condensate
polisher
Impurity ingress
Feed
Corrosion
Deposition
1.1 Introductory Comments
It is extraordinary that relatively sim-
ple materials can be designed and
constructed to function so effectively
as boiler tubes under high-tempera-
ture and high-pressure conditions,
subject to potential degradation by
a variety of mechanical and thermal
stresses, and with the potential for
environmental attack on both the
fluid- and fire-side.
If there are no breakdowns from the
original design conditions, water-
touched boiler tubes (waterwalls,
economizers, etc.) are designed for,
and should have, essentially infinite
life. The case for steam-touched
tubes, such as in the superheater
(SH) and reheater (RH) sections of
modern boilers, is somewhat differ-
ent because of the inevitability of
creep-limited lifetime; although life-
times well in excess of 200,000
operating hours are achievable.
Unfortunately, boiler tube failures
(BTF) remain a significant and per-
vasive problem in the electric power
industry. Historically, they have been
a primary contributor to lost avail-
ability in fossil-fired power plants,
ranking as the largest equipment
problem during the thirty years that
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
reliability statistics have been kept
in North America.1 The most recently
available statistics indicate that BTF
are responsible for between 2-3% of
lost availability of U.S. fossil-fired
power plants, representing lost
power generation that has been
estimated to be in excess of $1 bil-
lion per year. Despite a concerted
effort by many organizations to pre-
vent BTF, and with an improvement
of more than 1% in availability loss,
still more than 30,000 failures have
occurred in the last decade. Failures
have occurred in all boiler areas:
economizers, waterwalls, super-
heaters, and reheaters. More than
80% of all BTF force a shutdown,
and a typical outage lasting three
days can cost a utility $1,000,000
for replacement power.
The BTF mechanisms representing
the leading causes of availability
loss are shown in Table 1-1.
Although these results come from a
program involving 16 U.S. utilities,
the ranking is believed to be similar
for the whole of the United States
and similar rankings have been
recorded in many other countries
worldwide including Canada2, the
United Kingdom3, Australia4, and
Russia5.
1-1
Table 1-1
Boiler Tube Failure Mechanisms
Representing The Largest Losses of
Availability for U.S. Units in Order of
Importance
Corrosion Fatigue
Flyash Erosion
Hydrogen Damage
Long-term Overheating (Creep)
Short-term Overheating
Sootblower Erosion
Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
Falling Slag Erosion
For period 1986-1992.
Adapted from NERC data.
The pervasive nature of the problem
can be seen in the results of a boiler
tube failure survey conducted in
1991. Table 1-2 shows the percent-
age of utilities that had experienced
boiler tube failures by some of the
key failure mechanisms.
1.2 Objectives of this Book
Over the past ten years much tech-
nical work has been undertaken to
understand boiler tube failures. The
primary objective of this book is to
provide the most recent knowledge
about how to identify boiler tube fail-
ure mechanisms, determine their
root cause, and how to apply imme-
diate solutions and longer-term
strategies to prevent their reoccur-
rence. Additional objectives are:
• To provide direct, easy-to-follow
actions to be taken if a boiler tube
failure has occurred and, perhaps
as important, actions to be taken
if a precursor has occurred in a
unit that might lead to a future
boiler tube failure.
• To provide sufficient background
information, so that the reader, if
interested, can understand why
the prescriptions are made.
• To provide guidance about the
interactions between boiler tubes
and their failures with overall unit
health and operation practices.
1-2 Introduction and Background
Table 1-2
Results of 1991 BTF Survey
Have your units experienced:
Boiler Tube Failure Mechanism
Corrosion Fatigue
High Temperature Creep
Fly Ash Erosion
Dissimilar Metal Welds
Hydrogen Damage
Supercritical Waterwall Cracking
Source: Conference Questionnaire, Proceedings: International Conference on Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil
Plants, November 5-7, 1991.6
• To provide sufficient information
so that a company-wide BTF cor-
rection, prevention, and control
program can be established.
This compilation includes all known
boiler tube failure mechanisms. It is
never possible to anticipate what
future concerns might arise, but a
final objective of the work reported
here is to provide enough informa-
tion about how the breakdown situa-
tions in boiler tubes develop to allow
rational approaches to be formu-
lated for the analysis of as yet
unknown challenges.
1.3 Organization of this Book
and How to Use It
This book is organized in three
Volumes. Volume 1 provides infor-
mation that is applicable to many
individual mechanisms. By placing
this generic information in Volume 1,
the stage is set for the detailed dis-
cussion of individual mechanisms
found in Volumes 2 and 3
Volume 2 is focused exclusively on
BTF mechanisms in water-touched
tubing of conventional fossil-fuel
power plants, that is in waterwalls
and economizers.
Volume 3 covers mechanisms that
affect superheater/reheater tubing in
conventional units, along with three
Yes No
84% 5%
80% 9%
73% 16%
52% 36%
41% 48%
34% 27%
mechanisms that affect both water-
and steam-touched tubing (mainte-
nance damage, material flaws, and
welding flaws) and chapters on BTF
mechanisms in FBC units (bubbling
bed and circulating bed) and waste-
to-energy units.
1.3.1 Volume 1: Boiler tube funda-
mentals and "top-down" implications
of BTF. Volume 1 begins with a look
at the significance of boiler tube fail-
ures and a historical perspective on
the understanding of them. This is
followed by discussions of impor-
tance to the understanding and cor-
rection of BTF by all mechanisms
including:
• Why do BTF arise? (Chapter 2)
• How are unit cycle chemistry,
operation and maintenance tied
to boiler tube failures?
(Chapters 3 and 4)
• How can utility-wide programs for
BTF prevention and control be set
up? (Chapter 5)
• What are the basics of boiler tube
metallurgical investigations?
(Chapter 6),
• How can mechanisms that
appear similar be distinguished?
(Chapter 7)
• What methods are available to Table 1-3
conduct remaining life assess- Boiler Tube Failure Mechanisms in Water-Touched Tubes of Conventionally-Fueled
ments of boiler tubes? Power Plants
(Chapter 8)
Mechanism Chapter of Volume 2
• How can the extent of micro-
Corrosion fatigue 13
scopic or macroscopic damage
be determined? (Chapters 9 Flyash erosion 14
and 10) Hydrogen damage 15
Acid phosphate corrosion 16
• What are repair and replacement Caustic gouging 17
methods for boiler tubes?
Fireside corrosion in coal-fired units 18
(Chapter 11).
Thermal fatigue in supercritical waterwalls 19
Thermal fatigue of economizer inlet headers 20
1.3.2 Organization and content of Erosion corrosion (economizer inlet headers) 21
volumes 2 and 3 Volumes 2 and 3
Sootblower erosion 22
provide detailed discussions of indi-
vidual BTF mechanisms; Table 1-3 Short-term overheating 23
provides an index to those chapters. Low-temperature creep 24
With only a few exceptions, mostly Chemical cleaning damage 25
in the case of those mechanisms Fatigue in water cooled circuits 26
which occur relatively infrequently, Pitting in water-cooled tubes 27
or for which mechanism, cause and Coal particle erosion 28
required actions are obvious, each Falling slag damage 29
chapter is organized in the same Acid dewpoint corrosion 30
manner. The first half of the chapter
provides Theory and Background Boiler Tube Failure Mechanisms in Steam-Touched Tubes
information including:
Mechanism Chapter of Volume 3
• 1.0 Features of Failure and
Typical Locations Long-term overheating/creep 32
Fireside corrosion in coal-fired units 33
• 2.0 Mechanisms of Failure Fireside corrosion in oil-fired units 34
• 3.0 Possible Root Causes and Dissimilar metal welds 35
Actions to Confirm Short term overheating 36
• 4.0 Determining the Extent of Stress corrosion cracking 37
Damage SH/RH sootblower erosion 38
Fatigue in steam-touched tubes 39
• 5.0 Background to Repairs,
Rubbing tubes/fretting 40
Immediate Solutions and Actions
Pitting (RH loops) 41
• 6.0 Background to Long-Term Graphitization 42
Actions and the Prevention of SH/RH chemical cleaning 43
Repeat Failures
• 7.0 Case Studies (if any) Mechanisms Affecting both Water-Touched and Steam-Touched Tubes

A key part of each Theory and Mechanism Chapter of Volume 3

Background section is the develop- Maintenance damage 44
ment of a Table that shows the pos- Material flaws 45
sible root causes, actions to con- Welding flaws 46
firm, immediate actions/solutions
and long-term actions to prevent BTF in Non-conventionally-Fired Units
repeat failures. It is important that
the root cause of a particular dam- Mechanism Chapter of Volume 3
age mechanism be clearly identified Bubbling fluidized bed combustion units 47
so that the proper short- and long- Circulating fluidized bed combustion units 48
term actions can be initiated. To fail Water-touched tubes of MSW/RDF units 49
in any of these steps, is to open the
door to probable repeat failures.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 1-3

For many boiler tube failure mecha-
nisms, choices for preventing a
reoccurrence of the problem are lim-
ited to only one or two options that
directly address the underlying root
cause. For some mechanisms, fire-
side corrosion is a notable example;
the optimal choice of a long-term
strategy may be as much an eco-
nomic decision as one driven by
engineering considerations. The
importance of economic evaluation
when seeking long-term solutions to
BTF cannot be over-emphasized.
The second half of each chapter
contains Actions to be followed by
the investigator or BTF team if a
boiler tube failure has occurred and
a particular mechanism is sus-
pected, or if a unit precursor has
occurred that might lead to a future
BTF by this mechanism.
The Actions are numbered in a man-
ner consistent with the Theory and
Background section. That is, Action
2 corresponds to Section 2.0 of the
Theory and Background which pro-
vides additional information about
the mechanism, why these specified
actions are to be taken, and how the
mechanism develops.
1.3.3 Using volumes 2 and 3.
Figure 1-1 provides a flowchart for
the use of this book. This figure has
also been reproduced in the intro-
ductory chapters in Volume 2 and 3
for reference. As shown, three
avenues are open to the investigator
or BTF team depending upon the
status of the BTF event:
• A: BTF with mechanism
unknown. If a BTF has occurred
for the first time or a number of
repeat failures have occurred,
and the mechanism is not known,
then the charts of typical appear-
ance and location, Tables 1-4 and
1-5, should be consulted. These
can provide a first suggestion
toward a specific chapter in
Volumes 2 and 3 where confirma-
tion can occur.
1-4 Introduction and Background
• B: BTF with known mechanism. If
the BTF Team has knowledge
from past failures that a particular
mechanism is the likely cause,
then Table 1-3, the index to all the
mechanisms and their location in
Volumes 2 and 3, can be used to
go directly to the appropriate
chapter.
• C: Anticipating future BTF. The
BTF Team should continually
anticipate possible failures by
reviewing key unit/boiler operating
events that can lead to future BTF.
Table 1-6, discussed in detail in
the next section has been com-
piled to help in this regard.
Figure 1-1 shows the actions which
will occur once a specific mecha-
nism has tentatively been chosen.
All such actions, built into each indi-
vidual chapter on a mechanism, are
structured to: confirm that the postu-
lated mechanism is appropriate,
determine the underlying cause,
determine the extent of damage,
implement immediate solutions and
actions, implement long-term
actions to prevent repeat failures,
and evaluate any ramifications to the
rest of the unit.
1.3.4 Unit "precursors" and BTF - an
anticipatory approach. Path C may
seem initially difficult for the BTF
Team to execute. There are several
reasons for this. It is anticipatory.
That is, without a BTF having
occurred, it may be initially difficult
to get the resources necessary to
evaluate whether a unit event is
cause for concern for future boiler
tubing failures. However, the
process is not unlike routine inspec-
tion of components; it should only
take one identification of an incipient
failure to justify the cost-effective-
ness of the practice to even the
most cost-conscious management.
Further, the number of unit events
that can be cause for concern can
seem overwhelming because of the
interconnected nature of unit opera-
tion, maintenance, equipment status,
cycle chemistry, and boiler tube
concerns. However, by stepping
through Table 1-6, along with any
modifications introduced by the BTF
Team based on unit experience, the
BTF Team or investigator may iden-
tify potential BTF mechanisms for
additional evaluation.
Table 1-6 is organized as a series of
"unit precursors". These are events
or conditions that could have been
identified during some aspect of
inspecting, operating, maintaining,
repairing, or fueling the unit, which,
although no BTF has occurred,
should act as a signal that the con-
dition identified should be cause for
review of the potential for a future
BTF. In other words, this Table
allows the reader to get to the dis-
cussion of a specific mechanism to
anticipate future problems.
The BTF Team or investigator may
find that the best way to implement
Table 1-6 is to work through each
precursor and query: "Has this pre-
cursor occurred in our utility/unit?",
or "Have we taken this action
recently?" If the answer to either is
"yes", then a review of the mecha-
nism(s) indicated in the final column
may be needed.
In compiling Table 1-6, an attempt
has been made to limit the "precur-
sor" list to those which: (i) can be
easily identified, (ii) are important
observations and will be useful for
indicating a potential BTF problem,
(iii) are not direct indications of
boiler tube damage (an inspection
that finds cracks at the toe of a
tube/attachment weld would be a
direct indicator of a BTF), and (iv)
are reasonably likely to lead to a
BTF based on past historical evi-
dence.
 A: B: C:
BTF - BTF - Anticipating Future BTF
Mechanism Unknown Known Mechanism (Table 1-6)
(Table 1-3)

Compare Macroscopic Tentative identification of Tentative identification of

Appearance to Table 1-4
(Water-touched) or
Table 1-5 (Steam-touched)
Tubes to identify
candidate(s)
mechanism(s). Go to
Volume 2 (Water-touched)
or Volume 3 (Steam-
touched) Tubes.
Follow actions
mechanism(s). Go to
Volume 2 (Water-touched)
or Volume 3 (Steam-
touched) Tubes.

Action 1a: Perform Action 1b: Screening

Screening Analysis: Is it
possible that this boiler tube
No
failure is caused by this
mechanism?
Yes
Action 2: Determine
(confirm) mechanism
Analysis:
¥ Review precursor list in
mechanism chapter
¥ Remove tube sample to
determine extent of
damage
Yes Are BTF likely to occur in
the future by this
mechanism?

No
Action 3: Determine root
cause

Action 4: Determine extent

of damage or affected
areas

Action 5: Implement
repairs, immediate
solutions and actions

Action 6: Implement
long-term solutions to
prevent repeat failures

Action 7: Determine possible

ramifications/ancillary unit
problems

Figure 1-1. Flowchart of actions for identifying, evaluating and anticipating boiler tube failures.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 1-5

Table 1-4
Screening Table for Water-Touched Boiler Tube Failures
Typical Fracture Other Likely Macroscopic and Possible Chapter in
Surface Appearance Metallographic Features Typical Locations Mechanism Volume 2
(or 3 as noted)

Thick-Edged Fracture Surface

Thick-edged (pin- Multiple, transgranular cracks that initiate Near attachments, particularly where high Corrosion 13
hole leak also pos- on the inside of the tube. restraint stresses can develop. Fatigue
sible)

Thick-edged, leak Internal damage: gouging, wall thinning; High heat flux areas; hot side of tube; horizon- Hydrogen 15
or window blowout tube deposits. tal or inclined tubing; pad welds; locations with Damage
local flow disruptions such as upstream of
weld, backing ring or other discontinuities.

Thick-edged Multiple, parallel cracks on the outside Maximum heat flux locations; fireside or water- Supercritical 19
tube surface or on membrane; sharp, wall tubing or membranes between tubes. Waterwall
V-shaped oxide coated cracks; wall thin- Cracking
ning from external surface when found
with fireside corrosion.

Thick-edged, leak First sign as pin-hole leak at toe of stub Economizer inlet header stub tubes nearest the Thermal Fatigue 20
or crack. weld; multiple, longitudinal cracks; bore feedwater inlet.
hole cracking.

Thick-edged Outside surface initiated, inter- Predominant in tube bends, particularly at Low- 24
granular crack growth with evidence intrados on outside surface, and other locations Temperature
of grain boundary creep cavitation and subject to high residual, forming, or service Creep Cracking
creep voids. stresses.

Thick-edged Transgranular cracking, OD-initiated and Near attachments, particularly solid or jammed Fatigue 26
associated with tubing (at tube bends - sliding attachments; at bends in tubing.
longitudinal or attachments - transverse)
or headers (particularly at the ends).

Thin-Edged Fracture Surface

Thin-edged, longi- Polishing of tube outside surface; very Near side and rear walls; near economizer Flyash Erosion 14
tudinal, "cod- or localized damage, wastage flats. banks; near plugged or fouled passages; where
"fish-mouth" previous baffles have been installed.

Thin-edged, leak or Internal damage: gouging, wall thinning; As for hydrogen damage. Acid Phosphate 16
split tube deposits. Corrosion

Thin-edged, leak or Internal damage: gouging, wall thinning; As for hydrogen damage. Caustic Gouging 17
split tube deposits.

Thin-edged, long External wastage; probably affecting a Areas with locally substoichiometric environ- Fireside 18
"fish-mouth" number of tubes; maximum wastage at ment; side and rear walls near burners; highest Corrosion
crown facing flame (maybe flame heat flux areas. (coal-fired units)
impingement); damage extending in 120°
arc around tube; hard deposits on tube
outside surface.

1-6 Introduction and Background

Table 1-4
Screening Table for Water-Touched Boiler Tube Failures (continued)
Typical Fracture Other Likely Macroscopic and Possible Chapter in
Surface Appearance Metallographic Features Typical Locations Mechanism Volume 2
(or 3 as noted)

Thin-Edged Fracture Surface (continued)

Thin-edged rupture Erosion, wall thinning from inside; Economizer inlet header stub tubes nearest to Erosion- 21
"orange peel" appearance. point of feedwater inlet. Corrosion

Thin-edged, "fish- Wastage flats on tube external surface at Circular pattern around wall blowers. Sootblower 22
mouth" 45° around tube from sootblower direc- Erosion
tion, little or no ash.

Generally thin- Often shows signs of tube bulging or Highest heat flux locations above locations Short-Term 23
edged "fish-mouth": appearance; real keys will such as: the site of a tube or orifice blockage, Overheating
be transformation products in or in horizontal tubing where a downcomer
microstructure. May also be thick-edged steam "slug" can occur.
under certain circumstances.

Thin-edged External wastage, little or no ash; Tubes near replaceable wear liners in cyclone Coal Particle 28
location should be key. burners; throat or quarl region of burners. Erosion

Thin-edged External erosion or mechanical impact Sloping wall tubes and/or ash hopper near Falling Slag 29
damage features. bottom. Damage

Thin-edged External, thinned or missing external Low temperature areas of economizer. Acid Dewpoint 30
oxide; generally in economizer. Corrosion

Pinhole Damage

Pinhole Internal tube surface damage. Locations where boiler water can stagnate dur- Chemical 25 or 27
ing unit shutdown (pitting). Cleaning
Damage or
Pitting

Various Other Damage Types

Depends on under- Usually obvious from type of damage Maintenance Chap. 44,
lying cause. and correspondence to past maintenance Damage Volume 3
activity.

Depends on defect. Materials Flaws Chap. 45,

Volume 3

Usually thick- Care required to separate weld defects Welding Flaws Chap. 46,
edged. from another problem located at a weld. Volume 3

Note: This table is based on simple, macroscopic features of failure and should be used as a guide to a particular chapter for further analysis. The more detailed discus-
sions starting with Actions can then be used for identification and confirmation of the actual mechanism.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 1-7

Table 1-5
Screening Table for Steam-Touched Boiler Tube Failures
Typical Fracture Other Likely Macroscopic and Possible Chapter in
Surface Appearance Metallographic Features Typical Locations Mechanism Volume 3
(or 2 as noted)
Thick-Edged Fracture Surface

Thick-edged Outside surface initiated, inter- Predominant in lower temperature regions in Low- Chap. 24
granular crack growth with evidence tube bends, particularly at intrados on outside Temperature Volume 2
of grain boundary creep cavitation and surface, and other locations subject to high Creep Cracking
creep voids. residual, forming, or service stresses.

Thick-edged Internal thick scales, may be accompa- Highest temperature locations: near material Long-Term 32
nied by external wastage at 10 o'clock transitions, where there is a variation in gas- Overheating
and 2 o'clock positions; generally touched length, in or just beyond cavities, in (Creep)
longitudinal (axial) orientation; damage the final leg of tubing just prior to the outlet
on heated side of tube. header.

Thick-edged, leak Usually fusion line cracking on low At dissimilar metal welds. Dissimilar Metal 35
alloy side of weld, circumferential Weld Failure
orientation.

Thick-edged (may Cracking is transgranular or intergranular Bends and straight tubing with low spots; high Stress 37
manifest as a pin- usually with significant branching; initia- stress locations are particularly susceptible at Corrosion
hole) tion can be at ID (most common) or bends, welds, tube attachments, supports or Cracking
on OD, circumferential or longitudinal spacers.
orientation.

Thick-edged Transgranular cracking, OD-initiated and Tubing-related failures associated with attach- Fatigue 39
associated with tubing (at tube bends or ments or bends in tubing; header-related gen-
attachments) or headers (particularly at erally at ends of header.
the ends).

Thick-edged, leak Most commonly in HAZ of C or C-Mo Adjacent to weld fusion line at heat affected Graphitization 42
steel tubes; key is microstructure zone most common.
appearance of graphite particles or
nodules.

Thin-Edged Fracture Surface

Thin-edged (unless External polishing of tube surface; very Most prominent in backpass regions; bends Flyash Erosion Chap. 14
creep-assisted) localized damage. near to walls. Volume 2

Thin-edged External damage; wastage at 10 and 2 Highest temperature tubes: leading tubes, near Fireside 33 (Coal-fired
o'clock (flue gas at 12 o'clock); longitu- transitions, tubes out of alignment, tubes Corrosion (coal- units)
dinal cracking; perhaps "alligator hide" around radiant cavities. fired units and
appearance; real key to identification will oil-fired units) 34 (Oil-fired
be the presence of low-melting point ash units)
in external deposits.

Thin-edged Often shows signs of tube bulging or Most commonly near bottom bends in vertical Short-Term 36
"fish-mouth" appearance, longitudinal loops of SH/RH; outlet legs, and near material Overheating
orientation. transitions.

1-8 Introduction and Background

Table 1-5
Screening Table for Steam-Touched Boiler Tube Failures (continued)
Typical Fracture Other Likely Macroscopic and Possible Chapter in
Surface Appearance Metallographic Features Typical Locations Mechanism Volume 3
(or 2 as noted)
Thin-Edged Fracture Surface (continued)

Thin-edged, pin- External wastage flats at 45° around First tubes in from wall entrance of retractable Sootblower 38
hole or "thin" longi- tube from sootblower direction, little or blowers; tubes in direct path of retractable Erosion
tudinal blowout no ash. blowers.

Thin-edged External damage; obvious metal-to- Rubbing/ 40

metal contact on tube surface. Fretting

Pinhole Damage

Pitting Internal tube surface damage. For pitting: Tubes where condensate can form Chemical 41 or 43
and remain during shutdown: bottoms of pen- Cleaning
dant loops on either SH or RH, low points in Damage or
sagging horizontal tubes. Pitting

Various Other Damage Types

Depends on the Usually obvious from type of damage and Maintenance 44

underlying cause correspondence to past maintenance Damage
activity.

Depends on defect Materials Flaws 45

Usually thick-edged Care required to separate weld defects Welding Flaws 46

or pinholes from another problem located at a weld.

Note: This table is based on simple, macroscopic features of failure and should be used as a guide to a particular chapter for further analysis. The more detailed discus-
sions starting with Actions can then be used for identification and confirmation of the actual mechanism.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 1-9

Table 1-6
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

1.1 Water- Excessive waterside deposits Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
touched tubes ( >> 30 mg/cm2) for high-pressure boilers. (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2), short-term overheating
(waterside) (23,V2)

Excessive waterside deposits, such as ripple Fe3O4 in once-through Supercritical waterwall cracking (19,V2)
(O/T) and supercritical units.

Boiler water samples that appear black (high suspended solids). Acid phosphate corrosion (16,V2)

Corrosion/erosion in feedwater system; fouling in boiler feed pump or
orifices.
• For supercritical or O/T units: supercritical waterwall
cracking (19,V2)
• For subcritical or non-O/T units - hydrogen damage
(15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion (16,V2), or caustic
gouging (17,V2)
• Erosion-corrosion of economizer inlet header (21,V2)

Pressure drop across circulation pumps (orifices are plugging). Short-term overheating in waterwall tubing (23,V2)

1.2 Water- Flame impingement due to burner change or misalignment, leading to Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
touched tubes excessive tube deposits. (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2), fireside corrosion
(fireside) (18,V2)

Excessive furnace slagging that could lead to overheating in convective Short-term in overheating SH/RH tubing (36,V3)
passes (or fuel change).

Fresh rust found on tubes after unit washing, external flat spots, bur- Flyash erosion (14,V2), sootblower erosion - waterwalls
nishing or polishing. (22,V2), coal particle erosion (28,V2)

Failed tubes, any upstream tube leaks, as a warning to scout for the Short-term overheating in waterwall tubing (23,V2)
potential short-term overheating.

Significant hardness or ovality, particularly associated with tube bends, Low-temperature creep cracking (24, V2)
found during routine inspection.

1.3 Steam- Excessive steamside oxide (detected by UT measure of oxide thickness, Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside
touched tubes or analysis of removed tube samples, evidence of excessive exfoliation corrosion (33&34,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures
(steamside) like solid particle erosion in turbine). (35,V3), short-term overheating (36,V3)

Steamside deposits in RH tubing - particularly of sodium sulfate, or Pitting and failure in steam-touched tubes (41,V3)
high Na or SO4 levels in steam.

1-10 Introduction and Background

Table 1-6
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance (continued)
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

1.4 Steam- Excessive flue gas temperature, displaced fireball, delayed combustion, Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside
touched tubes periodic overfiring or uneven firing of burners. corrosion (33 & 34,V3)
(fireside)
High levels of excess oxygen. SH/RH fireside corrosion: oil-fired units (34,V3)

Blockage or laning of boiler gas passages observed during boiler Flyash erosion (14,V2), long-term overheating/creep
inspection. (32,V3), SH/RH fireside corrosion: coal/oil units (33 &
34,V3)

Excessive temperatures measured by thermocouples in vestibule or Flyash erosion (14,V2), long-term overheating/creep
header area. (32,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3)

Evidence of "alligator hide" appearance on external tube surface, Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside
observed during boiler inspection, associated with wall loss or thinning. corrosion (33 & 34,V3)

Fresh rust found on tubes after unit washing, external flat spots, bur- Flyash erosion (14,V2), sootblower erosion in SH/RH
nishing or polishing. (38,V3)

Significant hardness or ovality, particularly associated with tube bends, Low-temperature creep cracking (24,V2)
found during routine inspection.

Distortion or misaligned tube rows found during routine inspection. Flyash erosion (14,V2), SH/RH fireside corrosion (33 &
34,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3), fatigue of
steam-touched tubing (39,V3), rubbing/fretting (40,V3),

Failed tube supports and lugs, location of dissimilar metal welds close Fatigue of steam-touched tubing (39,V3), dissimilar
to fixed supports. metal weld failures (35,V3)

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 1-11

Table 1-6
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

2.1 All units Problem with high levels of feedwater corrosion products; operating
ranges for pH, cation conductivity or dissolved oxygen consistently
outside recommended ranges, including persistent reducing conditions
or excessive use of oxygen scavengers.
Corrosion fatigue (13,V2), hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid
phosphate corrosion (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2),
waterwall fireside corrosion (18,V2), supercritical water-
wall cracking (19,V2), erosion/corrosion in economizer
inlet header (21,V2), short-term overheating in waterwall
tubing (23,V2),

Carryover of volatile chemicals from boiler, such as NaOH for units on Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3), pitting in steam-
caustic treatment, or excess of Na, SO4, and/or chloride; steam limits touched tubes (41,V3)
exceeded.

Major acid contamination event (pH < 8) when unit is at full load; con- Hydrogen damage (15,V2)
denser leak, or breakdown of makeup or condensate polisher regenera-
tion chemical.

2.2 Units on Evidence of a persistent problem with phosphate hideout, particularly Acid phosphate corrosion (16,V2)
Phosphate where mono-sodium and/or an excess of di-sodium phosphate has
Treatments been added to the boiler.

Persistent phosphate hideout with phosphate return causing a pH Corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
depression (7-8).

Caustic level in excess of that necessary for optimal control (>> 2 ppm). Caustic gouging (17,V2)

2.3 Units on Caustic, used in excess of that necessary for optimal control of conta- Caustic gouging (17,V2)
AVT minant ingress (to counteract pH depressions on startup).

pH depression during shutdown and early startup (pH around 7-8). Corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
Hideout/return of sulfate.

2.4 Units on Caustic, used in excess of that necessary for optimal control (>> 2 ppm). Caustic gouging (17,V2)
Caustic
Treatment

1-12 Introduction and Background

Table 1-6
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

3.1 Chemical Evidence of shortcoming in chemical cleaning process such as inap- Chemical cleaning damage in waterwalls (25,V2) or
cleaning propriate cleaning agent, excessively strong concentration or long SH/RH (43,V3), short-term overheating (23,V2 & 36,V3).
cleaning time, too high a temperature, failure to neutralize, breakdown
of inhibitor, inadequate rinse.

Shortcoming in SH/RH cleaning process such as inadequate rinse, Short-term overheating in SH/RH tubing (36,V3)
improper flow verification.

Evidence that level of Fe in cleaning solution continued to increase Chemical cleaning damage in waterwalls (25,V2) or
instead of leveling out when cleaning process was ended. SH/RH (43,V3)

Need for excessive cleaning in supercritical units (interval < 2 years). Supercritical waterwall cracking (19,V2)

Contamination in SH/RH (particularly by chlorides) during chemical Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3)
clean of SH/RH (breakdown of inhibitors or improper flushing of sol-
vents) or waterwalls (caused by poor backfill procedures that failed to
protect SH circuits).

3.2 Repairs In water-touched tubes: use of backing rings, pad welds, canoe pieces, Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
weld overlay that penetrates to inside surface - as a source of flow dis- (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2)
ruption and excessive deposits.

Application of shielding, baffles, palliative coatings to mitigate flyash Flyash erosion (14,V2)
erosion without the use of a cold-air velocity test.

In water-touched tubes, Cu in water-side deposits. Hydrogen damage (15,V2), welding defects (46,V3)

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 1-13

Table 1-6
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

4.1 Startup Feedwater introduced intermittently into economizer inlet at high flow Economizer inlet header thermal fatigue (20,V2)
Procedures rates during startups and particularly during off-line top-ups.

Rapid unit startups that cause the reheater to reach temperature before SH/RH fireside corrosion (33 & 34,V3)
full flow starts (no furnace exit gas temperature control).

4.2 Heat flux change caused by change to higher BTU-value coal, dual fir- Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
Combustion ing with gas, changeover to oil- or gas-firing leading to excessive tube (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2), fireside corrosion
conditions deposits in waterwalls; new burners causing impingement. (18,V2)

Implementing low excess air strategies for NOx control and the potential Waterwall fireside corrosion (18,V2)
for waterwall fireside corrosion (note that unlike the other precursors in
this Table, this is a possibility based on understanding the mechanism;
to date no failures have been directly attributed to this cause).

Operation with high levels of excess oxygen in oil-fired units (> 1%). SH/RH fireside corrosion in oil-fired units (34,V3)

4.3 Fuel Change to a fuel that either contains more ash or contains elements Flyash erosion (14,V2)
choices and which are more erosive such as quartz.
changes
Change to a more corrosively-aggressive coal, particularly one high in Waterwall fireside corrosion (18,V2), acid dewpoint corro-
chlorine, Na, K, or S contents. sion (30,V2), SH/RH fireside corrosion (33 & 34,V3)

Use of Mg-based additives (oil-fired units) leading to coating of water- Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside cor-
walls, reflecting heat into convection passes. rosion in oil-fired units (34,V3)

4.4 Cycling Conversion of the unit to cycling operation or an increase in the num- Corrosion fatigue (13,V2), economizer inlet header thermal
ber of cycles. fatigue (20,V2), fatigue in water-touched (26,V2) or steam-
touched tubing (39,V3),dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3)

4.5 Evidence of a shortcoming during unit shutdown/layup such as uncer- Pitting in water-touched (27,V2) or steam-touched tubes
Shutdown or tainty about water and/or air quality during period, insufficient nitrogen (41,V3), and maybe corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
layup blanketing, insufficient N2H4, evidence of air inleakage.

Indication that stagnant, oxygenated water may have rested in tubes Pitting in water-touched (27,V2) or steam-touched tubes
during shutdown or layup particularly in economizer and RH. (41,V3)

Evidence that condensate is forming in SH/RH bends during unit shut- Short-term overheating in SH/RH tubes (36,V3), pitting in
down, exacerbated if steam purity is not good (as determined by ele- steam-touched tubes (41,V3)
vated levels of SO4).

4.6 Other Operation above the maximum continuous design rating, with excess Flyash erosion (14,V2)
air flow settings above design, with unbalanced fans or air heaters -
leading to nonuniform gas flows.

Low drum level. Short-term overheating (23,V2)

1-14 Introduction and Background

Table 1-6
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

5.1 Major condenser leaks or minor leaks that have occurred over a long Hydrogen damage (15,V2)
Condensers period of time.

Condenser leak leading to condenser cooling water constituents in Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3)
attemperator spray water.

5.2 Water Upset in water treatment plant or condensate polisher regeneration Hydrogen damage (15,V2)
treatment chemicals leading to low pH condition in boiler (pH < 8).
plant/
condensate Upset in water treatment plant or condensate polisher regeneration Caustic gouging (17,V2)
polisher chemicals leading to high pH condition.

5.3 Drum Carryover test indicates high mechanical carryover. Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3), pitting in steam-
touched tubing (41,V3)

Operating with high drum level allowing excessive carryover into steam. Pitting in steam-touched tubing (41,V3)

5.4 Poor sootblower maintenance. Sootblower erosion in waterwalls (22,V2), SH/RH soot-
Sootblowers blower erosion (38,V3)

5.5 Low Header has large number of operating hours, has experienced large Economizer inlet header thermal fatigue (20,V2)
temperature thermal gradients, spacing of ligament holes is small (< 3.5 cm),
headers header thickness is well above Code minimum, header-to-stub tube
joints made with partial penetration welds.

5.6 High Excessive relative movement of header/ tube during unit transients, Fatigue in steam-touched tubing (39,V3).
temperature restricted movement, header is not allowed to expand freely (maybe
headers ash-related), unit change to cycling.

5.7 Turbine A problem with solid particle erosion (SPE) in the turbine. Short-term overheating SH/RH tubing (36,V3), long-term
overheating /creep (32,V3)

5.8 Redesign of the SH/RH circuit may change the absorption patterns Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside cor-
SH/RH Circuit through other SH/RH sections and increase tube temperatures. rosion (33 & 34,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3)
(redesign)

5.9 Supports/ Addition of supports without consideration of their impact on the Dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3)
Attachments stresses of dissimilar metal welds.
(redesign)
Redesign of waterwall tube attachments to increase flexibility without Corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
analysis to determine whether solution is actually beneficial.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 1-15

Clearly, it is not possible to put every
precursor in this compilation, but by
using this listing it is hoped that two
objectives are achieved. First, forced
outages by BTF are further pre-
vented by anticipating the pre-condi-
tions to the most common mecha-
nisms. Second, that a first step will
be taken to improve the understand-
ing of the complex, interconnected
nature of cycle chemistry, operating
practice, combustion processes,
and maintenance effects on BTF. As
a final note, the list should not pre-
empt good engineering judgment; if
a precursor is found in the unit that
you think should be an alert of a
future problem, follow it up, even if it
is not in this particular list.
1.3.5 For BTF mechanisms not cov-
ered in this book. If, having gone
through the above procedure, it
appears that the BTF experienced is
not covered in this book or if multi-
ple mechanisms appear to be oper-
ative, then the generic investigation
procedure shown in Figure 1-1 is
still applicable. Specifically, it is
important that the following
sequence be followed:
Understand the mechanism
¯
Determine the root cause
¯
Apply proper long-term solution
Removal of a tube sample and use
of metallurgical techniques should
provide an understanding of the
underlying damage (erosion, corro-
sion, overheating, creep, fatigue,
environmentally-assisted cracking,
etc.) and may help move the investi-
gator to one of the covered mecha-
nisms for additional specific guid-
ance.
1-16 Introduction and Background
1.4 Introduction to the Water-
Steam Cycle and Primary
Components in Conventional
Fossil-Fuel Power Plants
There are several excellent reviews
of the design and operation of con-
ventional fossil-fueled power plants,
see for example references 7 and 8.
A very much simplified review of pri-
mary power plant components and
the water-steam cycle is provided
here.
Water is preheated to a relatively
low temperature by passing through
a series of low pressure (LP) and
high pressure (HP) feedwater
heaters. It then passes through the
various parts of the boiler where it is
heated to superheated steam. From
the exit from the boiler the steam is
allowed to expand through the high
pressure (HP) turbine from which it
may be reheated and passed
through intermediate pressure (IP)
and low pressure (LP) turbines
where further work is extracted. Exit
steam from the LP turbine is con-
densed and fed back into the boiler
through the feedwater heaters.9
Figures 1-2 and 1-3 show a
schematic of this cycle for a drum
and a once-through cycle, respec-
tively. Also shown in those figures
are the locations in the cycles where
ingress, corrosion and deposition
can occur. The ingress of contami-
nants and its deposition and corro-
sion have major implications to the
analysis of boiler tube failures.
Boiler tube temperatures are
another important factor that will
determine when failures will occur.
Tube metal temperatures depend on
the heat flux from the fireside, the
internal fluid flow and the condition
of the working fluid. The lowest tem-
perature fluid is in the economizer
and waterwall sections. The fluid
enters the economizer as a liquid
and becomes a steam-liquid mixture
in the waterwalls caused by heat
transfer through the walls.
Temperatures in the fluid for subcriti-
cal boilers are limited to saturation
temperatures for the given boiler
pressure, thus tube temperatures
are typically around 400°C (~750°F).
In supercritical units, waterwall
materials typically operate at slightly
higher temperatures: 454°C (849°F).
The steam next flows into super-
heater/reheater sections. There is a
distribution of increasingly higher
temperatures as the fluid moves
through the circuit. This results in
more severe demands on the tube
materials including the need for bet-
ter creep and oxidation resistance.
For final steam temperatures of 538
to 565°C (1000 to 1050°F), tube
temperatures in excess of 600°C
(~1110°F) can be reached during
the final stages of the superheater
and reheater sections.
Additional details of the design,
constructional materials and
demands placed on boiler tubes in
the various sections of the boiler are
provided in Chapter 2.
1.5 Historical Developments in
the Identification, Correction
and Prevention of BTF
Internationally, extensive research
into the causes and prevention of
boiler tube failures has been on-
going since the early 1950s. The
problems confronted, the solutions
sought, and the progression of tech-
nology in different countries have
proceeded along many paths. As a
result different countries have had,
and continue to have, different fail-
ure types and have instituted differ-
ing approaches to their resolution.
Factors that have shaped the
research on individual boiler tube
failure mechanisms include: (i) fuel
sources available, (ii) design philos-
ophy, (iii) an outbreak of a serious
failure or series of failures, (iv) avail-
able technology, (v) knowledge of
prior shortcomings, (vi) the level of
available manufacturing technology
and quality control that could be
achieved, (vii) what type of cycle
chemistry control was chosen, and
(viii) the flexibility to change once a
decision about one of the above
had been made.
 HP
turbine
Feed LP
IP turbine
turbine

Attemperation Condenser
Makeup

Deaerator
Boiler

HP heaters

Condensate
polisher
Impurity ingress
Feed
Corrosion
Deposition

Figure 1-2. Major unit components and locations of impurity ingress, corrosion and deposition in drum
cycles. Source: R.B. Dooley and A. Bursik10

HP
turbine
LP
IP turbine
turbine
Condenser
Makeup
Attemperation
Deaerator
Boiler

HP heaters

Condensate
polisher
Impurity ingress
Feed
Corrosion
Deposition

Figure 1-3. Major unit components and locations of impurity ingress, corrosion and deposition in once-
through cycles. Source: R.B. Dooley and A. Bursik10

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 1-17

1.5.1 On the general nature of pro-
tective oxides. Evaluations of the
general nature of protective oxides
and laboratory studies of various
boiler tube materials, as well as the
study of specific failure mechanisms
and field performance has been
extensively pursued since the
1950s. The growth of magnetite on
tube materials and the attack
caused by acidic or basic solutions
was investigated in the early
1960s.11, 12 The earliest extensive
U.K. research on the corrosion
behavior of steels in steam environ-
ments was a collaborative exercise
in the 1960s between the CEGB,
Brown Firth Research Laboratories,
Brown Bayley Steels Ltd., and
United Steel Cos. Ltd.13
1.5.2 Influence of available fuel
sources. Units in the United
Kingdom differ from those in North
America in burning coals containing
levels of chlorine up to 0.7% from
which serious problems with water-
wall and SH/RH fireside corrosion
have arisen. Because of the serious-
ness of the problem, much effort has
been, and still is, being undertaken
to understand the basic mecha-
nisms and to develop the optimal
mitigation strategies.
The recognition of the effect of coal
composition on the incidence of
fireside corrosion has influenced
U.S. research into this mechanism
as well, such as the studies con-
ducted for Eastern U.S. coals by
Borio, et al.14
In a similar light, some countries
have major problems with highly ero-
sive (high ash content) coals. In
these countries (such as India, South
Africa, Australia) the problem of fly-
ash erosion is of major importance.
1-18 Introduction and Background
1.5.3 Influence of operating condi-
tions. The advanced steam condi-
tions that were typical of early once-
through supercritical units in the
U.S. (following their introduction in
Europe) led to a host of problems
with corrosion and overheating in
boilers operating at 621°C (1150°F)
and 650°C (1202°F).15, 16 The recog-
nition in the 1950s that high steam
temperatures can cause significant
problems with low-melting point ash
constituents and extensive fireside
corrosion led to limitations on main
steam temperature in coal-fired
units. These limitations are, for the
most part, still followed in today’s
units, generally to a maximum tem-
perature of 566°C (1050°F) and
pressure of 3600 psig.
In contrast, many countries includ-
ing Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
and Hong Kong, continued to
employ drum units with 548°C
(1000°F) and 2500 psig cycles and
as a result, avoided the problems
with serious fireside corrosion that
had resulted in the higher tempera-
ture units.
1.5.4 BTF and the choice of water
chemistry control (evolution of caus-
tic treatment contrasted with phos-
phate treatment). In the 1950s and
1960s both the U.S. and the U.K.
had serious waterside corrosion
problems.17 Careful laboratory work
in both countries set the scene for
operational limits to water chemistry
and interestingly led to two drasti-
cally different approaches.
In the U.S., a seminal study was
conducted in the early 1960s by the
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers Research Committee on
Boiler Feedwater Studies to identify
the cause of this very severe attack
of boiler tubes.18, 19 The cause was
identified as high levels of sodium
hydroxide and sodium phosphate in
the treatments which were standard
practice at the time. As a result, the
chemistry of choice became congru-
ent phosphate treatment so as to
move away from the free hydroxide
regime. As discussed in more detail
in Chapter 3 of this volume, this
choice has led to problems with
control because of phosphate hide-
out and subsequently to the occur-
rence of BTF caused by acid phos-
phate corrosion. In response, there
has been an evolution of phosphate
treatment options which continues in
U.S. units.
In the U.K., the choice in the 1970s
was to use NaOH because of its
superior buffering ability against the
contamination caused by any
ingress of seawater from condenser
leaks. That choice required strict
control of the level of NaOH to pre-
vent the continuation of waterside
corrosion by a caustic gouging
mechanism.
1.5.5 BTF and the choice of water
chemistry control method (evolution
of all-volatile treatment contrasted
with oxygenated treatment). Water
chemistry for supercritical units in
the U.S. was derived from that of
existing European practice at the
time (early 1950s) which was all-
volatile treatment (AVT). The use of
AVT in once-through supercritical
units has subsequently led to prob-
lems including: (i) the production of
an excess of feedwater corrosion
products, (ii) excessive boiler pres-
sure drops, (iii) deposit buildup, (iv)
BTF by a supercritical waterwall
cracking mechanism, and (v) con-
denser tube failures. In the early
1970s European utilities changed to
an oxygenated treatment chemistry
and have been able to avoid these
problems; similar changes are now
occurring in U.S. supercritical units.
1.6 Recent Developments in
the Identification, Correction
and Prevention of BTF
Over the last fifteen years there
have been major efforts to improve
not only the understanding of the
technical details of boiler tube fail-
ures, but also the management
approaches and the overall influ-
ences of plant cycle chemistry,
operation, and maintenance on their
occurrence. These efforts have
been concentrated on four primary
areas of interest:
• Identification of BTF mechanisms,
root causes, and corrective
actions
• Setting unit cycle chemistry levels
and understanding the interac-
tions with BTF
• Understanding the effects of unit
and boiler operation and mainte-
nance on BTF
• Formulating utility-wide, coordi-
nated, management-supported
programs for BTF correction, pre-
vention, and control.
A brief overview of some of these
more recent activities sets the stage
for more detailed discussion in later
parts of this book.
1.6.1 Identification of BTF mecha-
nisms, root causes, and corrective
actions. The first compilation of all
known boiler tube failure mecha-
nisms and their direct causes was
prepared in the late 1970s and pub-
lished by the Canadian Electric
Association as Analysis and
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures.20
An updated version, Manual for
Investigation and Correction of
Boiler Tube Failures was published
by the Electric Power Research
Institute in the mid-1980s.21 These
technical compilations were used as
the bases for overall management-
supported, programmatic
approaches for the evaluation and
correction of BTF on a utility-wide
basis.22
By the early 1980s, twenty-two dif-
ferent BTF mechanisms had been
identified; nineteen of those were
considered to be well understood,
meaning that approaches and solu-
tions to root causes were available.
The three failure mechanisms for
which understanding was incom-
plete included: (i) corrosion fatigue
tube failures that initiate from the
waterside of waterwall and econo-
mizer tubing; (ii) circumferential
cracking that initiates from the fire-
side of the waterwall tubing in the
highest heat flux regions of super-
critical units, and (iii) flyash erosion.
Extensive research into these mech-
anisms over the last ten years has
resulted in essentially a complete
understanding of them and solutions
are now available that can be confi-
dently applied by utilities for their
prevention.
As metallurgical and root cause
analysis have become more wide-
spread, additional specific BTF
mechanisms have been identified.
For example, during the past five
years, a new mechanism, acid
phosphate corrosion, related to the
use of congruent phosphate treat-
ment, has been identified in the U.S.
Worldwide survey of experience and
research has assisted in under-
standing this mechanism and is pro-
viding cycle chemistry guidance to
overcome it.
The publication of the Boiler Tube
Failure Metallurgical Evaluation
Handbook23 provided a key
resource and a sharp focus on
metallurgical analysis to determine
the correct mechanisms responsible
for degradation or failure of boiler
tubing.
The present book, in three volumes,
expands upon the base provided by
these prior compilations. It com-
bines those efforts with the wealth of
recent research into specific mecha-
nisms and unit-wide influences.
Most of the major boiler tube failure
mechanisms that have been identi-
fied worldwide are included.
Investigation of tube failures falling
outside the major types can be con-
ducted following the generic
approach that is provided.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
1.6.2 Setting unit cycle chemistry
levels and understanding the interac-
tions with BTF. Even a causal
review of the mechanisms on Table
1-3 will confirm that the control of
plant cycle chemistry and the reduc-
tion of boiler tube failures are inti-
mately connected. Many of the most
prevalent BTF mechanisms, as well
as other components throughout the
unit, are directly influenced by cycle
chemistry. The most direct, most
effective, and ultimately the least
expensive means to prevent many
serious BTF is through the appropri-
ate choice, control, and monitoring of
the steam and water purity.
Following the successful experience
in Germany (VGB Guidelines24),
England (CEGB Guidelines25) and
Japan (CRIEPI26) with reducing
chemistry and corrosion incidences
through formalized cycle chemistry
guidelines, the U.S. introduced a
similar comprehensive approach
with the release of the Interim
Consensus Guidelines for Fossil
Plant Cycle Chemistry27 and the
Guideline Manual for Instrumentation
and Control for Fossil Plant Cycle
Chemistry28.
Recent advances have been made
in the understanding of, and control
of, all the major chemistries. As a
result several documents which rep-
resent revisions to the Interim
Consensus Guidelines have been or
should soon be released including:
Guidelines for Oxygenated
Treatment29, Cycle Chemistry
Guidelines for Fossil Plants:
Phosphate Treatment for Drum
Units30, Sodium Hydroxide for
Conditioning the Boiler Water of
Drum-Type Boilers17 and a docu-
ment that will cover all-volatile treat-
ment31. Because of the importance
of cycle chemistry, monitoring and
control, Chapter 3 of this volume is
devoted to a discussion of the key
aspects of cycle chemistry and its
importance to boiler tube failures.
1-19
1.6.3 Understanding the effects of
unit and boiler operation and mainte-
nance on BTF. Similarly, there has
been an increasing recognition of
the effect of both maintenance activ-
ities including inspection, repair,
chemical cleaning, and of unit oper-
ations such as unit cycling and
layup, on the incidence of a number
of BTF. Recent advances in these
areas are discussed in Chapter 4 of
this volume.
1.6.4 Formulating utility-wide, coor-
dinated, management-supported pro-
grams for BTF correction, preven-
tion, and control. As noted above, at
the time that early BTF manuals
were produced, nineteen of the
twenty-two mechanisms that had
been identified were understood and
permanent solutions to each existed.
Why then did (and still do) BTF con-
tinue to occur? Additional analysis
indicated that, at that time, the pri-
mary barrier to achieving major
availability improvement was not a
lack of technical knowledge, but (i)
getting that knowledge into the
hands of more utility personnel and
(ii) dealing with a variety of manage-
ment and economics issues in a
formalized corporate-wide manner.
Specifically, it was found that in
order to address the management
and economic issues surrounding
BTF, a company-wide BTF preven-
tion program was required that
could address the multi-functional
nature of the problem. Such a pro-
gram was developed and a major
demonstration project involving six-
teen utilities demonstrated that such
a company-wide program could
result in significant availability
improvements.32 The results are dra-
matically illustrated in Figure 1-4
where the results of equivalent avail-
ability loss (EAL) for BTF are shown
for the two sets of participating utili-
ties and compared with the national
average.
1-20 Introduction and Background
EAL%
3.8
Second 6 utilities
3.4
3.0
Nation average for
2.6 units above 200 MW
2.2
First 10 utilities
1.8
1.4
Target for first 10 utilities: 1.45%
1.0
1985 1986 1987 1988
Figure 1-4. Availability improvements achieved through a formalized BTF reduction
program. EAL is equivalent availability loss caused by BTF.
A main objective of this book is to
provide a centralized, up-to-date
source of information about the
identification and prevention of
boiler tube failures, but it is clear
from historical precedence that this
alone will be insufficient to end the
occurrence of BTF. For that reason,
Chapter 5 discusses the importance
of formalized programs for the iden-
tification, prevention and control of
BTF.
In a similar manner to the BTF
reduction program, a demonstration
of the needed activities for improve-
ments in cycle chemistry has also
been undertaken with thirteen utili-
ties.33 Discussion of the critical fac-
tors for such programs is provided
in Chapter 3.
1.7 TodayÕs Situation and
Challenges that Remain
The technical knowledge of BTF has
improved dramatically since the ear-
liest compilations. Within the past
five years, complete understanding
of the basic mechanisms and miti-
gation options for flyash erosion,
corrosion fatigue, and circumferen-
tial cracking in supercritical units
have been gathered. The impor-
tance of, and the requirements to
implement, on a practical basis, the
1989 1990 1991 1992
cycle chemistry controls to prevent
the known chemistry-controlled
damage mechanisms are now
known. Further, large-scale, utility
demonstration projects have shown
that technical knowledge plus a
company-wide BTF correction, pre-
vention, and control program can
demonstrably achieve significant
availability improvements.
However, there remain some chal-
lenges. Two “generic” challenges,
the frustrating appearance of repeat
failures, and the misdiagnosis of
mechanisms are discussed briefly
here, as is a vision for the future.
1.7.1 Repeat failures. Analysis has
indicated that a disturbing feature of
many outbreaks of BTF is that an
alarming number of them are repeat
failures.34 There will, of course, be
random tube failures caused by
errors during engineering, fabrica-
tion, construction, operation and
maintenance. Examples include:
wrong or defective tube materials,
poor field welding, defective or mal-
functioning tube supports or spac-
ers, etc. However, the costs associ-
ated with random tube failure inci-
dents are small compared to repeat
failures. Within the past few years
repeat tube failures have caused, for
example: replacement of 40,000 lin-
ear feet of waterwall tubing due to
hydrogen damage, replacement of
an entire superheater due to over-
heating, and replacement of entire
economizers because of oxygen pit-
ting (local corrosion).34
Repeat failures are those that con-
tinue to occur on the same tube,
same material or in the same boiler
sections. This happens for one of
four reasons: (i) the root cause of
the initial failure was not determined,
(ii) the root cause was improperly
determined and thus the wrong cor-
rective action was taken, (iii) the root
cause was identified, the proper cor-
rective action was attempted, but
was not performed correctly, or (iv)
no corrective action was taken.
Without a proper understanding of
the mechanism of failure, the root
cause, the appropriate corrective
actions, and the proper execution of
those actions, it is not possible to
apply permanent engineering solu-
tions. One of the purposes of this
book is to match mechanism, root
cause and corrective action to help
avoid this problem.
1.7.2 Distinguishing between similar
mechanisms. That there is a signifi-
cant loss of availability from all boiler
tube failure causes is certain as
reflected by the statistics cited
above. It should be noted however,
that there is some uncertainty as to
relative contributions to unavailability
for several of the more prominent
mechanisms. This is caused by an
inability to distinguish between some
of these mechanisms, usually as a
result of inferior metallurgical analy-
sis. This problem then leads to
incorrect root cause identification
followed by an inappropriate and
ineffective solution to the problem.
Chapter 7 of this volume looks
specifically at a comparison of some
commonly misdiagnosed mecha-
nisms. Key defining characteristics
for each are also given in the
relevant discussions of individual
mechanisms.
Table 1-7
Goals and Vision for BTF Prevention
An active BTF reduction program with corporate philosophy signed by senior management.
Availability loss due to BTF of less than 1%.
No cycle chemistry related BTF.
Cycle chemistry operating guidelines for all units including optimization of shutdown, layup and
start up.
No maintenance influenced BTF.
Approved welding and quality control procedures.
Established NDE procedures.
Qualified metallurgical analysis.
Established life assessment methodology.
Comprehensive documentation including: location of failures, mechanism responsible, root cause
determined, repair procedures, and applied solutions.
Sources: J.P. Dimmer, G.A. Lamping, O. Jonas, and R. Niebo32; R.B. Dooley35,36
1.7.3 A vision for the future. The
inter-relationship of the various fac-
tors influencing BTF and goals for
the near term, developed by EPRI
and participating utilities, are shown
in Table 1-7. These goals are
achievable now; there are no techni-
cal barriers to a target of less than
1% availability loss caused by BTF
by the turn of the century.36 In addi-
tion the following should be imple-
mented:
¥ New units. New units will be
designed to minimize problems with
dissimilar weld metals, and to mini-
mize the attachment stresses that
can lead to corrosion fatigue prob-
lems. During commissioning of new
units, specific testing will be done to
ensure that BTF are minimized, such
as cold air velocity tests to deter-
mine potential for flyash erosion,
installation of monitoring equipment
such as thermocouples to keep tube
temperatures below design and oxi-
dation limits, and archives of tube
samples for future reference use.
¥ New technologies. It is important
that the lessons learned about unit
operating, maintenance, and cycle
chemistry, and boiler tube failures,
should not be forgotten when new
power sources are designed and
built. Combined cycle and heat-
recovery steam generators are a
case in point; the need for optimum
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
cycle chemistry and the careful
design of attachment details should
be applied in order to avoid the
problems that have produced corro-
sion fatigue in conventional plants.
¥ Systematic records. A means to
record where failures are occurring,
the incidence, mechanism, and the
corrective actions used will be in
place. Without such a process to
record failures and as much data as
is available, much of the systematic
approach to preventing failures is
stymied.
¥ Identify ÒdamageÓ not ÒfailuresÓ.
The entire sequence of events will
be executed with a goal to have no
failures, that is, utilities are to be
encouraged to identify damaged
tubes, prior to “failure”, and to exe-
cute the steps needed to address
the underlying root causes.
¥ No repeat failures. Repeat
failures are unacceptable and are
avoidable. Repeat failures are those
by the same mechanism in the
same location as a result of the
same cause.
¥ Need for a utility-wide commit-
ment. Correction, prevention and
control requires utility-wide commit-
ment and can result in significant
savings and measurable reduction
in system-wide BTF.
1-21
1.8 References
1Niebo, R.J., “Implementing a Boiler Tube Failure
Mechanism Reporting Program”, in B. Dooley, ed.,
Proceedings: International Conference on Boiler Tube
Failures in Fossil Plants, held in San Diego, California
November 5-7, 1991, Proceedings TR-100493, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1992, pp.
1-31 through 1-46.
2McNabb, D., D. Sidey, and R.W. Patterson, “Canadian
Boiler Tube Failure Experience”, in B. Dooley and D.
Broske, eds., Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil Power Plants:
Conference Proceedings, Conference held in Atlanta,
Georgia, November 10-12, 1987, CS-5500-SR, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1988, pp. 1-19
through 1-35.
3Senior,
B.A., “An Integrated Approach to BTF Integrity
R&D”, op. cit., reference 1, pp. 12-55 through 12-67.
4Platfoot,
R.A. and C.A.J. Fletcher, “Boiler Tube Failures
Caused by Grit Erosion”, ibid., pp. 5-29 through 5-43.
5Shtromberg, Y., “Analysis of Tube Failures of Boiling
Heating Surfaces in Fossil Plants of the USSR”, ibid., pp.
9-15 through 9-21.
6Conference Questionnaire, Appendix A, ibid., pp. A-1
through A-10.
7Stultz, S.C. and J.B. Kitto, eds. Steam: Its Generation
and Use, 40th Edition, Babcock & Wilcox Company,
Barberton, Ohio, 1992.
8Singer,
J.G., ed., Combustion Fossil Power: A Reference
Book on Fuel Burning and Steam Generation, 4th Edition,
Combustion Engineering, Inc., Windsor, Connecticut,
1991.
9Jaffee,R.I., “Metallurgical Problems and Opportunities
in Coal Fired Steam Power Plants”, Met. Trans., Volume
10A, May, 1979, pp. 139-165.
10R.B. Dooley and A. Bursik, “State of the Art in Fossil
Plant Cycle Chemistry”, 12th International Conference on
Water and Steam, held in Orlando, FL, September, 1994,
Begel House “Physical Chemistry of Aqueous Systems”.
11Potter,E.C. and G. M. W. Mann, Proc. 1st Int. Cong.
Metall. Corrosion, London, Butterworks, 1961, p. 417.
12Field,E.M., R.C. Stanley, A.M Adams, D.R. Holmes,
“The Growth, Structure and Breakdown of Magnetite
Films on Mild Steel”, Proc. 2nd Int. Conf. Metallic
Corrosion, New York, 1963, p. 829.
13King, C.W., M.T. Robinson, H. Howarth, and R. Perry,
“Oxidation Behaviour of Steels in High Temperature
Steam”, CEGB Report SSD/MID/R244/71, 1971, cited in
Armitt, J, et al., The Spalling of Steam-Grown Oxide from
Superheater and Reheater Tube Steels, Technical
Planning Study 76-655, Final Report FP-686, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February, 1978.
1-22 Introduction and Background
14Borio, R., et al., “The Control of High-Temperature
Fireside Corrosion in Utility Coal-Fired Boilers”, U.S.
Office of Coal Research, Research and Development
Department, No. 41, April ,1969.
15Reid,
W.T., External Corrosion and Deposits - Boilers
and Gas Turbines, Elsevier, New York, 1971.
16Williams, D.N., H. R. Hazard, H.H. Krause, L.J.
Flanigan, and I.G. Wright, Fireside Corrosion and Fly Ash
Erosion in Boilers, Research Project 2711-1, Final Report
CS-5071, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto,
CA, February, 1987.
17Ball, M., Sodium Hydroxide for Conditioning the Boiler
Water of Drum-Type Boilers, Research Project 9000-20,
Final Report TR-104007, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, California, January, 1995. See also M.
Ball, “Caustic Treatment for Drum Boilers”, in R.B.
Dooley and R. Pate, eds. Fourth International
Conference on Cycle Chemistry in Fossil Boilers, held in
Atlanta, Georgia, September 7-9, 1994, Final Report TR-
104502, Elecrtic Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
January, 1995.
18Goldstein,P., “A Research Study on Internal Corrosion
of High Pressure Boilers”, Trans. ASME 90(A), 1, 1968,
pp. 23-37.
19Goldstein, P. and C.L. Burton, “A Research Study on
Internal Corrosion of High Pressure Boilers - Final
Report”, Trans. ASME 91(A), 1969, pp. 75-101.
20Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec,
November, 1983.
21Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.
22Dimmer,
J.P., G.A. Lamping, and O. Jonas, Boiler Tube
Failure: Correction, Prevention, and Control, Research
Project 1890-7, Final Report GS-6467, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, July, 1989.
23Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.
24VGB, “VGB Guidelines for Feedwater, Boiler Water, and
Steam of Generators Exceeding 68 bar Operating
Pressure” (in German) VGB Technische Vereinigung der
Grosskraftwerksbetreiber, e.V. VGB-R 450 L, Essen,
1983. See also A. Bursik, “VGB Guidelines on Boiler
Feedwater, Boiler Water and Steam of Water-Tube
Boilers”, IWC-84-116, presented at the 45th Annual
Meeting of the International Water Conference,
Pittsburgh, PA, October 22-24, 1984.
25Central Electricity Generating Board, Generation
Operation Memorandum (GOM) 72: Part 1 - Introduction
and General Aspects of Chemical Control of the Steam
Water Circuit, Issue 5, April, 1983. Part 2 - Chemical
Control of the Steam Water Circuit of Drum-Type Boilers,
Issue 6, September 1985. Part 4 - Sampling, Analysis,
Instrumentation and Chemical Dosing, Issue 5,
September, 1983.
26Japanese
Industrial Standard JIS B 8223-1977, Water
Conditioning for Boiler Feed Water and Boiler Water,
Japanese Standards Association, 1977.
27Aschoff,
A.F., Y.H. Lee, D.M. Sopocy, and O. Jonas,
Interim Consensus Guidelines on Fossil Plant Cycle
Chemistry, Research Project 2712-1, Final Report CS-
4629, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
June, 1986.
28Hopkins,
R.D., et al., Guideline Manual on
Instrumentation and Control for Fossil Plant Cycle
Chemistry, Research Project 2712-2, Final Report CS-
5164, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
April, 1987.
29Bursik, A., B. Dooley, and B. Larkin, Guidelines for
Oxygenated Treatment for Fossil Plants, , Research
Project 1403-45, Final Report TR-102285, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December, 1994.
30Dooley, R.B., A. Aschoff, and F. Pocock, Cycle
Chemistry Guidelines for Fossil Plants: Phosphate
Treatment for Drum Units, Final Report TR-103655,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
December, 1994.
31Dooley, R.B., A. Aschoff, and F. Pocock, Cycle
Chemistry Guidelines for Fossil Plants: All-Volatile
Treatment, Final Report, TR-105041, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1996.
32Dimmer, J.P., G.A. Lamping, O. Jonas, and R. Niebo,
Boiler Tube Failure Reduction Program, Research Project
1890-7, Final Report GS-7454, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, August, 1991.
33Dimmer, J.P.,L. Ruby, K. Shields, and O. Jonas, Cycle
Chemistry Corrosion and Deposition: Correction,
Prevention and Control, Research Project 2712-11, Final
Report TR-103038, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, December, 1993.
34Dooley, R.B., “Cycle Chemistry Related Boiler Tube
Failures and Reduction”, Proceedings of the International
Water Conference, 50th Annual Meeting, held in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 23-25, 1989.
35Dooley, R.B., “A Vision for Reducing Boiler Tube
Failures”, Power Engineering, March, 1992, pp. 33-37.
36Dooley, R.B., “A Vision for Reducing Boiler Tube
Failures: Part II”, Power Engineering, May, 1992,
pp. 41-42.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 1-23
1-24 Introduction and Background
 Discontinuous Outer
Chapter 2 • Volume 1
Fe2O3 Steam columnar
porous oxide
(Fe3O4)
The Boiler Tube
Original ++
steel 2-
O Fe Inner
surface equiaxed
spinel
Ferritic
Note: = voidage steel
Operating Environment
and its Breakdown
2.1 Introduction
With the exception of the limitations
on SH/RH tube life introduced by
long-term creep, boiler tube failures
occur because of some deviation or
breakdown from the design condi-
tion. This chapter begins with an
examination of the function and gen-
eral design considerations for both
water- and steam-touching tubing
(Section 2.2).
The extraordinary ability of tube
materials to function in the condi-
tions on the fluid-side of the tube is
due primarily to the formation of pro-
tective oxides. The reaction of iron-
based materials with water and
steam is reviewed briefly in Section
2.3.
Boiler tube failures (BTF) originating
on the fluid-side do so because of
some breakdown (mechanical,
chemical, or thermal) of the normally
protective oxide. This process, the
formation and breakdown of protec-
tive oxides, is central to the analysis
and understanding of BTF.
Therefore, two sections (Sections
2.4 and 2.6) look in detail at oxide
formation and its breakdown for
water-touched and steam-touched
tubes respectively.
Section 2.5 examines the demands
placed on the fluid-side of tubes by
looking at the thermal-hydraulic
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
regimes present in tubes. A distinc-
tion is made between “global” ther-
mal-hydraulic regimes and the local
conditions that are set up by flow
disruption.
This chapter ends with an overview
of the combustion process and
demands placed on the fireside of
tubes (Section 2.7). Of particular
interest for the analysis of fireside
tube failures are both the chemical
and the mechanical aspects of ash
formation by the combustion
process; these will manifest them-
selves as corrosion or erosion
mechanisms. This discussion should
provide background for the more
complete look at fireside tube failure
mechanisms as they are described
in the appropriate chapters of
Volumes 2 and 3.
Although obviously important to the
occurrence of BTF, the details of the
overall design of boilers are not dis-
cussed because of the complexity
and the number of varieties. Two
comprehensive references that can
be consulted for such information
are Steam: Its Generation and Use1
and Combustion Fossil Power: A
Reference Book on Fuel Burning
and Steam Generation.2
2-1
2.2 Basic Function and General
Design Considerations
At its most basic, the purpose of a
boiler tube is to transfer heat gener-
ated by the combustion process to
the water and/or steam within the
tube. The tube must have sufficient
mechanical strength (a function of
its diameter, wall thickness, and
material of construction) to contain
the internal pressure, as well as ade-
quate resistance to corrosion on
both fluid and fireside surfaces.
These requirements must be contin-
uously met over the required life of
the boiler, usually well in excess of
100,000 operating hours. Finally,
economic considerations require
that the cheapest adequate materi-
als be used.3 Worldwide these
demands are met by a number of
international materials and design
codes. This section briefly overviews
the requirements in the United
States.
Material choice is a function of
expected temperature of operation.
Economizers and waterwall sections
are usually constructed with a mild
or medium carbon steel while low
alloy ferritic steels are used for most
superheater and reheater sections,
with austenitic stainless steels speci-
fied for the highest temperature cir-
cuits or corrosion performance.
Alloys for use as boiler tube materi-
als in the United States are identified
by an ASME designation (SA-xxx) or
an essentially equivalent ASTM des-
ignation (A-xxx). ASME material
specifications are found in ASME
Boiler & Pressure Vessel (B&PV)
Code, Section II, Part A: “Materials
Specifications for Ferrous Materials”.
The specific grade of material is
required as well as the specification
number. Table 2-1 provides an
overview of the typical boiler tube
materials, their basic composition,
alloy designation, and general prop-
erties.
2-2 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown
Table 2-1
Summary of Typical Boiler Tube Materials of Construction
Class of Material Typical Alloy Designations
Carbon steel SA-178: Welded carbon steel
SA-192: Seamless carbon-silicon steel
SA-210: Seamless carbon-manganese-
silicon steel
Carbon - SA-209-T1, T1a and T1b: Seamless
molybdenum carbon-1/2 molybdenum steel
steel SA-250-T1: Welded carbon-
1/2 molybdenum steel
Chromium- SA-213-T2: Seamless 1/2 chromium -
molybdenum 1/2 molybdenum steel.
steel SA-213-T12: Seamless 1Cr-1/2Mo steel
SA-213-T11: Seamless 11/4Cr-1/2Mo steel
SA-213-T22: Seamless 21/4Cr-1Mo steel
SA-213-T21: Seamless 3Cr-1Mo steel
SA-213-T5: Seamless 5Cr-1/2Mo steel
SA-213-T5b: Seamless 5Cr-1/2Mo-Si steel
SA-213-T5c: Seamless 5Cr-1/2Mo-Ti steel
SA-213-T7: Seamless 7Cr-1/2Mo steel
SA-213-T9: Seamless 9Cr-1Mo steel
SA-213-T91: Seamless 9Cr-1Mo-
1/2V-X (Cb/N/Ni/Al) steel
Austenitic SA-213-TP304/304H: Seamless 18Cr-8Ni
stainless steel austenitic stainless
SA-213-TP316/316H: Seamless 16Cr-
12Ni-2Mo austenitic stainless
SA-213-TP321/321H: Seamless 17Cr-
11Ni-Ti austenitic stainless
SA-213-TP347/347H: Seamless 18Cr-
10Ni-Cb austenitic stainless
Ferritic stainless
steel
Martensitic
stainless steel
Nonferrous alloys Nickel-chromium (Alloy 600)
Nickel-chromium- Alloy 800 or 800 H
iron
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4
General Properties
Hypoeutectoid steels.
Mild corrosion resistance.
Moderate strength up to 538°C
(1000°F).
Susceptible to graphitization
above 427°C (800°F).
Greater creep strength than car-
bon steels.
Susceptible to graphitization
with prolonged exposure above
468°C (875°F).
Most common boiler tube
materials (particularly T22 and
T11).
Each increase in Cr content
yields improved properties,
particularly higher strength,
creep properties, and improved
corrosion resistance.
Resistant to graphitization.
Excellent oxidation resistance
and good elevated temperature
strength.
"H" following designation indi-
cates higher carbon content and
slightly higher solution heat
treat temperature.
For use in highly aggressive or
high temperature environment.
For use in highly aggressive or
high temperature environment.
For use in highly aggressive or
high temperature environment.
For use in highly aggressive or
high temperature environment.
Table 2-2 A list of the minimum tensile and
Minimum Tensile and Yield Strengths yield strengths of some commonly
used boiler tube materials is pro-
vided in Table 2-2. The maximum
Tube Steel Type ASME Grade Minimum Tensile Minimum Yield tube metal temperatures for a selec-
Specificationa Strength (ksi) Strength (ksi) tion of materials is provided in Table
2-3.
Carbon Steel
Because several materials are usu-
ally used in the SH/RH sections, a
Electric resis- SA-178 A 47b 26b schematic showing the locations of
tance welded C 60 37 materials and the transitions is criti-
cal, both for tracking materials and
Seamless SA-192 – 47b 26b for developing the appropriate weld
procedures.
Seamless SA-210 A1 60 37 “Upgrading” materials is, for several
C 70 40 key BTF mechanisms, the optimal
strategy. For example, where persis-
Electric resis- SA-226 – 47b 26b tent long-term overheating and
tance welded creep damage is occurring in the
lower grade of two materials near a
Ferritic Alloy transition, extending the use of the
higher grade material can often be
Electric resis- SA-250 T1 55 30 the most cost-effective solution. If a
material change is made, careful
tance welded
documentation should be made of
the new material and its location so
Seamless SA-209 T1 55 30 that, if needed, repairs can be prop-
T1a 55 30 erly executed.
SA-213 T1b 55 30
Further, some care is required to
T2 60 30
ensure that the “upgraded” material
has the necessary properties to
Seamless T5c 60 30 meet all the requirements of the
T9c 60 30 location. For example, increased
T11 60 30 erosion resistance may not be found
T12 60 30 in conjunction with increased creep
T22 60 30 strength in a particular alloy. When
T91d 85 60 looking for an upgraded property of
one type, care must be taken to
Austenitic assure that deterioration of another
Stainless Steel key property is not incurred.
An extensive catalog of properties
Seamless SA-213 TP304H 75 30 for boiler tube materials including
TP316H 75 30 high temperature properties, and
TP321 75 30 the microstructure of original and
TP347 75 30 service-exposed material is avail-
able in the EPRI Boiler Tube Failure
TP347H 75 30
Metallurgical Guide.4
Notes:
a ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, Section I, Power Boilers - Part PG-9, Pipes, Tubes and Pressure-
Containing Parts
b Not required by ASME material specification. For purposes of design, these tensile properties may be
assumed.
c Not commonly used in modern boilers.
d Recently approved.

Adapted from: G.A. Lamping and R.M Arrowood, Jr.5

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-3

2.2.1 Basic considerations for water- Table 2-3
walls and economizers. Under nor- Maximum Tube Metal Temperatures
mal conditions in waterwall tubes for
subcritical boilers the steam-water
temperature is limited to the satura- Tube Steel ASME ASME1 B&W2 C-E3 Riley4
tion temperature for the given boiler Type Spec. No. Max. Max. Max. Max.
pressure and thus the tube tempera- °F °F °F °F
tures are typically less than 400°C (°C) (°C) (°C) (°C)
(~ 750°F). In supercritical units, the
waterwall materials typically operate Carbon steel SA-178C 1000 950 850 850
to slightly higher temperatures (538)5,6 (510) (454) (454)
(454°C (849°F)). As a result, high
temperature creep is not a consider-
" SA-192 1000 950 850 850
ation and waterwall tubes are
designed on the basis of short term (538)5,6 (510) (454) (454)
tensile strength properties and for
indefinite life. In practice, however, " SA-210 1000 950 850 850
this goal is not achieved; waterwall A1 (538)5,6 (510) (454) (454)
failures account for a large fraction
of BTF. Also low temperature creep Carbon Moly SA-209 1000 -- 900 900
can occur in economizer tubing T1 (538)7 (482) (482)
bends and in the low temperature
sections of superheaters and " SA-209 1000 975 -- --
reheaters. T1a (538)7 (524)
Plain carbon steel, such as SA210
or SA192, is most often used for Chrome Moly SA-213 1200 1050 1025 1025
subcritical boilers in North American T11 (649) (566) (552) (552)
units with some use of SA213 T11 or
T22 (chromium-molybdenum steel); " SA-213 1200 1115 1075 1075
the latter material is usually the
T22 (649) (602) (580) (580)
material of choice for supercritical
units. Maximum allowable design
stress as specified in the ASME Stainless SA-213 1500 1400 -- 1500
Code is chosen to be no higher than 321H (816) (760) (816)
the lowest of:
" SA-213 1500 -- 1300 --
(i) 1/4 of the specified minimum ten-
sile strength at room temperature; 347H (816) (704)

(ii)1/4 of the tensile strength at " SA-213 1500 1400 1300 --

design temperature;
(iii) 5/8 of the specified minimum
yield strength at room tempera-
ture;
(iv) 5/8 of the yield strength at
design temperature.
Tube metal temperatures are an
important factor in the manner in
which BTF develop. Tube metal tem-
peratures depend on the heat flux
from the fireside, the internal flow
rate and the condition of the working
fluid.
304H (816) (760) (704)
1 From ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Table PG-23.1. This is the highest metal temperature for
which maximum allowable stress values are given.
2 From reference 1, 1978 edition, p. 29-11, Table 3.
3 From reference 2, 1981 edition, p. 6-43, Table IV.
4 From reference 6, 1983 edition, p. 263, Table VI.
5 Upon prolonged exposure to temperatures above about 800°F (427°C), the carbide phase of carbon steel
may be converted to graphite.
6 Only killed steels shall be used above 850°F (454°C)
7 Upon prolonged exposure to temperatures above about 875°F (468°C), the carbide phase of
carbon-molybdenum may be converted to graphite.
Note: Direct comparison of maximum metal temperature is not meaningful without information on design heat
transfer analysis and actual material properties.

Source: G.A. Lamping and R.M Arrowood, Jr.5

2-4 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

Heat transfer through the tube wall is
mainly by conduction and involves
several temperature gradients, as
shown schematically for a subcritical
waterwall in Figure 2-1. Furnace gas
temperatures near to the wall are
typically around 1200°C (~ 2200°F)
but a massive gradient exists
between this and the tube metal,
mainly due to the cooling effect of
the internal fluid, but also to low
conductivity of the gas boundary
layer and fireside scale.
Under normal circumstances, with-
out heavy internal deposits, the gra-
dient through the tube metal is
small, typically about 25°C (45°F),
and a further drop occurs through
the waterside magnetite layer and
the boundary layer in the
steam/water mixture. Important con-
sequences are: (i) tube metal tem-
perature in the steam generating
tubes is normally below 400°C (~
750°F); and (ii) excessive waterside
deposit growth raises tube metal
temperature by restricting heat flow.
Excess fireside corrosion scaling
reduces metal temperature in the
affected area but can cause prob-
lems due to excess heat flux else-
where in the boiler.3
2.2.2 Basic considerations for super-
heaters and reheaters. The design of
superheater/reheater (SH/RH) sec-
tions is more involved. There will be
a distribution of increasingly higher
metal temperatures through the cir-
cuit, necessitating tubes with
increasing wall thickness and/or
material changes. Thus the primary
stages may use carbon steel tubing,
followed by progressive change to
low alloy ferritic steels for increasing
creep and oxidation resistance, and
finally to the use of austenitic stain-
less tubes for the highest tempera-
ture sections. Figure 2-2 shows the
range of materials and sizes used in
the construction of a typical super-
heater.
Each manufacturer specifies a maxi-
mum operating temperature for each
material, based on laboratory oxida-
tion experiments. Thus, during the
design stage, a tube material is
used up to the gas-touched length
Fireside
scale
Boundary
film
Tube
wall
Furnace
(~1200°C)
Figure 2-1. Schematic of a typical temperature profile through a water wall tube.
Source: R.B. Dooley and H.J. Westwood3
(tube heated length within the fur-
nace) at which it is estimated the
maximum oxidation temperature is
reached. Transition is then made to
the next higher grade material.
In superheater and reheater tubes,
the dry steam temperature has no
saturation limitation and is simply
determined by the balance between
heat flux and internal flow rate.
Depending on the design, final
steam temperatures of 538 to 565°C
(1000 to 1050°F) can require tube
metal temperatures in excess of
600°C (~1110°F) in the last stages
of the SH and RH sections. Tube
materials are initially selected by
performing a heat balance analysis.
This starts with the gas outlet tem-
perature from the air heater and
works backward through all the con-
vection and radiant sections to
achieve the desired furnace gas out-
let temperature by inserting the
appropriate amount of tubing in
each section to achieve the rated
steam conditions. This is achieved
by having bank effectiveness factors
which vary with the heat pickup for
each individual section or bank of
tubing.3
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
Waterside
Boundary
film
Water
(366°C)
Boiler tubes up to 12.5 cm (5.0 in.)
in diameter are designed in accor-
dance with the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code, Section I.
Essentially, the code sets limits on
wall thickness based on boiler pres-
sure and operating temperature of
the specific tube. Tube diameter is
selected by the manufacturer based
on experience and is not governed
by the Code.3
For SH and RH tubes, the stresses
are based on 100% of the stress to
produce a creep rate of 0.01%/1000
hr, as determined from the most
appropriate available data. In addi-
tion, code stresses are limited to
67% of the average stress to pro-
duce rupture in 100,000 hours, or
80% of the minimum stress for rup-
ture in 100,000 hours, whichever is
lower. RH tubes are relatively thin
walled compared with SH tubes
since the pressure in the RH is sub-
stantially lower than the rated boiler
pressure. For example, for boilers
operating at 16.2 MPa (2350 psi),
RH pressure is typically 3.4 MPa
(500 psi).3
2-5
The following formulae are currently
Rear pendant
used for minimum wall thickness Front pendant Outlet header
and maximum operating pressure: Inlet header
Outlet header
Inlet header
2 1/8" O.D. x
Platen section 2 1/8" O.D. x 0.400" min
Outlet header 0.440" min SA-213, T22
PD Inlet header SA-213, T11 2 1/8" O.D. x
T = ÑÑÑÑÑ + 0.005D + e (2-1) 2 1/8" O.D. x 0.340" min
0.420" min SA-213, T11 Horizontal
2" O.D. x
2S+P 0.188" min SA-213, T22 2 1/8" O.D. x section
SA-213, T11 2 1/8" O.D. x 0.340" min
0.281" min 2 1/8" O.D. x Outlet
SA-213, T22 Header
SA-213, T11 0.400" min
SA-213,
(2T - 0.01D - 2e) 2 1/8" O.D. x TP374H
0.340" min
P= S ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÐ (2-2) 2" O.D. x SA-213, T11 2 1/8" O.D. x
x 2 1/8" O.D. x
2" O.D. x
0.188" min 0.360" min 0.360" min
[D - (T - 0.005D - e)] SA-209, T1 SA-213,
x SA-213, T22 0.281" min
SA-213,
TP374H T11 2" O.D. x
2" O.D. x 0.220" min
0.188" min 2 1/8" O.D. x SA-213, T11
SA-213, T11 0.320" min
2" O.D. x
where T = minimum wall thickness (in.) SA-213,
TP347H 0.203" min
2 1/8" O.D. x
0.400" min SA-209, T1
D = outer diameter (in.) SA-213, T9
2" O.D. x
P = maximum allowable working x Indicates a dissimilar metal weld 0.168" min
Indicated a change in material or wall thickness SA-209, T1
pressure (psi) Horizontal section 2" O.D. x
Ring inlet header 0.240" min
SA-192
S = maximum allowable stress Material Specifications
value at operating temperature SA-192 Carbon steel
SA-209, T1 Carbon moly
of metal as given in reference
SA-213, T11 1 1/4% chrome, 1/2% moly
table (psi) SA 213, T22 2 1/4% chrome, 1% moly
SA 213, T9 9% chrome, 1% moly
e = thickness factor (in.)
SA-213, TP347H Columbium stainless steel

There is no corrosion allowance, per

se, in the ASME Code, but effec-
tively the term 0.005D covers this
factor. Also, for cold drawn seam-
less tubing, ASME SA450 allows
+22% on the calculated wall thick-
ness, hence the conservatism in the
Code. The maximum allowable
stresses are determined on the
basis of the operating metal temper-
ature.
Superheater and reheater tubes
operate at temperatures ranging
from around 400°C (~ 750°F) to over
600°C (~ 1110°F) depending on
location and design. Because of the
higher operating temperatures, and
as a result of the progressive
buildup of internal steamside oxide,
which increases tube metal temper-
atures, they are subject to accumu-
lation of damage by creep, which
ultimately causes rupture. Such
tubes therefore have a finite service
life, in contrast to economizer and
waterwall tubes which should in
principle last indefinitely.
Figure 2-2. Example of boiler superheater tubing materials and sizes per section.
Source: G.G. Stephenson and J.W. Prince7
An additional consideration is the water or steam (see, for example,
formation of wustite (FeO), a non- references 8 and 9). Why should the
protective form of oxide, at tempera- practicing utility operator, engineer
ture in excess of 570°C (~ 1060°F). or chemist be concerned? There are
This can lead to very rapid oxidation at least two reasons; first, it is the
rates in superheater/reheater tubes formation of the thin oxide layers
and has led to limiting allowable that make it possible for these mate-
temperatures for carbon steels to rials to be used in the demanding
about 454 to 510°C (~ 850 to temperature and pressure condi-
950°F); for T-11 to 552 to 566° tions of modern boilers. When those
(~ 1025 to 1050°F) and for T-22 to oxide layers breakdown, the result is
580 to 602°C (~ 1075 to 1115°F). the variety of boiler tube failures
described in Volumes 2 and 3. The
second reason is that the condition
2.3 The Reaction of Iron and (thickness, morphology, composi-
Water/Steam: Oxide Formation tion) of the oxide scales formed are
There is a plethora of information valuable diagnostic tools. A brief
discussing the most likely mecha- overview of the topic is presented
nisms, characteristics, rates of here with additional detail in the
growth and features of the oxides appropriate discussions of individ-
that form on iron-based materials ual mechanisms.
when exposed to air, or more impor-
tantly for boiler tube purposes, to

2-6 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

There are three stable, solid forms of Table 2-4
oxide that occur as a result of the Overview of Oxides of Iron
reaction of iron and water/steam
under temperature and pressure
conditions relevant to boiler prac- Characteristic Magnetite Hematite Wustite
tice: wustite (FeO), magnetite
(Fe3O4), and hematite (a-Fe2O3). Composition Fe3O4 a-Fe2O3 FeO
Table 2-4 provides an introduction to
some of the differences among the Structure Face-centered cubic,
three. spinel
The conditions which will tend to
favor the formation of one of the Growth Both cations and n-type conductor. p-type conductor.
three are a function of a number of mechanisms anions diffuse. Growth involves Growth involves mostly
variables including: oxygen concen- mainly anions. cations.
tration, temperature and pH.18 The
iron-oxygen phase diagram shown in Stability Above 560°C (1040°F);
Figure 2-3 illustrates the tempera- below it decomposes to
ture-oxygen regimes for each. Since Fe3O4 and iron.
there is a gradient of available oxy-
gen (highest in the water/steam, low-
Position in oxide Predominant layer in If found, will be on the If found, it will be on the
est nearest the inside tube surface),
the conditions will often be such that layers typical oxides outermost layer of the steamside between the
more than one form of oxide can throughout boiler. oxide nearest the tube metal and the pre-
exist. Further complicating the devel- water/ steam. dominant magnetite. In
opment of oxide will be the formation ferritic alloys, FeO
of multiple layers and laminated occurs between the alloy
structures, topics that are further spinel and the Fe3O4.
explored in following sections.
Wustite (FeO), the form that is stable Oxygen Levels at A wide range of oxy- Highest Lowest
with the lowest oxygen concentra- Formation gen partial pressures
tion, is not stable below tempera-
tures that depend on the alloy con- Hardness (HV) 450-550 > 1000 250-350
tent of the steel and range from 560
to 620°C (~ 1040 to 1150°F) on 1Cr- Density (g/cm3) 5 - 5.4 (Ref. 10) 5.24 (Ref. 10) 5.7
1/2 Mo and 21/4Cr-1Mo steels, at which

point it decomposes into iron and Thermal 0.0423 - 1.37 x 10-5 T 0.0423 - 1.37 x 10-5 T
magnetite. If it forms on the steam-
conductivity (Ref. 11) (Ref. 11)
side of tubes, it could be between
the tube metal and the predominant (W cm-1 K-1)
magnetite layer. As noted above,
wustite is of concern because of the Tensile fracture 5 - 30 1-3
potential for accelerated oxidation if strain (x 104) (Refs. 12, 13) (Refs. 14, 15)
it forms. This has been suggested for
the growth of multilaminated oxides Young's modulus 14 - 26 (scale) 12.2 (scale) 12.8 (bulk)
in steam; FeO is not seen in the ( x 10-10 Nm-2) (Ref. 12) (Ref. 16) (Ref. 17)
scales after shutdown.
Magnetite (Fe3O4) is the predomi- Relevance to Protective form of Is a non-protective form;
nant form of oxide. It exists over a analysis of BTF oxide. Its breakdown if found can lead to rapid
wide range of oxygen partial pres- by chemical and/or oxidation of SH/RH
sures and temperatures.4 Hematite mechanical means is tubes. Indicator of over-
(a-Fe2O3), stable in the highest oxy- at the root of most heating.
gen concentrations will form in the BTFs.
outermost layer of the oxide.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-7

 The growth mechanism involves a
Atom % Oxygen flux of iron ions from the steel to the
50 52 54 56 58 60 outside interface of the oxide and an
Liquid Liquid oxide 3000 equal flux of oxygen ions from the
iron
1600 + oxygen boiler water to the steel surface, as
Liquid iron +
liquid oxide Liquid oxide Magnetite + illustrated schematically in Figure 2-
Liquid oxide oxygen 4. There has been much discussion
+ magnetite
Iron + about whether these fluxes of iron
liquid oxide 2600 and oxygen occur by a solid state

Magnetite
1400 Iron + liquid oxide diffusion mechanism through the
oxide or whether the growth consists

Hematite + oxygen
of diffusion of the reactants in liquid
WŸstite (boiler water) filled pores.3

Temperature °F
1200 Iron + 2200 A number of explanations for how
wŸstite
the various species are transported
Temperature (°C)

through the oxide include8:

• Vapor phase transport of water
1000 1800 vapor inward and ‘volatile’
WŸstite + Magnetite +
magnetite hematite Fe(OH)2 outward through liquid-
filled pores22;
• Solid-state, countercurrent diffu-
800 sion of iron and oxygen ions
Iron + 1400 through lattice defects, the two-
wŸstite layer structure arising because
the outer part of the magnetite
behaves as a metal deficit semi-
600
1040°F conductor, and the inner part as a
1000 metal excess semiconductor23;
FeO Iron+ magnetite Fe3O4 Fe2O3 • Outward cation solid-state diffu-
sion coupled with accelerated
400 inward transport of water vapor
0 0.4 22 24 26 28 30
across disconnected pores via a
Weight % Oxygen
redox-type reaction24;
• Inner layer growth by transport of
Figure 2-3. Iron-oxygen phase diagram. water along pores to the scale-
metal interface with rate of corro-
sion limited by outward diffusion
of cations along oxide grain
2.4 Oxide Development and It grows as a tenacious and coher- boundaries. Outer layer growth
Breakdown in Water-Touched ent film which then impedes trans- limited by the amount of outward-
Tubes port and diffusion; as a result, the bound iron ions which depends
rate of transport decreases with on various corrosion reactions
time. The rate of oxide formation is involved (compensating current
2.4.1 Growth of protective mag- initially high but decreases as the carried by electron or proton
netite. The growth of protective mag- layer thickness increases (parabolic transfer through the oxide or an
netite which occurs adjacent to the growth) and becomes self-limiting. external circuit through the
tube wall in water-touched tubing In actual practice the outer layer is water)25;
under typical boiler conditions was infrequently formed because as it
first characterized around thirty does it becomes entrained in the The growth of Fe3O4 thus occurs at
years ago.12, 19, 20 The protective boiler water flow and is redeposited the two interfaces and, because of
layer of magnetite (Fe3O4) is formed with feedwater corrosion products in the equal fluxes, the growth rates
by the reaction between iron and other regions, maybe of higher heat are the same. As a result the oxide
neutral, or alkaline water.3 flux. Even after years, the oxide grows in a stress-free situation, and
layer is normally only a few microm- is therefore protective. The mecha-
eters thick (10mm - 15mm)21, yet will nism described varies very little in
3 Fe + 4 H2O ® boiler water treated with caustic,
still provide protection to the boiler
(Fe3O4) + 4 H2 (2-3) tube until mechanically cracked or
fluxed away.

2-8 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

 phosphate, or in boiler treated by
Boiler water all-volatile or oxygenated treatment.
B
- The growth of waterside Fe3O4
O2 Protective occurs in economizer tubing in a
Fe3O4
Fe2+ similar fashion to that in the water-
A wall, although there is much less
feedwater corrosion product deposi-
Tube wall tion which is a function of heat flux
and heat transfer. Further, waterside
surfaces are generally more uneven
and contain more pits than those in
Figure 2-4. Schematic of counter-flux diffusion growth of protective Fe3O4 in boiler
waterwalls.
water. Most often the outer layer is not present. Source: R.B. Dooley and H.J.
Westwood3
2.4.2 Scale in waterwall tubes. The
total amount of scale/deposits on a
boiler tube water wall (either subcrit-
ical or supercritical once-through
units) consists of the protective
a) AVT Treatment Fe3O4 described above plus a
layer/thickness of deposited mater-
Deposit Loading, mg/cm2
ial, primarily feedwater corrosion
120 products. This material can consist
100 pH = 9.4 of Fe3O4, Cu, Zn, Ni, and other met-
pH = 9.2 als and oxides which are trans-
80 pH = 9.0 Ð 9.2 ported from the feedwater system
60 pH = 8.5 Ð 9.1 and deposit on the water wall sur-
40 pH = 8.0 Ð 8.5 faces. The total thickness controls
the heat transfer and is also the rea-
20 son that boilers have to be chemi-
0 cally cleaned.
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000
The rate at which such deposits
Service Exposure (hours) accumulate is a function of: (i) local
heat flux, (ii) local thermal-hydraulic
b) Combined or Neutral Oxygenated Treatments features, and (iii) boiler water chem-
Deposit Loading, mg/cm2 istry.4 The typical effects of unit
chemistry are shown in Figure 2-5
120 which contrasts the rate of deposit
100 Combined, pH = 7.6 Ð 8.2 buildup for all-volatile treatment
Combined, pH = 6.6 Ð 7.8 (AVT) and oxygenated treatment
80 Neutral, pH = 6.3 Ð 7.2 (OT) for some units in Russia. The
60 experience can vary markedly
between units even operating under
40 the same chemistry. For example,
20 scale densities of only 25 mg/cm2
have been found after 70,000 hours
0 of operation for units under AVT. The
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000
effects of cycle chemistry and treat-
Service Exposure (hours) ment options are explored in more
detail in Chapter 3 of this volume.

Figure 2-5. Water wall deposit weight expressed as function of service hours for sev-
eral water treatment methods. Note the dramatic benefit of oxygenated water treat-
ments in eliminating rapid waterside deposits. Source: I.I. Chudnovskaya, Central
Boiler and Turbine Institute, St. Petersburg, Russia

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-9

In supercritical and once-through
boilers the oxides and metals
depositing in wall tubes can form
ripples under some circumstances.
Figure 2-6 shows the typical surface
appearance, a magnification
through the cross-section of the rip-
ples is shown in Figure 2-7.
Although a complete understanding
of the phenomenon is not in-hand,
the following observations have
been made about the process26:
• Rippled surfaces offer greater
flow resistance than normal
smooth magnetite profiles and are
generally responsible for increas-
ing boiler pressure drop.
• Heat flux seems to have little
effect on formation. Ripple dimen-
sions are the same on the fireside
and non-fired side of tubes, how-
ever, ripple spacings are related
to the flow velocity in the tube.

2.4.3 Breakdown of protective mag- Figure 2-6. Photograph showing "ripple" deposits on the inside surface of a supercriti-
netite and the resulting BTF. While cal waterwall tube.
the protective magnetite remains
intact, the tube is generally pro-
tected. However, once this layer is
cracked, removed, fluxed away, or
grows at an accelerated rate, then
the protection can be considered to
be lost. The manner in which the
magnetite scale is modified, chemi-
cally by various contaminant
species, or mechanically by the
application of locally excessive
strain levels, leads directly to the
manifestation of various damage
types.
Table 2-5 lists some of these break-
down processes and the associated
boiler tube damage mechanisms for
water-touched tubing. Several are
associated with the excessive
buildup of internal deposits, primar-
ily as a result of feedwater corrosion
products. The chemical attack of
magnetite under such deposits can
be rapid at temperatures consistent
with those in an operating boiler. The

Figure 2-7. Cross sectional view through ripple magnetite.

2-10 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

Table 2-5 tion.27 Additional detailed discus-
Protective Magnetite Breakdown and the Resulting BTF Mechanisms in sion is presented in Chapter 15,
Water-Touched Tubing Volume 2, in the section on the
hydrogen damage mechanism.
Boiler Tube Nature of Breakdown Conditions Chapters for
Dissolved salt contaminants such as
Failure Additional
chlorides and sulfates are of con-
Mechanism Information cern as they can affect the morphol-
ogy, formation rate, thickness, and
Normal Condition Counter flux of O2- and Fe2+. Oxide grows stress-free by a Main text, this strength of the protective layer.31
parabolic growth law. section
In addition to modification of the
way in which the scales forms (with
•Caustic Gouging Underdeposit fluxing of magnetite followed by diffusion of Chapters 16, subsequent chemical attack), the
•Acid Phosphate locally concentrated corrosion species to form characteristic 17, Vol. 2 magnetite film can be damaged
Corrosion deposits. directly either by chemical means
(corrosion) or by mechanical means
Hydrogen Damage Underdeposit modification of magnetite growth mechanism Chapter 15, (strain), or by the synergistic effect
to linear accumulation with internal strains; followed by Vol. 2 of the two.28 Destabilization primar-
chemical attack by locally concentrated, low pH fluid. ily by chemical means usually
occurs at pre-existing active sites31,
Corrosion Fatigue Mechanical strain applied to oxide causes microfissures that Chapter 13, resembles pitting and has some-
are susceptible to environmental attack from bulk conditions. Vol. 2 times been termed stress-assisted
pitting. When the film is fractured
primarily by strain of the substrate
Pitting Primarily caused by stagnant, oxygenated water formed dur- Chapter 27, tube, corrosion paths are produced,
ing shutdown which attacks oxide as generalized corrosion. Vol. 2 leading to an array of cracks which
is generally termed corrosion fatigue
Chemical cleaning Manifested as generalized corrosion because of direct chem- Chapter 25, in boiler tubes. Rupture of the pro-
damage ical attack of oxide Vol. 2 tective oxide film leads to more
rapid damage by corrosion fatigue
because (i) additional base metal is
exposed to corrosion damage and
rate of attack under typical bulk corrosion species to deposit at the (ii) the rupture, which is a crack or
boiler water operating conditions as outer layer. In the case of caustic crack-like, acts as a stress concen-
well as under either high or low pH gouging, the presence of concen- trator.
is shown in Figure 2-8. The figure trated solutions of sodium hydroxide
also provides an indication of the results in the formation of character- That there is a lower bound or criti-
solubility of Fe3O4 under these con- istic crystals of sodium ferroate cal level of strain that is required to
ditions. It is this accelerated attack within the corrosion product. The fracture the protective oxide film and
at pH levels outside a narrow range, magnetite breakdown reaction for begin the corrosion fatigue damage
and the nature of changes to the these two waterside, underdeposit- process is supported by the
protective magnetite (specifically corrosion mechanisms is thus pri- absence of corrosion fatigue in boil-
mechanisms for concentration of marily chemical in the presence of ers where the design considers the
deposits), that underlies many of the concentrated corrosive solutions. magnetite strain tolerance, and from
waterside, waterwall and economizer modeling studies of oxide. The criti-
In contrast, in the presence of acidic cal strain to fracture magnetite at
boiler tube failure mechanisms. chloride solutions, Potter and high temperatures is generally
Under locally high pH conditions, Mann20 found that the growth of the reported to be between 0.01 and
caused by a concentration of oxide scale itself is changed. 0.1% strain.15, 29, 30, 31 The German
sodium hydroxide (leading to caus- Specifically the oxidation rate of design standard TRD 301, for exam-
tic gouging) or alternatively a con- mild steel becomes linear and the ple, requires that the strain level in
centration of low Na: PO4 ratio phos- magnetite scale formed is stratified tube oxide be kept below a certain
phate liquids or solutions (leading to or laminated. Further, it has been limit (about 0.1% strain) during
acid phosphate corrosion), a fluxing shown that the oxide that forms is operation to avoid rupturing the
reaction removes the magnetite. internally stressed. Thus the oxide magnetite scale.
There is a subsequent transport of growth process is affected both
chemically and mechanically for the
case of acidic chloride contamina-

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-11

 depends critically on the mainte-
a) nance of satisfactory boiling condi-
tions within the tube.
100.0 The effect of increasing heat flux on
2-
metal temperatures is shown
Fe2+ Fe(OH)4 schematically in Figure 2-10. Up to
10.0
point A in the figure, water heating
Solubility (m.mol.kg-1)
Corrosion (mm/year)

1.0
without boiling takes place; this is
the situation for economizer sections
0.1
that perform the final stages of the
feedwater preheating. Between A
Fe(OH)-3 and B, the local heat flux is sufficient
0.01
to cause local or “nucleate boiling”
at the solid-liquid interface but the
0.001
FeOH+ Corrosion steam bubbles so formed condense
in the bulk fluid, helping to raise its
0.0001 temperature. This condition is
Fe(OH)2
pH 300°C
termed “sub-cooled nucleate” or
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
local boiling. Beyond B, the bubbles
do not collapse and nucleate boiling
Rapid acid Normal bulk with net steam evolution occurs up
chloride Rapid
attack with
boiler water
operating caustic to point C. High rates of heat trans-
hydrogen attack
damage region fer exist during the sub-cooled and
saturated boiling stages so that the
b) tube metal temperature does not
HCl or greatly exceed the saturation value.
Compound H3PO4 NaH2PO4 Na2HPO4 Na3PO4 NaOH
Beyond C, bubble coalescence
Common Hydrochloric Monosodium Di-sodium Tri-sodium Sodium
name acid or phosphate phosphate phosphate Hydroxide begins to form a superheated steam
phosphoric film over part or all of the heating
acid surface, the condition known as film
Approximate 1.5 4.8 8.8 12.0 13.5 boiling. From D to E, the film boiling
pH of a 1% is unstable, beyond E stable film
solution @
25°C boiling exists. When the local heat
flux exceeds that at D, the tube
metal temperature may increase
very rapidly to D', which may well
Figure 2-8 a) Corrosion of mild steel and solubility of magnetite at 300°C. b) Some result in tube rupture if this overtem-
common contaminants and boiler water treatment chemicals. perature condition persists. For
example, the tube can reach over
850°C (~ 1560°F), at which temper-
2.5. Overview of Thermal- the concentration of contamination ature rupture will ensue in a matter
that led to the breakdown of the pro- of minutes. D is clearly a key point
Hydraulic Regimes and and the adjacent point C is the point
Waterside BTF tective magnetite (see for example,
Masterson, Castle and Mann27). of departure from nucleate boiling,
In previous sections it has been (DNB), or the critical heat flux.
2.5.1 Global thermal-hydraulic
noted that local mechanical and Factors promoting DNB or steam
regimes. Figure 2-9 illustrates the
chemical conditions can lead to a blanketing are: increases in heat
different global regimes of fluid con-
breakdown in the protective mag- flux, high steam quality (percentage
dition in an idealized boiler tube fed
netite of tubing, but how is it possi- of steam in the two-phase mixture),
by a bottom header. Over the major
ble that such conditions can be set tube geometry, and pressure.
portion of the boiler tube, there is an
up within the normal flow conditions Curves are available giving limiting
annular flow of water at the tube
of a boiler? Many past studies of the values for specific boiler conditions.
inside diameter and a core of steam;
basic hydraulic and thermal condi-
a condition that occurs at a steam From the tube design standpoint,
tions are the key to understanding
quality of about 5% and greater. This the onset of DNB can be delayed if
the mechanisms of deposition of
is also called nucleate boiling. the internal surface acts to create
feedwater corrosion products and of
Control of metal temperatures in
waterwall tubes to avoid BTF

2-12 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

 Drum
Boiling Steam
Mode Quality
20%
Annular
flow
Churn 5%
Slug
Bubbly
Sub-cooled nucleate
Bottom
header
Figure 2-9. Schematic representation of
two-phase flow in a heated vertical tube
of a drum boiler. Source: H.G.
Masterson, et al.27 after P.M.C. Lacey
and G.J. Kirby32
turbulent conditions tending to dis-
rupt steam film formation. This has
been successfully achieved with
rifled tubes, for example, which are
more expensive than plain tubing,
but may be specified for high heat
flux areas in boilers operating above
15.2 MPa (2200 psi).
2.5.2 Local thermal-hydraulic condi-
tions. The processes described
above present a global view of the
thermal hydraulic conditions.
However, it is the understanding of
local boiling conditions, tube metal
temperatures and heat flux which
provides insight to subsequent dis-
cussion of boiler tube failures that
occur in association with under-
deposit corrosion.
Clearly, if the normal situation, as
described above and by Figure 2-9,
persists during all operating periods,
F
D D'
C
Log Heat Flux
E
B
A
Log Metal Temperature
Figure 2-10. The relationship shown schematically between
increasing heat flux and metal temperature on a water-touched
tube. Source: R.B. Dooley and H.J. Westwood3
then boiler tube problems should not face and only superheated steam
develop. It is when the annular flow (or high boiling point concentrates)
regime breaks down that BTF can reaches the tube/deposit interface.
initiate. The key feature is that the
Local flow pattern obstructions can
flow of water and the nucleate boil-
cause low flow nodes immediately
ing process adjacent to the tube
downstream of the obstruction with-
wall is disrupted and a local steam
out substantially altering the total
“blanket” (an area of high steam
flow through the tube. Examples are
quality) is formed. Steam blanketing
weld backing rings, penetrations of
and dryout are caused by any of
weld from poor repairs (such as pad
several different sets of conditions,
welding, weld overlay, or canoe
each requiring a different route to
pieces) or corroded tube material
prevent repeat failures. These
laps. Such areas can be quite small,
include: stratification, excessive
down to a size of 6 mm (1/4 in.).
deposits, crevices, reduced fluid
flow, excessive heat flux, and local Local conditions that exacerbate
flow pattern obstructions. deposition are listed in Table 2-6.
These lead to a cascading set of
Stratification refers to segregation of
problems that ultimately result in
water to the bottom and of less
waterside BTF. Whereas a clean
dense steam to the top of a sloped
tube surface manifests only a slight
or horizontal tube. This is the most
rise in tube temperature for an
common type of steam blanketing
increase in heat flux, once a deposit
where a blanket of steam separates
forms on the surface (such as
an area of tube surface from the
excess oxide or deposition of feed-
adjacent water. Porous internal tube water corrosion products) there may
deposits can obstruct free flow of be a marked rise in the tube temper-
water to the tube surface and con- ature. This is illustrated schemati-
duct heat inward; consequently, cally in Figure 2-11.
where there are thick deposits, boil-
ing occurs away from the tube sur-
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-13
Table 2-6 Increased damage is caused by
Local Tube Conditions Which Can Lead to Initial Deposits concentration in the forming
deposits of the corrosive sub-
Locations where the water/fluid flow adjacent to the tube wall is disrupted stances contained in the boiling
• Welded joints such as: water. Estimates of the potential
• Joints with backing rings concentrating factor range from
• Poor repair welds such as pad welds, "canoe" pieces or window welds 10,000 times27 to over 100,000
• Poor weld overlay (penetrating to the inside surface) times.33 Masterson, et al.27, empha-
size that to give comparable corro-
• Locations with existing internal deposits caused by: sion rates, sodium hydroxide must
• A deposition mechanism concentrate by a factor of ten to one
• Deposits left from improper chemical cleaning hundred times more strongly than
• Locally high heat flux acid chloride. This explains why an
• Locally high steam quality ingress of caustic from a breakdown
• Geometric features in the makeup system doesn’t result
in caustic gouging, whereas an
• Bends around burners or openings
ingress in acidic chloride nearly
• Sharp changes of direction (such as the nose of the furnace) always results in hydrogen damage.
• Tubes bending off lower headers and drums
Deposit concentration generally
Locations with a high heat flux occurs by some form of “wick boil-
ing” whereby the contaminants
Locations where boiling first initiates within the bulk boiler water are able
to penetrate the porous tube
Locations with thermal-hydraulic flow disruptions deposits and the moisture is then
• Locations with local very high steam quality driven off by heating of the tube sur-
• Locations with horizontal or inclined tubing heated from above or below face locally leaving behind the con-
centrated contaminants or chemi-
Localized overheating of the tube (fireside conditions) cals. Figure 2-12 illustrates one vari-
• Flame impingement ety of this process.
• Burner misalignment
This process of flow disruption, for-
• Operating conditions such as overfiring or underfiring, gas channeling, or inadequate
mation of deposits, and concentra-
circulation rates tion of chemicals or contaminants
• Drastic change in fuel source, such as higher BTU value coal, dual firing with gas, changeover provides a means by which concen-
to oil or gas firing where heat flux increases. trated liquids can stay in contact
with a susceptible tube surface for a
sufficient length of time for corrosion
to occur. It is the basic process by
which three of the most pervasive
boiler tube failure mechanisms
(hydrogen damage, caustic gouging
and acid phosphate corrosion)
develop. There are distinctions
Salt (a)
Clean surface among the three essentially involving
concentrated
Metal Temperature

1000-fold different concentrating solutions; but

the basics for all of them are the dis-
Salt ruption of flow and nucleate boiling,
concentrated generating locally high quality steam
100-fold
areas which promote deposition, and
Deposit on subsequent concentrating reactions.
surface
Salt
concentrated
10-fold
(b)
2.6 Oxide Development and
Breakdown in Steam-Touched
Tubes
A protective oxide forms on the car-
Heat Flux
bon, low-alloy and austentitic steels
used in SH/RH tubing exposed to
Figure 2-11. Effect of tube deposit on the heat transfer surface as a func- steam that is analogous to that for
tion of heat flux. Curve (a) shows a clean heat transfer surface; Curve (b) a water-touched tube materials. The
surface carrying a thick deposit. The salt concentration factor in the deposit initial formation is rapid and in the
is also shown. Source: H.G. Masterson, et al.27

2-14 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

 absence of heat flux decreases with
Steam time in a “parabolic” manner.
liberation Eventually for the ferritic materials,
the layers formed become lami-
nated and multilaminated and the
Solution rate changes to linear. The scales
replenishment formed are then susceptible to exfo-
liation. The processes of oxide for-
mation, change to a laminated
Heat structure and subsequent exfoliation
transfer are all normal occurrences of SH/RH
section tubing operating in these regimes.
An excess of steamside scale can
lead to increased tube temperatures
which is a contributor to damage in
superheater/reheater tubes by long-
term and short-term overheating,
Applied heat fireside corrosion, and graphitization
mechanisms. Table 2-7 lists the BTF
mechanisms that are associated
Figure 2-12. Schematic representation of boiler salt concentration in a thick porous with an excess of steamside scale
deposit. Source: H.G. Masterson, et al.27 and/or the breakdown of protective
oxides from the steamside.

Table 2-7
Protective Oxide Breakdown and the Resulting BTF Mechanisms in Steam-Touched Tubing

Boiler Tube Failure Nature of Breakdown Conditions Chapters for Additional

Mechanism Information

Normal Condition Counter flux of O2- and Fe2+. Initial oxide grows stress-free by a parabolic growth. Later multilami- Main text, this section
nated oxide structures are formed according to a linear growth law. It is normal for these oxides to
exfoliate.

Fireside Corrosion Although a fireside process, result is exacerbated in tubes by overheating caused by excessive Chapters 33 & 34, Vol. 3
steamside oxide growth (usually multilaminated).

Short-Term Primarily caused by exfoliation of steamside oxide leading to tube blockage and the resultant rapid Chapter 36, Vol. 3
Overheating overheating.

Long-Term Primary cause is overheating of tubes due to inadequate initial design. Tube temperatures are ele- Chapter 32, Vol. 3
Overheating (Creep) vated as the steamside oxide increases in thickness.

Pitting Caused by stagnant, oxygenated water formed during shutdown which attacks oxide as generalized Chapter 41, Vol. 3
corrosion or the stagnant water can be acidified by mechanical carryover of sulfate in steam.

Chemical cleaning Manifested as generalized corrosion because of direct chemical attack of oxide. Chapter 43, Vol. 3
damage

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-15

The processes are examined in Outer
Discontinuous
more detail in the following sections Fe2O3 Steam columnar
beginning with oxide development in porous oxide
ferritic materials. (Fe3O4)

2.6.1 Growth of steamside oxide in Original ++

ferritic materials. Growth of steam- steel O
2- Fe Inner
side oxide in ferritic materials is illus- surface equiaxed
trated schematically in Figure 2-13. spinel
Ferritic
As for water-touched tubing, a Note: = voidage steel
counter diffusion mechanism (oxy-
gen ions to the tube surface and Fe
ions to the outer layer) occurs. The Figure 2-13. Schematic of general two layered oxide growth in steam. Fe++ ions move
mobility of the alloying elements is outwards and O2- ions move inwards. Sometimes the inner layer also becomes lami-
considerably less than that of iron in nated with alternating Fe3O4 and chromium-containing layers. Fe2O3 is often seen at
the oxide and thus they stay at the the oxide/steam interface.
inner layer at a level above that in
the original material.
The inner layer is an equiaxed Fe,
Cr oxide spinel. It has a very fine
grain size (< 0.1 mm) and the spinel
structure contains the alloying con-
stituents (Cr, Ni, Si, etc.) at about 1.5
times their concentration in the metal
with the iron concentration reduced
accordingly. Etching reveals that the
inner layer is composed of fine-
grained equiaxial grains. In the case
of high temperature overheating this
normally dense layer may contain
porosity.4
The outer layer of iron oxide consists
of coarse columnar grains of Fe3O4,
but the grains become smaller and
equiaxed near the base of the outer
layer. A layer of Fe2O3 may be pre-
sent on the outer surface of the
oxide and within the outer layer de-
pending on the oxidizing conditions
and the oxidation rate at that time.
The Fe2O3 has a finer grain size than
the Fe3O4 and appears as a lighter
phase in optical micrographs of pol-
ished sections, Figure 2-14.
The boundary between the two lay-
ers is at the original tube surface.
Figures 2-14a and 2-14b show that
the layers are of about equal thick-
ness and parallel sided. Unlike
water-touched tubing where the
outer layer is generally missing, for
steam-touched tubes it is always
present.

Figure 2-14. Appearance of Fe3O4, and Fe2O3 (finer grain size and lighter appear-
ance) iron oxides on a ferritic (T22) superheater tube after 90,000 hours of operation at
2500 psi. (a) Optical photomicrograph (MAG:200 X). (b) SEM Fractograph.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4

2-16 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

The formation of the oxide occurs
initially parabolically but at a later
stage can become linear. Any devia-
tion from the parabolic growth is
associated with multilaminated
scale. A two duplex layer structure is
shown schematically in Figure 2-15;
the process simply repeats to form
multilaminated oxides. Exfoliation,
discussed in more detail below, will
also only occur when a multilami-
nated structure forms, and it will
occur at the interface between the
two duplex structures. If more than
two duplex layers form, which is typ-
ical, the exfoliation will still occur
between layers 2 and 3 in Figure 2-
15.
In addition to the protection pro-
vided, the oxide layers formed on
the steamside of carbon and low-
alloy steel tubing are important
because they provide useful infor-
mation about the service tempera-
tures to which the tube has been
exposed. Steamside scale will
increase the tube temperatures by
approximately 0.28°C (0.5°F) per
0.025 mm (0.001 inch) of oxide
thickness in typical reheater tubes
and by 1.67°C (3°F) per 0.025 mm
(0.001 inch) for typical superheater
tubes.4
Oxide scale analysis is a powerful
tool to predict remaining life of
superheater/ reheater tubes. This
subject, along with a discussion
about the reaction kinetics of oxide
growth in SH/RH tubes is included in
Chapter 8 of this Volume. As an
example of the detrimental effects of
the scale, a 0.508 mm (0.020 inch)
thick scale will increase the typical
superheater tube metal temperature
by about 33°C (60°F) which will
result in an increase in damage
accumulation by creep by a factor of
more than five. It will also increase
the propensity for fireside corrosion.
2.6.2 Growth of steamside oxide in
austenitic materials. Austenitic
stainless steels generally corrode
more slowly than ferritics under the
same steam conditions because of
their higher chromium content. As a
result the scales are somewhat thin-
Fe2O3 Steam
1
Original duplex
2
Exfoliation
3
Second duplex
4
Ferritic steel
Figure 2-15. Schematic of the start of multilaminated oxide growth on ferritic steels.
Layers 1 and 3 are essentially pure Fe3O4, 2 and 4 are Fe, Cr spinel. Exfoliation
occurs between 2 and 3. When more laminations are present the exfoliation occur at
the same interface between layers. Fe2O3 is often found at the outermost interface.
Fe2O3 Steam
Porous Fe3O4
Original
steel Compact spinel
surface
Austenitic steel
Note: = voidage
Figure 2-16. Schematic of two-layered oxide growth on austenitic materials. Note
irregularity and keyed nature of inner Fe, Cr spinel. Also note the voidage at the
oxide/oxide interface; exfoliation occurs at this interface.
ner. Two-layered scales do form but austenitic materials occurs at the
with some marked differences. The oxide/oxide interface and results in a
situation is shown schematically single oxide layer and a lower
in Figure 2-16. chromium (and alloy element) con-
centration. The importance of exfolia-
The inner layer forms in a more
irregular manner. Grain boundaries tion in SH/RH tubes is discussed
next.
in the steel affect the penetration of
the oxide and consequently the
2.6.3 Exfoliation of steamside oxide
metal/inner oxide interface is uneven
scale and its effects. Steamside
and ‘keys’ the inner layer to the
oxide (duplex on austenitic stainless
metal. The outer layer is columnar as
steels and multilaminated on ferrit-
for ferritics but contains more voids;
ics) can exfoliate (spall) because of
as the oxide increases in thickness
the difference in the coefficient of
these voids accumulate near the
thermal expansion between the
oxide/oxide interface. Figure 2-17
base material and the oxide and
shows a typical example. As with fer-
also because of natural growth
ritic materials, a small amount of
stresses in laminated oxides.
Fe2O3 is usually observed at the
Exfoliated oxide can collect in the
outer interface of the Fe3O4 layer.
lower U-bends of superheater and
The oxide/oxide interface again reheater tubes, thus restricting
occurs at the position of the original
steel interface and remains flat irre-
spective of the oxide irregularities.
The initiation of exfoliation in
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-17
 steam flow and causing BTF. Even
more importantly, the exfoliated
oxide can be carried into the turbine
causing solid particle erosion dam-
age to blades, nozzles, and control
valves.
A rating system for steamside scale
exfoliation has been developed and
is shown in Table 2-8.4 Such infor-
mation can provide an estimate of
the potential for downstream dam-
age. Figures 2-18a through 2-18e
illustrate a progression of boiler
tubes with increasingly severe levels
of exfoliation.4
Some key points about the exfolia-
tion of SH/RH materials include:
• Susceptible materials. Carbon
steel, low alloy steel and
austenitic stainless steel are all
Figure 2-17. Appearance of steam grown oxide on an austenitic (321H) superheater
tube. Note the uneven penetration of the inner spinel into the steel and accumulation
susceptible to spalling as shown
of voids near to the oxide/oxide interface. in Table 2-9 which presents data
from a reheater with 63,430 hours
of service and 450 starts.34, 35
• Failure criterion. Figure 2-19 illus-
Table 2-8 trates an oxide failure criterion for
Rating System for Steamside Oxide Scale Exfoliation austenitic materials. Failure will
occur when the energy stored in
Exfoliation Rating Percent of Surface Approximate Weight of Magnetite a strained scale is greater than
Area Exfoliated Released (Exfoliated) Per Unit Length the energy required to generate
of Tube g/m (lbm/100 ft) new surfaces by delamination of
the scale. Sources of strain from
1 (Little to None) <1 < 3 (< 0.2) operation include: cooling strains
(developed due to differential
thermal contraction of a layered
2 (Mild) 1 - 10 3 - 30 (0.2 - 2) structure when cooled from one
uniform temperature to a lower
3 (Moderate) 11 - 20 30 - 60 (2 - 4) uniform temperature), removal of
steady heat flux, thermal shock
4 (Severe) 21 - 40 60 - 125 (4 - 8.4) (caused by rapid cooling),
oxide/oxide transformation, and
5 (Very Severe) > 40 > 125 ( > 8.5) flexural and other strains imposed
by the system.
Note: Approximate weight estimate based on an assumed density of 5.18 g/cm3 for iron oxide, a steamside
scale thickness of 0.038 cm (0.015 in), and a tube inside diameter of 5.08 cm (2.00 in.).

Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4

2-18 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

 a. Exfoliation Rating = 1 (Little to No Exfoliation)
Exfoliated Area = 0%
Weight of Magnetite Exfoliated Per Length of Tube = None
Steamside Oxide Thickness = 0.069 cm (0.027 in)

b. Exfoliation Rating = 2 (Mild)

Exfoliated Area = 4%
Weight of Magnetite Exfoliated Per Length of Tube = 7 g/m
Steamside Oxide Thickness = 0.0216 cm (0.0085 in)

c. Exfoliation Rating = 3 (Moderate)

Exfoliated Area = 14%
Weight of Magnetite Exfoliated Per Length of Tube = 38 g/m
Steamside Oxide Thickness = 0.033 cm (0.013 in)

d. Exfoliation Rating = 4 (Severe)

Exfoliated Area = 32%
Weight of Magnetite Exfoliated Per Length of Tube = 100 g/m
Steamside Oxide Thickness = 0.038 cm (0.015 in)

e. Exfoliation Rating = 5 (Very severe)

Exfoliated Area = 41%
Weight of Magnetite Exfoliated Per Length of Tube = 78 g/m
Steamside Oxide Thickness = 0.023 cm (0.009 in)

Figure 2-18. Comparison of the appearance of the steamside oxide scale for reheater tubes with varying degrees of exfoliation.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-19

Table 2-9 • Critical thickness. The oxide thick-
Oxide Thickness on Reheater Tubes and Percent Exfoliated ness at which spalling occurs
depends on temperature, tube
Material Average thickness, Percent Exfoliated material, and operation. The strain
tolerance decreases with increas-
mm (mils)
ing oxide thickness (Figure 2-19)
and therefore with operating time,
T-11 70 ( 3) < 10 and if this is exceeded during the
lifetime of a station for the strain
T-22 270 ( 11) 80 cycle involved then oxide failure
(exfoliation) will occur.
T-9 150 ( 6) <5 • In ferritic materials. Spalling from
ferritic steels is most prominent as
304H 90 ( 4) <2 illustrated in Table 2-9. Exfoliated
oxide from ferritic materials usu-
From a reheater with 63,430 hours of service and 450 startups. ally consists of at least two layers,
one of Fe3O4 and one of an iron
Sources: R.B. Dooley, et al.34; V.R.D. Miller and A.V. Manolescu35 chromium spinel as shown in
Figure 2-15; very often the oxide
is multilaminated. As noted
above, exfoliation only occurs in
ferritic materials when a multilami-
nated growth occurs. The original
Total Elastic Strain x 103
duplex structure grows in a
3 stress-free configuration because
of the counter-current diffusion
Spalling mechanism. However, when two
or more duplex layers form, the
2 outer layer does so under stress.
Compression

Eventually the stress disrupts the

oxide and exfoliation results.
Concave surface Thus, exfoliated scale from ferritic
1 material is expected to be at least
two layers of oxide and therefore
Region of scale integrity Convex surface contains chromium. Oxides on
ferritic steels also show degrada-
tion by “through scale” cracking
0 and by accelerated oxidation
100 200 Scale thickness,
(mm) rates associated with multiple
laminations in the inner layer.
• In austenitic materials. Spalling
-1
Through-scale cracking occurs in all four 18/8 austentitic
Tension

steels used for SH/RH tubes

Multilaminations (Types 304, 321, 316, and 347).
Oxide spalling from the austenitic
-2 steels almost invariably occurs at
Spalling the inner layer/outer layer inter-
face of the duplex scale (Figure
2-17). Generally the exfoliated
-3 oxide from austenitic materials
consists only of magnetite and
has thicknesses in the range
10-200 mm. The iron chromium
Figure 2-19. Oxide failure modes as a function of thickness and impressed strain. spinel from the inner layer doesn’t
Source: J. Armitt, et al.36 usually exfoliate. Spalling appears
to be increased when hematite
(a-Fe2O3) is present towards the
outside of the Fe3O4 layer. This
Fe2O3 can result from a

2-20 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

 decreased outward flux of iron Table 2-10
ions (due to voids at the interface BTF Mechanisms Strongly Influenced by Fireside Conditions
between oxides) or from the nor-
mal oxide growth in steam. For a Boiler Tube Failure Nature of Fireside Conditions Chapters for
given steam composition the
Mechanism Additional Information
amount of Fe2O3 which forms in a
scale depends on temperature
and time. Normal Condition Formation of a protective oxide layer on tube Main text, this section
outside surface.
• Damage done by exfoliated scale.
Spalling can lead to blockages in
Fireside Corrosion Increased corrosion in substoichiometric envi- Chapter 18, Vol. 2
the lowest bends of pendant SH
or RH tubes and erosion of first (Waterwall tubes) ronment. Formation of non-protective scales
stage blades in HP and IP tur- containing sulfur and oxygen.
bines; whether tube blocking or
erosion of the turbine occurs Fireside Corrosion Disruption of protective external oxide by attack Chapter 33, Vol. 3
depends on hydrodynamic fac- (SH/RH tubes; Coal- of low-melting point ash constituents, the result
tors, particularly tube diameter Fired Units) is accelerated oxidation because of: (i) removal
and configuration, the steam of the protective oxide by mechanical loss, (ii)
velocity, and flow path geometry. oxidation-sulfidation attack by sulfur in the
• Effect of unit chemistry. Changing slag, and (iii) via fluxing of the oxide.
the cycle chemistry to oxy-
genated treatment (OT) has no Fireside Corrosion Fluxing of protective oxide by molten vanadates Chapter 34, Vol. 3
effect on either the growth of the (SH/RH tubes; Oil- (high vanadium oils) or sulfatic compounds (low
oxide or its exfoliation. This is an Fired Units) vanadium oils) leading to accelerated corrosion.
important point to note because
BTF by short-term overheating Long-term Tube temperatures increase with time due to Chapter 32, Vol. 3
have occurred in units under OT
Overheating (Creep) increased oxide thickness, operational changes,
as well as with other feedwater
and boiler treatments. More dis- in SH/RH Tubes and poor initial choice of material. The fireside
cussion of this chemistry option is environment then provides the potential for
presented in Chapter 3 of this increase in corrosion rates.
Volume.
Flyash Erosion Accelerated tube wastage caused by direct mate- Chapter 14, Vol. 2
In closing, it is important to empha-
size that the growth and exfoliation rial removal and increased oxidation of exposed
of oxide in SH/RH circuits is a nor- metal surface; strongly dependent on local
mal event of operating these materi- velocity and ash content (particularly quartz).
als of construction at high tempera-
tures in steam. Sootblower Erosion Excessively slagging or fouling coals will neces- Chapter 22, Vol. 2
sitate excessive sootblower operation and poten-
tial for blow problems, leading directly to tube
2.7 The Combustion Process,
failures by an underlying erosion mechanism.
Coal Effects and Fireside BTF
2.7.1 Overview of fireside BTF and Coal Particle Erosion Erosion by coal particles impinging at an angle. Chapter 28, Vol. 2
general causes. The previous three
subsections have examined the flu- Falling Slag Damage Damage from fused coal ash deposits or reso- Chapter 29, Vol. 2
idside of boiler tubes: scale forma- lidified molten material (slag) that detach from
tion and its disruption leading to fail- furnace walls and superheater pendants.
ures. BTF can also result because of
conditions on the fireside. This sec-
tion examines the demands placed Supercritical Thermal fatigue by slagging/deslagging thermal Chapter 19, Vol. 2
on tubes by fireside conditions and Waterwall Cracking cycles underlies the problem.
reviews some of the general back-
ground needed to understand the
progression of fireside BTF mecha-
nisms. Table 2-10 lists the fireside
boiler tube failure mechanisms that
occur in both water-touched and
steam-touched tubes.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-21

Coal content and moisture are
related to the age of the coal T=1800°-2400°F T=1200°-1800°F
deposit; contained mineral matter
depends on plant types from which 5
the coal was formed. Some of the 6
denser mineral constituents sepa-
rate out in the pulverizers. Once 3-4 T=1000°-1200°F
coal particles are introduced into the
flame, the moisture and the volatile
species are driven off, the fixed car- Coal Coal
bon in the individual particles 1 + 2 +
begins to burn, and contained min- Air Air
eral matter may be melted or vapor-
ized, and is largely oxidized.37, 38
T=2000°-3000°F
Gaseous species (CO2, CO, H2O,
N2, etc.) are released by the com-
bustion of coal and also contain a
1. Initial Coal 2. Combustion 3. Early Combustion Products
number of potential corrodants. The Minerals
most important are sulfur (present as Char and fly ash
mm
O-Na+ Na, K rapidly receding
sulfur dioxide, sulfur trioxide or as
75
C SOx Solids char surfaces
OH
hydrogen sulfide), vapors of alkali- C O-Ca++ O-H
OH Vapors
Inorganic
metal salts (oxide, hydroxides or sul- Coal and
inorganic droplets
Fly
fates), and chlorine compounds components ash 1-5 microns
Ca-rich
Liquids Coal flame
(mostly HCl). These vapor species
will deposit and react on tube sur-
4. Slag Deposit 5. High-Temperature 6. Low-Temperature
faces when the metal temperature is Formation Fouling Deposit Formation Fouling Deposit
below the species condensation Formation
temperature. The result will be Secondary Primary
superheater tube superheater
deposition of flyash and the entrain- Liquid phase tube
ment of alkali and sulfur species, Condensed Condensed
Rebound-solid flame
which can, for certain corrosive particle volatiles
flame
volatiles
coals and boiler operating condi- Sticking-liquid Na or Ca sulfate
and silicate
tions, lead to fireside corrosion in particle waterwall
bonding Ca sulfate
waterwalls as described in Chapter Captive surface
bonding

18, Volume 2 and in SH/RH tubing, Na-rich surface

Chapter 33, Volume 3.

A Coal Quality Impact Model
(CQIM) has been developed to
bring together the various effects of
coal quality into an integrated com-
puter code.39, 40 It can help a utility
to evaluate how coal and coal
changes will affect unit operation,
such as slagging, fouling and ero-
sion propensities, as well as the
economic impact of fuel choice.
2.7.2 Ash formation and deposition.
Key aspects of ash formation and
deposition as they affect the propen-
sity for boiler tube failures are
reviewed here.
Although general formulae are avail-
able for ash analysis, the specific
prediction of the exact final products
of combustion, particularly at the
individual ash particle level, are not
yet possible. This is not surprising
given the range of coal composi-
Figure 2-20. Typical ash deposition phenomena in utility boilers illustrating slag and
fouling deposit formation. Reprinted from: S.A. Benson, M.L. Jones, and John N.
Harb, “Ash Formation and Deposition”, Chapter 4 in Coal Science and Technology 20:
Fundamentals of Coal Combustion for Clean and Efficient Use, L.D. Smoot, ed., 1993,
p. 329 with kind permission from Elsevier Science - NL, Sara Burgerhartstraat 25, 1055
KV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
tions, temperatures, and the variety resulting deposit is a function of:
of chemical reactions that occur dur- physical and chemical characteris-
ing the combustion process result- tics of the steel, metal temperature,
ing in a plethora of gases, liquids melting behavior of ash particles,
and solids that react in various ways and thermal/chemical compatibility
with boiler tube materials. of the deposit and metal surface.41
Ash related problems will be a func- The overall process is shown
tion of coal composition, combustion schematically in Figure 2-20 begin-
conditions and system geometry. ning with the basic composition of
Fireside deposition, slagging (which the initial coal, through combustion,
occurs in radiant sections) and foul- combustion product formation and
ing (which occurs in the convective the formation of slagging or fouling
passes) occur when intermediate deposits depending upon the loca-
ash species accumulate on heat tion in the boiler. The individual fea-
transfer surfaces. The strength of the

2-22 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

 pulverized coal and the subsequent
Liquid-Enhanced Particle erosive potential of flyash. Table 2-
Sticking and Sintering 11 summarizes the changes which
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) take place during combustion on the
various mineral species in pulver-
Silicate
Behavior

Predominantly liquids ized coal. Figure 2-22 shows the

sulfate liquids change in hardness for the common
mineral constituents as the minerals
Sulfate Ash pass through the combustion/boiler
melting sintering Ash fusion process as a function of increasing
point Sulfate liquid temperature temperature temperature.
dew point
Quartz particles are a primary con-
Deposit/Tube Tempeature cern for erosive/abrasive processes.
Quartz exposed to the flame condi-
Deposition Regimes: tions of typical boilers can either be
(I) Dry-sticking regime: (no glue) changed to a glassy (relatively non-
(II) Vapor or thermophoretically deposited liquid glue erosive form) or an unvitrified or sur-
(III) Glue produced by heterogeneous chemical reactions face-vitrified particle; the latter being
at vapor/ash interface highly abrasive. Unchanged quartz
(IV) Ash particle softening on impact has a hardness around 1000-1200
(V) Wet limit (sticking coefficient nearly unity) kg/mm2, vitrified particles under
1000 kg/mm2, and glassy phase has
an ‘apparent’ hardness of 600 -
Figure 2-21. Distribution of liquid phases as a function of deposit temperature. 1000 kg/mm2.44 The majority of the
Source: R. Nagarajan and R.J. Anderson42 cited in S.A. Benson, et al.41 quartz is unchanged because it
does not reach the temperature
(1800° - 2000°K) required for vitrifi-
cation. For bituminous coal, approxi-
tures which can make these nate. Figure 2-21 shows the types of mately 25-50% of the quartz remains
deposits and environments damag- liquids that are present as a function unchanged after combustion. An
ing to boiler tubes are listed in the of temperature. even greater amount remains in the
compilation of fireside mechanisms case of subbituminous coals and lig-
External tube deposits will affect the
found in Table 2-10. nite, because of the lower flame
heat transfer to the tube. Wall, et
temperatures.
Factors contributing to slagging al.43 summarized the effects on
include: (i) gas flow patterns leading emissivity and thermal conductivity Iron pyrite (FeS2) oxidizes above
to impacting and sticking particles, of deposits. Emissivity is affected 1000°K giving off sulfur gas and
(ii) locally substoichiometric condi- by: physical structure, shape and freeing the iron to combine with oxy-
tions which increase the amount of chemical composition (color) of the gen to form either wustite, magnetite
low melting-point phases, (iii) forma- deposit; thermal conductivity by the or hematite depending on available
tion of a molten surface deposit that physical structure and chemical oxygen. Thus pyrites are changed at
functions as an efficient collector of composition of the deposit. typical flame temperatures and as a
impacting particles, and (iv) increas- result their hardness changes from
ing gas temperatures caused by 2.7.3 The combustion process and about 1000 to 600 kg/mm2, as
less efficient heat transfer.41 The ash erosiveness. The nature of the shown in Figure 2-22, curve B.
effect of slagging is to change the ash (particularly particle size, shape
and hardness) produced during the Hydrated silicate minerals (primarily
heat transfer properties of the sur-
combustion of pulverized coal is a kaolin, illite and muscovite) change
face both by radiation and by con-
factor in several major boiler tube from sharp, irregular shapes to
ductivity. spherical form. Carbonate minerals
failure mechanisms. The erosivity
Two primary types of fouling in con- (primarily calcite, dolomite, ankerite,
indices that have been developed
vective passes have been defined: and siderite) dissociate to form car-
are discussed in the chapter on the
high-temperature fouling where sili- bonate residues (primarily CaO,
flyash erosion mechanism (Chapter
cates dominate, and low-tempera- MgO, and FeO) that do not melt to
14, Volume 2).
ture fouling, where sulfates domi- form spherical particles.
Raask44 has reviewed the effect of
combustion on the components of

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-23

Table 2-11
Mineral Particle Size, Shape and Hardness Changes in Pulverized-Coal Flames

Flame Induced Changes

Mineral species Ash constituent Particle size Shape asperitya Hardness

Alumino-silicate clay Glass spheres with crystalloid No marked change Marked decrease Marked increase
minerals (adventitious ash) species

Alumino-silicate clay As above Marked increased As above As above

minerals (inherent ash)

Quartz Unchanged quartz and glass No marked change Some decrease Some decrease
spheres

Pyrite Magnetite and spheres; some Some decrease Marked decrease Marked decrease
dissolved in silicate particles

Carbonates Magnetite spheres, sulfate fume, Marked decrease Marked decrease Some increase
some dissolved in silicates

Nonspecific Grit Marked increase Marked increase Marked increase

Coal Coke residue Decreaseb Some increase Some increase

a Asperity is a measure of particle jaggedness defined as the reciprocal of roundness.

b Coke residue particles in ash originate from large (above 50 mm in diameter) coal particles because some of these, for example, low-volatile coal particles, require a
longer burning time than the duration of passage through the flame.

From: Erosion Wear in Coal Utilization, 1988, p.310, E. Raask, Taylor & Francis, Washington, D.C. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved.

Figure 2-22. Change of hardness of coal

minerals on heating: A - Quartz; B - Pyrite; Vickers Hardness, kg. mm-2
C - Siderite; D - Alumino-silicates, Kaolin, 1200
Illite, Muscovite. From: Erosion Wear in Coal
Utilization, 1988, p.314, E. Raask, Taylor &
Francis, Washington, D.C. Reproduced with
permission. All rights reserved.

800

B A
C D

400

0
800 1200 1600 2000
Temperature, °K

2-24 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown

2.8 References
1Stultz,
S.C. and J.B. Kitto, Steam: Its Generation and
Use, 40th Edition, Babcock & Wilcox Company,
Barberton, Ohio, 1992.
2Singer, J.G., ed., Combustion Fossil Power: A
Reference Book on Fuel Burning and Steam Generation,
4th Edition, Combustion Engineering, Inc., Windsor,
Connecticut, 1991.
3Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec,
November, 1983.
4Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.
5Lamping,
G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.
6French, D.N., Metallurgical Failures in Fossil-Fired
Boilers, John Wiley & Sons, Wiley-Interscience
Publications, New York, 1983.
7Stephenson, G.G. and J.W. Prince, Guidelines on Fossil
Boiler Field Welding, Research Project 2504-02, Final
Report TR-101699, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, January, 1993.
8Wright,
I.G. and A.K. Agrawal, “Development of Oxides
and Deposits in Waterwall Tubes”, in B. Dooley and A.
Bursik, eds., Interaction of Iron-Based Materials with
Water and Steam: Proceedings of an International
Conference, held in Heidelberg, Germany, June 3-5,
1992, Electric Power Research Institute, Report TR-
102101, Palo Alto, CA, 1992.
9Paterson, S.R., R. Moser, and T.R. Rettig, “Oxidation of
Boiler Tubing” in B. Dooley and A. Bursik, eds., Ibid,
pp. 8-1 through 8-25.
10Lynch,
J.F., C.G. Ruderer, and W.H. Duckworth,
“Engineering Properties of Selected Ceramic Materials”,
American Ceramic Society, 1966.
11Molgaard, J. and W.W. Smeltzer, “Thermal Conductivity
of Magnetite and Haematite”, Journal of Applied
Physics, Volume 42, 1971, p. 3644.
12Field,E.M., R.C. Stanley, A.M Adams, D.R. Holmes,
“The Growth, Structure and Breakdown of Magnetite
Films on Mild Steel”, Proc. 2nd Int. Conf. Metallic
Corrosion, New York, 1963, p. 829.
13Richardson,
S.A. and M.I. Manning, “Strain Tolerance of
Steam Grown Oxides”, CEGB Report, 1977.
14Hancock, P., “Mechanical Considerations of the Growth
and Breakdown of Surface Oxide Films”, Werk. and Korr.,
Volume 12, 1970, p. 1002.
15Hurst, R.C., M. Davies, and P. Hancock, “The
Determination of Fracture Strains of Growing Surface
Oxides on Mild Steel at High Temperatures”, Oxidation of
Metals, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1975, p 161.
16Metcalfe,
E. and M.I. Manning, “The Spalling of Steam
Grown Oxide from Austenitic and Ferritic Steels”, CEGB
Report RD/L/R1966, 1977.
17Vagnard, G., Thesis, Faculte des Sciences de
L’Universite de Paris, 1965.
18Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Nagasaki Research
and Development Center, “In-Situ Measurement of Metal
Oxide on the Heat Exchanger Surface at the High
Temperature and Pressure Water”, presented at the
Annual Meeting of the International Society for the
Properties of Steam, Vancouver, Canada, 1988.
19Potter, E.C. and G. M. W. Mann, Proc. 1st Int. Cong.
Metall. Corrosion, London, Butterworks, 1961, p. 417.
20Potter,E.C. and G. M. W. Mann, Proc. 2nd Int. Cong.
Metall. Corrosion, 1963, p. 872.
21Garnsey, R., “The Chemistry of Steam Generator
Corrosion”, CEGB Research, No. 9, June, 1979, pp. 12-
23.
22Castle,J.E. and G.M.W. Mann, “The Mechanism of
Formation of a Porous Oxide Film on Steel, Corrosion
Science, volume 6, 1966, pp. 253-262.
23Effertz,
P.H. and H. Meisel, Der Machinenshaden,
Volume 55, No. 1, 1971, p. 14.
24Fuji, C.T. and R.A. Meussner, Journal of the
Electrochemical Society, Volume 111, 1964, p. 1215.
25Robertson, J., Corrosion Science, Volume 29, Nos.
11/12, 1989, pp. 275-291.
26Bartholomew, R.D., W.E.Chesney, R.D. Hopkins, J.S.
Poole, J.W. Siegmund, J.P. Williams, and S. Yorgiadis,
Guidelines for Chemical Cleaning of Fossil-Fueled
Steam-Generating Equipment, Research Project 2712-06,
Final Report TR-102401, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, June, 1993.
27Masterson,H.G., J.E. Castle, and G.M.W. Mann,
“Waterside Corrosion of Power Station Boiler Tubes”,
Chemistry and Industry, September 6, 1969, pp. 1261-
1266.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 2-25
28Magnin, T., “An Approach to the Mechanisms of
Corrosion Fatigue Damage”, Memoires et Etudes
Scientifiques Revue de Metallurgie, LS7857/7Feb90/js,
November, 1983.
29Hickling,
J. and D. Blind, “Strain-Induced Corrosion
Cracking of Low-Alloy Steels in LWR Systems - Case
Histories and Identification of Conditions Leading to
Susceptibility”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 91,
1986, pp. 305-330.
30Ward,
G., B.S. Hockenhull, and P. Hancock, “The Effect
of Cyclic Stressing on the Oxidation of a Low Carbon
Steel”, Metallurgical Transactions, Vol. 5., June, 1974.
31Sidey,D., et al., Corrosion Fatigue Boiler Tube Failures
in Waterwalls and Economizers, Volume 2: Laboratory
Corrosion Studies; July, 1992, Research Project 1890-5,
Final Report TR-100455, 4 Volumes, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA.
32Lacey,
P.M.C. and G.J. Kirby, Proc. I. Mech. Eng.,
1965-6, Part C, p. 180
33Ball, M., Sodium Hydroxide for Conditioning the Boiler
Water of Drum-Type Boilers, Research Project 9000-20,
Final Report TR-104007, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, California, January, 1995. See also M.
Ball, “Caustic Treatment for Drum Boilers”, in R.B. Dooley
and R. Pate, eds. Fourth International Conference on
Cycle Chemistry in Fossil Boilers, held in Atlanta,
Georgia, September 7-9, 1994, Final Report TR-104502,
Elecrtic Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, January,
1995.
34Dooley, R.B., F.M Somerset, A.C. Davidson, V.R.D.
Miller and A.V. Manolescu, "Ontario Hydro's Experience
with Solid Particle Erosion of Steam Turbines", in 1980
EPRI/ASME Workshop on Solid Particle Erosion of Steam
Turbine Components, Report CS-4683, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1980, p. 3-36.
35Miller, V.R.D and A.V. Manolescu, "Maintenance
Strategies and Specific Design Changes to Ontario
Hydro's Lambton TGS Coal-Fired Generating Units to
Mitigate the Effects of Solid Particle Erosion", Solid
Particle Erosion of Steam Turbine Components: 1985
Workshop, Report CS-4683, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1985, p. 2-21.
2-26 The Boiler Tube Operating Environment and its Breakdown
36Armitt,J, R. Holmes, M.I. Manning, D.B. Meadowcroft,
and E. Metcalfe, The Spalling of Steam-Grown Oxide
from Superheater and Reheater Tube Steels, Technical
Planning Study 76-655, Final Report FP-686, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February, 1978.
37Williams, D.N., H.R. Hazard, H.H. Krause, L.J. Flanigan,
R.E. Barrett, and I.G. Wright, Fireside Corrosion and Fly
Ash Erosion in Boilers, Research Project 2711-1, Final
Report CS-5071, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, February, 1987.
38Heap, M.P., et al., Effects of Coal Quality on Power
Plant Performance and Costs, Volume 4: Review of Coal
Science Fundamentals, Research project 2256-1, Final
Report CS-4283, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, February, 1986.
39Davidson, P.G, et al., Development and Application of
the Coal Quality Impact Model: CQIMTM, Research
Project 2256-2, Final Report GS-6393, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1990.
40Pavlish, J.H., P.R. Miller, N.C. Craig, and A.K. Mehta,
"CQIM - An Analytical Tool Used to Evaluate Performance
and Economic Issues", Proceedings: Ninth Annual
International Pittsburgh Coal Conference, October, 1992.
41Benson, S.A., M.L. Jones, and J.N. Harb, "Ash
Formation and Deposition", in L.D. Smoot, ed., Coal
Science and Technology 20: Fundamentals of Coal
Combustion for Clean and Efficient Use, Elsevier,
Amsterdam, 1993, pp. 299-373.
42Nagarajan, R. and R.J. Anderson, "Effect of Coal
Constituents on the Liquid-Assisted Capture of Impacting
Ash Particles in Direct Coal-Fired Gas Turbines", ASME
Paper No. 88-GT-192, 1988.
43Wall,T.F., A. Lowe, L.J. Wibberley, and I. Stewart,
"Mineral Matter in Coal and the Thermal Performance of
Large Boilers", Prog. Energy Combust. Sci., Volume 5,
1979, pp. 1-29.
44Raask, E., Erosion Wear in Coal Utilization, Hemisphere
Publishing Company, Washington, D.C., 1988.
 HP
turbine
IP
turbine
Boiler
HP heaters
Attemperation
Deaerator
Impurity ingress
Corrosion
Deposition
Key Implications of Cycle
Chemistry and BTF
It is important that:
1. The optimum choice of boiler
water chemistry, equilibrium
phosphate treatment (EPT),
phosphate treatment (PT), all-
volatile treatment (AVT), or
caustic treatment (CT) is
made for drum units.
2. The optimum choice of feed-
water chemistry is made for
each unit to minimize the
transport of feedwater corro-
sion products.
3. Specific operating guideline
limits are derived for each
unit.
4. A minimum “core” level of
instrumentation is provided
for every unit.
Chapter 3 • Volume 1
LP
turbine
Condenser
Makeup
Cycle Chemistry and
Condensate
polisher
Feed
Boiler Tube Failures
3.1 Introduction and
Significance of the Challenge
The purity of boiler water, feedwater
and steam is one of the most impor-
tant criteria for ensuring the avail-
ability and reliability of components
in fossil-fuel power plants. The pre-
vention of boiler tube failures (BTF)
requires a cycle chemistry that is
specifically designed and adopted
for the particular unit. The purpose
of this chapter is to provide an
overview of the key issues surround-
ing cycle chemistry and to provide
direction in optimization with particu-
lar emphasis to BTF.
Tables 3-1a and 3-1b list the boiler
tube failure mechanisms that are
directly caused by, or significantly
influenced by, cycle chemistry;
among them are some of the lead-
ing causes of availability loss in the
industry today. Even a cursory
glance at the descriptions for indi-
vidual mechanisms will reveal that
for many boiler tube failures, the
simplest, and most cost-effective
means of prevention lies in one of
the cycle chemistry control options.
The challenge is not trivial. BTF are
related not only to the choice of boil-
er chemistry, but also to other fea-
tures in the cycle. The pervasive-
ness of the problem was illustrated
in Figures 1-2 and 1-3 which
showed typical locations for impurity
ingress, corrosion and deposition in
drum and once-through boilers.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
Contaminants such as chlorides, sul-
fates, organics, air and CO2, enter
the condensate part of the cycle, but
do their damage in the boiler (tube
failures) or in the turbine (blade fail-
ures). Sources for such impurity
ingress into the steam and/or water
process cycle include: (i) condenser
cooling water inleakage, (ii) air
inleakage or (iii) make-up demineral-
izer, evaporator or condensate pol-
isher effluent contamination.
Corrosion products are generated in
feedwater heaters and condensers
and flow into the boiler where they
deposit in high heat flux locations
and provide the initiating event for
underdeposit corrosion BTF.
Each utility should have a set of
cycle chemistry goals for every unit.
Table 3-2 provides a list of objec-
tives that have driven the EPRI cycle
chemistry program for the past ten
years; they form the basis for many
utility goal statements. The achieve-
ment of those goals remains a high
priority.
A primary goal is to eliminate all
boiler tube failures that are related
to cycle chemistry; this is currently
achievable by optimizing boiler and
feedwater chemistry. Such optimiza-
tion includes requirements for the
highest quality condensate and
feedwater, an emphasis on cleaning
up the overall cycle, and eliminating
excessive deposition. For most
3-1
Table 3-1a Table 3-2
BTF Mechanisms in Water-touched Tubes that are Influenced by Cycle Chemistry Goals for a Cycle Chemistry
Improvement Program
Mechanism Nature of Chemistry Influence
• To eliminate boiler tube failures related to
Hydrogen damage Excessive feedwater corrosion products form excessive deposits cycle chemistry.
and combine with a source of acidic contamination.
• To eliminate turbine chemical problems
Caustic gouging Excessive feedwater corrosion products form deposits and such as LP blades and disk cracking, and
combine with a source of caustic. deposits

Acid phosphate Excessive feedwater corrosion products form deposits and • To eliminate the need for boiler chemical
corrosion combine with a source of phosphate. cleaning.

Chemical cleaning Excessive deposits in waterwalls lead to chemical cleaning; • To identify simple, reliable cycle chemistry
damage process errors lead to tube damage. instrumentation including standards for
instrumentation and quality control/quality
Corrosion fatigue Poor water chemistry, shutdown or layup practices, and improper assurance procedures.
chemical cleaning worsen contribution of the environment to
causing damage. • To shorten the startup period as a result of
• Optimization of shutdown, layup and
Supercritical waterwall Excessive internal deposits lead to increased tube metal tempera- startup chemistry.
cracking tures; exacerbates mechanism.
• The elimination of chemical holds in the
startup sequence.
Fireside corrosion Excessive internal deposits lead to increased tube metal tempera-
tures; exacerbates mechanism.
• To develop operational guidelines with
Short-term overheating Plugging of waterwall orifices by feedwater corrosion products. action levels for all units.

Erosion/ corrosion of Attack by reducing feedwater conditions. • To identify the optimal managerial approach.
economizer inlet headers

Pitting (economizer) Stagnant, oxygenated water formed during shutdown.

drum and cycling units, condensate
polishers will be a key means by
which to achieve this aim.
Table 3-1b The need for frequent chemical
BTF Mechanisms in Steam-touched Tubes that are Influenced by Cycle Chemistry cleaning is a major indicator of non-
optimized feedwater chemistry. It
Mechanism Nature of Chemistry Influence also implies a dirty boiler that is
more susceptible to contaminant
Long-term overheating If caused by restricted steam flow as a result of contaminant excursions and BTF by mechanisms
(creep) deposits, debris, etc. such as underdeposit corrosion
(hydrogen damage, caustic goug-
Short-term overheating Blockage from improper chemical cleaning (of SH/RH or ing, or acid phosphate corrosion).
waterwalls). Another target therefore is to clean
up the cycle so as to eliminate
Stress corrosion cracking Variety of bad environment influences, most directly related to chemical cleaning in once-through
units and put it on at least a 10-year
chemistry control and practices.
cycle for drum units.
Pitting (RH loops) Carryover of Na2SO4 or poor shutdown practices allowing for The next two sections review the
oxygenated, stagnant condensate. options for boiler water treatment
and feedwater treatment respective-
Chemical cleaning damage ly, with a particular emphasis on
Poor chemical cleaning practice.
choosing and optimizing each as a
means to eliminate BTF.

3-2 Cycle Chemistry and Boiler Tube Failures

3.2 Boiler Water Treatment
One of the most important choices 4.0 10.0
3.0 Na/PO43.0 (TSP)
is the boiler water treatment. For

Concentration (ppm)
2.0

Equivalent NaOH
drum units this includes: phosphate
treatment, equilibrium phosphate 9.5

pH at 25C
1.0
treatment, or congruent phosphate
treatment (PT, EPT or CPT), all-
volatile treatment (AVT), or caustic 0.4 9.0
treatment (CT). In this section each 0.3
is discussed briefly to provide a his- 0.2
torical perspective and the latest 8.5
guidance. The section concludes 0
5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4
with a roadmap which has been ppm PO4
developed to help decide which a) Operating Range of Boiler Water on Coordinated Phosphate Treatment
treatment is optimum for each boiler. 4.0 10.0
3.0 Na/PO43.0 (TSP)
For once-through units the boiler

Concentration (ppm)
water is controlled by the feedwater 2.0

Equivalent NaOH
Na/PO42.6
treatment and thus reference should 9.5

pH at 25C
be made to Section 3.3. 1.0
CPT
3.2.1 Phosphate treatments. 0.4 9.0
The use of phosphate chemicals for 0.3
internal boiler water treatment is 0.2
more than 70 years old. Phosphate
8.5
provides good buffering of acids 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4
and hydroxides and precipitates ppm PO4
residual hardness, forming remov- b) Operating Range of Boiler Water on Congruent Phosphate
Treatment (CPT)
able sludge (hydroxyapatite). Figure TSP + 1 ppm NaOH Na/PO43.0 (TSP)
3-1 shows the development of phos- 4.0 10.0
phate treatments. Coordinated pH- 3.0 Na/PO42.6
Concentration (ppm)

phosphate control was introduced in 2.0

Equivalent NaOH

1942 to protect boiler tubes from 9.5

pH at 25C

“caustic embrittlement” as well as 1.0 EPT

the effects of condenser in-leakage CPT
of water hardness contaminants.
0.4 9.0
The operating range was as shown 0.3
in Figure 3-1a. The alkalinity levels
0.2
preserve magnetite3 and provide
protection against “caustic under 8.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deposit” corrosion attack and hydro- ppm PO4
gen damage from “under deposit c) Operating Ranges of Boiler Water on Equilibrium Phosphate
acidic chloride” attack.4,5,6 Treatment (EPT) Used in Ontario Hydro and Congruent Phosphate
Treatment (CPT)
The use of coordinated treatment
led to a number of failures believed
to be caustic gouging7 and, as a
Figure 3-1. Historical development of pH-phosphate control ranges in the
result, the move to the use of CPT absence of ammonia. (TSP) is tri-sodium phosphate. Sources: S.F. Whirl
with an operating range below the and T.E. Purcell1; and J. Stodola2
curve of molar ratio Na:PO4 of 2.6
as shown in Figure 3-1b. Guidance
about the application, monitoring
and actions levels for the use of
CPT was provided in the interim
cycle chemistry guidelines.8, 9

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 3-3

Many utilities have experienced
phosphate hideout, (a decrease in
phosphate and an increase in pH 3.0
with increasing load), and hideout
return (when the unit load is 2.7
decreased, an increase of phos-
phate occurs with a pH depression). NaOH
2.6
Phosphate hideout has usually not
been regarded as harmful, but the TSP
depression of pH on startup to DSP
2.3
pH
below 7 or 8 can exacerbate boiler
tube failures, particularly by corro- MSP
Blowdown
sion fatigue. More often, problems, H3PO4 2.2
notably acid phosphate corrosion,
arise from the use of acidic chemi- 2.1
cals in a vain effort to “chase”
hideout so as to maintain the control Na/PO4
point within the CPT range (Figure
3-2). Figure 3-3 shows the interac-
Phosphate
tion of load changes, Na:PO4 ratio,
Note: TSP is Tri-sodium phosphate
pH, and phosphate level on phos- DSP is Di-sodium phosphate
phate hideout and return. MSP is Mono-sodium phosphate

A recent survey shows that over

90% of drum units in the U.S. using Figure 3-2. Vector family superimposed on normal control region
congruent phosphate treatment shows effect of chemical additions and blowdown on operating regime
experience hideout and more than for congruent phosphate treatment.
60% have had corrosion conse-
quences.11
As a result of the increasing aware- 200
ness that phosphate hideout was
symptomatic of an underlying con-
trol problem, several investigations Net
Megawatts 140
into root cause and correction have
been initiated. The Canadian
Electrical Association (CEA) con-
ducted tests to identify hideout and 80
corrosion reactions between mag- 2.5
Na/PO4
netite and phosphate chemicals.12 Molar
Ratio 2.0
The results showed that maricite
(also found to be the corrosion prod- 10
uct formed as a result of acid phos- pH @
25°C
phate corrosion of boiler tubes)
8
formed by reaction with mono-and 10
di-sodium phosphate but not with tri-
sodium phosphate. ppm
PO4 7
In a second study, model boiler tests
4
were conducted by EPRI to identify
ppm 0.2
the parameters responsible for
NH3
phosphate hideout. Those studies 0
Cond. 40
found that operation with a sodium-
to-phosphate ratio of 3 with up to 1 ppm 0.10 Conductivity
SiO2 25
ppm of free hydroxide did not pro- SiO2 (mmhos/cm)
duce corrosion. An international sur- 0.06 10
vey found that many utilities have
1500

2000

0100

0500

0900

operated without hideout and/or cor-

rosion using EPT or a phosphate Time
treatment with a sodium-to-phos-
phate ratio above three with a small
Figure 3-3. The effect of load changes on phosphate hide-out and
level of free hydroxide.
return. Source: C.C. Scheerer and J.K. Maxwell10

3-4 Cycle Chemistry and Boiler Tube Failures

As a result of these studies, a
revised guideline for phosphate
treatment has been issued13 with a
goal of minimizing the occurrence of
phosphate hideout and the continu-
al correction in chemistry by addi-
tions of acid phosphates. Two phos-
phate treatments have evolved as
approaches to the previous prob-
lems: (i) PT broadens the control
range above the sodium-to-phos-
phate 2.8 ratio curve and allows
operation with up to 1 ppm of free
hydroxide; (ii) EPT operates at a
lower level of phosphate along with
up to 1 ppm free hydroxide. Figure
3-1c shows the range for EPT (as
used by Ontario Hydro2), and a
comparison of all three (CPT, PT and
EPT) treatment ranges is shown in
Figure 3-4. It should be noted that
CPT is applicable over the Na:PO4
molar ratio range of 2.1 - 2.8; the
version shown in Figure 3-4 shows
the most frequently used range
below a molar ratio of 2.6.
Under equilibrium phosphate treat-
ment, high pH excursions are con-
trolled with boiler water blowdown
and/or by reducing boiler pressure;
low pH excursions are counteracted
with adequate doses of tri-sodium
phosphate and sodium hydroxide or
with pressure reductions.13 PT can
be regarded as an extension of EPT
up to higher levels of PO4 (above 3
ppm) and maybe for lower pressure
units. PT has more tolerance if a unit
is more susceptible to the ingress of
contaminants.
With phosphate treatments, as with
all options for boiler chemistry con-
trol, choices will depend upon unit-
specific issues. The key objectives
are to minimize or eliminate phos-
phate hideout and to use only tri-
sodium phosphate as the phos-
phate addition. The treatments allow
for the addition of NaOH to correct
for (i) low pH on startup and (ii) to
increase pH if a small contaminant
enters. They also allow up to 1 ppm
of free NaOH.
Equivalent NaOH Concentration (ppm)
10.0 4.0
TSP + 1 ppm NaOH 3.0
PT
9.5
pH at 25°C
EPT 1.0
CPT
9.0 0.4
Na: PO4 = 3.0
Na: PO4 = 2.8 0.3
Na: PO4 = 2.6
0.2
8.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ppm PO4
Figure 3-4. Schematic of operating ranges of boiler water on equilibrium phosphate
treatment (EPT), congruent phosphate treatment (CPT) and phosphate treatment (PT).
TSP - tri-sodium phosphate. Source: R.B. Dooley, A. Aschoff and F. Pocock13
3.2.2 All-volatile treatment (AVT). to produce accelerated attack.
Under AVT there are generally no ASME-sponsored work performed
solid additions to boiler water, from 1963-1968 showed that a few
although the addition of NaOH or ppm of impurities under boiling con-
Na3PO4 is allowed to correct for pH ditions could concentrate in boiler
on startup or as a response to cont- water to corrosive levels.14, 15
amination. The chemistry is set by Beginning with that work, and
the feedwater chemistry as dis- through considerable efforts world-
cussed in Section 3.3. Operation wide, there has been considerable
with a condensate polisher is gener- refinement in the application of
ally required although some units sodium hydroxide and it is now
using AVT do so without one. estimated that it is used successfully
in over 50,000 MW of plant world-
3.2.3 Caustic treatment (CT). wide.16
Historically, there has been justified
The key to successful use of caustic
concern over the operation of units treatment lies in limiting the concen-
under high levels of sodium hydrox- tration of anionic impurities, particu-
ide and sodium phosphate treatment larly chlorides and in the strict con-
as was standard in the 1950s and trol of sodium hydroxide; there
1960s. As units began to operate at needs to be a minimum NaOH con-
higher pressures, caustic gouging centration to prevent acid conditions
became a serious problem in U.S. and achieve the required benefits,
units operating with sodium hydrox- but the maximum level must be
ide; as a result a number of varia- strictly controlled to prevent caustic
tions on phosphate treatment dis- gouging in the boiler, carry-over into
cussed above became the predomi- the steam, and damage to austen-
nant chemistries. titic superheaters and turbines. This
Early plants had been operated with control is achieved through continu-
several hundred ppm of sodium ous monitoring of the feedwater,
hydroxide in the boiler water boiler water and steam, particularly
because autoclave studies had for chloride, sodium, and alkalinity
shown that sodium hydroxide levels concentrations.
of thousands of ppm were required
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 3-5
Table 3-3
Comparison of Normal Cycle Chemistry Limits for Four Drum Boiler Water Chemistries
Equilibrium
Cycle Phosphate Phosphate Caustic All-volatile
Chemistry Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment
Parameter (PT) (EPT) (CT) (AVT)

Na, ppm 1.5 0.85 1.5 0.7

Cl, ppm 0.9 0.028 0.4 0.028

SO4, ppm 1.6 0.028 0.5 0.028

SiO2, ppm 0.13 0.13 0.2 0.13

pH 9.3 9.0 - 9.7 9.4 - 9.6

Na:PO4 > 2.8 > 2.8

PO4, ppm > 2.5 < 2.5

NaOH, ppm 1.0 - 1.5

Note: Values are normal operating limits for a coal-fired 2500 psi boiler with reheat.

Sources: For PT & EPT (R.B. Dooley, A. Aschoff, and F. Pocock13)

For CT (M. Ball16)
For AVT (A.F. Aschoff, Y.H. Lee, D.M Sopocy, and O. Jonas8)

If satisfactory values cannot be
obtained, the reasons for the high
values should be investigated and, if
necessary, the concentration of
impurities and conditioning chemi-
cals in the boiler water should be
reduced.
The EPRI interim guidelines, issued
in the mid-1980s, make allowance
for up to 5 ppb sodium in the
steam.8 More recently, a detailed
study by Ball16 suggests that ideally
to prevent deposition, the steam
from high pressure boilers should
contain no more than 2 ppb sodium;
well operated units should achieve
less than 1 ppb.
Benefits of CT over AVT include: (i) a
higher tolerance to chloride in the
boiler water which is important for
dealing with condenser leaks, par-
ticularly in units using brackish or
sea water for cooling, (ii) a reduced
risk of acid corrosion, and (iii)
removing the need for a condensate
polishing plant.16
Compared to phosphate treatment,
CT can: (i) offer reduced risk of cor-
rosion due to the ingress of chloride,
(ii) avoid phosphate hide-out and
associated complications, (iii) avoid
the complications of monitoring and
chemical control associated with
phosphate chemistry, and (iv)
reduce the risk of producing either
acidic or alkaline boiler water condi-
tions, causes of several corrosion-
related boiler tube failure mecha-
nisms, as well as reduce the risk of
general problems throughout the
cycle.16
3.2.4 Optimization of drum boiler
treatment. The correct choice of
boiler water chemistry is vitally
important to the prevention of boiler
tube failures. For any method of
chemical conditioning, it is important
that the boiler is kept as clean as
possible, that the ingress of impuri-
ties is kept to a minimum, and that
action is taken if impurities enter the
boiler.
There are now an increasing num-
ber of options for boiler water chem-
istry control and the optimized oper-
ating regimes for each are becom-
ing increasingly clear. A comparison
of the limits for key cycle chemistry
parameters between the various
common boiler chemistry control
methods is shown in Table 3-3. This
example is for normal operating
conditions in a 2500 psi boiler. Note
that in addition to normal operating
limits, it is vital that “action levels”
be set as described below.
A suggested road map for utilities to
use in selecting the optimum drum
boiler chemistry is shown in Figure
3-5. The choice will depend on,
among other considerations,
whether the unit has a condensate

3-6 Cycle Chemistry and Boiler Tube Failures

 Review normal No Continue use of
or current PT current treatment
Are there any problems?
Yes

Base-line monitoring

Evaluation of phosphate
hideout behaviour

No Yes

Consider changing to
EPT, AVT or CT

Yes Are feedwater No

contaminant Is condensate polisher
events significant? available or practical?

Yes
No
Optimize PT Convert to CT Convert to AVT
Yes

Chemically clean boiler

Convert to EPT

Develop specific unit PT, Develop specific AVT

EPT or CT guidelines guidelines

Monitor to compare with

baseline data

Normal operation

Figure 3-5. Roadmap to optimize boiler water treatment for drum boilers. (EPT) - equilibrium phosphate treatment; (AVT) - all-volatile
treatment; (CT) - caustic treatment; (PT) - phosphate treatment.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 3-7

polisher and the severity of feedwa-
ter contaminant events in accor-
dance with the following general
guidelines:
• If hideout or other chemistry prob-
lems such as: (i) the use of exces-
sive amounts of mono- or di-sodi-
um phosphate added to the boiler,
(ii) underdeposit corrosion BTF in
the waterwalls, (iii) corrosion
fatigue BTF, (iv) excessive turbine
deposits, (v) condenser inleak-
age, or (vi) makeup water contam-
inant excursions have not been
experienced, continue with the
current treatment which may be
PT, AVT or even CPT.
• Improve current practice by moni-
toring the critical cycle chemistry
parameters as a function of differ-
ent unit loads, if not currently
done. Section 3.5 below discuss-
es typical monitoring campaigns.
• If there have been problems, it is
necessary to determine which
alternative (generally among PT,
EPT, AVT or CT) will be optimal.
• If a condensate polisher is avail-
able, the choice is generally AVT.
• If a condensate polisher is not
available, then a choice will have
to be made between EPT, PT or
CT.
• If monitoring and experience indi-
cate few incidences of contami-
nant ingress, the choice would
generally be EPT.
• If there have been frequent inci-
dences of contaminant ingress,
then the choice is either PT or CT.
• Whichever choice is made, the
final and continuing step is to
develop unit-specific guidelines
and to compare monitoring data
with the established baseline.
The foregoing discussion was for
drum boilers. For once-through
units, the boiler water is controlled
by the feedwater, the subject of the
next section.
3-8 Cycle Chemistry and Boiler Tube Failures
Table 3-4
Worldwide Problems Relating to Feedwater Corrosion
Product Generation, Transport and Deposit
Generation
• Low pressure feedwater heater
erosion/corrosion
• High pressure feedwater heater
erosion/corrosion
• Deaerator erosion/corrosion
• Economizer inlet erosion/corrosion
• Feedwater piping erosion/corrosion
Source: R.B. Dooley17
3.3 Feedwater Treatment
The generation of feedwater corro-
sion products, usually originating in
low-pressure (LP) and high-pressure
(HP) feedwater heaters and the
deaerators, and their deposition are
directly responsible for a number of
problems in the cycle. Table 3-4 lists
some of these. The relationship
between improvements in feedwater
chemistry and the opportunity for
preventing boiler tube failures is the
focus of this section. However, the
benefits that will accrue throughout
the unit from these actions should not
be overlooked, including benefits to
the turbine, feedwater heaters, con-
densers and throughout the boiler.
The classical approach to feedwater
treatment in the U.S. and many
other countries has consisted of
adjusting pH with ammonia to 8.8 -
9.1 for mixed copper/iron systems
and to 9.2 - 9.6 for all-ferrous sys-
tems, to deoxygenate the feedwater
mechanically in the condenser and
deaerator, and to deoxygenate
chemically by the addition of an
oxygen scavenger. The belief was
that all oxygen should be eliminated
to control corrosion.
Transport/ Deposition
• Boiler feedpump impeller fouling
• Boiler orifice fouling
• Boiler wall deposits and pressure drop
• Ripple magnetite formation
• Boiler tube failures
• Chemical cleaning
This is the basic approach taken for
all-volatile treatment, and until 1969
was the only feedwater treatment
applied worldwide in plant cycles
with subcritical and supercritical
once-through steam generators; in
the U.S. this was the case until
November, 1991.18 AVT can be
applied to all units, and is still the
method of choice for plants with
mixed metallurgy (copper and iron)
in the feedwater train and/or for
units without condensate polishers.
In deoxygenated feedwater sys-
tems, very low levels of oxygen
(<< 5 ppb) in conjunction with high
levels of an oxygen scavenger
(such as hydrazine) result in condi-
tions reducing to the materials in the
feedwater train.19 Under such con-
ditions, either the normal oxide
(Fe3O4) is not protective on the fer-
rous alloys in the feedwater train, or
they break down, either event lead-
ing to an excessive production and
transport of corrosion products. The
reducing conditions are directly
responsible for erosion-corrosion
failures of economizer inlet header
tubes (see Chapter 21, Volume 2).
Indirectly, the deposition of such
products is a contributor to at least
seven other BTF mechanisms:
hydrogen damage, caustic gouging,
acid phosphate corrosion, supercrit-
ical waterwall cracking, fireside cor-
rosion, short-term overheating, and
creep.
A brief review of oxygen scavengers
is useful to set the stage for the cur-
rent use of hydrazine. Until the
1950s sodium sulfite was used to
deoxygenate feedwater. Hydrazine
was introduced in Germany prior to
1950 to remove oxygen from boiler
feedwater and to overcome the pos-
sibility of acidic steam and conden-
sate, first in locomotives and tug
boats, then in power plants.20, 21, 22
The first introduction of hydrazine
into U.S. units was at Duke Power in
1951.23 Until this time, and in fact
through the late 1950s, the feedwa-
ter trains all contained copper-
based alloys.24 In the interim period,
many alternatives to hydrazine have
been developed and applied inde-
pendent of feedwater metallurgy.
Unfortunately, none have the most
important characteristic of hydrazine
which is no reaction or decomposi-
tion products to affect the total plant
cycle chemistry.25
Just as for boiler water, the feedwa-
ter must be optimized. The variables
of importance are metallurgy, pH,
cation conductivity, and oxygen. The
following sections look at feedwater
control in all-ferrous and in mixed
metallurgy systems.
3.3.1 Feedwater treatment for all-
ferrous feedwater systems.
In all-ferrous feedwater trains, the
major choices are deoxygenated
AVT or oxygenated treatment (OT).
Figure 3-6 shows the major differ-
ences between AVT, which attempts
to minimize corrosion and erosion-
corrosion using deaerated feedwa-
ter with an elevated pH, and oxy-
genated treatment, which relies on
oxygenated, high purity water to
minimize corrosion and erosion-cor-
rosion in the feedwater train up to
the economizer inlet.
All volatile treatment (AVT)
¥ Ferrous or mixed feedwater train
¥ Cation conductivity 0.2-0.4 mS/cm
¥ pH 8.8-9.6
Fe <10 ppb
O2 <5 ppb
HP
Boiler Heaters BFP DA
Fe <2 ppb O2
Oxygenated treatment (OT)
¥ All-ferrous feedwater train
¥ Cation conductivity <0.15 mS/cm
¥ pH 8.0-8.5
Figure 3-6. Schematic comparison of all volatile treatment (AVT) versus oxygenated
treatment (OT) feedwater chemistries. Sources: R.B. Dooley, et al.27
For AVT, the condensate is deaerat-
ed in two locations in the plant
cycle: the condenser and the deaer-
ator. Hydrazine is used as an addi-
tional feedwater conditioner
because it is difficult to reach an
oxygen level of 5 ppb through the
plant cycle using only thermal
deaeration.26 The selected level for
pH with AVT ranges between 9.2
and 9.6.
For oxygenated treatment, an oxy-
gen level of 30-150 ppb is main-
tained across the whole plant.18, 26
Reduced pH levels (8.0 to 8.5) are
possible because of the use of oxy-
gen as the corrosion inhibitor.
The interim guidelines for unit cycle
chemistry8, 9 advocated deoxygena-
tion for all cycles; the normal dis-
solved oxygen level at the econo-
mizer inlet was less than 5 ppb with
a minimum hydrazine level of 20
ppb and/or three times the oxygen
level. The trend in the last ten years
has been toward lower oxygen lev-
els and if mechanical/thermal deaer-
ation was insufficient, then large
amounts of an oxygen scavenger
were applied (sometimes between
50-100 ppb). This causes the feed-
water to become more reducing
electrochemically (< -300 mV).
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
N2H4 (>3 x O2)
NH3
LP
Heaters CP CEP Condenser
O2 (>30 ppb)
NH3
As noted above, under such condi-
tions the oxide scales in the feedwa-
ter train become nonprotective,
leading to an excessive production
and transport of corrosion products,
mainly magnetite. Thus the addition
of oxygen scavengers has had the
opposite of the desired effect: there
has been an increase in erosion-cor-
rosion of iron-based materials with a
concomitant increase of transported
feedwater corrosion products and
associated problems.
Most units operating under AVT con-
trol can meet the interim guideline
requirements8, 9 and action levels,
and have good availability. However,
many problems have emerged over
the years in units on AVT.27 Under
AVT, even if properly applied, the
transport of corrosion products can
be substantial, particularly during
transients and start-ups as shown in
Figure 3-7. The subsequent deposi-
tion of feedwater corrosion products
is a contributor to a variety of water-
wall and economizer boiler tube fail-
ure mechanisms, and results as well
in the need for increased chemical
cleaning. As a consequence of
these problems, a change to oxy-
3-9
genated treatment for appropriate
units has become the recommended 800 80
practice.
It is now clear that the addition of 700 70

Copper Concentration (ppb)

even small levels of oxygen (> 5

Iron Concentration (ppb)

ppb) to high purity water (cation 600 60
conductivity < 0.15 mS/cm) provides
a substantial reduction of transport- 500 Iron 50
ed feedwater products.29 This
occurs because protective or pas- 400 40
sive oxide layers form in the pres-
ence of a limited amount of oxy- 300 30
gen.19 Specifically, ferric oxide
hydrate (FeOOH) forms which 200 20
blocks the pores of the original
Fe3O4 and reduces the transport of Copper
100 10
oxygen and iron ions through the
layer.18 These surface layers of 0
0
FeOOH also have a much lower sol-
0 1 2 3 4 5
ubility in flowing feedwater than
magnetite. Time (hours)
Oxygenated treatment was intro-
duced into the U.S. in 1991 and over
60 once-through units have subse- Figure 3-7. Feedwater total iron and copper concentrations during startup.
quently been converted.18, 26 In Source: J. Brown and R.E. Massey28
1994, the first U.S. drum unit was
converted. The results have been
outstanding with very large reduc-
tions of feedwater corrosion prod- ppb
ucts (usually Fe < 1 ppb at the AVT Feedwater Iron Transport Data
3.5
economizer inlet) as a result of the
more oxidizing environment (> + 120
mV) and the change of the surface 3.0
layers from magnetite to FeOOH. Total Fe

Advantages of running without an 2.5

O2 scavenger have also been real-
ized in both drum and once-through
units.19 An example is shown in 2.0
Figure 3-8 in which hydrazine dos-
ing was switched off in a 880 MW,
once-through, supercritical unit in 1.5
June, 1993; the unit has accumulat-
ed over one year of operation with- 1.0
out hydrazine. An immediate
decrease in iron concentration was
observed after hydrazine dosing 0.5
was switched off. Feedwater iron No N2H4
concentrations continue to run less
0
than 2 ppb; unit protection and star- Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
tups proceed as usual for AVT-treat-
ed units, except that no hydrazine is
used.
Figure 3-8. Iron levels at the economizer inlet with and without hydrazine.
Source: R.B. Dooley, et al.19

3-10 Cycle Chemistry and Boiler Tube Failures

Figure 3-9 shows the overall
No current
approach to develop optimized Step 1 problems
feedwater treatment in all-ferrous
Review normal or
systems. The key parts are monitor- current feedwater
Continue use of
ing of Fe, pH, oxygen, and the oxi- current treatment
treatment
dizing-reducing potential at the No problems. BUT
possible economic Step 2
economizer inlet as a minimum, for savings Low level of
all types of operating regimes (full corrosion products
Monitoring
and partial load, shutdown and baseline
startup). Not all units with all-ferrous
metallurgy may be suitable for con-
version to OT. Some may not have a Step 3
condensate polisher or be able to
produce feedwater with cation con- Reduce oxygen Eliminate oxygen
ductivities of better than 0.15 mS/cm. scavenger in steps scavenger
These systems should, however, still
be optimized and made less reduc-
ing.19 This is very important as there
is a large cost savings in eliminating
or reducing the amount of oxygen Monitor
(as in Step 2)
scavenger.

3.3.2 Mixed metallurgy feedwater

systems. Copper alloy corrosion in Step 5
condensate and feedwater systems
is a function of oxygen, carbon diox- Yes Can unit No
ide, and ammonia. As a result, convert to OT? Step 6
Step 7
mixed metallurgy feedwater systems
(those containing copper-based Convert to OT. Drum Optimize feedwater
and once-through with minimum O2
alloys) generally need a reducing units scavenger
environment and thus hydrazine or
an alternate oxygen scavenger will
be required. The overall approach
outlined in Figure 3-9 is still applica- Figure 3-9. Roadmap for optimizing feedwater treatment for all-ferrous systems.
ble, that is, the feedwater chemistry Source: R.B. Dooley, et al.19
should be optimized over the com-
plete operating spectrum for the
unit. Table 3-5 shows the normal Table 3-5
operating limits for key cycle chem- Comparison of Normal Cycle Chemistry Limits for AVT Feedwater and Oxygenated Treatment
istry parameters for AVT (all-ferrous),
AVT (mixed metallurgy) and OT. Cycle Chemistry AVT AVT Oxygenated
Parameter (mixed metallurgy) (all-ferrous) Treatment (OT)
3.3.3 Final words on feedwater. It is
quite clear that high purity feedwa- pH 8.8 - 9.1 9.2 - 9.6 8 - 8.5(1)
ter (< 0.2 mS/cm) and low levels of 9 - 9.5(2)
feedwater corrosion products (as
measured at the economizer inlet) Ammonia, ppm 0.5 - 1.0 0.02 - 0.07(1)
are necessary but not sufficient con-
ditions to prevent BTF. The final fac-
tor is the deposition rate on water- Cation conductivity (µS/cm) < 0.2 < 0.2 < 0.15
wall tubes in the boiler.
Figure 3-10 shows a schematic of Fe, ppb < 10 <5 <5
the deposition rate on waterwalls.
The solid line indicates the experi- Cu, ppb <2
ence on OT units in which the
deposition rate falls below Oxygen, ppb <5 1 - 10 30 - 150(1)
0.5 mg/cm2/1000 hours. A rate of 30 - 50(2)

Notes: (1) For once-through units. (2) For drum units

Parameter levels shown for sampling at the economizer inlet.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 3-11


Deposition Rate (mg/cm2/1000 h)
4 action levels for all key cycle conta-
3 ing pressure, 600 psia to 2850 psia;
Target for optimum feedwater treatment
2 single-cycle diagram for each of the
1 methodical rationale that relates all
AVT → OT
0 that parameter.
1 4 10
Operating Period (years)
Figure 3-10 Water wall deposition rate for units converted to oxygenated treatment
(solid line) and suggested target for other feedwater treatments (shaded band).
Source: R.B. Dooley, et al.19
less than 1 mg/cm2/1000 hours will Board (CEGB)30 in the United
markedly increase the time between Kingdom, the Vereinigung der
chemical cleaning. In contrast, levels Grosskraftwerks Betreiber (VGB)31 in
around 3-4 mg/cm2/1000 hours Germany, and the Central Research
essentially mean that a unit will need Institute of Electric Power Industry
cleaning on a 2-4 year interval. A (CRIEPI)32 in Japan all resulted in
goal of around 1 mg/cm2/1000 hours significant reductions in cycle corro-
should be set as an initial target. sion-related failures and improve-
For all feedwater treatment the aim ments in unit availabilities.
should be to minimize/reduce depo- EPRI introduced the first compre-
sition rates. The boiler should not be hensive guidelines in the U.S. in
asked to correct for the mistakes 1986 to provide the guidance need-
made in setting up the feedwater ed for better control of cycle corro-
chemistry. sion and deposition.8 These interim
guidelines covered the most com-
mon chemistry control practices as
3.4 Developing Unit-Specific of the early 1980s, especially con-
Guidelines gruent phosphate treatment or all-
volatile treatment with deoxygenated
3.4.1 Overview of available guid- condensate/feedwater as treated by
ance. The development of unit cycle ammonium hydroxide and
chemistry guidelines is vital to the
hydrazine. The guidelines included
availability of the unit and the reliabil- target values and action levels for
ity of equipment. Such guidelines significant contaminants at critical
can help control cycle corrosion and sample points. The basis of these
deposition and the resultant BTF. guidelines was that if the overall
Introduction of unified cycle chem-
cycle chemistry limits were set to
istry guidelines such as those by the protect the turbine then they would
then Central Electricity Generating also protect the boiler and other
cycle components.
3-12 Cycle Chemistry and Boiler Tube Failures
The guidelines differentiate between
reheat and non-reheat cycle
designs; suggest target values and
minants in drum boilers as a contin-
uum over a broad range of operat-
summarize all sample points, moni-
toring and control parameters, tar-
get values, and action levels on a
major cycles and chemical treat-
ments; and feature a consistent,
sample points, target values, and
action levels for each parameter to
the component(s) most affected by
The interim guidelines included the
following action levels:
• Normal. Values are consistent
with long-term system reliability. A
safety margin is provided to avoid
concentration of contaminants at
surfaces.
• Action Level 1. Contaminants
could accumulate resulting in
corrosion. Values should be
returned to normal levels within
one week.
• Action Level 2. Impurities will
accumulate resulting in corrosion.
Values should be returned to nor-
mal levels within 24 hours.
• Action Level 3. Rapid corrosion
will occur that can be prevented
by shutting the unit down within
four hours.
• Immediate Shutdown. Clear evi-
dence shows rapid boiler tube
damage by acid contamination.
Immediate shutdown of the unit
will prevent further damage.
For most parameters the following
criteria were used:
• Action Level 1 Value: 2 x [Normal
Target Value]
• Action Level 2 Value: 2 x [Action
Level 1 Value]
• Action Level 3 Value: > [Action
Level 2 Value]
• Immediate Shutdown: Boiler
water pH indicates a serious
acidic contamination.
Table 3-6 shows typical guideline
values for normal operation, the
three actions levels and a criterion
for immediate shutdown (in this
case pH < 8). The established lev-
els of key cycle chemistry parame-
ters take into account the type of
boiler (once-through or drum, with
and without reheat), operating pres-
sure, and boiler water treatment
type. The example in Table 3-6 illus-
trates the key parameter levels for a
drum boiler with reheat, operating at
2500 psig boiler pressure and using
phosphate boiler water treatment.
Subsequently, as a result of much
research and analysis of the interna-
tional experience base, four addi-
tional guidelines for specific boiler
and feedwater treatments have
been developed. A guideline on
oxygenated treatment for once-
through and drum units has been
introduced in the United States.26 A
guideline on phosphate treatment13,
discussed above, is available. A
review of caustic treatment which is
now used successfully in over 50,
000 MW worldwide is also available.
Finally, a new AVT guideline40 for
drum and once-through units will be
available in 1996.
Ancillary guidelines have also been
published on topics related directly
to setting and controlling cycle
chemistry:
• Setting up cycle chemistry
improvement programs33
• Instrumentation and control34
• Makeup water treatment35
• Monitoring cycle water
chemistry36
• Chemical cleaning37
• Steam sampling38
• Condensate polishing
guidelines39
3.4.2 Unit-specific guidelines. It
should be remembered that pub-
lished guidelines, such as those
from EPRI, VGB, CRIEPI, etc., are
provided for guidance only, and it is
Table 3-6
Typical Normal and Action Levels for Drum Boiler Water for a Unit With Reheat on
Phosphate Treatment (PT)
Cycle
Chemistry Normal Action Action Action Immediate
Parameter Level Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Shutdown
Na, ppm < 1.5 <3 < 7.5 < 7.5
Cl, ppm < 0.9 < 1.8 < 3.7 > 3.7
SO4, ppm < 1.6 < 3.2 < 6.4 > 6.4
SiO2, ppm < 0.13 < 0.27 < 0.55 > 0.55
pH 9.3 <8
Na:PO4 > 2.8
PO4, ppm 2.5
Example for a 2500 psig boiler.
vital that they be adapted or cus- mechanical and vaporous carry-
tomized specifically for each unit. over into the steam. Thus, the
This process should include the fol- allowable concentrations in boiler
lowing steps: water depend on the desired
steam chemistry, which are
• Select unit-specific boiler water
treatment. This should follow the based on the solubility limits of
procedure in Section 3.2.4 and the contaminants (NaCl and
on Figure 3-5. It should be inti- NaOH) and silica.13
mately related to the cooling • Develop specific action and target
water source (lake water, sea levels for contaminants in boiler
water, cooling tower, etc.) and water as indicated in Section
the availability of a condensate 3.4.1.
polisher. • Verify the specific unit guideline
• Select unit-specific feedwater values by a detailed monitoring
treatment. This should follow the program, which includes measur-
procedure in Section 3.3.1 and ing the actual mechanical carry-
on Figure 3-9. It should take care- over and the efficacy of the cho-
ful note of the system metallurgy sen boiler water treatment. For
and whether an oxygen scav- example, tests should confirm
enger is needed. The importance that phosphate hideout and
of this step cannot be overem- return do not occur under any
phasized as the generation and operating circumstances.
deposition of feedwater corrosion
products affects many of the fail-
ure mechanisms in water-touched
tubing.
• Develop specific boiler water lim-
its. Allowable boiler water impuri-
ties will depend on an analysis of
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 3-13
3.5 Instrumentation and Table 3-7a
Monitoring for Boiler Water “Core” Monitoring Parameters (Minimum level of instruments for all plants/units)
All units should have a set of reli- Usage, Measurement
able, simple instruments to optimize Parameter Measurement Locations On-line/ Grab Frequency
boiler and feedwater chemistry and
as a means to implement and verify
the required unit-specific guidelines. Cation conductivity • Condensate pump discharge O C
Table 3-7a provides a “core” list of (CPD)
instrumentation which represents the
minimum level for every plant. Table Cation conductivity • Polisher outlet or economizer inlet O C
3-7b provides a list of additional
monitoring or diagnostic parameters Cation conductivity • Hot reheat steam or main steam O C
and instruments that may be • Downcomer1 O C
required to verify the chosen chem-
istry or for troubleshooting. pH (Drum Boilers) • Blowdown or downcomers O C
Five critical aspects of cycle chem-
istry instrumentation are that: (i) the Dissolved oxygen • CPD O C
installed instrumentation is appropri- • Economizer inlet O C
ate for the mode of unit operation • Downcomer1 O C
and/or high availability requirements,
(ii) the sampling methods and sys- Sodium • CPD O C
tem design reflect the current state-
of-the art, e.g., that chemical con-
stituents of interest are transported Sodium • Polisher outlet or economizer inlet O C
and conditioned for analysis without
altering any of their characteristics, Sodium • Hot reheat steam or main steam O C
(iii) the sample frequency is suffi-
cient to provide early alert of any
deviation outside of limits consid-
ered best practice, (iv) proper quali- Table 3-7b
ty control to ensure the reliability of Additional Monitoring or Diagnostic Parameters
the measurements has been imple-
mented, and (v) the instrumentation Usage, Measurement
recommended actually provides Parameter Measurement Locations On-line/ Grab Frequency
indirect indications of the state of the
cycle, as the main features of inter- pH • Economizer inlet O C
est, such as corrosion and scaling,
are not directly monitored. Specific conductivity • Economizer inlet O C
The use of monitoring and diagnos- • Treated makeup O C
tic results of chemical species plays
an important role in (i) confirming Cation conductivity2 • Blowdown or downcomer O C
the mechanism, (ii) identifying root
cause(s), (iii) specifying optimal cor- Silica • Treated makeup O C
rective action, and (iv) assuring the
long-term effectiveness of the cho- Phosphate2 • Blowdown or downcomer O or G C or S
sen preventative action for many
boiler tube failure mechanisms. It is Chloride3 • Blowdown or downcomer O or G C or D
interesting to note that there tends to
be a direct correlation between sig-
nificant BTF and low levels of on-line Iron • Economizer inlet O W
instrumentation.
Copper • Economizer inlet O W

Total Organic Carbon • Condensate pump discharge O W

Air Inleakage • Air removal system O or G C or D

1Drum boilers on oxygenated treatment
2Drum boilers on phosphate treatment
3Drum boilers with all-volatile treatment
O - On-LIne G- Grab C - Continuous or Semi-Continuous S - Grab, Once/Shift
D - Grab, Once/Day W - Grab, Once/Week

3-14 Cycle Chemistry and Boiler Tube Failures

3.6 References
1Whirl,S.F. and T.E. Purcell, “Protection Against Caustic
Embrittlement by Coordinated Phosphate-pH Control”,
Proceedings of the Water Conference, Pittsburgh, PA,
1942.
2Stodola, J., “Review of Boiler Water Alkalinity Control”,
International Water Conference, 47th Annual Meeting,
held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 27-29, 1986.
3Garnsey, et al., “Waterside Corrosion in Advanced
Designs of Nuclear Steam Generators”, Journal of the
British Nuclear Energy Society, Volume 11, No. 1, 1972,
pp. 65-70.
4Pocock, F.J. and A. Banweg, “Current Waterside
Corrosion Concerns in Fossil Utility Steam Generators”,
Electrochemical Society, Detroit, Michigan, October,
1982.
5Partridge, E.P., “Hydrogen Damage in Power Boilers”,
Paper No. 63 PWR-9, The National Power Conference,
Cincinnati, Ohio, September, 1963.
6Ames, W.C. and J.A. Lux, “An Experimental
Investigation of Hydrogen Damage in Boiler Tubing”,
American Power Conference, April, 1967.
7Klein, H.A., J.A. Lux, W.L. Riedal, D.E. Noll, and H.
Phillips, “A Field Survey of Internal Boiler Tube Corrosion
in High Pressure Boilers”, American Power Conference,
Chicago, Illinois, April, 1971.
8Aschoff, A.F., Y.H. Lee, D.M Sopocy, and O. Jonas,
Interim Consensus Guidelines on Fossil Plant Cycle
Chemistry, Research Project 2712-1, Final Report CS-
4629, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
June, 1986.
9Aschoff, A., D. Sopocy, O. Jonas, and B. Dooley,
“Interim Consensus Guidelines for Fossil Plant Cycle
Chemistry”, Proceedings of the 46th International Water
Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, 1985.
10Scheerer, C.C. and J.K. Maxwell, “Phosphate Hide-Out:
An On-Line Indication of Boiler Cleanliness”,
Proceedings of the American Power Conference, Vol. 52,
April, 1990, pp. 1044-1050.
11Dooley, R.B. and R. Pate, eds., Fourth International
Conference on Cycle Chemistry in Fossil Boilers, held in
Atlanta, Georgia, September 7-9, 1994, Final Report TR-
104502, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA.,
January, 1995.
12Tremaine, P.R., L.G.S. Gray, B. B. Wiwchar, and J.
Stodola, Sodium Phosphate Chemistry Under High
Pressure Utility Drum-Boiler Conditions, Volumes 1
through 3, Project 913 G730, Canadian Electric
Association, October, 1992.
13Dooley, R.B., A. Aschoff, and F. Pocock, Cycle
Chemistry Guidelines for Fossil Plants: Phosphate
Treatment for Drum Units, Final Report TR-103655,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
December, 1994.
14Goldstein,P., “A Research Study on Internal Corrosion
of High Pressure Boilers”, Trans. ASME 90(A), 1, 1968,
pp. 23-37.
15Goldstein, P. and C.L. Burton, “A Research Study on
Internal Corrosion of High Pressure Boilers - Final
Report”, Trans. ASME 91(A), 1969, pp. 75-101.
16Ball, M., Sodium Hydroxide for Conditioning the Boiler
Water of Drum-Type Boilers, Research Project 9000-20,
Final Report TR-104007, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, California, January, 1995. See also
Ball, M., “Caustic Treatment for Drum Boilers”, Fourth
International Conference on Cycle Chemistry in Fossil
Boilers, held in Atlanta, Georgia, September 7-9, 1994.
17Dooley, R.B., “Fossil Plant Cycle Chemistry and
Availability Problems”, ESKOM/EPRI Cycle Chemistry
Symposium, South Africa, June, 1994.
18Dooley,R.B., B. Larkin, L. Webb, A. Bursik, I. Oliker,
and F. Pocock, “Oxygenated Treatment for Fossil Plants”,
Paper IWC-92-16, Proceedings of the 53rd International
Water Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, October, 1992.
19Dooley, R.B., J. Mathews, R. Pate, and J. Taylor,
“Optimum Chemistry for ‘All-Ferrous’ Feedwater Systems:
Why Use an Oxygen Scavenger?”, Proceedings of the
55th International Water Conference, Pittsburgh, PA,
October 31-November 2, 1994.
20Zimmermann, M., “A New Technique for Chemically
Degassing Boiler Feedwater”, Mitteilungen der VGB, No.
2/3, 1948, pp. 70-73.
21Zimmermann, M., “Practical Works Experience
Concerning the Deoxygenation of Boiler Feedwater and
Hydrazine”, in Hydrazine and Water Treatment:
Proceedings of an International Conference, held at
Bournemouth, England, May, 1957, Whiffen and Sons,
January, 1958.
22Hydrazine and Water Treatment: Proceedings of an
International Conference, held at Bournemouth, England,
May, 1957, Whiffen and Sons, January, 1958.
23Fiss, E.C., American Power Conference, March, 1954.
24Stones, W.F., “Experiences with Hydrazine as a
Chemical Deoxidant in High Pressure Boilers”, in
Hydrazine and Water Treatment: Proceedings of an
International Conference, held at Bournemouth, England,
May, 1957, Whiffen and Sons, January, 1958, pp. 77-97.
25”OrganicConditioning Agents and Oxygen
Scavengers”, VGB Conference at Lahnstein, March,
1994.
26Bursik,A., B. Dooley, and B. Larkin, Guidelines for
Oxygenated Treatment for Fossil Plants, Research
Project 1403-45, Final Report TR-102285, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December, 1994.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 3-15
27Dooley, R.B., A. Bursik, O. Jonas, F. Pocock, and J.
Rice, “Perspective and Vision of Cycle Chemistry for
Fossil Plants”, in R.B. Dooley, ed., Proceedings
International Conference on Fossil Plant Cycle Chemistry,
held in Baltimore, Maryland, June 4-6, 1991, Report TR-
100195, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
December, 1991, pp. I-1 through I-22.
28Brown, J., and R.E. Massey, “Condensate, Feedwater,
Steam Sampling, and Analysis in Ontario Hydro Thermal
Generating Stations”, 41st International Water
Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, 1980, pp. 151-155.
29Bates, A.J., G.J. Bignold, K. Garbett, W.R. Middleton,
D. Penfold, K. Tittle and I.S. Woolsey, “The Central
Electricity Generating Board Single-Phase Erosion-
Corrosion Research Programme”, Nuclear Energy, No. 6,
December, 1986, pp. 361-370.
30Central Electricity Generating Board, Generation
Operation Memorandum (GOM) 72: Part 1 - Introduction
and General Aspects of Chemical Control of the Steam
Water Circuit, Issue 5, April, 1983. Part 2 - Chemical
Control of the Steam Water Circuit of Drum-Type Boilers,
Issue 6, September 1985. Part 4 - Sampling, Analysis,
Instrumentation and Chemical Dosing, Issue 5,
September, 1983.
31VGB, “VGB Guidelines for Boiler Feedwater, Boiler
Water, and Steam of Generators Exceeding 68 bar
Tolerated Operating Pressure” (in German) VGB
Technische Vereinigung der Grosskraftwerksbetreiber,
e.V. VGB-R 450 L, Essen, 1988. See also A. Bursik, “VGB
Guidelines on Boiler Feedwater, Boiler Water and Steam
of Water-Tube Boilers”, IWC-84-116, presented at the
45th Annual Meeting of the International Water
Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, October 22-24, 1984.
32Japanese Industrial Standard JIS B 8223-1977, Water
Conditioning for Boiler Feed Water and Boiler Water,
Japanese Standards Association, 1977.
3-16 Cycle Chemistry and Boiler Tube Failures
33Dimmer, J.P., G.A. Lamping, O. Jonas, and R. Niebo,
Cycle Chemistry Corrosion and Deposition: Correction,
Prevention and Control, Research Project 2712-11, Final
Report TR-103038, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, December, 1993.
34Hopkins, R.D., E.H. Hull, K.J. Shields, and S.
Yorgiadis, Guideline Manual on Instrumentation and
Control for Fossil Plant Cycle Chemistry, Research
Project 2712-2, Final Report CS-5164, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1987.
35Cline, D.A., Jr. and K.J. Shields, Guidelines for
Makeup Water Treatment, Research Project 2712-4, Final
Report GS-6699, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, March, 1990.
36Aschoff, A.F., D.M. Sopocy, D.T. Eglar, O. Jonas, J.K.
Rice, C.C. Stauffer, and W.E. Allmon, Monitoring Cycle
Water Chemistry in Fossil Plants - Volume 3: Project
Conclusions and Recommendations, Final Report GS-
7556, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA.,
October, 1991.
37Bartholomew, R.D., W.E. Chesney, R.D. Hopkins, J.S.
Poole, J.W. Siegmund, J.P. Williams, and S. Yorgiadis,
Guidelines for Chemical Cleaning of Fossil-Fueled
Steam-Generating Equipment, Research Project 2712-
06, Final Report TR-102401, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, June, 1993.
38Jonas, O., R.K. Mathur, J.K. Rice, E. Coulter, and R.
Freeman, Development of a Steam Sampling System,
Final Report TR-100196, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA.
39Larkin, B.A., et al., Condensate Polishing Guidelines,
Final Report TR-104422, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, in process.
40Dooley,R.B., A.F. Aschoff, and F. Pocock, Cycle
Chemistry Guidelines for Fossil Plants: All-Volatile
Treatment, Final Report TR-105041, Electric Power
Research Institute, 1996.
Oxide Thickness (mils) Chapter 4 • Volume 1
100
90 1150 1125
80 1100

The Effects of Unit and

70
60
1075
50
40 1050
30
20
10

0
0 50,000 100,000 150,000
Time (hours)
200,000 250,000
1025
1000
900
300,000
Boiler Operation and
Maintenance on BTF

4.1 Introduction and statement, discussed in Chapter 5,

Background
Operation and maintenance (O&M)
procedures are inseparable from the
nature and incidence of boiler tube
failures. The effect of O&M practices
and the judicious choice of proper
procedures as a preventive measure
against BTF can be found through-
out the individual mechanism write-
ups in Volumes 2 and 3. The pur-
poses of this section are to overview
briefly the types of O&M activities
that can impact the incidence and
severity of BTF and to provide
detailed information about several
topics (chemical cleaning, cycling
and unit transients, lay-up, and
commissioning) that will affect a
number of BTF mechanisms.
Two other general topics from the
list of O&M activities have been
placed in separate chapters.
Chapters 9 and 10 provide detail
about methods to inspect boiler
tubes and ways of determining the
extent of “macroscopic” and micro-
scopic damage. Chapter 11 covers
repair and replacement of boiler
tubes. These subject areas are a
vital part of the overall BTF identifi-
cation, correction and prevention
responsibilities of O&M personnel.
It is critical that O&M control
procedures and practices become
incorporated into any BTF reduction
program. A corporate philosophy
generally has a number of state-
ments that are directly applicable to
maintenance related BTF.
4.2 Chemical Cleaning of
Waterwalls
4.2.1 Introduction. The proper
application and timing of chemical
cleaning can be a significant part of
the overall program of boiler tube
failure prevention and control. As
discussed in Chapter 3 of this vol-
ume, one aim of proper cycle chem-
istry control is to avoid, to the great-
est extent possible, the need for
chemical cleaning. Until the goal of
eliminating all chemical cleans is
achieved, the focus must be on pre-
venting boiler tube failures by
removing excessive deposits with-
out introducing damage through the
cleaning process itself.
Chemical cleaning although it can
be very effective is not simple nor
risk-free. An extensive publication
has compiled the details of the alter-
native processes including: sources
of deposits; determining the need to
chemical clean; solvent selection
and application; planning for chemi-
cal cleaning; hazards and safety
precautions; chemical cleaning pro-
cedures for boilers; specifications;
waste minimization, treatment, and
disposal; and the post-cleaning
inspection, startup and operation.1

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 4-1

Our focus is to present the back- Table 4-1
ground about chemical cleaning as BTF Mechanisms Influenced by or Influencing Chemical Cleaning
it specifically pertains to boiler tube
failures: how the proper use of Chemical
chemical cleaning can prevent them Influenced Cleaning to Mechanism
from occurring, and to set the stage by Internal Remove Exacerbated
for how the improper use of chemi- Chapter, Deposits or Deposits by Chemical
cal cleans can, in itself, be a cause Volume(a) Mechanism Oxides(b) and/or Oxides Cleaning
of increased failures. Two failure
mechanisms specifically relate to Volume 2 Water-Cooled Tubes
tube damage caused by the clean-
ing process itself; the waterwalls dis- 13 Corrosion fatigue ✓
cussion is in Chapter 25, Volume 2,
and for SH/RH in Chapter 43,
Volume 3. 15 Hydrogen damage ✓ ✓ possible(c, d)

There are at least fourteen BTF 16 Acid phosphate corrosion ✓ ✓ possible(c)

mechanisms that are influenced by,
or influence, chemical cleaning,
17 Caustic gouging ✓ ✓ possible(c)
Table 4-1.

4.2.2 Assessing waterside cleanli- 18 Fireside corrosion in

ness. The recommended method to
evaluate waterside cleanliness is to
remove a tube sample from the area
of highest corrosion product deposi-
tion.1 Samples can be used to deter-
mine the deposit weight, chemical
composition, and morphology or
physical structure of waterside
deposits. Not only will such sam-
pling help set the optimal cleaning
procedures, but it may also provide
significant information about the
potential for future boiler tube fail-
ures and highlight potential unit
operating problems.
Levels have been established for
deposit weights at which cleaning
should occur for a mechanical
method and a solvent method, as
shown in Figure 4-1.
waterwalls of coal-fired units ✓ ✓
19 Thermal fatigue
(supercritical waterwalls) ✓ ✓
25 Chemical cleaning damage
(waterwalls) ✓
27 Pitting (economizers) ✓ ✓ ✓
Volume 3 Steam-Cooled Tubes
32 Long-term overheating (Creep) ✓ ✓
33 Fireside corrosion in SH/RH
circuits (coal-fired units) ✓ ✓
34 Fireside corrosion in SH/RH
circuits (oil-fired units) ✓ ✓

4.2.3 When to clean water-touched 36 Short-term overheating

tubes. In addition to cleaning when (Exfoliated oxide) ✓ ✓ ✓
the deposit weight exceeds a critical
value, the following additional occa-
sions are recommended1: 37 Stress corrosion cracking ✓

• Immediately following a cycle 43 Chemical cleaning damage

chemistry upset resulting in low (SH/RH) ✓
boiler pH. Boiler tube concern:
hydrogen damage. (a) Chapter in Volume 2 or 3 to consult for detail about this specific mechanism.
(b) Thus needing removal by chemical cleaning.
• Following periods of cycle chem-
(c) May leave deposits in tubes which would act as flow disruptions (a contributor).
istry upset resulting in high pH
(d) Further, deposits may be acid-saturated and not fully neutralized.
condition. Boiler tube concern:
caustic gouging damage.

4-2 The Effects of Unit and Boiler Operation and Maintenance on BTF
• In the event of condenser tube
leakage over a long period of Deposit Weight by Mechanical Method
time (> 6 months), particularly
when chemistry control is not 60
adequate to control the resulting

Specific deposit weight, g/ft2

pH level. Boiler tube concern: 50
hydrogen damage. Clean
40
• In the event of water-touched
tube failures by any of the under- 30
deposit corrosion mechanisms 20
(hydrogen damage, caustic Consider Cleaning
gouging, acid phosphate corro- 10
sion), indicating the presence of No Cleaning Required
excessive deposit buildup. 0
1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5
• In the event of overheating tube Pressure, psig x 103
failures in either water-touched or
Metric Conversions
steam-touched tubing, indicating
either deposit buildup (water- g/ft2 x 1.07 = mg/cm2
touched tubes), excessive steam-
psig x 6.9 x 10-3 = MPa
side oxide (steam-touched tub-
ing), or blockage (either). Deposit Weight by Solvent Method
• Where the pressure drop (in
once-through boilers) has 60
increased significantly.
Specific deposit weight, g/ft2

50
• Where a problem is indicated
(such as by cycle chemistry mon- 40 Clean
itoring) from a previous, incom-
30
plete or improper chemical clean.
• Before a change in boiler feedwa- 20 Consider Cleaning
ter treatment.
10
• Before major change in fuel, par- No Cleaning Required
ticularly if it will result in signifi- 0
1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5
cant change to heat flux profile.
Pressure, psig x 103
• After an extended unit layup if
layup procedures were improper-
ly controlled.
Figure 4-1. Permissible specific deposit weight limits as a function of boiler pressure.
• After a major waterwall tube
replacement, e.g., 10-20%
replacement.
weight. The information is then plot- basis with the rule of thumb to
The choice of chemical cleaning
ted on a figure of deposition rate chemical clean when the average
period should be tied to field experi-
versus time as was shown schemati- oxide thickness exceeded 50 mm
ence. Several optional means to
cally in Figure 3-10. From such an (e.g., approximately 18 mg/cm2),
“trigger” a chemical clean have
analysis, it can be determined that typically after 3-4 years.2
been useful. The first is to evaluate
units with a deposition rate of 3-4
the level of feedwater corrosion
mg/cm2/1000 hours will need to be 4.2.4 Solvent choice for water-
products at the economizer inlet touched tubes. Tables 4-2a and
cleaned every 2-4 years whereas
(trying to maintain levels of Fe < 5 4-2b provide an overview of the
those units with rates of deposition
ppb for example, or of < 1 ppb in
on the order of 0.5 mg/cm2/1000 most commonly utilized solvents for
the case of oxygenated treatment). chemical cleaning of boilers along
hours should never need cleaning.
A second means is to measure and with a rough guide to their efficacy
A third criterion is to set a limit on
plot the rate of deposit formation. for various types of deposits. It is
deposit thickness or weight, consis-
This is done by removing a tube extremely important to consider con-
tent with the type of analysis above.
sample each year from a similar centrations and compatibility with
For example, for boilers in the for- various materials of construction.1
position and using a consistent
mer CEGB system, chemical clean-
method of determining the deposit
ing was conducted on a periodic

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 4-3

Table 4-2a
Typical Concentration and Temperature of Use for Common Solvents Used for Waterwall and Economizer Cleanings
Hydrochloric Hydroxyacetic Ammoniated Ammoniated Ammonium Hydrofluoric
Acid Formic Acid EDTA Citric Acid Bromate Acid (ref. 3)

Typical
Concentration, 5-6 % 3% 4-6 % 3% 0.1 - 0.5 % 1 - 2%

For Iron: For Iron:

Typical 66-71°C 93°C 82-93˚C 82-93˚C 60-71˚C 50-60˚C
Temperature, ˚C (150-160°F) (200˚F) (180-200˚F) (180-200˚F) (140-160˚F) (122-140˚F)
(˚F) or or
129-149°C 116-135°C
(265-300˚F) (240-275˚F)

For Copper: For Copper:

66°C (150°F) 66˚C (150˚F)

Sources: R.D. Bartholomew, et al.1 and A. Bursik3

Table 4-2b
Capacity of Selected Solvents for Constituents in Waterwall and Economizer Deposits
Constituent in Hydrochloric Hydroxyacetic Ammoniated Ammoniated Ammonium Hydrofluoric
Deposit Acid Formic Acid EDTA Citric Acid Bromate Acid (ref. 3)

Iron Oxides High High High High N/A High

Copper
– Metallic Lowa Traceb Medium Medium High
– Oxide Mediuma Traceb Medium Medium High Low (for CuO)

Nickel Oxides High –— High High Trace

Zinc Oxide High –— High High Trace N/A

Calcium Salts Highc Low Low —– N/A N/A

Magnesium Salts High Low Low –— N/A N/A

Silica Lowd –— –— –— N/A Medium

Organics Tracee –— —– —– N/A N/A

a With sufficient copper complexor present, such as thiourea.
b Dissolved copper will redeposit on bare steel surfaces.
c Except for calcium sulfate, which is difficult to dissolve.
d With ammonium bifluoride.
e Trace materials may slough off during cleaning. Organics, when present, often carbonize next to the metal surface and require removal with an alkaline permanganate
solution. Massive, short-term oil intrusion into the feedwater can result in oily deposits covering a mixture of carbonized oil and existing metal oxide deposits. Use of
a strong alkaline detergent for removal of uncarbonized oil and prolonged exposure to strong alkaline permanganate solutions for removal of carbonized oil deposits may
be necessary.

Sources: R.D. Bartholomew, et al.1 and A. Bursik3

4-4 The Effects of Unit and Boiler Operation and Maintenance on BTF
4.2.5 Typical operations in chemical
cleaning of water-touched tubes.
From a BTF reduction viewpoint, the
BTF Team should ensure that the fol-
lowing steps are executed during
the chemical cleaning process1:
• Isolation of system to be cleaned
• Removal of debris prior to clean-
ing
• Hydrostatic testing and prelimi-
nary leak detection
• Backflushing superheater and for-
ward flushing economizer
• Preheating of system and temper-
ature control
• Solvent injection
• Leak detection and response
• Solvent movement
• Monitoring of cleaning process
• Completion of cleaning
• Removing solvent
• Rinsing and flushing
• Neutralization of residual solvent
• Inspection of cleaned system
• Layup of unit
• Safety procedures during process
It is most important for reducing BTF
that monitoring of the cleaning
process is performed and, in partic-
ular, to determine whether the level
of Fe in solution continues to
increase or levels out indicating that
the clean has finished.
4.3 Chemical Cleaning of
Superheaters/Reheaters
4.3.1 Introduction. The chemical
cleaning of superheaters and
reheaters is not nearly so common
as for water-touched portions of the
boiler. There are distinct advan-
tages, but it is a significantly more
difficult process, in part because of
the variety of materials used in
SH/RH tubing, and because of the
difficulty in ensuring complete
rinsing, particularly of the platens.
For three reasons, the chemical
cleaning of SH/RH sections is pri-
a)
Temperature °F
1100
1080
1060
1040
Estimated
1020 end of life
1000
980
0 120,000 237,601
Time (hours)
b)
Temperature °F
1060
1040
1020
Estimated
end of life
1000
980
0 120,000 300,818
Time (hours)
Figure 4-2. Estimated tube metal temperature at 120,000 hours for a superheater tube
(T22) operating at 2400 psi when the steamside oxide thickness was 11 mils.
marily directed to the removal of Finally, a proper chemical cleaning
steamside oxide scale. First, is to can remove excessive steamside
minimize exfoliation which carries oxide that acts to insulate the tube
over into the turbine causing solid from the cooling effects of steam.
particle erosion (SPE) of nozzles and This can prevent long-term over-
blades. This is a significant industry heating/creep failures and provide
problem. A recent estimate was that increased life for the SH or RH cir-
SPE damage cost to the industry cuit. Figures 4-2a and 4-2b illustrate
exceeds $150 million per year and the process. Figure 4-2a illustrates
can be as high as $3 million for the continuously increasing tube
some units.4, 5 metal temperature expected as a
A second objective of SH/RH clean- result of the growth of internal oxide.
ing of oxide is to prevent exfoliation With a chemical clean at 120,000
that would lead to blockage of tubes hours (Figure 4-2b) the operating
and subsequent failure by short- temperature is significantly
term overheating. This failure mech- decreased, with a corresponding
increase in remaining tube life.
anism is the subject of a separate
writeup in Chapter 36, Volume 3.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 4-5
Chemical cleaning of SH/RH sec-
tions can be performed preopera- Oxide Thickness (mils)
tionally to remove the mill scale and
100
protective coatings on new tube sur-
faces. The brief summary of SH/RH 90 1150 1125
considerations that follows, however, 80 1100
concentrates on post-operation
cleaning. 70
60
4.3.2 When to clean steam-touched 1075
tubes. Figure 4-3 shows the typical 50
thickness of steamside oxide scale 40
on 21/4 Cr - 1 Mo as a function of 1050
tube temperatures. As an example, 30
a scale of approximately 8 mils (475 20 1025
mm) would be expected in 50,000
10 1000
hours of operation at 538°C (1000°F)
900
steam temperature. 0
0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000
Unlike the specific guidance that is
available for water-touched tubes, Time (hours)
there is no clearly established guid-
ance regarding when to clean
SH/RH tubes, although some rules Figure 4-3. Steamside oxide growth curves for 21/4 Cr - 1 Mo steel predicted by
of thumb have been proposed. One EPRIGEMS TUBELIFE III. Oxide grown in 2150 psi steam at listed temperatures (°F).
of the triggers for cleaning SH/RH Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.5
tubing will be when it is necessary
to prevent turbine damage caused
by solid particle erosion (SPE). 4.3.3. Locations to be cleaned. used. This consists of extracting a
Another reason for limiting internal Locations to be cleaned in the tube or tubes from the locations to
oxide buildup is to limit tube temper- SH/RH will depend on a variety of be cleaned and subjecting them, in
atures and thus minimize the accu- factors including: type and nature of the laboratory, to candidate chemi-
mulation of creep damage. In a exfoliating oxides, the erosion mech- cal cleaning environments. The eval-
typical SH/RH tube, each 25.4 mm anism, steam velocities, materials, uation should include as a minimum:
(1 mil) of oxide buildup increases particle size and density, and tem- the evaluation of the optimal sol-
the tube metal temperature by perature levels across the various vents, characterizing the length of
approximately 1.7°C (3°F).6 For a circuits.7 exposure, and the velocity of the sol-
510 mm (0.020 inch) thick scale, vent to be used.1
tube metal temperatures increase by 4.3.4 Importance of sampling and
Typical solvent choices for SH/RH
about 33°C (~ 60°F) which corre- process optimization. For SH/RH
tubing are listed in Table 4-3. It is
sponds to a five-fold increase in the chemical cleans it is even more
particularly important that samples
accumulation of damage by creep. important than for waterwalls to
taken reflect the specific materials
select carefully the solvent to be
Ultrasonic testing (UT) and selective
sampling to confirm the UT results
can identify when excessive oxide Table 4-3
buildups begin to occur. Using the Chemical Cleaning Solvents for SH/RH Circuits
remaining life methods described in
Chapter 8 of this volume, along with Solvent Typical Concentration Typical Temperature
a knowledge of the rate of oxide
growth taking place in the SH/RH, Ammoniated EDTA
such as by periodic ultrasonic mea- – High-temperature 4.0 - 6.0%a 135°C (275°F)
surements, a statement of desired – Low-temperature 4.0 - 6.0%a 93°C (200°F)
tube life can be used to set allow-
able limits on oxide thickness and to
Hydroxyacetic-Formic 6.0% 93°C (200°F)
develop optimum chemical cleaning
intervals.
Ammoniated Citric Acidb,
low temperature 3.0 - 6.0% 93°C (200°F)
a 10-15% as a 40% solution of EDTA.
b Confined mostly to preoperational cleanings.

Source: R.D. Bartholomew, et al.1

4-6 The Effects of Unit and Boiler Operation and Maintenance on BTF
that will be cleaned, including
austenitic stainless steels if they are
to be cleaned, and representative
scales that are targeted for removal.
This will allow a judgment to be
made about the probable efficacy of
the process and whether damage of
tube materials may be possible. It
should be noted that small-scale
sample testing will not completely
predict the eventual cleaning
process in the boiler itself; however,
such testing is recommended as an
aid to help optimize the choice of
process variables.
Also in the case of SH/RH chemical
cleans, agents are often added to
remove other than oxide material,
such as SiO2. It is important that the
process development includes tests
with and without these agents, such
as ammonium bi-fluoride, especially
as they could cause damage to the
austenitic materials. It may be possi-
ble that these agents are not
required; for example, ammonium
bi-fluoride is often found to not be
required.
4.3.5 Steps in the cleaning process
for steam-touched tubes. Extensive
planning often up to 18 months, is
often required prior to the first super-
heater/reheater cleaning. The
process itself requires 75-100 hours
to complete and therefore is usually
scheduled at the end of a major tur-
bine outage. The BTF Team should
ensure that the following steps are
an integral part of the preparation
and procedure1:
Preparation:
• System design review and prelimi-
naries such as cost estimates, etc.
• Planning, scheduling, and proce-
dure development
• Estimating flow rates and solution
velocity requirements ensuring
that minimum flow velocities are
met in all circuits
• Determining hardware require-
ments including: temporary pip-
ing, pumps, heat exchangers,
flowmeters, and turbine isolation
requirements
• Characterizing water supply
requirements
• Waste disposal and storage
requirements
• Venting requirements
• Monitoring requirements. An
important part of this step will be
to monitor the level of Fe to
ensure that the clean is complete,
but that the process is not clean-
ing/corroding the base tubes. A
side loop for monitoring should be
considered during the planning
for this portion of the process.
Procedure:
• Steam purge
• Water backfill and venting
• Circulation and cooldown
• Orifice installation
• Circulation and system heatup
• Flow verification. This is a very
important step and should be
done for all circuits
• Chemical solvent injection
• Chemical solvent circulation
• Endpoint determination. This can
be done in part via monitoring of
Fe and other key parameters as
described in the section below
• Cooldown
• Chemical solution displacement
• Passivation
• Displacement flush. This step is
critical to avoid the buildup of
crud at the bottom of loops
• Inspection of headers via hand-
hole caps, etc.
Care must be taken to remove any
loosened or dislodged scale
through a final system purge using
either steam or air blows. Scale may
also be lying in the bottoms of pen-
dant loops and may not be removed
by steam or air blows. Each loop
should be checked and this material
be removed.
4.3.6 Monitoring during cleaning
and post-cleaning. Monitoring of the
conditions during testing, chemical
cleaning, and post-cleaning sam-
pling to confirm the efficacy of the
process are critical to the success of
the cleaning process for both water-
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
walls and SH/RHs. During the clean-
ing process key variables to monitor
include: temperature, pH, total acidi-
ty measurements, analysis of Fe, Cr
and Ni ions, flow-rate measurements,
and continuous corrosion rate moni-
toring. These indicate end points
and also ensure that corrosion of the
base tubes (chemical cleaning dam-
age) does not take place.
For SH/RH tubing, oxide thickness
should be measured by ultrasonic
testing after the clean. This method
is described in more detail in
Chapter 9 of this volume. For confir-
mation, if needed, a sample or sam-
ples can be removed to determine
the efficacy of the cleaning process.
Typically this might include at least
one sample of each material type in
the circuits cleaned. A suitable tar-
get might be less than 5mm of
remaining scale. Post-clean flow ver-
ification is also important, particular-
ly if the chemical clean was trig-
gered by a boiler tube failure that
was caused by tube blockage. Such
verification is often performed by
running water of changing tempera-
ture through the affected circuits
and verifying that all tubes have
proper circulation. Monitoring of the
changing temperature of the tube is
generally done by “hand check”, but
verification can also be performed
with thermal monitoring devices.
4.3.7 Case study of SH chemical
cleaning. The discussion of short-
term overheating failures in Chapter
36, Volume 3 contains a case study
of chemical cleaning of a number of
secondary superheaters in one
plant. The sequence included devel-
oping the proper solvents, on-line
monitoring during the cleaning
process and post-clean analysis of
results. The superheater contained
both ferritic and austentitic stainless
steels and the cleaning process
showed excellent results for both:
complete cleaning in T12 and T22
and cleaning of the outer of two lay-
ers of oxide in Type 304. Over 150
kg (330 lbs.) of iron were removed
from each unit during the chemical
cleaning process.8
4-7
Table 4-4
Direct Effects on BTF Mechanisms from Unit Transients
Chapter, Vol.
For Additional
Mechanism Unit Cycling or Transient Effect Information

Corrosion fatigue Startups induce temperature differences between tube and attachment. Also, major 13, Vol. 2
pH transients occur during shutdown and early start-ups (under both AVT and
phosphate treatments)

Supercritical waterwall A proposed contributor is thermal cycles introduced by unit cycling 19, Vol. 2
cracking

Economizer inlet header Introduction of cold feedwater into a hot header during transient operations, 20, Vol. 2
cracking by thermal fatigue particularly startup and shutdown

Short-term overheating Poor drum level control during transients, particularly startup, can lead to a steam 23, Vol. 2
in waterwalls bubble passing down the downcomer and subsequent tube blow out.

Fatigue in water-touched tubing Attachment or header related fatigue failures can be driven by thermally-induced 26, Vol. 3
stresses that result from cycling operation.

Pitting in water-touched tubing Poor shutdown procedures can lead to formation of stagnant, oxygenated water 27, Vol. 2
which is the primary cause of pitting damage.

Acid dewpoint corrosion Flue gases pass through temperature regime where economizer is below dewpoint 30, Vol. 2

SH/RH fireside corrosion Load changes can lead to breakdown of oxide scale, particularly in austenitic 33 & 34,
steels enhancing corrosion, sulfidation and carburization of the alloy. Vol. 3

Dissimilar metal weld failures Change to cycling operation is a major contributor to DMW damage increases 35, Vol. 3

Short-term overheating in • Exfoliated scale is a major root cause; formation and exfoliation of scale is a 36, Vol. 3
steam-touched tubes normal and expected process that is accelerated by thermal transients.
• Improper shutdown and startup of unit (condensate collection in SH/RH bends)

Fatigue in steam-touched tubing Attachment or header related fatigue failures can be driven by thermally-induced 39, Vol. 3
stresses that result from cycling operation.

Pitting in steam-touched tubing Primary cause is poor shutdown and layup procedures that allow stagnant 41, Vol. 3
condensate to form.

4.4 Chemical Cleaning in FBC
Units
Chemical cleaning guidance for
FBC units is not as well established
as for conventional units, and there
is a degree of concern that some-
what stricter requirements may be
needed because of the higher heat
transfer rates and horizontal tubing.9
As a result, it has been recommend-
ed that the guidance summarized
above for conventional units be
used for decisions about chemical
cleaning of FBC units until such time
as a data base of experience with
FBC units can be compiled and
evaluated.
4.5 Start-up, Shutdown,
Cycling, and Unit Transients
Startup, shutdown, cycling and other
unit transients place great demands
throughout a unit; boiler tubing is no
exception. These unit transients allow
for both (i) mechanical attack caused
by increased or cyclic stresses/ther-
mal cycles and (ii) chemical attack
as control of cycle chemistry is
markedly more difficult, of boiler
tubes. Table 4-4 provides a list of the
BTF failure mechanisms that are
exacerbated by the direct and the
mechanical effects of cycling.
Perhaps more insidious is that dur-
ing both cycling and peaking opera-
tion, a substantial amount of time is
spent at low-load or during startup
and shutdown, sometimes under

4-8 The Effects of Unit and Boiler Operation and Maintenance on BTF
short-term lay-up modes, when
cycle chemistry and corrosion are
difficult to control. Feedwater and
boiler water chemistry during startup
depends on: type of startup (cold,
warm, or hot); cleanliness of the unit
and hideout; effectiveness of blow-
down, oxygen removal, and scav-
enging; and unit design (conden-
sate polishing, bypass system,
etc.).10
Hideout and return of phosphate is a
major contributor to acid phosphate
corrosion as discussed in Chapter 3
of this volume. Also the associated
low pH (7-8) during the shutdown
and early start-up periods is a major
influence on corrosion fatigue. At
low load, deaeration in the con-
denser and deaerator is less effec-
tive, leading to increased oxygen
ingress during startup. Iron concen-
trations, pH in the feedwater and
boiler water, and silica concentration
in drum boilers are also major con-
cerns.
These problems contribute particu-
larly to the underdeposit corrosion
mechanisms in waterwalls: hydrogen
damage, caustic gouging, and acid
phosphate corrosion. However, as
Tables 3-1a and 3-1b showed, many
other failure mechanisms are influ-
enced by poor cycle chemistry and
control.
There are, as yet, no generally
accepted guidelines for startup,
cycling and peaking. Target values
and action levels have not yet been
established, unlike normal operating
conditions under all major cycle
chemistry regimes as discussed in
Chapter 3.
4.6 Lay-Up
Improper shutdown and layup pro-
cedures can affect components
throughout the unit. Boiler tube fail-
ure mechanisms that are directly
affected by improper layup include
pitting in water-touched tubing
(Chapter 27, Volume 2), and pitting
in the SH/RH (Chapter 41, Volume
3). Pitting can also be a precursor to
corrosion fatigue (Chapter 13,
Volume 2). A host of other BTF are
exacerbated during startup after an
improper layup which can generate
excessive amounts of metal oxides,
and contaminate layup water with
oxygen and carbon dioxide.
Every utility should have written pro-
cedures to cover unit lay-up for units
returned to service: (i) within 72
hours, (ii) within seven days, and (iii)
for long-term storage.
Alternatives for boiler lay-up
include9:
• A wet layup with a pH of 10.0
achieved with ammonia, 200 ppm
of hydrazine, and condensate-
quality water plus a pressurized
nitrogen blanket;
• A wet layup with treated good-
quality boiler water of the same
chemical composition as that
used during operation without any
chemical additives; or
• A dry layup in which a hot boiler
is drained and purged with nitro-
gen or dehumidified air.
Wet layup is often used when the
boiler may need to be returned to
service on relatively short notice.11
Circulation is maintained, a head
tank used, or positive nitrogen pres-
sure maintained throughout the shut-
down with water at normal operating
levels.
There should be no difference in the
level of protection provided by any
of the methods; the differences are
in the cost of layup chemicals,
preparation and maintenance. The
advantages and disadvantages of
the options are shown in Table 4-5.
Although lay-up with clean, dry,
dehumidified air is seldom used in
U.S. units, it can offer significant
benefit particularly where pitting or
generalized corrosion during layups
has been a problem. All layup con-
ditions should be monitored to
ensure that layup water or air quality
is being maintained. Table 4-6
shows the recommended monitoring
schedule.
Additional information about unit
layup practices can be found in the
ASME Consensus of Current
Practices for Lay Up of Industrial
and Utility Boilers12, and in refer-
ences 9, 13, and 14.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
4.7 Commissioning
The lessons learned from analysis of
boiler tube failures in existing units
can offer significant guidance about
activities that should be performed
prior to new unit operation to prevent
future boiler tube failures. This is an
important and comprehensive sub-
ject, about which only a few key
points are made here. Some of the
activities that the BTF Team should
ensure happen on a new unit
include:
• Verify boiler tube materials using
in situ sampling to confirm com-
position.
• Take sections of each type of tub-
ing (archiving) for future baseline
material properties for remaining
life calculations.
• Establish wall thicknesses by sur-
veying unit prior to commissioning
in order to establish a baseline for
future reference.
• Commissioning of cycle chemistry
starting with the measurement of
mechanical carryover and then
developing the optimum boiler
chemistry, followed by the opti-
mum feedwater chemistry. This
topic is addressed in consider-
able detail in Chapter 3.
• Place comprehensive instrumen-
tation to monitor combustion con-
ditions, including at a minimum:
gas and tube temperatures, gas
compositions, coolant flows, and
heat fluxes.
• Place thermocouples across the
SH/RH in the vestibule and fur-
nace to monitor the temperatures
of superheater and reheater
tubes.
• If early measured temperatures
vary significantly from design
temperatures, an evaluation of the
significance should be performed
immediately. A 10°C temperature
difference at superheater temper-
atures can result in a factor of two
on corrosion and creep life.14
4-9
Table 4-5
Boiler Layup Procedures: Advantages and Disadvantages
Method Advantages Disadvantages

Wet storage with ammonia/
hydrazine solutions
(requires nitrogen blanket)
• No concern about relative humidity.
• Easily maintained.
• Easily tested
• With proper installation, leaks can easily be
detected.
• Superheaters and reheaters may be stored safely.
• If facilities are installed, solution may be reused.
• Possible pollution when draining.
• Need to recirculate regularly.
• Hydrazine is a possible carcinogen.
• High water consumption prior to startup; solution
must be drained and boiler possibly rinsed.
• Regular monitoring required.
• Ammonia must not be added if copper or copper
alloys are present in system.
• Tight isolations are prerequisite.
• Not recommended if freezing may occur.
• Draining, if work is to be carried out.
• Pure water (demin) must be used.

Wet storage with • Fast return to service. • Possible impurity inleakage.

good quality boiler water • Easily maintained.
and no chemical additions • Easily tested.

Dry with nitrogen • System need not be completely dry. • Very dangerous; asphyxiation of workers if not
• Completely independent of climatic conditions. properly vented.
• May be used as a capping of normal operating • Preferably carried out while system is being
fluid during outages. drained.

Dry with dehumidified air
• Readily available basic constituent. • Drying equipment and blowers required.
• Maintenance on plant performed without • Climatic conditions may cause rapid deterioration
problems. in storage conditions.
• Easy monitoring. • Hermetic sealing may be required to prevent such
• No risk to personnel. deterioration.
• Whole plant may be stored dry if drainable or • System must be completely dry.
dryable. • Sediment may cause corrosion if hydroscopic.
• Independent of ambient temperature if air dry • SO2 and dust must be excluded from the air used.
enough. • If work to be carried out on part of dried system,
• Residual heat in boiler steelwork utilized for that part of system must be isolated and redried
drying. afterwards.
• Even draining hot and under pressure does not
ensure complete water removal.

Adapted from: A.F. Aschoff and O. Jonas9

4-10 The Effects of Unit and Boiler Operation and Maintenance on BTF
• Since there will be early failures of Table 4-6
instrumentation, need to relate Layup Monitoring
actual measurements, while they
are available, to instrumentation Method Parameter Short Layup Long Layup
readings used for operating the
boiler. Wet layup Nitrogen pressure C or S C or D
• Performing a cold air velocity test
in the clean unit to ensure that Water pH D M
there are no locally high velocity
areas as a means of flyash ero- Ammonia (NH3) D M
sion control. This test is
described in detail in Chapter 14, Hydrazine (N2H4) D M
Volume 2.
• Increasing surveillance of welds. Dissolved oxygen D M
Some utilities have gone to 100%
inspection of waterwall welds. Dry layup with nitrogen Nitrogen pressure C or S C or D

Water in drains —— M

Amount of vapor-phase —— M
inhibitors

Preservation / corrosion —— M
of turbine and other
machinery

Dry layup with Relative humidity

dehumidified air

Note: C = continuous; S = every shift; D = daily; M = monthly

Sources: A.F. Aschoff and O. Jonas9; Aschoff, A.F., Y.H. Lee, D.M. Sopocy, and O. Jonas10

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 4-11

4.8 References
1Bartholomew, R.D, W.E. Chesney, R.D. Hopkins, J.S.
Poole, J.W. Siegmund, J.P. Williams, and S. Yorgiadis,
Guidelines for Chemical Cleaning of Fossil-Fueled
Steam-Generating Equipment, Research Project 2712-
06, Final Report TR-102401, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, June, 1993.
2Mann,
G.M.W., “Water Chemistry for Older High
Pressure Boilers: CEGB Experience”, Proceedings of the
American Power Conference, Volume 45, 1983, pp.
1005-1009.
3Personal
Communication from A. Bursik to R.B. Dooley,
June, 1995.
4McCloskey, T.H. and C. Bellanca, “Minimizing the
Effects of Solid Particle Erosion in Utility Steam Turbines”,
in S.R. Murphy, ed., Solid Particle Erosion of Steam
Turbine Components: 1989 Workshop, held in New
Orleans, LA, March 7-9, 1989, Research Project 1885-6,
Report GS-6535, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, September, 1989, pp. 1-2 through 1-12.
5Shalvoy,
R.S., W.J. Sumner, T. McCloskey, and C.
Bellanca, “Measurements of Solid Particles in an
Operating Steam Turbine”, ibid., pp. 2-1 through 2-20.
6Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
7Harth, G.H. and M.R. Richner, “Assess the Remaining
Life of High Temperature Boiler Parts”, Power, Vol. 129,
August, 1985, p. 70.
4-12 The Effects of Unit and Boiler Operation and Maintenance on BTF
8Angeli,F., V. Grillo, G. Mantini, and P.V. Scolari, “Boiler
SH Tube Failures in ENEL’s Supercritical Fossil Units Due
to Oxide Descaling of Stainless Steel”, in R.B. Dooley
and A. Bursik, eds., Interaction of Iron-Based Materials
with Water and Steam: Proceedings of an International
Conference, held in Heidelberg, Germany, June 3-5,
1992, Electric Power Research Institute, Report TR-
102101, Palo Alto, CA, 1992, pp. 7-1 through 7-20.
9Aschoff, A.F. and O. Jonas, Guidelines on Cycle
Chemistry for Fluidized-Bed Combustion Plants,
Research Project 979-29, Final Report TR-102976,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
September, 1993.
10Aschoff,A.F., Y.H. Lee, D.M. Sopocy, and O. Jonas,
Interim Consensus Guidelines on Fossil Plant Cycle
Chemistry, Research Project 2712-1, Final Report CS-
4629, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
June, 1986.
11Twigg,R.J., “Mothballing - The Impossible Solution?”,
Conference on Fossil Plant Layup and Reactivation, held
in New Orleans April 14-15, 1992, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA.
12American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Consensus
of Current Practices for Lay Up of Industrial and Utility
Boilers, ASME, New York, 1985.
13Abraham, R.S., Long-Term Layup of Fossil Plants,
Research Project 1266-38, Final Report CS-5112, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1987.
14Central Electricity Generating Board, Long Term
Storage of Power Plants, General Considerations and
Preservation Techniques, Central Electricity Generating
Board, April, 1978.
 1. BTF
ID #
BOILER TUBE FAILURE REPORT
2. Date
detected
3. Load at
Failure
Chapter 5 • Volume 1
Spent by Unit # Failure # Year Month Day Time NMW

4. Unit unavailable 6. ( ) Repaired during outage for other equipment failure.

due to BTF 7. ( ) Repaired during scheduled maintenance outage
Year Month Day Time
8. Generation loss mWhs

Company-Wide Programs
5. Unit available
BTF repaired
9. ( ) Was Unit's Boiler Inspector Called.
10. ( ) Was BTF Team Leader Called.
11. Operating conditions at failure - fuel, burners, slag, etc

12. BTF inspected by:

FAILURE LOCATION:*
13. ( ) WATERWALL (A)

for the Correction,

( ) Furnace Front Wall (01) ( ) Backpass Front Wall (06)
( ) Furnace Rear Wall (02) ( ) Backpass Rear Wall (07)
( ) Furnace Right Side Wall (03) ( ) Backpass Right Side Wall (08)
( ) Furnace Left Side Wall (04) ( ) Backpass Left Side Wall (09)
( ) Furnace Roof Tubes (05) ( ) Backpass Roof Tubes (10)
( ) Other (11)

( ) ECONOMIZER (B) ( ) SUPERHEATER (C) ( ) REHEATER (D)

( ) First Section (01) ( ) Primary (1) ( ) Primary
( ) Second Section (02) ( ) Secondary (2) ( ) Secondary (2)
( ) Third Section (03) ( ) Pendant (01) ( ) Pendant (01)
( ) Other ( ) Division Panel (02) ( ) Other

Prevention and Control of

(04) ( ) Platen (03) (02)
( ) Other
(04)
( ) OTHER (E)

Boiler Tube Failures

5.1 Introduction the root causes and strategies to

There are many technical answers
that will provide guidance in pre-
venting and correcting BTF; never-
theless, the evidence is pervasive
that the utilities with formalized,
company-wide programs and a
commitment to reducing BTF have
been the ones that garnered the
most significant benefits from the
technical experience base. This
brief chapter reviews the key, pri-
marily non-technical, elements of
the successful utility programs for
the prevention, correction, and con-
trol of BTF.
Improvements of 1 to 11/2% reduc-
tion in the equivalent availability loss
for a unit are achievable through the
implementation of a formalized pro-
gram for BTF avoidance.
Furthermore, continual, formalized
programs show continued long-term
improvement in availability.
5.2 Formalizing a Program
for Correction, Prevention
and Control
Without specific directives, it can be
very difficult for operating personnel
to convince system control person-
nel about significant conditions in
the unit that are “harmful” to boiler
tubes in the same way as vibrations
are harmful to the turbine. An exam-
ple is hydrogen damage which is
perhaps the most insidious of all
repeat BTF mechanisms because
eliminate it have been well known
for more than a decade. Yet without
a directive that indicates specific
procedures, such as shutdown of
the boiler if it has been steaming at
or near full load for over an hour at a
pH below 8, followed by chemical
cleaning as soon as possible, oper-
ating personnel at many utilities
might have trouble avoiding the oth-
erwise preventable problem with
hydrogen damage.
A useful classification of parameters
influencing boiler tube failures has
been: maintenance-controllable,
operator-controllable, engineering-
controllable, and management-con-
trollable.1 The key recognition pro-
vided in such a schema is that spe-
cific activities, choices and controls
within the job function of a variety of
utility personnel will affect the occur-
rence of BTF. Training and clear
directive is critical for each group to
have an appropriate role in prevent-
ing BTF.
Three aspects needed, and most
often lacking, in any formalized pro-
gram are discussed in the following
subsections: (i) formal corporate
directives or a “philosophy state-
ment” to provide action-oriented
directives, (ii) forming a multidiscipli-
nary team to solve BTF and the
training of these personnel, and (iii)
the comprehensive reporting and
trending of BTF. Additional critical

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 5-1

success factors for any formalized
program include topics that are
addressed elsewhere in this book:
identifying root cause, determining
the residual life of damaged tubing,
and applying permanent engineer-
ing solutions to problems identified.
There clearly needs to be a respon-
sible and accountable person in
each power plant, whose specific
task is to coordinate all BTF investi-
gations.
There are many interfaces of such a
formal program with other topics dis-
cussed in this book. For example,
Chapter 3 of this Volume empha-
sized the need to allow operating
personnel to direct unit activities so
as to set and achieve cycle chem-
istry action levels. Actions include:
application of permanent engineer-
ing solutions, development of “con-
trollable” procedures, and the use of
instrumentation for monitoring critical
control parameters. Similarly, as dis-
cussed at length in Chapter 4, it is
critical that maintenance control pro-
cedures and practices become
incorporated into any BTF reduction
program.
5.2.1 Corporate directives/philoso-
phy statement. The most important
step in implementing an effective
BTF reduction program is to develop
and issue a corporate philosophy
statement signed by senior manage-
ment. The statement provides corpo-
rate direction and support for all
functional groups within the utility to
engage in activities specifically tar-
geted to reducing BTF and the asso-
ciated costs. It should provide short-
and long-term goals, and must also
provide direction for the necessary
corrective and preventative actions
necessary to reduce repeat failures.
Table 5-1 lists typical examples of
statements that have been found to
be effective.
It has been repeatedly shown that a
clear corporate policy, signed at the
highest possible level in the utility,
provides the needed mandate for
good unit operating practices. With
such a statement, operating person-
nel then have support at all levels
5-2 Company-Wide Programs for the Correction, Prevention and Control of BTF
Table 5-1
Examples of Boiler Tube Failure (BTF) Philosophy Statements
1. Every BTF will be reported and documented by responsible, trained personnel in a comprehen-
sive format describing: specific boiler and tube locations; failure mechanisms and root causes;
repair and welding procedure; and the solution applied.
2. Every BTF problem will be defined and reported in terms of magnitude, historical trend and
cost (MWh loss).
3. Every BTF problem will be analyzed by an assigned, responsible, trained, full-time team of
personnel (The BTF Team). Some key failures will require metallurgical analysis.
4. Every BT failure will require a pre-repair inspection to determine the failure mechanism, the
extent of damaged tubing, and whether tube samples are required for root cause analysis.
5. Every BT repair will be inspected and/or tested to verify tube pressure integrity before repair is
considered complete.
6. Every BT repair will include quality assurance provisions for welder and inspector certification,
welding materials, and selection of tube material.
7. Every BT problem and failure report will be centrally processed.
8. All scheduled major boiler inspections will include boiler tube wall-thickness measure-
ments in areas experiencing erosion or corrosion damage.
9. All modes of boiler operations including start-up, load change, planned or immediate
removal from service, and layup will be controlled by established steam-tube metal tempera-
tures, cycle chemistry quality limits, and action-oriented procedures.
10. Use of palliative tube fireside erosion or corrosion protection methods, such as shields,
plasma or metal spraying are discouraged. Reduction of rates of damage by correcting the root
cause is preferred.
11. Use of pad welding or window weld repairs is appropriate only when replacement tubing is not
available. When they are used, they should be replaced at the next scheduled outage.
across the utility to execute the nism (see Volumes 2 and 3 of this
actions needed to understand fully book) provides a specific list of the
the BTF mechanism and root cause steps required from the BTF Team in
and provide permanent operating dealing with a BTF, or with a unit
solutions. As an example, such a precursor that could lead to a BTF.
formal statement will provide the
necessary support to take a unit off The Actions include: identifying the
underlying mechanism and its root
line in the case of a contaminant
excursion. cause(s), determining the extent of
damage, and implementing immedi-
ate and long-term solutions. The
5.2.2 Multidisciplinary approach
and personnel training. It is impor- BTF Team will also have responsibil-
ity for determining what ramifica-
tant that all functional groups (main-
tenance, engineering, operations, tions to other parts of the unit may
chemical, and management, at a be implied by an incidence of BTF,
minimum) understand the implica- and conversely, what unit precur-
tions of their actions on the overall sors may eventually lead to a prob-
goals set in a BTF control program. lem with a specific BTF mechanism.
The development of a “BTF Program The Actions prescribed for each
Team” which can respond quickly to mechanism are thus addressed to
any incidents is critical. The Actions the BTF Team for execution.
portion of each individual mecha-
5.2.3 Comprehensive reporting and
trending of BTF. A standardized
report form, such as shown in
Figure 5-1, along with a means to
store, evaluate and disseminate
information about BTF is required.
This will help in diagnosing BTF out-
breaks, judging the efficacy of
imposed solutions, and predicting
future problems.
5.3 Does it Work? Results
from Field Application
Formal BTF programs, consisting of
the above attributes, have been criti-
cally evaluated in several multi-utility
demonstration projects. As has been
widely reported, a number of bene-
fits have been derived.1 The most
easily measured has been a signifi-
cant improvement in availability. As a
result of boiler tube failure reduction
programs (BTFRP) started at ten
utilities in 1986 and an additional six
utilities in 1988, substantial availabil-
ity improvement has been achieved
as was shown in Figure 1-4.
A target of 1.45% availability loss
due to all BTF causes was derived
from the goals of the initial group of
ten participating utilities and has
nearly been achieved. These ten
utilities represent about 44,000 MW.2
The only year which showed an
increase in BTF was 1989, due to
hydrogen damage in a single unit.
The second group of six have about
16,000 MW of capacity. It is esti-
mated that the total dollar savings
represented by these sixteen partici-
pating utilities during the period
from 1986 through 1992 was about
$ 500 million, with markedly better
availability improvements than the
national average for coal-fired units
greater than 200 MW.
Analysis of the results from such for-
malized programs has led to the
development of the following list of
factors that the most successful util-
ity programs have included3:
• An emphasis on the importance
of a corporate directive reflecting
continued management support
of BTF Team activities. This
should be renewed and signed
on at least two year intervals to
take account of personnel
changes at all levels.
• An emphasis on the importance
of a multifunctional team, i.e., BTF
are not just a maintenance prob-
lem.
• A recognition that the long-term
view of failure prevention is cost-
effective. More specifically, “quick
fixes” and palliative solutions to
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
BTF outbreaks, except in an
emergency to get a unit back on-
line under conditions of duress,
are to be avoided and will only
result in repeat failures.
• Training of key personnel is cen-
tral to the success of the program
and is a continual process with
the addition of new program per-
sonnel. Again, the maximum time
between training sessions should
be limited to two years.
• The necessary technical under-
standing and the solutions
needed to mitigate outbreaks of
BTF are available, and if applied
can prevent the problem of
repeat boiler tube failures.
• Remaining life assessment for
damaged tubes is a critical part
of the successful utility BTF
analysis and prevention pro-
grams.
• A detailed walkdown of a boiler
by trained staff is essential to
detect developing or emerging
problems such as: sootblower
erosion, flyash erosion, and
cracking in locations with known
thermal restraint, etc.4
5-3
 BOILER TUBE FAILURE REPORT
1. BTF 2. Date 3. Load at
ID # detected Failure
Spent by Unit # Failure # Year Month Day Time NMW

4. Unit unavailable 6. ( ) Repaired during outage for other equipment failure.

due to BTF 7. ( ) Repaired during scheduled maintenance outage
Year Month Day Time

5. Unit available 8. Generation loss mWhs

BTF repaired
9. ( ) Was Unit's Boiler Inspector Called.
10. ( ) Was BTF Team Leader Called.
11. Operating conditions at failure - fuel, burners, slag, etc

12. BTF inspected by:

FAILURE LOCATION:*
13. ( ) WATERWALL (A)
( ) Furnace Front Wall (01) ( ) Backpass Front Wall (06) 14. ASSEMBLY NUMBER
( ) Furnace Rear Wall (02) ( ) Backpass Rear Wall (07) ( ) From Left (A)
( ) Furnace Right Side Wall (03) ( ) Backpass Right Side Wall (08) ( ) From Right (B)
( ) Furnace Left Side Wall (04) ( ) Backpass Left Side Wall (09)
( ) Furnace Roof Tubes (05) ( ) Backpass Roof Tubes (10) 15. TUBE NUMBER
( ) Other (11) ( ) From Top (A)
( ) From Bottom (B)
( ) From Front (C)
( ) ECONOMIZER (B) ( ) SUPERHEATER (C) ( ) REHEATER (D) ( ) From Rear (D)
( ) First Section (01) ( ) Primary (1) ( ) Primary ( ) From Right Side (E)
( ) Second Section (02) ( ) Secondary (2) ( ) Secondary (2) ( ) From Left Side (F)
( ) Third Section (03) ( ) Pendant (01) ( ) Pendant (01)
( ) Other ( ) Division Panel (02) ( ) Other 16. DISTANCE ALONG TUBE IN FEET
(04) ( ) Platen (03) (02) ( ) From Roof (A)
( ) Other ( ) From Bottom Bend (B)
(04) ( ) From Front Wall (C)
( ) OTHER (E) ( ) From Front Bend (D)
( ) From Rear Bend (E)
FAILURE OCCURRED AT:
17. WELD 18. ATTACHMENT 19. TUBING
( ) Header-Nipple (A) ( ) Seal (A) ( ) Vertical Straight Run (A)
( ) Dissimiliar Metal (B) ( ) Support (B) ( ) Horizontal Straight Run (B)
( ) Previous Repair (C) ( ) Spacer (C) ( ) U-bend (C)
( ) Construction (D) ( ) Tie Weld (D) ( ) Near Sootblower (D)
( ) Other (E) ( ) Membrane (E) ( ) Above Burners (E)
( ) Other (F) ( ) Other (F)
20. FAILURE DESCRIPTION EXTERNAL TUBE 21. FAILURE DESCRIPTION INTERNAL TUBE
( ) Fish-mouth Appearance (A) ( ) Thick Edged Fracture (I) ( ) Crater-like Appearance (A)
( ) Blister Appearance (B) ( ) Pinhole Fracture (J) ( ) Red. Rusty Appearance (B)
( ) Gouged Appearance (C) ( ) Window Opening Fracture (K) ( ) Thick Deposits (C)
( ) Alligator Hide Appearance (D) ( ) Thick Edged Cracks (L) ( ) Heavily Etched Surface (D)
( ) Crazed Cracking Appearance (E) ( ) Hard, Dark Ash Deposits (M) ( ) Gouged Appearance (E)
( ) Longitudinal Fracture (F) ( ) Flat Spots Adjacent to Fracture (N) ( ) Other (F)
( ) Circumferential Fracture (G) ( ) Oxide Coated Fracture Surfaces (P)
( ) Thin Edged Fracture (H) ( ) Severe Localized Deformation (Q)
( ) Other (R)
22. Original Inches nominal 24. Failed Inches nominal
Tube O.D. Tube O.D.
23. Original Inches nominal 25. Failed Inches nominal
Tube Wall Tube Wall

26. Failed Tube Material__________________ 27. ( ) Material determined from specs. 28. ( ) Material determined by test
29. ( ) Was NDE used during inspection. 30. NDE method and equipment__________________________________________
31. Secondary Tube Failures_____________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________

* Boiler gasses flow from the Front of a boiler to the Rear.

Right and Left are determined with the observer looking from the rear toward the front.

Figure 5-1 A Sample BTF Report Form.

5-4 Company-Wide Programs for the Correction, Prevention and Control of BTF

( ) Short-term Overheat
( ) Hi-temp. Creep
( ) Dissimilar Weld
( ) Caustic Gouging
( ) Hydrogen Damage
( ) Pitting
( ) Acid Phosphate Corrosion
32. PRIMARY FAILURE MECHANISM:
( ) Stress Corrosion ( ) Slag Fall Erosion ( ) Chemical Cleaning
( ) Lo-temp. Corrosion ( ) Sootblower Erosion ( ) Material Defect
( ) WW Fireside Corrosion ( ) Coal Particle Erosion ( ) Weld Defect
( ) Coal SH/RH Fireside Corrosion ( ) Vibration Fatigue ( ) Graphitization
( ) Oil SH/RH Fireside Erosion ( ) Thermal Fatigue ( ) Erosion-Corrosion
( ) Fly Ash Erosion ( ) Corrosion Fatigue ( ) Rubbing/Fretting
( ) Chemical Cleaning ( ) Maintenance Damage

33. Secondary Contributing Mechanisms:

34. Suspected ROOT CAUSE of the failure mechanism_____________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
35. Verification of ROOT CAUSE during the BTF Outage___________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
36. Actions taken to correct ROOT CAUSE during BTF Outage______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

BFT REPAIR ACTIVITIES:

37. Replacement 38. Replacement

Tube O.D. Inches nominal Tube Wall Inches nominal

39. Replacement Tube Material________________ 40. ( ) Mtrl determined from specs. 41. ( ) Mtrl determined by test.

42. Tube Replaced Above or feet 43. Tube Replaced Below or feet
to Right of Fracture To Left of Fracture
44. Welding Procedure Specification Number____________________________________________________________________________
45. Post Weld Heat Treating Method_____________________________________________________________and Temperature_________
46. ( ) Was NDE used after weld? 47. NDE method. equipment. & inspector________________________________________________
48. Repairs by ( ) Welder's ID Letters__________(A) ( ) Contractor____________________. Welder_______________________________
49. Secondary Failures Repaired______________________________________________________________________________________

POST REPAIR ANALYSIS:

50. Verification of ROOT CAUSE after the BTF Outage_____________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
( ) Sample sent to lab for analysis?
51. Actions taken to correct ROOT CAUSE after BTF Outage________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
52. ( ) Recommendations for verification during next scheduled maintenance outage_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
53. ( ) Recommendations for correction activities during next scheduled maintenance outage____________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
54. ( ) Recommendations for Future Preventative Action___________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
55. ( ) Attachments, such as photos, copies of NDE reports, copies of lab analysis, etc.

FORM PREPARED BY:_________________________________________________________________________DATE:______________

STATION MANAGER:___________________________________________________________________________DATE:_____________

Send copy of this form and attachments to BTF Team Leader.

Figure 5-1 A Sample BTF Report Form (continued).

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 5-5

5.4 References
1Dimmer, J.P., G.A. Lamping, and O. Jonas, Boiler Tube
Failure: Correction, Prevention, and Control, Research
Project 1890-7, Final Report GS-6467, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, July, 1989.
2Dooley, R.B., “A Vision for Reducing Boiler Tube
Failures: Part II”, Power Engineering, May, 1992,
pp. 41-42.
3Dimmer, J.P., G.A. Lamping, O. Jonas, and R. Niebo,
Boiler Tube Failure Reduction Program, Research Project
1890-7, Final Report GS-7454, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, August, 1991.
4Personal Communication from D. Barnett (Pacific Power,
Australia) to R.B. Dooley, 2-17-95.

5-6 Company-Wide Programs for the Correction, Prevention and Control of BTF
 6A3 Deep etch at 6A1 Metallography
Chapter 6 • Volume 1
uncracked ligament at uncracked 6A1 Furnace
ligament side
A
6A3
6A

Dimensions,
microstructural
characterization,
alloy verification
A
Cracking Deposit
weight
Cracking

Dimensions, microstructural
6A2

characterization, alloy verification

Metallurgical Analysis

6.1 The Role of Metallurgical • To characterize the active degra-

Analysis for Analyzing Boiler
Tube Failures
The route to action for dealing with
boiler tube failures consists of three
primary steps: identifying the active
mechanism, identifying the relevant
root cause, and implementing per-
manent solutions. These steps are
emphasized throughout the discus-
sions of individual mechanisms in
Volumes 2 and 3. Metallurgical
analysis, the subject of this chapter,
is a vital part of the first key step:
confirming the correct mechanism.
Key objectives for the metallurgical
evaluation of boiler tube failures
include1:
• To identify properly the damage
and underlying failure mecha-
nism.
• To characterize the life-limiting
attributes of non-failed tubes so
that life prediction can be made
and predictive maintenance tech-
niques can be implemented.
• To detect the early signs of a
decreased life expectancy.
dation modes so that actions can
be taken to forestall failures.
• To use the metallurgical charac-
teristics of in-service tubing to
characterize the localized envi-
ronment, temperature, wastage
rate, and other key factors, so
that optimized redesigns can be
developed or so that the need for
replacement boiler tubing is doc-
umented.
• To develop databases of like fail-
ures to forecast failure rates. The
completed metallurgical evalua-
tion will confirm the failure mode.
The three key steps in the metallur-
gical examination process are1: (i)
Tube removal and documentation,
(ii) Collection and review of tube
operating conditions, (iii) Laboratory
metallurgical examination of tube
section. Each major step includes a
number of detailed substeps as
shown in Figure 6-1. This chapter
briefly reviews each action to be
taken.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 6-1

 Step 1.1 Identify failed or degraded Step 3.3 Visual and other non-destructive
tube sample examinations and photographs of as-
received condition

Step 1.2 Enter location of tube into the boiler

tube tracking report form or computer Step 3.4 Ring samples removed for
program dimensional measurements

Step 1.3 Mark and photo-document the tube

prior to its removal (gas flow, fluid Step 3.5 Samples removed for alloy verification
flow, assembly number, elevation,
boiler section)

Step 3.6 Prepare and evaluate metallographic

Step 1.4 Perform a visual examination of the samples
boiler in the vicinity of the tube

Step 3.7 Perform hardness measurements

Step 1.5 Remove the tube

Step 3.8 Determine the steamside oxide scale

Step 1.6 Package and transport the tube to thickness and morphology (steam-
the metallurgical laboratory touched tubes)

Step 2.1 Prepare a background information
package including: sectional sideview
with tube location, material
specifications, tube design and
operating pressure, and tube
operating hours
Step 3.9 Determine the composition,
morphology and extent of waterside
deposits/scale (waterwall tubes only)
Step 3.10 Characterize the external scale/ash
deposit and morphology of external
surface

Step 3.1 Tube log-in

Step 3.11 Prepare metallurgical report and use

of results by BTF Team

Step 3.2 Prepare a metallurgical evaluation

plan

Figure 6-1 Steps in a Metallurgical Analysis of Failed Boiler Tubing. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

6-2 Metallurgical Analysis

6.2 Identify Failed or Degraded
Tube Sample (Step 1.1, Figure
6-1)
Figure 6-2 shows field documenta-
tion of a burst superheater support
tube.

6.3 Enter Location of the Tube

into the Boiler Tube Tracking
Report or Computer Program
(Step 1.2)
This action is a critical part of the
overall program to address boiler
tube failures. The form, such as was
shown in Figure 5-1, is one aspect
of the formalized program for the
identification and correction of BTF
described in Chapter 5.

6.4 Mark and Photo-Document

the Tube Prior to its Removal
(Step 1.3) Figure 6-2. Documenting the field failure. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1
Information to be included: direction
of gas and fluid flows, assembly
number, row number, elevation,
boiler section, and an identification
number. Figure 6-3 shows a sample
of such a process.

6.5 Perform a Visual

Examination of the Boiler in
the Vicinity of the Failure
(Step 1.4)
The condition of nearby tubes, sup-
ports, attachments, sootblowers and
other potentially relevant factors
should be noted.

Figure 6-3. Identification of the gas flow and steam flow directions which should be
marked along with the tube identification number prior to its removal from the boiler.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 6-3

6.6 Remove the Tube
(Step 1.5)
Tube removal and shipping require-
ments are summarized in Table 6-1.
Equipment should be used that will
provide a high quality cut and will
minimize debris, such as electric or
air-powered reciprocating saws, or
grinders with thin cut-off wheels. It is
important that the amount of debris
entering vertical tubes be minimized
to avoid subsequent blockage and
tube failures by short-term overheat-
ing. This objective is usually accom-
plished by making the lower cut first
and blocking the tube. A three-foot
section of tubing is usually sufficient
for a full metallurgical examination.
6.7 Package and Transport the
Tube to the Metallurgical
Laboratory (Step 1.6)
6.8 Prepare a Background
Information Package for the
Tube (Step 2.1)
The typical information that should
be included as background is listed
in Table 6-2.
6.9 Tube Log-in (Step 3.1)
6.10 Prepare a Metallurgical
Evaluation Plan (Step 3.2)
After logging in the tube and associ-
ated samples from it, and providing
each with a unique identification
number and/or tag, a plan should be
prepared. A form, similar to that
shown in Figure 6-4 will aid in focus-
ing the investigation and specifying
the work to be performed.
6-4 Metallurgical Analysis
Table 6-1
Tube Sample Removal and Shipping Requirements
1. All samples should be saw cut with proper removal techniques to prevent debris from entering
the tubing and avoiding additional end preparation time.
2. All samples should be a minimum of 18 inches long. A 3-foot section is preferable.
3. The sample should be properly marked to indicate sample identification, gas flow direction, tube
orientation, etc.
4. The tube ends should be sealed with tape to prevent contamination or loss of deposits or scale.
5. An identification tag should be completed and attached to the sample.
6. A listing of all tube information should be completed and included as a packing list with the
samples.
7. A sturdy wooden crate should be used for shipment.
8. The tubes should be wrapped in a layer of polyethylene sheet with water absorbing desiccant
inside.
9. Each tube sample should be wrapped in clean rags or packing material to avoid damage during
shipment.
10. The crate should be shipped by air freight or equivalent. Experience has shown that shipping by
truck can sometimes take several weeks.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1
Table 6-2
Typical Boiler Tube Failure Background Information
1.* Sectional side drawing of boiler showing the location of each tube sample.
2.* Unit material drawing of superheater/reheater, etc. also showing the tube locations.
3.* Contract data sheet from the equipment vendor with specified tube material, dimensions, etc..
4.* Operating hours and total starts (hot, cold and warm) on the unit since commercial operation date.
5.* Last chemical clean of waterwall tubes.
6. Commercial operation date.
7. Total generation of unit since commercial operation date.
8. Expected future average operating load for unit.
9. Past tube failure history of unit.
10.* Cycle chemistry treatment if BTF is obviously from the inside of the tube. Detailed cycle
chemistry data will be needed later during the root cause analysis.
11. Any available tube failure reports.
12. Boiler maintenance records for the boiler section of concern including, for example,
replacements or modifications,
13. Previous remaining life studies performed on the section.
14. Any additional pertinent information on the unit.
* This information is required. Other items are desirable but not required.
Adapted from: S.R. Paterson, et al.1
6.11 Visual and Other Non-
Destructive Examination; Metallurgical Evaluation Form
Photo-Documentation of the
1. Log-in 6. Alloy Verification
As-Received Tube (Step 3.3)
2. As-received photos 7. Waterside deposit weight
Visual and macroscopic examination Black & white 8. Waterside deposit composition
of the failed tubing is an extremely Color 9. Fireside scale/deposit evaluation
important step. A preliminary diag- 3. Visual examination 10. Metallographic evaluation
nosis of the mechanism can often be
made using only macroscopic fea- 4. Ring samples and 11. Hardness measurements
dimensional measurements
tures. Tables 1-4 and 1-5 use such
features as an aid to lead the investi- 5. Steamside oxide scale 12. Other:
thickness measurements
gator to a preliminary diagnosis. The
Actions found in each mechanism
writeup also rely heavily on the 6A3 Deep etch at 6A1 Metallography
uncracked ligament at uncracked 6A1
analysis of macroscopic features. Furnace
ligament
A side
6A3
Important features include1: (i) mor- 6A
phology of the rupture (factors such
as thick- or thin-edged fracture sur-
face, pin-hole leak, longitudinal or
circumferential orientation to crack-
ing), (ii) thickness and color of any 6A2
A
deposits on both the inner and outer Dimensions, Cracking Deposit
Cracking
microstructural
surfaces, (iii) swelling, (iv) wall thin- characterization, 6A2 Metallography weight Dimensions, microstructural
ning, (v) pitting, (vi) the presence alloy verification fractography characterization, alloy verification
locally of welds, bends, and attach- Sectioning Plan Section A-A
ments. Visual examination should be
conducted with direct and oblique Job number: Circle rush items:
lighting; the latter can often highlight Laboratory number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
surface features.
Requestor: Rush items required by:
Further examination using a stere-
Date: All results required by:
obinocular microscope at magnifica-
tions up to around 70X can also be
useful.
Figure 6-4. Example of a boiler tube metallurgical evaluation laboratory request form
Documentation of important features Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1
should include: written descriptions
of the features observed, sketches,
and especially photographs. Scale
and magnification of the photo-
graphs should be indicated using a
ruler or other common object, such
as a coin. Color photography is use-
ful to show the color of waterside
scale, corrosion products, and ash
deposits.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 6-5

6.12 Ring Samples are
Removed for Dimensional
Measurements (Step 3.4)
Ring specimens should be cut from
the tube and measurements made
as shown in Figure 6-5. This step
can be critical in helping to distin-
guish between otherwise similar
mechanisms such as sootblower
erosion versus flyash erosion and
fireside corrosion versus long-term
overheating. A single ring or multiple
cross-sections may be required,
such as one from each side of a
material transition weld.
Wall thickness readings should be
taken at six or more locations
around the circumference. Depth of
corrosion pits can help judge where
minimum wall requirements have
been violated. Measurements of
inside and outside diameters can
help judge whether tube swelling
has occurred.
Measurements can be made with
any of a number of devices includ-
ing: rulers, calipers, or micrometers.
If access is not available for some
reason, ultrasonic measures of thick-
ness can be made. Additional detail
about such methods are available in
Chapter 9.
6.13 Alloy Verification
(Step 3.5)
It is important that tube material type
be verified. Wet chemical analysis is
often used to determine the elemen-
tal composition. A number of spec-
trochemical analysis techniques can
also be used for quantitative mea-
surements in which the intensities of
emission lines are proportional to the
amount of each element present.
6.14 Prepare and Evaluate
Metallographic Samples
(Step 3.6)
Metallography and the evaluation of
microstructural features are key
Actions in determining each active
boiler tube failure mechanism. Often
the thermal and/or mechanical his-
tory of the failed tube (and perhaps
more importantly, of those nearby
6-6 Metallurgical Analysis
A
F B
E C
D
Wall Thickness Inside Diameter
(inch) (inch)
Tube
Sample Nominal
Identification Material Dimensions A B C D E F AD BE CF
54-1 ASME 2.5" OD x 0.220 0.293 0.327 0.320 0.323 0.280 2.128 2.083 2.085
SA-210 0.300 MWT
54-2 ASME 2.5" OD x 0.293 0.305 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.313 1.947 1.935 1.935
SA-210 0.300 MWT
Figure 6-5. Ring section showing typical locations where wall thickness measurements
and inside diameter measurements should be made. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1
tubes which have not yet failed) can ing, usually) oxidation or other dam-
often be determined through metal- age is at its greatest and therefore
lographic analysis. the original characteristics indicative
of the mechanism of fracture can be
Such evaluations usually document
obliterated.5 Thus, it is normally
features such as1: (i) microstructure,
more fruitful to take micro-speci-
(ii) microstructural degradation
mens from the ends of the crack or
including degree of spheroidization
fracture surface where the damage
or graphitization, (iii) microstructural
will be less. It is, however, always
transformation, (iv) pit shape and
necessary to keep in mind that the
depth, (v) crack morphology, (vi)
mechanism may vary along the frac-
characteristics of internal and exter-
ture surface or crack. Fractography
nal scales or deposits (including
is essential to determine from sur-
thickness, color, and morphology), face topography any variations that
and (vii) the extent of cavitation may exist and often a range of
(transgranular, intergranular, and any microsections should be removed to
deformation involved).
verify mechanisms.5
Metallographic sections are gener-
Light microscopy is usually per-
ally taken on both the hot and cold
formed with bright-field illumination,
sides, at and away from the rupture
although various filters, polarizers,
or location of maximum damage.
and interference techniques can be
ASTM standards E32, E3403, and
used, as needed, to highlight partic-
E4074 cover specimen preparation. ular phases and structures.
It is not possible to indicate in detail Scanning electron microscopy
the approach necessary for any indi- (SEM) allows much higher magnifi-
vidual failure; it is, however, worth cations and provides a greater
pointing out that often in the middle depth of field so that irregular sur-
of a fracture (i.e., the origin of crack-
faces can be viewed directly without Midwall Hardness: HRB 68.7
metallographic preparation. These Steamside Oxide Thickness 0.0025"
features make SEM applicable to
viewing fracture surfaces, determin-
ing the mode of fracture (ductile or Midwall Hardness: Midwall Hardness:
HRB 70.7 HRB 69.7
brittle), and in some cases, the
Steamside Oxide Steamside Oxide
intensity and frequency of stresses Thickness 0.002" Thickness 0.0025"
driving a crack. A

Figure 6-6 shows a composite of F B

metallography information combined
with hardness and oxide thickness
measurements (the subjects of the
next two steps) to provide significant
E C
detail about a particular tube sample.
It is often necessary to etch the D
microstructure of a metallurgical Midwall Hardness: Midwall Hardness:
cross section. Compilations of useful HRB 71.5 HRB 71.2
etching reagents are available, Steamside Oxide Steamside Oxide
Thickness 0.002" Thickness 0.002"
including for the following materi-
als1, 6: (i) macroetches for ferritic
MAG: 1000X
tubing, (ii) macroetches for
austenitic tubing, (iii) microetches Midwall Hardness: HRB 72.2
Steamside Oxide Thickness 0.0015"
for ferritic tubing, (iv) microetches
for austenitic tubing, (v) microetches
for dissimilar metal welds (ferritic to Figure 6-6. Composite photograph showing the microstructure and results of corre-
austenitic), (vi) microetches for sponding measures of tube metal hardness and steamside oxide thickness around the
nickel/chromium alloys (Inconel, circumference of a tube. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1
Incoloy, etc), and (vii) microetches
for oxide scales. Sulfur print prepa-
ration used in fireside corrosion
analysis and electroless plating for
the edge preservation of metallo-
graphic mounts is also a required
and useful technique.7

6.15 Perform Hardness

Measurements (Step 3.7)
Microhardness or mid-wall Rockwell
hardness measurements can be
used as a further diagnostic.
Standard methods, for example
ASTM E108 and E189 for Brinell and
Rockwell hardness testing respec-
tively, and sample preparation tech-
niques are commonly available.

6.16 Determine the Steamside-

Oxide Scale Thickness and
Morphology (Steam-Touched
Tubes) (Step 3.8)
A tremendous amount of information
is contained in the steamside oxide Figure 6-7. The thickness of steamside oxide can be used to estimate the long-term
of SH and RH boiler tubes, Figure 6- temperature of the tube; the morphology provides an indication of the thermal history.
7. The thickness of the scale can be Here the scale is composed of a thick outer magnetite (Fe3O4) layer on top of alterna-
used to estimate the long-term ser- tive layers of Fe3O4 and (Fe, Cr, Mo)3O4 Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1
vice temperature of a tube and is a
critical part of the evaluation of

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 6-7

remaining life (see Chapter 8). The
ratio of steamside scale thickness to
wall loss (at one location around the
tube periphery) can be used to
determine whether fireside wastage
is more predominant than the growth
of internal steamside scale. This
determination can be a powerful aid
to sorting out the primary mecha-
nism for a particular tube failure. A
plot showing typical information
obtained is shown in Figure 6-8.
Finally, the morphology of the scale
may be used to answer a number of
questions including the thermal
cycling seen by the tube.
As with other evaluations, the thick-
ness and morphology of the internal
scale should be documented at mul-
tiple locations around the tube.
6.17 Characterize the
Composition, Morphology and
Extent of Waterside
Deposits/Scale (Step 3.9)
The analysis of internal deposits and
scale of water-touched tubing is a
primary means of distinguishing
among failure mechanisms and is
useful for determining whether there
are unit shortcomings such as exces-
sive feedwater corrosion products
and/or a need to chemically clean.
The metallographic analyses under-
taken in this step are key, not only in
assisting in the overall BTF analysis,
but also in providing “vital signs”
information on the condition of the
unit overall.
The total internal scale on water-
touched tubing, especially in high
heat flux areas, consists of two
parts: (i) protective Fe3O4 (typically
between 5 -10 mm) plus (ii) deposits
(which can be over 100 mm thick).
There is an important assessment
which is needed for each of these
parts.
As indicated in Chapter 2, assessing
the Fe3O4 indicates the level of pro-
tection afforded by the chemical
boiler treatment; the layer should be
uniform and continuous. What is its
general condition? Is it cracked,
6-8 Metallurgical Analysis
Wall Loss (inch)
0.20
Dominant mechanism
0.18 is fireside corrosion or
flyash erosion Dominant damage
0.16 mechanism is long
y=5x term overheating
0.14
0.12
y=3x
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
Typical sample
0.02
0
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Internal Scale Thickness (inch)
Finding Typical Cause
Wall loss <3 times the steam side Damage is primarily caused by long-term
oxide thickness overheating of the tube with or without
accelerated fireside oxidation, i.e. fireside
corrosion or flyash erosion are not dominant.
Wall loss >5 times the steamside oxide Damage is primarily a fireside process such
thickness as (i) fireside corrosion caused by molten alkali
salts or (ii) fireside erosion (flyash, sootblower,
or steam).
Note that if the problem is on the intrados of a bend, these ratios may not apply because
of the thinning caused by the bending fabrication process.
Figure 6-8. Typical plot showing the relationship between wall loss and steamside
oxide scale thickness. Rules of thumb for interpreting such plots is provided.
removed, missing in places? Is it involving either mechanical or
laminated, composed of alternating chemical solvent deposit removal.
porous and dense layers? Has it The deposits so removed are
been removed altogether and weighed. Chemical cleaning fre-
replaced by a corrosion product? quency can be triggered by the
amount of deposits accumulated, as
Evaluating the deposits which have
formed provides important supple- discussed in Chapter 4.
mental information to the chemical The deposits usually contain Fe3O4,
cleaning process. Two types of infor- copper, zinc, and nickel, as well as
mation which are particularly useful calcium, phosphorus, and other ele-
are the thickness of the deposits ments from water treatment prac-
and their composition/morphology. tice. The composition will help
As a rule of thumb, dividing the total determine the applicable solvent for
thickness of the deposit (in mm) by a the chemical clean. The distribution
factor of three gives the weight in of elements is also important; for
mg/cm2. This conversion is useful example, is all of the Cu towards the
because the extent of deposits is outside of the deposit or uniformly
generally determined by the meth- distributed throughout?
ods of ASTM Standard D348310,
Chemical analysis is generally per-
formed by energy dispersive x-ray
(EDX) spectroscopy or x-ray diffrac-
tion. The bulk deposits can be ana-
lyzed by EDX directly on a large
area of the tube or, for more detailed
analysis, on a cross-section through
the tube. X-ray diffraction can be
used to identify the specific com-
pounds that are present. The pat-
terns of diffraction of a sample, usu-
ally at least 1 mg, are compared to
known standard patterns for precise
identification. The common corro-
sion products are indicated through-
out the mechanism sections in
Volumes 2 and 3. Further informa-
tion, in the case of unidentified or
new compounds, is also extensively
available.1, 11
Carefully determining the morphol-
ogy of waterside deposits is the
most accurate means for distin-
guishing among the underdeposit
corrosion mechanisms: hydrogen
damage, acid phosphate corrosion,
and caustic gouging. Detail about
the three are found in Volume 2,
Chapters 15-17.
6.18 Characterize the Surface
Morphology of Fireside
Scale/Ash Deposit on Tube
(Step 3.10)
Judgment about fireside corrosion
mechanisms can be inferred from
knowledge of the fireside scale/ash
constituents. Typically this involves:
(i) examining the fireside scale and
ash layers metallographically, (ii)
determining their compositions by
spectrochemical analysis or x-ray
diffraction, (iii) determining the distri-
bution of constituents by EDX map-
ping, and/or (iv) atomic absorption
spectroscopy to determine the acid
or water soluble constituents within
each distinct layer, especially the
inner and intermediate layer(s), and
(v) measuring their melting tempera-
ture(s) by thermogravimetric analy-
ses (ASTM E113112) and/or differen-
tial thermal analysis (ASTM E79413).
For fireside corrosion the identifica-
tion of low-melting point compounds
in the ash is particularly illuminating.
Details can be found in Volume 2,
Chapter 18 and Chapters 33 and 34
in Volume 3.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
A sulfur print can be used to verify
the presence and locations of sulfur
in fireside deposits. This is done by
soaking photographic paper in a
weak sulfuric acid solution and hold-
ing a freshly cut ring sample against
the emulsion for several minutes.
Dark areas on the print, caused by
precipitation of silver sulfide on the
paper, correspond to the amount and
distribution of sulfur in the sample.
6.19 Preparation of a
Metallurgical Report (Step 3.11)
The findings of the metallurgical
analysis will be central to the boiler
tube failure team in confirming the
mechanism of failure, identifying
specific root causes and specifying
the applicable permanent solutions.
For this reason, the importance of
completing the metallurgical analy-
sis and transmitting the results in a
comprehensive and useful form
cannot be overstated.
6-9
6.20 References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
2American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E3-80 (1986), “Standard Methods of Preparation of
Metallographic Specimens”, 1994 Annual Book of ASTM
Standards, Volume 03.01, American Society for Testing
and Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1994.
3American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E340-87 (1987), “Standard Test Method for Macroetching
Metals and Alloys”, 1994 Annual Book of ASTM
Standards, Volume 03.01, American Society for Testing
and Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1994.
4American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E407-93 (1993), “Standard Practice for Microetching
Metals and Alloys”, 1994 Annual Book of ASTM
Standards, Volume 03.01, American Society for Testing
and Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1994.
5Personal Communication from K. Woolhouse (FCA,
Australia) to R.B. Dooley, February, 1995
6Vander Voort, G.F., Metallography Principles and
Practice, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1984.
7American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E1180-94 (1994), “Standard Practice for Preparing Sulfur
Prints for Microstructural Examination”, 1994 Annual Book
of ASTM Standards, Volume 03.01, American Society for
Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1994.
6-10 Metallurgical Analysis
8American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E10-93 (1993), “Standard Testing Method for Brinell
Hardness of Metallic Materials”, 1994 Annual Book of
ASTM Standards, Volume 03.01, American Society for
Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1994.
9American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E18-93 (1993), “Standard Test Methods for Rockwell
Hardness and Rockwell Superficial Hardness of Metallic
Materials”, 1994 Annual Book of ASTM Standards,
Volume 03.01, American Society for Testing and
Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1994.
10American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
D3483-83 (1990), “Standard Test Method for
Accumulated Deposition in a Steam Generator Tube”,
1992 Annual Book of ASTM Standards: Water, Volume
11.02, American Society for Testing and Materials,
Philadelphia, PA, 1992.
11Jonas, O. and A. Pebler, Characterization of Steam
Turbine Environment, Research Project 912-1, Final
Report CS-2391, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, 1984.
12American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E1131-86, “Standard Test Method for Compositional
Analysis by Thermogravimetry, 1992 Annual Book of
ASTM Standards: General Methods and Instrumentation,
Volume 14.02, American Society for Testing and
Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1992.
13American
Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E794-85 (1989), “Standard Test Method for Melting
Temperatures and Crystallization Temperatures by
Thermal Analysis, 1992 Annual Book of ASTM Standards:
General Methods and Instrumentation, Volume 14.02,
American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia,
PA, 1992.
 0.2
Steam Washed Superheater Tube Chapter 7 • Volume 1
Y = 5X
Flue gas flow
A
0.15

Distinguishing Features
F B
Wall Loss,Inch

Y = 3X
0.1 E C
FB
A D

of Some Mechanisms
0.05
DE
C
0
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Steamside Oxide Scale

with Similar
Thickness, Inch

Appearances
7.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to
define clear and distinguishing fea-
tures among several groups of
boiler tube failure mechanisms
which may have superficial similari-
ties. If the wrong mechanism is
identified, there is little chance that
the appropriate root cause and solu-
tion can ever be chosen. By bring-
ing together the various easily mis-
diagnosed mechanisms, it is hoped
that this problem will be avoided.
The information presented here
complements that which can be
found in the detailed discussion of
the individual mechanisms.
7.2 Waterside Underdeposit
Corrosion Mechanisms:
Hydrogen Damage, Caustic
Gouging, and Acid Phosphate
Corrosion
These three corrosion mechanisms
are superficially similar in appear-
ance; as a result, distinguishing
among them is not simple. For
example, all will have internal sur-
face gouges, often significant,
which often will be filled with thick
deposits. All three mechanisms will
generally occur in similar locations.
They are all waterside mechanisms,
found in waterwall tubes, generally
initiating on the fireside (hot side) of
the inside surface. They will all initi-
ate in locations where a deposit of
feedwater corrosion products has
occurred, generally as a result of
one or more of the flow disruptions
listed in Table 2-6. These are precur-
sors to all three waterside, underde-
posit corrosion mechanisms.
Table 7-1 lists some of the key char-
acteristics that can be used to dis-
tinguish among the three.
7.2.1. Features of the failure.
Macroscopically, hydrogen damage
will often be manifested by a thick-
edged, “window opening” failure
appearance. This is a result of weak-
ened base material and a resultant
brittle final failure. In contrast, caus-
tic gouging and acid phosphate cor-
rosion are not accompanied by
microstructural degradation, which
means that final failure is most often
ductile and will manifest itself as a
thin-edged or pin-hole failure.
7.2.2 Effect on oxide and character-
istic deposits. With hydrogen dam-
age, both the mechanism of mag-
netite growth and the rate are
affected. The rate of magnetite
growth changes from parabolic
(protective) to linear resulting in the
formation of thick multilayer scale of
porous and dense magnetite. This
scale may be missing after the fail-
ure as a result of the failure incident
itself, requiring additional means to
identify hydrogen damage.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 7-1

Table 7-1
Distinguishing Characteristics of Hydrogen Damage,Caustic Gouging and Acid Phosphate Corrosion
Characteristic Hydrogen Damage Caustic Gouging Acid Phosphate Corrosion

Features of Failure • Gouged areas, thick deposits. • Gouged areas; thick, adherent • Gouged areas; thick, loose
• Thick-edged often “window opening” deposits. deposits.
failure appearance. • Ductile, thin-edged or pin-hole • Ductile, thin-edged or pin-hole
• Brittle failure. failure. failure.

Effect on oxide and
characteristic deposits
• Oxide growth under stress leads to
thick, multilayer scale (alternating
layers of porous and dense mag-
netite) which may be missing as
a result of failure incident.
• Caustic concentrates at base of
deposit and leads to dissolution of
protective oxide via “fluxing”.
• Deposit usually contains distinctive
crystals of sodium ferroate and/or
sodium ferroite.
• Acid phosphate chemicals concen-
trate at base of deposit and lead to
dissolution of protective oxide
(fluxing).
• Two or three distinct layers of
which the inner layer (white, gray,
and speckled with red) is maricite
(NaFePO4).

Key microstructural • Intergranular microfissures in base
feature tube material linking to form cracks.
• Decarburization at inner surface.
• Multi-laminated, non-protective
oxide sometimes containing
chloride.
• Material removal only, no
microstructural changes in tube
steel.
• Distinctive metal removal usually
filled with adherent deposit.
• No protective oxide layer.
• Similar to caustic gouging, e.g., no
intergranular hydrogen fissures;
distinctive corrosion product
(maricite) on innermost layer.
• No protective oxide layer.

Root Causes • Deposits formed by a number of root • Deposits formed by similar causes • Deposits (similar formation) plus
causes plus acidic contamination as for hydrogen damage plus caustic acid phosphate concentration.
(several potential sources). concentration.

Cycle chemistry • Source for low pH contamination • Source for high pH levels (caustic) • Occurs with addition of mono-
implications (acidic) exists. Can be bulk or local exists. and/or di-sodium phosphate,
concentration only. but not with tri-sodium phosphate
alone.

Attack rate • Very rapid (can be > 10 mm/year). • Rapid (up to 2 mm/year). • Rapid.
Failures can occur within six
months.

Other Factors to Consider:

All three mechanisms are superficially similar in appearance. Distinguishing among them is not simple. For example, all will have superficial tube gouging and the
formation of deposits.
All three mechanisms will generally occur in similar locations; location is not a way of distinguishing among them.
Hydrogen damage must have acidic contamination and therefore will not occur when caustic gouging or acid phosphate corrosion is active (but can occur with caustic or
phosphate treatment when acidic contamination occurs).
Either acidic, caustic or phosphate concentration by itself is not sufficient to cause damage by any of these three mechanisms; must also have substantial deposition; often
occurs where flow disruption accelerates deposition.
Deposition alone is also not sufficient to cause hydrogen damage, caustic gouging or acid phosphate corrosion; must also have concentration of aggressive chemicals.

7-2 Distinguishing Features of Some Mechanisms with Similar Appearances

Figure 7-1a. Montage showing typical multilaminated magnetite and subsurface
microcracking associated with hydrogen damage. Source: J. Hickey, Irish Electricity
Supply Board1
Figure 7-1c. Enlarged view of deposits on tube with acid phosphate corrosion damage.
Both caustic gouging and acid
phosphate corrosion mechanisms
occur via a fluxing of the protective
magnetite and underlying tube
material. With caustic gouging, the
deposit that forms will usually con-
tain distinctive crystals of sodium
ferroate (NaFeO2) and/or sodium fer-
roite (Na2FeO2). Acid phosphate
corrosion will generally result in a
deposit that contains two or three
distinct layers of which the
white/gray inner layer is maricite
(NaFePO4) speckled with red
hematite.
Figures 7-1a, b and c show the
appearance of the deposits typical
of hydrogen damage, caustic goug-
ing, and acid phosphate corrosion,
respectively. It will likely be neces-
sary to determine the composition of
the deposit via an analytical tech-
nique such as energy dispersive x-
ray or equivalent to confirm the
presence of key elements. Figures
7-2a and b show typical spectra
taken from the deposits for hydro-
gen damage with a distinctive Cl
peak, and the Na, P and Fe peaks
typical of deposits found with acid
phosphate corrosion damage.
Similarly, the Na-containing sodium
ferroate and/or sodium ferroite will
indicate an underlying cause by
caustic gouging.
7.2.3 Microstructural features.
Hydrogen damage causes specific
deterioration to the base material
microstructure. Intergranular
microfissures will form, as shown in
Figure 7-1a, linking to form microc-
racks and leading to eventual
through-wall failure. Decarburization
will occur near the tube surface.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
Figure 7-1b. Cross-section through
deposits formed on a tube damaged by
caustic gouging. Source: S.R. Paterson,
et al.2
Because the damage is caused by
hydrogen diffusing into the base
metal from the inside, the degrada-
tion will be most prominent at the
inner surface and will decrease with
thickness toward the outside of the
tube. There is no equivalent
microstructural degradation accom-
panying caustic gouging or acid
phosphate corrosion.
Note however that all of these failure
mechanisms require as a precursor
the presence of deposits consisting
of feedwater corrosion products. As
a result, these mechanisms are
sometimes accompanied by suffi-
cient overheat to cause deterioration
of the tube steel. This will generally
be manifested by distinct micro-
structural changes and the pres-
ence of transformation products.
7-3
 7.2.4 Sources of contamination.
Finally, the sources of chemical
concentration that eventually lead
to corrosion damage by each of the
mechanisms are also distinctly
different.
Hydrogen damage requires a locally
acidic contamination. Typical
sources include: (i) small condenser
leaks over many months, (ii) a large
condenser leak leading to a large
ingress of contaminated water such
as sea water, (iii) breakdown of
water treatment plant, such as
improper valving or rinsing following
regeneration of ion exchange resins,
leading to an ingress of sulfuric or
hydrochloric acid or (iv) an improper
chemical cleaning process where
incomplete removal of deposits
occurs, acid-filled remnants then
lead to more hydrogen damage dur-
ing start-up.
Caustic gouging requires a concen-
Figure 7-2a. EDAX analysis showing the distinctive Cl peak tration of caustic such as: (i) an
resulting from hydrogen damage. The tube section is from the excessive level of caustic under
evaporator front wall close to the burner level in this high-heat caustic treatment, (ii) an excess
flux drum unit. Source: J. Hickey, Irish Electricity Supply Board1 addition of caustic under all-volatile
treatment, (iii) too high a level of
caustic as a control chemical under
phosphate treatment, or (iv) ingress
of caustic as a result of water treat-
ment plant or condensate-polisher
regeneration breakdown.
Acid phosphate corrosion generally
occurs because of improper phos-
phate cycle chemistry controls, par-
ticularly “chasing” of phosphate
hideout by adding mono-sodium
phosphate or an excess of di-
sodium phosphate. Acid phosphate
attack has not occurred with the use
of only tri-sodium phosphate.

7.2.5 Summarizing comments for

the underdeposit corrosion mecha-
nisms. In order to occur, all three
mechanisms must have both exces-
sive tube deposits and a source of
contamination. Acidic, caustic or
phosphate contamination by itself is
not sufficient to cause damage;
there must also be excessive
deposits to allow concentration to
occur. The presence of each of the
contaminants can have significant
effects in other parts of the cycle in
Figure 7-2b. EDAX spectra of inner of two layers consisting of addition to underdeposit corrosion of
tightly packed crystalline material comprised primarily of sodium waterwall tubes.
(Na), iron (Fe) and phosphorus (P) typical of acid phosphate
corrosion.

7-4 Distinguishing Features of Some Mechanisms with Similar Appearances

Similarly, deposition alone is not suf-
ficient to cause hydrogen damage, a)
Delta iron
caustic gouging or acid phosphate 3000 (1649)
corrosion; there must also be a con- Delta iron + liquid Liquid
2800 (1538)
centration of the applicable contam-
inant. Here again, excessive 2600 (1427)
Cementite
deposits must be avoided as they 2400 (1316) Delta iron + liquid
+ Austenite
can lead to a range of other prob- Austenite
+ liquid
lems including boiler tube failures in 2200 (1204)

Temperature, °F (°C)
Austenite
waterwalls by fireside corrosion,

Cementite Ledeburite
2000 (1093)
short- and long-term overheating,
1800 (982)
and corrosion fatigue. Hence the Austenite,
Eutectic +
criticality of chemical cleaning at the 1600 (871) Ferrite + Austenite Cementite
Austenite +
optimum time. Cementite
1400 (760)

0.80 % Eutectoid

4.3% C Eutectic
1200 (649)
7.3 Water-Touched Tubing: Pearlite + Pearlite + Cementite,

(Ledeburite)
Ferrite Cementite Pearlite +

(Pearlite)
1000 (538)
Short-term Overheating (Three transformed

2.0% C
Eutectic
Grades) Irons

In the case of short-term overheat- Steels Cast irons

ing in waterwall tubes, the distinc- 32 (0)
0 0.5 1 2 3 4 5
tion between the three levels of Carbon, %
overheating is more a diagnostic
than a means to pinpoint the appro-
priate mechanism. Specifically, an
evaluation of microstructural change b)
can be used to estimate the tube 1800 (982)
Upper-critical
temperature reached at burst. shor t-term overheating
Three levels of “short-term” over- 1600 (871)
A3
heating are possible, depending on Inter-critical shor t-
whether the temperature at burst ter m overheating
Temperature, °F (°C)

1400 (760)
was (i) below the lower critical tem-
perature, A1, (“subcritical short-term A1
1200 (649) Subcritical shor t-term
overheating”), (ii) between A1 and overheating

the upper critical temperature, A3
(“intercritical short-term overheat-
ing”), or (iii) above A3 (“upper criti-
cal short-term overheating”). Figures
7-3a and b show the equilibrium
diagram for iron-iron carbide and
the regions where these tempera-
ture ranges are operative. Additional
detail on the defining characteristics
of each of the three degrees of over-
heating are shown in Table 7-2.
The base metal has a typical
microstructure consisting of ferrite
and pearlite and normal limits on its
operating temperature of about
440°C (~ 825°F). The explanation of
why the microstructural differences
occur for different levels of overheat-
ing can be seen by reference to the
iron-iron carbide phase diagram
pertinent to waterwall tube materials
in Figures 7-3a and b.
If the temperature before burst
exceeds the A1 temperature, the
pearlite will be transformed to
0.80% C Eutectoid
Long-ter m overheating
1000 (538)
826 (441) Nor mal tube
design allowable
Steels
32 (0)
0.5 1
Figure 7-3 (a.) Equilibrium diagram for iron-iron carbide. (b.) Detail of equilibrium
diagram, showing long-term and short-term overheating regimes.
In the case of overheating to levels
austenite. If the A3 temperature is
exceeded the original material will above the A3 temperature, the final
fracture will generally be thick-
all be transformed to austenite and
because of the quenching effects of edged as indicated in Table 7-2. As
noted, it will show microstructural
tube rupture, upon examination will
consist of martensite and bainite. evidence of the complete transfor-
mation of the ferrite structure to
Thus the maximum temperature
reached can be determined by the austenite, and subsequent transfor-
relative amounts of ferrite, bainite, mation to martensite or bainite on
and martensite in samples of the cooling.
failed tubing.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 7-5

Table 7-2
Distinguishing Features of the Three Levels of Short-Term Overheating for Waterwall Materials
Type of Temperature Fracture Extent of Fracture Microstructure Hardness
Overheating Range Surface Tube Swelling Mechanism (for ferritic tubing) Characteristics

Subcritical > Design Thin-lipped, Considerable Transgranular void Ferrite and spher- Near that of original
short-term < Lower critical “fish-mouth” formation by power oidized pearlite or hardness.
overheating temperature, A1 law creep. bainite.

Intercritical Between the lower Thin-lipped, “fish- Considerable Transgranular or Ferrite, transfor- Variable, with hard-
short-term critical temperature, mouth” mixed inter- and mational products ness near transfor-
overheating A1 and the upper transgranular void (pearlite, bainite, mation products
critical temperature, formation by power and/or martensite). being higher than
A3 law creep. Some spheroidized the original.
pearlite or bainite
may also be
present.

Upper critical > Upper critical Thick-lipped, Little Inter- or transgran- Near rupture, Above original.
short-term temperature, A3 “fish-mouth” ular creep fracture. transformational
overheating products (pearlite,
bainite, and/or
martensite). Some
ferrite may also be
present.

7.4 Water-Touched Tubing:
Corrosion Fatigue Versus OD-
Initiated Mechanical Fatigue
Corrosion fatigue, particularly in the
form manifested as a pin hole leak,
may be similar in visual appearance
to mechanical fatigue cracks that
have initiated on the OD. Both may
seem to be associated with a weld
from the tube to an external attach-
ment. The primary difference is that
corrosion fatigue cracks initiate from
the inside surface whereas mechani-
cal fatigue will tend to initiate from
the outside surface of the tube.
Additional differences, summarized
in Table 7-3 include:
• As a general rule, the OD-initiated
fatigue will be at a surface defect
that causes a geometric stress
riser, such as the toe of a weld,
whereas it would be rare for a
corrosion fatigue crack to grow to
the outside surface precisely at a
stress riser. The exception is
where cracks grow from both
sides by the respective mecha-
nisms, and failure occurs through
both.
• If grinding is performed before
weld repair, ID-initiated corrosion
fatigue cracks will become more
extensive with deeper grinding
whereas the surface initiated
fatigue crack will decrease in size.
• The OD-initiated mechanism
tends to appear earlier in the life
of the boiler.
7.5 Failure Mechanisms in
Economizer Inlet Header
Tubes: Thermal Fatigue,
Erosion-Corrosion, and
Flexibility-Induced Cracking
Three distinct failure mechanisms
occur in economizer inlet header
tubes and similarities in location
may lead to confusion. Table 7-4
summarizes key differences
between thermally-induced corro-
sion fatigue, erosion-corrosion, and
flexibility-induced cracking of these
header tubes.
7.6 SH/RH Tubing: Long-Term
Overheating (Creep) Versus
Fireside Corrosion
Two of the most often misdiagnosed
BTF mechanisms are failure of a
SH/RH tube by (i) long-term over-
heating, with or without accelerated
oxidation, leading to a final failure
by creep, and (ii) fireside corrosion
by molten alkali sulfates, also result-
ing in subsequent creep. Table 7-5
provides a list of primary macro-
scopic and microscopic features of
the two mechanisms. When distin-
guishing between creep and fireside
corrosion, it is important to note that
many of the features are superfi-
cially similar. For both mechanisms
the final failure mechanism is creep
which is easy to identify. The prob-
lem is recognizing the dominant
underlying root cause.
In the case of long-term overheat-
ing, the tubes operate above the
design temperature limits. This can
occur (i) from unit startup because
of poor design, (ii) as a result of the
accumulation of internal oxide scale

7-6 Distinguishing Features of Some Mechanisms with Similar Appearances

Table 7-3
Distinguishing Corrosion Fatigue from Mechanical Fatigue of Water-Touched Tubes
Characteristic Corrosion Fatigue Mechanical Fatigue

Initiation Location • Inside surface • Outside surface

Proximity to stress riser • Possible, especially if the • Typical condition exactly at

(such as toe of a weld)
at outside surface
weld is the attachment weld the toe of the weld.
of the tube to a non-pres-
sure part. Cracking may be
slightly removed from the
exact toe position.

Appearance when grinding • Damage appears to increase • Damage decreases as grind-

out defect as grinding proceeds from ing progresses from outside
outside surface. Flaw surface inward.
increases in size towards
its initiating site at inside
surface.

Timing of appearance • Usually later in life of boiler • Usually earlier in life of

boiler

Table 7-4
Distinguishing Features of the Common Damage Mechanisms in Economizer Inlet Header Tubes
Thermally-Induced Flexibility-Induced Cracking
Characteristic (Corrosion) Fatigue (Thermal Fatigue) Erosion-Corrosion

Location on header. • Near to feedwater inlet (locations of • At the ends of the header (locations of • Near to feedwater inlet.
highest ÆT). highest flex).

Location in tube • Near toe of fillet weld. • At the toe of the fillet weld. • Anywhere along the first 4-5 inches
attachment weld area from the header inlet.

Nature of damage • Longitudinal cracking.
• Longitudinal cracking is also present
down the header bore and on the
header ID, sometimes across the
ligaments.
• Cracking at weld only. Header and ID
are not cracked.
• Wastage with an “orange-peel”
appearance of internal tube surface.
• Generally erosion-corrosion is not
visible along the header bore or on
header ID.

Damage morphology • Straight, transgranular cracks, typi- • Generally, straight, transgranular • Generalized corrosion, “orange peel”
cally filled with oxide originating on cracks originating on tube OD, typi- appearance typical on tube ID.
the tube ID. May be bulbous in cross cally with slight oxidation depending • No protective Fe3O4 on ID surface.
section. upon service conditions.

Initiation Site • ID-Initiated. • OD-Initiated. • ID-Initiated.

Orientation of • Longitudinal (parallel) to tube axis • Circumferential around the toe of the • In the middle of the largest gouge on
the damage on ID. weld on the OD. the ID.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 7-7

Table 7-5
Distinguishing Characteristics of Long-Term Overheating (Creep)
and Fireside Corrosion (Coal-Fired Units) In Superheater/Reheater Tubing
Characteristic Long-Term Overheating/Accelerated Oxidation
Fracture Surface and • Generally thick-edged, brittle final failure.
Appearance of Failure • Generally accompanied by external tube wastage, which
may be small, at the 10 o’clock and 2 o’clock
positions.
Internal Scale? Yes, generally extensive, multi-laminated and
exfoliating.
External Scaling? • Yes, thick, laminated and often longitudinally cracked.
• Usually two layers - (i) a hard, porous outer layer with
composition typically that of flyash, and (ii) a black
glossy inner layer (mostly oxide, but may contain
some sulfates and sulfides of iron).
Outside surface appearance Characteristic longitudinal grooving and pitting (“alligator
after removal of scale/deposits hide”) appearance.
Composition of Does not contain low melting point ash compounds such
External Scales/Deposits as alkali iron sulfates
Wall Thinning? Typically wastage flats at 10 o’clock and 2 o’clock posi-
tions caused by accelerated oxidation, however, depend-
ing on tube position, could just be on one side. There is
always a layer of oxide adjacent to the tube.
Ratio of wall loss to steamside Typically less than 3:1
oxide thickness
Tube Material Degradation Yes, generally extensive signs of overheating and/or of
creep damage, particularly near the crack tip. Creep
voids will not be found away from crack tip.
Change in material hardness Localized softening near the rupture is typical.
which results in increased tube The internal scale that develops is
metal temperatures, (iii) because of usually thick, multi-laminated and
steam flow imbalance, or (iv) out-of- cracked.
plane tubes (resulting in the heat
In the case of fireside corrosion, the
flux being too high). Wastage
overriding cause is a corrosive coal
occurs, generally at the 10 o’clock
or oil ash. This causes the formation
and 2 o’clock positions on the tube of a liquid ash deposit which fluxes
as a result of increased oxidation. away the protective oxide. The tube
The outside tube surface generally
is not necessarily overheated,
has an “alligator hide” appearance.
although it can be for the same rea-
7-8 Distinguishing Features of Some Mechanisms with Similar Appearances
Fireside Corrosion by Molten Alkali Sulfates
• Tube wastage, particularly at the 10 and 2 o’clock
positions.
• Longitudinal cracking, final failure can be, but is not
necessarily by overheating.
Yes, particularly if tube metal overheating was an
influencing factor.
Yes, with multi-layers: (i) a hard, porous layer - composi-
tion typically of flyash, (ii) an intermediate layer contain-
ing complex alkali sulfates, and (iii) a black, glossy inner
layer mostly of oxides, sulfates, and sulfides of iron.
Characteristic longitudinal grooving and pitting (“alligator
hide”). Sometimes “orange peel” appearance at extremi-
ties of severe corrosion; sometimes the corroded area is
smooth and featureless.
Does contain low melting point compounds such as
alkali-iron sulfates (coal-fired units).
Primary feature of failure, may be worse at the 10 and 2
o’clock positions, however, depending on tube position,
could just be on one side. Depending upon the rate of
corrosion, a protective oxide layer may remain on the tube
or may have been fluxed off.
Typically greater than 3:1; for ratios greater than 5:1 fire-
side corrosion or erosion is the dominant mechanism.
If overheating has been a problem, yes; otherwise, no.
Molten sulfate corrosion can occur in a tube at design
temperatures.
Hardening is not necessary; if there has been no over-
heating, there will be no change in hardness.
sons as listed above for long-term
overheating. The appearance of the
external tube surface can be the
same as for long-term overheating
(thick, dark, “alligator hide” oxide)
and there can be thick, cracked
internal oxide as well. The key fea-
ture that will identify fireside corro-
sion wastage is the presence of low-
melting point ash compounds in
external deposits.
A second means to distinguish
between the two mechanisms is the
ratio of wall thickness loss to internal
scale thickness. An example is
shown in Figure 6-8. If the ratio of
wall loss to internal scale buildup is
less than three the probable mecha-
nism is long-term overheating; if
greater than five, the dominant
mechanism is fireside corrosion.
Where the problem is on the extra-
dos of a bend, these ratios may not
apply because of the thinning
caused by the bending fabrication
process.
7.7 SH/RH Tubing: Flyash
Erosion Versus Sootblower
Erosion
Table 7-6 provides a comparison of
the principal differences between
flyash erosion and sootblower ero-
sion. The primary means to distin-
guish the two is the location of the
damage relative to the position of
the sootblowers. This same logical
correspondence between the dam-
age caused by an erosive process
and the source of the impacting par-
ticles will help identify other erosion
processes in the unit such as coal
particle erosion and falling slag
damage.
7.8 SH/RH Tubing:
Graphitization and Long-Term
Overheating (Creep)
Graphitization has been frequently
confused with creep damage.
Primary distinguishing features will
be in the appearance of the mater-
ial’s microstructure. Specifically the
formation of graphite nodules or
particles will provide the unique
appearance of graphitization; exten-
sive signs of overheating and spher-
oidization will indicate creep. Table
7-7 provides a more complete delin-
eation of the key features of these
two mechanisms.
Table 7-6
Distinguishing Characteristics of Sootblower and Flyash Erosion
Feature
Correlation of damage to
distance from a sootblower
Nature of wastage flats
Severity of erosive process
Principal underlying cause
Table 7-7
Distinguishing Characteristics of Graphitization and Long-Term Overheating
Characteristic
Location in tube
Location and
Orientation of Failure
Fracture Surface
Wall Thinning?
Material Degradation?
Material(s) Involved
Sootblower Erosion
• Obvious correspondence
between (i) the severity of
the erosion and (ii) the dis-
tance to sootblower and the
track of the sootblower.
• Generally two, located at
45° around tube circumfer-
ence from direction of soot-
blowing.
• Can be very severe with
short times to tube failure
in the case of a deficiency in
the sootblowing operation.
• Excessive use, malfunction,
improper operation, or poor
maintenance of sootblowers.
Graphitization
Edge of HAZ or in the tube.
Usually circumferential;
parallel to weld.
Thick-edged, brittle
No
Only along graphitization lines.
T1A
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
Flyash Erosion
• None
• Flats form in direction facing
into gas flow.
• Tends to occur over some-
what longer periods,
although it can also be
rapid in the case of extreme
local velocity profiles or ash
loadings.
• Excessive local flue gas
velocities exacerbated by
high ash loadings.
Long-Term Overheating
Not necessarily at weld or HAZ.
Usually final failure is
longitudinal.
Thick-edged in middle of wall
loss with some bulging.
Yes, wastage flats typical at
10 and 2 o’clock positions.
Extensive signs of
overheating and spheroidization.
Any ferritic.
7-9
7.9 SH/RH Tubing:
Intergranular Stress Corrosion
Cracking (IGSCC),
Intergranular Creep, and
Intergranular Corrosion
Chapter 37 in Volume 3 is devoted
to the attack of superheater/reheater
tubing by stress corrosion cracking
(SCC), the initiation and growth of
cracks in a susceptible material by
simultaneous exposure to stress and
an adverse chemical environment.
SCC of boiler tubes occurs primarily
in austenitic stainless steels, but can
also occur in ferritics. It can be
either transgranular or intergranular
(IGSCC). In the form of IGSCC, it
may be confused with intergranular
creep or intergranular corrosion. A
few brief comments may help distin-
guish among these alternative dam- Figure 7-4 Example of tube wastage caused by steam impingement. Note the
absence of a fireside scale and that the wall loss is in a region encompassing approxi-
age types. mately one-third of the tube circumference. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.2
Intergranular creep will show the
presence of grain boundary creep
cavitation under high magnification;
intergranular SCC will not. During
polishing of the material for metallur- Steam Washed Superheater Tube
gical examination, SCC damage will 0.2
Y = 5X
typically have grains that fall out,
Flue gas flow
whereas the cracking tends to be
A
more discontinuous for intergranular 0.15
creep cracking. A complication is F B
Wall Loss,Inch

that cracking may grow to part-

Y = 3X
through the wall by IGSCC, then 0.1
FB E C
propagate by intergranular creep.
A D
IGSCC and intergranular corrosion
have the same morphology, that is, 0.05
in austenitic stainless steels, they
DE
both require sensitization. The two C
will be distinguished primarily by
damage location. IGSCC is usually 0
located at stress concentrations and 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Steamside Oxide Scale
can be either ID- or OD-initiated. Thickness, Inch
Intergranular corrosion occurs in
such locations as (i) on the tube OD
as caused by wash down or (ii) on Figure 7-5. Plots of wall and steamside scale thicknesses around the circumference of
the tube ID at low spots where liq- the tube failure by steam impingement shown in Figure 7-4.
uids will accumulate. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.2

7-10 Distinguishing Features of Some Mechanisms with Similar Appearances

7.10 Secondary (Steam
Impingement) Versus Primary
Failures
It is important when determining the
root cause of field failures not to
confuse secondary failures, gener-
ally caused by steam escaping from
a tube leak or rupture, with the pri-
mary failure. This final section briefly
describes how to recognize steam
impingement, which is not treated as
a separate damage mechanism in
this book.
Figure 7-4 shows the typical features
of a tube that has been subjected to
steam impingement: one or more
fireside wastage flats which are not
located symmetrically around the
tube periphery and which are essen-
tially free of fireside ash and oxide.
The final failure may be either a pin-
hole leak or a longitudinal stress
rupture. The ratio of the wall loss to
steamside scale thickness will usu-
ally exceed five as illustrated in
Figure 7-5.
It is important to identify the affected
area of steam impingement damage
whenever a primary tube leak or
rupture has occurred. Since a num-
ber of tubes may be affected and
significant wall thinning may have
occurred, it is critical that the full
extent of the damage be determined
and that a wall thickness accep-
tance criterion be defined on the
basis of creep-rupture life calcula-
tions.2 Chapter 8 looks at such
remaining life evaluations.

7.11 References
1Personal Communication from J. Hickey (ESB Ireland) to
R.B. Dooley, February, 1995.
2Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 7-11

7-12 Distinguishing Features of Some Mechanisms with Similar Appearances
 1 ¥ Review
Chapter 8 • Volume 1
- Materials
- O&M and failure history
- Temperature distributions

2 Select locations

3 ¥ Perform UT
- Wall and scale thickness
Boiler Tube Remaining
4a ¥ Remove samples
- Metallographic analysis
- Oxide scales + mechanism
- Temperature distributions
4b ¥ Estimate scale thickness
- Temperature from hardness
- Temperature from
microstructure

5 ¥ Conduct tubelife evaluation

Life Assessment
- Is there uncertainty?
No Yes

6a Is RL > DL? 6b Rupture tests

No Yes
Replace tubes Set inspection
interval

8.1 Introduction 8.2 Assessment for Tubes

A complete program of prevention
and control of boiler tube failures
includes an understanding of the life
of boiler tubes expected from initial
design considerations, and esti-
mated remaining life as calculated
from actual material properties,
actual stresses and temperatures,
and characterization of present tube
condition.
The methods to assess remaining
life rely on an estimate of current
damage, along with a rule for dam-
age accumulation and a criterion for
final failure. Failure prevention and
replacement decisions require that
such assessments should be done
periodically, with the time-to-next
evaluation being one of the results
from each successive analysis.
The purpose of this chapter is to
review the methods that can be
used to determine remaining life of
boiler tubes. The chapter is divided
into those tubes which operate in
the creep regime (superheater and
reheater tubing) and those that
operate at temperatures below the
creep regime (waterwalls and econ-
omizer tubing). More information
about the design of both was pre-
sented in Chapter 2.
Operating in the Creep Regime
8.2.1 Overview.
Superheater/reheater (SH/RH) tubes
operate in the creep regime. Creep
deformation is exacerbated by tem-
perature or stress increases. The
temperature of a tube increases dur-
ing its lifetime because the buildup
of steamside oxide insulates the
tube metal from the flow of cooling
steam. Stress increases can occur
as a result of wall thinning such as
caused by fireside corrosion or ero-
sion processes.
SH/RH tubes are designed for a
finite life based on a conservative
creep criterion. Therefore, even in
the absence of an accelerating
damage mechanism, tube failures
can be expected. Assessment of
creep-rupture times reduces eventu-
ally to determining the history of
stress and temperature for a particu-
lar tube.
During the past twenty years a num-
ber of techniques have been devel-
oped to assess remaining life of
superheater/reheater tubing subject
to high temperature creep and cor-
rosion. Table 8-1 provides a list of
the currently available techniques,
along with the frequency of use of

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 8-1

Table 8-1
Common Superheater/Reheater Remaining Life Methods
• NDE of wall and scale thickness, or destructive examination of wall and scale thickness and
microstructure: plus oxide scale analysis method (43%)
• Measurement of wall thickness by ultrasonics: at least two measurements are required, separated
by a number of years (34%)
• Direct measurement of tube temperature by thermocouples (25%)
• Microstructural techniques (25%)
• Cavitation
• Carbides
• Microstructure catalog
• Hardness
• Extrapolation of failure rates (16%)
• Uniaxial tests on chordal specimens (14%)
• Burst tests (2%)
• Calculation based on operating history (no survey results)
Note: Values in parenthesis indicates percent of utilities that use method from survey of 44 utilities reported in
B. Dooley1.
Sources: B. Dooley1 and R. Viswanathan, et al.2
these methods from a survey of 44
utilities.1 The primary goal for all of
the methods is to determine the tem-
perature to which the tubing has
been subjected. From that informa-
tion and an understanding of the
creep rupture properties of the
material, it is possible to estimate
the life expended and the remaining
life of subject tubes.
A prime difficulty has been the accu-
racy of the temperature estimates of
the various methods. For example,
the tube temperature changes
markedly as a result of operating
changes, and as a result of the nat-
ural increase in steamside oxide
over time. It is also worth noting that
among the hundreds of tubes in
each superheater bank in a boiler
8-2 Boiler Tube Remaining Life Assessment
there will be a distribution of gas and
metal temperatures further compli-
cating the analysis of remaining life.
As shown in Table 8-1, the method
of choice is one based on internal
oxide scale analysis. However, it is
important to recognize the advan-
tages offered by some of the other
techniques, particularly when used
selectively in conjunction with oxide
scale analysis. For example,
microstructure-based (degree of
spheroidization, analysis of car-
bides, degree of creep cavitation),
and hardness-based techniques
may be useful to supplement the
analysis of tube condition. A com-
prehensive methodology in which
calculation methods, oxide scale-
based NDE methods, and destruc-
tive evaluations are used in a com-
plementary, feedback loop, has been
described by Viswanathan, et al.3
There are cases where the steam-
side oxide technique is not usable,
such as where spalling of the scale
or a previous chemical cleaning
does not allow an accurate measure
of oxide thickness. It should be
noted that the technique can how-
ever be used in conjunction with a
chemical clean to predict the
increased remaining life that will
occur if a proper chemical clean is
performed; this is illustrated in
Figure 4-2.
The concentration in this section is
primarily on the use of the oxide
scale technique, in addition there is
a brief description of a method
based on statistical analysis of his-
torical failures. Microstructural meth-
ods to determine the extent of dam-
age are described in Chapter 10.
8.2.2 Remaining life assessment of
superheater/reheater tubing using
oxide scale methodologies.
The most universally applied analy-
sis method utilizes measurements of
steamside oxide scale thickness
and tube wall thickness to predict
the remaining creep life of super-
heater/reheater tubing. The use of
oxide scale as a condition assess-
ment method for SH/RH tubing is
reasonably cost effective. For a typi-
cal 400 MW unit, such an assess-
ment is typically around $25,000
(~ $60/MW). A summary of the
method, procedures, and present
understanding of the limitations of
the methodology is presented here.
Sources of additional information
include: Viswanathan, et al.2, 3,
Viswanathan and Gehl4, and
Paterson and Rettig.5
The overall process is shown in the
flow diagram of Figure 8-1.
Procedures for stubs and dissimilar
metal welds (DMWs) have also been
developed. The first step is to iden-
tify tubes or tube assemblies at risk,
that is, those with thickest steamside
oxide and thinnest walls (Steps 1, 2,
and 3 of Figure 8-1). Note that
among the hundreds of tubes in
each superheater bank in a boiler
there will be a distribution of gas
and metal temperatures as a func-
tion of a particular operating condi-
tion. As a result there will be a distri-
bution of creep and corrosion rates.
One of the functions of the remain-
ing life process is to forestall unex-
pected outages caused by tube fail-
ures. Therefore the key to a suc-
cessful prevention program will
involve a search for the highest risk
locations, and their conditions, not
the average condition.
The accuracy of the prediction is
tied directly to a knowledge of the
thickness of the steamside oxide.
Early use of the method required
sampling and destructive examina-
tion. This resulted in a number of
problems inherent with any sam-
pling program: choosing the proper
locations, choosing the number of
specimens to give statistically signif-
icant results, etc. Within the past few
years, there has been good correla-
tion of non-destructive ultrasonic
measures of steamside oxide thick-
ness using UT methods with that
measured in samples removed from
service (See discussion in Chapter
9, particularly Figure 9-3). It has
been variously estimated that the
minimum oxide scale thickness
measurable by the UT method
ranges from about 2 to 10 mils.
Because there can be considerable
variation along a tube length and
around its circumference, good
judgment is still required in its appli-
cation. Additional detail is provided
in Chapter 9.
For tube analysis, remaining life of
each tube is predicted by a com-
puter code such as the EPRI-devel-
oped TUBELIFE, or available com-
mercial codes from U.S. vendors
such as NOTIS, TUBECALC, or
TUBEPRO. Sacrificial tube samples
are then removed from select loca-
tions (Step 4a) and subjected to lab-
oratory metallurgical analysis and/or
isostress rupture testing so as to
refine the remaining life estimates.
As an example, the computer code
(TUBELIFE) uses present oxide
thickness and an isothermal oxide
growth rate to determine a current
“equivalent” temperature of the
1 ¥ Review
- Materials
- O&M and failure history
- Temperature distributions
2 Select locations
3 ¥ Perform UT
- Wall and scale thickness
4a ¥ Remove samples 4b ¥ Estimate scale thickness
- Metallographic analysis - Temperature from hardness
- Oxide scales + mechanism - Temperature from
- Temperature distributions microstructure
5 ¥ Conduct tubelife evaluation
- Is there uncertainty?
No Yes
6a Is RL > DL? 6b Rupture tests
No Yes
Set inspection
Replace tubes
interval
Figure 8-1. Roadmap to assess remaining life of superheater/reheater tubing. RL -
remaining life; DL - desired life. Adapted from: R. Viswanathan, et al.3
tube. An effective stress is calcu- lated temperature. Life fractions are
lated from the tube dimensions. The summed to determine total life con-
temperature and stress values are sumed. Remaining life for each tube
then extrapolated back to initial con- is then calculated. These actions
ditions assuming linear growth of correspond to Step 5 in Figure 8-1.
steam scale and fireside wastage A typical plot of oxide thickness as
along with heat-transfer properties a function of temperature from field
of the steel and oxide scale. measurements and as predicted by
the TUBELIFE code is shown in
The average metal temperature and
Figure 8-2.
stress for every 1000 hour interval
from the beginning of service is then Selective tube sampling is generally
calculated iteratively. For each inter- recommended to confirm input infor-
val, oxide scale thickness and wall mation or where there is unaccept-
thinning are estimated under non- able uncertainty in the analysis.
isothermal conditions. The life frac- Metallurgical analysis of tube sam-
tion expended at each 1000 hour ples and tests such as accelerated
interval is computed from the tem- burst or rupture (axial or chordal)
perature increase caused by the isostress testing can be used.
steamside oxide, the stress increase
caused by fireside corrosion, and
stress-rupture curve at each calcu-
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 8-3

Steamside Scale (inch)
0.030
0.028
0.026
0.024
0.022
0.020
0.018
0.016
0.014
0.012
0.010
0.008
0.006
0.004
910 930 950 970
Temperature (°F)
Figure 8-2. Oxide thickness plotted as a function of metal temperature. The solid line
is the thickness/temperature correlation predicted by EPRIGEMS TUBELIFE III.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.6
The end result of the remaining life
assessment process is a decision. Is
the remaining life (RL) of the tube
greater than the desired life (DL)
(Step 6a)? If not, tube replacement
is required and a replacement date
should be set; if RL > DL, then a re-
inspection interval should be set
where the process should be
repeated to ensure that conditions
are proceeding as expected in the
life of the tubing.
Available codes for oxide scale
analysis cover various materials
depending upon the vendor and
version available. For example, early
versions of TUBELIFE available
through EPRI, evaluated only ASME
SA213-T22. More recent versions
now cover a total of ten materials:
T1, T2, T5, T9, T11, T12, T21, T22,
SA178, and TP304. Capabilities now
include the ability to assess the
effects of chemical cleaning, of
operational changes, and the appli-
8-4 Boiler Tube Remaining Life Assessment
990 1010 1030 1050 1070 1090
cation of variations in stress formu-
las including oxide kinetics, fireside
wastage, and alternative stress rup-
ture algorithms.
Differences among the various
codes arise because of different
assumed rates of oxide scale
growth, fireside corrosion rates, and
reference stress formulae used to
calculate tube stresses from steam
pressure.4
8.2.3 Oxide scale growth law.
Several alternative expressions have
been proposed to describe the
kinetics of steamside oxide growth.
As the choice of expression is at the
basis of the prediction by an oxide
scale methodology, it is worthwhile
to review briefly some of the alterna-
tives. Table 8-2 shows the general
form of the various expressions.
One oxide growth model was that
proposed by Paterson, Moser and
Rettig7:
x = ktn (8-1)
where:
x = oxide thickness, mils
t = time, hrs.
n = 1/2.6 to 1/3.0 = T/4390 ¡R
k = proportionality coefficient
= A U P0.2 exp (T/C2) / C3
A = alloy coefficient defined as the
relative rate of oxidation for a
given alloy as compared to
21/4Cr-1Mo
U = unit specific term which
allows the analyst to fine tune
the kinetics relationship for a
specific boiler (typically ranges
from 0.8 to 1.2 in value)
P = bulk steam pressure, psi
T = absolute temperature, ¡R
C2, C3 = empirical coefficients =
243¡R and 9.535 x 106
A typical set of oxidation curves
from this model are shown in Figure
8-3.
An experimental program was con-
ducted to compare temperatures
predicted by the various oxide scale
analysis methods with those mea-
sured by thermocouples in pent-
house tubes of a gas-fired utility
boiler.11 This location was chosen
because there is no heat flux in the
penthouse and as a result the
through-wall tube metal temperature
is constant. The results showed that
four of the five most common oxide
scale analysis methods predicted
temperatures that were higher (more
conservative) than those that were
measured; the fifth provided results
that fairly accurately matched those
of the thermocouple data, although
a few data points were non-conserv-
ative, that is, predicted to be lower
than measured. Figure 8-4 shows
how the various predictive rules
compared to the measured tempera-
tures. It should be noted however,
that because significant differences
in oxide scale thickness can exist in
locations only a few inches apart,
the choice of location and sample
selection is equally as critical as the
choice of stress formulae or oxide
growth law.4
8.2.4 Fireside wastage and choice Table 8-2
of rates. The remaining life of a General Forms of Oxide Correlations for Cr-Mo Steels
SH/RH tube will also be controlled
by the effects of fireside wastage General form of Corresponding Researchers
such as caused by corrosion, flyash expression approximation
or sootblower erosion, and oxida-
tion. Exfoliation of steamside oxide,
which exposes fresh surfaces to oxi- log x = A + B (LMP) x3 = kt Rehn and Apblett8
dation, can also impact the rate of
tube wastage. These wastage log x = A + B (LMP) x2.1 to 2.6 = kt Paterson and Rettig5
mechanisms are a function of tem-
perature, with the tubes at the high- x2 = kt x2 = kt Dewitte and Stubbe9
est temperatures being the most
susceptible. Figure 8-5 shows how At
dramatic the wastage rates can be x = ––––– + Dt x = kt Roberts10
for the various mechanisms. B + Ct
The ratio of fireside wastage/wall
thinning to steamside oxide build-up x = k (t, A, P)1/3.0 to 1/2.6 x2.6 to 3.0 = kt Paterson, et al.7
can be used as a diagnostic tool in
pinpointing the most dominant
mechanism affecting a degrading or where x = oxide scale thickness, mils
t = time, hrs.
failed boiler tube. This is particularly
k = oxide scale growth law rate constant
important in distinguishing between A, B, C, D = coefficients
fireside corrosion and long-term LMP = Larson-Miller Parameter
overheating in SH/RH tubes. See P = bulk steam pressure, psi
Chapter 6 for a more complete dis-
cussion of the technique and the Source: R. Viswanathan, et al., 3
description in Figure 6-8. The vari-
ous predictive models have incorpo-
rated wastage rates that are based
on either linear or non-linear algo-
rithms and that have incorporated Oxide Thickness (mils)
both fireside wastage and oxidation 100
or only the former.2, 3
90 1150 1125
8.2.5 Accelerated creep rupture 80 1100
testing. One means of supplement-
ing remaining life estimates is to 70
measure actual material properties 60
1075
and remaining life by accelerated 50
testing on selective tubes removed
from service. Such tests have been 40 1050
used for three reasons2, 3: (i) to pro- 30
vide a direct measure of remaining 20 1025
useful life, (ii) to estimate stress rup-
ture properties of the unexposed 10 1000
900
(virgin) material, and (iii) to derive a 0
stress-rupture algorithm directly 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000
from the post-exposure test to be Time (hours)
applied to other tubes.

Figure 8-3. Steamside oxide growth curves for 21/4Cr - 1Mo steel predicted by
EPRIGEMS TUBELIFE III. Oxide grown at 2150 psi steam at the listed temperatures
(°F). Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.7

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 8-5

 It is recommended that such testing
Model Temperature Estimate (°F) be used (Step 6b, Figure 8-1) in
1100 conjunction with oxide scale meth-
1
2 ods so as to remove the excess
3 conservatism in remaining life esti-
4 mates.2, 3 However, reliance on such
1050 testing alone is unwarranted, and
there should be recognition of the
uncertainties of such tests, including
1000 how to choose the appropriate
2 stresses and temperatures for test-
3
ing, how to relate the results of the
1 Dewitte and Stubbe accelerated test to the field condi-
950 1 2 Rehn and Apblett tion, and knowing how to relate the
3 Paterson and Rettig
4 Roberts sampled locations to other locations
Field Data of interest. These questions are top-
900 ics of active research efforts and
900 950 1000 1050 considerable insight about the
Thermocouple Temperature (°F) details of the tests and their interpre-
tation are available, see for example,
references 11 and 12.
Figure 8-4. Comparison of thermocouple measurements with various oxide growth
laws. See Table 8-2 for formulas and reference numbers. Source: R. Viswanathan and The most benefit from such testing
S. Gehl4 will be: (i) when there is a significant
difference between predicted mini-
mum and maximum remaining lives,
(ii) when superheater tubing is expe-
riencing little fireside corrosion or
Wall Loss (mils)
erosion and thus the remaining life is
Y=30X dominated by creep resistance of
350
Superheater tubes with the material.2,3
severe erosion
300 8.2.6. Statistical analysis. One
Superheater additional method for gaining insight
tube with into tube failures is based on statisti-
250 liquid ash cal analysis of historical failure data.
corrosion
The analysis of the data base of
200 past BTF and operating conditions
should not be overlooked as a sup-
5X
plement to the more rigorous meth-
150
Penthouse ods used to analyze remaining life
superheater as it can help place an emphasis on
tubes
100 unit priorities. Davison has reviewed
Y=2X the application of one such method
Reheater utilizing Weibull distribution plots
50
tubes low constructed and interpreted via the
heat flux following steps13,14:
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 • List all the failures in the area
Steamside Oxide Thickness (mils) under consideration.
• Discount inappropriate mecha-
nisms including (i) random
Figure 8-5. Correlations between wall loss and steamside oxide thickness for various
causes such as material defects,
wastage mechanisms. Note that symbols indicate plant data from tubes that experi-
enced the identified wastage mechanism. See also Figure 6-8.
Source: R. Viswanathan, et al.2

8-6 Boiler Tube Remaining Life Assessment

 weld defects, blockages, wrong
materials, etc., and (ii) “fast”
causes such as sootblower ero-
sion or transient overheating
• Note replacements of tubes with
damage but that had not failed,
which would reduce the risk of
subsequent failures.
• Plot on Weibull distribution (log
cumulative hazard versus log
time-to-failure) and compare data
base to straight line.
• Evaluate outliers for significance.
• Modify distribution parameters to
provide a straight line plot.
The method has the advantages that
it is simple, permits identification of
tubes that may be at risk of failure
by the same mechanisms as those
in the data set, and by analysis it
can also identify failures not part of
the series being studied.14
Application has been made to such
failure mechanisms as superheater
creep and economizer fatigue
cracking.14
8.3 Assessment for Tubes
Operating in the Non-Creep
regime
Waterwall tubes are normally carbon
or low alloy steel with service metal
temperatures up to about 450°C (~
840°F) and are therefore outside the
regime of creep deformation. As a
result, they are designed for infinite
life assuming no corrosion occurs.
Remaining life analysis is required
when a wall thinning mechanism
such as corrosion or erosion does
occur, particularly for material
removal rates in excess of about 40
nm/hr (13.8 mils/yr).
Waterwall tube remaining life is
based on a method that limits the
developed hoop stress to less than
a critical value which is related to
the strength of the material. A for-
mula for the remaining life of these
tubes will be similar to that devel-
oped by the CEGB15:
R = W2 (2Fc - P) - P(D-2W)
ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ (8-2)
C(2Fc - P)
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
where:
W = original wall thickness, mm
W2 = present wall thickness, mm
C = corrosion rate, mm/hr
D = original outside diameter of
the tubing, mm
P = internal pressure, N/mm2
Fc = material failure criterion,
N/mm2
R = remaining life, hrs.
The recommended value for Fc is:
Fc = 1/2Kt (Futs - Fps) (8-3)
where:
Futs = ultimate tensile strength of
the material, N/mm2
Fps = proof stress of the material,
N/mm2
Kt = a safety factor to accommo
date scatter in tensile data,
For mild steels it has been found
advisable to use the appropriate
properties for a temperature of
450°C which are: Kt = 1.25 and
Fc = 227 N/mm2.
8-7
8.4 References
1Dooley, B., “Boiler Tube Failures - A Perspective and A
Vision”, in B. Dooley, ed., Proceedings: International
Conference on Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil Plants, held
in San Diego, California November 5-7, 1991,
Proceedings TR-100493, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1992, pp. 1-1 through 1-29.
2Viswanathan, R., S.R. Paterson, H. Grunloh, and S. Gehl,
“Life Assessment of Superheater/Reheater Tubes, ibid.,
pp. 7-1 through 7-49.
3Viswanathan, R., S.R. Paterson, H. Grunloh, and S. Gehl,
“Life Assessment of Superheater/Reheater Tubes in Fossil
Boilers”, ASME Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology,
Volume 116, February, 1994, pp. 1-16.
4Viswanathan, R. and S. Gehl, “Advances in Life
Assessment Techniques for Fossil Power Plant
Components Operating at Elevated Temperatures”, in
A.E. Meligi, T.V. Narayanan, and C.B. Bond, eds., PVP-
Volume 208, Power Plant Systems/Components Aging
Management and Life Extension, Book No. H00634,
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1991.
5Paterson,
S. R. and T.W. Rettig, Remaining Life
Assessment of Superheater and Reheater Tubes,
Research Project 2253-5, Final Report CS-5564, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, May, 1988.
6Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
7Paterson,
S.R., R. Moser, and T.R. Rettig, “Oxidation of
Boiler Tubing” in B. Dooley and A. Bursik, eds.,
Interaction of Iron-Based Materials with Water and Steam:
Proceedings of an International Conference, held in
Heidelberg, Germany, June 3-5, 1992, Electric Power
Research Institute, Report TR-102101, Palo Alto, CA,
1992, pp. 8-1 through 8-25.
8-8 Boiler Tube Remaining Life Assessment
8Rehn, I.M. and W. Apblett, Corrosion Problems in Coal-
Fired Fossil Boiler Superheater and Reheater Tubes,
Final Report CS-1811, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, 1981.
9Dewitte, M. and J. Stubbe, personal communication to
D.A. Roberts of G.A. Technologies, San Diego, Laborolec
Co., Belgium, 1986.
10Letter communication D.A. Roberts (G.A. Technologies)
to R. Viswanathan, 1986.
11Grunloh, H.J. and R.H Ryder, Life Assessment of
Boiler Pressure Parts, Volume 7: Life Assessment
Technology for Superheater/Reheater Tubes, Research
Project 2253-10, Final Report TR-103377-V1/7, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, November, 1993
12Viswanathan, R., Damage Mechanisms and Life
Assessment of High-Temperature Components, ASM
International, Metals Park, Ohio, 1989.
13Davison, J.K, “The Use of BTF Statistics to Estimate
Future Incidence of Failures”, in B. Dooley and D.
Broske, eds., Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil Power Plants,
Conference Proceedings, Conference held in Atlanta,
Georgia, November 10-12, 1987, CS-5500-SR, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1988, pp. 1-37
through 1-51.
14Davison, J.K., “Experience in the Use of Boiler Tube
Failure Prediction to Aid Maintenance Planning”, op. cit.
ref. 1, pp. 10-1 through 10-16.
15Laxton, J.W., D.B. Meadowcroft, F. Clarke, T. Flatley,
C.W. King, and C.W. Morris, The Control of Fireside
Corrosion in Power Station Boilers, Third edition, Central
Electricity Generating Board, 1987.
Temperature (°F) Oxide Thickness (Mils) Chapter 9 • Volume 1
1050 24.0
Thermocouple data
1020 20.8
990
960
Oxide
17.6
14.4
Determining the Extent
930
900
1 6
thickness
11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56
11.2
8.0 of Macroscopic Damage:
Overview of Inspection
Tube Element
Methods, Monitoring, and
Sampling
9.1 Introduction
There are a variety of nondestructive
and destructive methods to assess
boiler tube condition. This chapter
provides a brief overview of some of
those methods as they pertain to the
assessment of boiler tubing.
Inspection is used for a variety of
purposes including1:
• To identify defective components
• To determine the extent of dam-
age. This is required to help
develop the appropriate action
strategy as well as to assess
remaining life of the component.
• To identify any secondary (conse-
quential) damage. This is an
important and sometimes over-
looked aspect of inspection.
• To assist in identifying the failure
mechanism, although this may
more often be by a technique that
can determine microscopic dam-
age, the subject of Chapter 10.
• In a pro-active manner as part of
a component life management
program to detect early signs of
damage.
• As part of the repair process to
ensure that all defects/damage
are removed prior to welding.
• After the repair to confirm that no
rejectable defects are present.
• As part of a periodic re-inspection
program to determine the suc-
cess of corrective actions, and to
detect developing problems.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
The factors that will affect the choice
of NDE method include: (i) the nature
of the damage that is suspected, (ii)
access, (iii) material and/or weld
type, and (iv) the detection capabili-
ties and limitations of the NDE
method. An overview of five primary
methods (ultrasonic testing, liquid
penetrant, magnetic particle, radio-
graphic testing and eddy current test-
ing) is provided in Table 9-1. A num-
ber of good texts are available for
reviews of the most common techni-
ques, see for example, the American
Society for Metals, Metals Handbook,
Volume 17: Nondestructive Inspection
and Quality Control3.
For any given damage type, there
may be an array of optional exami-
nation methods. For example, hydro-
gen damage is particularly difficult to
detect since it occurs at a micro-
structural level and therefore simple
non-destructive inspection methods
are not available; nonetheless there
are at least three detection options
that can be pursued: (i) evaluate for
the effects of hydrogen damage, that
is measure for tube wastage and
wall thinning, (ii) direct measure for
the presence of micro-fissuring at
grain boundaries, or (iii) the
changed tube material properties.
Specific guidance is provided in the
individual mechanism writeups of
Volumes 2 and 3.
Formal, written procedures are
required independent of the exami-
nation method chosen. A checklist
for the contents of those procedures
is provided in Table 9-2.
9-1
Table 9-1
Comparison of Nondestructive Examination Methods
NDE Method Detection Capability
Ultrasonic testing • Accuracy better than one percent of
thickness.
• Depends strongly upon specific tech-
nique, part geometry, and material.
• 0.5 mm (0.02 in.) equivalent flat-
bottomed hole in large forgings.
Liquid penetrant • Crack-like flaws equal to or greater
than 10-4 mm ( 4 x 10-6 in.) wide.
• Pits or voids 0.025 mm (0.001 in.) in
diameter.
Magnetic • Surface discontinuities 0.025 mm
(0.001 in.) deep.
• Subsurface discontinuities generally
to 6.35 mm (0.25 in.) deep, optimally
to 25.4 mm (1.0 in.) deep.
Radiography • Absorption differences of 2% or more
are detectable.
Eddy current • 0.25 mm (0.010 in.) deep surface
cracks.
• 0.075 mm (0.003 in.) pits.
• Can penetrate up to 12.5 mm (0.5 in.)
below surface.
Adapted from: P. Cohen2
9-2 Determining the Extent of Macroscopic Damage
Advantages
• Great penetrating power.
• High sensitivity.
• Potentially good accuracy for deep
internal flaws.
• Only one-surface access necessary.
• Not hazardous.
• Applicable to any size, shape, or
composition.
• Simplicity of process and
interpretation.
• Inexpensive.
• Detects various flaw types.
• Best method for small and/or shallow
cracks.
• Can detect subsurface flaws.
• Few size and shape limitations.
• Rapid, simple, and inexpensive.
• Works with surface films.
• Locates and sizes surface or internal
flaws.
• Best technique for volumetric defects.
• Permanent inspection record.
• Versatile and rapid.
• Detects all types of flaws.
• Surface and near-surface detection.
• Sensitive to microstructure.
• Probe need not contact surface.
• Surface cleaning usually not required.
Disadvantages, Limitations
and Precautions
• Rough, irregular surfaces difficult or
impossible.
• Near-surface flaws not detectable.
• Reference standards needed.
• Couplant between transducer and part
required.
• Certain microstructures hinder
interpretation.
• Trained operators and highly technical
interpreters needed.
• Flaws must be surface-connected.
• Surface finish must be fairly good.
• Penetrant must wet the surface.
• Surface films can interfere.
• Parts must be cleaned before and after
testing to avoid corrosion.
• Applies only to ferromagnetic materials.
• Tight cracks may not be detected.
• Flaw must be transverse to magnetic
field.
• Surface must be stripped on nonferro-
magnetic features.
• Part must be cleaned of particles and
demagnetized after inspection.
• Interpretation takes skill.
• Planar flaws can be a problem.
• Time consuming and costly capital
equipment.
• Access to two sides needed.
• Hazardous; significant space and
shielding requirements.
• Evaluation difficult.
• Part must be electrical conductor.
• Ferromagnetic materials pose special
problems.
• Reference standards required.
• Interpretation can be complicated.
9.2 Codes and Standards Table 9-3
Table 9-3 provides a list of the ASTM and ASME Standards for Nondestructive Examination Methods
American Society for Testing and Liquid Penetrant Testing
Materials (ASTM) and American
Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM E165 Standard Practice for Liquid Penetration Inspection Method
(ASME) standard practices for vari- ASTM E270 Standard Definitions for Terms Relating to Liquid Penetrant Inspections
ous NDE techniques. Table 9-4 gives ASTM E433 Standard Reference Photographs for Liquid Penetrant Inspection
the standards for tubular products. ASME Section V Article 6
The ASME Boiler and Pressure Magnetic Particle Testing
Vessel (B&PV) Code requirements ASTM E709 Standard Recommended Practice for Magnetic Particle Examination
and methods for NDE are covered
ASTM E269 Standard Definitions of Terms Relating to Magnetic Particle Examination
in Section V, “Nondestructive
Examination”. ASME Section V Article 7
Radiographic Testing
9.3 Ultrasonic Testing (UT) ASTM E94 Standard Practice for Radiographic Testing
Ultrasonic testing (UT) is a key ASTM E142 Standard Method for Controlling Quality of Radiographic Testing
method in many boiler tube exami- ASTM E586 Standard Definitions of Terms Relating to Gamma and X Radiography
nations. This is a primary method ASME Section V Article 2
used for boiler tube inspections to
detect cracking, wall thinning, and Ultrasonic Testing
steamside oxide thickness. ASTM E500 Standard Definitions of Terms Relating to Ultrasonic Testing
Specialized forms of UT are used to ASTM E428 Standard Recommended Practice for Fabrication and Control of Steel
detect waterside deposits, a precur- Reference Blocks Used In Ultrasonic Inspection
sor to the underdeposit corrosion ASTM E213 Standard Practice for Ultrasonic Inspection of Metal Pipe and Tubing
mechanisms, and to detect subtle
ASTM E164 Standard Practice for Ultrasonic Contact Examination of Weldments
microstructural changes such as
induced by hydrogen damage. ASTM E797 Standard Practice for Measuring Thickness by Manual Ultrasonic
Pulse-Echo Contact Method
ASTM E114 Standard Recommended Practice for Ultrasonic Pulse-Echo
Table 9-2
Straight-Beam Testing by Contact Method
General Checklist for Nondestructive
Examination Procedure Contents ASME Section V Article 4
Testing Agency Qualification
• Written procedure
• Procedure number ASTM E543 Standard Practice for Determining the Qualification of Nondestructive
• Procedure approved by certified Level III Testing Agencies
operator
Source: G.G. Stephenson and J.W. Prince1
• Products to be tested
• Serialization of parts
• Applicable code
• Code effective date Table 9-4
• Revision history American Society for Testing and Materials Standards for
• Operator certification requirements Nondestructive Examination of Tubular Products
• Operator qualification records
• Operator eye examinations A450 Standard Specification for General Requirements for Carbon, Ferritic Alloy, and Austenitic
• Calibration data Alloy Steel Tubes
• Organization E273 Standard Practice for Ultrasonic Examination of Longitudinal Welded Pipe and Tubing
• Responsibilities
E213 Standard Practice for Ultrasonic Inspection of Metal Pipe and Tubing
• Chemical requirements of consumables such
as: tapes, markers, couplants, penetrant E309 Standard Practice for Eddy Current Examination of Steel Tubular Products
materials, etc. Using Magnetic Saturation
• Shooting sketch (RT) E426 Standard Practice for Electromagnetic (Eddy Current) Testing of Seamless and Welded
• Interpretation and evaluation of indications Tubular Products, Austenitic Stainless Steel and Similar Alloys
• Acceptance criteria
• Handling of non-conforming items E570 Standard Practice for Flux Leakage Examination of Ferromagnetic Steel Tubular Products
• Mechanism of repair and rework
Source: G.G. Stephenson and J.W. Prince1
• Re-inspection after repair and rework
• Reporting forms
• Record retention period

Source: G.G. Stephenson and J.W. Prince1

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 9-3

Most UT methods are well-
established. Although they require a
reasonably skilled operator for inter-
pretation, these skills are available
to utilities either in-house or on a
contract basis. Guidance about
1) TS = 1007°F
pre-inspection activities, standards, 2) TSSO = 1034°F
Steamside
precautions about data-taking in scale = 9 mils 1 2 3 4 3) TSOM = 1063°F
boilers, and inspection rates is 4) TMFO = 1100°F
available.4, 5
Factors which must be considered
in UT include the angle of the sound
beam, the testing surface, the scan
pattern, and the scan coverage.
Principal limitations to UT are the
need for coupling between the
sound transducer and the tube
surface, the difficulty in interpreting
signals, and the limited sound
penetration capability in nickel base 1) TS = 1007°F
alloys and austenitic stainless steels. Steamside 2) TSSO = 1034°F
scale = 20 mils 1 2 3 4 3) TSOM = 1099°F
Depending upon the application,
4) TMFO = 1135°F
sample tubes may be required to
allow for custom designing the
transducer shoe and establishing
the testing procedures. The various
UT applications to boiler tubing,
except for the standard use of UT to
detect cracking, are examined in the
subsections below. Figure 9-1. Influence of steamside scale thickness on the tube metal temperature (not
to scale).
9.3.1 Ultrasonic testing to measure
wall thinning. To measure wall thin-
ning, a UT pulse is generated by a ods are now available that can track Once the steamside scale thickness
transducer coupled to the surface of the large number of ultrasonic data and tube dimensions are known, the
interest. When the pulse hits a points in a utility boiler. effective temperature and stress at a
boundary (surface) the energy is Damage caused by pitting can be
given instant can be evaluated and
reflected. The time of transit can difficult to detect unless it is exten- remaining life methods as outlined in
then be used to calculate the dis- sive in which case UT may be able Chapter 8 can be applied. However,
tance traveled and thus the thick- to gauge the resultant loss of wall there will be a distribution of gas and
ness of the material. thickness. metal temperatures, such as illus-
trated in Figure 9-2, and therefore a
UT thickness surveys are performed
9.3.2 Ultrasonic testing for measur- need to survey in a cost-effective
periodically on boiler tubing to mea-
ing steamside oxide thickness. The way for the highest risk locations.
sure the wall thickness. Procedures
for thickness gauging by pulse-echo creep rupture of SH/RH tubes is Within the past few years, there has
UT are described in detail by an major cause of unit outages. Tube been good correlation of non-
ASTM Standard Practice.6 An accu- temperatures are continuously destructive ultrasonic measures of
racy of ± 0.13 mm (± 0.005 in) can increasing during service as a result steamside oxide thickness using
be obtained with proper calibration of the buildup of steamside scale. A time-of-flight with that measured in
and operation of the ultrasonic simple example, provided in Figure samples removed from service.7
instrument. 9-1 illustrates the point. Here a differ-
ence in steamside oxide thickness of The details of the method have been
Periodic surveys to detect tube thin- 20 mils versus 9 mils results in an described elsewhere.8, 9, 10 Figure
ning is a primary part of a unit increase of 19.4°C (35°F) in the tube 9-3 shows the results of an experi-
assessment. Data from previous sur- skin temperature (for a constant mental program at two units (one
veys at the same locations can be steam temperature); this translates to coal-fired and one gas-fired) to
used to calculate a thinning rate, an determine the accuracy of the UT
a significant decrease in the creep
input to a remaining life assessment. method for measuring oxide scale
life of the tube.
Computer-aided data analysis meth- non-destructively. As shown, there is

9-4 Determining the Extent of Macroscopic Damage

 “A”), while at a location less than
Temperature (°F) Oxide Thickness (Mils) three feet away it makes a bend and
takes on the characteristics of a
1050 24.0
Thermocouple data leading tube (“out-of-plane”, loca-
tion “B”). Metallographic results of
1020 20.8 the oxide thickness as a function of
circumferential position show a
nearly 30 mil difference between the
990 17.6
two locations. This would result in a
considerable difference in the pre-
960 14.4 dicted remaining life between the
Oxide two locations.
thickness
930 11.2 UT measurements taken on the tube
at location A, over approximately a
60° arc show good correlation with
900 8.0
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 the measurements taken by destruc-
tive means. The lesson from these
Tube Element results is that the locations for UT
testing must be carefully considered
Figure 9-2. Typical distribution of oxide thickness and temperature across a sec- including7: (i) elevation within the
ondary superheater. boiler/assembly, (ii) circumferential
location with respect to flue gas flow
or surrounding tubes, and (iii) on the
surface of the tube.
Oxide Thickness (UT) (mils) Some surface preparation is gener-
40 ally required such as grit-blasting
Coal fired host unit followed by light grinding with an
35 abrasive flapper wheel. Care should
Gas fired host unit
30 be taken not to “over-prepare” the
surface which will result in wall thin-
25 ning and lead to decreased tube
service life as well as an overly con-
20 servative estimate of tube wastage.
15 As noted above, measurement loca-
tions should be chosen that repre-
10 sent the areas of highest metal tem-
perature (thickest oxide growth) and
5 most severe external tube wastage
0 by erosion or corrosion. Typical key
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 locations are the 12 o’clock position
Oxide Thickness (met) (mils) on leading tubes of an assembly
(flue gas at 12 o’clock) and at the 1
to 2 o’clock and the 10 to 11 o’clock
Figure 9-3. Correlation of oxide thickness measurements by ultrasonic testing (UT) positions on trailing tubes. UT test-
with metallographic sampling (met). Source: H.J. Grunloh and R.H. Ryder7 ing for oxide thickness is normally
done in conjunction with wall thick-
ness measurements.
a good correlation between the UT ment is still required as there can be Locations are chosen on the basis
results and those obtained from tube considerable variation of the oxide of needs, design and unit operating
sampling. It has been variously thickness, along the length of a tube data. Criteria will include11: (i) suffi-
estimated that the minimum oxide and around its circumference.7 An cient locations to determine accu-
scale thickness measurable by the example of the challenge is illus- mulated creep damage and metal
UT method ranges from about 2 to trated in Figure 9-4. The figure temperatures across the boiler and
10 mils. shows the results of the measure- through assemblies, (ii) accessibility,
ment of steamside scale in a (iii) operating conditions, and (iv)
Although this method avoids many
reheater tube removed from a gas-
of the problems inherent in destruc-
fired unit. The tube is shielded for
tive sampling schemes, good judg-
part of its length (“in-plane”, location

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 9-5


Oxide Thickness (mils)
60
50
Front of tube location B
40
30
UT
20 Front of tube Metallography
location A
10
0 9.3.4 Ultrasonic detection of
0 160 120
Circumferential Location (degrees)
Figure 9-4. Steamside oxide thickness versus circumferential location at two locations
on a tube separated by a distance of three feet.
Source: H.J. Grunloh and R.H. Ryder7
dimensional or materials transition
locations. UT testing should be ide-
ally performed on at least 75% of all
material transition points.
9.3.3 Ultrasonic testing for measure-
ments of waterside deposit thick-
ness. UT has also been success-
fully applied to determine the
increase in waterside deposits.12 A
pulse-echo or transit-time method
has been used to measure deposit
thicknesses along with proprietary
software/hardware to differentiate
the signal obtained from tubes with
and without significant deposits.
Because of the lower density of
waterside deposits compared to
steam side scales, the results do not
provide a quantitative measure of
deposit loading (in g/ft2 or mg/cm2,
for example), but the ability to sur-
vey large areas and pinpoint high
deposit locations for specific sam-
pling is advantageous. The tech-
nique is most useful for identifying
areas with heavy deposit loading
(> 20 g/ft2), less so for moderate
deposit loading (5 - 20 g/ft2).
Factors influencing the measure-
ment of deposits include12: (i) tube
geometry and type (ribbed, metal-
B work well with coextruded tubes,
A rials does not cause signal attenua-
Gas
A 3'
B surface finishes are poor, or in stud-
180 240 300 360
ized, bends, eroded areas), (ii) tube
surface condition (internal and
external), (iii) metal condition (cor-
roded, cracked, bulged), (iv) wet
(flooded) versus dry tubes, (v) inter-
nal deposit loading, (vi) internal
deposit type (composition, density,
morphology, stratification), and (vii)
transducer type (frequency, delays,
contact surface area).
Locations chosen for UT testing
should be among the high risk loca-
tions such as those subject to high
heat flux or local flow disruptions.
Table 2-6 has a complete list of local
conditions that can lead to initial
deposits.
As with other UT methods, careful
tube surface preparation is required
to obtain accurate results. For this
method, the external surface condi-
tion, as well as the internal condi-
tion, for example the extent of pit-
ting, etc. will dominate the determi-
nation of deposit buildup.
Calibration via tube sampling is
required to provide a reference point
for field test results. A minimum of
one tube prior to, and one tube post
testing is recommended with addi-
tional samples to provide a range of
deposit readings and/or some that
focus on areas with high levels of
deposits.12
The method has been shown to
carbon steel coextruded with Type
304 stainless steel, for example, as
the interface between the two mate-
tion problems and surface finish is
appropriately smooth. In contrast,
the method is not recommended at
this time for metalized tubes, where
ded tubes as there is insufficient
access for the UT transducer.12
microstructural changes. UT has
also been used in an attempt to
detect subtle changes in microstruc-
ture induced by hydrogen damage.
The wave velocity, attenuation, and
backscatter signal are all affected
by hydrogen damage.
In the 1980s an approach was tried
to measure attenuation associated
with grain boundary cavitation.13 A
number of successful applications
have been reported13; however the
method was not fully satisfactory
because of its sensitivity to various
factors including surface condition
(roughness), corrosion, pitting and
transducer coupling. In a similar
manner, the backscattering method
was also found to have shortcom-
ings, notably the backscatter from
hydrogen damage was difficult to
separate from that due to inside sur-
face corrosion.14
As a result of these shortcomings a
UT method based on velocity
changes has been developed.13,14,15
The method relies on the fact that
the velocity of sound through a
material is a function of its modulus
of elasticity, a material property that
is changed by the accumulation of
hydrogen damage. A pair of trans-
ducers are operated in the pitch-
catch mode. As the signal passes
through a damaged region, the
change in transit time is noted; that
change can then be related to the

9-6 Determining the Extent of Macroscopic Damage

depth of hydrogen damage. Both
laboratory and field tests have con-
firmed the usefulness of the method
developed.13,14 Additional informa-
tion about the use of this technique
for detecting hydrogen damage can
be found in the mechanism discus-
sion, Chapter 15, Volume 2.
9.4 Other Standard Inspection
Methods
9.4.1 Visual examination. Visual
examination is a primary means to
assess boiler tubing for conditions
such as:
• Fireside wastage caused by cor-
rosion and erosion processes.
• Significant wastage by recogniz-
ing the presence of rusted tube
locations within a few hours of a
boiler wash, indicating the
removal of protective surface
oxides.
• Broken attachments, hangers, or
supports can warn of higher
imposed stresses on affected
tubing.
• Tubes misaligned out of the gen-
eral platen can lead to overheat-
ing or may be symptomatic of
excessive restraint stresses.
• Convection pass fouling or
blocked passages might induce
localized high velocity conditions
and provide the potential for fly-
ash erosion.
• Flame impingement, carbon parti-
cle impingement, or burner mis-
alignment can be a sign of local-
ized overheating of tubes and
eventually can manifest damage
via a variety of mechanisms.
• Water-side scaling, corrosion,
deposition and/or pitting can be
detected using borescopes, fiber
optics, mirrors, and miniature
closed circuit television sys-
tems.16
• Measurement of tube diameters
can detect tube bulging, a pre-
cursor to failure by short-term
overheating due to blockage, for
example.
9.4.2 Liquid penetrant testing (PT).
Liquid penetrant testing (PT) is used
to find cracks or pores in materials
provided that the discontinuities are
clean and open to the surface. This
method is applicable to magnetic
and nonmagnetic materials and is
particularly useful where magnetic
particle examinations cannot be
used. The penetrant may be a visi-
ble dye used in normal light or a flu-
orescent dye for detecting smaller
defects. Typical boiler tube damage
detected using PT includes dissimi-
lar metal weld cracking, stress cor-
rosion cracking, fatigue and weld
defects.
9.4.3 Magnetic particle testing (MT).
Magnetic particle testing is used for
detecting surface or near-surface
discontinuities in ferromagnetic
materials such as damage caused
by fatigue, stress corrosion cracking
or surface-related material defects.
For stress corrosion cracking, the
cracks are usually tight and the use
of fluorescent magnetic particle may
be useful. MT is used primarily in
the tube manufacturing process, but
may also be employed to detect
welding defects. The magnetic
fields produced by DC are more
penetrating than those produced by
AC and allow the detection of dis-
continuities deeper in the material.
MT cannot be used to inspect non-
ferromagnetic materials such as
austenitic stainless steels. Joints
between steels with dissimilar mag-
netic characteristics may create
magnetic particle indications even
though the joints are sound.
9.4.4 Radiographic testing (RT).
Radiographic testing is used to
detect surface and subsurface dis-
continuities which can be aligned
with the propagation direction of the
radiation beam. Factors to be con-
sidered for RT include: accessibility,
radioisotope source strength, geom-
etry, exposure time and distance,
material thickness, and the spatial
relationship of the type of disconti-
nuity. Selection of the radiation
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
source for a particular tube wall
thickness is a critical factor since
low contrast and poor radiographic
sensitivity will result if the energy of
the source is too high or too low. RT
is based on differences in density in
the material so that discontinuities
must be more or less aligned with
the radiation beam. Since RT
involves the use of a radioactive
source, radiographers must be spe-
cially trained and licensed, and
safety procedures established.
A specialized radiographic tech-
nique, termed the Union Electric
technique for its developer, can
detect well-developed damage in
dissimilar metal welds (DMW) made
with stainless steel filler metal.17,18,19
The basics of the method are illus-
trated in Chapter 35, Volume 3
which addresses DMW failures.
Although the method can detect
damage levels down to about 5% of
the interface, film interpolation was
found to be difficult below about
15% damage.19 Good correlation
between the technique and actual
damage was confirmed for over 50
DMWs that had damage levels
ranging from 5 to 90%.19
RT can also be used to measure the
extent of waterside corrosion fatigue
damage without removing the lag-
ging and insulation.
9.4.5 Eddy current. In eddy current
testing, a search coil is used to
induced electric currents (electro-
magnetic induction) in a part to be
inspected. Discontinuities in the part
create eddy currents that are
detected by the search coil. The
method is very sensitive, which can
create interpretation difficulties. A
constraint on the technique is that
the part has to be electrically con-
ducting; otherwise it has wide-
spread application.
Sollish20 reviewed a remote field
eddy current (RFEC) technology for
use in measuring boiler tube wall
thickness. A probe containing an
exciter coil and one or more
receiver coils is inserted into the
9-7
tube to be inspected. Currents gen-
erated by exciter and detected at
the receiver coils are changed in
magnitude and delayed in phase
depending on the thickness of the
tube they travel through.20 The
results can be obtained for the entire
tube circumference and length,
overcoming the “spot-check” nature
of other sampling NDE schemes.
Since internal scale and deposits do
not appreciably affect the results,
cleaning is not required prior to the
test. The method requires skilled
interpretation, particularly as
changes in tube geometry such as
bends generate the same patterns
as wall loss. The results, obtained on
several hundred boilers, indicated a
system accuracy of ± 10% (worst
case) to ± 1% (best case) with the
greater wall loss having the greater
accuracy.20 As a result, note was
made only of wall loss greater than
30%. Good repeatability was found.
9.4.6 Acoustic monitoring. Acoustic
systems monitor the jet noise gener-
ated by a leak.21 This sound propa-
gates through the furnace gas to
sensitive piezoelectric transducers
mounted on the walls. Relatively few
probes, typically 6 to 12, can be
used to monitor an entire boiler.
While these systems are very good
for leak detection, they are some-
what poorer at leak location. This is
particularly true in tightly-spaced
tube bundles such as the super-
heaters and reheaters, and yet these
are the areas where manually locat-
ing a leak is most difficult.
In addition to air- or fluid-borne
noise generated by leaks, there is
also structure-borne sound which
can be detected by high frequency
piezoelectric transducers. Whenever
plastic strains occur in a material,
acoustic energy is emitted, com-
monly called acoustic emission.
Typically, the acoustic emission can
be detected earlier in the degrada-
tion process than air-borne noise.22
Acoustic emission technology has
been applied for a number of years
in the industry. These applications
include both crack growth detection
9-8 Determining the Extent of Macroscopic Damage
Stainless steel pad,
longitudinally mounted Stainless steel
and welded on three sides gear clamps
Figure 9-5. Pad-type thermocouple attachment to tube. The steel pad can be insulated.
Flue gas flow
Weld
Hot junctions metal
Dutchman
with
chordal Grind
T/C out Peen over
channel channel
Outlet Shielding
tube
Thermocouple
wire
Vestibule Flue gas flow
Cross Section Side View
Figure 9-6. Typical location of in-furnace chordal thermocouple within tube assembly.
Source: H.J. Grunloh and R.H. Ryder7
and leak detection in components; microstructural changes which pro-
the feasibility of on-line acoustic vide indications of past (average)
emission monitoring in hostile envi- temperatures.
ronments has been demonstrated.
Thermocouples should be installed
so as to provide good analysis of
9.5 Monitoring Temperatures outlet temperature profiles across
the boiler and through assemblies.
The accurate determination of tem-
Typically 20-30 percent of the tube
perature, particularly in SH/RH tub-
outlet legs and a half a dozen tube
ing is critical to an accurate deter-
inlet legs are instrumented in the
mination of remaining tube life.
penthouse outside of the fireside
Methods can be either direct, pri-
heat flux region.11 These should be
marily thermocoupling, which pro-
regarded as a primary resource in
vide current temperature levels, or
assessing SH/RH temperatures and
indirect. A few comments about
life.
thermocouples are provided here.
Chapter 10 provides more complete
discussion about indirect methods
such as oxide scale analysis or

Flue gas
flow
Figure 9-7. Chordal thermocoupled tube sections reinserted into original location
within the tube assembly. Note stainless steel shielding tube which surrounds thermo-
couple lead wires. Source: H.J. Grunloh and R.H. Ryder7
9.5.1 Pad-type thermocouples.
Pad-type thermocouples are com-
mon in boilers both as original con-
struction and installed for monitoring
operation and maintenance. Figure
9-5 shows the typical construction. A
thermocouple junction is embedded
in a small metal plate (approximately
1 inch square) then welded to the
tube of interest and covered with
insulation. The lead should be
attached to the tube about every 1 to
2 inches to prevent burnout. The
thermocouple is attached to the tube
to allow differential thermal expan-
sion of the metal plate and the tube.
9.5.2 In-furnace chordal thermocou-
ples. Chordal thermocouples are
designed to measure in-furnace
tube metal temperatures directly and
to provide information about
through-wall temperature gradients.
Figure 9-6 (left side) shows a typical
location that would be monitored
with chordal thermocouples. The
installation is accomplished by plac-
ing a thermocouple junction at mid-
wall points such as locations at 25%
and 50% from the outside surface.
Tube sections are drilled to place
New tube
(no ID oxide)
Chordal
thermocouples
(OD and midwall)
Old tube
(ID oxide present)
Shielding tube
T/C lead wires
the thermocouple wires which are
then tack welded in place and cov-
ered by peening-in weld metal. The
process is shown in the right side of
Figure 9-6. The tube section thus
instrumented is then welded back
into the circuit and the lead wires
covered with a stainless steel shield-
ing tube. The resulting installation is
shown in Figure 9-7.
Additional detail about thermocou-
ple theory and application can be
found in reference 23.
9.6 Monitoring Heat Flux
Heat flux can be monitored using
chordal thermocouples, absorbed
heat flux meters (flux tubes or
domes), and incident heat flux
meters (flux probes). At least three
chordal thermocouples from the
crown of a tube to the membrane in
the case of waterwall measurements
are appropriate for heat flux charac-
terization24; although heat flux is not
measured directly, it can be inferred
from the differences in reading from
the thermocouples.
Absorbed heat flux meters measure
a thermal gradient in a cylinder of
known thermal conductivity, and
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
thus deduce heat flux. At least two
types are available, a flux tube and
a dome. The latter have the advan-
tage that they can be attached as
discrete devices to the surfaces of
existing tubes without removal of the
tubes from the boiler.
The flux meter is designed to mea-
sure total (convective and radiative)
heat flux. It consists of a water-
cooled probe that houses a cylindri-
cal block. The block has a serrated,
blackened front surface to give high
radiation absorption. Front and rear
thermocouples are used to calculate
heat flux.25 It has an accuracy of 3
percent and a cost of about
$10,000.25
The Fluxdome consists of two con-
centric cylinders. An inner, or “sen-
sor” cylinder contains two thermo-
couples; surrounding it the outer or
“guard” cylinder ensures that there is
minimum unwanted loss of heat
through the side of the sensor cylin-
der. The temperature gradient in the
sensor cylinder is measured with two
thermocouples placed inside the
sensor cylinder and is proportional to
the heat flux. The Fluxdome has a
manufacturers specified range of
operation of 0 -1200°C with a tem-
perature resolution of better than
3°C.
Experience at the former CEGB indi-
cated that absorbed heat flux was
generally between 50-75% of the
incident flux depending on tube
condition.26 The range of absorbed
heat fluxes was from less than 100
kW/m2 in heavily slagged areas to
over 500 kW/m2 on clean tubes in
boilers at high loads; typically val-
ues on CEGB combustion chambers
were 300-350 kW/m2.26 It should
also be noted that accurate heat
flux measurement requires that the
device used should have the same
layer of ash as on the tubes sur-
rounding it.
9-9
9.7 Monitoring Displacements
and Strains
Displacements are most commonly
measured with linear voltage digital
transducers (LVDTs).
There are a variety of sensors avail-
able to measure strain. Those most
commonly applied to boiler tubes
are weldable strain gages and
capacitance strain gages.
Conventional resistance strain
gages can be used for low-tempera-
ture locations but are generally lim-
ited to temperatures up to about
300°C (~ 575°F).
High-temperature gages have been
extensively evaluated in laboratory
testing but in-plant use, although
promising27, is more limited.
Weldable platinum-tungsten gages
have temperature ratings up to
about 650°C (~ 1200°F) with field
confirmation of reliable static strain
measures up to about 480°C
(~ 900°F). Nickel-chromium gages
used in the same field tests were
found to give accurate dynamic
strains at temperatures up to around
815°C (~ 1500°F). The latter were
used on the fireside of waterwall
panels as a result. The gages did
not require shielding, although the
leads were shielded. Capacitance
strain gages were used on the cold
side of the waterwall panels.
9-10 Determining the Extent of Macroscopic Damage
Strain levels will be highly localized,
so that care must be taken to pick
locations for analysis carefully con-
sidering the complexity of the local
geometry, loading conditions and
temperature ranges. For practical
purposes, strain gages are best
used to measure changes in strain
at a particular location as a function
of changes in operating conditions.
9.8 Sampling
Tube sampling is performed for a
variety of reasons: (i) as an aid to
root cause determination or confir-
mation, (ii) to confirm the accuracy
of nondestructive examination
results, (iii) to provide both qualita-
tive and quantitative information
about the type, extent and thickness
of deposits, (iv) to confirm oxide
scale thickness, (v) to provide mate-
rial needed to perform detailed
visual and metallurgical examina-
tions. Sampling practices and test
methods are provided in ASTM
Standards D88728 and D348329.
Some general considerations about
sampling include:
• Samples should be taken for a
specific purpose, for example to
confirm the results of NDE mea-
sures or to bound the “worst”
conditions: highest temperatures,
thickest steamside oxide, thickest
internal deposits, or worst wall
thinning, for example.
• A plan for the use of samples
should be prepared that specifi-
cally lays out what kinds of testing
are to be done on samples
removed: metallographic,
strength, creep rupture, wall,
steamside oxide and waterside
deposits thickness, measures, etc.
9.9 Hydrostatic Testing
A hydrostatic pressure test is good
practice following weld repairs and
as a means to ensure that all dam-
aged tubes have been identified fol-
lowing an outbreak of a particular
damage mechanism.
Testing is normally performed with
room temperature water to at least
normal operating pressure, but
preferably to 1.5 times the drum
design pressure. Visual examination
to detect leaking after testing is indi-
cated. For safety reasons the pres-
sure should be reduced prior to
visual inspection.
9.10 References
1Stephenson, G.G. and J.W. Prince, Guidelines on Fossil
Boiler Field Welding, Research Project 2504-02, Final
Report TR-101699, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, January, 1993.
2Cohen, P., ed., The ASME Handbook on Water
Technology for Thermal Systems, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 1989.
3American
Society for Metals, Metals Handbook, Volume
17: Nondestructive Inspection and Quality Control, 9th
edition, American Society for Metals, Metals Park, Ohio,
1989.
4Lamping,
G.A., L.A. LeJune, and W.R. Meredith,
“Ultrasonic Examination of Boiler Tubing: Automated
Data Acquisition and Computer-Aided Data Analysis”, in
Failures and Inspections of Fossil-Fired Boiler Tubes:
Conference and Workshop, Final Report CS-3272,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
December, 1983.
5Allen,
C.C. and E. R. Reinhart, “Optimized NDE
Methods for Preventive Maintenance of Power Boilers”,
ibid., pp. 5-1 through 5-15.
6American
Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E797-90 (1990), “Standard Practice for Measuring
Thickness by Manual Ultrasonic Pulse-Echo Contact
Method”, 1994 Annual Book of ASTM Standards:
Nondestructive Testing, Volume 03.03, Society for
Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1994.
7Grunloh,
H.J. and R.H. Ryder, Life Assessment of Boiler
Pressure Parts, Volume 7: Life Assessment Technology
for Superheater/Reheater Tubes Research Project 2253-
10, Final Report TR-103377-V1/7, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, November, 1993
8Bonin,
D.W., “Nondestructive Oxide Thickness
Measurement in Superheater and Reheater Tubing”, in
Proceedings of the EPRI Fossil Plant Inspections
Workshop, San Antonio, Texas, September 9-11, 1986,
Final Report CS-5320, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, 1987.
9Beak,
W.E. and D.W. Bonin, “Nondestructive
Technology to Evaluate Superheater Condition”, in B.
Dooley, and D. Broske, eds., Boiler Tube Failures in
Fossil Power Plants: Conference Proceedings,
Conference held in Atlanta, Georgia, November 10-12,
1987, CS-5500-SR, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, 1988, pp. 5-27 through 5-38.
10Adkins, W.J. and D.F. Powell, “Boiler Tube Internal
Scale Measurement Using Ultrasonic Inspection
Techniques and Interpretation of Results”, ibid., pp. 5-1
through 5-25.
11Hara, K., C. Lee, R. Moser, T. Rettig, and K. Clark,
Improved Superheater Component Longevity by Steam
Flow Redistribution, Research Project 1893-13, Final
Report TR-101697, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, December, 1992.
12Hicks, P., A. Banweg, and M. Parker, “The Use of
Ultrasonic Testing in Determining Waterside Deposit
Buildup in Boiler Systems”, Corrosion 94, Paper No. 205,
NACE International, 1994.
13Lamping, G.A., and S. Gehl, “Hydrogen Damage
Assessment Using Ultrasonic Velocity Measurement”, in
B. Dooley, ed., Proceedings: International Conference on
Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil Plants, held in San Diego,
California November 5-7, 1991, Proceedings TR-100493,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April,
1992, pp. 8-23 through 8-35.
14Birring,A.S., D.G. Alcazar, J.J. Hanley, G.J. Hendrix,
and S. Gehl, “Detection of Hydrogen Damage by
Ultrasonics”, op. cit. reference 9, pp. 5-59 through 5-67.
15Birring,A.S., D.G. Alcazar, J.J. Hanley, and S. Gehl,
“Ultrasonic Detection of Hydrogen Damage”, Materials
Evaluation, March, 1989, pp. 345-350, 369.
16Parker, J.D., A. McMinn, R.J. Bell, R.H. Richman, W.P.
McNaughton, J.P. Dimmer, J.E. Dammon, and D.S.
Galpin, Condition Assessment Guidelines for Fossil Fuel
Power Plant Components, Research Project 2596-10,
Topical Report GS-6724, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, March, 1990.
17Gurnea, R.F, “Radiographic Technique for Detecting
Cracks in Dissimilar Weld Joints”, in R. Viswanathan and
D.A. Roberts, eds., Proceedings: Seminar on Dissimilar
Welds in Fossil-Fired Boilers, held in New Orleans, LA.,
February 23-24, 1984, Research Project 1874-1,
Proceedings CS-3623, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, July, 1985, pp. 4-47 through 4-60.
18Prager, M., D.I. Roberts, H.J. Grunloh, and K.H. Holko,
Dissimilar-Weld Failure Analysis and Development
Program, Volume 5: Evaluation of Acoustic Emission and
Enhanced Radiography, Research Project 1874-1, Final
Report CS-4252, 8 Volumes, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA., November, 1985
19Grunloh, H.J., R.H. Ryder, and R. Hellner, “Damage
Assessment and Predictive Maintenance of Dissimilar
Metal Welds in Superheater and Reheater Tubes”, op.
cit., reference 13, pp. 7-51 through 7-76.
20Sollish,
D.B., “Field Experience Utilizing State-of the-Art
NDE Techniques Applied to In-Service Boiler Tube
Examinations”, ibid., pp. 8-1 through 8-23.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 9-11
21Stulen,F.B., B. Salisbury, and J.R. Scheibel, “Leak
Detection in Boilers”, op. cit. reference 9, pp. 5-91
through 5-104.
22Perkul, P.J., and S. Perrnise, Vibration Signature
Analysis and Acoustic Emission Monitoring at Brayton,
Final Report CS-1938, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, July, 1981.
23Stultz,
S.C. and J.B. Kitto, Steam: Its Generation and
Use, 40th Edition, Babcock & Wilcox Company,
Barberton, Ohio, 1992.
24Nowak, S., et al., Corrosion Fatigue Boiler Tube Failures
in Waterwalls and Economizers, Volume 5: Field
Validation, Research Project 1890-5, Final Report TR-
100455, V5, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto,
CA, 1996.
25Crim, H.G. and E.K. Levy, Power Plant Performance
Monitoring and Improvement, Volume 1: Boiler
Optimization, Research Projects 1681, 2153, Final Report
CS/EL-4415, Volume 1, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, February, 1986.
9-12 Determining the Extent of Macroscopic Damage
26The Control of Fireside Corrosion in Power Station
Boilers, Second edition, Central Electricity Generating
Board, 1977.
27Cane, B.J. and J.A. Williams, “Remaining Life
Prediction of High Temperature Materials”, International
Materials Review, Volume 32, Number 5, 1987, p.241.
28American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
D887-82 (1989), “Standard Practice for Sampling Water-
Formed Deposits”, 1992 Annual Book of ASTM
Standards: Water, Volume 11.02, American Society for
Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1992.
29American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
D3483-83(1990), “Standard Test Method for
Accumulated Deposition in a Steam Generator Tube”,
1992 Annual Book of ASTM Standards: Water, Volume
11.02, American Society for Testing and Materials,
Philadelphia, PA, 1992.
 10 1.0
Area Rate of Creep Void (x 103 mm-2)
fraction of M6C
Relative Fraction of M6C Carbide
8 0.8
4
6 0.6
0.4
2 0.2
0 0
10
Creep Rupture Life Consumption Rate (%)
Chapter 10 • Volume 1
Relative
carbide (D)
Determining the Extent
Area density
of creep
void (❍)
of Microstructural
Damage
20 40 60 80 100
10.1 Introduction
The microstructures of all boiler tube
materials are thermodynamically
unstable at elevated temperature
and are thus subject to time-depen-
dent changes. Under normal condi-
tions, any changes to carbon steel
economizer and waterwall tube
structures are very slight and can
be neglected. Low-alloy ferritic SH
and RH tubes, however, do show
perceptible structural changes after
long-term service, while austenitic
materials undergo both short-term
and occasionally, long-term
changes. When operating condi-
tions, particularly temperature,
exceed design levels, microstruc-
tural changes can be more signifi-
cant and can in some cases be
used as a measure of the deviation
from design conditions.1
A careful analysis of the microstruc-
ture of a boiler tube can provide sig-
nificant information about the ser-
vice conditions to which it has been
subjected. Microstructural analysis
is a vital tool in confirming the
mechanism of failure and underlying
root cause in failed tubes. Although
oxide scale is often the key determi-
nant of tube temperature history, in
those conditions where the oxide is
missing or incomplete, an analysis
of the tube microstructure can also
provide valuable guidance about
temperature history, needed for the
assessment of remaining life in
unfailed tubes.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
Table 10-1 lists those failure mecha-
nisms which are specifically accom-
panied by fundamental changes to
the tube microstructures. It excludes
those mechanisms for which only
cracking without other microstruc-
tural change, or surface hardening,
such as caused by the impact of
erosive particles, are evident.
This Chapter begins with brief dis-
cussions of microstructural changes
in ferritic steels (Section 10.2), and
continues with an overview of
changes in austenitic stainless
steels (Section 10.3). An overview of
methods for assessing the extent of
creep damage, a topic which has
seen considerable effort in the past
few years (Section 10.4), and a note
about post-exposure testing
(Section 10.5) are also included.
Detailed discussion of specific
microstructural changes that
accompany the mechanisms listed
in Table 10-1 is included in the
chapters referenced in the table.
Catalogues of tube microstructures
as a function of time, temperature
and stress history are available.
They should be consulted for com-
parative micrographs of undamaged
and service-degraded materials of
all boiler tube material classes, or to
compare samples removed from the
field with specimens containing
known amounts of accumulated
exposure.2 This process will provide
an estimate of average tube metal
temperature over its service life.
10-1
Table 10-1 The Larson-Miller Parameter (LMP)
BTF Mechanisms Manifesting Significant Microstructural Change is commonly used to combine time
and temperature into a single mea-
Chapter, Volume for sure. It is used in many of the plots
Mechanism Nature of Microstructural Change Additional Information in this chapter to display an inte-
Hydrogen damage Decarburization and microfissuring. Chap. 15, grated time/temperature variable
and is given by:
Vol. 2
LMP = (T + 460)
Short-term overheating Significant transformation of initial Chap. 23, (20 + log10 t ) (10-1)
in waterwall tubing microstructure with final morphology depend- Vol. 2
ing upon temperature reached. where T = temperature in ¡F
t = exposure, hours
Long-term • Nucleation, growth, and interlinking of Chap. 32,
overheating/creep creep voids or cracks (creep cavitation) Vol. 3 10.2 Microstructural Changes
• For ferritic materials: spheroidization, for- in Ferritic Materials
mation of decarburized layer, graphitization.
• For austenitic materials: sigma phase 10.2.1 Oxide Thickness. Although
microstructure and formation of grain strictly not a microstructural change,
boundary cavities. the analysis of oxide scale in ferritic
SH/RH tubes, when possible, is so
central to the analysis of damage
Dissimilar metal • Signs of creep damage. Specifics depend Chap. 35, accumulation and remaining life
weld failures on filler metal. Vol. 3 assessment, that a few summary
• Formation of planar array of globular car- comments are included here.
bides.
Analysis of steamside oxide scale
buildup is a key parameter for ana-
Short-term overheating May be similar to that for short-term over- Chap. 36, lyzing accumulated damage in
in SH/RH tubes heating in waterwall tubes, or for long-term Vol. 3 boiler tubes. For the sake of com-
overheating in SH/RH tubes, or may be none. parisons with other parameters that
follow, Figure 10-1 shows oxide
Graphitization • Graphitization. Chap. 42, thickness versus LMP typical of 21/4
Vol. 3 Cr-1 Mo material removed from ser-
vice and measured on in-service
tubes. The basics of steamside
oxide scale formation can be found
in Chapter 2, their use in remaining
Oxide Thickness (mils) life analysis (Chapter 8), and mea-
50 surement by non-destructive means
(Chapter 9).

40

30

20

10

0
26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42
LMP/1000

Figure 10-1. Oxide thickness as a function of the Larson-Miller Time/Temperature

Parameter (LMP) for T22 tube material (21/4 Cr-1 Mo). Source: S.R. Peterson, et al.2

10-2 Determining the Extent of Microstructural Damage

Table 10-2 10.2.2 Spheroidization. If the
Qualitative Description of Degrees of Spheroidization steamside oxide has exfoliated or
been removed by chemical cleaning
Stage then changes to the microstructure
Identification Degree of Spheroidization in ferritic material can be examined
to deduce service history. The typi-
1 Typical of the structure of a new tube consisting of ferrite and fine cal starting structure is ferrite with
pearlite. May be partially spheroidized if post-weld heat treatment was either (i) fine pearlite composed of
used on a fabricated structure. alternating lamellae of ferrite and
iron carbide Fe3C or (ii) acicular
2 The first stage of carbide spheroidization usually coinciding with the bainitic carbides. Over time the car-
appearance of small particles of carbides at the grain boundaries bide tends to agglomerate into
spheres. The degree to which this
3 An intermediate stage of spheroidization showing more distinct signs process has proceeded was classi-
of carbide spheroidization in the pearlite areas, but some carbide fied initially into six stages by Toft
plates still evident. Increased carbide precipitation within the ferrite and Marsden.3 A seventh stage has
been added; the stages are identi-
grains and at the grain boundaries.
fied by number 1-7 or by letter A-G;
Table 10-2 provides a qualitative
4 Spheroidization of the carbides is virtually complete, but they are still description of the stages. Figure 10-
grouped in the original pearlite pattern. 2 shows typical data of the spher-
oidization rating versus LMP for
5 Spheroidization is complete and the carbides are dispersed leaving 21/4Cr-1Mo.
little trace of the original pearlite areas. A potential drawback to such analy-
sis is that the current state of the
6 There is a marked increase in the size of some of the carbide microstructure will depend on the
particles, partly due to coalescence. original microstructure (prior to ser-
vice), which is often not well
7 Carbides disappear. known.2 Three means of dealing
with this problem are: (i) use labora-
Source: From S.R. Paterson, et al.2 based on L.H. Toft and R.A. Marsden3 tory heat treatments to simulate the
fabrication procedure if it is known
and thus characterize the starting
microstructure, (ii) obtain samples
from the coldest regions of the
Spheroidization Rating boiler and assume that their
7 microstructure is the starting
6 microstructure, (iii) use a catalog of
the microstructures of various start-
5 ing points such as contained in ref-
erence 2 to obtain a scatterband of
4
behavior.
3
2
1
0
26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42
LMP/1000

Figure 10-2. Spherodization rating as a function of the Larson-Miller Time/Temperature

Parameter (LMP) for T22 tube material (21/4 Cr-1 Mo). Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.2

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 10-3

 10.2.3 Hardness. The strength of
Vickers Hardness low alloy steels changes with expo-
sure to temperature. Hardness is an
indirect measure of strength.
280
Measurements of the change in
hardness can, as a result, be used
260
to estimate average temperatures for
240
a component. The approach is most
suited to changes occurring as a
220 result of carbide precipitation and
growth when strain softening strain
9 Cr - 1 Mo effects do not interfere.4 Figure 10-3
200 2 1/4 Cr - 1 Mo
shows the relationship between LMP
180 and change in material hardness.
Drawbacks to using hardness for
160 damage assessments include4: (i)
uncertainty about the initial hardness
140 of the material, (ii) sensitivity to local
1Cr - 1/2 Mo microstructural variation, (iii) strain-
120 softening effects can lead to erro-
neous results.
100
Figure 10-4 shows the decrease in
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 hardness in material near a location
Larson-Miller Parameter that failed by long-term overheating.
(LMP) = T(°R) (20 + log10t [Hr] x 10-3) Figure 10-5 shows the trend of hard-
ness with increasing LMP number
9 Cr - 1 Mo HAZ laboratory 1 Cr - 1/2 Mo normalized for several data bases of 21/4Cr-1Mo
data, 100 g load material laboratory data,
LMP includes material. While in-situ measurements
20 kg load of tube surface hardness may be
2 1/4 Cr - 1 Mo HAZ temper
laboratory data, 100 g load 1 Cr - 1/2 Mo normalized treatment - 3 h, used to identify strength decreases,
material laboratory data, 640 °C
some care is required to estimate
2 1/4 Cr - 1 Mo HAZ ex- 30 kg load
service weldment data, the original (or at least non-
100 g load degraded) hardness as a baseline
for comparison.

Figure 10-3. Correlations between hardness and the Larson-Miller Time/Temperature

Parameter (LMP) for 1 Cr-1/2 Mo, 21/4 Cr- 1 Mo, and 9 Cr-1 Mo steels. Source: R.
10.3 Microstructural Changes
Viswanathan, et al.5 in Austenitic Stainless Steels
The nature and extent of carbide
precipitation is a key variable in
determining the exposure of the
With a Knoop indentor and a 300 gram load austenitic stainless steels to stress
170 and temperature. For example, high
80 HRB
Rockwell Hardness Conversion

carbon grades are particularly sus-

160 ceptible to sensitization in which
chromium carbides form at the grain
Knoop Hardness

boundaries, depleting the chromium

75 HRB
150 content of adjacent areas and lead-
ing to intergranular attack.2
140 70 HRB A key identifying factor is the pres-
ence and extent of the sigma phase,
a brittle intermetallic FeCr com-
130 65 HRB pound. It forms during long-term
Cold side away exposures at temperatures between
from rupture
600 and 900°C (~ 1110 to 1650°F).
120
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Metallographic examination for the
Distance from Rupture Line (inch) presence of sigma phase can be
used to estimate average tube oper-
ating temperatures. Figure 10-6
Figure 10-4. Midwall microhardness traverse to illustrate the loss in hardness in the
vicinity of a long-term overheat failure. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.2

10-4 Determining the Extent of Microstructural Damage

 shows the growth of sigma phase
Hardness (HRB) Hardness above HRB 100 for various austenitic stainless steels
100 at 700°C (1292°F).

10.4 Assessment of Creep

90
Damage in Boiler Tube
Materials
80
10.4.1 Overview of available meth-
ods. A number of investigations
70 have established a quantitative rela-
tionship between microstructural
features and time-temperature rela-
60 tionships for thick section compo-
nents. Methods to detect develop-
ing creep damage and to predict
50
26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 remaining life of high temperature
components once creep cracks initi-
LMP/1000 ate have been under extensive
development during the past few
years.4, 6 Table 10-3 summarizes the
Figure 10-5. Hardness and the Larson-Miller Time/Temperature Parameter (LMP) for 1
Cr- 1/2 Mo, 21/4 Cr-1 Mo, and 9 Cr-1 Mo steels. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.2 methods, including open issues.
Table 10-4 provides a list of the
applications and some additional
notes for the key techniques.
KOH Etched Area, % Several of these methods are
reviewed below.
Note that at high stress levels, for
347
5 example > 0.75sy, creep failures
321 may be experienced without
A-1 microstructural change.
4 316
304 10.4.2 Analysis of carbides.
3 Laboratory and field tests have
shown that the percentage of M6C
carbides in 21/4Cr-1Mo steel
2 increases with time and temperature
in a predictable way. Nakatani, et
1 al.8 and Sugita, et al.,9 have outlined
a procedure to estimate life fraction
from these results. Figure 10-7 is a
0 plot of % M6C carbides and of
102 103 104 105
creep voids versus rupture life
Aging Time at 700°C, h
expended and shows the concept.
During early creep life (up to 50%
consumption of life), the relationship
Figure 10-6. Growth of sigma phase at 700°C in various austenitic steels. KOH is between % M6C carbides and life
potassium hydroxide etchant. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.2

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 10-5

Table 10-3
Life Assessment Techniques for Creep Damage
Crack Initiation:
Technique
Calculation
Extrapolation of past experience
Conventional NDE
High-resolution NDE
• Acoustic emission
• Positron annihilation
• Barkhausen noise analysis
Strain (dimension) mesaurement
Rupture testing
Microstructural evaluation
• Cavitation measurement
• Carbide-coarsening measurements
• Lattice parameter
• Ferrite composition analysis
• Hardness monitoring
Oxide scale and wall thickness
Replication strain monitoring
Crack Propagation:
Technique
Analysis combines NDE, stress analysis
and crack growth with an end-of-life
criterion to predict remaining life
10-6 Determining the Extent of Microstructural Damage
Issues
Inaccurate
Inaccurate
Inadequate resolution
Not sufficiently developed at this time
Uncertainty regarding original dimensions
• Lack of clear-cut failure criteria
• Difficulty in detecting localized damage
• Doesn’t account for increasing stress/
temperature history
• Difficulty in sample removal
• Not suitable as a monitoring technique
• Validity of life-fraction rule
• Effects of oxidation and specimen size
• Uniaxial-to-multiaxial correlations
Quantitative relationships with remaining life
are lacking
Issues
• Uncertainties in NDE results
• Lack of adequate crack growth data in creep
and creep-fatigue
• Lack of a clear-cut end-of-life criterion under
creep conditions
• Difficulty in assessing toughness of in-
service components
fraction can be used as an index to
remaining life.4 After that point,
creep cavitation was the more useful
index. Both the % M6C carbides
and the % void formation can be
measured by careful replication.
Note that these results pertain to the
heat affected zone of stub tube
welds.
10.4.3 Creep cavitation models.
There has also been significant work
to relate the evolution of the
microstructural cavities that develop
during the creep process to evalua-
tions of remaining life, again for
thick section components.
Classification of the amount of dam-
age into four stages was first per-
formed by Neubauer and Wedel10:
isolated cavities, oriented cavities,
linked cavities (microcracks), and
macrocracks. The classification was
placed on a more quantitative basis
through the development of the “A”
parameter, a measure of the number
fraction of cavitated boundaries and
the life fraction consumed.11
Creep cavitation surveillance of the
coarse-grain heat affected zone of
SH and RH outlet header stub tube
welds is frequently performed.
However, in tubing away from welds,
creep cavitation occurs very late in
life, and thus has not been used to
monitor damage.
10.5 Post-Exposure Testing
A destructive test of samples
removed from selected tubes can
be used as an adjunct to any of the
above methods, such as to confirm
the results of an oxide analysis. A
variety of tests are available includ-
ing tube burst tests under condi-
tions of accelerated temperature or
stress, and axial or chordal rupture
samples. Problems with accelerated
testing include: (i) choice of sam-
pling location, (ii) interpretation of
how that sample corresponds to the
tubes remaining in the SH/RH, (iii)
choice of acceleration means, and
(iv) interpreting how the resultant
value corresponds to the properties
of the remaining tubes.
Table 10-4
Creep Detection and Assessment Techniques, Applications, and Additional Notes
Technique Typical Applications Notes

Replication • Header stubs Estimates of creep damage only.

• Girth welds (weld and HAZ)

Replication, “A” parameter • High stress regions in base metal Estimates of creep damage only.
• Weld HAZ

Carbide spacing • Header, steam pipe base metal Probable use as a monitor of temperature or with other
methods for life assessment.

Accelerated rupture testing • Header OD base metal Creep damage only. Need oxidation correction.
• Steam pipe base metal

Mini-specimen creep testing • Header OD base metal and steam pipe base
metal when limited material is available.

Hardness • Base metal Currently limited to estimates of average temperature, not

remaining life.

Replica strain monitoring • Welds Used to establish strain rate by re-examination at periodic
• HAZ intervals.
• Local strain regions of interest

Ultrasonic testing • Long seam welds

• Ligaments (for long cracks)
• Locations with extensive creep damage

Crack growth analysis • Wherever cracks or crack-like defects are found Creep crack growth and creep-fatigue crack growth methods
during inspections have been developed; materials properties available.

Analysis of steam side oxide. • Tubes Scale will develop cracks at very low creep levels and thus
may be a qualitative indicator of creep deformation.

Source: R.B. Dooley, et al.7

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 10-7

Results from post-exposure testing
have been used three ways4: (i) as a 10 1.0
direct measure of remaining life, Relative

Area Rate of Creep Void (x 103 mm-2)

however, this is difficult because fraction of M6C

Relative Fraction of M6C Carbide

tubes experience a non-simple carbide (D)
8 0.8
increase in stress and service tem-
perature with life, (ii) as a means to
estimate the properties of the virgin
material, which are then used in an 6 0.6
analytical approach such as that for
the oxide methods like EPRI TUBE-
LIFE or other commercially available 4 0.4
codes, as described in Chapter 8, Area density
and (iii) predicting remaining life of creep
through a stress rupture algorithm 2 0.2 void (❍)
and these same analytical methods,
Chapter 8.
0 0
10 20 40 60 80 100
Creep Rupture Life Consumption Rate (%)

Figure 10-7. Relation between nondestructive structure parameter and creep rupture
life consumption rate evaluated by creep rupture test of removed tubes. Source: R.
Viswanathan, et al.4

10.6 References
1Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and A.E. Meligi, T.V. Narayanan, and C.B. Bond, eds., PVP-
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31, Volume 208, Power Plant Systems/Components Aging
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec, Management and Life Extension, Book No. H00634,
November, 1983. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1991.
2Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H. 7Dooley, R.B., W.P. McNaughton, and R. Viswanathan,
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide, “Life Assessment and Component Condition Assessment
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices, in the United States”, Proceedings: VGB Conference on
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433, Assessment of Residual Service Life, Mannheim,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, Germany, July 6-7, 1992, pp. 26-1 through 26-36.
October, 1993. 8Nakatani, H., T. Yokoyama, F. Masuyama, and N.
3Toft,L.H. and R.A. Marsden, “The Structure and Nishimura, “Metallurgical Damage Detection and Life
Properties of 1%Cr-0.5%Mo Steel After Service in CEGB Evaluation System For Boiler Pressure Parts”, in
Power Stations”, in Conference on Structural Processes Proceedings of the EPRI Conference on Predictive
in Creep, JISI/JIM, London, 1963, p. 275. Maintenance of Fossil Plant Components, Boston,
4Viswanathan, R., S.R. Paterson, H. Grunloh, and S. October, 1990.
Gehl, “Life Assessment of Superheater/Reheater Tubes, 9Sugita,Y., et al., “Evaluation of Creep Damage Progress
in B. Dooley, ed., Proceedings: International Conference by Metallurgical Examination in Aged Power Boiler
on Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil Plants, held in San Pressure Parts”, ISIJ International, Volume 30, Number
Diego, California November 5-7, 1991, Proceedings TR- 10, 1990, pp. 859-904.
100493, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 10Neubauer, B. and V. Wedel, “Restlife Estimation of
April, 1992, pp. 7-1 through 7-49.
Creeping Components by Means of Replicas”, in
5Viswanathan, R., J.R. Foulds, and D.A. Roberts, Advances in Life Prediction Methods, D.A. Woodford and
“Methods for Estimating the Temperature of Reheater J.R. Whitehead, eds., American Society of Mechanical
and Superheater Tubes in Fossil Boilers”, Proceedings of Engineers, New York, 1983, pp. 307-324.
the International Conference on Life Extension and 11Cane, B.J., and M. Shammas, “A Method for Remnant
Assessment, The Hague, June, 1988.
Life Estimation by Quantitative Assessment of Creep
6Viswanathan,R. and S. Gehl, “Advances in Life Cavitation on Plant”, Report TPRD/L2645/N84, Central
Assessment Techniques for Fossil Power Plant Electricity Generating Board, United Kingdom, June,
Components Operating at Elevated Temperatures”, in 1984.

10-8 Determining the Extent of Microstructural Damage

Chapter 11 • Volume 1
Repair and
Replacement of
Boiler Tubes
11.1 Introduction
There are five maintenance-control-
lable activities associated with every
tube failure and repair:
(i) Pre-repair inspection
(ii) Removal of the failed tube
section
(iii) Repair/replacement of the failed
tube
(iv) Post-repair inspection and tests
(v) Future preventive/control actions
The purpose of this chapter is to
overview the repair and replacement
of the failed tube, step (iii) in the
process. Methods for determining
the extent of damage: pre-repair
inspection and post-repair inspec-
tion and tests are covered in
Chapter 9. Removal of a failed sec-
tion, step (ii) above, and general
metallurgical examination of such
sections are discussed in Chapter
6. Future prevention and control
actions are discussed within the
chapters of Volumes 2 and 3 that
cover specific mechanism.
Welding is the most important main-
tenance activity for repairing or
replacing boiler tubes. An overall
approach to weld repairs of boiler
tubes is shown in Figure 11-1. It
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
assumes that a BTF has occurred,
the BTF Team has identified the spe-
cific mechanism and underlying root
cause, alternative immediate actions
have been considered, and a repair
has been identified as the appropri-
ate option. Key steps in the process
are discussed throughout this chap-
ter. The sections in which particular
steps are discussed are shown on
the figure.
11.2 General Strategies for
Damaged Tubes
There are essentially four general
options available for the repair
and/or replacement of boiler tubes:
• For leaks or failures: (i) repair or
replacement to restore to original
condition or (ii) to a condition
acceptable for service (meeting
ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel
Code requirements and other
applicable rules).
• For damaged, but not “failed”
components: (iii) remove damage
and assess whether remaining
material meets service and Code
requirements, or (iv) perform
integrity assessment (“fitness-
for-service”) to determine whether
component can be placed back in
service in damaged condition at
least until replacement is possible.
11-1
 Text Section Action (➠) or Step in the Sequence Text Section Action (➠) or Step in the Sequence
Section
Specific A BTF has occurred, the BTF Team
Chapters in has followed the Actions for a specific
11.5.3, ➠Remove damaged material/flaws
this chapter
Volumes 2 mechanism. The mechanism has
and 3 for each been confirmed, root cause identified,
mechanism and it has been determined that a
weld repair is among the appropriate
immediate actions to be taken. ➠Use NDE to confirm that defect
has been removed

Action 4.0
in each ➠Determine Extent of Damage as
mechanism, described for each mechanism
Section 11.5, ➠Perform repair using Qualified
this chapter Procedure
Volumes 2 (in Action 4.0)
and 3

Sections
Sections ➠Use temporary repair technique,
11.5.4, 11.5.5, such as a pad weld or window piece,
11.2, 11.5, ➠Determine Repair Options this chapter if absolutely necessary
this chapter

➠Obtain access/clearance ➠Note the location of temporary

repairs, Remove at next outage

Section 11.3, ➠Identify materials and dimensions

this chapter
➠Perform final inspection/testing

Sections ➠Establish repair technique, or use

11.4, 11.5 previously qualified procedures
this chapter

➠Choose Qualified Welder

Figure 11-1. Roadmap for Boiler Tube Weld Repairs Adapted from: G.G. Stephenson and J.W. Prince1

Where repair is not possible, option
(iv), analysis, may be the only
choice. However, such methods are
often complex, costly, and may
require significant time.
The following historical information
should be considered in making the
decision about repair1:
• Was the original material selection
in the design appropriate?
• Did all the original materials meet Each utility should have in place a
specified requirements? set of guidelines about minimum
wall thickness to expedite the repair
• Did the operating conditions con-
decision. General guidance about
tribute to the failure in any way:
when to replace or restore tubes is
creep, fatigue, erosion, shock or
available from boiler manufacturers.
thermal loading?
Table 11-1, for example, provides
• Are there any unusual metallurgi- such guidance from one manufac-
cal characteristics in the defective turer as a function of tube thickness
or suspect area? and location.
• Has the problem occurred in any
other units at the same site or
within the industry?

11-2 Repair and Replacement of Boiler Tubes

Table 11-1 Methods of Construction”. Section
Guidelines for Tube Repair/Replacement I requires written welding proce-
dures qualified to Section IX
Actual Tube Wall requirements and inspection
Thickness Relative to requirements per Section V.
Percent Specified Wall
• ASME B&PV Code, Section IX,
Location Thickness, t Course of Action
“Welding and Brazing
Qualifications” includes require-
Furnace Support Tubes Tubes equal to or Monitor thickness ments for weld procedures,
Economizer Stringer greater than 85% t “Welding Procedure
Support Tubes Specification” (WPS), procedure
records, “Welding Procedure
“ Tubes less than 85% t Restore tube wall Qualification Record” (PQR), and
thickness or replace tube welder qualification records,
“Welder/Welding Operator
Economizer, Furnace Wall Tubes equal to or Monitor thickness Qualification Record” (WQ).
and other Water-Cooled Tubes greater than 70% t • ASME B&PV Code, Section V,
“Nondestructive Examination”
“ Tubes less than 70% t Restore tube wall thickness covers inspection requirements
or replace tube for components fabricated by
welding.
Superheater, Reheater, and Tubes equal to or Monitor thickness • ASME B&PV Code, Section II,
Other Steam-Cooled Tubes greater than 85% t Part A, “Material Specification for
Ferrous Materials” and Part C,
“ Tubes less than 85% t Restore tube wall thickness “Welding Filler Materials” cover
or replace tube materials used in welding.

Source: Babcock & Wilcox, cited in G.G. Stephenson and J.W. Prince1
11.3 Pre-Repair: Confirm
Materials to be Repaired
It is critical to confirm the material(s)
to be repaired prior to developing an
optimized procedure. In-situ or labo-
ratory confirmation is possible,
depending on access. Chapter 2
provides more information about the
materials that are typically used in
boiler tubes.
The specific grade of material is
required as well as the specification
number. That is, ASME SA-213
includes a variety of material
grades, SA-213 T11 will require a
different repair procedure from
SA-213 T22 for example.
Because several materials are usu-
ally used in the SH/RH sections, a
schematic showing the locations of
materials and the transitions is criti-
cal, both for tracking materials and
for developing the appropriate weld
procedures. “Upgrading” materials
is, for several key BTF mechanisms,
the optimal strategy. If a material
change is made, careful documenta-
tion should be made of the new
material and its location so that any
needed repairs can be properly exe-
cuted.
11.4 Applicable Codes for
Weld Repairs
Applicable U.S. codes for the weld-
ing of boiler tubes include:
• National Board Inspection Code
(NBIC), American National
Standard, ANSI/NB-23, The
National Board of Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Inspectors,
Columbus, Ohio, January, 1991
• ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
(B&PV) Code, Section I. “Power
Boilers”, particularly Part PW,
“Requirements for Boilers
Fabricated by Welding” and PG,
“General Requirements of All
To reduce the number of weld pro-
cedures, the ASME Code groups
materials into “P” groups. Table 11-2
provides a summary of the ASME,
Section IX classifications. Note that
these groupings are for weld proce-
dure development and execution
only; the materials are not inter-
changeable in their properties.
It should be further noted that the
Code is written for original design
and construction, usually shop-
welded, and not for repair situations.
Because of the difficulties in assur-
ing the highest quality welds in a
field condition (access problems,
weld positions possible, inability to
post-weld heat treat, etc.), repairs
may not have the same margin of
safety as inherent original construc-
tion performed to the Code require-
ments. On the other hand, there is a
margin of safety built into Code
requirements. The main message
here is that engineering assessment
and judgment may be required for

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 11-3

Table 11-2
P-Number Groupings for ASME Specified Tube Materials
P- Number Nominal Composition
1 Carbon steel
3 Carbon-molybdenum
Chromium-molybdenum
Manganese-molybdenum
4 1% to 11/2% Cr - 1/2% Mo
13/4% to 2% Cr - 1/2% Mo
5 21/4% Cr - 1% Mo
3% Cr - 1% Mo
5% Cr - 1/2% Mo
7% Cr - 1% Mo
9% Cr - 1% Mo
9% Cr - 1% Mo - V - Cb- N
8 Austenitic stainless steel
Adapted from: G.G. Stephenson and J.W. Prince1
specific repair conditions; such
assessments might include gaining
a knowledge of: (i) actual operating
conditions (temperatures, stresses,
cyclic and steady state), (ii) the
actual integrity of components
(actual material properties in the
aged condition, extent of damage
and defect sizes), and (iii) the actual
accumulation of damage in the com-
ponent.
11.5 Specific Repair
Procedures
11.5.1 Overview and general com-
ments. The following will be applic-
able to all boiler tube weld repair
procedures1:
• Every utility should use a qualified
welder with qualified procedures
for all repairs.
• Where possible use gas tungsten
arc welding (GTAW) for root
11-4 Repair and Replacement of Boiler Tubes
ASME Specification Number
and Grade
SA-178A, C, D
SA-192
SA-210A1, C
SA-209T1, T1A, T1B
SA-213T2
SA-213T11, T12
SA-213T3
SA-213T22
SA-213T21
SA-213T5
SA-213T7
SA-213T9
SA-213T91
SA-213TP304
SA-213TP316
SA-213TP321
SA-213TP347
passes rather than shielded metal
arc welding (SMAW). Either can
be used for the filler passes.
• Do not use backing rings for tub-
ing in the water-touched circuits.
They will cause flow disruption, a
precursor to the underdeposit
corrosion mechanisms of hydro-
gen damage, caustic gouging,
and acid phosphate corrosion.
• Use backing rings in SH/RH tub-
ing only if a high quality root pass
by either GTAW or SMAW cannot
be made without backing.
• Some semi-automatic welding
processes have been used in lim-
ited applications, mainly for skin
casing and membrane replace-
ment.
• Slag removal is required prior to
performing maintenance work;
removal methods include water
lancing, shotgun, rappers and
water sootblowers. Boiler tube
failures have resulted from the
mechanical damage done during
slag removal (Chapter 44, Volume
3) and from sootblower damage
(Chapter 22, Volume 2; Chapter
38, Volume 3).
• Access is critical, and may be
difficult. It may be necessary to
cut away a sound tube to gain
access to a damaged tube.
Detailed instructions for the repair of
boiler tubes by: (i) tube section
replacement, (ii) grinding out the
defect and welding, (iii) pad weld-
ing, (iv) window welding, (v) boiler
tube build-up, (vi) dissimilar welds
between low alloy steels, (vii) dissim-
ilar metal welds between ferritic
steels and austenitic stainless steels,
and (viii) for large-scale tube
replacement, have been
developed.1 Table 11-3 summarizes
the use of repair strategies (i)
through (v).
11.5.2 Tube section replacement.
This is the preferred method for
boiler tube repair. Several of the
steps are key from the viewpoint of
boiler tube failures:
• The damaged section of the tube
should be saved for metallurgical
examination (see Chapter 6), par-
ticularly if the mechanism or root
cause are unknown.
• During cutting steps, care must
be taken to avoid getting debris
into tubes that could lead to
blockage and subsequent boiler
tube failures by short-term over-
heating. Thus, cut the bottom first
and block.
• The replacement tube section
should be the same material and
thickness of that removed. If
matching thickness is not avail-
able a thicker tube can be used,
but not thinner. If a tube of the
same or thicker section is not
available, a higher grade material
may be substituted. However, an
austenitic stainless steel tube
should not be used in water-
touched service.
• The length of replacement should
be shorter than the distance
between the prepared ends by
1.6 mm to 3.2 mm (1/16 in. to 1/8
in.) to allow for a root gap and
some shrinkage of the first weld.
The replacement length is more
critical for waterwall tube replace-
ment where tubes are held in
place by membranes.1
• All completed welds should be
examined visually and inspected
according to Code requirements.
A hydrostatic test is also recom-
mended. Radiography may be
used instead of hydrostatic test-
ing if approved by regulatory
agencies.
Although the details will vary
according to location and local con-
ditions, the fit-up details for a typical
boiler tube replacement and the
sequence for a welding repair are
shown in Figures 11-2 and 11-3,
respectively.
11.5.3 Grinding out the defect and
welding. This procedure should only
be used for small defects such as
pinhole leaks caused by porosity. If
internal damage is suspected, it will
not be possible to limit the vee
dimension at the root to an accept-
able level. Although quicker than a
tube replacement, there is a signifi-
cant chance of repeat failures with
this kind of repair.1
Table 11-3
Repair Techniques and Their Application
Method Applicability
Tube section replacement • The preferred repair method.
• Consists of replacing tube section with one of same
material and dimensions.
Grind out and re-weld • Applicable for small defects such as pin-hole leaks.
• Vee- preparation and re-weld.
Pad welding • Should only be used in an emergency as repeat fail-
ures are nearly always guaranteed. Should be
replaced at next major outage.
• Involves mechanically closing the rupture to original
contour, veeing a weld groove and re-welding.
Window welding • May be required if access all around the tube is
limited. Should be used only as a temporary measure
with full replacement at next major outage.
Boiler tube build-up • For restoring thinned tubes to original thickness.
Source: G.G. Stephenson and J.W. Prince1
Second Weld
Root gap before starting
first weld 0.0"Ð 1/32"
Note: This end must be free
to move down 1/16" due to
shrinkage in first weld
Weld Details

11.5.4 Pad welding. A temporary 37 1/2° + 2 1/2°

1/16" to 5/32"
repair such as pad welding or win-
dow welding may be performed to
return the unit to service in the
shortest possible time, but only in
exceptional circumstances if
absolutely necessary to reduce the
time of a forced outage. Under such 0" to 3/32" I.D. 2 I.D. 1
circumstances a pad weld must be I.D. 1 shall be
replaced with a permanent repair at within 1/16" of
the next available outage; as a I.D. 2
result, careful documentation of pad
weld locations is indicated.
Pad welding sometimes involves
First Weld
mechanically restoring the tube to Root gap 1/16" Ð 5/32"
its original shape by bending the
edges of the rupture back together, Complete this weld before
followed by sealing the root and fill- starting on opposite end
ing the vee with a weld. Differences
in the thickness in the weld area are
possible so that care is required not
to burn through the thin sections. Figure 11-2. Fit-up details for boiler tube replacement. Source: G.G. Stephenson and
J.W. Prince1

Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals 11-5


Good
tube
➂ Tack weld
➃ Complete weld
Weld back
➄ membrane
(The membrane will
be cut out the full
tube length if tube is
to be pulled out of
plane for repair)
➀ Tack weld
➁ Complete weld
Figure 11-3. Sequence of welding a replacement tube section. Source: G.G.
Stephenson and J.W. Prince1
Pad welding of thinned tubes has
been used as a temporary measure
until a scheduled outage. It is not,
however, recommended as a regular
or permanent repair procedure, nor
as a long-term “fix” of the problem
for the following reasons:
• Heat input of pad welding can
affect internal deposits.
Particularly bad is the presence
of Cu in the internal deposits on
water wall tubes. These can, dur-
ing the welding process, become
molten and embrittle the grain
boundaries of the tube wall. If Cu
is likely to be present some orga-
nizations have adopted a rule that
pad welds should not be applied
where the tube thickness is less
than 3 mm.2
11-6 Repair and Replacement of Boiler Tubes
Replacement Good
tube tube
Alignment bar
(optional)
2" min
1/2" min
• There is no critical determination
of the minimum wall to which the
process can be applied. If
applied to a wall which is too thin,
then the weld beads can pene-
trate the wall or make the internal
surface protrude into the water or
steam flow. This will cause a dis-
ruption of the flow and lead to
deposition, with the associated
and concomitant events eventu-
ally leading to an underdeposit
corrosion mechanism: hydrogen
damage, caustic gouging, or acid
phosphate corrosion.
• There is no indication of whether
a crack is present on the internal
surface, such as is caused by
corrosion fatigue. The pad weld-
ing will not seal the crack, which
can then act as an initiating cen-
ter or exacerbate the cracking
process. Figure 13-22 in Volume
2 shows an example of an
attempt to place a pad weld over
a region of corrosion fatigue
attack.
Similar considerations occur in the
repair of superheater/reheater tub-
ing, where there is uncertainty about
the tube condition such as the exis-
tence of creep cracks and their
depths, and of the conditions of the
internal tube surface.
11.5.5 Window welding (canoe
piece repair). The sequence for a
window welding repair is illustrated
in Figure 11-4. As for pad welding, a
window welding repair should only
be used as a temporary measure
and should be replaced at the next
available outage. Its primary use is
where accessibility is limited. The
main problem with the procedure is
making an acceptable root fit-up all
around the opening. If the patch
does not match the interior dimen-
sion of the tube, flow disruption may
occur initiating increased deposition
and associated underdeposit boiler
tube failures.
11.5.6 Boiler tube build-up. Weld
build-up can be used to increase
the wall thickness of thinned tubes.1
It should not be used if the
remaining wall thickness is less
than 60% of design thickness or
on tubes less than 1.59 mm (1/16
inch) thick. Ultrasonic testing
should be used to ensure these cri-
teria are met and to determine the
extent of thinned wall. Either GTAW
or SMAW can be used to make the
deposit; the former is preferred on
thinner (up to 0.090 in thick) tubes to
prevent burn-through. Care should
be taken to remove oxides and scale
prior to welding. The arc should be
started in the thicker areas. Overlap
beads by 50-75%. For vertical welds,
downhill progression should be used.
Finally, the reinforcement should be
limited to 1/8 inch above the original
surface.

Drill
window
holes
Locate
bad
section
Remove
damaged
section
Figure 11-4. Welding sequence for replacing a defective tube section using the win-
dow welding technique. Source: G.G. Stephenson and J.W. Prince1
11.5.7 Dissimilar welds between low
alloy steels. In SH/RH repairs, it
may be necessary to join two differ-
ent ferritic materials. Filler metals
should be qualified in the repair pro-
cedure. Successful procedures
have used filler metals that match
one or other of the base materials or
provide some intermediate value.
11.5.8 Dissimilar metal welds
between ferritic steels and austenitic
stainless steels. Repairs involving
welds between ferritic and austenitic
stainless steels are discussed at
length in Chapter 35, Volume 3. In
brief, the optimal procedure is to
use a shop-welded “dutchman” so
that field repairs involve only like
material welds, e.g., ferritic-to-ferritic
and stainless-to-stainless. For in-situ
welds, repairs with nickel-base filler
metals are preferred although they
are somewhat more difficult to
execute than welds with stainless
steel filler.
Grind:
A) Internal
bevel
B) Window
bevel
Weld:
Replacement
A) Tube
section
tube B) Window
plugs
11.5.9 Large-scale tube replace-
ment. For the large scale replace-
ment of tubing, the procedures are
mostly similar to those described
above, with some additional precau-
tions such as1: (i) leaving sufficient
tubes in place to provide support
until the replacements are installed,
(ii) capping off the tubes to ensure
that no debris enters tubes once
they are cut, (iii) tack welding and
completing the bottom weld first,
and (iv) tack welding and complet-
ing the top welds starting with the
smallest gaps first.
11.6 Documentation
Documentation of welding proce-
dures should be maintained includ-
ing1: (i) welding procedure specifi-
cations, (ii) procedure qualification
records, (iii) weld qualifications, (iv)
heat treatment procedures, (v)
inspection procedures, and (vi) spe-
cific detailed procedures, such as
covering specific boiler tube repair
procedures.
Volume 1: Boiler Tube Fundamentals
11.7 Welding Co-Extruded
Tubing
A somewhat specialized topic
related to welding is that of co-
extruded tubing. One of the options
available for the mitigation of fire-
side corrosion in either waterwalls or
superheater/reheater tubing is the
use of co-extruded tubing. This
solution uses a highly corrosion-
resistant outer material that is metal-
lurgically bonded to a less-expen-
sive inner layer. The former CEGB
has been a leader in the experience
base of these materials. They typi-
cally used an outer layer of AISI
T310 over an inner layer of high-
temperature, high-strength stainless
steel for superheater/reheater appli-
cation, and AISI T310 outer with car-
bon steel inner layer for waterwall
applications.3 The experience base
has indicated corrosion perfor-
mance improvements of 2 to 5 times
the original material for these materi-
als. Through 1984, the CEGB had
over 10 years of experience in these
materials including approximately
70,000 welds without technical weld
problems or any weld failures.
The primary goal of the welding of
these materials is to use two differ-
ent filler metals so as to have the
eventual weld properties match
those of the corresponding base
metal. Flatley and Thursfield3
reviewed the required weld proce-
dures. Conventional weld tech-
niques, mostly SMAW and GTAW,
are suitable. Generally a root pass
of GTAW is followed by runs using
either of the above processes and a
filler consistent with the inner mater-
ial. Then the outer layer filler is laid
in with a corrosion-resistant material
such as T309 applied by SMAW.
Neither preheat nor post-weld heat
treatment have been required.
11-7
11.8 References
1Stephenson, G.G. and J.W. Prince, Guidelines on Fossil
Boiler Field Welding, Research Project 2504-02, Final
Report TR-101699, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, January, 1993.
2Personal
Communication from D. Barnett (Pacific Power,
Australia) to R.B. Dooley, 2-12-95.
3Flatley,T. and T. Thursfield, “Review of Corrosion
Resistant Co-Extruded Tube Development for Power
Boilers”, in R.D. Sisson, Jr., ed., Coatings and Bimetallics
for Aggressive Environments, American Society for
Metals, Metals Park, OH, 1985.

11-8 Repair and Replacement of Boiler Tubes

Index
Acid contamination, 15-10 through
15-12
Acid deposition, 30-2, 30-3
Acid dewpoint corrosion (economizer),
30-1 through 30-12
actions, 30-8 through 30-12
determining the extent of
damage, 30-6, 30-11
features of failure, 30-2, 30-8
locations of failure, 30-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
30-6, 30-12
mechanism, 30-3, 30-4, 30-9
precursors, 30-8
ramifications/ancillary problems,
30-12
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 30-6, 30-12
root causes and actions to
confirm, 30-5, 30-10
Acid phosphate corrosion, 16-1
through 16-28
actions, 16-22 through 16-28
case study, 16-16 through 16-20
deposit characteristics, 7-1
through 7-4, 16-2, 16-4, 16-6,
16-19, 16-20
determining the extent of
damage, 16-13, 16-25
distinguishing from hydrogen
damage or caustic gouging,
7-1, 7-2, 16-3
features of failure, 7-1, 7-2, 16-2
through 16-4, 16-18 through
16-20, 16-22
locations of failure, 16-4, 16-5
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
16-14, 16-15, 16-27
mechanism, 16-6 through 16-8,
16-23
precursors, 16-22
ramifications/ancillary problems,
16-28
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 16-13, 16-26
root causes and actions to confirm,
7-4, 16-9 through 16-12, 16-24
Additives, oil-fired units, 34-10, 34-11,
34-18, 34-19
Air inleakage, 13-24, 27-6, 27-7, 27-9,
30-4, 30-5, 41-6
Alkali iron trisulfates, 33-2, 33-7, 33-8
Alkali salts, 33-2, 33-7, 33-8
All-volatile treatment (see also
Feedwater treatment), 1-18, 3-9,
3-13
“Alligator hide”, 32-2, 33-3, 33-4, 34-5
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) Codes
design, 2-2 through 2-6
non-destructive examination, 11-3
welding 11-3, 11-4
Ammonia, 3-8, 3-9
Ash analysis, 33-12
Austenitic welds (in dissimilar metal
welds), 11-7, 35-2 through 35-9,
35-15
Availability losses and improvement,
1-20
Backing rings, 2-14, 11-4
Baffles (erosion), 14-12
Bell-shaped corrosion curve, 33-7,
33-8
Black boiler water samples, 16-11
Boiler pressure drop losses, 19-5,
19-6
Boiler Tube Failure (BTF) Reduction
Program, 1-20, 5-1 through 5-3
corporate directives for BTF
reduction, 5-2
goals, 1-20, 1-21, 5-2
multidisciplinary teams for BTF
reduction, 5-2
Boiler tube failures
formalizing programs for
reduction of, 1-20, 5-1 through
5-6
historical developments in
identification, correction and
prevention, 1-16, 1-18
importance, 1-1
importance of operation and
maintenance procedures in
preventing, 4-1
influence of cycle chemistry, 1-18,
3-1 through 3-2
influence of fuel options, 1-18
influence of operating conditions,
1-18
influence of unit lay-up, 4-9
influence of unit transients, 4-8, 4-9
influencing or influenced by
chemical cleaning, 4-2
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
largest availability losses, 1-1, 1-2
precursors to, 1-4, 1-10 through
1-15, 1-16, 12-7 through 12-12,
31-7 through 31-13
repeat failures, 1-20, 1-21
reporting and report form, 5-3
through 5-5
resulting from breakdown of
protective magnetite in
water-touched tubing, 2-11
resulting from breakdown of
protective oxide in steam-
touched tubing, 2-15
resulting from fireside conditions,
2-21
screening table, steam-touched
tubes, 1-8, 1-9, 31-4, 31-5
screening table, water-touched
tubes, 1-6, 1-7, 12-4, 12-5
steps in generic investigation 1-4,
1-5, 1-16, 12-2, 12-3, 31-2, 31-3
with significant microstructural
changes, 10-2
worldwide statistics, 1-1
Boiler tubes (see also Superheater/
reheater tubes and Waterwalls
and economizer tubes)
design considerations, 2-2
through 2-6
materials and alloys, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6
maximum design and oxidation
temperatures, 2-4, 23-2, 23-3
Boiler water treatment, 3-1 through
3-8
all-volatile treatment (see also
Feedwater treatment), 1-18,
3-9, 3-13
caustic treatment,
and caustic gouging, 17-5, 17-6,
17-10
guidelines for, 3-5, 3-6, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18,
3-5, 17-5
success factors for use of, 3-5
comparison of options, 3-6
effect on boiler tube failures
3-1, 3-2
factors during unit transients, 4-8
optimization of, 3-6 through 3-8
I-1
 phosphate treatments, 3-3 through
3-5, 16-6
and acid phosphate corrosion,
16-6 through 16-8, 16-11,
16-12,16-16, 16-17
effect of chemical additions on
operating regimes, 3-4
guidelines for, 3-5, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18,
3-3
Borio index, 33-9
Bubbling-bed FBC units, 47-1
through 47-12
chromized tubes, 47-10
plasma coatings, 47-10
tube armoring, 47-10
Burner misalignment, 15-10, 16-11,
17-10
Carbides, 10-5, 10-6
Carryover, 37-5, 37-6
of Na2SO4, 41-2, 41-5, 41-6
Caustic gouging, 17-1 through 17-22
actions, 17-16 through 17-22
case study, 17-14
deposit characteristics, 7-1
through 7-3, 17-2, 17-3, 17-6,
17-7
determining the extent of
damage, 17-11, 17-19
distinguishing from hydrogen
damage or acid phosphate
corrosion, 7-1, 7-2, 17-2
electrochemical corrosion cell,
17-6, 17-7
features of failure, 7-1, 7-2, 17-2,
17-3, 17-16
locations of failure, 17-2 through
17-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
17-12, 17-13, 17-21
mechanism, 2-11, 2-14, 17-5
through 17-7, 17-17
precursors, 17-16
ramifications/ancillary problems,
17-22
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 17-11, 17-20
root causes and actions to
confirm, 7-4, 17-8 through 17-10,
17-18
Caustic treatment (see also Boiler
water treatment),1-18, 3-5, 3-6,
3-13, 17-5,17-6, 17-10
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-2
Chemical cleaning (see also Chemical
cleaning damage in super
heater/reheater tubes and
Chemical cleaning damage:
waterwalls)
as indicator of non-optimized
feedwater chemistry, 3-2
boiler tube failures influenced by,
4-2, 36-6, 36-8
effect of changing to oxygenated
treatment, 3-11, 3-12
FBC units, 4-8
superheaters/reheaters, 4-5
through 4-7, 32-21, 33-21,
34-19, 37-5 through 37-10
importance of sampling, 4-6
locations to clean, 4-6
monitoring, 4-7
process optimization, 4-6, 4-7
reasons to perform, 4-5
solvent choice, 4-6
typical operations for, 4-7
when to clean, 4-6
waterwalls, 4-1 through 4-5
assessing cleanliness and
deposit levels, 4-2, 4-3
guidelines for, 4-1
importance, 4-1
inhibitor breakdown, 25-4
monitoring Fe levels to
determine finish, 4-5
possible problems that could
lead to damage, 25-4
solvent choice, 4-3, 4-4
typical operations for, 4-5
when to clean, 4-2
Chemical cleaning damage in
superheater/reheater tubes,
43-1 through 43-8
actions, 43-5 through 43-8
determining the extent of
damage, 43-3, 43-7
features of failure, 43-2, 43-5
locations of failure, 43-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
43-4, 43-8
mechanism, 43-2, 43-6
precursors, 43-5
ramifications/ancillary problems,
43-8
repairs and immediate
solutions/actions, 43-4, 43-8
root causes and actions to
confirm, 43-3, 43-7
Chemical cleaning damage: water
walls, 25-1 through 25-9
actions, 25-6 through 25-9
determining the extent of
damage, 25-4, 25-8
features of failure, 25-2, 25-3, 25-6
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
25-5, 25-9
mechanism, 25-4, 25-7
precursors, 25-6
ramification/ancillary problems,
25-9
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 25-5, 25-9
root causes and actions to
confirm, 25-4, 25-7
Chlorine in coal, 18-5, 18-6, 33-10,
33-11, 47-6
Chordal thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
Chromizing waterwalls, 19-15, 19-16
Circulating-bed FBC units, 48-1
through 48-4
coatings, 48-2
erosion/abrasion, 48-2 through
48-4
underdeposit corrosion, 48-2
Coal composition (see also
Combustion process and/or
Fireside scale/ash)
and corrosiveness, 18-4 through
18-6, 33-8 through 33-11
and erosiveness, 14-5 through
14-7
effect of chlorine content on fire
side corrosion in steam-
touched tubes, 33-10, 33-11
effect of chlorine content on
fireside corrosion in water-
touched tubes 18-5, 18-6
effect of sulfur level on fireside
corrosion in water-touched
tubes, 18-4
Coal particle erosion, 28-1 through
28-5
actions, 28-3 through 28-5
description and manifestation, 28-1
Coal Quality Impact Model (CQIM)
2-22, 33-14, 33-20
Coatings, 22-4, 48-2
for fireside corrosion in steam-
touched tubing, 33-18, 34-16,
34-17
for fireside corrosion in water-
touched tubing, 18-12 through
18-14
for sootblower erosion, 38-5
Cold air velocity test (CAVT) (see also
Flyash erosion), 14-12 through
14-18
Co-extruded tubing
for fireside corrosion in steam-
touched tubes, 33-20, 34-17
for fireside corrosion in water-
touched tubes, 18-14
welding, 11-7
Cold bent tubes and low-
temperature creep, 24-4
Cold end corrosion, 30-1
Combustion process,
ash formation, erosiveness, and
deposition, 2-22 through 2-24
formation of gaseous species, 2-22,
18-4
Commissioning of units,
activities to prevent future boiler
tube failures, 4-9, 4-11
Concentration in deposits, 2-13, 2-14,
15-4 through 15-6, 15-8, 15-10,
16-5 through 16-7, 17-4, 17-6, 17-7
Condenser leaks, 15-10, 15-11, 37-6
Congruent phosphate treatment
(see also Boiler water treatment),
3-4, 16-6
Coordinated phosphate treatment
(see also Boiler water treatment),
3-3, 3-4
Core monitoring parameters for
cycle chemistry, 3-14
Corporate commitment needed to
solve boiler tube failures, 5-1, 5-2
Corporate directives for BTF
reduction, 5-2
Corrosion
indices, 18-5, 18-6, 33-8 through
33-11
rates as a determinant of repair
choices, 18-11
Corrosion fatigue, 13-1 through
13-41
actions, 13-35 through 13-41
analysis of field experience, 13-13
through 13-15
breakdown of magnetite, 13-10
through 13-12
case study, 13-30 through 13-32
determining the extent of
damage, 13-26, 13-38
distinguishing from OD-initiated
fatigue, 7-6, 7-7
environmental effects on initiation
and propagation, 13-16
through 13-20
features of failure, 13-2 through
13-5, 13-35
Influence Diagram for the analysis
of corrosion fatigue, 13-24
through 13-26, 13-30 through
13-32
locations of failure, 13-6 through
13-9
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
13-28, 13-29, 13-40
mechanism, 2-11, 13-10 through
13-20, 13-36
oxygenated treatment, effect on
corrosion fatigue, 13-20
phosphate treatment, effect on
corrosion fatigue, 13-18, 13-20
precursors, 13-35
ramifications/ancillary problems,
13-41
repairs and immediate
solutions/actions, 13-27, 13-39
root causes and actions to con
firm, 13-21 through 13-26, 13-37,
13-38
stress effects on initiation and
propagation, 13-15, 13-16
Corrosion products, 1-17, 3-1, 3-2
Creep (see also Long-term overheat-
ing and Low-temperature creep
cracking), 6-8, 7-6, 7-8, 24-1
through 24-11, 32-1 through 32-32
Creep cavitation, 10-6
Creep damage
assessment techniques, 10-5
through 10-8
Larson-Miller Parameter (LMP),
10-2 through 10-6
Cycle chemistry (see also Boiler
water treatment and Feedwater
treatment),
core monitoring parameters, 3-14
developing unit-specific
guidelines, 3-12 through 3-13
diagnostic parameters, 3-14
goals for improvement program,
3-1, 3-2
guidelines documents for, 3-13
instrumentation and monitoring,
3-14
setting action levels, 3-12, 3-13
Cycling of units, 4-8, 4-9, 13-24, 20-4,
26-5, 35-12, 39-5
effect on boiler tube failures, 4-8,
4-9
effect on thermal fatigue in
economizer inlet header tubes,
20-2
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Departure from nucleate boiling
(DNB), 2-12, 2-13
Deposit density, 4-2
Deposit weight, 4-2, 4-3
Deposits (see Waterside deposits,
Feedwater corrosion products,
Concentration in deposits, Oxides
internal in steam-touched tubes,
Oxides internal in water-touched
tubes, Fireside scale/ash), 15-2,
15-4, 16-2 through 16-5, 17-2
through 17-4, 19-5
Diffusion screens (erosion), 14-14,
14-16 through 14-18
Dissolved oxygen, 13-11, 13-12,
13-16 through 13-20, 21-3, 21-4
Dissimilar metal welds, 35-1 through
35-25
actions, 35-19 through 35-25
case study, 35-17
determining the extent of
damage, 35-12, 35-13, 35-22
features of failure, 35-2 through
35-5, 35-19
influence of welding variables,
35-7 through 35-9
locations of failure, 35-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
35-15, 35-16, 35-24
mechanism, 35-6 through 35-9,
35-20
microstructural changes in
service, 35-6, 35-7
precursors, 35-19
ramifications/ancillary problems,
35-25
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 35-14, 35-23
root causes and actions to
confirm, 35-10 through 35-12,
35-21
Distorted or misaligned tubes, 14-3,
14-4, 14-11, 33-6, 33-15, 33-21,
34-5, 34-15, 34-19, 35-10, 39-5,
40-1, 40-3
Distribution screens (erosion), 14-14,
14-16 through 14-18
DMW LIFE code, 35-16
Drum boiler water treatment, 3-3
through 3-8
Drum level control, 23-6, 37-6, 41-6
“Dutchman” repair, 11-7, 35-23
Economizer inlet header tube
failures (see Erosion-corrosion of
economizer inlet header tubes
and/or Thermal fatigue in econo-
mizer inlet header tubes)
I-3
Electric resistance flash welding, 45-1
through 45-3
Equilibrium phosphate treatment (see
also Boiler water treatment), 3-3,
3-5, 16-14
Erosion (see also Flyash erosion, Coal
particle erosion, Falling
slag damage, Sootblower
erosion in superheater/reheater
tubes, Sootblower erosion in
water-touched tubing,
Fluidized-bed combustion
(FBC) units)
abrasion index, 14-6, 14-7
basics of damage mechanism,
14-5
erosiveness of ash constituents,
2-23, 2-24, 14-5, 14-6
wear propensity calculation, 14-6,
14-7
Erosion-corrosion,
general 3-9, 21-3, 21-4
Erosion-corrosion of economizer
inlet header tubes, 21-1 through
21-9
actions, 21-7 through 21-9
determining the extent of
damage, 21-5, 21-8
distinguishing from thermal
fatigue and flexibility-induced
cracking, 7-6, 7-7
features of failure, 21-1, 21-2,
21-7
locations of failure, 21-2, 21-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
21-5, 21-9
mechanism, 21-3, 21-8
precursors, 21-7
ramifications/ancillary problems,
21-9
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 21-5, 21-9
root causes and actions to
confirm, 21-4, 21-8
Excess oxygen,
high excess air in oil-fired units,
34-14, 34-19
low excess air, 18-1, 18-7, 34-14
Exfoliation of SH/RH steamside oxide,
2-17 through 2-21, 36-5, 36-7
effect of unit chemistry on, 2-21
effects, 2-17, 2-18, 2-21
failure criterion, 2-18, 2-20
rating severity of, 2-18, 2-19
susceptible materials, 2-18, 2-20,
2-21
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-4
Failure mechanisms
fluidized-bed units, Chapters 47
and 48
list, 1-3
steam-touched tubes, Volume 3
waste-to-energy units, Chapter
49, Volume 3
water-touched tubes, Volume 2
Falling slag damage, 29-1 through
29-6
actions, 29-3 through 29-6
description and manifestation,
29-1, 29-2
Fatigue in superheater/reheater
tubes, 39-1 through 39-12
actions, 39-9 through 39-12
determining the extent of
damage, 39-7, 39-11
features of failure, 39-2, 39-9
locations of failure, 39-3, 39-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
39-7, 39-12
mechanism, 39-5, 39-10
precursors, 39-9
repairs and immediate
solutions/actions, 39-7, 39-12
root causes and actions to
confirm, 39-5, 39-6, 39-11
Fatigue in water-touched tubes, 26-1
through 26-12
actions, 26-9 through 26-12
determining the extent of
damage, 26-7, 26-11
distinguishing from corrosion
fatigue, 7-6, 7-7, 26-3
features of failure, 26-2, 26-9
locations of failure, 26-3, 26-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
26-8, 26-12
mechanism, 26-5, 26-10
precursors, 26-9
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 26-8, 26-11
root causes and actions to
confirm, 26-6, 26-7, 26-11
Feedwater corrosion products,
1-17, 3-1, 3-2, 15-4, 15-14, 16-4,
16-5, 16-14, 17-2 through 17-4,
17-12, 23-5
Feedwater treatment, 3-8 through
3-12
all-volatile treatment (AVT), 3-9
guidelines for, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18
comparing AVT and oxygenated
treatment, 3-9, 3-11, 3-12
factors during unit transients, 4-8,
4-9
importance of proper choice of,
3-8
optimizing for all-ferrous
feedwater trains, 3-9 through
3-11, 21-5, 21-6
optimizing for mixed metallurgy
feedwater trains, 3-11, 21-5,
21-6
oxygen scavenger use, 3-8 through
3-10, 21-3, 21-6
oxygenated treatment (OT), 3-9
through 3-11
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-20
effect on oxide growth and
exfoliation, 2-21
guidelines for in once-through
and drum units, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18
to reduce deposition in
waterwalls, 19-5, 19-6, 19-11,
19-13, 19-15
problems with erosion-corrosion
throughout unit, 3-9
Fe-Fe carbide equilibrium diagram,
7-5, 23-2
FeO, 2-7, 32-9
Fe2O3, 2-7, 2-16, 2-17, 2-20, 32-9
Fe3O4, 2-7, 2-16, 2-17, 2-20, 32-9
Ferric oxide hydrate (FeOOH), 3-10
Film boiling, 2-12, 2-13
Finite element analysis for analyzing
corrosion fatigue, 13-29
Fireside corrosion in SH/RH tubes
(coal-fired units), 33-1 through
33-30
actions, 33-24 through 33-30
case study, 33-22
determining the extent of
damage, 33-15, 33-27
distinguishing from long-term
overheating, 6-8, 7-6 through
7-8, 33-4, 33-5
features of failure, 7-6, 7-8, 33-2
through 33-5, 33-24
locations of failure, 33-6
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
33-17 through 33-21, 33-28,
33-29
mechanism, 33-7 through 33-11,
33-25
precursors, 33-24
ramifications/ancillary problems,
33-30
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 33-16, 33-28
 root causes and actions to
confirm, 33-12 through 33-15,
33-26, 33-27
use of indices to predict
likelihood of, 33-8 through
33-10, 33-15
Fireside corrosion in SH/RH tubes
(oil-fired units), 34-1 through
34-26
actions, 34-21 through 34-26
determining the extent of
damage, 34-14, 34-24
distinguishing from long-term
overheating, 6-8, 7-6 through
7-8, 7-9, 34-5, 34-6
features of failure, 7-6, 7-8, 34-2
through 34-5, 34-21
locations of failure, 34-5
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
34-16 through 34-19, 34-25
mechanism, 34-7 through 34-10,
34-22
precursors, 34-21
ramifications/ancillary problems,
34-26
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 34-15, 34-24
root causes and actions to
confirm, 34-11 through 34-14,
34-23
Fireside corrosion in water-touched
tubes, 18-1 through 18-24
actions, 18-18 through 18-24
case study, 18-16
determining the extent of
damage, 18-11, 18-21
effect of coal chlorine content on,
18-5, 18-6
features of failure, 18-2, 18-3, 18-18
locations of failure, 18-2, 18-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
18-12 through 18-15, 18-23
mechanism, 18-4 through 18-6,
18-19
precursors, 18-18
ramifications/ancillary problems,
18-24
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 18-11, 18-22
root causes and actions to
confirm, 18-7 through 18-10
summary of field experience, 18-16
Fireside scale/ash,
compositional analysis of, 33-12,
33-15
development on SH/RH tubing,
32-10
metallurgical analysis of, 6-9
Flame impingement, 15-10, 16-11,
17-10
Fluidized-bed combustion (FBC) units
boiler tube failures in bubbling-
bed units, 47-1 through 47-12
boiler tube failures in circulating-
bed units, 48-1 through 48-4
chemical cleaning of, 4-8
Fluxdome, 9-9
Flux meter, 9-9
Flyash erosion, 14-1 through 14-29
actions, 14-23 through 14-29
case studies, 14-19 through
14-21
cold air velocity test (CAVT),
14-12 through 14-18
determining the extent of
damage, 14-11, 14-26
distinguishing from sootblower
erosion in SH/RH tubes, 7-9
estimating solids loading, 14-16
features of failure, 14-2, 14-3,
14-23
locations of failure, 14-3, 14-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
14-12 through 14-18, 14-28,
14-29
mechanism, 14-5 through 14-7,
14-24
precursors, 14-23
protection options, 14-16 through
14-18
ramifications/ancillary problems,
14-29
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 14-11, 14-27
root causes and actions to
confirm, 14-8 through 14-10,
14-25
Forging laps, 45-1, 45-2, 45-3
Fossil-fuel power plants, primary com-
ponents, 1-16
Fretting, 40-1 through 40-5
Fuel changing, blending, washing,
14-10, 18-10, 18-14, 30-3, 30-5,
30-6, 33-15, 33-20, 34-7
Gas-touched length (GTL), 32-8, 34-5
plotting as a diagnostic tool,
32-15, 33-12, 33-15
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW),
11-4, 11-6, 11-7
Gouging of tubes, 15-2, 15-3, 16-2,
16-3, 17-2, 17-3
Graphitization, 42-1 through 42-11
actions, 42-9 through 42-11
determining the extent of damage,
42-6, 42-11
distinguishing from dissimilar metal
weld failures, 42-3
distinguishing from long-term
overheating (creep), 7-9, 42-3
features of failure, 42-2, 42-3, 42-9
kinetics of growth, 42-4, 42-5
locations of failure, 42-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
42-8, 42-11
mechanism, 42-4, 42-5, 42-10
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 42-7, 42-11
root causes and actions to
confirm, 42-6, 42-11
Hardness
assessing changes in, 10-4, 10-5
metallurgical analysis, 6-7
Header flexibility, 39-4
Heat flux
effects of high levels, 15-10,
16-11, 17-10, 18-9
measuring with Fluxdome, 9-9
measuring with a flux meter, 9-9
monitoring, 9-9
Heat recovery steam generators
(HRSG), 30-1
Hideout of phosphate, 3-4, 3-8,
16-6, 16-11, 16-12
Hydrazine, 3-8, 3-9, 21-4, 27-7
Hydrogen damage, 15-1 through
15-30
actions, 15-21 through 15-30
case studies, 15-16 through
15-19
deposit characteristics, 7-1
through 7-4, 15-3
determining the extent of
damage, 9-1, 9-6, 9-7, 15-13,
15-25
distinguishing from caustic
gouging or acid phosphate
corrosion, 7-1, 7-2, 15-3
electrochemical corrosion cell, 17-6
features of failure, 7-1, 7-2, 15-2,
15-3, 15-7, 15-21
locations of failure, 15-4
I-5
 long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
15-14, 15-15, 15-27
mechanism, 2-11, 2-14, 15-5
through 15-7, 15-22, 15-23, 17-6
microstructural changes, 7-3, 15-2,
15-3, 15-7
precursors, 15-21
ramifications/ancillary problems,
15-29
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 15-14, 15-26
root causes and actions to
confirm, 7-4, 15-8 through 15-12,
15-24
Hydrogen sulfide, 18-4
Hydrostatic testing, 9-10
In-bed wastage (in bubbling-bed FBC
units), 47-5 through 47-8, 47-11,
47-12
Induction pressure welds (in dissimilar
metal welds), 35-2, 46-2
Influence diagram, 13-24 through
13-26, 13-30 through 13-32
Inhibitor breakdown during chemical
cleaning, 25-4
Inspection, 9-1 through 9-12
acoustic monitoring, 9-8
codes and standards, 9-3
eddy current testing, 9-1, 9-2, 9-7,
9-8
importance, 9-1
liquid penetrant testing, 9-1, 9-2,
9-7
magnetic particle testing, 9-1, 9-2,
9-7
NDE for different weld types, 46-4
radiographic testing, 9-1, 9-2, 9-7
ultrasonic testing, 9-1 through 9-7
detecting microstructural
changes, 9-6, 9-7, 15-13
measuring steamside oxide
thickness, 9-4 through 9-6
measuring wall thickness, 9-4
measuring waterside deposits,
9-6
Union Electric technique for
dissimilar metal welds, 35-12,
35-13
visual examination, 9-7
Instrumentation for cycle chemistry
monitoring, 3-14
Intergranular stress corrosion
cracking (see also Stress corrosion
cracking), 37-1 through 37-3
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-6
Lack of fusion weld defect (see also
Welding/repair defects), 45-1
through 45-3
Laning of gas passages, 14-8,
32-16, 33-15, 34-14
Larson-Miller Parameter (LMP), 10-2
through 10-5
Lay-up, 4-9 through 4-11, 27-7,
41-5, 41-6, 41-8
Lifetime, tubes (see also Remaining
life of tubes and Boiler tubes,
design considerations), 2-2 through
2-6, 4-5, 8-1 through 8-8, 18-12,
23-2, 23-3, 32-18, 32-19
Long-term overheating (creep), 32-1
through 32-32
actions, 32-24 through 32-32
case study, 32-22
determining the extent of
damage, 32-16, 32-29
distinguishing from fireside
corrosion, 6-8, 7-6, 7-8, 7-9, 32-2
through 32-6
distinguishing from graphitization,
7-9
distinguishing from short-term
overheating, 32-5
features of failure, 7-6, 7-8, 32-2
through 32-6, 32-24
locations of failure, 32-6 through
32-7
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
32-18 through 32-21, 32-31,
32-32
mechanism, 32-8 through 32-10,
32-25, 32-26
precursors, 32-24
ramifications/ancillary problems,
32-32
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 32-17, 32-30
root causes and actions to
confirm, 7-6, 7-8, 32-11
through 32-16, 32-27, 32-28
Low excess air for Nox control, 18-1,
18-7
Low melting point ashes (see Melting
points of fireside ashes)
Low-temperature corrosion, 30-1
Low-temperature creep cracking,
24-1 through 24-11
actions, 24-8 through 24-11
determining the extent of
damage, 24-6, 24-10
features of failure, 24-1, 24-2, 24-5,
24-8
locations of failure, 24-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
24-7, 24-11
mechanism, 24-4, 24-5, 24-9
precursors, 24-8
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 24-6, 24-11
root causes and actions to
confirm, 24-6, 24-10
Magnetite, strain tolerance, 1-18, 2-18,
2-20, 13-10
Maintenance, effects on boiler tube
failures, 4-1 through 4-12
Maintenance damage, 44-1 through
44-6
actions, 44-3 through 44-6
as a possible cause of short-term
overheating in waterwall
tubing, 23-5
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 44-1, 44-2
Maricite, 16-2 through 16-4, 16-7, 16-8
Material flaws, 45-1 through 45-6
actions, 45-4 through 45-6
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 45-1 through
45-3
Melting points of fireside ashes
coal-fired, 33-7, 33-8
oil-fired, 34-2, 34-3, 34-7 through
34-10
waste-to-energy units, 49-3
through 49-5
Membrane fins, failures associated
with, 45-1 through 45-3
Metallurgical analysis, 6-1 through
6-10
fireside scale/ash analysis, 6-9
flowchart of steps for, 6-2
importance of, 6-1
metallographic samples, 6-6, 6-7
oxide scale thickness and
morphology, 6-7, 6-8
required background information,
6-4
ring sampling for dimensional
checks, 6-6
sample evaluation form, 6-5
sample removal and shipping, 6-4
waterside deposits/scale analysis,
6-8, 6-9
MgO - V2O5 phase diagram, 34-10
Microstructure
assessing changes in austenitic
stainless steels, 10-4 through
10-5
assessing changes in ferritic
steels, 10-1 through 10-4
Microvoids, 10-6 through 10-8
Misaligned or distorted tubes, 14-3,
14-4, 14-11, 33-6, 33-15, 33-21,
34-5, 34-15, 34-19, 35-10, 39-5,
40-1, 40-3
Molten deposits, 2-22 through 2-24
Molten salt attack, 32-10, 33-7
Monitoring
displacements and strains, 9-10
heat flux, 9-9
temperatures, 8-6, 9-8, 9-9
Multidisciplinary teams for BTF reduc-
tion, 5-2
Multilaminated oxides, 2-16, 2-17
Municipal solid waste (MSW) units,
BTF issues in, 49-1 through 49-7
Nickel-based welds (in dissimilar
metal welds), 11-7, 35-2, 35-3, 35-5
through 35-9, 35-15
Nitrogen blanketing (see Layup)
Nucleate boiling, 2-12, 2-13
Oil composition
and corrosiveness, 34-7, 34-8
effect of additives on corrosive-
ness, 34-9, 34-10, 34-15, 34-18,
34-19
Oil-fired boilers
fireside corrosion in, 34-1 through
34-26
maintenance damage while
washing, 44-1
Operation and maintenance, effects
on boiler tube failures, 4-1 through
4-12
Orifice plugging, 23-5
Ovality of tubes, 24-4, 24-5
Over-fire air, 18-1, 18-7
Oxide notch, 35-3, 35-4, 35-6
Oxide thickness (see also Oxides,
internal in steam-touched tubes),
2-14 through 2-21, 4-5, 4-6, 6-7,
6-8, 8-2 through 8-6, 9-4 through
9-6, 10-2, 32-9
Oxides internal in steam-touched
tubes,
development and breakdown, 2-14
through 2-21, 10-2, 32-2, 32-9
exfoliation, 2-17 through 2-21,
36-5 through 36-7
failure criterion, 2-18, 2-20
growth on austenitic materials,
2-17, 8-4, 8-5
growth on ferritic materials, 2-16,
2-17, 8-4, 8-5, 10-2
influence on tube metal tempera-
tures, 4-6, 8-4, 8-5, 9-4, 9-5, 32-2
life assessment analysis of, 8-2
through 8-4
life improvement by chemical
cleaning of, 4-5
measuring by ultrasonic testing,
9-4 through 9-6
metallurgical analysis of, 6-7, 6-8
spalling, 2-17 through 2-21, 36-5,
36-6
Oxides, internal in water-touched
tubes,
comparing most common forms,
2-7
formation, 2-6 through 2-12, 19-7
general nature of, 1-18
model explaining regular array of
cracking, 13-10, 13-11
Pourbaix diagram, 13-11, 13-12
protective magnetite breakdown
and resulting boiler tube
failures, 1-18, 2-10, 2-11, 13-10
through 13-13
protective magnetite growth, 2-8
strain tolerance of magnetite, 2-11,
13-10
Oxygen (see also Dissolved oxygen)
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-16
through 13-20
Oxygen scavengers 3-8, 3-9, 3-10,
21-3 through 21-6
Oxygenated treatment (see also
Feedwater treatment), 1-18, 3-9
through 3-11, 3-13, 19-5, 19-6,
19-11, 19-13, 19-15
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-20
effect on growth and exfoliation,
2-21, 19-5, 19-6, 19-11, 19-13,
19-15
Pad-type thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
Pad welding (see also Repair and
replacement of boiler tubes), 11-5,
11-6, 13-27, 15-15, 16-13, 16-14,
17-11, 17-12, 22-4, 38-6, 46-2, 46-3
Personnel, importance of training,
5-2
pH depression, 13-16 through
13-20, 13-23, 13-24, 15-10 through
15-12, 15-14, 15-15
pH elevation, 17-5
Phosphate control, 3-3, 3-4, 16-6
through 16-8
Phosphate control diagrams, 3-3,
3-4, 16-7
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Phosphate hideout, 3-4, 3-8, 16-6,
16-11, 16-12
Phosphate treatment (see also Boiler
water treatment), 1-18, 3-3
through 3-5, 3-13, 16-6 through
16-8, 16-12, 16-14, 16-16, 16-17
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-18,
13-20
Pitting in superheater/reheater
tubes, 41-1 through 41-14
actions, 41-10 through 41-14
determining the extent of
damage, 41-8, 41-12
features of failure, 41-2, 41-3, 41-10
locations of failure, 41-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
41-8, 41-13
mechanism, 41-4, 41-11
precursors, 41-10
ramifications/ancillary problems,
41-13
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 41-8, 41-12
root causes and actions to
confirm, 41-6, 41-7, 41-12
Pitting in water-touched tubes (see
also Chemical cleaning damage:
waterwalls), 27-1 through 27-13
actions, 27-9 through 27-13
determining the extent of
damage, 27-7, 27-12
features of failure, 27-2, 27-3, 27-9
initiation, 27-4
locations of failure, 27-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
27-7, 27-13
mechanism, 27-4, 27-5, 27-10
precursors, 27-9
ramifications/ancillary problems,
27-13
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 27-7, 27-12
root causes and actions to con
firm, 27-6, 27-11
Plasma coating (see Coatings)
PODIS (Prediction of Damage in
Service) code, 35-15, 35-16
Polythionic acid, 37-5, 37-6
Post-exposure testing of tubes 10-6,
10-8
Pourbaix diagram, iron, high tempera-
ture, 13-11, 13-12
Pressure drop across circulation
pumps (orifices plugging), 23-4,
23-5
I-7
Pressure drop losses in boiler, 19-5,
19-6
Protective oxide, 1-18, 2-6 through
2-21
Pyrites (effect on erosion), 2-23, 2-24,
14-5 through 14-7
Quartz (effect on erosion), 2-23, 2-24,
14-5 through 14-7, 47-6
Reducing fireside conditions, 18-1
through 18-5, 18-7
Reducing feedwater conditions, 21-3,
21-4
Refuse-derived fuel (RDF) units (see
also Waste-to-energy units) 49-1
through 49-7
Remaining life computer codes, 8-3
through 8-6
NOTIS, 8-3
TUBECALC, 8-3
TUBELIFE, 8-3 through 8-6, 10-8
TUBEPRO, 8-3
Remaining life of tubes,
accelerated creep rupture testing,
8-5, 8-6
assessment, 8-1 through 8-8,
32-18, 32-19
assessment methods for SH/RH
tubes, 8-1 through 8-7, 32-18,
32-19, 33-17, 33-18, 34-16
assessment methods for water-
walls and economizer tubes, 8-7
assessment to optimize actions
for fireside corrosion, 18-12
computer codes, 8-3 through 8-6
for graphitization in SH/RH tubes,
42-4, 42-5
improvement by chemical
cleaning of SH/RH tubes, 4-5
roadmap for analysis of, 8-3
statistical analysis, 8-6, 8-7
Repair and replacement of boiler
tubes (see also Welding/repair
defects), 11-1 through 11-8
boiler tube buildup, 11-6
codes for weld repair, 11-3
dissimilar metal welds 11-7
general requirements, 11-4
pad welding, 11-5, 11-6, 13-27,
15-15, 16-13, 16-14, 17-11,
17-12, 22-4, 38-5, 46-2, 46-3
repair strategies, 11-1, 11-2
roadmap for weld repair, 11-2
tube section replacement, 11-4,
11-5
welding co-extruded tubes, 11-7
welding problems that can lead to
boiler tube failures, 46-2
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-8
window welding (canoe piece
repairs), 11-6, 11-7, 15-15,
16-13, 17-11
Residual oils, 34-7
high vanadium, 34-7
low vanadium, 34-8
Mexican, 34-8
Rifled tubes, 2-13, 15-15, 16-14, 17-12
“Ripple” magnetite, 2-10, 19-3
Root passes in welding repairs, 11-4,
11-5
Rubbing/fretting failures, 40-1 through
40-5
actions, 40-3 through 40-5
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 40-1, 40-2
Rupture times, 23-2, 23-3
Rust on tubes following washing,
14-2, 22-1, 38-2
Sampling, 9-10
Secondary tube failures, identifying,
7-10, 7-11
Shielded metal arc welding (SMAW),
11-4, 11-6, 11-7
Shields
for corrosion resistance, 33-18,
33-19, 34-16
for erosion resistance, 14-12, 22-4
Short-term overheating in super-
heater/reheater tubes, 36-1
through 36-16
actions, 36-12 through 36-16
case study, 36-10
determining the extent of
damage, 36-9, 36-15
distinguishing from long-term
overheating, 36-2, 36-3
features of failure, 36-2 through
36-4, 36-12
locations of failure, 36-3, 36-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
36-10, 36-16
mechanism, 36-4, 36-13
precursors, 36-12
ramifications/ancillary problems,
36-16
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 36-9, 36-15
root causes and actions to
confirm, 36-5 through 36-8,
36-14
Short-term overheating in waterwall
tubing, 23-1 through 23-14
actions, 23-9 through 23-14
determining the extent of
damage, 23-7, 23-12
distinguishing among the three
levels of, 7-5, 7-6, 23-2 through
23-4
features of failure, 23-2 through
23-4, 23-9
locations of failure, 23-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
23-8, 23-13
mechanism, 23-5, 23-10
precursors, 23-9
ramifications/ancillary problems,
23-14
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 23-7, 23-13
root causes and actions to
confirm, 23-5, 23-6, 23-11
Shutdown of units, 4-8, 4-9, 27-6,
37-10, 41-4 through 41-6
Sigma phase of austenitic stainless
steels, 10-4, 10-5, 32-3
Slagging, 2-22, 2-23, 19-6 through
19-8, 29-2, 36-12
Slagging propensity, 29-2
Solid particle erosion in the turbine,
32-32, 36-5, 36-12, 36-16
Solvent choice for chemical cleaning,
4-3, 4-4, 4-6
Sootblower erosion in superheater/
reheater tubes, 38-1 through
38-10
actions, 38-7 through 38-10
determining the extent of
damage, 38-5, 38-9
distinguishing from flyash erosion,
7-9, 38-3
features of failure, 38-2, 38-3,
38-7
locations of failure, 38-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
38-5, 38-6, 38-10
mechanism, 38-4, 38-8
precursors, 38-7
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 38-5, 38-10
root causes and actions to
confirm, 38-4, 38-9
Sootblower erosion in water-touched
tubing, 22-1 through 22-9
actions, 22-6 through 22-9
determining the extent of damage,
22-3, 22-8
features of failure, 22-1, 22-6
locations of failure, 22-1
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
22-4, 22-9
 mechanism, 22-2, 22-7
precursors, 22-6
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 22-4, 22-8
root causes and actions to
confirm, 22-2, 22-3, 22-8
Sootblower operation and mainte-
nance practices (see also
Sootblower erosion in
superheater/reheater tubes and
Sootblower erosion in water-
touched tubes), 22-2
Spacers, 26-3
Spalling of SH/RH steamside oxide,
2-17 through 2-21, 36-5, 36-6
Spray coatings (see Coatings)
Spheroidization, 10-3, 32-3, 42-4
Stagnant water, 27-1, 27-4, 27-5, 41-2,
41-4, 41-5
Startup of units, 4-8, 4-9, 27-6
Steam blanketing, 2-12, 2-13, 15-5,
15-6, 16-6 through 16-8, 17-5
through 17-7
Steam flow redistribution, 32-19
through 32-21, 33-21, 34-19
Steam impingement, importance of
identifying, 7-10, 7-11
Steam monitoring, 3-14, 41-8
Steamside oxide (see Oxides, internal
in steam-touched tubes)
Strain age embrittlement, 45-1
Strains, monitoring, 9-10
Stress analysis for analyzing corrosion
fatigue, 13-29
Stress corrosion cracking, 37-1
through 37-16
actions, 37-12 through 37-16
case study, 37-10
determining the extent of
damage, 37-8, 37-15
distinguishing from stress
corrosion cracking and inter-
granular corrosion, 7-10
features of failure, 37-2, 37-3, 37-12
locations of failure, 37-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
37-9, 37-16
mechanism, 37-4, 37-5, 37-13
precursors, 37-12
ramifications/ancillary problems,
37-16
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 37-8, 37-15
root causes and actions to
confirm, 37-6 through 37-8,
37-14
Substoichiometric fireside conditions,
18-1 through 18-5, 18-7
Sulfidation, 18-4, 33-7, 33-8
Supercritical steam properties, 19-6
Supercritical waterwall cracking, 19-1
through 19-22
actions, 19-19 through 19-22
case study, 19-16
chromizing waterwalls, 19-15, 19-16
determining the extent of
damage, 19-14, 19-21
features of failure, 19-2, 19-3, 19-18
in oil-/gas-fired units, 19-10
international experience base, 19-5,
19-6, 19-16
locations of failure, 19-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
19-15, 19-16, 19-22
mechanism, 19-5 through 19-10,
19-19
precursors, 19-18
ramifications/ancillary problems,
19-22
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 19-14, 19-21
root causes and actions to
confirm, 19-11 through 19-13,
19-20
Superheater/reheater chemical clean-
ing (see also Chemical clean-
ing), 4-5 through 4-7
solvent choice, 4-6
Superheater/reheater tubes,
basics, 2-5, 2-6, 32-8
failure mechanisms screening
table, 1-8, 1-9, 31-4, 31-5
maximum metal temperatures,
32-8, 32-9
temperature distribution in, 32-11,
32-14, 32-15
Supports, 26-3, 35-10, 35-11, 39-3,
39-4
Temperature measurements,
in economizer inlet headers, 20-6,
20-7, 20-10
in SH/RH tubes, 32-11, 32-14
10 o’clock - 2 o’clock flats, 32-2,
32-10, 33-2, 33-3,
Thermal-hydraulic regimes in boiler
tubes, 2-12 through 2-14
conditions that lead to deposit
formation, 2-13, 2-14
global, 2-12, 2-13
local, 2-13, 2-14
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Thermal fatigue in economizer inlet
header tubes, 20-1 through
20-19
actions, 20-14 through 20-19
assessment methodology, 20-9
case study, 20-12, 20-13
determining the extent of
damage, 20-8, 20-17
distinguishing from erosion-
corrosion and flexibility-
induced cracking, 7-6, 7-7, 20-4
features of failure, 20-2, 20-3, 20-14
locations of failure, 20-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
20-11, 20-19
mechanism, 20-4, 20-5, 20-15
precursors, 20-14
ramifications/ancillary problems,
20-19
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 20-9 through 20-11,
20-18
root causes and actions to
confirm, 20-6, 20-7, 20-16
Thermocouples, 8-6, 9-8, 9-9
chordal thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
pad-type thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
Thermogravimetry analysis, 33-12,
33-15
Transgranular stress corrosion crack-
ing (see also Stress corrosion
cracking), 37-1 through 37-3
TUBELIFE, 8-3 through 8-6, 10-8
Tube blockage, 23-5, 36-5
Tube build-up, 11-6
Tube manufacturing laps, 45-1, 45-2,
45-3
Tube ovality, 24-4, 24-5
Tube temperatures
increased by increasing oxide
thickness, 4-5, 8-3, 8-4, 9-4
measuring via thermocouples, 8-6,
9-8, 9-9
predicted by oxide growth laws
compared to thermocouple
measurements, 8-4 through 8-6
Two phase flow, 2-12, 2-13
U-bends in tubes as fatigue site, 26-3,
26-4, 39-3
Ultrasonic measurement of oxide
thickness, 4-6, 9-4 through 9-6,
32-11
I-9
Underdeposit corrosion,
acid phosphate corrosion, 16-1
through 16-28
caustic gouging, 17-1 through
17-22
distinguishing among the types,
7-1 through 7-5
hydrogen damage, 15-1 through
15-30
in bubbling-bed FBC units, 47-3,
through 47-5, 47-9
in circulating-bed FBC units, 48-2
Unit lay-up,
as a cause of boiler tube failures,
4-9, 27-7, 41-1, 41-6, 41-8
options, 4-9 through 4-11, 27-7,
41-8
Unit startup and shutdown,
effect on boiler tube failures, 4-8,
4-9
effect on pitting in water-touched
tubes, 27-6
effect on pitting in SH/RH tubes,
41-6
effect on stress corrosion
cracking in SH/RH tubes,
37-10
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-10
V2O5 - MgO phase diagram, 34-10
V2O5 - Na2O phase diagram, 34-3
Vanadates, 32-2, 32-3
Vibration in tubes as cause of fatigue,
26-6, 39-6, 39-11
Vortex shedding, 26-6, 39-6, 39-11
Waste-to-energy units, BTF issues
in, 49-1 through 49-7
additives, 49-5
erosion, 49-2, 49-3, 49-7
fireside corrosion of SH/RH, 49-3
through 49-6
fireside corrosion of waterwalls,
49-3 through 49-6
high chlorides, 49-2
Water chemistry (see Boiler water
treatment and/or Feedwater treat-
ment)
Waterside fireside corrosion (see
Fireside corrosion in water-touched
tubes)
Water-steam cycle
ingress, corrosion and deposition
in drum units, 1-17
ingress, corrosion and deposition
in once-through units, 1-17
introduction to 1-16
Waterwall deposits,
effect on tube metal temperatures,
19-7, 19-8
local tube conditions that can
cause, 2-13, 2-14, 15-4, 15-5,
15-6, 15-8, 15-10, 16-5, 17-4
measuring by ultrasonic testing, 9-6
metallurgical analysis of, 6-8, 15-2,
15-3, 16-2, 16-3, 16-18 through
16-20, 17-2, 17-3
rate of accumulation, 2-9
Waterwalls and economizer tubes,
basics, 2-4, 2-5
failure mechanisms screening
table, 1-6, 1-7, 12-4, 12-5
Weld build-up, 11-6
Welding/repair defects, 45-1, 46-1
through 46-7
actions, 46-5 through 46-7
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 46-1 through
46-4
Welding repairs (see also Repair and
replacement of boiler tubes), 11-1
through 11-8
Wick boiling, 2-13, 2-14
Window welds (canoe piece repairs),
11-6, 11-7, 15-15, 16-13, 17-11
Boiler Tube Failures:
Theory and Practice
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes

R. B. Dooley
Electric Power Research Institute

and

W. P. McNaughton
Cornice Engineering, Inc.

i
 About EPRI
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ii
Table of Contents Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes

Chapter Page
12 Introduction and Use of Volume 2 12-1
12.1 Subject Matter and Objectives for This Volume 12-1
12.2 Organization of Volume 2 12-1
12.3 Optimizing the Use of this Volume 12-2
12.4 For BTF Mechanisms Not Covered by This Book 12-2
13 Corrosion Fatigue 13-1
Introduction 13-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 13-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 13-10
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 13-21
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 13-26
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 13-27
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 13-28
7. Case Study 13-30
8. References 13-33
ACTIONS 13-35
14 Flyash Erosion 14-1
Introduction 14-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 14-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 14-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 14-8
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 14-11
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 14-11
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 14-12
7. Case Study 14-19
8. References 14-22
ACTIONS 14-23
15 Hydrogen Damage 15-1
Introduction 15-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 15-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 15-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 15-8
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 15-13
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 15-14
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 15-14
7. Case Study 15-16
8. References 15-20
ACTIONS 15-21

iii
Table of Contents Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes (continued)

Chapter Page

16 Acid Phosphate Corrosion 16-1

Introduction 16-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 16-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 16-6
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 16-9
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 16-13
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 16-13
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 16-14
7. Case Study 16-16
8. References 16-21
ACTIONS 16-22
17 Caustic Gouging 17-1
Introduction 17-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 17-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 17-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 17-8
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 17-11
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 17-11
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 17-12
7. Case Study 17-14
8. References 17-15
ACTIONS 17-16
18 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion 18-1
Introduction 18-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 18-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 18-4
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 18-7
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 18-11
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 18-11
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 18-12
7. Case Study 18-16
8. References 18-17
ACTIONS 18-18

iv
Table of Contents Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes (continued)

19 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking 19-1

Introduction 19-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 19-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 19-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 19-11
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 19-14
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 19-14
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 19-15
7. Case Study 19-16
8. References 19-17
ACTIONS 19-18
20 Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes 20-1
Introduction 20-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 20-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 20-4
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 20-6
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 20-8
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 20-9
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 20-11
7. Case Study 20-12
8. References 20-13
ACTIONS 20-14
21 Erosion/Corrosion in Economizer Inlet Headers 21-1
Introduction 21-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 21-1
2. Mechanism of Failure 21-3
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 21-4
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 21-5
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 21-5
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 21-5
8. References 21-6
ACTIONS 21-7
22 Sootblower Erosion (Water-Touched Tubes) 22-1
Introduction 22-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 22-1
2. Mechanism of Failure 22-2
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 22-2
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 22-3
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 22-4
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 22-4
8. References 22-5
ACTIONS 22-6

v
Table of Contents Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes (continued)

23 Short-Term Overheating in Waterwall Tubing 23-1

Introduction 23-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 23-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 23-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 23-5
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 23-7
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 23-7
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 23-8
8. References 23-8
ACTIONS 23-9
24 Low-Temperature Creep Cracking 24-1
Introduction 24-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 24-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 24-4
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 24-6
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 24-6
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 24-6
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 24-7
8. References 24-7
ACTIONS 24-8
25 Chemical Cleaning Damage: Waterwalls 25-1
Introduction 25-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 25-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 25-4
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 25-4
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 25-4
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 25-5
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 25-5
8. References 25-5
ACTIONS 25-6
26 Fatigue in Water-Touched Tubes 26-1
Introduction 26-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 26-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 26-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 26-6
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 26-7
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 26-8
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 26-8
8. References 26-8
ACTIONS 26-9

vi
Table of Contents Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes (continued)

27 Pitting in Water-Touched Tubes 27-1

Introduction 27-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 27-1
2. Mechanism of Failure 27-4
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 27-6
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 27-7
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 27-7
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 27-7
8. References 27-8
ACTIONS 27-9
28 Coal Particle Erosion 28-1
Description of Coal Particle Erosion and Its Manifestation 28-1
References 28-2
ACTIONS 28-3
29 Falling Slag Damage 29-1
Description of Falling Slag Damage and Its Manifestation 29-1
References 29-2
ACTIONS 29-3
30 Acid Dewpoint Corrosion (Economizer) 30-1
Introduction 30-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 30-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 30-3
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 30-5
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 30-6
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 30-6
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 30-6
8. References 30-7
ACTIONS 30-8
Index I-1

vii
viii
 A:
BTF -
Mechanism Unknown
B:
BTF -
Known Mechanism
C:
Anticipating Future BTF
(Table 12-3)
Chapter 12 • Volume 2
(Table 12-2)

Compare Macroscopic Tentative identification of Tentative identification of

Appearance to Table 12-1 mechanism(s). Go to mechanism(s). Go to

Introduction and
(Water-touched) or Volume 2 (Water-touched) Volume 2 (Water-touched)
Table 31-1 Volume 3 or Volume 3 (Steam- or Volume 3 (Steam-
(Steam-touched) Tubes to touched) Tubes. touched) Tubes.
identify candidate(s) Follow actions

Action 1a: Perform Action 1B: Screening

Screening Analysis: Is it Analysis:
possible that this boiler tube ¥ Review precursor list in
No
failure is caused by this mechanism chapter

Use of Volume 2
mechanism? ¥ Remove tube sample to
determine extent of
damage
Yes
Action 2: Determine Yes Are BTF likely to occur in
(confirm) mechanism the future by this
mechanism?

No
Action 3: Determine root
cause

Action 4: Determine extent

of damage or affected
areas

Action 5: Implement
repairs, immediate
solutions and actions

Action 6: Implement
long-term solutions to
prevent repeat failures

Action 7: Determine possible

ramifications/ancillary unit
problems

12.1 Subject Matter and 12.2.1 Theory and Background - the

Objectives for This Volume
The primary objective of this volume
is to provide the most recent knowl-
edge about boiler tube failures
(BTF) in water-touched tubing of
conventional fossil-fueled power
plants. Constituent objectives are:
first half of each chapter. The
Theory and Background matter gen-
erally includes the following topics:
• 1.0 Features of Failure and
Typical Locations
• 2.0 Mechanisms of Failure

• To provide sufficient theory and • 3.0 Possible Root Causes and

background information so that
the reader can (i) identify boiler
tube failure mechanisms, (ii)
determine their root cause, and
(iii) apply immediate solutions to
correct the problem, and (iv)
implement longer-term strategies
to prevent their reoccurrence.
• To provide direct, easy-to-follow
actions to be taken in the event
that a boiler tube failure or pre-
cursor has occurred.
Actions to Confirm
• 4.0 Determining the Extent of
Damage
• 5.0 Background to Repairs,
Immediate Solutions and Actions
• 6.0 Background to Long-Term
Actions and the Prevention of
Repeat Failures
• 7.0 Case Studies
• 8.0 References

A key part of each Theory and

12.2 Organization of Volume 2
Each chapter deals with a specific
boiler tube failure mechanism. With
only a few exceptions each chapter
consists of two parts. The first half
covers the Theory and Background
about the mechanism; the second
half addresses Actions to be taken.
Background section is a Table that
ties together the possible root
causes, actions to confirm, immedi-
ate actions/solutions and long-term
actions.
It is crucial that the root cause of the
damage be clearly identified so that
the correct actions (short- and long-
term) can be properly chosen. To fail
in either identification or correction is
to open the door to repeat failures.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 12-1

12.2.2 Actions - the second half of
each chapter. The second half of
each chapter contains Actions to be
followed by the investigator or BTF
team if (i) a boiler tube failure has
occurred and a particular mecha-
nism is suspected, or (ii) if a unit
precursor has occurred that might
lead to a future BTF by this mecha-
nism.
Note that throughout the three vol-
umes, actions are generally marked
with a special symbol, "➠". The
Actions are numbered in a manner
consistent with the Theory and
Background section. That is, Action
2 corresponds to Section 2.0 of the
Theory and Background section; the
former details specific actions to be
taken to confirm the mechanism, the
latter provides additional information
about the mechanism, why these
specified actions are to be taken
and how the mechanism develops.
12.3 Optimizing the Use of
this Volume
Figure 12-1 shows that three
avenues are open to the investigator
or BTF team depending upon the
status of the BTF event:
¥ A: BTF with mechanism
unknown. If a BTF in water-
touched tubing has occurred and
the mechanism is not known, then
Table 12-1 should be consulted.
The aim of this table is to provide
a starting point for the investiga-
tion based on the macroscopic
appearance of the failure and a
description of typical locations.
From it, a preliminary choice of
mechanism can be made, then
the Actions for that mechanism
followed to confirm that the
choice was correct. Note that as
shown in Table 12-1, three BTF
mechanisms (those caused by
maintenance damage, materials
flaws, and welding flaws), com-
mon to both water-touched and
steam-touched tubing, are cov-
ered in Volume 3.
12-2 Introduction and Use of Volume 2
• B: BTF with known mechanism.
If the BTF Team has knowledge
from past failures that a particular
mechanism is the likely cause,
then Table 12-2, an index to
Volumes 2 and 3, can be used to
go directly to the appropriate
chapter.
• C: Anticipating future BTF. The
BTF Team should continually
anticipate possible failures by
reviewing key unit/boiler operat-
ing events, that can lead to future
BTF. Table 12-3 is a tool that can
help to anticipate BTF. It is orga-
nized as a series of "unit precur-
sors". These are events or condi-
tions that experience has shown
should be cause for detailed
evaluation of the potential for
future BTF, even though no BTF
has yet occurred. The process is
not unlike routine inspection of
components; it may take only one
identification of an incipient fail-
ure to justify the cost-effective-
ness of the practice to even the
most cost-conscious manage-
ment.
The table is organized in five sec-
tions: (1.0) inspection results or
appearance, (2.0) cycle chemistry
events, (3.0) maintenance-related,
(4.0) operation-related, and (5.0)
specific equipment events.
The BTF Team or investigator may
find that the best way to implement
this table is to work through each
precursor and ask: "Has this precur-
sor occurred in our utility/unit?", or
"Have we taken this action recently?"
If the answer to either is "yes", then
a review of the mechanism(s) indi-
cated in the final column may be
indicated. Note that this table
includes both water-touched and
steam-touched tubing.
In compiling this table, an attempt
has been made to limit the "precur-
sor" list to those which (i) can be
easily identified, (ii) are important
observations and will be useful for
indicating a potential BTF problem,
(iii) are not direct indications of
boiler tube damage (an inspection
that finds cracks at the toe of a
tube/attachment weld would be a
direct indicator of a BTF), and (iv)
are reasonably likely to lead to a
BTF based on past evidence.
Clearly, it is not possible to put
every possible precursor in Table
12-3, but it is hoped that two objec-
tives are achieved. First, that forced
outages by BTF are reduced by
anticipating the pre-conditions to the
most common mechanisms.
Second, that a first step will be
taken to improve the understanding
of the complex, interconnected
nature of cycle chemistry, operating
practice, combustion processes,
and maintenance effects on BTF.
As a final note, the list should not
pre-empt good engineering judg-
ment. If a precursor is found that
you think should be an alert of a
future problem, follow it up, even if it
is not in this particular list.
12.4 For BTF Mechanisms Not
Covered in this Book
If, having gone through the above
procedure, it appears that the BTF
experienced is not covered in this
book, or if multiple mechanisms
appear to be operative, then the
generic investigation procedure
shown in Figure 12-1 is still applica-
ble. Specifically, it is important that
the following sequence be followed:
Understand the mechanism
¯
Determine the root cause
¯
Apply proper long-term solution
Removal of a tube sample and use
of metallurgical techniques should
enable an understanding of the
underlying damage process (ero-
sion, corrosion, overheating, creep,
fatigue, environmentally-assisted
cracking, etc.) and may facilitate
assignment of the BTF to one of the
categories discussed here, which
will then provide additional guid-
ance to the investigator.
 A: B: C:
BTF - BTF - Anticipating Future BTF
Mechanism Unknown Known Mechanism (Table 12-3)
(Table 12-2)

Compare Macroscopic Tentative identification of Tentative identification of

Appearance to Table 12-1
(Water-touched) or
Table 31-1 Volume 3
(Steam-touched) Tubes to
identify candidate(s)
mechanism(s). Go to
Volume 2 (Water-touched)
or Volume 3 (Steam-
touched) Tubes.
Follow actions
mechanism(s). Go to
Volume 2 (Water-touched)
or Volume 3 (Steam-
touched) Tubes.

Action 1a: Perform Action 1b: Screening

Screening Analysis: Is it
possible that this boiler tube
No
failure is caused by this
mechanism?
Yes
Action 2: Determine
(confirm) mechanism
Analysis:
¥ Review precursor list in
mechanism chapter
¥ Remove tube sample to
determine extent of
damage
Yes Are BTF likely to occur in
the future by this
mechanism?

No
Action 3: Determine root
cause

Action 4: Determine extent

of damage or affected
areas

Action 5: Implement
repairs, immediate
solutions and actions

Action 6: Implement
long-term solutions to
prevent repeat failures

Action 7: Determine possible

ramifications/ancillary unit
problems

Figure 12-1. Flowchart of actions for identifying, evaluating, and anticipating boiler tube failures.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 12-3

Table 12-1
Screening Table for Water-Touched Boiler Tube Failures

Typical Fracture Other Likely Macroscopic and Possible Chapter in

Surface Appearance Metallographic Features Typical Locations Mechanism Volume 2
(or 3 as noted)

Thick-Edged Fracture Surface

Thick-edged (pin- Multiple, transgranular cracks that initiate Near attachments, particularly where high Corrosion 13
hole leak also pos- on the inside of the tube. restraint stresses can develop. Fatigue
sible)

Thick-edged, leak Internal damage: gouging, wall thinning; High heat flux areas; hot side of tube; horizon- Hydrogen 15
or window blowout tube deposits. tal or inclined tubing; pad welds; locations with Damage
local flow disruptions such as upstream of
weld, backing ring or other discontinuities.

Thick-edged Multiple, parallel cracks on the outside Maximum heat flux locations; fireside or water- Supercritical 19
tube surface or on membrane; sharp, wall tubing or membranes between tubes. Waterwall
V-shaped oxide coated cracks; wall thin- Cracking
ning from external surface when found
with fireside corrosion.

Thick-edged, leak First sign as pin-hole leak at toe of stub Economizer inlet header stub tubes nearest the Thermal Fatigue 20
or crack. weld; multiple, longitudinal cracks; bore feedwater inlet.
hole cracking.

Thick-edged Outside surface initiated, inter- Predominant in tube bends, particularly at Low- 24
granular crack growth with evidence intrados on outside surface, and other locations Temperature
of grain boundary creep cavitation and subject to high residual, forming, or service Creep Cracking
creep voids. stresses.

Thick-edged Transgranular cracking, OD-initiated and Near attachments, particularly solid or jammed Fatigue 26
associated with tubing (at tube bends - sliding attachments; at bends in tubing.
longitudinal or attachments - transverse)
or headers (particularly at the ends).

Thin-Edged Fracture Surface

Thin-edged, longi- Polishing of tube outside surface; very Near side and rear walls; near economizer Flyash Erosion 14
tudinal, "cod- or localized damage, wastage flats. banks; near plugged or fouled passages; where
"fish-mouth" previous baffles have been installed.

Thin-edged, leak or Internal damage: gouging, wall thinning; As for hydrogen damage. Acid Phosphate 16
split tube deposits. Corrosion

Thin-edged, leak or Internal damage: gouging, wall thinning; As for hydrogen damage. Caustic Gouging 17
split tube deposits.

Thin-edged, long External wastage; probably affecting a Areas with locally substoichiometric environ- Fireside 18
"fish-mouth" number of tubes; maximum wastage at ment; side and rear walls near burners; highest Corrosion
crown facing flame (maybe flame heat flux areas. (coal-fired units)
impingement); damage extending in 120°
arc around tube; hard deposits on tube
outside surface.

12-4 Introduction and Use of Volume 2

Table 12-1
Screening Table for Water-Touched Boiler Tube Failures (continued)

Typical Fracture Other Likely Macroscopic and Possible Chapter in

Surface Appearance Metallographic Features Typical Locations Mechanism Volume 2
(or 3 as noted)

Thin-Edged Fracture Surface (continued)

Thin-edged rupture Erosion, wall thinning from inside; Economizer inlet header stub tubes nearest to Erosion- 21
"orange peel" appearance. point of feedwater inlet. Corrosion

Thin-edged, "fish- Wastage flats on tube external surface at Circular pattern around wall blowers. Sootblower 22
mouth" 45° around tube from sootblower direc- Erosion
tion, little or no ash.

Generally thin- Often shows signs of tube bulging or Highest heat flux locations above locations Short-Term 23
edged "fish-mouth": appearance; real keys will such as: the site of a tube or orifice blockage, Overheating
be transformation products in or in horizontal tubing where a downcomer
microstructure. May also be thick-edged steam "slug" can occur.
under certain circumstances.

Thin-edged External wastage, little or no ash; Tubes near replaceable wear liners in cyclone Coal Particle 28
location should be key. burners; throat or quarl region of burners. Erosion

Thin-edged External erosion or mechanical impact Sloping wall tubes and/or ash hopper near Falling Slag 29
damage features. bottom. Damage

Thin-edged External, thinned or missing external Low temperature areas of economizer. Acid Dewpoint 30
oxide; generally in economizer. Corrosion

Pinhole Damage

Pinhole Internal tube surface damage. Locations where boiler water can stagnate dur- Chemical 25 or 27
ing unit shutdown (pitting). Cleaning
Damage or
Pitting

Various Other Damage Types

Depends on under- Usually obvious from type of damage Maintenance Chap. 44,
lying cause. and correspondence to past maintenance Damage Volume 3
activity.

Depends on defect. Materials Flaws Chap. 45,

Volume 3

Usually thick- Care required to separate weld defects Welding Flaws Chap. 46,
edged. from another problem located at a weld. Volume 3

Note: This table is based on simple, macroscopic features of failure and should be used as a guide to a particular chapter for further analysis. The more detailed discus-
sions starting with Actions can then be used for identification and confirmation of the actual mechanism.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 12-5

Table 12-2
Index to BTF Mechanisms
Chapter Chapter
Water-Touched Tubes In Volume 2 Steam-Touched Tubes In Volume 3

Acid dewpoint corrosion 30 Chemical cleaning damage in SH/RH tubes 43

Acid phosphate corrosion 16 Dissimilar metal weld failures 35

Caustic gouging 17 Fatigue in steam-touched tubes 39

Chemical cleaning damage 25 Fireside corrosion in SH/RH tubes (coal-fired units) 33

Coal particle erosion 28 Fireside corrosion in SH/RH tubes (oil-fired units) 34

Corrosion fatigue 13 Flyash erosion 14 (Volume 2)

Erosion-corrosion (economizer inlet headers) 21 Graphitization 42

Fatigue in water-cooled tubes 26 Long-term overheating/creep 32

Falling slag erosion 29 Low-temperature creep 24 (Volume 2)

Fireside corrosion (coal-fired units) 18 Maintenance damage 44

Flyash erosion 14 Material flaws 45

Hydrogen damage 15 Pitting in steam-touched tubes 41

Low-temperature creep 24 Short-term overheating 36

Maintenance damage 44 (Volume 3) Sootblower erosion in SH/RH tubes 38

Material flaws 45 (Volume 3) Stress corrosion cracking 37

Pitting in water-touched tubes 27 Rubbing tubes/fretting 40

Short-term overheating 23 Welding flaws 46

Sootblower erosion in water-cooled tubes 22

Supercritical waterwall cracking 19

Thermal fatigue of economizer inlet headers 20

Welding flaws 46 (Volume 3)

12-6 Introduction and Use of Volume 2

Table 12-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

1.1 Water- Excessive waterside deposits Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
touched tubes ( >> 30 mg/cm2) for high-pressure boilers. (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2), short-term overheating
(waterside) (23,V2)

Excessive waterside deposits, such as ripple Fe3O4 in once-through Supercritical waterwall cracking (19,V2)
(O/T) and supercritical units.

Boiler water samples that appear black (high suspended solids). Acid phosphate corrosion (16,V2)

Corrosion/erosion in feedwater system; fouling in boiler feed pump or
orifices.
• For supercritical or O/T units: supercritical waterwall
cracking (19,V2)
• For subcritical or non-O/T units - hydrogen damage
(15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion (16,V2), or caustic
gouging (17,V2)
• Erosion-corrosion of economizer inlet header (21,V2)

Pressure drop across circulation pumps (orifices are plugging). Short-term overheating in waterwall tubing (23,V2)

1.2 Water- Flame impingement due to burner change or misalignment, leading to Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
touched tubes excessive tube deposits. (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2), fireside corrosion
(fireside) (18,V2)

Excessive furnace slagging that could lead to overheating in convective Short-term in overheating SH/RH tubing (36,V3)
passes (or fuel change).

Fresh rust found on tubes after unit washing, external flat spots, bur- Flyash erosion (14,V2), sootblower erosion - waterwalls
nishing or polishing. (22,V2), coal particle erosion (28,V2)

Failed tubes, any upstream tube leaks, as a warning to scout for the Short-term overheating in waterwall tubing (23,V2)
potential short-term overheating.

Significant hardness or ovality, particularly associated with tube bends, Low-temperature creep cracking (24, V2)
found during routine inspection.

1.3 Steam- Excessive steamside oxide (detected by UT measure of oxide thickness, Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside
touched tubes or analysis of removed tube samples, evidence of excessive exfoliation corrosion (33&34,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures
(steamside) like solid particle erosion in turbine). (35,V3), short-term overheating (36,V3)

Steamside deposits in RH tubing - particularly of sodium sulfate, or Pitting and failure in steam-touched tubes (41,V3)
high Na or SO4 levels in steam.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 12-7

Table 12-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance (continued)
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

1.4 Steam- Excessive flue gas temperature, displaced fireball, delayed combustion, Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside
touched tubes periodic overfiring or uneven firing of burners. corrosion (33 & 34,V3)
(fireside)
High levels of excess oxygen. SH/RH fireside corrosion: oil-fired units (34,V3)

Blockage or laning of boiler gas passages observed during boiler Flyash erosion (14,V2), long-term overheating/creep
inspection. (32,V3), SH/RH fireside corrosion: coal/oil units (33 &
34,V3)

Excessive temperatures measured by thermocouples in vestibule or Flyash erosion (14,V2), long-term overheating/creep
header area. (32,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3)

Evidence of "alligator hide" appearance on external tube surface, Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside
observed during boiler inspection, associated with wall loss or thinning. corrosion (33 & 34,V3)

Fresh rust found on tubes after unit washing, external flat spots, bur- Flyash erosion (14,V2), sootblower erosion in SH/RH
nishing or polishing. (38,V3)

Significant hardness or ovality, particularly associated with tube bends, Low-temperature creep cracking (24, V2)
found during routine inspection.

Distortion or misaligned tube rows found during routine inspection. Flyash erosion (14,V2), SH/RH fireside corrosion (33 &
34,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3), fatigue of
steam-touched tubing (39,V3), rubbing/fretting (40,V3),

Failed tube supports and lugs, location of dissimilar metal welds close Fatigue of steam-touched tubing (39,V3), dissimilar
to fixed supports. metal weld failures (35,V3)

12-8 Introduction and Use of Volume 2

Table 12-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

2.1 All units Problem with high levels of feedwater corrosion products; operating
ranges for pH, cation conductivity or dissolved oxygen consistently
outside recommended ranges, including persistent reducing conditions
or excessive use of oxygen scavengers.
Corrosion fatigue (13,V2), hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid
phosphate corrosion (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2),
waterwall fireside corrosion (18,V2), supercritical water-
wall cracking (19,V2), erosion/corrosion in economizer
inlet header (21,V2), short-term overheating in waterwall
tubing (23,V2),

Carryover of volatile chemicals from boiler, such as NaOH for units on Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3), pitting in steam-
caustic treatment, or excess of Na, SO4, and/or chloride; steam limits touched tubes (41,V3)
exceeded.

Major acid contamination event (pH < 8) when unit is at full load; con- Hydrogen damage (15,V2)
denser leak, or breakdown of makeup or condensate polisher regenera-
tion chemical.

2.2 Units on Evidence of a persistent problem with phosphate hideout, particularly Acid phosphate corrosion (16,V2)
Phosphate where mono-sodium and/or an excess of di-sodium phosphate has
Treatments been added to the boiler.

Persistent phosphate hideout with phosphate return causing a pH Corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
depression (7-8).

Caustic level in excess of that necessary for optimal control (>> 2 ppm). Caustic gouging (17,V2)

2.3 Units on Caustic, used in excess of that necessary for optimal control of conta- Caustic gouging (17,V2)
AVT minant ingress (to counteract pH depressions on startup).

pH depression during shutdown and early startup (pH around 7-8). Corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
Hideout/return of sulfate.

2.4 Units on Caustic, used in excess of that necessary for optimal control (>> 2 ppm). Caustic gouging (17,V2)
Caustic
Treatment

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 12-9

Table 12-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

3.1 Chemical Evidence of shortcoming in chemical cleaning process such as inap- Chemical cleaning damage in waterwalls (25,V2) or
cleaning propriate cleaning agent, excessively strong concentration or long SH/RH (43,V3), short-term overheating (23,V2 & 36,V3).
cleaning time, too high a temperature, failure to neutralize, breakdown
of inhibitor, inadequate rinse.

Shortcoming in SH/RH cleaning process such as inadequate rinse, Short-term overheating in SH/RH tubing (36,V3)
improper flow verification.

Evidence that level of Fe in cleaning solution continued to increase Chemical cleaning damage in waterwalls (25,V2) or
instead of leveling out when cleaning process was ended. SH/RH (43,V3)

Need for excessive cleaning in supercritical units (interval < 2 years). Supercritical waterwall cracking (19,V2)

Contamination in SH/RH (particularly by chlorides) during chemical Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3)
clean of SH/RH (breakdown of inhibitors or improper flushing of sol-
vents) or waterwalls (caused by poor backfill procedures that failed to
protect SH circuits).

3.2 Repairs In water-touched tubes: use of backing rings, pad welds, canoe pieces, Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
weld overlay that penetrates to inside surface - as a source of flow dis- (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2)
ruption and excessive deposits.

Application of shielding, baffles, palliative coatings to mitigate flyash Flyash erosion (14,V2)
erosion without the use of a cold-air velocity test.

In water-touched tubes, Cu in water-side deposits. Hydrogen damage (15,V2), welding defects (46,V3)

12-10 Introduction and Use of Volume 2

Table 12-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

4.1 Startup Feedwater introduced intermittently into economizer inlet at high flow Economizer inlet header thermal fatigue (20,V2)
Procedures rates during startups and particularly during off-line top-ups.

Rapid unit startups that cause the reheater to reach temperature before SH/RH fireside corrosion (33 & 34,V3)
full flow starts (no furnace exit gas temperature control).

4.2 Heat flux change caused by change to higher BTU-value coal, dual fir- Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
Combustion ing with gas, changeover to oil- or gas-firing leading to excessive tube (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2), fireside corrosion
conditions deposits in waterwalls; new burners causing impingement. (18,V2)

Implementing low excess air strategies for NOx control and the potential Waterwall fireside corrosion (18,V2)
for waterwall fireside corrosion (note that unlike the other precursors in
this Table, this is a possibility based on understanding the mechanism;
to date no failures have been directly attributed to this cause).

Operation with high levels of excess oxygen in oil-fired units (> 1%). SH/RH fireside corrosion in oil-fired units (34,V3)

4.3 Fuel Change to a fuel that either contains more ash or contains elements Flyash erosion (14,V2)
choices and which are more erosive such as quartz.
changes
Change to a more corrosively-aggressive coal, particularly one high in Waterwall fireside corrosion (18,V2), acid dewpoint corro-
chlorine, Na, K, or S contents. sion (30,V2), SH/RH fireside corrosion (33 & 34,V3)

Use of Mg-based additives (oil-fired units) leading to coating of water- Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside cor-
walls, reflecting heat into convection passes. rosion in oil-fired units (34,V3)

4.4 Cycling Conversion of the unit to cycling operation or an increase in the num- Corrosion fatigue (13,V2), economizer inlet header thermal
ber of cycles. fatigue (20,V2), fatigue in water-touched (26,V2) or steam-
touched tubing (39,V3),dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3)

4.5 Evidence of a shortcoming during unit shutdown/layup such as uncer- Pitting in water-touched (27,V2) or steam-touched tubes
Shutdown or tainty about water and/or air quality during period, insufficient nitrogen (41,V3), and maybe corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
layup blanketing, insufficient N2H4, evidence of air inleakage.

Indication that stagnant, oxygenated water may have rested in tubes Pitting in water-touched (27,V2) or steam-touched tubes
during shutdown or layup particularly in economizer and RH. (41,V3)

Evidence that condensate is forming in SH/RH bends during unit shut- Short-term overheating in SH/RH tubes (36,V3), pitting in
down, exacerbated if steam purity is not good (as determined by ele- steam-touched tubes (41,V3)
vated levels of SO4).

4.6 Other Operation above the maximum continuous design rating, with excess Flyash erosion (14,V2)
air flow settings above design, with unbalanced fans or air heaters -
leading to nonuniform gas flows.

Low drum level. Short-term overheating (23,V2)

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 12-11

Table 12-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment

Category Precursor Mechanism(s) of Concern

(Chapter,Volume)

5.1 Major condenser leaks or minor leaks that have occurred over a long Hydrogen damage (15,V2)
Condensers period of time.

Condenser leak leading to condenser cooling water constituents in Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3)
attemperator spray water.

5.2 Water Upset in water treatment plant or condensate polisher regeneration Hydrogen damage (15,V2)
treatment chemicals leading to low pH condition in boiler (pH < 8).
plant/
condensate Upset in water treatment plant or condensate polisher regeneration Caustic gouging (17,V2)
polisher chemicals leading to high pH condition.

5.3 Drum Carryover test indicates high mechanical carryover. Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3), pitting in steam-
touched tubing (41,V3)

Operating with high drum level allowing excessive carryover into steam. Pitting in steam-touched tubing (41,V3)

5.4 Poor sootblower maintenance. Sootblower erosion in waterwalls (22,V2), SH/RH soot-
Sootblowers blower erosion (38,V3)

5.5 Low Header has large number of operating hours, has experienced large Economizer inlet header thermal fatigue (20,V2)
temperature thermal gradients, spacing of ligament holes is small (< 3.5 cm),
headers header thickness is well above Code minimum, header-to-stub tube
joints made with partial penetration welds.

5.6 High Excessive relative movement of header/ tube during unit transients, Fatigue in steam-touched tubing (39,V3).
temperature restricted movement, header is not allowed to expand freely (maybe
headers ash-related), unit change to cycling.

5.7 Turbine A problem with solid particle erosion (SPE) in the turbine. Short-term overheating SH/RH tubing (36,V3), long-term
overheating /creep (32,V3)

5.8 Redesign of the SH/RH circuit may change the absorption patterns Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside cor-
SH/RH Circuit through other SH/RH sections and increase tube temperatures. rosion (33 & 34,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3)
(redesign)

5.9 Supports/ Addition of supports without consideration of their impact on the Dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3)
Attachments stresses of dissimilar metal welds.
(redesign)
Redesign of waterwall tube attachments to increase flexibility without Corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
analysis to determine whether solution is actually beneficial.

12-12 Introduction and Use of Volume 2

Chapter 13 • Volume 2
Corrosion Fatigue
Introduction
Corrosion fatigue occurs by the
combined actions of cyclic loading
and a corrosive environment. The
primary occurrence is on the water-
side in waterwall and economizer
tubing, usually located adjacent to
attachments or restraints.
Corrosion fatigue in boiler tubes has
been a major source of availability
loss in fossil-fueled power plants for
over ten years. It is one of the last
major boiler tube failure mecha-
nisms to be characterized to the
point that root cause analysis and
solutions to prevent recurrence can
be defined. Although not as com-
mon as in subcritical boilers, the
same damage has also been found
in supercritical boilers.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
Corrosion Fatigue:
Identification Keys
1. Failures are initiated at the
inside surface, at multiple initia-
tion sites, which can be associ-
ated with pits or other surface
discontinuities.
2. Damage at the outside tube
surface can appear as a pin-
hole, a thick-edge crack that is
usually axial but may be cir-
cumferential, or a thick-edge
section “blow-out”. Particular
care must be taken to distin-
guish corrosion fatigue from
outside surface-initiated
mechanical fatigue.
3. Cracks are usually wide, oxide
filled, with irregular profiles and
evidence of discontinuous
growth.
4. Failures are nearly always asso-
ciated with tube attachments or
other locations where significant
constraint stresses develop. A
list of 24 generic failure loca-
tions has been developed.
13-2 Corrosion Fatigue
1.1 Features of failure
Corrosion fatigue failures occur in
water-touched tubes, usually in
waterwall tubing, but also in econo-
mizer tubing under some conditions.
Corrosion fatigue cracks initiate on
the inside surface. Although they are
predominantly located on the cold-
side of the inside surface such dam-
age may also form on the fireside.
General features of corrosion fatigue
cracks are listed in Table 13-1.
A typical failure is shown in Figure
13-1; key features illustrated here
are the initiation at multiple sites on
the inside of the tube, the longitudi-
nal orientation of the cracks and the
association of the failure with an
external tube attachment. Figure
13-2 shows schematically the gen-
eral features of this damage type;
these features are shown in actual
tubes in Figures 13-3 and 13-4. As
shown, cracks initiate from multiple
sites at the inside surface, are ori-
ented axially, can grow through the
wall, and although they may be
associated with pits and other inter-
nal defects, they are not necessarily
associated with weld defects.
Sometimes damage is also seen on
the outside surface.
Corrosion fatigue cracks have been
identified with three types of macro-
scopic appearance: (i) a pinhole
leak, (ii) a thick-edged crack ori-
ented axially (usually) or circumfer-
entially, or (iii) a thick-edge blow-out
or rupture which usually follows the
membrane weld line either on the
hot or cold side.
The pinhole leak on the tube outside
surface is the most commonly
observed form. Figure 13-4 would
be typical of the cross section
through such a defect type. This
damage manifestation can often be
confused with an OD-initiating
mechanical fatigue crack. There are
three means to distinguish the two.
First, the surface-initiated fatigue
crack is generally associated with
a discontinuity or stress riser, such
as the toe of a weld, whereas the
ID-initiated corrosion fatigue crack
would only rarely break through to
the outside surface exactly at the
toe. An exception would be cracks
that linked—one initiated on the
inside surface and the other initiated
on the outside surface.
Second, when grinding the flaw prior
to weld repair, the outside-surface
initiated damage will decrease with
grinding depth into the tube, the
inside-surface initiated damage will
become more widespread. Third,
externally initiated fatigue cracks
tend to show up earlier in the life of
the boiler.
The second damage manifestation,
the thick-edged crack such as
shown in Figure 13-5. This damage
type is generally associated with
attachments, but may be of consid-
erable length and extend beyond
the attachment area.
The third macroscopic manifestation
of damage is the thick-edge blow-
out or rupture and is characterized
by cracking down both sides of the
tube along the weld lines of the
membrane; this causes an entire
section of tube to fail (Figure 13-1).
This third form is rare but has the
potential to cause catastrophic dam-
age and can be a safety problem if it
occurs on the cold side of the tube in
an area with heavy personnel traffic.
Microscopically, corrosion fatigue
cracks are characterized by features
such as multiple, wide, transgranular
cracks with irregular profiles, usually
filled with oxide and showing signs
of discontinuous growth such as
crack arrest marks. Figure 13-6
shows cross sections through corro-
sion fatigue cracks illustrating these
features.
Table 13-1
Common Features of
Corrosion Fatigue Damage
Macro-features
• Initiation from inside (waterside) of tube.
• “Typical” development on “cold” side of
the tube but can be on fireside.
• Cracks usually oriented longitudinally
with respect to tube axis, i.e., normal to
the predominant stress field, which in the
typical case are tensile hoop stresses.
• Cracks can also be circumferential or any
direction that is normal to the major
applied stress.
• Can be initiated from pits or other surface
discontinuities.
• Not OD-initiated.
• Not specifically related to presence of
weld defects.

Micro-features
• Multiple, transgranular cracks.
• Cracks usually wide.
• Cracks usually oxide filled and blunt
tipped.
• Crack profiles usually irregular.
• Signs of discontinuous growth,
re-initiations.

Figure 13-1. An example of corrosion fatigue cracking in SA-210 A1 waterwall tubing.

Note that the main failure is coincident with an attachment welded onto the tube and
that there are multiple longitudinal cracks on the tube inside surface. Source: G.I.
Ogundele, et al.1b

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-3

 Protective Fe 3O4 Water/steam
Secondary side
crack
Deposited
particles

Slip band Extensive

activity oxidation
Spherical Deformed
corrosion particles
pits

Onset of
final fracture

Figure 13-2. Schematic showing the general features of corrosion fatigue cracks.
Source: M.D.C. Moles and H.J. Westwood2

Figure 13-4. Throughwall penetration of

a corrosion fatigue crack. Note how the
crack decreases in width towards the
outside surface. Source: H.J. Westwood
and W.K. Lee3

Figure 13-3. Typical multiple corrosion fatigue cracks in a boiler

waterwall tube. Source: D. Sidey, et al.1d

13-4 Corrosion Fatigue

Figure 13-5. Thick-edged failure by corrosion fatigue. Source: D. Sidey, et al.1d

Figure 13-6. Cross-sections of corrosion fatigue cracks showing typical features: oxide coating of the fracture surface, corrosion
within the crack, wide crack mouths and tips, and a transgranular fracture path. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.10

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-5

 Steam
drum
17

Penthouse Furnace
floor gas exit
scallop scallop
plate 1
plate
Buckstay Top
attachments 18 windbox
2 (a) Corner casing
10 (b) Tie-bars Rear wall attachment
10 (c) Stirrups arch Burner
throat Windbox
1 region
Bottom
windbox
casing Burner
attachment elevations

9
Windbox Buckstay
extension elevations
22 Gas flat bar
recirculation
duct Slope
19 region
6
attachment Boiler water Side wall
seal buckstay
3 + 4 connection
21 5
to slope wall 15 24 24

Front wall Side wall Side (a) (b)

S-bends gusset plate wall/slope Division Lower
wall wall division
connection penetration wall tube
of slope ties
Note: Buckstay corner failures occur at Buckstay elevation ( )
other than in Slope region and Burner elevation

Figure 13-7a. Typical locations for tube failures by corrosion fatigue. Locations in tangentially-fired boilers.
Numbers refer to additional description given Table 13-2. Source: D McNabb, et al.1a

1.2 Locations of failure factors: size, mode of operation, fuel

A major effort has gone into identify-
ing the most common initiation sites
for corrosion fatigue. The predomi-
nant locations are near tube attach-
ments: locations where large
stresses develop during transient
operating conditions as thermal
expansion has been constrained by
the attachment. Typical locations
include windbox casing attach-
ments, buckstay attachments, and
scallop bar attachments. In econo-
mizer tubing, failures have been
reported in bends or the heat-
affected zone of welds.
A list of twenty-four susceptible loca-
tions was developed following the
detailed survey of ten operating
units with a history of corrosion
fatigue failures.1a The units were all
subcritical drum units but otherwise
were chosen to reflect a variety of
type, quality of cooling water and
cycle chemistry. Table 13-2 presents
those locations in order of the fre-
quency with which corrosion fatigue
was found for the units surveyed.
These locations are illustrated
schematically in Figures 13-7a and
13-7b for two generic boiler designs
- a tangentially-fired radiant boiler
and a front/rear fired radiant boiler,
respectively. As a general rule, any
failure associated with constraint
(attachment) should be examined
carefully for evidence of a corrosion
fatigue mechanism.
Table 13-2 summarizes the key
aspects of corrosion fatigue at each
location including: a description of
the design, nature of the failures,
and recommended modifications.
Table 13-2 also presents a “stress

13-6 Corrosion Fatigue

 14
Scallop plate penthouse
floor connection

13 20 12
Side wall buckstay Upper
connection to gas off-
baffle wall take
gusset
plates

Gas Gas off-

outlet takes
7
Upper
windbox 8
casing (a) Burner throat region
attachment (b) Burner mount

Windbox
and
burners

Lower
windbox Slope
casing region
attachment

23 Side wall/
slope wall 16 6
Furnace floor connection
connection End of waterwall Division wall
between front membrane region penetration
and rear walls of slope wall

Figure 13-7b. Typical locations for tube failures by corrosion fatigue. Locations in front/rear-fired radiant boil-
ers. Numbers refer to additional description given Table 13-2. Source: D. McNabb, et al.1a

rank” for the location, and possible A common denominator among

modifications that can be used in
corrective strategies; these two top-
ics are discussed in considerably
more detail in sections that follow.
The problem can also arise in econ-
omizer tubing. The general industry
experience has indicated the most
likely failure locations are (i) at
bends, (ii) in welds with the potential
for high residual stresses such as fin
welds, and (iii) at attachments simi-
lar in nature to those outlined above
for waterwalls. Parts of economizer
circuits can form walls of the back
pass.
nearly all of the most common fail-
ure locations is the presence of sig-
nificant thermal gradients, induced
by either (i) high heat flux typical, for
example, of the sites in the combus-
tion zone of the furnace, or (ii) a
variety of other causes such as
where tubing carrying different
media (e.g. steam and water) are
connected.
Failures have also been found at
locations without significant thermal
gradient. These are generally the
result of: (i) poor boiler water chem-
istry conditions, (ii) an unusual
structural loading, or both.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-7

Table 13-2
Corrosion Fatigue Failure Site List with Descriptions, Stress Ranking, and Potential Modifications
Location
1. Windbox casing
2. Buckstay corners*
3. Boiler ash hopper seal plate
4. Boiler seal heat shield
(slag screen)
5. Side wall gusset plate
6. Division wall penetration
of slope
7. Burner throat/gas off-take
tube ties
8. Burner barrel mounts
9. Windbox extension vertical
seal
10. Buckstay connections to
waterwalls
13-8 Corrosion Fatigue
Stress Rank
for Use in
Description Influence Diagram Applied Modification
a) Continuous scallop plate–primarily corner B No modification derived
tubes affected
b) Filler bars B Replace cast filler bars with plate
formed filler bars
a) Rigid corner scallop plate connected to buckstay B Remove or relieve rigid corner
b) Lug mounted tie-bar connected to tubes at A Same as for case (a)
corner
c) Tangent/membrane wall with filler bar D Remove filler bar
connections
Continuous scallop plate B Change to U-bolt arrangement
a) Continuous scallop plate B Short tangent bar (3-4 tubes),
or a U-bolt arrangement
b) 6-8 tube tangential bar C Same as for case (a)
Triangular plate between redirected tubes A Change to peg membrane
a) Refractory box rigidly connected at the top D Remove rigid connections
and bottom
b) Continuous scallop plate B Use refractory box without rigid
connections
a) Short bars welded between redirected tangent C Replace tube ties with membrane
tubes bar
b) Short bars welded between tubes in tangent B Weld bar on hot side to restore
tube wall neutral bending axis to geometric
axis of tube
Direct connection from burner barrel to waterwall C Use mounting plate between burner
and wall
Increase the number of attachment
lugs
Windbox extension duct welded directly to vertical D Install expansion plate between
flat bar–flat bar is on outside of windbox, but could windbox casing and flat bar, remove
also be on inside flat bar on inside
a) Continuous scallop tie-bar C Use stirrups or lugs on membrane
walls
Tack weld to alternate tubes on
tangent tube wall
b) Continuous tangent bar tack welded to tubes
• membrane wall D Same as for case (a)
• tangent tube wall B Same as for case (a)
Table 13-2
Corrosion Fatigue Failure Site List with Descriptions, Stress Ranking, and Potential Modifications (continued)
Stress Rank
for Use in
Location Description Influence Diagram Applied Modification

11. Scallop tie-bars Tangent tube waterwalls – most failures at corners D Address source of stress
or associated with abnormally high loads Remove weld from every other tube

12. Miscellaneous waterwall a) Sootblower penetrations D Replace with peg membrane

penetration gusset plates* b) Burner throat and gas off-takes C

13. Miscellaneous filler bar a) Windbox strut attachment D Replace solid filler bars with formed
attachments* b) Side wall buckstay/baffle wall connection D plate filler bars
c) Slope wall support I-beam at side wall B

14. Penthouse floor attachments Continuous scallop plate No modification determined

a) problems most common in corners D
b) more serious if connecting tubes carrying B
different media

15. Side wall/slope wall seal a) Scallop bar D Replace with refractory box
b) Rod welded between tubes B

16. End of membrane More serious adjacent to redirected tube A Cut back membrane

17. Furnace gas exit scallop plate Continuous scallop plate C Move scallop plate further from
• adjacent to redirected tubes redirected tubes and cover with
refractory

18. Rear waterwall arch Continuous scallop bar D Cut scallop bar at intervals to make
• adjacent to separation of hanger tubes discontinuous

19. Side wall buckstay connection a) Tangent bar tack welded to tubes C Replace with scallop bar
to slope wall Evaluate necessity of attachment
b) Scallop bar tack welded on alternate sides of bar D Same as for case (a)

20. Side wall buckstay connection Flat bar connection to baffle wall seal welded with C No modification derived
to baffle wall filler bars at side wall
• lowest connection affected

21. Lower front/rear waterwall Immediately downstream of mud drums, with B Remove scallop bars and replace
S-bends locating scallop bars between tubes affected bends

22. Gas recirculation duct scallop Continuous scallop bar D No modification derived
plate attachment

23. Furnace floor connection Direct connection between nose tubes in opposite C Replace solid filler bars with formed
between nose tubes walls plate filler bars
• filler bars used No other modification derived
• natural gas-fired boiler only

24. Division wall tube ties* First set of tube ties above slope wall D No modification derived

*Listed stress rank applies to locations within the combustion or radiant sections of the boiler.
Source: D. McNabb, et al.1a

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-9

2. Mechanism of Failure
Corrosion Fatigue: Mechanism
1. Corrosion fatigue is caused by
the synergistic effects of stress
and environment. This leads to
a breakdown of the protective
magnetite on a tube surface by
both mechanical (stress) and
chemical (environment) means.
2. Corrosion fatigue is a discontin-
uous process with cracks
initiating and growing during
transient periods such as
starts and stops, and full load
operation.
3. Transient operations result in
cyclic strains driven by temper-
ature differences between
attachments and the tube.
During peak strain range peri-
ods reinitiation or initial crack-
ing of the protective oxide will
occur. Full load operation can
result in a corrosive environ-
ment which allows crack
growth.
4. Both initiation and propagation
of the corrosion fatigue are
influenced by the interactions
of: operating factors, chemical
factors, and strain factors. A
probabilistic approach, termed
the Influence Diagram, has
been developed to assess the
impact of these three factors on
the accumulation of corrosion
fatigue damage.
13-10 Corrosion Fatigue
2.1 Introduction
Corrosion fatigue is one of a number
of failure mechanisms that consist of
synergistic effects of stress and
environment. Among the boiler tube
failure mechanisms, other combina-
tions have variously been termed
stress corrosion cracking and
stress-assisted pitting. In many
ways the distinction among various
stress/environment-driven failure
mechanisms is artificial, character-
ized by whether the stress or the
environmental aspect seems to be
predominant. The end result in any
case is the accumulation of damage
through the interaction of the two
basic contributors.
A significant effort has gone into
characterizing corrosion fatigue
damage, differentiating it from dam-
age caused by other mechanisms,
and to targeting solutions specific to
corrosion fatigue. The balance of
this section reviews the following
aspects of corrosion fatigue in boiler
tubes: (2.2) breakdown of mag-
netite, (2.3) overview of mechanistic
models, (2.4) analysis of trends in
the field experience, (2.5) stress
effects on initiation and propagation
including both field measurements
and finite element analysis, and
(2.6) environmental effects including
laboratory and field results.
2.2 Breakdown of magnetite
during corrosion fatigue
The use of carbon steel for boiler
tubes in the high temperature and
high pressure boiler environment
depends on the formation of the
protective layer of magnetite (Fe3O4)
on the waterside of the tube.2-4
Corrosion fatigue presents perhaps
the clearest example of the prob-
lems that develop once that film is
damaged.
In general, the magnetite layer can
be damaged either by chemical
means (corrosion) or by mechanical
means (strain), or by the synergistic
effect of the two5. Destabilization
primarily by chemical means usually
occurs at pre-existing active sites,
resembles pitting and has some-
times been termed stress-assisted
pitting. When the film is destabilized
primarily by strain, corrosion paths
are produced, leading to an array of
cracks and is generally termed cor-
rosion fatigue in boiler tubes.
Rupture of the protective oxide film
leads to more rapid damage by cor-
rosion fatigue because (i) additional
base metal is exposed to corrosion
damage and (ii) the rupture, which
is a crack or crack-like, acts as a
stress concentrator.
The critical strain to fracture mag-
netite at high temperatures is gener-
ally reported to be between 0.01
and 0.1% strain.1b, 6-8 That there is a
lower bound or critical level of strain
that is required to fracture the pro-
tective oxide film and begin the cor-
rosion fatigue damage process is
supported by the German field
experience and from modeling stud-
ies of oxide. In the former instance,
the German design standard TRD
301 requires that the strain level in
oxide be kept below a certain limit,
about 0.1% strain, during operation
to avoid rupturing the magnetite
scale. The lower level of damage
from corrosion fatigue in those boil-
ers seems to confirm the effective-
ness of this limit.
Modeling and analysis of oxide pro-
vides another indication of the effect
of strain level on the appearance of
corrosion fatigue damage. Damage
is often manifested as a surprisingly
regular array of cracks, see Figure d
13-3, for example. Grosskreutz and b
McNeil9 proposed an explanation for w
this phenomenon while analyzing
layers of Al2O3. They suggested that
regularly spaced cracks would form
in a layer under strain, that the sepa- Stress in
Ds ( d2 )
ration between cracks would be a s¦
film (s)
function of the strain level, and that
the separation would decrease until
some minimum was reached. x
o
The stress relaxation model that they
proposed is illustrated in Figure 13-8.
The cracking process will result in Figure 13-8. Schematic representation of the development of a
stress relaxation, with the highest regular array of evenly-spaced cracks caused by corrosion fatigue.
relaxation located immediately adja- (sf) is fracture stress; (Ds(x)) is a measure of stress relaxation.
cent to the crack formed. Therefore, Source: A.G. Crouch and R.B. Dooley4
the maximum remaining (unrelaxed)
stress will be centered between
cracks. With an increasing strain
applied to the coating or oxide layer, Potential (V SHE)
the next crack will then form at the
center between the existing cracks 0.2
assuming a layer with uniform 200°C
properties.
275°C
This model was used to explain the
0
observation of cracks in silica coat-
ings for 9 Cr 1 Mo in experimental
work by Crouch and Dooley4; their
experimental results were used by
Hay and Meadowcroft11 to improve -0.2
upon the original model. The same
model appears to apply to the initia-
250°C
tion of corrosion fatigue cracks and
explains nicely the regular array of -0.4 150°C
parallel cracks on the inner surface.
In addition to the geometry of crack-
ing, the type of oxide that will form
depends on the electrochemical Potentials at 275°C
-0.6
potential of the material, which is in Oxygen Potential
turn controlled by the oxygen con- (ppb) (VSHE)
tent of the water, see Figure 13-9,
5 -0.780
and by the pH. A potential-pH map,
also known as a Pourbaix diagram, -0.8 320 -0.190
is used to identify the stable oxide 1000 -0.090
species for selected conditions.

-1.0
1 5 10 100 1000 10,000
Oxygen Concentration (ppb)

Figure 13-9. Electrochemical potential of carbon steel in water as a function of dis-

solved oxygen content. Source: P.M. Scott and W.H. Bamford12

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-11

Figure 13-10 shows a Pourbaix dia-
gram for iron in high temperature Potential (Volt vs. SHE)
water. Plotted on this figure are 2.5
results of laboratory tests using arti-
No corrosion fatigue
ficially high levels of dissolved oxy- 2.0 Corrosion Fatigue
9
gen from a program described
below; corrosion fatigue most readily Fe 3+
1.5
occurs outside the region of mag- 21
netite stability. Once the film is 4
breached, damage accumulates 1.0 Fe42-
Fe(OH) 2+
until the surface is repassivated,
thus repairing the film. 0.5 Fe2+ +
28
Fe(OH) 2
Dissolved salt contaminants such as
chlorides and sulfates are of con- 0 30
cern as they can affect the morphol- Fe2O3
ogy, formation rate, thickness, and -0.5 26
17
23
strength of the surface oxide. As will
13 Fe3O4 29
be described in more detail below, -1.0 27
the contribution to corrosion fatigue Fe HFeO2-
damage in laboratory tests on boiler -1.5 24
tube materials was not as significant
for these environmental variables as -2.0
for either pH or dissolved oxygen -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
levels. pH (e) @ 250°C

2.3 Mechanistic models of cor-

Figure 13-10. Pourbaix diagram showing the stable oxide film as
rosion fatigue a function of electrochemical potential and pH. Stability of a pro-
A review was undertaken of the cur- tective Fe3O4 scale is believed to be related to the severity of
rent thinking on alternative mechanis- corrosion fatigue. Source: C.M. Chen, et al.13
tic models that attempt to predict
from fundamentals the process that
leads to corrosion fatigue damage.1b
A brief description of four such
mechanistic models is included here:
film rupture/stabilization, mechani- Material Active crack tip strain
cal/chemical dissolution, hydrogen assisted dissolution
embrittlement, and/or strain-induced
corrosion cracking. Migra
tion o
f
• Film rupture/stabilization. There are towar vacancies
d c ra c
several variations of this model k tip
which ascribes accelerated crack Corrosive solution
growth to the rupturing of protec- Vacancies
tive films and subsequent re-oxida- Dissolution of metal
tion or corrosion when the bare atoms creates
metal is exposed to the environ- vacancies
ment.5, 14-17 A variation of this
model explains the onset of corro- Atoms
sion fatigue or stress corrosion
cracking as being controlled by
Highly strained region
crack tip effects that can be
explained by the superposition of Vacancies migrate
toward strained region
an environmental effect and a
strain effect.18 Coalescence causes
crack to grow
• Mechanically-assisted chemical
dissolution. Figure 13-11 illus-
trates the basics of this model.
Figure 13-11. Schematic of the mechanical/chemical dissolution model with the
Vacancies, caused by dissolution
feature of the possibility of corrosion-generated surface vacancies migrating to the
of the metal surface in a corrosive crack tip.

13-12 Corrosion Fatigue

 environment are driven by a
stress field and accumulate at the Localized corrosion reactions
crack tip; such coalescence (e.g. 3Fe + 4H2O - > Fe3O4 + 4H2)
results in incremental crack Hydrogen generation and
growth.19 absorption into crack tip
Material
• Hydrogen assisted (or embrittle-
ment) cracking. Hydrogen is pro-
duced by reaction of carbon steel Oxide
bare scale or
with water. Absorption of free surfac
e
hydrogen into the tube metal at
the crack tip has been suggested Oxide free
Corrosive solution crack tip
by a number of researchers as
being at the root of corrosion
fatigue and stress corrosion wa l l
s
cracking mechanisms.20-23 A a ck
s i v e cr
schematic of the process is Pas Highly
shown in Figure 13-12. strained
region
• Strain-induced corrosion crack-
ing. Similar to the film rupture Hydrogen migration
into hightly strained
model, this concept involves the region ahead of
local disruption of protective crack tip
oxide.6, 22, 24 Destabilization of the
oxide can occur by the environ-
ment (dissolved oxygen content,
Figure 13-12. Schematic of the hydrogen embrittlement model showing how
conductivity and temperature of hydrogen is generated at an active crack tip and then absorbed into the material.
the water), mechanical means
(strain rate and strain level), or by
material characteristics (such as
sulfur content).24
Tube Failures
2.4 General trends in corro- 140
Individual boilers
sion fatigue failures: result of
120 Range
the analysis of field results.
A number of factors have an influ- 100 Cycling Boilers
ence on the incidence of corrosion
fatigue in boiler tubes: boiler water 80
and feedwater quality, chemical
cleaning, tube replacement, boiler 60
modifications, and operating mode. Peaking Boilers
General observations from field 40
studies include:
1. Unit operation can have a signifi- 20
cant effect on the incidence of
corrosion fatigue as shown in 0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
Figures 13-13 and 13-14. Peaking
units have a large number of Total Starts
starts and relatively few operating
hours; cycling units are those that
tend to load follow and have rela- Figure 13-13. Total boiler starts versus tube failures by corrosion fatigue.
tively few starts and a larger num- Source: D. McNabb, et al.1a
ber of operating hours.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-13

2. Chemical cleans by hydrochloric
acid were shown to aggravate
corrosion fatigue as illustrated in Tube Failures
Figure 13-15. For example, boiler 140
1 shows a step function increase Range
120 Peaking Boilers Individual boilers
in the number of tube failures by
corrosion fatigue directly follow-
ing hydrochloric acid cleans. No 100
such dramatic increase in corro-
sion fatigue failures was found 80
after cleans done with EDTA or Cycling Boilers
citric acid. Two competing effects 60
are in progress: crack tip blunting
caused by acid cleaning may 40
slow propagation of modest sized
cracks, but in the case of pre- 20
existing severe damage may lead
to through-wall failure in a much 0
shorter period. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Operating Hours (thousands)
3. Boilers that have had problems
maintaining boiler water and
feedwater limits generally experi-
Figure 13-14. Operating hours versus tube failures by corrosion fatigue.
ence more boiler tube failures by
Source: D. McNabb, et al.1a
corrosion fatigue. Units that have
experienced extensive corrosion
fatigue have had indications that
large swings in pH may have
occurred in the boiler. Such indi- Tube Failures
cators include: hydrogen dam- 140
age, or caustic gouging, or, for HCL clean
those units using congruent Boiler 8 EDTA or citric
phosphate boiler water treatment, 120 acid clean
evidence of phosphate hideout.
Particularly important are pH 100
depressions during shutdown Boiler 1
and startup where pH drops to 80
less than 8 such as caused (i) in
phosphate treatment units when
there is a phosphate hideout 60
return, or (ii) in AVT units caused
by CO2 ingress and slippage 40
through the condensate polish-
ers. It is interesting that corrosion Boiler 7
fatigue occurs much less fre- 20
quently in caustic-treated boilers;
these units do not usually experi- 10
ence a pH depression during 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
shutdown or early startup. Operating Hours (thousands)
Hideout and hideout return analy-
sis of sulfate can be very informa-
tive for boilers on AVT. Up to 1500 Figure 13-15. Operating hours versus corrosion fatigue tube failures illustrating the
ppb of sulfate has been observed effects of different chemical cleaning solutions. Source: D. McNabb, et al.1a
during the overnight shutdown of
boilers.25

13-14 Corrosion Fatigue

4. Boiler layup conditions were also
suspected to aggravate damage
by corrosion fatigue, particularly if
the pH was depressed and dis-
solved oxygen levels were not
controlled.
2.5 Stress effects on initiation
and propagation of corrosion
fatigue cracks
Corrosion Fatigue: Summary of
Key Stress Factors
1. Local stresses and water
chemistry are considered to be
the two major factors that pro-
mote corrosion fatigue.
2. A methodology is not yet fully
established that can (i) predict
stress levels at locations sus-
ceptible to corrosion fatigue,
(ii) predict the rate at which
damage will accumulate, or
(iii) confirm, a priori the degree
to which a proposed attach-
ment modification will result in
lower tube stresses.
3. However, guidelines for the
application of finite element
analysis and field confirmation
have been developed and con-
firmed in field testing. These
should guide utilities in the
careful use of such techniques.
As noted above, the state of stress
is a primary consideration in the
analysis of corrosion fatigue.
Predicting where corrosion fatigue
will occur, predicting how quickly
damage will accumulate, and pre-
dicting the effectiveness of pro-
posed modifications to mitigate a
high stress condition will all ulti-
mately require a knowledge of how
to measure or analyze the relevant
state of stress. This section reviews
recent work toward that goal.
Sources of loads acting on tubes
include (i) boiler pressure, (ii) ther-
mal gradient through the tube (heat
flux), (iii) constraint during thermal
expansion, and (iv) weight of the
attachment (for some locations).
Field tests have identified two major
sources of cyclic strain: strains
resulting from the pressure and tem-
perature ramp during boiler starts,
and strains from subcooling in nat-
ural circulation boilers.
An idealized view of the levels of
strain that would be expected dur-
ing various load changes are shown
in Figure 13-16. The results of strain
gauge tests performed on three dif-
ferent types of units confirmed that
cold starts resulted in the highest
measured tube strains; warm starts,
hot starts, and load changes, both
sliding pressure and constant pres-
sure, resulted in lesser levels. The
typical trends for a cold start are
shown in Figure 13-17. The peak
strain occurs at the point when the
boiler reaches full operating pres-
sure. This peak strain corresponds
to the maximum thermal gradient
through the tube as shown by the
difference between the tube temper-
ature and the attachment tempera-
ture shown in the top part of Figure
13-17. Hoop strains then decline to
steady state levels as the thermal
gradient decreases.
The strains measured in units were
lower than expected and lower than
those which were thought, from lab-
Peak
Strain
»
(me)
Cold Steady Sliding
start state pressure
load change
»
Time
Figure 13-16. Schematic of an idealized strain cycle for a cold start, sliding pressure
load change and shutdown. Source: D. Sidey, et al.1c
oratory investigations, to be needed
to develop corrosion fatigue dam-
age. Refinements to the measure-
ment process have been made and
subsequently applied to other units
and have resulted in measured
strain levels on the order of 0.2 to
0.3%, more consistent with that
needed for the accumulation of cor-
rosion fatigue damage.
The second largest level of strains
developed as a result of subcooling
during warm starts. Subcooling
occurs in natural circulation boilers
when there is a top to bottom tem-
perature stratification during “bot-
tled” cool down periods. The magni-
tude of the subcooling effect first
increases, peaks at about 50 hours
after shutdown for most natural cir-
culation units, then starts to decline
as temperatures over the height of
the boiler start to equalize. The
largest thermal transient in the sub-
sequent start was observed in the
lower furnace. It is believed that
strains resulting from subcooling
may not be an important contributor
to corrosion fatigue in boiler tubes
although a more important factor in
thicker walled components. The
strains associated with subcooling
occur early in the start of a unit
when boiler pressure and heat
fluxes are low, and thus overall tube
stresses are low.
Steady state
»
Partial sliding
pressure
shutdown
Shutdown
Zero pressure
shutdown
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-15
Guidelines for utility application of
stress analysis in attacking corrosion 500
fatigue problems are presented in Hoop strain (me)
Section 6 below on long-term 400
actions to deal with corrosion fatigue
damage. 300 Tube
temperature (°C)
Attachment temperature (°C)
200
2.6 Environment effects on the
initiation and propagation of 100 Axial strain (me)
corrosion fatigue cracks
0

Corrosion Fatigue: Summary of -100

Key Environment Factors
500
1. There is a clear effect of envi- Unit load (MW)
ronmental parameters on the 400
Coal fires
Feedwater flow (kg/s)
severity of corrosion fatigue ini- 300 Roll turbine
tiation and propagation. The Lost coal fires Unit
effects are independent of the 200 synchronization
Purge Coal fires
basic treatment chosen, for 100 Oil Drum pressure (MPa X 10)
fires
example AVT compared to 0
congruent phosphate treat-
ment. 80
CBD O2
10.8
(ppb) CBD phosphate (ppm x 10)
2. Most obvious effects are for pH
excursions and the presence of 60 10.2
high levels of dissolved oxy- CBD - pH
gen. 40 9.8 pH
3. pH is particularly important as CBD cation
low pH excursions, such as 20
conductivity(mS/cm)
9.4
associated with phosphate
hideout, can occur concur-
rently with high strain in sus- 0 9.0
ceptible tubes. 22 0 2 4 6 8 10
Time (hours)

There is no comprehensive model
that can predict the effect of various
environmental factors on the rate of
initiation and propagation of corro-
sion fatigue cracks in the boiler envi-
ronment. A number of past experi-
mental programs have been con-
cerned with isolating the effect of
one or more major parameters such
as dissolved oxygen, pH and cation
conductivity. A broad outline of
those studies and some of the impli-
cations are presented in the first part
of this section (2.6.1)
There have also been a few field
studies that have tried to correlate
the results of the laboratory investi-
gations with field measurements of
similar factors, and with the inci-
Figure 13-17. Strain, temperature and cycle chemistry information collected on the
cold start of a 500 MW unit. (CBD) is continuous blowdown. Source: D. Sidey, et al.1d
dence or extent of corrosion fatigue A knowledge of cycle chemistry par-
damage. Unfortunately there has not ticularly during starts and transients
been good correlation between what is essential. For example, at one unit
was thought to be important in the the major parameters (dissolved
laboratory and what was measured oxygen, pH and cation conductivity)
in the field. In the broad outline in were well maintained throughout
section 2.6.2 is a summary of what transients. This was the result of
is presently known, what is thought specific operating procedures which
to be correct and is undergoing con- allowed up to 1 ppm free hydroxide
firmation, and what is presently to counteract a phosphate hideout
unknown. The discussion here is lim- problem. Prior to making that
ited to specific knowledge about change in procedure, pH would
boiler tube materials, the boiler envi- drop to around 7 during shutdown
ronment and stress levels, and and remain around that level until
actual field investigations in working restart.26 Similar hideout was
boilers. observed during load changes as

13-16 Corrosion Fatigue

 well. This hideout phenomenon has
Cycles to Initiation been well documented27, 28 and has
important implications for units on
104
congruent phosphate control. See
additional discussion on this topic in
Chapter 3, Volume 1.
103 In the final part of this section (2.6.3)
a brief note clarifies the use of oxy-
genated feedwater treatment, and
how its use in drum boilers can be
102 consistent with the observation that
increased levels of dissolved oxy-
gen have increased the propensity
for corrosion fatigue damage in lab-
10 Air Data (274°C) oratory tests.
Clean AVT water at 274°C
2.6.1 Laboratory results. The follow-
Contaminated AVT water at 274°C ing results have been obtained from
laboratory studies1b; it is important
1 to note that there have been some
10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 1 10
differences from those obtained in
Frequency (Hz)
field tests:
1. The number of cycles to crack
initiation by corrosion fatigue are
Figure 13-18. Effect of cycle chemistry and frequency on the lower in simulated boiler water,
initiation of corrosion fatigue cracking.
either high-quality or contami-
Source: G.I. Ogundele, et al.1b
nated, than in air. Figure 13-18
shows this result. The number of
cycles to initiation is markedly
influenced by the presence of
Dissolved Oxygen (DO) ppb contaminants (lower curve).
104 However, there is very little differ-
LOG (N) = 3.3883 - 0.5256 LOG (DO) ence in these results between the
R = -0.9842 normal base chemistries for AVT
Phosphate test data and phosphate.
AVT test data
103 2. Figure 13-18 also indicates that
the frequency of strain reversal is
important for initiation. Lower fre-
quencies increase the corrosion
102 fatigue initiation potential.
Frequency effects are also evi-
dent for propagation rates.
Higher frequency tests in labora-
10 tory experiments are not thought
to allow the full effects of the cor-
rosion aspect of the damage
mechanism to influence the crack
1 growth. Long periods at lower
10 102 103 104 strains between cycles allow full
Cycles to Initiation, N influence of corrosion effects.
3. Dissolved oxygen was shown to
have a strong influence on cycles
Figure 13-19. Effect of oxygen on corrosion fatigue initiation at to initiate corrosion fatigue as
274°C (525°F) and a frequency of 0.0005 Hz.
illustrated in Figure 13-19.
Source: G.I. Ogundele, et al.1b

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-17

4. pH level was also shown to have
a strong effect. A series of speci-
mens was tested in solutions with
a constant levels of 5 ppb dis-
solved oxygen and with varying
phosphates to simulate acidic
phosphate hideout return. The
number of cycles to initiation was
reduced to about 1/3 at both
204°C (400°F) and 274°C (525°F)
when the pH level was approxi-
mately 6 as compared to the base
condition of pH 9. Figure 13-20
illustrates this important result.
5. The presence of chlorides and
sulfate had less noticeable
effects, with the effect of chlorides
up to 3000 ppb the most signifi-
cant in reducing cycles to initia-
tion.
2.6.2 Implications of laboratory tests
to operating boilers and comparison
to field results. What are the impli-
cations of laboratory test results,
particularly for dissolved oxygen lev-
els and pH on the potential for cor-
rosion fatigue in boilers? The effect
of oxygen levels are reviewed first.
It is clear that in the laboratory envi-
ronment an increase in dissolved
oxygen levels from 5 to 1000 ppb
will significantly decrease the num-
ber of cycles to initiate corrosion
fatigue cracks (Figure 13-19). There
is also no doubt that during a shut-
down period the oxygen level in
boiler water can reach high, per-
haps saturation, levels; but upon first
firing and circulation of the boiler
water the dissolved oxygen levels
decrease once the deaerator and
drum start to separate oxygen. As a
result, the experience from field test-
ing has indicated that oxygen at
high levels (> 20 ppb) does not gen-
erally occur at the same time as the
peak in applied strain level (Figure
3-17); peak strains occur well after
the time when oxygen levels have
approached a low level. It is impor-
tant to know the time dependency of
the elevated oxygen levels on
startup and especially important to
monitor the oxygen levels in the
downcomer as compared to the
boiler drum.
13-18 Corrosion Fatigue
Cycles to Initiate Cracks
1200
400°F (204°C)
1000
525°F (274°C)
800
600
400
200
0
4 6 8 10
pH @ 25°C
Figure 13-20. The influence of pH on cycles to initiate corrosion fatigue cracks in
deaerated boiler water (< 5 ppb oxygen). The pH was controlled with phosphate solu-
tions of different Na:PO4 molar ratios. Source: R.B. Dooley and L.D. Paul32
This situation is contrasted with that conditions in three units that had his-
for pH depressions on shutdown/ torical problems with corrosion
startup. Such depressions can be fatigue-induced tube failures.1c At
caused by phosphate hideout the time of testing, as shown in the
return, leakage from condensers, or table, boiler water chemistry for
ingress of carbon dioxide. In these units A and B was generally well
cases, particularly the first, the pH within acceptable values when tube
level does not return to the normal strains were highest during both
range until the unit pressure has cold starts and during warm starts.
risen considerably and/or phosphate What then was at the root of the
or caustic has been added to the problem with corrosion fatigue?
unit. Thus, the pH of the boiler water Subsequent investigation indicated
can be depressed during the period that each unit had been subject to
of peak strain at locations suscepti- considerable past problems with
ble to corrosion fatigue. A pH level phosphate hideout and concurrent
of 8 and below is not unusual in possibility of low pH excursions
these cases as shown in Figure 16- when operating with congruent
7. As indicated in Figure 13-20, this phosphate treatment. As a result,
can reduce the number of cycles to both units had changed to equilib-
initiate or re-initiate corrosion fatigue rium phosphate treatment before the
cracks. field tests and had not been experi-
encing hideout, hideout return, or
Note that care is required to judge the low pH excursions which result.
field test results. Table 13-3 shows
chemistry, strains and temperatures
measured for a variety of operating
Table 13-3
Field Test Results
Temperature
Temperature Rate of Hoop Axial
Range Change Strain Strain Dissolved Cation
(Tube OD) (Tube OD) DeH DeA Oxygen conductivity
Operation/Boiler DT (˚C) (˚C/hr) (µe) (µe) pH (ppb) (µS/cm)

Cold Start

Unit A 170 70 280 -700 8.6 - 9.5 > 1,000 to < 1 2 - 10

Unit B 145 120 500 50 10.0 - 9.5 > 1,000 to < 5 20 - 40

Unit C1 260 250 150 — 8.5 - 7.2 > 1,000 to < 1 1 - 11

Unit C2 (trip) 160 1,750 2,000 — 8.5 - 7.2 > 1,000 to < 1 1 - 11

Warm Start

Unit A1 60 50 200 -500 9.2 - 9.4 <2 3-7

Unit A2 45 700 170 -500 9.2 - 9.4 <2 3-7

Unit B 125 110 400 -100 9.2 - 9.4 <2 10 - 30

Hot Start

Unit A1 40 80 100 -175 9.1 - 9.3 <5 2-6

Unit A2 50 350 100 -250 9.1 - 9.3 <5 2-6

Unit B 50 70 220 -100 9.1 - 9.8 <5 5 - 40

Load Changing

Unit A 40 75 115 -125 9.1 - 9.3 <5 2-6

Unit B — — 50 50 9.2 - 9.6 <5 10 - 25

Unit C1 50 90 80 — 8-9 <1 3.2 - 2.8

Unit C3 30 1,500 -700 — 8-9 <1 3.2 - 2.8

Notes:
1Pressure/temperature ramp event
2Subcooling correction event.
3Unidentified temperature excursion

Source: D. Sidey, et al.1c

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-19

These results imply that cracks may
only initiate, reinitiate and/or grow
when environmental conditions are
conducive. Inactive cracks are
found in field studies, indicating that
the process is not continuous but
consists of a series of re-initia-
tions.1d Laboratory tests are seldom
able to duplicate this feature of field
cracking because of the time con-
straints inherent in any test program.
This discontinuous nature of the cor-
rosion fatigue process also makes
life assessment a very difficult task.
2.6.3 Oxygenated water chemistry
and effect on corrosion fatigue. The
operation of supercritical and once-
through units on oxygenated treat-
ment has been fairly widespread.
Today however, the operation of
13-20 Corrosion Fatigue
drum units on oxygenated feedwater
is also being implemented as the
benefits are expected to be similar
to those for once-through units. The
level of oxygen entering the econo-
mizer inlet has to be carefully con-
trolled to ensure that elevated oxy-
gen levels do not occur in the boiler
tubes. As indicated in the last sec-
tion, once the boiler starts to steam
then the oxygen level in the water-
walls is controlled by the recircula-
tion ratio (the ratio of oxygen at the
economizer inlet to that in the down-
comer) which is typically between 6
at low load and 4 at full load. A sam-
ple point for oxygen in the down-
comer rather than in the drum is
thus needed to control the oxygen
levels.
For drum units, utilities should add
oxygen only when the unit is steam-
ing, operating above a certain mini-
mum load, when the feedwater
cation conductivity is less than 0.15
mS/cm, and when the boiler water
(downcomer) cation conductivity is
less than 1.5 mS/cm. Some utilities
add oxygen no more than once a
week. Whatever procedure is
adopted for control, the oxygen level
should be targeted to keep the oxy-
gen level in waterwall tubes at
around 5-10 ppb. Oxygen at this
concentration should have minimal
influence on the initiation of corro-
sion fatigue cracks (see Figure 13-
19). Guidelines for oxygenated treat-
ment for fossil plants have been pro-
duced.29
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Corrosion Fatigue: Root Causes
1. Corrosion fatigue is caused by
a combination of cyclic
stresses/strains and environ-
mental effects. Analysis of root
causes will consist of identify-
ing excessive sources of these
contributors.
2. An “influence diagram” can
help judge the relative contri-
bution of the various root
cause influences to an identi-
fied problem with corrosion
fatigue and to judge the effi-
cacy of proposed solutions.
3. The influence diagram should
be considered as a predictive
tool to anticipate the potential
for corrosion fatigue, even in
new units.
3.1 Introduction
Corrosion fatigue is caused by the
interaction of stresses and environ-
ment. The effects are synergistic
and, as of yet, no closed form model
or analytical tool can predict corro-
sion fatigue initiation and propaga-
tion from first principles. A method
that is based on an influence dia-
gram has been developed and
allows decisions to be made about
the relative contribution of various
root cause influences. It also pro-
vides a tool to evaluate possible
approaches to prevent the recur-
rence of corrosion fatigue; the
method is discussed at the end of
this section.
The discussion of root causes is
divided into excessive stresses
(3.2), environment (3.3), and opera-
tional history of the boiler (3.4), as
each can contribute to the problem
of corrosion fatigue. Table 13-4 sum-
marizes the potential root causes,
actions to confirm, and immediate
and long-term actions to be taken.
3.2 Influence of excessive
stresses/strains
3.2.1 Restraint stresses at attach-
ments. Primary failure locations are
in tubes near attachments; many
successful solutions to the problem
have been effected by lowering the
stresses associated with the restraint
at these attachments. Stress analy-
sis and confirmation with field mea-
surements should be used in any
redesign situation, particularly as
some redesigns to combat corrosion
fatigue by “lowering” local stresses
have actually accumulated damage
more quickly than the original
design. It should also be noted that
weld reinforcement at an existing
attachment in an attempt to improve
the weld profile and eliminate fatigue
caused by thermal restraint has
resulted in tube failures due to cor-
rosion fatigue within two years. No
corrosion fatigue cracking was
experienced with identical boilers
where the weld profile was improved
by grinding.
Actions to confirm the influence of
excessive stresses/strains include:
(a). Compare locations of damage
to those compiled in Figures 13-
7a/b and in Table 13-2. Note partic-
ularly those locations with high
stress ranks, i.e., where field survey
experience indicates attachment
details are likely to have the highest
stress levels.
(b). Use Figures 13-7a/b and Table
13-2 as an inspection guide to
locate other highly susceptible loca-
tions before damage is detected via
tube failure.
(c). Selectively sample tubes to see
if cracking has initiated.
(d). Field test with thermocouples
and/or strain gauges to confirm the
levels of strain developed at sus-
pect attachments during operation,
including hot, warm and cold starts.
(e). Perform finite element stress
analysis for the suspect detail to
confirm field results and/or predict
future behavior. See the guidelines
for stress analysis and field testing
in Section 6 on long-term actions.
3.2.2 Subcooling in natural circula-
tion boilers. High strains have
occurred during subcooling (stratifi-
cation of cooling water along the
length of the waterwall) during shut-
down and restart in natural circula-
tion boilers.
Actions to confirm:
(f). Review operating records.
(g). Install thermocouples at the top
and bottom of the boiler and monitor
the ÆT as a function of shutdown
length.
(h). Strain gauge to confirm exis-
tence and seriousness of the prob-
lem.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-21
Table 13-4
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause
Influences
3.2 Influence of Excessive
Stresses/Strains
3.2.1 Restraint stresses
at attachments
3.2.2 Subcooling (cooling
water stratification)
in natural circulation
boilers
3.3 Influence of
Environmental Factors
3.3.1 Poor water chemistry
13-22 Corrosion Fatigue
Actions to Confirm
(a). Compare damaged locations to those
typical of corrosion fatigue. See Figures
13-7a/b and Table 13-2.
(b). Inspection of susceptible locations
before tube failures occur.
(c). Selectively sample to identify damage
accumulation.
(d). Thermocouple and/or strain gauge test-
ing to confirm high strain
locations.
(e). Finite element stress analysis to
predict high strain locations.
(f). Review operating records.
(g). Thermocouple top and bottom of
boiler to monitor DT as function of
shutdown time.
(h). Strain gauge to confirm.
(i). Review water chemistry logs and prac-
tices, with particular emphasis on pH
reductions during shutdown and early
startup; if review indicates a problem
then implement a monitoring program.
See discussion of minimum levels of
instrumentation in Chapter 3, Volume 1.
(j). Calculate Environmental Parameter for
use in Influence Diagram from informa-
tion gathered above Section 3.5.2 and
Table 13-5; this will help determine the
contribution of environment to the
corrosion fatigue problem.
(k). Selectively sample tubes from at-risk
areas for evidence of pitting or corro-
sion fatigue damage
Immediate Actions
and Solutions
• Apply Influence Diagram
(Section 3.5) as a tool to
identify proper short-
and long-term solutions.
• Replace damaged tubes.
• Do not pad weld.
• Determine the extent of
damage.
• Confirm damage
mechanism is corrosion
fatigue.
• Same as above.
• Same as above, particu-
larly initiating the appli-
cation of the Influence
Diagram to characterize
the contribution of the
environment.
Long-Term Actions and
Prevention of Repeat Failures
• See guidance in Section 6.2.
• Most effective measures have been
modification of attachments to lower
stresses.
• Install off-line boiler circulation pumps
to reduce level of subcooling.
• Clean up overall cycle and confront
specific chemistry problems such as
condenser leaks, impurity ingress,
lack of appropriate procedures, lack
of appropriate monitoring devices, etc.
• Apply appropriate guideline procedures
for specific chemistry, monitoring,
and instrumentation. See overview of
recommended practices in Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
Table 13-4
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions (continued)
Possible Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.3.2 Overly aggressive (l). Review chemical cleaning procedures, • Same as above, plus • Optimize chemical cleaning procedures
or improper chemical and correlate chemical cleaning with • Revise chemical clean- and frequency. See overview in
cleaning corrosion fatigue failures. ing procedures, as Chapter 4, Volume 1.
(m). Selective sampling of at-risk tubes. required.

3.3.3 Improper boiler (n). See actions in items (i),(j) above. • Same as above, plus • Optimize shutdown, lay-up procedures.
shutdown and/or • Optimize shutdown, lay- • See overview in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
lay-up procedures up procedures.

3.4 Influence of Historical

Unit Operation

3.4.1 Operating procedures (o). Review operating records to determine • Apply Influence Diagram • See guidance in Section 6.2.
that have produced operating hours and boiler starts. as a tool to identify • Reduction of stresses or improvement
high stresses (p). Plot failure history against unit operat- proper short- and in environmental parameter are possible
ing conditions. See Figures 13-13 long-term solutions. actions.
and 13-14. • Replace damaged tubes.
• Do not pad weld.
• Determine the extent of
damage.
• Confirm damage
mechanism is corrosion
fatigue.

3.3 Influence of environmental
factors
3.3.1 Poor water chemistry. A vari-
ety of excursions, including low pH,
high levels of dissolved oxygen, and
cycle chemistry contaminants, can
influence both propagation and initi-
ation of corrosion fatigue. Poor water
chemistry will accelerate the corro-
sion attack in existing cracks or
breaks in the protective oxide; pit-
ting caused by poor shutdown
chemistry can provide a preferential
initiation site for starting corrosion
fatigue cracks.
Actions to confirm:
(i). A two-pronged approach is
required. The first part will be a
review of the chemistry records and
logs. Particular emphasis should be
given to reductions in pH during the
shutdown and early startup periods.
For phosphate-treated units, the key
question will be whether phosphate
hideout occurs, which will result in
phosphate return with concurrent pH
reductions during shutdown or load
reductions. For AVT units, depres-
sions in pH during shutdown and
early start up can result from conta-
minant ingress, slippage from the
condensate polisher, or carbon diox-
ide ingress. For both chemical treat-
ments, the pH depressions can
remain during the early startup
period.
(j). Using information gathered
above, evaluate the severity of the
environmental contribution to the
corrosion fatigue problem by calcu-
lating the “environmental parameter”
for the influence diagram. This
process is discussed in more detail
in Section 3.5.2.
If the review indicates a problem,
then a monitoring effort should be
undertaken. The primary aim of such
a program would be to confirm any
pH reduction. It should also address
the possibility that dissolved oxygen
in the boiler tube, as monitored at
the downcomer, is high during shut-
down, and more importantly,
remains high (³ 20 ppb) well into the
startup period (past pressure rais-
ing).
(k). Selectively sample tubes from
high stress areas, or other at-risk
locations, to determine whether pit-
ting has begun, or whether there is
evidence of more advanced dam-
age such as developing corrosion
fatigue cracks.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-23

3.3.2 Overly aggressive or improper
chemical cleaning. Aggressive
chemical cleaning can promote initi-
ation and propagation of corrosion
fatigue damage.
Actions to confirm:
(l). Review chemical cleaning pro-
cedures and plot out corrosion
fatigue failure history against past
chemical cleaning events as shown
in Figure 13-15.
(m). Selectively sample for evi-
dence of initiating or propagating
corrosion fatigue cracks.
3.3.3 Improper boiler shutdown
and/or lay-up procedures.
Oxygenated stagnant water is a key
ingredient for pitting and the forma-
tion of corrosion fatigue initiation
centers. Proper shutdown and/or
layup procedures are vital. These
involve the adequate use of N2H4 or
alternatives, or ensuring nitrogen
blanketing.
Actions to confirm:
(n). Ensure that excessive oxygen
levels are not present into the
startup period, see items (i, j) above
for specific actions required.
3.4 Influence of unit operation
3.4.1 Operating procedures that
have produced high stress levels,
particularly during load changes.
Field experience indicates that the
highest cyclic strains are developed
in tubes during load changes, par-
ticularly cold starts. Increased
cycling of the unit, choice of ramp-
ing rates, and other operating
choices can adversely affect a mar-
ginal location. Peaking boilers with a
large number of starts and few
operating hours display a distinctly
different failure trend than base load
or load-following boilers. The influ-
ence diagram incorporates this con-
sideration through a combination of
the number of operating hours (H)
13-24 Corrosion Fatigue
and total boiler starts (Ns) into one
parameter termed the equivalent
operating hours (EOH):
EOH = (H/1000) +
(NS/(H/1000)) (13-1)
Actions to confirm:
(o). Review operating logs to deter-
mine operating hours and boiler
starts.
(p) Plot failure history by corrosion
fatigue, if any, against unit operating
conditions to observe patterns like
in Figures 13-13 and 13-14.
3.5 The influence diagram and
its use to confirm root cause
influences.
Figure 13-21 illustrates the influence
diagram approach to analysis of
corrosion fatigue susceptibility or
failures. The approach integrates
the three basic influences on failure
of boiler tubes by corrosion fatigue:
stresses, environment and unit oper-
ating history.
3.5.1 Stress rank. The influence of
stresses enters the diagram through
the choice of a stress rank for a
given location and condition. Four
stress ranks have been proposed,
labeled A through D in order of
decreasing stress. Each of the 24
susceptible locations was assigned
a generic stress rank to be used as
the default stress rank, Table 13-2.
The location-specific stress ranks
were determined from time-to-failure
history for each of the 24 sites, infor-
mation on detailed site design, and
a qualitative estimate of the major
loads present.
Where additional information, such
as field measurements or stress
analysis, about a particular location
is available, it is used to fine-tune
the judgment about stress rank. For
sites not listed, a first cut is to iden-
tify a listed site that is of similar
design and then fine-tune the
assessment through additional
analysis or measurement.
A primary aim of the stress ranking
process was to allow priorities to be
set among various locations; the
stress rank chosen is the ordinate on
the influence diagram, Figure 13-21.
3.5.2 Environmental parameter.
The effect of environment on corro-
sion fatigue propensity is also evalu-
ated by a four level ranking scheme:
E1, E2, E3, and E4, where E1 is
good cycle chemistry and E4 is
poorest. The ranking is chosen by
answering the questions presented
in Table 13-5. A weighting process
provides a means to indicate the
larger influences on corrosion
fatigue.
Environmental influences of interest
include: (i) pH and dissolved oxygen
levels as obtained either by direct
measurements or indirectly, such as
indicated by hideout problems, (ii)
chemical cleans, and (iii) boiler shut-
down and layup procedures.
Completing the questionnaire will
allow an environmental factor to be
entered into the influence diagram.
A detailed example of how this form
is completed from unit information is
provided in the case study that fol-
lows later in this section.
3.5.3 Unit operation. The effect of
unit starts and operating hours is
entered into the influence diagram
through the calculation outlined in
equation 13-1.
3.5.4 Using the influence diagram.
When the appropriate stress rank
and equivalent operating hours
have been calculated, a location on
the influence diagram can be deter-
mined. A point to the left of the
appropriate environment line indi-
cates a low risk of failure by corro-
sion fatigue; to the right indicates a
high risk of failure. It can be seen
how an increasingly higher stress,
given a particular environmental
state, will lead to a greater risk of
failure. Similarly, for two units of iden-
tical design and operating history,
the unit with a better environment
including cycle chemistry practices
will have a significantly lower risk of
corrosion fatigue failures.
Table 13-5
Form to Evaluate Environmental Parameter (E)
Response Total
Value Item Score Score

Phosphate boiler water alkalinity control

3 Does the boiler experience phosphate hideout No Irregularly Regularly

or phosphate carryover to the reheater? 3 6 9

Excursions

3 How many hydrogen damage or caustic gouging events None One More than one
resulting in tube failures have occurred over the life 3 6 9
of the boiler?

Typical on-line chemical operations

1 (1a) Boiler water pH at blowdown 9.0 - 9.6 8.0 - 10.0 < 8, > 10
1 2 3

1 (1b) Cation conductivity (µS/cm) <6 6 - 30 > 30

(minus phosphate correction 4.1 x ppm PO4) 1 2 3

1 (2) Feedwater at the economizer inlet, <5 < 20 > 20

dissolved oxygen (ppb) 1 2 3

Typical start-up chemical operating ranges

(measured at the point of reaching target (or full) pressure)

2 (1a) Boiler water pH at blowdown 9.0 - 9.6 8.0 - 10.0 < 8, > 10
2 4 6

2 (1b) Cation conductivity (µS/cm) <6 6 - 30 > 30

(minus phosphate correction 4.1 x ppm PO4) 2 4 6

2 (2) Feedwater at the economizer inlet, < 50 < 200 > 200
dissolved oxygen (ppb) 2 4 6

Chemical cleans

1 How many chemical cleans using a hydrochloric None One More than one
acid solution has the boiler been exposed to? 1 2 3

Boiler shutdown/lay-up procedures

2 What actions are taken for shutdown corrosion protection: Actions Actions No action
(a) N2 cap on drum and treat water if boiler not drained. (a) to (d) (a) and (b)
(b) Refill drained boiler with chemically treated water to 2 4 6
control pH and oxygen
(c) Ensure dry storage if drained.
(d) Monitor and adjust pH and oxygen in boiler water
during wet lay-up.

Total Value: __________ (total for questions answered) Total Score: _______
Environment Parameter: = E1, for Total Score/Total Value = 1.0 to 1.5; = E2, for Total Score/Total Value = 1.5 to 2.0; = E3, for Total Score/Total Value = 2.0 to 2.5
= E4, for Total Score/Total Value = 2.5 to 3.0
Source: D. Sidey, et al.1d

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-25

The influence diagram has been
found to be particularly useful as a Stress Rank (S)
means to rank locations for further High (A)
analysis and to provide a quick Stress
screening method before consider-
ing approaches to prevent recur-
rence of the problem.
(B)
The version of the influence diagram
that is presented in Figure 13-21,
and in the case study is one based
on a 15% probability of failure (85% Low High
risk risk
survivability). This probabilistic mea- (C)
sure was determined by analysis of Environment
field data. A plot of field failure data parameter (E)
versus a boiler tube corrosion
E4 E3 E2 E1
fatigue index (a combination of the Low
environmental parameter, stress rank Stress (D)
and equivalent operating hours) was 0 30 60 90 120 150
fitted to a Weibull cumulative distrib- Equivalent Operating Hours (EOH)
ution function to calculate an influ-
ence diagram that incorporated a
probability of failure.1d Influence Figure 13-21. Influence map for corrosion fatigue in waterwall tubes (based on a 15%
maps can be derived for 5%, 25% probability of failure). Source: D. Sidey, et al.1d
and 50%, etc. probabilities of failure.

4. Determining the Extent of Damage

Selective tube sampling and various
NDE methods (including UT and RT)
have been tried for determining the
extent of corrosion fatigue damage.
The NDE methods suffer from draw-
backs associated with access to the
susceptible locations and interfer-
ence from attachments, membranes,
etc. Another drawback is that gener-
ally only advanced damage can be
detected. In a limited number of
cases where inside access was pos-
sible, the inner surfaces of tubes
have been examined by videoprobe.
Most often tube removal and sam-
pling from suspect locations is the
primary means to assess the extent
of damage.
It is vital that once corrosion fatigue
has been confirmed, primarily by
metallurgical analysis, that the
extent of damage and correspond-
ing locations be carefully deter-
mined. The will help focus long-term
steps such as the redesign and
modification of attachments for key
locations.

13-26 Corrosion Fatigue

5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Corrosion Fatigue: Immediate
Solutions and Actions
1. Implement the influence dia-
gram approach to identify the
most important root cause influ-
ence (stress level, environment
or operation).
2. Remove and replace the
affected tube section.
3. Determine the extent of dam-
age, including a confirmation of
the failure mechanism.
4. Begin a long-term strategy to
deal with root causes of corro-
sion fatigue in each affected
location.
In the past, in an effort to get units
on-line quickly, minor corrosion
fatigue damage, such as pinhole
and axial cracks, was repaired by
pad welds either with or without
grinding. Because corrosion fatigue
cracks manifest multiple, branched
initiation sites, it is difficult to ensure
that all damage has been removed
and as a consequence, this repair
strategy has often resulted in repeat
failures at the same location. Figure
13-22 shows an example of this
problem. Therefore, it is strongly rec-
ommended that repairs be effected
by replacement of the damaged
tube sections.
However, if tube replacement is per-
formed without understanding and
dealing with the underlying causes,
repeat failures will occur eventually.
The use of the influence diagram
early in the process will be of great
value in defining the appropriate Figure 13-22. Pad weld repair showing
directions to take over the short and renewed corrosion fatigue crack growth.
long term. For example, a direct Source: D. Sidey, et al.1d
cycle chemistry cause may be indi-
cated after application of the influ-
ence diagram, if so, then the appro-
priate steps should be undertaken
to optimize cycle chemistry.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-27
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Corrosion Fatigue: Long-Term
Actions
1. An understanding of what is
causing corrosion fatigue must
be obtained before the proper
long-term actions can be
developed; the influence dia-
gram should be used as a tool
to gain this understanding.
2. The influence diagram can also
be used to anticipate future
potential problems with corro-
sion fatigue, even in new units.
The consequences of decisions
about operations, environment,
or to a lesser extent stresses
can thus be evaluated.
3. Any solution must have a
means to determine its effec-
tiveness; an example might be
before and after strain mea-
sures if attachment redesign is
used.
4. Solutions will consist of (i)
improving cycle chemistry, (ii)
lowering strains, primarily by
redesign and modification of
attachments, or (iii) both. Each
may have effects throughout
the boiler.
5. The most effective long-term
approaches have been
achieved by modifying attach-
ment designs. However,
improper modifications have
intensified the problem.
13-28 Corrosion Fatigue
6.1 Options for long-term
solutions
The key to corrosion fatigue preven-
tion is a coherent long term strategy
that begins with understanding what
is driving the corrosion fatigue. In
the past, costly mistakes have been
made when solutions were applied
without such understanding. Simply
designing a “more flexible” attach-
ment and assuming that it will,
through “lower” stresses, solve the
problem has been shown to be a
costly wrong assumption. Any solu-
tion that is applied must have a
means of testing its benefits. Thus, if
the solution is to lower strains
through attachment modification,
measurement of actual strains
before and after is recommended.
Note that the approach chosen will
be site-specific; there is no global
approach to corrosion fatigue pre-
vention.
Possible long-term actions are
drawn from a range of hardware
modifications, operating changes,
cycle chemistry controls, chemical
cleaning procedures, and lay-
up/shutdown procedures as follows:
• Redesign tube attachments to
eliminate or reduce restraint. Most
successful modifications increase
the amount of flexibility at the
connection and thus reduce the
total applied stress.
• Correct causes of low pH water
chemistry, such as condenser
leaks, or other impurity ingress,
by adopting the latest phos-
phate30 and AVT31 guidelines;
control cycle chemistry levels.
• Optimize boiler shutdown and lay-
up procedures to avoid out-of-
service corrosion.
• Chemically clean to remove
deposits; be cognizant that the
use of hydrochloric acid cleans,
where there is advanced corro-
sion fatigue damage, may lead to
a spike in the number of failures
observed.
• Install off-line boiler circulation
pumps to reduce level of sub-
cooling in the waterwalls, which
will reduce the stress level
caused by thermal transients on
startup. Such modifications have
been successful in reducing the
amount of subcooling but it is still
unknown whether they have also
reduced the amount of corrosion
fatigue.
• Place restrictions on amount of
cycling operation. This is not nor-
mally a feasible option although
the effect of increased cycling in
future operations can be seen
from its effects on the influence
diagram.
Because of the number of potential
locations that might be considered
for modification of attachments, i.e.,
sites with similar attachment
designs, it is important that the
extent of corrosion fatigue damage
be clearly determined before
embarking on an extensive program
of attachment redesign and modifi-
cation.
6.2 Guidelines for the use of
stress analysis and field mea-
surements
A combination of stress analysis,
using finite element methods, and
field confirmation using strain
gauges, is useful for determining the
contribution of strain to a location
experiencing corrosion fatigue. It will
also be helpful to (i) determine
whether proposed modifications will
lower the applied strains, and (ii)
confirm that, after modification, the
local condition did improve. Utilities
seeking to apply these methods
should do so with a full understand-
ing of the benefits to be gained and
the costs to execute such detailed
evaluations.
6.2.1 Overall guidance
1. An analytical and experimental
determination of applicable
stresses is only one part of the
overall approach to corrosion
fatigue. It is important to under-
stand how it fits into that ap-
proach and what the limitations of
the stress analysis methods are.
2. A consistent and fully predictive
finite element stress analysis
method is desirable as it would
provide a way to assess potential
design changes prior to their
introduction and to predict their
efficacy.
3. Modeling of a waterwall tube with
attachment requires careful con-
sideration of actual field loading,
geometry, and local constraint;
simplification of model, boundary
conditions and/or symmetry
choices can compromise the
results.
4. Any analysis of stresses via finite Iteration may be required to refine
element methods should be sup- boundary conditions and symme-
ported by a field test program. try assumptions until agreement
Field testing alone may be is obtained.
enough. 2. A 3-D model should be formu-
lated to accommodate the triaxial
6.2.2 Evaluation of the subject
stress state. Mesh size and num-
boiler. Analysis of the boiler should
ber of elements should be such
precede any analytical program and
as to allow convergence in a 2D
include identifying critical locations,
thermal analysis: apply a thermal
identifying the major anticipated
load to one side of the model and
loads, and reviewing tube failure
add elements until there is no
history. This evaluation should result
change in the thermal distribution.
in a prioritized list of sites for evalua-
A maximum aspect ratio of 7:1 for
tion. Tables 13-2 and Figures 13-
elements has been recom-
7a/b provide a starting point for
mended.
identifying those locations which
have generally been a concern. 3. Detail of attachment is important.
It was found, for example, that
6.2.3 Field testing. Field testing the assumption of a point attach-
is required to confirm major loads, ment for tack welds was not
help define applicable boundary appropriate.
conditions for the stress analysis,
4. When it is necessary to consider
and relate operating changes to
structural loads, an orthogonal
load and cycle chemistry changes.
plate extension to a local model
Instrumentation for a test program
was recommended; however, a
might include temperature and
global model was not considered
strain instrumentation, heat flux
cost-effective.
meters, cycle chemistry analyzers,
and data acquisition equipment. 5. The cost of the analysis is related
to the complexity of the model,
6.2.4 Finite element analysis. which will cause tradeoffs to be
Evaluation of model choice, degree made.
of detail, boundary and symmetry
6. A sensitivity analysis is necessary
conditions are critical; simplifying
to identify major applied loads at
assumptions must be made with
a given location.
care and confirmed. The following
key aspects are important1c: 7. Results should be presented in a
form (polar coordinates, a nodal
1. Boundary and symmetry condi-
map, etc.) that allow for the iden-
tions must be formulated from a
tification of high stress locations.
detailed evaluation of field test
A deformation map was also
results to include all critical field
deemed to be useful.
conditions and loads.
Subsequently, boundary and
symmetry conditions must be ver-
ified. Measured and calculated
strains should be compared.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-29
7. Case study
Corrosion Fatigue
Case Study I: Application of Influence Diagram
This case study illustrates how the
influence diagram approach might
be used to determine locations with
a potential for corrosion fatigue prob-
lems and how the evaluation of
stress rank and environmental para-
meter might influence that analysis.
Unit Background: The unit is rated at
163 MW. The boiler is a subcritical,
drum-type unit with natural circulation
and reheat. It is fired on lignite. The
boiler has 68,000 firing hours and 728
starts. Although the boiler has experi-
enced serious sootblower erosion
problems, there have been no report
of BTF by corrosion fatigue to date.
Stress Rank Evaluation: The first
step in the evaluation process is to
identify sites where the magnitude of
the stress might be sufficient to
cause a corrosion fatigue concern. A
detailed inspection of unit was con-
ducted; as a result a boiler ash hop-
per seal plate attachment was
selected for further evaluation. Figure
13-23 shows detail of the location. A
stress rank of “B” was assigned by
noting that this location was similar
to that of location #3 in Figure 13-7
and Table 13-2.
Environmental Parameter: A review
of the unit chemistry history allowed
a calculation of the environmental
parameter as detailed in Table 13-6.
The following information served as
the basis:
Phosphate Boiler Water Alkalinity
Control: Until about mid-1984 the
unit used congruent phosphate treat-
ment. A review of the level of phos-
phate consumption indicates that the
boiler had a severe hideout problem,
which would be a factor of “9” on the
form. However, the unit switched to
equilibrium phosphate treatment in
late 1984 and has not had a hideout
problem since that time. Therefore
the form shows “3” for this entry.
Excursions: The boiler had experi-
enced no excursions causing hydro-
gen damage (low pH events). Score
“3” on the form.
13-30 Corrosion Fatigue
Typical On-Line Chemical Operating
Ranges: Typical on-line ranges for
critical chemistry parameters (post-
1984) are:
• Boiler water pH: 9.1-9.8. Score “1”
on the form.
• Boiler water cation conductivity:
< 12 mS/cm minus a phosphate
correction gives about 8mS/cm.
Score “2” on the form.
• Feedwater dissolved oxygen:
< 5 ppb. Score “1” on the form.
The cation conductivity required for
the form is corrected to typical phos-
phate concentrations. Unit records
indicated a normal phosphate level of
1 ppm, for a correction of 4.1 mS/cm.
Note also that the unit has an all fer-
rous feedwater system; that is, there
are no copper alloy materials in the
condensate or feedwater systems.
Typical Start-Up Chemical Operating
Ranges: Selection of proper ranges
for start is complicated by variations
in chemistry and stress over the start-
up period. For the evaluation, typical
ranges at the point of attaining full or
target steam drum pressures are
used. Defining these ranges will
require data from several starts of
each type (cold, warm and hot). The
subject boiler had these ranges:
• Boiler water pH: 9.1-9.8. Score “2”
on the form.
• Boiler water cation conductivity, 20
mS/cm - correction of 4 mS/cm = 16
mS/cm. Score “4” on the form.
• Feedwater dissolved oxygen < 50
ppb. Score “2” on the form.
Chemical Cleans: There had been no
chemical cleans since commission-
ing. Score “1” on the form.
Boiler Shutdown/Lay-Up Procedures:
On shutdown a nitrogen blanket is
introduced once the boiler reaches
atmospheric levels. If the boiler is
drained and refilled, the water is
treated during the refilling process.
The boiler is fired and pressurized to
approximately 3 MPa to purge any
air in the steam and water circuits.
Score “4”, for actions “a” and “b” on
the form.
The assessed environmental para-
meter is the total score “23”, divided
by the value of the questions
answered “18” or E = 1.3 in this
case. As shown in the form, the
result falls in the range of E1 (good).
Equivalent Operating Hours: For
68,000 firing hours, (H) and 728 total
boiler starts (Ns) the equivalent
operating hours are derived from the
equation:
EOH = (H/1000) + (Ns/(H/1000))
= 78.7
Results: The corrosion fatigue
regime for this situation can now be
determined by plotting the results on
the influence map. This is shown in
Figure 13-24. Under the assigned
conditions, the location is at high
risk for damage due to corrosion
fatigue because the point falls to the
right of the E1 line. There have been
no failures yet. It is possible that the
actual stress at the location is
slightly less than the typical “B”
location. However, there should be
sufficient concern to conduct selec-
tive tube sampling for corrosion
fatigue at this location, despite the
fact that no failures have been
observed yet.
It is also easy to see how, given a
currently marginal situation, a slight
deterioration in the operating prac-
tices for cycle chemistry control
could push the situation into consid-
erably more severe problems. It is
interesting to note that the earlier
operation with congruent phosphate
treatment and a severe hideout
problem would have been charac-
terized by a calculated environmen-
tal parameter of E2; almost certainly
a severe corrosion fatigue problem
would have resulted.
 Scalloped Seal
Plate Attachment
Membrane
Tube

Scallop
bar

Windbox Fillet
casing weld

CL furnace

O.D.front or rear
wall tubes
Mud drum

Top of ash hopper

Seal
Slag screen: stainless plates
steel type 430 woven
wire space cloth Water Water
level trough

Figure 13-23. Schematic of the boiler ash hopper seal plate attachment.
Source: D. Sidey, et al.1d

Stress Rank (S)

High (A)
Stress

(B)

Low High
risk risk
(C)

Environment
parameter (E)
E4 E3 E2 E1
Low
Stress (D)
0 30 60 79 90 120 150
Equivalent Operating Hours (EOH)

Figure 13-24. The case study results are plotted onto the influence map to determine
the appropriate corrosion fatigue susceptibility. Source: D. Sidey, et al.1d

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-31

Table 13-6
Completed Form for Case Study to Evaluate Environmental Parameter (E)
Response Total
Value Item Score Score

Phosphate boiler water alkalinity control

3 Does the boiler experience phosphate hideout or phosphate No Irregularly Regularly

carryover to the reheater? 3 6 9 3

Excursions

3 How many hydrogen damage or caustic gouging events resulting None One More than one
in tube failures have occurred over the life of the boiler? 3 6 9 3

Typical on-line chemical operations

1 (1a) Boiler water pH at blowdown 9.0 - 9.6 8.0 - 10.0 < 8, > 10
1 2 3 1

1 (1b) Cation conductivity (µS/cm) ²6 6 - 30 > 30

(minus phosphate correction 4.1 x ppm PO4) 1 2 3 2

1 (2) Feedwater at the economizer inlet, dissolved ²5 ² 20 > 20

oxygen (ppb) 1 2 3 1

Typical start-up chemical operating ranges

(measured at the point of reaching target (or full) pressure)

2 (1a) Boiler water pH at blowdown 9.0 - 9.6 8.0 - 10.0 < 8, > 10
2 4 6 2

2 (1b) Cation conductivity (µS/cm) ²6 6 - 30 > 30

(minus phosphate correction 4.1 x ppm PO4) 2 4 6 4

2 (2) Feedwater at the economizer inlet, dissolved oxygen (ppb) ² 50 ² 200 > 200
2 4 6 2

Chemical cleans

1 How many chemical cleans using a hydrochloric acid solution None One More than one
has the boiler been exposed to? 1 2 3 1

Boiler shutdown/lay-up procedures

2 What actions are taken for shutdown corrosion protection: Actions Actions No action
(a) N2 cap on drum and treat water if boiler not drained. (a) to (d) (a) and (b)
(b) Refill drained boiler with chemically treated water to 2 4 6 4
control pH and oxygen
(c) Ensure dry storage if drained.
(d) Monitor and adjust pH and oxygen in boiler water
during wet lay-up.

Total Value: ____18

_____ (total for questions answered) Total Score: ____23
_____

Environment Parameter: = E1, for Total Score/Total Value = 1.0 to 1.5

= E2, for Total Score/Total Value = 1.5 to 2.0
= E3, for Total Score/Total Value = 2.0 to 2.5
= E4, for Total Score/Total Value = 2.5 to 3.0

13-32 Corrosion Fatigue

8. References
1Patterson,
R.W., et al., Corrosion Fatigue Boiler Tube
Failures in Waterwalls and Economizers, Research
Project 1890-5, Final Report TR-100455, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA.
a. McNabb, D., D. Sidey, R.W. Patterson, J. Fishburn,
and A. Banweg, Volume 1: Field Survey Results, April,
1992.
b. Ogundele, G.I., E.T.C. Ho, D. Sidey, R.W. Patterson,
L.D. Paul, M.T. Miglin, and A. Banweg, Volume 2:
Laboratory Corrosion Studies, July, 1992.
c. Sidey, D., D. McNabb, J. Stodola, R.W. Patterson, R.
Ganta, B. Barishpolski, J. Fishburn, D. Peterson, D.K.
Johnson, and A. Banweg, Volume 3: Field Testing and
Stress Analysis, January, 1993.
d. Sidey, D., D.D. McNabb, R.W. Patterson, J. Fishburn,
A. Banweg, and R.B. Dooley, Volume 4: Summary
Report and Guidelines for Corrosion Fatigue
Evaluation, December, 1993.
2Moles, M.D.C. and H.J. Westwood, “Corrosion Fatigue
Tube Failures in Fossil-Fueled Boilers”, Proceedings
International Conference on Materials to Supply the
Energy Demand, Harrison, B.C. Canada, American
Society for Metals, 1980, pp. 515-537.
3Westwood, H.J. and W.K. Lee, “Corrosion Fatigue
Cracking in Fossil-fueled Boilers”, Journal of Materials
Engineering, Vol. 9, 1987, pp. 163-173.
4Crouch, A.G. and R.B. Dooley, “The Mechanical
Integrity and Protective Performance of Silica Coatings”,
Corrosion Science, Volume 16, 1976, pp. 341-347.
5Magnin, T., “An Approach to the Mechanisms of
Corrosion Fatigue Damage”, Memoires et Etudes
Scientifiques Revue de Metallurgie, LS7857/7Feb90/js,
November, 1983.
6Hickling, J. and D. Blind, “Strain-Induced Corrosion
Cracking of Low-Alloy Steels in LWR Systems - Case
Histories and Identification of Conditions Leading to
Susceptibility”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 91,
1986, pp. 305-330.
7Ward, G., B.S. Hockenhull, and P. Hancock, “The Effect
of Cyclic Stressing on the Oxidation of a Low Carbon
Steel”, Metallurgical Transactions, Vol. 5., June, 1974.
8Hurst, R.C., M. Davies, and P. Hancock, “The
Determination of Fracture Strains of Growing Surface
Oxides on Mild Steel at High Temperatures”, Oxidation of
Metals, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1975, p 161.
9Grosskreutz, J.C. and M.B. McNeil, Journal of Applied
Physics, Vol. 40, 1969, pp. 355.
10Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
11Hay,
K.A. and D.B. Meadowcroft, “Kinetics of Oxide
Growth Through Cracks in Coatings on 9% Cr Steels”,
Corrosion Science, Volume 16, 1976, pp. 349-354.
12Scott,
P.M. and W.H. Bamford, “The Development and
Use of Electrochemical Potential Monitoring in
Environment Assisted Cracking Tests in High
Temperature, High Pressure , Aqueous Environments” in
W.H. Cullen, ed., Proceedings of the Second
International Atomic Energy Agency Specialists’ Meeting
on Subcritical Crack Growth, NUREG/CP-0067, Vol. 1,
1986, pp. 51-67.
13Chen. C.M., K. Aral, and G.J. Theus, Computer-
Calculated Potential-pH Diagrams to 300°C, Volume 2:
Handbook of Diagrams, Research Project 1167-2, Final
Report NP-3137, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, June, 1983.
14Parkins,R.N., “Stress Corrosion Spectrum”, British
Corrosion Journal, vol. 7, January, 1972.
15Ford,F.P., “Relationship Between Mechanics of
Environmental Cracking and Design Criteria”, ICM3, Vol.
2, Cambridge, England, August, 1979.
16Ford,F.P. and P.W. Emigh, “The Prediction of the
Maximum Corrosion Fatigue Crack Propagation Rate in
the Low Alloy Steel De-Oxygenated Water System at
288°C”, Corrosion Science, Vol. 25, No. 8/9, 1985, pp.
673-692.
17Ford, F.P. and P. Combrade, “Electrochemical Reaction
Rates on Bare Surfaces and Their Use in a Crack
Prediction Model for the Low Alloy Steel/Water System”,
Proceedings of the 2nd IAEA Specialists’ Meeting on
Subcritical Crack Growth, Sendai, Japan, May 15-17,
1985.
18Parkins,R.N., “Environment Sensitive Fracture and Its
Prevention”, British Corrosion Journal, Vol. 14, 1979, pp.
5-14.
19Galvele,J.R., “A Stress Corrosion Cracking Mechanism
Based on Surface Mobility”, Corrosion Science, Vol. 27,
No. 1, 1987, pp. 1-33.
20Pugh, E.N., J.A.S. Green, and A.J. Sedricks, “Current
Understanding of Stress Corrosion Cracking
Phenomena”, RIAS Technical Report 69-3, Research
Institute for Advanced Studies, Martin Marietta
Corporation, Baltimore Maryland, March, 1969.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-33
21Scully,
J.C., “The Theory of Stress Corrosion Cracking”,
The Theory of Stress Corrosion Cracking in Alloys, NATO
Science Affairs Division, September, 1972.
22Hickling,J., “Strain Induced Corrosion Cracking:
Relationships to Stress Corrosion Cracking/Corrosion
Fatigue and Importance for Nuclear Plant Service Life”,
Proceedings 3rd IAEA Specialists’ Meeting on Subcritical
Crack Growth, NUREG/CP-0112, ANL-90/22, Vol. II,
Moscow, May 14-17, 1990.
23Newman,
R.C. and R.P.M. Procter, “Stress Corrosion
Cracking: 1965-1990”, British Corrosion Journal, Vol. 25,
No. 4, 1990, pp. 259-269.
24Kussmaul, K. and B. Iskluth, “Environmentally Assisted
Crack Growth in a Low Alloy Boiler Steel in High
Temperature Water Containing Oxygen”, Nuclear
Engineering and Design, Vol. 119, Elsevier Science
Publishers, B.V., North Holland, 1990, pp. 415-430.
25Personal Communication from T. Healy, (ESB Ireland) to
R.B. Dooley, February, 1995.
26Sidey,D., et al., “Lambton TGS Unit 4, Investigation
Into Lower Waterwall Header and Steam Drum
Cracking”, Ontario Hydro Internal Report CTS-31020-5,
August, 1983.
27Stodola, J., “Review of Boiler Water Alkalinity Control”,
International Water Conference, 47th Annual Meeting,
held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 27-29, 1986.
13-34 Corrosion Fatigue
28Layton, K.F., “Water Side Corrosion in the Waterwall
Tubes of Hunter Unit 3”, in Dooley, B and D. Broske,
eds., Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil Power Plants:
Conference Proceedings, Conference held in Atlanta,
Georgia, November 10-12, 1987, CS-5500-SR, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1988, pp. 2-271
through 2-286.
29Bursik,A., R. B. Dooley, and B. Larkin, Guidelines for
Oxygenated Treatment for Fossil Plants, Research
Project 1403-45, Final Report TR-102285, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December, 1994.
30Dooley, R.B., A. Aschoff, and F. Pocock, Cycle
Chemistry Guidelines for Fossil Plants: Phosphate
Treatment for Drum Units, Final Report TR-103655,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
December, 1994.
31Dooley, R.B., A. Aschoff, and F. Pocock, Cycle
Chemistry Guidelines for Fossil Plants: All-Volatile
Treatment for Drum Units, TR-105041, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, to be published 1996.
32Dooley, R.B. and L.D. Paul, “Phosphate Chemistry and
Corrosion Fatigue”, International Water Conference,
Pittsburgh, PA, October, 1995, IWC-95-17.
ACTIONS for Corrosion Fatigue
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of corro-
sion fatigue begin here. The goal
of these actions is to see if fur-
ther investigation of corrosion
fatigue is warranted or whether
another BTF mechanism should
be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and corrosion fatigue
is the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precursor
has occurred in the unit that
could lead to future BTF by
corrosion fatigue.
Action 1a: If a BTF has oc-
curred and corrosion fatigue is
the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of corrosion fatigue
➠Review Figures 13-7a and b for
typical boiler regions.
➠Review Table 13-2 for suscepti-
ble locations.
➠Determine whether failure loca-
tions are near tube attachments
or other locations where con-
straint during transient opera-
tions is likely.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure
includes such features as:
• Cracking that has initiated on
the inside surface of the tube,
typically at multiple locations
(Figure 13-3).
• Association of the failure with
an external attachment (Figure
13-1).
• A pin-hole leak (Figure 13-4), a
thick-edged crack (Figure 13-5)
oriented either axially or circum-
ferentially, or a thick-edged
blowout or rupture (Figure 13-1).
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by corrosion
fatigue.
➠ Determine whether one of more
of the following precursors has
been found or is likely to have
occurred in the unit:
• Evidence of cracking found dur-
ing routine inspections, particu-
larly at susceptible locations. See
Table 13-2, Figures 13-7 a and b.
• Evidence of corrosion fatigue
damage found in similar units.
• Evidence that one or more of the
risk factors from the influence dia-
gram: environment ranking, stress
ranking or equivalent operating
hours, may lead to a concern.
See case study in main text.
• Evaluation of unit cycle chemistry
indicates an environmental rank-
ing of E3 or E4. See the case
study and Table 13-5. Such a
warning might be triggered by
one or more of the following:
• A persistent problem with phos-
phate hideout and return.
• One or more tube failures by
either hydrogen damage or
caustic gouging.
• Cycle chemistry operating
ranges for pH, cation conduc-
tivity, or dissolved oxygen,
either during normal operation
or upon startup, that are consis-
tently outside the recom-
mended ranges.
• More than one chemical clean
by hydrochloric acid.
• Boiler shutdown and layup pro-
cedures which have not
included such steps as nitrogen
capping, chemical treatment for
pH and oxygen control during
the lay-up and on re-start,
and/or dry storage during
drained periods.
• Unit has been subjected to
numerous starts or has accumu-
lated a large number of “equiva-
lent operating hours”. This should
be considered in conjunction with
location stress rank and environ-
mental factors - see main text.
➠ These precursors can be root
cause influences of corrosion
fatigue. If one or more has
occurred, go to Action 3 which
outlines the steps to confirm the
influence of each.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-35
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is corrosion
fatigue.

A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being caused by corro-
sion fatigue (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify corrosion
fatigue as the primary mecha-
nism or point to another cause.
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by removing representative
tube sample(s), followed by
visual examination and detailed
metallographic analysis. One of
the primary aims is to establish
that damage is not OD-initiated
fatigue.
➠ Confirm that damage location is
consistent with corrosion fatigue.
Is damage associated with a
susceptible location? See
Figures 13-7a/b and Table 13-2.
➠ Determine location of damage
initiation. Is damage initiated
from the inside (waterside) of
the tube?
➠ Evaluate nature of cracking. Is
there evidence of multiple initia-
tion sites, with wide cracks, of a
transgranular nature?
May still be corrosion fatigue, con-
tinue through flowchart; however,
review for indications of mechani-
cal fatigue, see distinctions dis-
cussed in main text, Section 1.1.
If OD-initiated, mechanism is more
likely to be mechanically-induced
fatigue. Review main text Section
1.1 for distinctions.
If damage is of a more ‘gouging”
nature check to see if an underde-
posit corrosion mechanism (hydro-
gen damage, caustic gouging or
acid phosphate corrosion) is active.

Probably mechanism is corrosion

fatigue. Confirming characteristics
are:
• Cracks filled with oxide and
blunt tipped.
• Crack profiles usually irregular.
• Signs of discontinuous growth,
re-initiation.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

References to other sources of infor-

mation:
• Main text (this chapter) provides
the background to the mecha-
nism and development of corro-
sion fatigue.
• Summary of the steps and meth-
ods of metallurgical investigation
of boiler tube failures can be
found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
• Some care is required to distin-
guish between ID-initiated corro-
sion fatigue and OD-initiated
fatigue. Key differences are dis-
cussed in the main text, Section
1.1, and in Chapter 7, Volume 1.

13-36 Corrosion Fatigue

Action 3: Determine root cause of corrosion fatigue
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as corrosion fatigue
(Action 2) or a precursor
occurred (Action 1b). The goal of
this Action 3 is for the BTF Team
to review the potential root
causes of corrosion fatigue, iden-
tify probable ones, and take
those actions that are needed to
confirm which are operative in
the unit. This step must be taken
so that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below.
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
3.2 Influence of Excessive Stresses/Strains
3.2.1 Restraint stresses at attachments
3.2.2 Subcooling (cooling water stratification) in
natural circulation boilers
3.3 Influence of Environmental Factors
3.3.1 Poor water chemistry
3.3.2 Overly aggressive or improper chemical
cleaning
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ a). Compare damaged locations to those
typical of corrosion fatigue. See Figures
13-7 a/b and Table 13-2.
➠ b). Inspect susceptible locations before
tube failures occur.
➠ c). Selectively sample to identify damage
accumulation.
➠ d). Thermocouple and/or strain gauge
testing to confirm high strain locations.
➠ e). Finite element stress analysis to
predict high strain locations.
➠ f). Review operating records.
➠ g). Thermocouple top and bottom of
boiler to monitor ÆT as function of shut-
down time.
➠ h). Strain gauge to confirm.
➠ i). Review water chemistry logs and prac-
tices, with particular emphasis on pH
reductions during shutdown and early
startup; if review indicates a problem then
implement a monitoring program. See dis-
cussion of minimum levels of instrumenta-
tion in Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ j). Calculate Environmental Parameter for
use in Influence Diagram from information
gathered above; this will help determine
the contribution of environment to the cor-
rosion fatigue problem.
➠ k). Selectively sample tubes from at-risk
areas for evidence of pitting or corrosion
fatigue damage.
➠ l). Review chemical cleaning procedures
and correlate chemical cleaning with cor-
rosion fatigue failures. See Chapter 4,
Volume 1 for additional information about
chemical cleaning.
➠ m). Selectively sample at-risk tubes.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-37
Action 3: Determine root cause of corrosion fatigue (continued)

Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm

3.3.3 Improper boiler shutdown and/or ➠ (n). See actions in items (i, j) above.
lay-up procedures

3.4 Influence of Historical Unit Operation

3.4.1 Operating procedures that have pro-
duced high stresses
➠ (o). Review operating records to deter-
mine operating hours and boiler starts.
➠ (p). Plot failure history against unit oper-
ating conditions. See Figures 13-13 and
13-14.

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root

cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Evaluation will be
based on detecting obvious
signs of cracking.
➠Identify all locations to be examined. Refer to Section
1.2 of main text, Figures 13-7 a/b, and Table 13-2 for
typical locations. Missed locations are sites for future
failures. Corrosion fatigue is very unlikely to have
occurred in only one area.

➠Perform visual examination to detect obvious signs of

cracking.

➠Perform UT/RT/videoprobe survey, as possible, to

measure extent of cracking. A review of NDE methods
is provided in Chapter 9, Volume 1.

➠Perform tube sampling to confirm results of NDE

inspection and to determine the degree of damage.

➠Use results interactively with Action 3.

➠Go to Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate

Solutions and Actions.

13-38 Corrosion Fatigue

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
➠Implement repairs or replacement
The most important immediate
actions for the BTF team are
to:(i) start the application of the
influence diagram method to
determine the probable effec-
tiveness of longer-term solutions,
(ii) repair or replace damaged
tubes, (iii) implement available
short-term changes to operation
or chemical cleaning where they
are at the root of the existing
➠ Apply the influence diagram.
problem.
of affected tubes as identified
from the NDE Survey (Action 4).
➠See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
➠Develop a plan to replace
affected tubing on the basis of
the root causes and probable
choice of long-term solution.
The use of the influence diagram
approach will help pinpoint which
root cause must be addressed to
prevent repeat failures by corro-
sion fatigue. This is primarily a
long-term action, but an immedi-
ate action that can be imple-
mented during any repair or
replacement activities is to
ensure that the necessary plant
information is gathered. See the
case study for an example of the
process.
➠Implement the appropriate
guidelines, controls and monitor-
ing if the root cause is poor cycle
chemistry. See main text this sec-
tion and background material in
Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠Institute modified procedures to
correct overly aggressive chemi-
cal cleaning. See Chapter 4,
Volume 1 for an overview of the
recommended practices.
➠If improper unit shutdown or
layup procedures underlie the
problem, modify procedures.
See Chapter 4, Volume 1 for an
overview of the recommended
practices.
References to other sources of
detailed information:
• Main text and Table 13-4 provide
additional detail on repairs, imme-
diate solutions and actions and
their relation to the underlying root
causes.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 13-39
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper
choice of long-term actions will
be based on clear identification
of the underlying root cause(s),
guided by the influence dia-
gram. The most effective long-
term solution has been lowering
the applied stresses by modify-
ing attachment designs; how-
ever, improper modifications
have intensified the problem.
13-40 Corrosion Fatigue
Major Root Cause Influences
Influence of Excessive Stresses
Restraint stresses at attachments
Subcooling (cooling water stratification) in
natural circulation boilers
Influence of Environmental Factors
Poor water chemistry
Overly aggressive or improper chemical
cleaning
Improper boiler shutdown and/or lay-up
procedures
Influence of Historical Unit Operation
Operating procedures that have produced high
stresses
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ See guidance in main text for this mecha-
nism, Section 6.2.
➠ Most effective measures have been modifi-
cation of attachments to lower stresses.
➠ Install off-line boiler circulation pumps to
reduce level of subcooling.
➠ Clean up overall cycle and confront specific
chemistry problems such as condenser
leaks, impurity ingress, lack of appropriate
procedures, lack of appropriate monitoring
devices, etc.
➠ Apply appropriate guideline procedures for
specific chemistry, monitoring, and instrumen-
tation. See the overview of recommended prac-
tices in Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Optimize chemical cleaning procedures and
frequency. See Chapter 4, Volume 1.
➠ Optimize shutdown, lay-up procedures. See
Chapter 4, Volume 1.
➠ See guidance in main text for this
mechanism, Section 6.2, and references
provided there.
➠ Reduction of stresses or improvement in
environmental parameter are possible actions.
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of corro-
sion fatigue or its precursors.
Corrosion Fatigue Alert for Other Cycle
Aspect Components
Problems with boiler • Potential for boiler tube
water or feedwater damage by other mech
chemistry control. anisms such as acid phos-
phate corrosion, if underly-
ing problem is phosphate
hideout, or hydrogen dam-
age such as via condenser
leakage.
• Potential for carryover
in steam to reheater.
Excessive or overly Potential for boiler tube
aggressive chemical damage by other mecha-
cleans. nisms
Inadequate or improper Potential for boiler tube
shutdown procedures. damage by other mecha-
nisms such as pitting.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes
➠ Actions
➠Implement stricter cycle chemistry
control program, instrumentation. See
Chapter 3, Volume 1 for an overview of
the issues.
➠Alert to potential problems
throughout cycle.
➠Apply guidelines for chemical
cleaning as summarized in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
➠Modify shutdown procedures.
13-41
13-42 Corrosion Fatigue
Chapter 14 • Volume 2
Fly Ash Erosion
Introduction
Flyash erosion is a significant boiler
tube failure concern. More than one
quarter of all boiler tube failures
worldwide are caused by fly ash
erosion. In the United States, for
example, it has been estimated that
about 28% of all failures in waterwall
tubes and 22% of superheater and
reheater tubes are caused by flyash
erosion, making it the second
largest cause of availability loss in
fossil-fueled power plants. In New
South Wales between 1967 and
1991, 23% of all tube failures were
caused by this problem.1 In the
Soviet Union, a unit has been cited
that has approximately 50% of the
tube failures caused by erosion.2
Flyash erosion is one of five erosion
mechanisms discussed in this book.
The others are sootblower erosion,
falling slag erosion, coal particle
erosion and the erosion of in-bed
tubes of bubbling fluidized bed
units. Because damage accumula-
tion may be at relatively low rates,
the process of wear by erosion may
be overlooked until tube failures
begin. Depending upon the extent
of local conditions, considerable
damage to pressure-part tubing
may have occurred. Even more dis-
tressing are repeat failures in the
same boiler locations following
repair methods that did not address
the root cause of the problem.
Flyash erosion accelerates tube
wastage by direct material removal,
and removal of fireside oxide
increases the fireside oxidation rate.
The latter mechanism becomes
dominant at temperatures above
425°C (~ 800°F). Although a fully
predictive model for erosion effects
is not in hand, the trends are well
known; an increase in erosion rates
occurs with higher velocities, high
ash loads or other abrasive particles
such as quartz, and low angles of
incident attack.
Over the past ten years, new
approaches to the characterization,
(notably the cold air velocity test),
and solution of flyash erosion by
flow modification have been devel-
oped. Based on such develop-
ments, a reasoned approach can
now be taken to solving flyash ero-
sion problems.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
Flyash Erosion:
Identification Keys
1. Smooth, polished wastage on
the tube surface facing into
the gas flow.
2. Removal of fireside oxide and
ash deposits; this feature may
be most evident by the forma-
tion of rust on tubes after
boiler washing.
3. Occurs in regions with nonuni-
form (high) gas flow rates
and/or high ash loading rates.
14-2 Fly Ash Erosion
1.1 Features of failure
Flyash erosion damage is usually
very localized. Moderate fly ash ero-
sion is characterized by burnishing
or polishing of affected tube sur-
faces facing the gas flow. The tube
surface is very smooth and differs
from unaffected tubes by coloring;
heavy, black polishing is the first
sign of impingement erosion. There
is a qualitative difference between a
heavy polishing caused by erosion
and slight erosive action that
removes just paint or scale.3
A distinguishing feature is the forma-
tion of fresh rust on tubes only a few
hours after boiler washing, indicat-
ing an advanced erosion problem
where the protective scale has been
removed.
Figure 14-1 Examples of erosion damage boiler tubing. Source: J.F. Drennen and P.
Kratina3
Flat spots, ovality and formation of
edges on straight tube sections indi-
cate a condition requiring immediate
action. Flattening and ovality
caused by bending may sometimes
be confused with severe erosion
damage, especially when the tubes
are polished. Discretion and judg-
ment are required to separate these
causes.
As erosion becomes more severe,
tubes begin to thin, flattened areas
develop, and eventually internal
pressure leads to tube rupture.
Figure 14-1 shows the appearance
of tubes that have been eroded and
have ruptured. If the erosion rate
was rapid, the failure may be thin-
edged, a pin-hole shape or a long,
“thin” blowout. If the failure was
gradual, creep effects may result in
a thick-edged failure.
Metallographically there is little evi-
dence of a problem. There may be
some surface hardening caused by
cold working of the surface by parti-
cle impingement (Figure 14-2).
Some distortion of surface grains
may be seen.
1.2. Locations of failure
The amount of ash loading and its
velocity are the key determinants of
flyash erosion; of the two, velocity is
dominant. Therefore, flyash erosion
will be a concern where nonuniform,
high gas flow develops anywhere in
the boiler, particularly in the econo-
mizer, primary superheater, and inlet
sections of reheater tubes. The
economizer is particularly suscepti-
ble because of the tight spacing of
tubes, often on 3 to 4 inch centers,
and because the cooler tempera-
tures lead to harder, more abrasive
ash particles. In the superheater
and reheater, flyash erosion is gen-
erally more prevalent in the cooler
regions either toward the top of the
furnace or in the back pass,
although an occasional failure has
been found in austenitic material
nearer to the furnace exit.
Figure 14-3 shows typical locations
where fly ash erosion can occur. A
close-up of some of the boiler
details that might have erosion prob-
lems is shown in Figure 14-4.
Nonuniform and thus high velocities
may occur:
• For a wide variety of boilers,
within a few feet of the side and
rear walls, especially near econo-
mizer banks.
• As a result of flow distortions
caused by fouling or plugging of
gas passages, misalignment of
tubing rows, loss of gas flow
guides or baffles, downstream of
large headers, etc.
• Areas where previous solid or
punched plate baffles have been
installed.
Knoop Hardness
140
300 gram load
130 15 sec dwell time
120
110
100
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Distance from Surface (mils)
Figure 14-2. Microhardness measurements made on a tapered cross section showing
the thin surface layer that has been hardened by ash particle impacts.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4
• Places where tubes are in an
opening with a lower flow resis-
tance than the surrounding tubes.
Table 14-1 lists some specific loca-
tions that can be subject to flyash
erosion.
Operation of the unit can also cause
high flows, such as operating above
the maximum continuous design rat-
ing, with excess air flow settings
above design, or through the
nonuniform flow of gas caused by
fan or air heater unbalance.
Locations with high flyash loads are
also susceptible, such as at the rear
wall, where flyash concentrations are
usually well above average due to
centrifugal separation as the flue
gas turns into the backpass. Finally,
along the side walls, flyash may be
more erosive because of the lower
temperature and heating rates due
to being closer to the furnace and
convective pass side walls.3 Severe
Figure 14-3. Typical boiler locations
localized erosion may be caused by
where flyash erosion can occur.
flows deflected from an existing
object such as a plate, tube sup-
port, offset tubes or existing erosion
controls.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-3
 Table 14-1
(a) Cross-over Tubes in (b) Screen Offsets Into High Typical Locations for
Concentrated Ash and Gas Flow Velocity Flow Flyash Erosion Damage
Gas flow
Screen tubes Economizer/Superheater/Reheater
Back • Leading edges of all tubes
Front pass pass • All pendant SH/RH surfaces especially
W.W. bottom bends at exit from furnace nose to
tubes
Gas rear pass
flow
• Roof and back wall
Erosion
• At top of rear pass
Erosion • Rear pass RH/SH and economizer, tube
bends (all rows) adjacent to back wall of
Furnace
division rear pass
wall
• Tube rows adjacent to side walls of rear
pass
Gas flow
Cross-over tubes • Staggered tube bank configurations
(economizer); sides of tubes in accessible
top rows, and often of tubes in middle of
(c) Improper Element Alignment (d) Tube Offsets Into
Concentrated Ash Flow the tube bank
Gas flow
Gas flow • Finned tubes (economizer); at base of fins
• Near tube bank stiffeners (wrapper tubes
in pendant banks, antivibration bars in
horizontal banks)
• Tubes immediately after open areas in
tube bank
SH/Econ
elements • Adjacent to sootblower runs
Erosion

Waterwalls
Erosion • Top of rear wall where gases change
direction to rear pass
• Where misalignment or ash plugging of
pendant tubes occurs near waterwall
W.W. tubes Gas flow
• Waterwall circuits in the back pass, espe-
cially (i) those forming dividing walls, (ii)
those that protrude into flow, and (iii)
Figure 14-4. Pressure part arrangements likely to initiate or intensify erosion activity. bend around openings.
Source: J.F. Drennen and P. Kratina3 • Around wall blowers

Source: R.B. Dooley and H.J. Westwood5

14-4 Fly Ash Erosion

2. Mechanism of Failure
Flyash Erosion: Mechanism
1. A variety of factors influence
the flyash erosion rate, but
high local velocity and extent
of ash loading are the two
principal and most control-
lable factors.
2. Flyash erosion accelerates
tube wastage directly by
material removal and indirectly
by removing the fireside
oxide, thus allowing an
increase in the oxidation rate.
Flyash erosion accelerates tube
wastage by direct material removal;
removal of fireside oxide also
increases the fireside oxidation rate.
The latter mechanism becomes
dominant at temperatures above
425°C (~ 800°F).
The rate and extent of erosive
processes are affected by particle
velocity, angle of impact, particle
composition and shape, and erosive
resistance of the tube surface
including compositional and temper-
ature variations. There are an extra-
ordinary number of papers on all
aspects of solid particle, liquid
droplet and cavitation erosion; only a
brief review of key aspects is pro-
vided here, specific to flyash erosion.
Particle velocity is the most impor-
tant parameter as the rate of erosive
loss is proportional to the velocity
raised to an exponent that ranges
between two and four. Particle
velocity is driven by the local flow
velocity at any particular boiler loca-
tion. The optimum long term solu-
tions are based on identifying and
reducing the highest velocity loca-
tions. It is important to note that
local velocities, not bulk velocities
across a section of the boiler are
those of interest. As a rule of thumb,
maximum design bulk velocities are
on the order of 50 ft/sec or less. It
has been observed that local veloci-
ties in excess of 100 ft/sec are
required to cause flyash erosion fail-
ures in 10,000 to 50,000 hours.4
Where units have been evaluated by
a cold air velocity technique to
determine local velocity profiles,
maximum local velocities of two or
more times the nominal velocity
were typically found, and these peak
velocities usually correspond to
locations of known tube erosion
damage. Some case studies are
described in more detail below.
A general equation for erosion can
be stated as:
E = k M Vn (14-1)
where: E = erosion rate (mils/hr)
k = proportionality constant
M = fly ash mass flux
( lb./hr-sq. ft.)
V = particle velocity (ft/sec)
n = velocity exponent,
ranges from 2-4
The proportionality constant
includes effects such as tempera-
ture, ash and target properties, etc.
Figure 14-5 is a graph of the effects
of velocity and ash loading on ero-
sion rate measured in an erosion
test facility using boiler ash at 371°C
(700°F).6 The erosion rate is given in
mils/hr, the loading in pounds of ash
for each pound of flue gas, and the
velocity is normalized to 60 ft/sec
(18.29 m/sec) (Rv = 1.0). The veloc-
ity exponent was calculated to be
about 2.71 for this ash. As shown in
the figure, for an increase in velocity
from 60 ft/sec (18.29 m/sec) to 90
ft/sec (27.43 m/sec), the erosion
rate triples for a constant ash load-
ing. The erosion rate will double for
a doubling in the ash loading at a
constant velocity.
Erosion rate is also a function of the
angle of incidence, as shown in
Figure 14-6. The most damaging
angle is at approximately 35-45°.
The composition of the ash impact-
ing a tube can also have a signifi-
cant effect on the rate at which ero-
sion occurs. Quartz and pyrite con-
tent have been found to be particu-
larly damaging. Discussion of the
hardness of these materials as they
pass through the combustion
process is provided in Section 2.7.3,
Volume 1.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-5
 Raask has developed an abrasion
Ash Loading Ð M (lbs/1000 lbs) index and a measure of wear
100 propensity based on coal character-
istics.7 An abrasion index (AI) was
derived from the analysis of abra-
80 sion wear experiments and the
Erosion rate, chemical analysis for SiO2 (silica)
E (mils/ and Al2O3 (alumina) in coal ash:
10,000 hrs.)
60 10 AI = qc + 0.5pc + 0.2Ac (14-2)
9
8 where qc = quartz content of coal
40 7 in weight percent
6
5 pc = pyrite content of the
4 coal in weight percent
20 3
2 Ac = ash content of the coal
1 in weight percent
0
0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 Expressions for the quartz content
Relative Velocity Ð Rv and the pyrite content were calcu-
lated as:

Figure 14-5. Dependence of erosion on particle velocity and fly ash loading. qc = 0.01 Ac(SiO2-1.5Al2O3) (14-3)
Rv is velocity relative to 60 ft/sec. E.g., Rv = 1.5 for a measured velocity of 90 ft/sec.
Source: J.F. Drennen and P. Kratina3 pc = 1.3 (S - 0.3) (14-4)

where SiO2 (silica) and Al2O3 (alu-

Maximum Material Loss (mm)
mina) are determined from chemical
1.8 analysis of the ash, and S is the sul-
Erosion Test Parameters fur content of the coal. These three
Average particle size: 12 mm equations can be combined to give
1.6 Tube cross-section
Ash load: 80 lb/hr
an expression for the abrasion
Test duration: 42 hrs ¯ index:
1.4
AI = 0.01 Ac(SiO2 - 1.5Al2O3) +

1.2 0.65(S - 0.3) + 0.2Ac (14-5)

The concept of wear propensity was

1.0 then derived by including the effect
V=150 ft/s of the coal throughput to achieve a
thermal target; this includes the
0.8 effect of the caloric value of the
coal, Q, MJ/kg. The full expression
for wear propensity, Wp, thus
0.6 V=125 ft/s derived is7:

Wp = [0.01 Ac(SiO2 - 1.5Al2O3)

0.4
V=100 ft/s + 0.65(S - 0.3) + 0.2Ac]

0.2 V=75 ft/s 25/Q (14-6)

0
0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 180
Angle of Flyash Impact, ¯

Figure 14-6. Erosion profile on a tube from ash-laden cross flow. Source: J.F.
Drennen and P. Kratina3

14-6 Fly Ash Erosion

The caloric value of coal, Q can be Table 14-2
estimated, if not given, from7: Classification of Coals by Abrasion Propensity

Q = Qo[1- 0.01(Ac + Mc)] (14-7) Abrasion Index Wear Propensity

Type of coal (AI) (Wp) Category
where Ac and Mc are the ash and
moisture contents expressed as a Low in ash and quartz <4 <3 Slightly abrasive
weight percent of the coals, and Qo
can be taken as 25, 30, 35, and 38 Medium in ash and quartz; 4-8 3-8 Moderately abrasive
MJ/kg for lignites, subbituminous high in ash but low in quartz
coals, bituminous coals and
anthracites, respectively.8 High in ash and quartz 8-12 8-15 Highly abrasive
Raask has classified four general
levels of abrasiveness of coals as a Exceptionally high in ash > 12 > 15 Exceptionally
result of their abrasion index. These and quartz abrasive
are listed in Table 14-2.
Table 14-3 lists the factors that con- From: Erosion Wear in Coal Utilization, 1988, p.225, E. Raask, Taylor & Francis, Washington, D.C. Reproduced
with permsission. All rights reserved.
tribute to flyash erosion, divided into
those which are mostly controllable
and those which are “constant” bar-
ring significant changes to the boiler Table 14-3
design. Summary of Controllable and
“Constant” Flyash Erosion Factors
Controllable* Factors
• Fuel and fly ash composition
• Gas flow rate
• Ash flux
• Mode of operation
• Boiler design characteristics (during
design process)

“Constant”* Factors
• Temperature profile
• Pressure part arrangement
• Tube material properties
• Target shape
• Angle of impingement

* Controllable factors include those that can be

changed during the design process or by operating
choices; Constant factors are those which are not
likely to change without fundamental modifications
once the boiler is built.

Source: J. F. Drennen and P. Kratina3

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-7

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Flyash Erosion: Root Causes
1. Root causes of fly ash erosion
are local nonuniform or turbu-
lent gas flows which entrain
large volumes of fly ash parti-
cles and direct them onto the
tube surface.
2. Specific contributors may
include designs that lead to
excess local velocities; main-
tenance, and operating proce-
dures that lead to excessive
gas flow; fuel or fuel handling
procedures; misapplication of
palliative measures; and/or
susceptible materials.
14-8 Fly Ash Erosion
3.1 Introduction
Flyash erosion occurs when the
local velocity and ash loading com-
bination exceeds the ability of the
material to resist the erosive
process. Primary root causes are an
excessive local velocity, which can
be caused by a number of design,
maintenance, and operating prob-
lems, and an excessive ash loading
level. Other root causes that are also
discussed below include improperly
applied prior “fixes” and susceptible
materials. Table 14-4 summarizes
the possible root causes, their con-
firmation, and corrective actions.
3.2 Influence of excessive
local velocities
There can be several causes of
excessive local velocities. Since the
erosion rate is such a strong func-
tion of velocity, their reduction will
often prove to be the most effective
and most economic means of pre-
venting further damage.
3.2.1 Excessive (non-uniform) gas
flows: geometry (design) considera-
tions. A number of locations are
susceptible to flyash erosion simply
because of the local geometry.
Many of the locations are identified
in Table 14-1 and Figure 14-4 and
include corners, walls, staggered
banks, and section changes. Since
most of the rest of the root causes of
flyash erosion are routinely identified
and dealt with, this cause is perhaps
the most prevalent in the industry
today. As will be discussed in detail
below, its solution will also require
the most effort, primarily through
analysis, careful design and installa-
tion of flow modification devices.
Actions to confirm:
(a). Compare locations of failures to
typical, known locations such as
delineated in Table 14-1 and Figures
14-3 and 14-4.
(b). Ensure that there are no other
obvious, applicable causes such as
missing or distorted flow guides and
baffles, recent operation in excess
of design rating, recent increase in
excess air, changes in fuel to a more
ash-laden or erosive composition,
redirection of flows into this location
by previous repairs, etc.
3.2.2 Excessive (non-uniform) gas
flows: maintenance considerations.
The distortion/misalignment of tub-
ing rows or misalignment/loss of gas
flow guides and baffles are two
examples where excessive localized
flue gas velocities can be produced
by maintenance considerations.
Such problems are generally
straightforward to identify and fix.
Actions to Confirm:
(c). Visual inspection in areas near
erosion problem.
3.2.3 Excessive (non-uniform) gas
flows: operations considerations.
Operation above the continuous
design rating or at excess air flows
above design can obviously
increase the velocities through all
sections and as a result push mar-
ginal locations into a regime where
erosion becomes a problem. This is
another root cause that should be
relatively easy to identify, although
changes to unit operation can often
have significant economic penalties
so that the evaluation of the optimal
fix is not so straightforward.
Actions to Confirm:
(d). Review unit operation to identify
significant changes that may have
increased flue gas velocities.
Table 14-4
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.2 Excessive Local Velocities

3.2.1 Excessive (non-uniform) (a). Compare locations of failure to those
gas flows: geometry typical of flyash erosion. See Table
(design) considerations 14-1, Figures 14-3 and 14-4.
(b). Eliminate other root causes as primary
factors.
• Change problem geome-
tries such as replacing
staggered tube rows with
in-line tubes in the
economizer, etc.
• Apply CAVT; design and install flow
modifications: local diffusion screens
and distribution screens, confirm
efficacy with CAVT retest. See Section
6.3.

3.2.2 Excessive (non-uniform) (c). Visual inspection in areas near erosion • Repair, replace, align • Monitor to ensure that damage does
gas flows: Maintenance problem for obvious distortions, damaged components. not reappear which would indicate an
– Distortion or misalignments, etc. underlying, uncured problem.
misalignment of
tubing rows
– Misalignment or loss
of gas flow guides
and baffles

3.2.3 Excessive (non-uniform) (d). Review unit operation to identify • Changes in unit opera- • Apply CAVT, to determine extent of
gas flows: Operation changes that increased local flue gas tion such as reducing problem; design and install flow modifi-
– Operating above the velocities. load or lowering excess cations: local diffusion screens and dis-
continuous design air, but economic penal- tribution screens, confirm efficacy with
rating ties are high. CAVT retest. See Section 6.3.
– Operating above • Balancing air flows, modifying soot-
design excess air flow blowers, etc., may be useful, but eco-
nomic penalties can be high.

3.3 Increased particle loading

3.3.1 Increase in particle (e). Evaluate ash and erosive material
loading: fuel content of fuel from an erosivity index
considerations and/or use CQIM to assess the eco-
nomic impact. Compare to design coal.
(f). Evaluate whether changes in fuel
handling or blending are evident.
• See long-term actions.
• Apply CAVT to determine extent of
problem; design and install flow modifi-
cations: local diffusion screens and dis-
tribution screens, confirm efficacy with
CAVT retest. See Section 6.3.
• Fuel and fuel handling changes may be
considered to reduce the amount of ash
and erosive minerals.
• Change to fuel with lower ash content.
• Washing or blending coal.
• Apply indices (see Section 2) and/or
use CQIM to assess economic impact.

3.3.2 Increase in erosive • Institute regular, but not excessive soot-

particle loading: (g). Review sootblower operating proce-
sootblower operation dures and confirm that equipment is
or maintenance properly functioning such as proper
temperatures and pressures.
• Institute regular, but not
excessive sootblowing.
blowing.
• Test to assess key sootblower parame-
ters such as temperature and pressure.
May need to assess and/or change
steam supply.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-9

Table 14-4
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions (continued)
Major Root Cause
Influences Actions to Confirm
3.4 Other Influences
3.4.1 Palliative shields and (h). Review history of flyash erosion, prior
baffles usually punched repairs, and relationship to current
plates or solid baffles damage.
that were misapplied
previously.
3.4.2 Inappropriate material, (i). Review prior maintenance activities to
improperly or poorly document such palliative techniques.
applied coating.
3.3 Influence of an increase in
erosive particle loading
Generally an increase in loading is
caused by a change to a fuel that
either contains more ash or contains
elements which are more erosive
such as a higher quartz content. It
may also occur because of a
change in fuel handling procedures
such as coal washing or blending.
An increase in particle loading may
also occur if there are sootblower
operating or maintenance problems.
3.3.1 Increase in erosive particle
loading: fuel considerations
Actions to Confirm:
(e). Evaluate ash and erosive parti-
cle content of current and recent
fuels and ash loading levels com-
pared to design. Either the abrasion
index, equation 14-5, or wear
propensity index, equation 14-6
developed by Raask may provide an
estimate of the changed propensity
for erosion caused by a change in
the composition of the fuel in use.
The Coal Quality Impact Model
(CQIM)9, 10 can also provide an indi-
cation of increased erosivity from dif-
ferent fuel sources along with an
14-10 Fly Ash Erosion
Immediate Actions
and Solutions
• See long-term actions.
•Temporary pad weld,
spray coating or shield-
ing may be used. These
are not recommended for
the long term as they will
mostly likely led to
continual repairs.
economic analysis of the effects of
erosion on unit availability and cost.
(f). Evaluate whether significant
changes to fuel handling or blending
procedures have resulted in a
change in the ash load level; the
CQIM can provide such analysis.
3.3.2 Increase in erosive particle
loading: sootblower operation or
maintenance
(g). Review sootblowing operating
procedures and confirm that equip-
ment is properly functioning, includ-
ing (i) that the correct level of super-
heat is available, (ii) that the drains
and valves are set correctly, (iii) that
wet steam is not used during the ini-
tial part of the blow.
3.4 Other root causes
3.4.1 Misapplication of palliative
shields and baffles. It is unfortunate
that too many flyash erosion prob-
lems occur because previous “fixes”
were not properly performed. For
example, previously installed protec-
tion may have been a punched plate
or solid baffle, which just moves or
redirects the erosion to another,
nearby location. It is important that a
Long-Term Actions and
Prevention of Repeat Failures
• Remove prior modifications.
• Apply CAVT to determine the extent of
the problem; design and install flow
modification: local diffusion screens
and distribution screens, confirm effi-
cacy with CAVT retest. See Section 6.3.
• If flow modification is not feasible or if
erosion remains persistent, change to
more resistant material or apply resis-
tant coating.
rational approach to flow modifica-
tion hardware be taken, such as the
cold air velocity test (CAVT); it is dis-
cussed in detail later in this Chapter.
Actions to confirm:
(h). Review history of flyash erosion
problem, previous repair history, and
visual examination of failure loca-
tions for evidence of prior modifica-
tions.
3.4.2 Inappropriate materials or
improperly or poorly applied coating.
It is possible that a material change,
either a coating or a new tube mate-
rial, can help where there is an ero-
sion problem. As a general rule,
however, the root cause is not the
material’s susceptibility but one or
more of the previously mentioned
problems, and replacing the material
will merely result in a repeat failure.
If repairs are poorly performed, they
can then be the root of subsequent
failures; this has been a common
result when coatings were used for
fly ash erosion control.
Action to confirm is:
(i). Review prior maintenance activi-
ties to document such palliative
techniques.
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Flyash Erosion: Immediate
Solutions and Actions
1. Although there are a few
immediate solutions that can
provide relief on a temporary
basis, most have either high
economic penalty or are truly
palliative and will require a
more complete long-term
solution.
2. Failed tubes should be
replaced and a long term plan
developed for cold air velocity
testing, and for the rational
design, fabrication, and instal-
lation of flow modification
screens.
Visual examination may identify a
serious flyash erosion problem
where significant wastage has
occurred or where the presence of a
problem can be identified indirectly,
such as at rusted tube locations
within a few hours of a boiler wash,
indicating the removal of protective
surface oxides.
In most circumstances, an ultrasonic
testing (UT) survey to detect wall
thinning will be required in suscepti-
Table 14-4 lists the available imme-
diate actions and solutions. For the
most part, the reduction of flyash
erosion is found in long-term
actions. The short-term approaches
mostly have an associated eco-
nomic penalty or are stop-gap mea-
sures. An example of the former is a
change in unit operation. The latter
might be the use of pad welds or
spray coatings to increase the wear
resistance of the tube, or shielding
to protect local eroded areas; these
require a commitment to on-going
repairs or more permanent solutions
that address the underlying causes.
The few immediate actions that are
recommended are where a mis-
aligned or missing component can
be replaced or repaired.
ble locations. Characterizing the dis-
tribution and extent of wear will be
useful for (i) remaining life analysis,
(ii) development of a complete solu-
tion and repair strategy, and (iii)
periodic re-inspection to determine
the success of the applied solution
and to detect developing problems.
Chapter 9, Volume 1 provides an
overview of the use of UT to detect
wall thinning.
Probably the best immediate action
is just to replace the eroded tube.
Some judgment will be required to
balance the following considera-
tions: how long did the previous
tube last, what is the possibility of
creating an erosive situation on an
adjacent tube, and how soon can a
long-term plan be implemented?
Care must be taken with short-term
repairs, because even some innocu-
ous sounding steps can lead to
unexpected problems if improperly
applied. For example, regular soot-
blowing to eliminate ash blockages
can be beneficial, whereas exces-
sive sootblowing could lead to soot-
blower erosion.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-11
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of
Repeat Failures
Flyash Erosion: Long-Term
Actions
1. The primary objectives of cor-
rective actions involve either
reducing the local velocity or
amount of ash striking the
tubes. A secondary action
may, in some cases, be to
increase the wear resistance
of the tube.
2. The primary tool to combat fly-
ash erosion is flow modification
in conjunction with a cold air
velocity test before and after
modification.
3. Depending upon the root
cause, other long-term actions
may be applied in a supple-
mental fashion; these include:
changing problem geometries,
changes in unit design or unit
operation. In all cases, the
CAVT should be used as the
indicator of the efficacy of the
solution. Fuel or fuel handling
changes should also be inves-
tigated to reduce the erosivity
of the fly ash.
14-12 Fly Ash Erosion
6.1 Overview of long-term
actions
Table 14-4 lists long-term actions to
prevent repeat failures. As noted
above, corrective actions involve
reducing the amount and/or the
velocity of ash striking the tube.
Increasing the wear resistance of
the tube can only be regarded as a
temporary palliative measure.
Structural changes such as baffles,
fences, shields, and plates may be
installed, but care must be taken to
prevent transfer of the erosion prob-
lem to another location. Staggered
tube arrangements may be replaced
with in-line tube geometry in econo-
mizer sections.
Plant maintenance procedures
should be established for the
inspection of flue gas passages,
flow guides and baffles, and tube
spacers and alignment during boiler
overhauls. Acceptable erosion rates
should also be established along
with plant procedures for monitoring
these rates during boiler over-
hauls.11
The use of cold air velocity testing to
identify regions of excessive veloc-
ity, followed by the installation of dif-
fusion and distribution screens, pro-
vides utilities with the most perma-
nent solution to the problem.3 This
approach is described below and
the efficacy is illustrated in one of
the case studies in Section 7.
6.2 Flyash erosion control and
cold air velocity technique
A step-by-step process, described
in the next section, can be used to
set up and execute an erosion con-
trol program in a utility boiler.3 It fea-
tures the use of flow control screens
which are selected and installed to
redistribute fly ash, reduce local gas
velocities and lower erosion rates to
acceptable levels. Proper types of
screens and their location are cho-
sen with the aid of a cold air velocity
test (CAVT). Air velocity measure-
ments are made at critical locations;
retesting at the same locations can
then judge the success of the instal-
lation.
Periodic inspection and wall thick-
ness surveys can monitor the pro-
gression of the erosion problem.
Systems with over ten years of suc-
cessful operation have been
installed with this methodology. It
has been estimated that the cost of
such a program ranges from about
$300-$400/MW depending upon the
unit design, operating characteris-
tics, and extent of fly ash erosion.
6.3 Steps in the methodology
Flyash Erosion: Summary of Flow
Modification
1. Clean boiler and assess its
condition, remove ineffective
prior shields and baffles, per-
form initial cold air velocity test
to identify local high flow
regions, and estimate solids
loading distribution.
2. Design and install flow modifi-
cations, i.e., distribution and
diffusion screens.
3. Confirm results with a second
cold air velocity test.
4. Perform wall thickness survey
to establish base line for peri-
odic reexamination on affected
tubes and in nearby areas.
Figure 14-7 illustrates the overall
approach to reducing flyash erosion BTF from fly ash erosion
with flow modification. There are two
tracks, each requires the same Yes
Step 1
sequence of events: the FAST track
Boiler assessment
requires some predesign, purchase
and fabrication of components and
completes the process in one out-
Step 2A
age, and the NORMAL track where Fast Track Step 2 Control No ¥ Change operation
the steps are completed during two Erosion with flow
Yes modification ¥ Redesign unit
or more outages.
?
The major steps in the flowchart are Before Yes
highlighted below: next Step 3 Normal Track
outage Step 3A
Step 1: Boiler assessment Boiler testing 1st outage
¥ Design flow
The first step is to collect unit design controls
Step 4
and operating data, fuel data, boiler ¥ Purchase material
condition, and erosion history. The ¥ Begin fabrication Data reduction and analysis
erosion history may include such During
items as known boiler tube failures extended Step 5
outage Step 3B
caused by fly ash erosion, mea- Protection system design 2nd outage
sured erosion rates if available, the ¥ Initial CAVT
date of the first erosion occurrence, ¥ Modify design
Step 6
¥ UT survey
results of past erosion control efforts Post installation inspection, CAVT
¥ Install controls
both successful and unsuccessful, ¥ Second CAVT
recent inspection results, and origi- ¥ Modify controls Step 7
nal tube thicknesses. During this 2nd or 3rd
step, it will also be appropriate to Modify controls outage
identify conditions that might be
contributing to tube failures such as Step 8
obvious signs of deflected flows, System monitoring Ongoing
ash plugging, high temperatures.
Figure 14-8 shows a means to iden-
tify erosion locations for guidance of No Step 9
Erosion?
Yes
the subsequent test layout and
design of flow modifications.
Step 2: Determine whether it is
likely that the erosion can be con- Figure 14-7. Overall approach to fly ash erosion control using cold air velocity test
trolled with flow modification. and flow modification. Source: J.F. Drennen and P. Kratina3
As indicated in Table 14-4, there
may be several root causes of flyash
erosion; the required actions will require correction other than through • Fan imbalance has produced
depend on the underlying cause. flow modification. These might increased flow velocities on one
include: side of a divided unit
The purpose of this step is to review
the other possibilities and confirm • The damage or BTF is being • Excessive temperatures entering
that flow modification is the most caused by a mechanism other the backpass.
applicable choice for this outbreak than flyash erosion, such as gen- These problems might have been so
of flyash erosion. The boiler exami- eralized corrosion or generalized significant as to mask a concurrent,
nations conducted in Step 1 may erosion not related to locally high underlying problem of high localized
identify several conditions which velocities. loading and velocity. Therefore,
• A fuel change has caused exces- once these problems are corrected,
sive ash loadings or excessively the process outlined above should
abrasive flyash. become a part of the regular boiler
practice beginning with Step 1.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-13

 (side-to-side) line and measurement
8' high heights if the locations are not clear
distribution from tubing arrangements.
screen
24" wide screen (65-70% Safety during test preparation and
(65-70% open) open)
conduct is an essential considera-

Rear RH pendent
tion. Details of safety procedures
have been identified3 and include:
16' high
distribution • For each two-man test team, the
screens

Finish SH pendent
presence of a safety person sta-

Inter. RH pendent
(65-70%
open) tioned outside the cavity to help
Gas open and close doors, move
24" wide Dome baffle flow equipment in and out, and assist
screen (45-50% open)
(45-50% if problems arise.
open) • Ensuring that radios between
Rear &
S.W.W.'s teams, to the outside safety per-
son, and to the control room, are
36" high screen operational. If they are not, an
(45-50% open)
alternative communication
Warped Refractory baffle
screen means, such as a hammer bang-
baffle Erosion areas ing on door from the inside, need
(45-50% to be established. The main con-
open)
Economizer banks cern here is opening a door if it is
latched or tied shut.
• Choice of safety cables and har-
nesses, and care in selecting
required scaffolding will depend
on judgment of the situation; they
are critical safety concerns.
• Personal protective equipment
Gas flow includes as a minimum proper
breathing and eye protection with
spares. Good practice would also
include dust suits or overalls,
Figure 14-8. Erosion locations on side elevation drawing, also showing subsequent gloves, knee pads, and hard-hat
application of distribution and diffusing screens. Source: J.F. Drennen and P. Kratina3
mounted lighting. During cold
weather testing there will be a
considerable wind chill factor so
Step 3: Boiler testing - the initial out including, as a minimum all fuel that warm clothing becomes
CAVT sources, ignition equipment, soot- essential.
The cold air velocity test (CAVT) blowers, other traversing or moving
probes, steam and compressed air Measurement points are generally
involves taking velocity measure- chosen to be those locations with
lines in bank areas. The backpass
ments in the boiler at ambient tem- proven or expected erosion prob-
should be cleaned prior to testing
perature and with the fans running lems. The most comprehensive test
as ash covered tubes tend to be
as close to actual flow conditions as would include all cavities at both
slippery; further, airborne ash is a
possible (usually 75-85%). The con- bank inlet and outlet; this can be
respiratory and eye hazard and to a
cept is shown schematically in reduced depending upon the objec-
lesser extent it can be a potential
Figure 14-9. It is executed by sev- tives of the test. Front-to-rear loca-
absorption or ingestion hazard
eral two-person teams as well as tions are usually based on tubing
safety personnel and control room depending upon composition. Water
washing is preferred over air clean- geometry rather than on evenly
operators. Table 14-5 lists some of spaced measurements. Side-to-side
the key aspects of this test. ing, if it is feasible.
locations are based on the level of
A pre-test inspection should be per- detail desired; a typical selection
The configuration of the unit is simi-
formed prior to the actual testing. would be five in-bank locations and
lar to normal except for fuel han-
Locations to be tested should be the side wall gaps for a total of
dling and sootblowing. Prior to the
marked on a side view drawing for seven lines.
test, equipment needs to be tagged
each team and in the boiler at key
locations. This might include lateral

14-14 Fly Ash Erosion

 The CAVT itself will consist of the
following steps3:
• Establishing the air flow. Typical
fan setting would be about 80%
of maximum operating flow; nor-
mally closed access doors, view
ports and other openings should
be closed for the test.
• Entering the unit. In pressurized
units, it may be necessary to
lower the air flow while teams
enter and leave cavities and the
doors are secured. This will
require particular attention when
coordinating multiple teams.
Radio contact and communication
between test teams and safety
personnel should be confirmed.
• For multiple teams, meeting in
one location to confirm uniformity
of procedure and reading on
instruments is recommended.
¥ Multiple teams at different planes
Control room • Information to be recorded should
¥ One person measures, the other takes readings, notes, etc.
¥ Safety person for each team outside at same plane include velocity data, start and
¥ Control room operator sets and monitors flow and other ending time for each plane to
equipment to support test allow for comparison with flow
data being recorded in the control
room, and damper settings or
splits between various inlets and
Figure 14-9. Cold air velocity technique team concept. outlets. Recorded control room
Source: J.F. Drennen and P. Kratina3 data should include as a minimum
total air flow (preferable in lb/hr or
cfm), air temperature in the back-
Table 14-5 pass, and furnace pressure.
Cold Air Velocity Test: Some Basics
Item Issues Figure 14-10 shows testing in
progress using a hand-held
Concept Velocity measurements at ambient temperature with boiler fans anemometer.
running and boiler configured as close to normal as possible. Step 4: Data reduction and analysis

Objective Obtain flow patterns in areas of known erosion activity. The primary purpose of this step is
to confirm that locations with erosion
problems are correlated to areas
Main Areas to Cover Cavities at both bank inlet and outlet, pendant, horizontal banks. with measured high local velocities
and/or expected high ash loadings.
Advantages Actual measurements on unit give higher confidence than modeling. With confirmation, design of applic-
More complete coverage possible than for in-situ methods. able modifications can proceed. If
locations of erosion have not been
Measurement Points Varies but on the order of 5-7 points side-to-side and 7-10 points identified by the test, then additional
Needed front-to-rear (top-to-bottom). examination is required. For exam-
ple, mismatch between the
Manpower/Time Varies; several two-man teams in an 8-12 hour period have been observed boiler tube failure loca-
shown to be sufficient. tions and locations that seem at
highest risk could be caused by
misdiagnosis of the failure mecha-
Estimated number of 20 nism (cause other than flyash ero-
utilities that have sion), if ash distribution has been
used CAVT

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-15


Figure 14-10. Cold air velocity test
measurement in progress.
Source: J.F. Drennen and P. Kratina3
Table 14-6
“Rules of Thumb” for Estimating Solids Loading
Unit Type/Construction Feature
Units with separate reheater and
superheater back passes.
Units with closely-coupled front
and rear passes
Units with vertical pendants separating
front and rear passes
Source: J. F. Drennen and P. Kratina3
14-16 Fly Ash Erosion
Estimated Distribution of Solids Loading
80% of ash gets to entrance of reheater (farthest
pass from the front combustion chamber).
80% of ash goes to the rear quarter; highest concen-
tration at rear wall.
80% of ash to the rear quarter; not as concentrated
at rear wall; decreases as distance between front and
rear passes increases.
incorrectly estimated, or there were
deflected flows from debris, plug-
ging, or improper flow controls that
were not detected during the test.
Estimates of ash loading by the
rules of thumb presented in Table
14-6 may be useful in conjunction
with velocity measurements to help
characterize regions at high risk of
erosion damage.
Step 5: Design of Protection System
This activity includes selection, fab-
rication, and placement of flow mod-
ification elements. Also included is
an estimate of the effect on veloci-
ties and ash loading for the pro-
posed design changes, along with
an evaluation of their propensity for
plugging. A brief summary of
options and some examples are
included here.
The two primary control options are
(i) distribution screens, which are
primarily for ash distribution, with lit-
tle effect on local velocity profiles,
and (ii) diffusion screens which are
primarily for diminishing locally high
turbulent velocities and have less
effect on ash distribution. Some
general characteristics of each are
listed in Table 14-7.
An open mesh screen is used for
each application; the orientation and
open area control the effect.
Screens may be of flat, curved or
angled installation. Figures 14-11a
and b show the types of screen
used; typical materials of construc-
tion will depend on service tempera-
ture, as indicated in Table 14-8.
It is recommended that a staged
approach to installation be used, as
opposed to “cover everything the
first time”. For example, it is recom-
mended that full width distribution
screens and vertical side wall
screens be installed first. Typical
locations might be as shown in the
example of Figures 14-8 and 14-12.
These can be followed by installa-
tion of diffusion screens to reduce
the local velocities and to protect
local areas with the highest erosion
rates. Finally, other areas can be
covered as needed.
Table 14-7 If screens show signs of wear after
Control Options only 1-2 years, a second set of dis-
tribution screens or velocity reduc-
Control Option Objective Placement ing screens is needed at the erosion
location. This is preferable to
Distribution Screen Reduce ash flows that are Well upstream of affected areas (such accepting a two year life with on-
above plane average. as entrance to backpass). going replacement. For many instal-
lations 5-10 year lives are achiev-
Diffusion Screen Reduce high turbulent veloci- In immediate areas where erosion has able. Plugging can be a real con-
ties locally. occurred. cern and must be considered in the
design of control modifications.
Curved and horizontal screens have
the highest potential for problems.
Pressure drop, even for significant
installation of control screens, has
not been found to be a problem as
the drop induced by the screens is
partially offset by the pressure
recovery gained by reducing high
velocity flows.
Attachment considerations, methods
and detail design drawings are
available3 for horizontal, vertical,
angled, and curved screens.
Step 6: Post Installation Inspection
and Second CAVT
This is a critical step in the overall
process. It consists of performing
the CAVT measurements at the
same locations as in the first CAVT.
The primary purposes are (i) to
Figure 14-11a. Expanded metal screen. ensure that the local velocities at
erosion sites have been reduced,
and (ii) that high velocity flows have
not been moved to adjacent tube
locations.
Step 7: Modification of Controls as
Required
Step 8: System Monitoring
Step 9: Analysis of Results of On-
Going Monitoring
A long-term monitoring plan is
required to ensure that the erosion
problem has been brought to man-
ageable levels. Periodic inspection
of screens for effectiveness and
plugging, and periodic inspection of
tubes and their wall thicknesses are
also required to confirm erosion
rates and tube health.
Figure 14-11b. Flattened expanded metal screen.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-17

Table 14-8 6.4 Summary of CAVT
Screen and Attachment Material Recommendations methodology
Temperature Range °C (°F) Expanded Metal Screens Attachments A primary concern with the arbitrary
placing of screens, i.e., without the
CAVT, is that flow modification will
Up to 370°C (~700°F) Carbon steel Carbon steel
move the problem to adjacent loca-
tions. This is probably the most fre-
370 - 480°C 304 stainless steel Corten high temp, quent reason for repeat failures.
(~700-900°F) 304 stainless steel Proper application of the CAVT,
before and after modifications,
480 - 650°C 304 stainless steel Corten high temp, removes this problem. However,
(~900-1200°F) 304 stainless steel periodic re-examination of the previ-
ously affected areas and locally
650 - 820°C 309, 310, 316 stainless steel Corten high temp, adjacent areas for signs of erosion
(~1200-1500°F) 304 stainless steel precursors is recommended. It is
also necessary to have an on-going
(annual) NDE thickness survey cam-
820 - 1040°C Rolled alloy (RA)-310 316, 310, Rolled alloy
paign until it is clearly established
(~1500-1900°F) stainless steel (RA)-310 stainless steel that tube thinning has stopped.
Source: J. F. Drennen and P. Kratina3 It has been found that application of
the CAVT has associated positive
effects on fouling and dropout of
ash, i.e., the technique also elimi-
nates the slow velocity areas.
Ash distribution screens Further, it is expected that it will
have some effect on heat rate as the
absorption patterns will be more
even in the convective sections.
The expense involved with the entire
process described above: testing,
design and installation of proper
flow control modifications, and
retesting, is often perceived as too
costly. However, in the long run such
an approach will be significantly
more cost effective than some short-
term solutions that have often been
employed in the past and that have
lead to a continual need for on-
going maintenance and repair.
There have been a few cases where
the cold air velocity test and associ-
ated procedures have not given sat-
isfactory results. Where correlation
between CAVT test results and
known erosion locations is unsatis-
factory, it may be necessary, in
Flow extreme cases, to supplement CAVT
results with hot testing or with unit
flow modeling.1 Note that the cost
Figure 14-12. Distribution screens in cascade arrangement. associated with either of these steps
Source: J.F. Drennen and P. Kratina3 is high.

14-18 Fly Ash Erosion

7. Case Studies
Flyash Erosion Case Study I:
Summary of Field Experience
The cold air velocity test (CAVT)
method of analysis for flow modifi-
cation has been applied at a num-
ber of utility and industrial units and
several case studies are available
in the literature.1, 3, 12 In general, it
has been found to be useful in the
diagnosis and mitigation of flyash
erosion. A brief summary of lessons
learned from these case studies
includes:
1. The CAVT technique has been
used to identify successfully local
high velocity locations in a range
of boiler sizes (100 - 750 MW)
and designs (tower, divided back
pass, etc.).
2. Flow modification by various dif-
fusion screen designs has been
used to change the local veloci-
ties and those changes have
been confirmed by a post-modifi-
cation CAVT.
Flyash Erosion Case Study II:
Cold Air Velocity Testing and Field Modifications
Introduction: A unit with flyash ero-
sion of boiler tubes was evaluated
with the cold air velocity test
(CAVT), modified by flow screen
installation, and retested with CAVT.
The retest results showed that
improvement had been achieved.
In fact, in the two years following
the installation, there were no
forced outages; this contrasts with
the two years prior to the installa-
tion when five forced outages total-
ing 316 hours caused by flyash ero-
sion were experienced in the unit.
This case study describes the work
done and results obtained.
Unit Assessment: The unit has a
single once-through, combined-cir-
culation, supercritical boiler and
burns pulverized coal. It is a single
3. Installation of distribution screens
reduced the level of erosive ash
reaching local high velocity
areas, particularly at the rear of
the boiler.
4. It appears from field data taken
to date that erosion rates can be
reduced by such flow modifica-
tions.
5. For the most part, erosion dam-
age appears to be highly corre-
lated with high local velocities,
with ash loading a secondary
consideration.
6. Plugging of installed screens has
occurred but usually the
deposited material is easily
removed and generally is not a
problem. Erosion of the screens
has not been a problem; such
erosion would indicate that the
screens had not been located
properly.
reheat cycle; nameplate rating is
around 575 MW. The unit had
accumulated over 100,000 operat-
ing hours by the start of the testing.
It burns Eastern Bituminous coal
with an ash content of 10-15% that
consists of 3.2-3.5% quartz and 18-
33% mullite.
Erosion Problems: Figure 14-8
shows the problem locations. The
worst erosion was along the back
wall of the backpass area. Average
erosion rates were about 8.2
mils/year.
Results from Initial Cold Air Velocity
Test: Three teams took approxi-
mately five hours to complete the
initial CAVT. Measurement locations
were determined in advance and
are shown in Figure 14-13. Air flow
was measured with flow-through
7. The materials used for screens
must be chosen to match the
temperatures expected. Higher
than anticipated temperatures
has been a problem that has led
to rapid replacement of installed
flow controls.
8. An important precondition for the
successful application of the
FAST TRACK version of the tech-
nique (pre-design of flow con-
trols, testing, installation, and
retest all in one outage) is a very
good working knowledge of the
unit and its erosion problems.
Adopting this track usually
requires good follow-up and the
possibility of repeated CAVT with
subsequent modification of the
screens.
anemometers. The test was con-
ducted with an average flow rate of
3.8 MM lb/hr (equivalent MCR oper-
ating condition would have been
5.1 MM lb/hr). Locations with flows
significantly above the average
were identified in locations such as
(i) near front and rear wall gaps, (ii)
near previously installed baffles,
and (iii) near front bends in the
economizer.
Flow Control Designs: Figure 14-8
shows the final flow control designs
that were installed. Figure 14-14
illustrates the nature of the installa-
tion at key locations. Note that
these photographs were taken after
eleven weeks of operation and thus
show some accumulation of ash on
the various screens.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-19
7. Case studies (continued)

Flyash Erosion Case Study II:

Cold Air Velocity Testing and Field Modifications (continued)

Post-Installation CAVT Test: A fol-
low-up CAVT was performed. It
took two teams approximately six
hours to take velocity readings at
three of the five original planes.
The effort was focused in those
areas where flow controls had been
installed. Satisfactory reduction in
peak, and in some cases total,
flows at the high velocity locations
were recorded.
Costs: The cost to install the flow
control system included engineer-
ing support for review and modifi-
cation of the installation drawings,
purchasing activities, support dur-
ing installation, materials for
screens and attachments, and
labor for fabrication and installa-
tion. Actual materials cost (1988 $)
was about $80K; total labor was
about $105K.
Inspections and Operating History:
The flow control screens were
inspected eleven weeks, one year
and two years after installation.
There was some minor pluggage
found in some screens caused by
“popcorn” ash after the eleven
week and one year inspections, but
no other items of any significance.
After two years, a few locations
needed minor repairs. During the
two years following installation,
there were no tube failures attrib-
uted to flyash erosion. On-going
inspections and repairs as needed
were recommended for the units.
Source: The information about this
case study is from the Guidelines
for Control and Prevention of Fly
Ash Erosion in Fossil Fired Power
Plants3, which can be consulted for
additional detail, including compila-
tions of specific data recorded.

CAV measurement locations

Figure 14-13. Measurement locations for the initial cold air velocity test on the unit
described in Case Study II. Source: J.F. Drennen and P. Kratina3

14-20 Fly Ash Erosion

 Location 4 1) 8 foot
Location 3
2) 2 foot wide screens at pendant distribution
inlet and outlet at missing elements screen

Rear RH pendent
4) 16 foot high
full width
distribution

Finish SH pendent
Inter. RH pendent
screens

6) Domed Gas
5) 2 foot wide screen at flow
wall screens, opening
side and
rear walls

3) 3 foot high full

width diffusion
screen
7) Full
width Erosion areas
diffusion
screen
Economizer banks

Location 7 Location 6
Gas flow

Location 5

Figure 14-14. Flow control installations at five locations for the case study. Source: J.F. Drennen and P. Kratina3

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-21

8. References
1Platfoot,R.A. and C.A.J. Fletcher, “Boiler Tube Failures
Caused by Grit Erosion”, in B. Dooley, ed., Proceedings:
International Conference on Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil
Plants, held in San Diego, California November 5-7,
1991, Proceedings TR-100493, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1992, pp. 5-29
through 5-43.
2Rundygin,
Y.A., et al., “Enhanced Reliability of
Desuperheater Protective Sheaths”,
Energomashinotroenie Vol. 3, 1988, pp. 29-32.
3Drennen,
J.F. and P. Kratina, Guidelines for the Control
and Prevention of Fly Ash Erosion in Fossil Fired Power
Plants, Research Project 2711-02, Final Report TR-
102432, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
February, 1994. See also, J.F. Drennen, et al., “Outline of
a Program to Control and Prevent Boiler Tube Failures
From Fly Ash Erosion”, in op. cit. reference 1, pp. 5-17
through 5-27.
4Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.
5Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec,
November, 1983.
14-22 Fly Ash Erosion
6Drennen, J.F., D.K. Anderson, and W.P. Bauer, “Control
and Prevention of Fly Ash Erosion”, 1991 International
Technical Conference, Boston, MA, September 9-10. 1991.
7Raask, E., Erosion Wear in Coal Utilization, Hemisphere
Publishing Company, Washington, D.C., 1988.
8Raask, E., Mineral Impurities in Coal Combustion -
Behaviour Problems and Remedial Measures, Hemisphere
Publishing Company, Washington, D.C., 1985.
9Davidson, P.G, et al., Development and Application of
the Coal Quality Impact Model: CQIMTM, Research
Project 2256-2, Final Report GS-6393, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1990.
10Pavlish,J.H., P.R. Miller, N.C. Craig, and A.K. Mehta,
“CQIM - An Analytical Tool Used to Evaluate
Performance and Economic Issues”, Proceedings: Ninth
Annual International Pittsburgh Coal Conference,
October, 1992.
11Dooley, R.B., “A Vision for Reducing Boiler Tube
Failures”, Power Engineering, March, 1992, pp. 33-37.
12Kratina, P. and J.F. Drennen, “Convective Pass Erosion
Control and Prevention in Utility and Industrial Boilers”, in
op. cit. reference 1, pp. 5-1 through 5-15.
ACTIONS for Flyash Erosion
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of flyash
erosion begin here. The goal of
these actions is to see if further
investigation of flyash erosion is
warranted or whether another
BTF mechanism should be
investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and flyash erosion is
the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by flyash erosion.
Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and flyash erosion is the
likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of flyash erosion.
• Areas with high local velocities
particularly in the economizer,
primary superheater, and inlet
sections of reheater tubes.
• Table 14-1, Figures 14-3 and
14-4 show typical locations.
• Locations where flows are
deflected from an existing
object such as a plate, tube
support, offset tubes or existing
erosion controls.
➠ Determine whether the failure, if
occurring in locations that are
not typical of flyash erosion, such
as high temperature SH/RH
sections, has the appearance of
flyash erosion.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure
includes such features as:
• Signs of extensive tube erosion
leading to a rupture.
• Thin-edged, pin-hole, or a long
“thin” blowout typical of rapid
erosion.
• Thick-edged fracture showing
creep effects associated with
slow erosion rates.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) or for
steam-touched tubing (Table 31-
1) to pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could lead
to future BTF by flyash erosion.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Burnishing or polishing of the
tube on the side facing into the
gas flow, indicating the early
stages of an erosion problem.
• Flat spots, ovality and formation
of edges on straight tube sec-
tions, indicating the advanced
stages of an erosion problem.
• Fresh rust found on tubes fol-
lowing a boiler washing.
• Distortion or misalignment of
tubing rows.
➠ Determine whether a major
change in coal for the unit has
been made or is going to be
made.
➠ Determine whether unit has been
operated above the maximum
continuous design rating, with
excess air flow settings above
design, or with unbalanced fans
or air heaters that could lead to
nonuniform flow of gas.
➠ These precursors can be root
cause influences of flyash ero-
sion. If one or more has occurred,
go to Action 3 which outlines the
steps to confirm the influence of
each.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-23
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is flyash
erosion.
A failure has occurred which
the BTF team has tentatively
identified as being flyash erosion
damage (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify flyash ero-
sion as the primary mechanism
or point to another cause. The
actions listed will be executed by
visual examination of affected
areas and removal of a represen-
tative tube sample(s) for analysis.
References to other sources of detailed information:
• Main text (this chapter) provides the background to mechanism and the
14-24 Fly Ash Erosion
➠ Confirm that damage is localized.
➠ Eliminate other erosive
processes as candidates. Is the
damage found in the typically
susceptible locations such as
within a few feet of the side and
rear walls, or in areas where pre-
vious solid baffles have been
installed? See Table 14-1,
Figures 14-3 and 14-4.
➠ Evaluate appearance of damage.
Is there smooth, polished
wastage on the tube surface,
particularly on the side facing
into the gas flow?
➠ Examine microstructure. Is there
distinct microstructural damage?
➠ Probable failure mechanism is
flyash erosion.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination.
development of flyash erosion.
If spread over a large area, prob-
lem may be generalized corrosion
or generalized erosion; however,
continue with balance of flowchart
to eliminate flyash erosion as the
cause.
Possibility that another erosive
mechanism — sootblower, coal
particle, or falling slag is responsi-
ble for the damage. Should be
able to distinguish by tube loca-
tion; see discussion of these alter-
native erosion mechanisms if there
is uncertainty in diagnosis.
Damage may be sootblower ero-
sion if wastage flats are symmetric
on tube surface and located
approximately 45° around tube
from sootblowing direction. Review
sootblower erosion (Chapter 22) to
distinguish between the two erosive
processes.
Mechanism is probably not flyash
erosion. Review fireside corrosion
and long-term overheating mecha-
nisms to see if they are the root
causes of damage detected.
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of flyash erosion
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as flyash erosion (Action
2) or a precursor has been iden-
tified which presents a concern
that flyash erosion may be devel-
oping (Action 1b). The goal of
this Action 3 is for the BTF Team
to review the potential root
causes of flyash erosion, identify
probable ones, and take those
actions that are needed to con-
firm which are operative in the
unit. This step must be taken so
that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below.
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
3.2 Excessive Local Velocities
3.2.1 Excessive (non-uniform) gas flows: ➠ (a). Compare locations of failure to those
geometry (design) considerations typical of flyash erosion. See Table 14-1,
Figures 14-3 and 14-4.
➠ (b). Eliminate other root causes as primary
factors.
3.2.2 Excessive (non-uniform) gas flows: ➠ (c). Visual inspection in areas near erosion
Maintenance problem for obvious distortions, misalign-
• Distortion or misalignment of tubing rows ments, etc.
• Misalignment or loss of gas flow guides
and baffles

3.2.3 Excessive (non-uniform) gas flows: ➠ (d). Review unit operation to identify
Operation changes that increased local flue gas
• Operating above the continuous design rating velocities.
• Operating above design excess air flow

3.3 Increased Particle Loading

3.3.1 Increase in particle loading: fuel consider-
ations
➠ (e). Estimate ash and erosive material con-
tent of fuel from an erosivity index and/or use
CQIM to assess the economic impact.
Compare to design coal.
➠ (f). Evaluate whether changes in fuel han-
dling or blending are evident.

3.3.2 Increase in erosive particle loading: soot- ➠ (g). Review sootblower operating proce-
blower operation or maintenance dures and confirm that equipment is properly
functioning such as at proper temperatures
and pressures.

3.4 Other Influences

3.4.1 Palliative shields and baffles, usually ➠ (h). Review history of flyash erosion, prior
punched plates or solid baffles, that were misap- repairs, and relationship to current damage.
plied previously.

3.4.2 Inappropriate material, improperly or ➠ (i). Review prior maintenance activities to

poorly applied coating. document such palliative techniques.

References to other sources of detailed information:

• More detailed discussion about the actions to confirm can be found in the
main text (this chapter) under the section number shown.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-25

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root ➠ Identify all locations to be examined. Refer to Section
cause analysis), the BTF Team 1.2 of main text, Figures 14-3 and 14-4, and Table 14-
should determine the extent of 1 for typical locations. Missed locations are sites for
damage. Evaluation will be future failures.
based on detecting obvious
signs of erosion and for wall thin-
ning. Proper design of the cold
air velocity test and of measures ➠ Perform visual examination to detect obvious signs of
erosion.
to be taken depend on identifying
all affected locations.

➠ Perform UT survey to measure extent of damage via

wall thinning. A review of UT methods is provided in
Chapter 9, Volume 1.

➠ Perform tube sampling to confirm results of NDE

inspection and to determine the degree of damage.

➠ Use results interactively with Action 3.

➠ Go to Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions

and actions.

14-26 Fly Ash Erosion

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
The most important actions for
the BTF team are to (i) make a
quick repair with the same mate-
rial after calculating the
expected erosion rate and being
assured that it will survive to the
next outage, and (ii) determining
sufficient unit information to plan
for effective long-term approach
to the problem (Action 6). Other
actions that can be executed in
the short-term are also noted.
➠ Implement repairs or replacement ➠ Repair, replace, or align dam-
of affected tubes as identified aged components, if damaged or
from the NDE Survey (Action 4). misaligned components such as
tubing rows, gas flow guides, baf-
➠ See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
fles, etc., are at the root of the
summary of applicable tube
problem.
repair techniques.
➠ Adjust operating conditions such
➠ Develop a plan to replace
as excess air flows if they are at
affected tubing, including an eco-
the root of the problem. Reducing
nomic assessment of the future
load or lowering excess air will
possible failure rate and the
incur economic penalties.
resulting optimal extent of new
tubing. ➠ Plan for CAVT at the next outage.
• In order to get the unit on-line
as quickly as possible, the
same material can be used for
tube replacements. This
assumes that a calculation of
the expected life shows that
the tube will last until the next
outage, as determined from a
knowledge of the expected
erosion rate.
• Temporary pad welds, spray
coating, or shielding may be
used, but are not recom-
mended as long-term solutions,
as they will most likely lead to
continual repairs. Plan to
remove at the next outage.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-27
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will include
the use of the cold air velocity
test methodology along with
additional steps based on the
clear identification of the under-
lying root cause (Action 3).
14-28 Fly Ash Erosion
Major Root Cause Influences
Excessive Local Velocities
Excessive (non-uniform) gas flows: geometry
(design) considerations
Excessive (non-uniform) gas flows: Maintenance
• Distortion or misalignment of tubing rows
• Misalignment or loss of gas flow guides
and baffles
Excessive (non-uniform) gas flows: Operation
• Operating above the continuous design rating
• Operating above design excess air flow
Increased Particle Loading
Increase in particle loading: fuel considerations
Increase in erosive particle loading: sootblower
operation or maintenance
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Apply CAVT to detemine extent of problem;
design and install flow modification: local dif-
fusion screens and distribution screens; con-
firm efficacy with CAVT retest. See Section 6.3
main text.
➠Monitor to ensure that damage does not
reappear which would indicate an underlying
uncured problem.
➠ Apply CAVT to determine extent of problem;
design and install flow modification: local dif-
fusion screens and distribution screens, con-
firm efficacy with CAVT retest. See Section 6.3
main text.
➠ Balancing air flow, modifying sootblowers,
etc., may be useful, but economic penalties
can be high.
➠ Apply CAVT to determine extent of problem;
design, and install flow modification: local dif-
fusion screens and distribution screens; con-
firm efficacy with CAVT retest. See Section 6.3
main text.
➠ Fuel and fuel handling changes may be
considered to reduce the amount of ash and
erosive materials:
➠ Change to fuel with lower ash content,
➠ Wash coal
➠ Blend coal.
➠ Apply indices (see Section 2, main text)
and/or use Coal Quality Impact Model to
assess economic impact.
➠ Institute regular, but not excessive, soot-
blowing.
➠ Test to assess key sootblower parameters
such as temperature and pressure. May need
to assess and/or change steam supply.
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
(continued)
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Long-Term Actions

Other Influences

Palliative shields and baffles, usually punched ➠ Remove prior modifications.

plates or solid baffles, that were misapplied pre-
viously.
➠ Apply CAVT to determine extent of problem;
design, and install flow modification: local dif-
fusion screens and distribution screens; con-
firm efficacy with CAVT retest. See Section 6.3
main text.

Inappropriate material, improperly or poorly ➠ If flow modification is not feasible, or if ero-

applied coating. sion remains persistent, change to a more
resistant material or apply a resistant coating.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

The final step for the BTF team is

to review possible ramifications
implied by the presence of flyash
erosion. The primary one is to be
aware of the possibility of redi-
recting the flow of air or ash to
other locations, thereby creating
a new problem area. Periodically
re-examine previously affected
areas and locally adjacent loca-
tions for signs of erosion precur-
sors.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 14-29

14-30 Fly Ash Erosion
Chapter 15 • Volume 2
Hydrogen Damage
Introduction
Hydrogen damage is caused by the
reaction of iron carbides in the
boiler tube steel with hydrogen pro-
duced as a result of corrosion reac-
tions, particularly those taking place
in low pH water. The combination
produces methane (CH4) at the
grain boundaries of the tube steel.
As the relatively large, insoluble
methane gas molecules accumu-
late, they force open microfissures
in the metal. Concurrently, local
decarburization results in a loss of
material strength. The fissuring
worsens, eventually leading to
through-wall failure.
Hydrogen damage is one of the
most disturbing of boiler tube failure
mechanisms as its cause and pre-
vention have been well understood
for over 15 years and yet it remains
one of the leading causes of avail-
ability loss in the United States. This
is in direct contrast to the interna-
tional experience base where hydro-
gen damage, as well as many of the
other chemistry-related boiler tube
failures, are extremely rare.1
Hydrogen damage, also called
hydrogen attack, results in serious
and irreparable damage to the tube
steel and should not be confused
with “hydrogen embrittlement” which
is a reversible adsorption of hydro-
gen into steel.
Hydrogen damage is one of three
under-deposit corrosion mecha-
nisms, along with acid phosphate
corrosion, Chapter 16, and caustic
gouging, Chapter 17. The three
waterside underdeposit corrosion
mechanisms are superficially similar
which means that attention to more
subtle distinguishing features must
be made. The root causes are vastly
different and thus the routes to pre-
vent repeat failures are also differ-
ent. The distinctions are discussed
in the Chapters for each mecha-
nism, however, reference can also
be made to Chapter 7, Volume 1 for
a more detailed discussion of the
features that distinguish the three.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
Hydrogen Damage:
Identification Keys
1. Damage can occur with little
or no wall thinning, but in most
cases some metal wastage
will occur, which is manifested
by a large pit or gouge on the
inside surface of the tube and
often covered by a multi-lay-
ered magnetite deposit.
2. The final failure will be thick-
edged, and have an embrit-
tled appearance.
3. Distinctive microstructural
changes in the tube steel are
decarburization initially around
the pearlite and then spread-
ing, and microfissuring leading
to intergranular cracking.
4. Thick deposits will generally
be found, sometimes contain-
ing chloride, near to the
scale/metal interface and
oxide layers.
15-2 Hydrogen Damage
1.1 Features of failure
A key macroscopic feature that dis-
tinguishes hydrogen damage from
otherwise similar mechanisms is a
thick-edged, brittle, final fracture. An
example is shown in Figure 15-1.
This occurs because the tube has
been weakened by decarburization
and micro-fissuring and, as a result,
failure is often violent with complete
sections of tube blown out; rectan-
gular sections called “window open-
ings” are common.
Damage can occur with little or no
apparent wall thinning, but in most
cases some metal wastage will
occur; a large pit or gouge will then
result which may be covered by a
multi-layered magnetite deposit.
Such deposits are often massive
near the fracture, but may also be
missing upon metallographic analy-
sis because of the violence of the
failure event.
On a microscopic basis, there are
several unique features that are con-
sistent with hydrogen damage. As
noted in the introduction to this
chapter, hydrogen damage is
caused by the reaction of iron car-
Figure 15-1. Hydrogen damage window opening and thick-edged failure.
Source: D.E. Hendrix.
bide with hydrogen which produces
methane (CH4) at the grain bound-
aries of the tube steel. As the rela-
tively large methane gas molecules
accumulate, they open up microfis-
sures in the metal. These microfis-
sures are a key means of distin-
guishing hydrogen damage, particu-
larly from the other underdeposit
corrosion mechanisms, in which the
microfissuring does not occur. The
concurrent local decarburization is a
further confirmation that hydrogen
damage has occurred.
Deposits will consist of multi-lami-
nated oxide with alternating layers
of dense and porous magnetite,
Figure 15-2. In this form the mag-
netite is non-protective. Chloride, if
present in the multi-layered deposit,
is also a key indicator of hydrogen
damage. Figure 15-3 shows the
results of EDAX analysis of the
microsection of Figure 15-2, and
indicates the distinctive Cl peak
typical of hydrogen damage.
Unalloyed carbon steel tube materi-
als (SA-178, SA-192 and SA-210 for
example) are most susceptible
because of the ease of dissolution
of iron carbides and the diffusion of
carbon to grain boundaries where
they react with hydrogen to form
methane, with eventual microfissur-
ing and concurrent decarburization.
In contrast, for example, chromium-
containing materials are not as
susceptible because the carbides
are much more stable. Hydrogen
damage has been identified in
11/4 Cr - 1/2 Mo (T11) steel.3
Some of the superficial features of
hydrogen damage are similar to
those of the other waterside under-
deposit corrosion mechanisms. As a
result, it can be difficult to distin-
guish the corrosion caused by
hydrogen damage from the superfi-
cially similar caustic gouging or acid
phosphate corrosion. The key differ-
ences between the mechanisms are
discussed in Chapter 7, Volume 1.
Briefly, the most telling determinants
of hydrogen damage will be the met-
allography of deposits and the dete-
rioration of the tube microstructure.
Hydrogen damage is also distin-
guished from either of the other two
mechanisms in that they tend to be
ductile final failures, preceded by
significant wall thinning whereas
hydrogen damage tends to be a brit-
tle final failure with less wall thinning.

Figure 15-2 Typical multilaminated magnetite scale and subsurface microcracking associated with hydrogen damage.
Source: J. Hickey, ESB Ireland2

Figure 15-3. Results of EDAX analysis near to metal/oxide interface

of specimen shown in Figure 15-2, showing distinctive Cl peak
resulting with hydrogen damage. Source: J. Hickey, ESB Ireland2

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-3

1.2 Locations of failure Table 15-1
Figure 15-4 shows an overview of Local Tube Conditions Which
boiler regions where hydrogen dam- Can Lead to Initial Deposits
age is most likely to occur. Table 15-
Locations where the water/fluid flow
1 lists the specific characteristics of
susceptible locations; localized adjacent to the tube wall is disrupted
areas with these characteristics are • Welded joints such as:
also susceptible to caustic gouging • Joints with backing rings
and acid phosphate corrosion. • Poor repair welds such as pad welds,
On a given tube, the failure by “canoe” pieces or window welds
hydrogen damage will generally initi- • Poor weld overlay (penetrating to the
ate on the hot (heat adsorption) side inside surface)
of the tube because boiling occurs • Locations with existing internal deposits
on this side. The higher heat transfer caused by:
rates cause faster deposition rates
• A deposition mechanism
of feedwater corrosion products,
locally generated corrosion prod- • Deposits left from improper chemical
ucts, and acidic contaminants. cleaning
• Locally high heat flux
• Locally high steam quality
• Geometric features
• Bends around burners or openings
• Sharp changes of direction (such as
the nose of the furnace)
• Tubes bending off lower headers and
Figure 15-4. Typical locations of hydro- drums
gen damage
Locations with a high heat flux
Locations where boiling first initiates
Locations with thermal-hydraulic flow
disruptions
• Locations with local very high steam
quality
• Locations with horizontal or inclined tub-
ing heated from above or below
Localized overheating of the tube (fireside
conditions)
• Flame impingement
• Burner misalignment
• Operating conditions such as overfiring or
underfiring, gas channeling, or inadequate
circulation rates
• Major change in fuel source, such as
higher BTU value coal, dual firing with
gas, changeover to oil or gas firing where
heat flux increases.

15-4 Hydrogen Damage

2. Mechanism of Failure
Hydrogen Damage: Mechanism
1. Hydrogen damage requires a
breakdown of the protective
magnetite.
2. Hydrogen damage requires
both the presence of deposits
and a source of low pH conta-
mination; neither acting alone
will cause hydrogen damage,
although each may cause
other boiler tube and/or unit
problems.
3. Hydrogen damage affects, in
an irreversible manner, the
microstructure and strength of
the tube steel.
2.1 Introduction
Hydrogen damage will not occur in
a boiler tube until the normal operat-
ing condition in a tube breaks down;
a breakdown situation consisting of
both deposits and concentration of
impurities must occur. 4-6
Under normal conditions, boiler
water flow through the tube is con-
tinuous and a magnetite layer is
formed that protects the tube from
chemical attack. The manner in
which magnetite scale is modified or
affected by various contaminant
species will determine how the vari-
ous damage types are manifested.
Hydrogen damage requires a locally
acidic environment which affects
both the mechanism of magnetite
growth and its rate.
Potter and Mann7 found that protec-
tive two-layer magnetite scale grows
parabolically on mild steel in moder-
ate solutions of sodium hydroxide.
This has subsequently been found
for the other cycle chemistries as
well. These two layers grow essen-
tially stress-free. The inner layer of
the two layers was found to be
porous by Field, et al.8 In contrast,
in the presence of acidic solutions,
Potter and Mann9 found that the oxi-
dation rate of mild steel becomes lin-
ear (non-protective); in this mode the
oxide layers are not grown in a
stress-free configuration and the total
oxide consists of multi-layers of mag-
netite. That is, the oxide growth
process is affected both mechani-
cally and chemically for the case of
acidic contamination.10
The manner by which the normal
magnetite scale is affected is one of
the characteristics that distinguishes
hydrogen damage from either caus-
tic gouging or acid phosphate corro-
sion. For the latter two mechanisms
the increase in corrosion rate is
caused by the removal of protective
oxide by a fluxing reaction due to
the concentrated caustic or phos-
phate solutions at the base of the
deposit, adjacent to the tube wall.
2.2 The development of hydro-
gen damage
Departure from design boiler water
flow conditions can occur locally in
a waterwall tube by any of a number
of factors, such as those listed in
Table 15-1. Such conditions lead to
local areas of high steam quality,
deposition and concentration of
acidic (chloride) contaminants, and
the resultant changes to the protec-
tive oxide as discussed above.
Figure 15-5 is a schematic repre-
sentation of how this process can
occur. The local flow disrupter
causes the normal nucleate boiling
process to be disrupted and a local
steam blanket or bubble is formed.
This local area is intermittently dried
and then rinsed, and it may be at a
slightly higher temperature than the
surrounding area which is cooled by
the flowing water. This process will
cause dissolved or suspended
solids to begin to be deposited just
downstream of the flow disruption
and on the hot side of the tube.
Such deposits might consist of feed-
water corrosion products such as
copper, nickel, and iron oxides.
These deposits can further cause
flow disturbance, lead to poor heat
transfer, and eventually destroy the
protective nature of the magnetite.
Note that if these deposits are
excessive, they can lead to a num-
ber of BTF mechanisms in waterwall
tubes such as fireside corrosion,
short- and long-term overheating.
However, it should be noted that by
themselves, such deposits are not
sufficient to cause hydrogen dam-
age to initiate in the boiler tube.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-5
a Protective
Fe3O4

(1)

Heavy
deposits

Region of
FeCl2 'influence'
Local steam
blanket or

Boiler
Water

Tube wall
bubble

Flow disrupter
(backing ring)
(2)
Time

Boiler water
Thick deposits
(Cu, Ni, Fe + Cl)
(3)
a
Figure 15-5. Schematic of the mechanism of steam bubble formation and initial depo-
sition. For illustration, the flow disruption here is shown as a backing ring; it could be
caused by any of the factors listed in Table 15-1.

Multi-laminated (porous
and non-porous) Fe3O4

Steel Tube wall

Figure 15-6. Schematic of the development of laminated oxides and hydrogen damage

In the area of the deposits, a

process such as wick boiling will
concentrate any anions that are pre-
sent in the water, for example, chlo-
rides or sulfates. This highly local-
ized acidic contamination will, in
conjunction with the forming
deposits, lead to hydrogen damage.
Although a precursor to hydrogen
damage, by itself, acidic contamina-
tion is not sufficient to cause hydro-
gen damage. Note also that tests
reported in 1974 by Ashford,
Garnsey and Mann11 indicated that
acid chlorides can form at a metal
surface even when the bulk water
pH is alkaline.

15-6 Hydrogen Damage

The local condition in the tube is
now conducive to hydrogen dam-
age; it contains deposits, a source
of acid contamination, and a means
of concentrating both. A cross-sec-
tion through the forming deposits
would show an upper layer of the
deposited feedwater corrosion prod-
ucts (Fe, Cu, Ni, etc.) with the
underlying, distinctive multi-lami-
nated growth of Fe3O4, and a layer
of FeCl2 “influence”. This process is
shown schematically in Figure 15-6.
Unfortunately, although the oxide
continues to grow according to:
3 Fe + 4 H2O ® Fe3O4 + 4 H2
(15-1)
the mechanism of oxide growth
changes. The presence of the con-
centrated chloride changes the con-
trolling step. The normal counter-flux
mechanism, described in Chapter 2,
Volume 1 (see Figure 2-4), is modi-
fied so that although oxygen ions
(O2-) continue to diffuse inwards,
there is no counter diffusion of Fe2+
outward. Oxide, instead of forming
at two locations and in a stress-free
state, now forms only at the inter-
face of the boiler tube metal and
inner oxide and its formation is now
under stress. At a critical level the
stressed oxide layer will delaminate
resulting in a repetitive cycle of lin-
ear growth, then delamination.
A second effect is that all hydrogen
generation now occurs at the tube
metal surface. Figure 17-7a shows
the resulting electrochemical cell
with diffusion of hydrogen into the
tube steel. This is contrasted in
Figure 17-7b with the case for caus-
tic gouging where hydrogen gas
diffuses mainly into the boiler water.
The hydrogen atoms react with iron
carbide (Fe3C) in the pearlite com-
ponent of the steel to form methane
according to:
Fe3C + 4 H « 3 Fe + CH4
(15-2)
As methane is a fairly large mole-
cule, it does not easily diffuse
through the material, pressure
builds up and microfissuring begins
at the grain boundaries. Figure 15-7
shows the distinctive microstructure
that results. In that figure, the mater-
ial nearest the inner surface shows
more advanced microcracking than
those areas farther removed from
the source of hydrogen. Usually, but
not always, the microcracking is
accompanied by a general, local-
ized decarburization of the pearlite.
The lower strength, microcracked
material is now susceptible to failure.
Masterson, et al.10 emphasized that
in order to give comparable corro-
sion rates, sodium hydroxide must
concentrate by a factor of ten to one
hundred times more strongly than
acid chloride. This explains the seri-
ousness of an ingress of acid such
Figure 15-7. Appearance of intergranular hydrogen fissures beneath the deposit in a region with moderate corrosion.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.12
as from a breakdown in the water
treatment or makeup system. Acidic
contamination can lead to very rapid
corrosion rates (> 10 mm/year)
which contrasts with caustic conta-
mination which shows lesser but still
significant rates of attack (up to 2
mm/year).13
Finally, it is important to note that
hydrogen damage will not occur
under areas of active caustic goug-
ing and/or acid phosphate corrosion
because of the contrasting effects
on the protective oxide of these
damage types. As discussed at
length above, hydrogen damage
results from the change of the mech-
anism of oxide growth whereas a
fluxing of the protective oxide is a
precursor to caustic gouging and
acid phosphate corrosion. This is
not to say that hydrogen damage
cannot occur in boilers treated with
caustic or phosphate treatments; if
acid contamination occurs with
these treatments and the other con-
ditions (flow disruption, steam blan-
keting, deposition and concentra-
tion) exist, then hydrogen damage
can occur.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-7
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Hydrogen Damage:
Root Causes
1. Excessive deposits usually ini-
tiated by a flow disruption,
thermal-hydraulic condition,
and/or exacerbated by fire-
side impingement or burner
misalignment are half of the
root cause equation.
2. The other half is a source of
acidic contamination. The
most common sources are: (i)
small condenser leaks over
many months, (ii) a large con-
denser leak leading to a large
ingress of contaminated water
such as in units using sea
water for cooling, (iii) break-
down allowing acidic regener-
ation chemicals to enter the
boiler from the water treatment
plant or condensate polisher,
or (iv) an improper chemical
cleaning process.
15-8 Hydrogen Damage
3.1 Introduction
Both deposits and acid contamina-
tion are required to initiate hydrogen
damage.4-6 Although neither alone
will lead to hydrogen damage, each
can cause damage to boiler tubes
via other mechanisms and should
be prevented.
Perhaps the most common con-
tributing features of the root cause
are: a “dirty” boiler, leading to exten-
sive deposits, followed by a low pH
excursion. This combination is
almost always prevalent among
those utilities reporting significant
hydrogen damage problems includ-
ing those shown in Case Study I
appearing later in this chapter.
However, hydrogen damage can
occur as a result of a number of fac-
tors. Table 15-2 summaries the
potential root causes, the actions that
are needed to confirm the root cause,
and corrective actions. This section
provides additional discussion about
each; note that there are separate
discussions for deposits and contam-
ination although both must be pre-
sent to cause hydrogen damage.
3.2 Influence of excessive
deposits
Deposition is normally most pro-
nounced in areas where boiling first
initiates and in areas of maximum
heat flux. These are normally the
areas of thickest deposit and where
underdeposit corrosion is likely to
initiate. Additionally, excessive
deposits can form when the local
boiler water flow is disrupted by one
or more causes as listed in Table
15-1. Independent of their source,
the following actions can confirm if
this is an operative root cause of the
problem:
(a). Analysis of results from cycle
chemistry monitoring and instrumen-
tation to determine the level of corro-
sion products entering the boiler at
the economizer inlet. Particularly
important indicators of corrosion
product transport that cause deposit
formation are Fe and Cu levels at
the economizer inlet; other factors
that affect the cleanliness of the
cycle chemistry are levels of pH,
cation conductivity, and oxygen.
Normal guidance is to keep the iron
level below 5 ppb and copper
below 2 ppb at the economizer inlet.
(b). Selective boiler waterwall tube
sampling from suspect regions to
measure deposition. Examples of
possible locations are indicated in
Table 15-1. Tube sampling practices
and test methods are briefly sum-
marized in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
(c). Check the efficacy of prior
chemical cleaning operations, such
as for the remnants of scab-like
deposits, to determine whether an
appropriate frequency is being used
or whether the boiler has been
allowed to exceed the guideline val-
ues which are summarized in
Chapter 4, Volume 1.
Specific areas of preferential depo-
sition include those of geometric
flow disruption and fireside condi-
tions addressed in order below.
3.2.1 Flow disruption. Typical
causes of flow disruption are
included in Table 15-1. In several of
these locations there can be a strati-
fication of steam to the top of the
tube and water to the bottom. The
condition termed “steam blanketing”
can lead to higher tube wall temper-
atures where the steam phase
occurs, leading to faster deposition
rates, as well as accelerated corro-
sion and deposition at the interface
between the two phases. Potential
for steam blanketing to occur is
highest when the velocity of the fluid
is not high enough to maintain tur-
bulence and produce thorough mix-
ing, such as at low loads and full
pressure. Stepped and bathtub pat-
terns of corrosion are characteristic
when local areas are experiencing
steam blanketing.
Table 15-2
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.2 Influence of Excessive Deposits

(a). Analysis of results from chemistry
monitors mainly for levels of Fe and Cu.
(b). Selective tube sampling for deposit
measurement.
(c). Check the efficacy of chemical cleaning.
• See long-term actions.
• Optimize chemical cleaning procedures.
See summary of practices in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
• Keep deposits to an acceptable level.
See guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
• Minimize feedwater corrosion products
through control of chemistry, particu-
larly pH and O2 scavenger additions;
Fe < 5 ppb and Cu < 2 ppb at econo-
mizer inlet. See also Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
• Monitor for effectiveness of chemistry
control

3.2.1 Flow disruption: (d). Boiler inspection for susceptible sites • See long-term actions. • Remove all pad welds.
- weld backing bar/ring (e). Sampling for distinctive “bathtub ring” • Replace weld repairs, canoe piece
- poor weld geometry, deposits. repairs, as needed to ensure good flow
pad welds, canoe piece (f). Circulation testing. conditions.
repairs, etc. • Remove weld backing rings.
- deposits • Modify tube geometry.
- locally high heat flux • Use rifled tubing if other primary
or steam quality measures are unsuccessful.
- bends or sharp • Design modifications, as needed.
changes in tube
direction
- horizontal or near
horizontal tubing
- local regions of DNB

3.2.2 Fireside Conditions (g). Inspect furnace wall for evidence of • Adjust burners, etc. • Periodic re-inspection for proper
- flame impingement flame impingement. burner alignment.
- burner misalignment (h). Check burner operation for possible
- major change in fuel direct flame impingement.
source (i). Measure heat flux at selected locations.

3.3 Influence of Acidic Contamination

• Depending upon sever- • Implement appropriate chemistry
ity, initiate established guidelines and instrumentation. See
procedures for unit shut- Chapter 3, Volume 1.
down and chemically • Install appropriate control room
clean, as needed. alarms.

3.3.1 Condenser leaks – (j). Review chemistry control logs to deter- • Same as above • If levels were outside their control
minor but occurring mine if and when impurities were limits, correct with procedural
over an extended period. excessive changes, training or equipment repairs.
• If levels were not outside control limits,
investigate for hideout mechanisms
such as steam blanketing in sloping
tubes. Fix or modify as needed.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-9

Table 15-2
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions (continued)
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.3.2 Condenser leaks - (k). Confirm from chemistry control logs, • Immediate shutdown of • Hardware or procedural changes to
major ingress, generally especially the extent and depth of pH unit, confirm pH depres- prevent a recurrence.
one serious event. depression sion, and chemical clean. • Alarm in control room with at least min-
imum level of instrumentation. See
guidance in Chapter 3, Volume 1.

3.3.3 Water treatment plant or (l). Evaluate results from and reliability of • Remove unit from • As above.
condensate polisher monitoring and alarm systems, particu- service and chemically
regeneration chemical larly for cation conductivity. clean, clean up water
upset leading to low chemistry.
pH condition

3.3.4 Errors in chemical
cleaning process
(m). Review chemistry logs during cleaning • Depending upon severity, .• Initiate chemical clean procedures and
and rinsing. initiate established pro- guidelines recommendations.
(n). Borescope examination to check the cedures for unit shut-
efficacy of the chemical cleaning. down and re-clean as
needed.

Smaller and more local areas of
steam blanketing can also be initi-
ated by local features such as tube
laps, backing rings and even
deposits. These areas may be as
small as a few millimeters in diameter.
Actions to confirm will generally be
indirect and focus on whether
deposits have begun to form or
whether the necessary pre-existing
conditions for deposition exist; that
is, actions should be taken to deter-
mine the cleanliness of the waterwall
tubes. In addition to those actions
listed in (a) through (c) above, addi-
tional steps may include:
(d). Examine boiler and mainte-
nance history for evidence of poten-
tial flow disruption sites particularly
pad welds, canoe pieces, poor
repairs, etc.
(e). Sampling for distinctive “bath-
tub ring” deposits, especially on
tubes that are not vertical.
(f). Circulation testing has also
been suggested as a means to
measure directly individual waterwall
tube flow rates, heat fluxes, and
metal temperatures as a function of
load level.
3.2.2 Fireside conditions such as
flame impingement, burner misalign-
ment, or a major change in fuel
source. Fireside conditions can
allow deposits of feedwater corro-
sion products to form rapidly at high
steaming rates and high metal tem-
peratures. Higher steam rates and
tube temperatures can also be
experienced with a major change in
fuel source, such as (i) changing to
a higher BTU value coal, (ii) some
necessary (forced) dual firing with
gas, or (iii) changeover to oil- or
gas-firing where the local heat flux is
dramatically increased.
Note that such conditions can also
lead to other boiler tube failure
mechanisms such as thermally
induced departure from nucleate
boiling, overheating, and subse-
quent premature failure by creep.
Actions to confirm consist of:
(g). Inspect furnace water wall slag
patterns for evidence of flame
impingement.
(h). Check burner operation for
direct flame impingement on the
(side) water wall.
(i). Measure heat flux at selected
locations.
3.3 Influence of acid contami-
nation
3.3.1 Small condenser leaks over
an extended period. Small leaks of
around 10 ppm or greater of chloride
measured in the boiler water can
cause a problem in less than one
year.14 The allowable level is a func-
tion of the operating pressure of the
unit and the chemical treatment type.
An example, showing the normal lev-
els, and three action levels is pro-
vided in Figure 15-8.

15-10 Hydrogen Damage

 Actions to confirm will include:
Chloride (ppm Cl) (j). Review plant chemistry control
20 logs, on-line cycle chemistry
records, or instrumentation alarms
such as sodium analyzers, for evi-
dence of the presence of chloride
Action level 3
10
over an extended period (typically, a
9 minimum of two years). In particular,
8 the pH, cation conductivity, and oxy-
7 gen levels at the economizer inlet
6 should be reviewed. Determine if,
Action level 2 and when, the impurity levels were
5
excessive for chlorides or for sul-
4 fates in the case of contamination
from water treatment plant or con-
3 densate polisher regeneration. This
Action level 1 action is important because if levels
were outside the control limits, but
2 could have been detected, then cor-
rective measures such as proce-
dural changes, training or equip-
ment repairs are needed. On the
Normal
other hand, if levels were not
1.0 detectable outside of the control lim-
0.9 its, investigation of hideout mecha-
0.8
nisms like steam blanketing in slope
0.7
tubes should be initiated.
0.6
0.5
3.3.2 A large ingress of contami-
0.4 nated water such as a large con-
denser leak especially an ingress of
0.3 sea water. Such a major contamina-
tion event will probably have led to
a boiler water pH depression.
0.2
Therefore actions to confirm will
include:
(k). Examine records of pH levels,
other instrumentation alarms, plant
0.1 control logs, and other available
900 1100 1300 1500 1700 1900 2100 2300 2500 2700 2900 3000 information. This action is required
Pressure (psia) to determine the appropriate correc-
tive measures; in particular, the
actions required for pH < 8.0 during
Figure 15-8. An example of action levels for boiler water chloride versus operating full load operation should have been
pressure. This example is for drum boilers with reheat using phosphate treatment. to shut the unit down, confirm the
Source: R.B. Dooley, et al.15 source of the pH depression, and to
examine the need to chemical
clean.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-11

3.3.3 Water treatment plant upset
such as breakdown of makeup
water treatment systems (ingress of
demineralizer regeneration acid into
boiler) or condensate polisher
regeneration, leading to a low pH
condition As noted above, ingress of
sulfuric acid that is used to regener-
ate ion exchange resins of conden-
sate polishers or of makeup water
can be a source of contamination.
Problems with water treatment plant
may also be initiated by mechanical
failure, such as valves, and should
normally be detected quickly by
conductivity monitors or alarms in
the feedwater train; however, opera-
tor error or poor maintenance can
15-12 Hydrogen Damage
cause the alarms to be unreliable.14
Actions to confirm include:
(l). Evaluate results from, and relia-
bility of, monitoring systems and
alarms, particularly of cation con-
ductivity measurements. As with
condenser leaks, it is important to
determine whether existing controls
detected the ingress in order to
apply the proper correction.
3.3.4 Errors in chemical cleaning
process. Often chemical cleanings
are not properly executed; as a
result, they may leave deposits of
more than 10 mg/cm2 on regions of
the water wall. Further, if rinses are
performed improperly some acid
can remain in “hideout”. If this
occurs, when the unit is returned to
service either one large spike can
be observed in pH or a number of
spikes can occur over the next few
weeks. Actions to confirm whether
this is a possible root cause include:
(m). Review of chemistry logs dur-
ing cleaning and rinsing stages, and
critical examination of instrumenta-
tion to ensure that pH depression
after chemical cleaning would be
detected.
(n). Borescope examination to
check the efficacy of the chemical
cleanings.
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
Hydrogen damage occurs at a
microstructural level and therefore
simple non-destructive inspection
methods are not available. Detection
options can be based on evaluating
for: (i) wastage and wall thinning,
particularly that associated with pit-
ting and gouging in conjunction with
hydrogen damage, (ii) the presence
of micro-fissuring at grain bound-
aries, or (iii) the changed tube mate-
rial properties. Prior to about 1980,
radiographic testing (RT) was the
primary method used to detect wall
thinning associated with hydrogen
damage. RT had the disadvantages
of being extremely time consuming
and expensive. Ultrasonic testing
(UT) methods were developed dur-
ing the 1980s to measure the attenu-
ation associated with grain bound-
ary cavitation. A number of success-
ful applications have been
reported16; however the method was
not fully satisfactory because of its
Hydrogen damage
Transmitter
Figure 15-9. Schematic of the ultrasonic velocity change technique to detect hydro-
gen damage. Source: G.A. Lamping and S. Gehl16
sensitivity to various factors includ-
ing surface condition (roughness),
corrosion, pitting and transducer
coupling.
As a result of these shortcomings a
UT method based on velocity
changes has been developed.16-19
The method relies on the observa-
tion that the velocity of sound
through a material is a function of its
modulus of elasticity; a material
property that is changed by the
accumulation of hydrogen damage.
The basics of the method are illus-
trated in Figure 15-9. A pair of trans-
ducers are operated in the pitch-
catch mode. As the signal passes
through a damaged region, the
change in transit time is noted; that
change can then be related to the
depth of hydrogen damage. Both
laboratory and field tests have con-
firmed the usefulness of the
method.16, 17
Corrosion
Receiver
Normal ID
Tube sampling is performed as an
aid to root cause determination/con-
firmation and to provide both quali-
tative and quantitative information
about the type, extent and thickness
of deposits. Sampling practices and
test methods are summarized in
Chapter 9, Volume 1; metallurgical
procedures to analyze such samples
are summarized in Chapter 6,
Volume 1.
Macroetching of a tube section with
a 50 percent heated solution of
hydrochloric acid has been used to
confirm the presence of hydrogen
damage. The damaged metal is
readily etched and will show a visi-
ble darkening and porosity in the
affected material. It is recommended
however, that microstructural exami-
nation be used instead as it will pro-
vide a more precise confirmation of
hydrogen damage. Bend tests of
sections to detect damage have
been recommended in the past20
but have not been found to provide
sufficient information to justify their
use.
Finally, in those cases where it is
suspected that there may be wide-
spread hydrogen damage or unde-
tected locations of excessive wall
thinning a hydrostatic test to 1.5
times operating pressure can pro-
vide reasonable assurance of the
condition of the waterwall tubes prior
to placing the unit back into service.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-13
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Hydrogen Damage: Immediate
Solutions and Actions
1. In the case of a major contam-
ination event, such as where
pH was depressed below 8
under full operating condi-
tions, immediately remove unit
from service and chemically
clean.
2. Effect necessary repairs or
tube replacements.
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of
Repeat Failures
Hydrogen Damage:
Long-Term Actions
1. Minimize deposits by keeping
the boiler clean and taking
steps to reduce the ingress of
feedwater corrosion products.
2. Initiate chemistry control mea-
sures to ensure, to the great-
est extent possible, that acid
contamination does not go
undetected in the cycle.
3. Other actions include minimiz-
ing the sources for flow dis-
ruption, ensuring proper fire-
side conditions, adjusting
operating procedures to pre-
vent hot spot formation, etc.
15-14 Hydrogen Damage
Table 15-2 includes a summary of
immediate solutions and actions.
The primary imperative is to react
immediately to contaminant ingress.
Procedures should be in place by
which action levels and shutdown
levels have been established for
cycle chemistry contamination. For
example a typical procedure might
state: “The unit should be immedi-
ately shutdown, removed from ser-
vice and chemically cleaned prior to
being placed back in service if a pH
level of less than 8.0 occurred for
more than one hour during full load
steaming”.
Obvious direct causes such as the
mechanical failure of a pump, or
major condenser tube leaks should
be rectified prior to start-up.
If significant wall thinning has
occurred, tube replacement to pre-
vent ductile failure will be necessary.
Repair and replacement procedures
for boiler tubes are summarized in
Prevention of hydrogen damage
includes steps to minimize the for-
mation of deposits and ensuring that
the possibility of acidic contamina-
tion is minimized. Table 15-2
includes a summary of the long-term
actions that can be considered as a
function of each of the root causes.
Since both deposits and acidic cont-
amination are required to initiate
hydrogen damage, the impact of
unforeseen events such as con-
denser leaks or water treatment plant
breakdowns can be minimized by
having cleaner waterwall tubing.
Keeping the boiler clean and
deposits to an acceptably low level is
a major preventive step for this and a
number of other failure mechanisms.
An optimized chemical cleaning pro-
gram can be a critical part of the
prevention of failures by hydrogen
damage. An overview of deposition
Chapter 11, Volume 1. It is most
important that hydrogen damage is
not repaired locally by the use of
pad welding or canoe/window
welds. Penetration of the repair to
the tube ID can disrupt the boiler
water flow and start the hydrogen
damage cycle again. These repair
methods can also result in copper
embrittlement and failure.
It is important that all tubing with
hydrogen damage and/or significant
wall loss be replaced since these
regions are especially susceptible to
chloride or sulfate hideout and, as a
result, on-going corrosion/hydrogen
damage.
Most of the other actions to be
taken, such as removing sources of
flow disruption (improperly executed
repair welds, and discontinuities
introduced by pad welds, etc.) can
be taken at the next outage as dis-
cussed in the next section.
levels and procedures for chemical
cleaning are provided in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
A significant effort has gone into
developing specific cycle chemistry
targets, action levels and shutdown
policies to maintain good boiler
cleanliness. Available guidelines
and information sources are dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 3,
Volume 1. As a minimum, normal tar-
gets, action levels, and shutdown
limits should be developed for each
boiler. It is also extremely important
that the feedwater chemistry is opti-
mized. Among a number of key fac-
tors, optimizing the use of oxygen
scavengers is of paramount impor-
tance in controlling feedwater corro-
sion products at the economizer
inlet. At least the minimum level of
instrumentation should be imple-
mented, such as outlined in Chapter
3, Volume 1.
Where possible, modifications
should be made to prevent flow dis-
ruptions in those locations where ini-
tiation of the deposition process can
eventually lead to hydrogen dam-
age. Such modifications might
include for example, elimination of
weld backing rings or other internal
surface contour irregularities. Also
all pad welds, “canoe” section or
window weld repairs should be
removed. These steps represent
good practice even if hydrogen
damage has not been a problem, as
they can lead to several other BTF
mechanisms. Further, design modifi-
cations to eliminate inadequate cir-
culation and the resultant steam
blanketing may also be required.
Internally-ribbed or rifled tubing can
create more turbulence in the nor-
mal flow conditions and thus main-
tain nucleate boiling on the wall.
This lessens the chance of local
steam blanketing, buildup of
deposits, and wick-boiling. If flow
problems are the principal root
cause of the problem the use of
rifled tubing may be appropriate;
however such a step does not obvi- be made with a material that is not
ate the necessity for control of cycle as susceptible to hydrogen dam-
chemistry. age. For example in T11 tubing (11/4
Cr - 1/2 Mo) the carbon is bound to
Modification of boiler operating con-
Cr in a more stable manner than in
ditions such as excessive overfiring
Fe3C, and therefore decarburization
or underfiring, misaligned burners,
and methane formation is restricted.
gas channeling, and inadequate cir-
Reliance on material substitution
culation rates may be required to
should be considered a secondary
mitigate local thermal hydraulic
choice after a cleaner boiler and
upsets. Furnace wall slag pattern
eliminating the sources of acid cont-
observation, burner inspection and
amination.
adjustment to prevent flame
impingement, and identification of In summary, the long-term preven-
burner misalignment, should be a tion of hydrogen damage will involve
part of normal periodic inspection minimizing root causes and will
practice. Certainly, if any of these include: keeping a clean boiler, hav-
has been a root cause for observed ing procedures for dealing with
hydrogen damage, immediate cor- major breakdown in cycle chemistry,
rection of the problem is indicated. ensuring that chemical cleaning pro-
cedures are effective and performed
Analysis of deposits found on the
on the required basis, controlling
waterside of tube samples can help
boiler chloride levels, avoiding flame
determine the extent of deposition
impingement or burner misalign-
and the likelihood of a developing
ment, and eliminating weld protru-
hydrogen damage problem. Chapter
sions and other features that can
9, Volume 1 provides more detail
disrupt the local boiler water flow.
about tube sampling procedures.
It should be possible to operate
practically every unit without hydro-
gen damage; however, it is also
possible that tube replacement can
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-15
7. Case Studies

Hydrogen Damage
Case Study I: Field Experience

Five utilities were visited during
1991-1992. All five were experi-
encing hydrogen damage. Table
15-3 illustrates that some features
were common to each incidence.
These same precursors to hydro-
gen damage are all-too-pervasive
in many U.S. utilities.21 As illus-
trated in the Table:
1. Hydrogen damage had been
present in all units for periods
ranging from 5-7 years.
2. All boilers were very dirty with
internal deposits in some
reaching over 100 g/ft2 (107
mg/cm2).
3. The levels of feedwater corro-
sion products at the econo-
mizer inlet were in most cases
reported to be at least an order
of magnitude over the EPRI
guideline22 values of 10 ppb Fe
and 2 ppb Cu.
4. In four of the five cases, fre-
quent condenser leaks of seri-
ous magnitude occurred which
introduced between 20-30 ppm
of chloride into the boiler water.
Over the years these levels
could by themselves cause
hydrogen damage in such dirty
boilers as indicated in item 2
above.
5. Hydrogen damage was initiated
in each case by an incidence of
water treatment plant break-
down, where regeneration chem-
icals were inadvertently intro-
duced into the boiler and the pH
was depressed to below 7.
6. None of the units were removed
from service and chemically
cleaned after the contamination
from water treatment plant or
condenser inleakage to remove
contaminants or feedwater cor-
rosion products.
7. None of the plants had devel-
oped a comprehensive set of
operating guidelines which
included action levels and shut-
down limits.
8. None of the plants had the mini-
mum levels of instrumentation
(Chapter 3, Volume 1) for pH,
conductivity, oxygen, phosphate
and hydrazine. Most took grab
samples once a day for these
parameters.
9. Only two of the five plants had a
qualified plant chemist.

Table 15-3
Hydrogen Damage Case Study I: Summary of Root Cause Similarities in Field Failures
Was there a Was Unit
Was There Major Ingress Removed Was there Were there
How Long Had Fe (ppb) Cu (ppb) a Continuing from a Water from an Effort to Guidelines for
Hydrogen Damage at at Condenser Treatment Plant Service Clean Up Instrumentation
Plant Been a Problem? Econ. Inlet Econ. Inlet Leak Problem? Breakdown? and Cleaned System? and Control?

A 7 years – >20 Yes Yes No No No

B 7 years – >20 Yes No No No

C 5 years 20-30 20-40 Yes Yes No No No

pH<5
2-500 ppm Cl

D 5 years – – Yes No No No

E 7 years >20 Yes Yes No No No

15-16 Hydrogen Damage

7. Case Studies (continued)
Hydrogen Damage
Case Study II: Preliminary Analysis of Failed Tubes
This case study illustrates some of
the early screening steps (visual,
metallographic and chemical
analysis) and their results from an
investigation into a tube failure
caused by hydrogen damage.
Failure Location: The tube seg-
ment was removed from the lower
slope region of a controlled circula-
tion boiler. The boiler used all
volatile treatment.
Visual Examination: The entire
inside surface exhibited pitting. On
the cold side, the pitting was
rounded and elongated in the axial
direction as shown in Figure 15-10.
The approximate lengths of the pits
were 0.25 mm (0.01 in.) (rounded)
to 3.81 mm (0.15 in) (elongated).
The hot side of the tube (Figures
15-11 and 15-12) contained deep
axial corrosion pits and waterside
corrosion which was exhibited over
an 80° arc. Wall loss was mea-
sured at about 0.76 mm (0.03
inches) of a nominal 5.08 mm (0.20
inch) thick wall. There was a small
amount of copper-colored deposit
on top of what appeared to be
black, indigenous iron oxide.
Metallography: Metallographic
samples were prepared from both
the hot and cold sides of the tube.
The hot side exhibited very exten-
sive intergranular fissuring as
shown in Figure 15-13. The cracks
extended about 60% of the remain-
ing wall thickness. At the inside
surface, the microstructure was
severely decarburized and exhib-
ited intergranular oxidation and pit-
ting (Figure 15-14). At midwall the
microstructure was partially decar-
burized at locations near the inter-
granular fissures. Pearlite, removed
from the fissures did not appear to
be spheroidized, indicating that
severe overheating of the hot side
of the tube was not occurring.
The microstructure of the cold side
was typical for low carbon steel
tubing consisting of ferrite, pearlite,
and an even dispersion of fine,
rounded intra- and intergranular
inclusions.
Chemical Analysis of the Deposits:
Energy dispersive x-ray analysis
was performed within the pits on
the severely corroded hot side of
the inside surface. Elements other
than Fe found included: S, Si, Al,
Cl, K, Ca, Cu, and Zn. Of these,
sulfur and chlorine were probably
producing the locally acidic condi-
tions that lead to corrosion and
hydrogen damage.
Conclusions and Next Steps: At
this stage it was possible to iden-
tify the damage as characteristic of
hydrogen damage, probably
caused by either a sulfate or chlo-
ride compound. The lack of thick
deposits indicated that the attack
was occurring in locations experi-
encing local steam separation on
the top of the slope tube. The next
steps would be to review water
chemistry records to determine
whether there had been prior evi-
dence of impurities (chlorides or
sulfates). If there had been evi-
dence of a problem, then correc-
tive actions to eliminate a recur-
rence would be required. If there
had been no evidence from moni-
toring systems, then the hideout
mechanism involving steam blan-
keting on the lower slope tubes
would need to be corrected. It
would also be appropriate to deter-
mine the extent of damage in the
slope tubes and within high flux
locations.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-17
 Figure 15-10. Axial pitting corrosion on inside
surface of the cold side of the damaged tube.

Figure 15-11. Severe pitting and grooving

corrosion on inside surface of the hot side of
the damaged tube.

Figure 15-12. Waterside corrosion occurring

over an 80° arc on the hot side of the dam-
aged tube.

15-18 Hydrogen Damage

Figure 15-13. Intergranular fissures and Figure 15-14. Intergranular fissures,
waterside corrosion on the hot side of decarburized microstructure and water-
the damaged tube extending up to 60% side corrosion on the hot side of the dam-
through the wall (MAG:16X, unetched) aged tube (2% Nital etch)

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-19

8. References
1Jonas, O., and R.B. Dooley, “International Water
Treatment Practices and Experience”, Proceedings of the
International Water Conference, 50th Annual Meeting,
IWC-90-41, held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 23-
25, 1990.
2Personal Communication from J. Hickey (ESB Ireland) to
R.B. Dooley, February, 1995.
3Personal Communication from F. Gabrielli (ABB/CE) to
R.B. Dooley, March, 1995.
4Goldstein,P., I.B. Dick and J.K. Rice, “Internal Corrosion
of High Pressure Boilers”, Trans. ASME 89(A), 3, 1967,
pp. 378-395.
5Goldstein,P., “A Research Study on Internal Corrosion
of High Pressure Boilers”, Trans. ASME 90(A), 1, 1968,
pp. 23-37.
6Goldstein, P. and C.L. Burton, “A Research Study on
Internal Corrosion of High Pressure Boilers - Final
Report”, Trans. ASME 91(A), 1969, pp. 75-101.
7Potter, E.C. and G. M. W. Mann, Proc. 1st Int. Cong.
Metall. Corrosion, London, Butterworths, 1961, p. 417.
8Field,E.M., R.C. Stanley, A.M Adams, D.R. Holmes, “The
Growth, Structure and Breakdown of Magnetite Films on
Mild Steel”, Proc. 2nd Int. Conf. Metallic Corrosion, New
York, 1963, p. 829.
9Potter,
E.C. and G. M. W. Mann, Proc. 2nd Int. Cong.
Metall. Corrosion, 1963, p. 872.
10Masterson,H.G., J.E. Castle, and G.M.W. Mann,
“Waterside Corrosion of Power Station Boiler Tubes”,
Chemistry and Industry, September 6, 1969,
pp. 1261-1266.
11Ashford, J.H., R. Garnsey, and G.M.W. Mann,
“Corrosion of Mild Steel under Heat Transfer in High
Temperature Aerated Sodium Chloride Solutions”,
Corrosion Science, 1974, pp. 515-525.
12Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
13Ball, M., Sodium Hydroxide for Conditioning the Boiler
Water of Drum-Type Boilers, Research Project 9000-20,
Final Report TR-104007, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, California, January, 1995. See also M.
Ball, “Caustic Treatment for Drum Boilers”, R.B. Dooley
and R. Pate, eds., Fourth International Conference on
Cycle Chemistry in Fossil Boilers, held in Atlanta,
Georgia, September 7-9, 1994, Final Report TR-104502,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
January,1995.
15-20 Hydrogen Damage
14Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec,
November, 1983.
15Dooley, R.B., A. Aschoff, and F. Pocock, Cycle
Chemistry Guidelines for Fossil Plants: Phosphate
Treatment for Drum Units, Final Report TR-103655,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
December, 1994.
16Lamping, G.A., and S. Gehl, “Hydrogen Damage
Assessment Using Ultrasonic Velocity Measurement”, in
R. B. Dooley, ed., Proceedings: International Conference
on Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil Plants, held in San
Diego, California November 5-7, 1991, Proceedings TR-
100493, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
April, 1992, pp. 8-23 through 8-35.
17Birring, A.S., et al., “Detection of Hydrogen Damage by
Ultrasonics”, in B. Dooley and D. Broske, eds., Boiler
Tube Failures in Fossil Power Plants: Conference Pro-
ceedings, Conference held in Atlanta, Georgia, November
10-12, 1987, CS-5500-SR, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1988, pp. 5-59 through 5-67.
18Birring,A.S., et al., “Ultrasonic Detection of Hydrogen
Damage”, Materials Evaluation, March, 1989, pp. 345-
350, 369.
19Birring,
A.S., “Method and Means for Detection of
Hydrogen Attack by Ultrasonic Wave Velocity Measure-
ments”, U.S. Patent 4,890,496, dated January 2, 1990.
20Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.
21Dooley, R.B., et al., “Perspective and Vision of Cycle
Chemistry for Fossil Plants”, in R.B. Dooley, ed., Proceed-
ings International Conference on Fossil Plant Cycle
Chemistry, held in Baltimore, Maryland, June 4-6, 1991,
Report TR-100195, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, December, 1991, pp. I-1 through I-22.
22Aschoff,
A.F., Y.H. Lee, D.M. Sopocy, and O. Jonas,
Interim Consensus Guidelines on Fossil Plant Cycle
Chemistry, Research Project 2712-1, Final Report CS-
4629, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
June, 1986.
ACTIONS for Hydrogen Damage
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of hydro-
gen damage begin here. The
goal of these actions is to see if
further investigation of hydrogen
damage is warranted or whether
another BTF mechanism should
be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and hydrogen dam-
age is the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by hydrogen damage.
Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and hydrogen damage is
the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of hydrogen damage:
➠ Review Figure 15-4 for
typical boiler regions.
➠ Review Table 15-1 for sus-
ceptible locations.
➠ Confirm that both of the neces-
sary precursors to hydrogen dam-
age are probably present: water-
side deposits and a source of
acidic contamination.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Thick-edged fracture surface
with brittle appearance (Figure
15-1)
• Tube gouging under the
deposits
• Thick layered deposits (Figure
15-2)
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by hydrogen
damage.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Major acid contamination event.
If this has occurred immediate
action is required.
• Major condenser leak.
• Minor condenser leaks that
have occurred over a long
period of time (months).
• Water treatment plant or con-
densate polisher regeneration
chemical upset leading to low
pH condition.
• Chemical cleaning process
errors suspected.
• Excessive waterside deposits.
• Sources of flow disruption. See
Table 15-1 for a comprehensive
list.
• Fireside conditions that could
lead to overheating of the
tubes. See Table 15-1 for a list
of typical conditions.
➠ These precursors can be root
causes for hydrogen damage. If
one or more has occurred, go to
Action 3 which outlines the steps
to confirm the influence of each. If
a major acid contamination event
has occurred, in parallel, see
Action 5, for immediate actions.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-21
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is hydrogen
damage.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being hydrogen damage
(Action 1a). Action 2 should
clearly identify hydrogen dam-
age as the primary mechanism
or point to another cause. The
actions listed will be executed by
removing representative tube
sample(s), followed by visual
examination and detailed metal-
lographic analysis.
15-22 Hydrogen Damage
➠ Analyze in detail the failure sur-
face. Is the failure surface thick-
edged and brittle in appearance?
➠ Analyze internal corrosion and/or
deposits. Is there evidence of
internal corrosion and/or
deposits?
➠ Analyze existent scale. If scale is
present, is it a multi-laminate for-
mation? See Figure 15-2.
➠ Analyze microstructure of tube
metal. Does tube microstructure
show distinctive decarburization,
particularly acute at inside sur-
face, and microfissuring? See
Figures 15-7, 15-13, and 15-14.
➠ Examine tube microstructure for
signs of overheating. Does tube
microstructure show presence of
transformation products (marten-
site, retained austenite, etc.)?
Does it show signs of creep dam-
age?
continued on next page
Ductile failures with significant wall
thinning by internal corrosion and
with deposits are more likely to be
either caustic gouging or acid
phosphate corrosion.
Problem may not be hydrogen
damage, however continue with
balance of flowchart as the force
of final failure may have separated
any attached deposits.
Damage may be either caustic
gouging or acid phosphate attack.
Compare Figure 15-2 to similar
figures for acid phosphate corro-
sion caustic gouging, Figures 16-1
and 17-1, respectively. Compare
distinguishing characteristics in
Chapter 7, Volume 1.
Mechanism is probably not hydro-
gen damage. Review Chapter 7,
Volume 1 to see if characteristics
are consistent with caustic goug-
ing or acid phosphate corrosion, if
not start identification sequence
over with Table 12-1.
Transformation products are likely
to be indicative of short-term over-
heating, creep damage or long-
term overheating; suspect one of
these mechanisms, particularly if
there is no corrosion or gouging of
tube inside surface.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is hydrogen
damage (continued).

➠ Probable mechanism is hydrogen

damage. Steps to confirm will
include:
➠ Identify constituents of scale.
The presence of chloride may
confirm hydrogen damage.
➠ Review Table 7-1 (Chapter 7,
Volume 1) to contrast with other
underdeposit corrosion mecha-
nisms.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

References to other sources of detailed information:

• Main text (this chapter) provides the background to mechanism and the
development of hydrogen damage.
• Summary of the steps and methods of metallurgical investigation of boiler
tube failures can be found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
• Acid phosphate corrosion and caustic gouging may be confused with
hydrogen damage; they are the subjects of Chapters 16 and 17, respec-
tively.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-23

Action 3: Determine root cause of hydrogen damage
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as hydrogen damage
(Action 2) or a precursor to
hydrogen damage has occurred
(Action 1b). The goal of this
Action 3 is for the BTF Team to
review the potential root causes
of hydrogen damage, identify
probable ones, and take those
actions that are needed to con-
firm which are operative in the
unit. This step must be taken so
that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
15-24 Hydrogen Damage
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below.
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in the
unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
3.2 Influence of Excessive Deposits
3.2.1 Flow disruption:
• weld backing bar/ring
• poor weld geometry, pad welds, canoe piece
repairs, etc.
• deposits
• locally high heat flux or steam quality
• bends or sharp changes in tube direction
• horizontal or near horizontal tubing
• local regions of DNB
3.2.2 Fireside Conditions
• flame impingement
• burner misalignment
• major change in fuel source
3.3 Influence of Acidic Contamination
3.3.1 Condenser leaks - minor but occurring
over an extended period.
3.3.2 Condenser leaks - major ingress, gen-
erally one serious event.
3.3.3 Water treatment plant or condensate
polisher regeneration chemical upset leading to
low pH condition.
3.3.4 Errors in chemical cleaning process.
• More detailed discussion about the actions to confirm can be found in
the main text (this chapter) under the section number shown or in the
cross-references.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Analysis of results from chemistry
monitors mainly for levels of Fe and Cu.
➠ (b). Selective tube sampling for deposit
measurement.
➠ (c). Check the efficacy of chemical
cleaning.
➠ (d). Boiler inspection for susceptible sites.
➠ (e). Sampling for distinctive “bathtub ring”
deposits.
➠ (f). Circulation testing.
➠ (g). Inspect furnace wall for evidence of
flame impingement.
➠ (h). Check burner operation for possible
direct flame impingement.
➠ (i). Measure heat flux at selected locations.
➠ (j). Review chemistry control logs to deter-
mine if and when impurities were excessive.
➠ (k). Confirm from chemistry control logs,
especially the extent and depth of pH
depression.
➠ (l). Evaluate results from and reliability of
monitoring and alarm systems, particularly
for cation conductivity.
➠ (m). Review chemistry logs during cleaning
and rinsing.
➠ (n). Borescope examination to check the
efficacy of the chemical cleaning.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root ➠ Identify all locations to be

cause analysis) the BTF Team examined. Refer to
should determine the extent of Section 1.2 of main text,
damage. Since hydrogen dam- Figure 15-4, and Table
age occurs on the microstruc- 15-1 for typical locations.
tural level, simple NDE inspec- Missed locations are
tion methods are not available. sites for future failures.
Detection will be based on eval- Hydrogen damage very
uating for: (i) wastage and wall rarely occurs in only one
thinning, (ii) the presence of of the locations.
micro-fissuring at grain bound-
aries, or (iii) the changed tube
➠ Perform NDE to ➠ Perform NDE to detect ➠ Perform NDE for
properties. It is critical that all microstructural change.
tubing with hydrogen damage or measure wall thin- detecting waterside
ning. If metallo- Review the use of UT deposits. Pulse-
significant wall loss be replaced methods based on
since these regions are espe- graphic and echo UT has been
visual analysis velocity change as a used to measure
cially susceptible to ongoing means of detecting
indicates that sig- the thickness of
corrosion/hydrogen damage. material change caused
nificant wall thin- waterside deposits,
ning has probably by hydrogen damage. an indirect indica-
occurred review See Figure 15-9 and tion of the potential
NDE options main text. for any of the water-
(Chapter 9, side corrosion
Volume 1). mechanisms to
occur.

➠ Perform tube sampling

to confirm NDE results
and to determine the
degree of damage,
type, extent and thick-
ness of deposits.

➠ Use results interactively

with Action 3.

➠ Go to Action 5:
Implement Repairs,
Immediate Solutions
and Actions.

References to other sources of detailed information:

• Main text (this chapter) provides additional detail on the methods for deter-
mining damage specific to hydrogen damage.
• Chapters 9 and 10, Volume 1, provide information about methods to deter-
mine macroscopic and microscopic damage, respectively, in boiler tubes.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-25

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
The BTF Team must ensure that
repairs and immediate solutions
are directly tied to the underlying
cause. Of most immediate con-
cern are major contamination
events; however, several underly-
ing problems can be dealt with
in the short-term, with longer
term actions pursued at a later
date.
• Actions for a major contamination
15-26 Hydrogen Damage
of affected tubes
➠ See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
• Do not pad weld
• Do not use canoe/window
weld repairs.
➠ Repair any obvious mechani-
cal problems that lead to an
ingress or acidic contamination
such as pump failures, major
condenser leaks, etc.
event typically where pH was
depressed below 8 under full
operating conditions:
➠ React immediately to contam-
ination ingress: implement in-
place procedures to shutdown
unit, remove from service and
chemically clean.
➠ Review other potential con-
tributors to the problem, as out-
lined under Action 3: Root
cause determination.
• Actions from NDE Survey
(Action 4):
➠ Develop a plan to replace
affected tubing, including an
economic assessment of the
possible future failure rate and
the resulting optimal extent of
new tubing.
➠ Chemically clean if excessive
deposits have contributed to
this problem, or are likely to
contribute to a future problem
with hydrogen damage. See
Chapter 4, Volume 1.
➠ Consider hydrostatic test to
1.5 times operating pressure
➠ Place the unit back in
service.
• Actions if fireside conditions such
as misadjusted burners, flame
impingement, etc. are a contribu-
tor to the problem:
➠ Adjust burners, etc.
References to other sources of
detailed information:
• Main text (this chapter) provides
additional detail on repairs,
immediate solutions and actions.
• Chapter 11, Volume 1 provides
information about repair and
replacement of boiler tubes.
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on clear identification of
underlying root cause (Action 3)
and an economic evaluation to
ensure that the optimum strategy
has been chosen.
Major Root Cause Influences
Influence of Excessive Deposits
Flow disruption:
• weld backing bar/ring
• poor weld geometry, pad welds, canoe piece
repairs, etc.
• deposits
• locally high heat flux or steam quality
• bends or sharp changes in tube direction
• horizontal or near horizontal tubing
• local regions of DNB
Fireside Conditions
• flame impingement
• burner misalignment
• major change in fuel source
Influence of Acidic Contamination
Condenser leaks - minor but occurring over an
extended period.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Optimize chemical cleaning procedures. See
summary of practices in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
➠ Keep deposits to an acceptable level. See
guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
➠ Minimize feedwater corrosion products
through control of chemistry, particularly
pH and O2 scavenger additions; Fe < 5 ppb
and Cu < 2 ppb at economizer inlet. See
also Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Monitor for effectiveness of chemistry
control
➠ Remove all pad welds.
➠ Replace weld repairs, canoe piece repairs,
as needed to ensure good flow conditions.
➠ Remove weld backing rings.
➠ Modify tube geometry.
➠ Use rifled tubing if other primary measures
are unsuccessful.
➠ Design modifications, as needed.
➠ Periodic re-inspection for proper burner
alignment.
➠ Implement appropriate chemistry guidelines
and instrumentation. See Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
➠ Install appropriate control room alarms.
➠ If levels were outside their control limits,
correct with procedural changes, training or
equipment repairs.
➠ If levels were not outside control limits,
investigate for hideout mechanisms such as
steam blanketing in sloping tubes. Fix or
modify as needed.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 15-27
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat
failures (continued)
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Long-Term Actions

Condenser leaks - major ingress, generally ➠ Hardware or procedural changes to prevent

one serious event. a recurrence.
➠ Alarm in control room with at least
minimum level of instrumentation. See
guidance in Chapter 3, Volume 1.

Water treatment plant or condensate polisher ➠ As above.

regeneration chemical upset leading to low pH
condition.

Errors in chemical cleaning process. ➠ Initiate chemical clean procedures and

guidelines recommendations.

References to other sources of detailed information:

• Main text (this chapter) provides additional detail on the reasoning behind
these actions.

15-28 Fly Ash Erosion

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of hydro-
gen damage or its precursors. In
general:
• In the case of a major contami-
nation ingress, immediate
action is required to prevent
significant damage throughout
the cycle.
• Most of the root causes of
hydrogen damage can also
cause other unit problems,
therefore avoiding the following
root causes will have benefit
throughout the unit: (i) exces-
sive deposits, (ii) overtempera-
ture in tubes, (iii) flow disrup-
tion, and (iv) improper cycle
chemistry.
Hydrogen Damage Alert for Other Cycle
Aspect Components
Deposits indicate high • Poor feedwater chem-
feedwater corrosion istry control (probably iron
products levels at the economizer
inlet are > 10 ppb).
• High Cu levels in
deposits might indicate Cu
deposition in HP turbine.
Potential for boiler tube
damage by other mecha-
nisms.
Excessive deposits Potential BTF by overheat-
ing and creep.
Geometric boiler water Potential for excessive
flow disruptions deposit buildup. Tube fail-
(Table 15-1) ures by overheating.
Contaminant ingress Corrosion of other cycle
parts - turbine, SH/RH.
Contamination by Potential for problems
improper chemical throughout cycle.
cleaning
Fireside Problems • Possible BTF by fireside
(flame impingement, corrosion of waterwall tub-
burner alignment, ing.
major fuel change) • Possible BTF by over-
heating.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes
➠ Actions Indicated
➠ Implement stricter cycle chemistry
control program, instrumentation, etc.
See Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Develop monitoring program to opti-
mize feedwater chemistry and use of O2
scavengers. See Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Sampling to determine nature and
extent of deposit problem. See Chapter
6, Volume 1 for metallographic methods
overview; Chapter 9, Volume for sam-
pling methods.
➠ Apply guidelines for chemical clean-
ing. See Chapter 4, Volume 1.
➠ Remove pad welds and other
improper repairs.
➠ Identify and remove other sources for
flow disruption.
➠ Inspect susceptible components,
sample steam and/or material in suscep-
tible locations for indications of damage.
➠ Careful examination of cycle chem-
istry monitors to characterize extent of
problem.
➠ Inspect for problems and carefully
monitor chemistry on return to service.
➠ Establish proper chemical cleaning
processes. See Chapter 4, Volume 1 for
guidance.
➠ Inspect and adjust as required.
15-29
15-30 Hydrogen Damage
Chapter 16 • Volume 2
Acid Phosphate
Corrosion
Introduction
Acid phosphate corrosion is the
second of three waterside under-
deposit corrosion mechanisms dis-
cussed in this book. It occurs when
tube deposits formed from feedwa-
ter corrosion products allow a con-
centration of phosphate salts; this
leads to underdeposit corrosion,
and eventually to tube failure. This
damage mechanism has only fairly
recently been characterized and is
probably more pervasive in the
industry than had been previously
recognized.1, 2, 3 Recent work identi-
fied more than twenty utilities which
had suffered serious corrosion and
subsequent boiler tube failures dur-
ing operation under congruent
phosphate treatment; each case
had previously been identified as
caustic gouging, but under careful
examination was found to be acid
phosphate corrosion.8
Acid phosphate corrosion, hydrogen
damage, and caustic gouging, all
waterside under-deposit corrosion
mechanisms, can produce features
that may appear to be superficially
similar. This means that attention
must be paid to more subtle distin-
guishing characteristics. The root
causes are vastly different and thus
the routes to prevention of repeat
failures are also quite different. The
distinctions among the three are dis-
cussed throughout this chapter; ref-
erence can also be made to
Chapter 7, Volume 1 for a more
detailed discussion of the features
that distinguish the three.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations

aAcid Phosphate Corrosion:

Identification Keys
1. Tube gouging or extensive

16-2
corrosion with the presence of
distinctive deposits; the inner
layer will typically be white or
grey with the major constituent
being maricite (NaFePO4).
2. Most likely to occur in units
with significant phosphate
control problems (hideout)
involving either mono- or di-
sodium phosphate additions.
3. Susceptible locations will be
those where both deposits
and concentration of boiler
water chemicals occur.
4. Distinguished from hydrogen
damage or caustic gouging
by the composition of the
deposits formed and cycle
chemistry operating history.

Acid Phosphate Corrosion

aa
Direction of flow

White deposit
1.1 Features of failure
A key attribute of acid phosphate
corrosion will be tube gouges, par-
tially or completely filled with dis-
tinctly layered deposits, as shown in
the schematic of Figure 16-1. The
appearance of the gouged tube with
layered deposits removed is shown
in Figure 16-2. After removal of
deposits, the corroded surface gen-
erally will manifest a smooth, “bath
tub” shape. Note in Figure 16-2 the
sharp demarcation between mild
and very severe corrosion, an indi-
cation of a location where phos-
phate concentration occurred as a
result of local steam blanketing or
locally high steam quality. The white
arrows in the figure highlight loca-
tions with steam bubble patterns
that were probably places where
local steam blanketing occurred but
was not sustained.
A key distinguishing feature for acid
phosphate corrosion is the composi-
tion of the layers shown in Figure 16-
1. Generally there will be two or more
layers, the inner layer (nearest the
tube inside surface) will typically be

Deposits have either

spalled or washed away
from this region

Grayish white deposit maricite (with streaks of red)

Black deposit

Figure 16-1. Schematic of the deposits along the length of an acid phosphate cor-
roded region. Source: Adapted from S.R. Paterson, et al.4
 white/grey and speckled with red
caused by the presence of hematite
(Fe2O3) and the major constituent of
that layer will be maricite (NaFePO4).
An example is shown in Figure 16-3a.
The covering layer will generally be
black in color and consist primarily of
magnetite (Fe3O4). Figure 16-3b
shows an example of the appearance
of this covering layer. It is important to
note that there is no protective mag-
netite layer on the tube surface, indi-
cating a fast corrosion process.
Eventually the underdeposit corro-
sion process will lead to wall thin-
ning and subsequent thin-edged
fracture. Final failure will be in a
ductile mode by overload or creep.
a)
If acid phosphate corrosion is
severe and steam blanketing has
occurred over a protracted period
the tube wall can show signs of
overheating, although unlike hydro-
gen damage, there is no direct
microstructural decarburization of
the base tube material and no iron
carbide reaction with hydrogen.
It is important to emphasize the
superficial similarity with both caus-
tic gouging and hydrogen damage,
notably the presence of tube goug-
ing.
• For acid phosphate corrosion key
features are: (i) presence of a dis-
tinctive layer of maricite
(NaFePO4), (ii) final failure by
ductile overload, (iii) the nature of
base metal microstructural deteri-
oration, if any, and (iv) the pres-
b) ence of this failure mechanism in
boilers where mono- and di-
Figure 16-2a, b. Morphology of corroded regions after removing deposits and oxide
sodium phosphate have been
scales by glass bead blasting. Note sharp demarcation between very mild and very
severe corrosion. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4 added as control chemicals.
• Acid phosphate corrosion con-
trasts with hydrogen damage in
that there is either no microstruc-
tural material degradation, or if it

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-3

 exists, it is indicative of overheat-
ing damage (spheroidization) as
opposed to the decarburization
and microfissuring typical of
hydrogen damage. The failure is
ductile and thin-edged rather than
brittle and thick-edged in the
case of hydrogen damage. The
composition of the deposits is dif-
ferent.
• Acid phosphate corrosion is con-
trasted from caustic gouging by
the deposits formed. Maricite
forms in the case of acid phos-
phate corrosion instead of crys-
tals of sodium ferroate and/or
sodium ferroite within the deposit
for caustic gouging. The cycle
chemistry treatment that is likely
to lead to the accumulation of
those deposits also differs; the
addition of mono- and/or
Figure 16-3a. Inner layer of maricite (NaFePO4) - red in color. di-sodium phosphate for acid
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4 phosphate corrosion in contrast
to caustic gouging which will
result from either (i) operating at
too high a level of caustic under
caustic treatment, or (ii) the
addition of an excess of caustic
under AVT.
Additional information about distin-
guishing among these damage
mechanisms is provided in Chapter
7, Volume 1.

Figure 16-3b. Distinctive outer layer of deposited magnetite (Fe3O4) - black in color.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4

16-4 Acid Phosphate Corrosion


Figure 16-4. Typical boiler locations
where acid phosphate corrosion can
occur.
Table 16-1
Local Tube Conditions Which
Can Lead to Initial Deposits
Locations where the water/fluid flow
adjacent to the tube wall is disrupted
• Welded joints such as:
• Joints with backing rings
• Poor repair welds such as pad welds,
“canoe” pieces or window welds
• Poor weld overlay (penetrating to the
inside surface)
• Locations with existing internal deposits
caused by:
• A deposition mechanism
• Deposits left from improper chemical
cleaning
• Locally high heat flux
• Locally high steam quality
• Geometric features
• Bends around burners or openings
• Sharp changes of direction (such as
the nose of the furnace)
• Tubes bending off lower headers and
drums
Locations with a high heat flux
Locations where boiling first initiates
Locations with thermal-hydraulic flow
disruptions
• Locations with local very high steam
quality
• Locations with horizontal or inclined
tubing heated from above or below
Localized overheating of the tube (fireside
conditions)
• Flame impingement
• Burner misalignment
• Operating conditions such as overfiring or
underfiring, gas channeling, or inadequate
circulation rates
• Major change in fuel source, such as
higher BTU value coal, dual firing with
gas, changeover to oil or gas firing where
heat flux increases.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-5
2. Mechanism of Failure
Acid Phosphate Corrosion:
Mechanism
1. Although a complete explana-
tion for the mechanism is not
in hand, acid phosphate cor-
rosion requires the breakdown
of the normal protective tube
situation which occurs via a
fluxing of the protective oxide.
2. The conditions necessary for
acid phosphate corrosion to
occur include: phosphate
hideout, localized flow disrup-
tion, the formation of deposits
of feedwater corrosion prod-
ucts, a localized concentrat-
ing mechanism such as steam
blanketing, locally high steam
quality, and the addition of
either mono- or di-sodium
phosphate.
3. Acid phosphate corrosion has
not been observed in phos-
phate treated boilers where
only tri-sodium phosphate has
been added.
4. Phosphate hideout itself will
not necessarily lead to acid
phosphate corrosion of boiler
tubes; many units operate with
a hideout problem without
experiencing boiler tube cor-
rosion.
5. The corrosive process can be
stopped if the boiler is chemi-
cally cleaned and the water
chemistry is changed.
16-6 Acid Phosphate Corrosion
1.2 Locations of failure
Boiler areas which are typically
affected by acid phosphate corro-
sion are shown in Figure 16-4.
These are typically the same regions
that are also susceptible to both
hydrogen damage and caustic
gouging. Table 16-1 lists the spe-
cific characteristics of susceptible
locations.
On a given tube, the failure by acid
phosphate corrosion will generally
initiate on the hot (heat adsorption)
side of the tube. The higher heat
transfer rates cause faster deposi-
tion of feedwater corrosion prod-
ucts, of locally generated corrosion
products, and of the mono- and di-
sodium phosphates added to cor-
rect for hideout. This in turn leads to
the earlier interruption on this side of
the tube of the free exchange of
water between the metal surface
and the bulk fluid.
Acid phosphate corrosion has been
found in both rifled and plain boiler
tubes.
2.1 Introduction
As with the other waterside underde-
posit corrosion mechanisms, acid
phosphate corrosion occurs
because of a breakdown in the pro-
tective oxide layer. See Chapter 2,
Volume 1 for a discussion of the nor-
mal condition within the tube and
conditions that can lead to its break-
down. As with these other mecha-
nisms, damage normally begins with
disruption of the fluid (water/steam)
flow adjacent to the tube wall,
and/or the formation of deposits
from feedwater corrosion products.
A subsequent reaction involving
concentrating acid phosphates in
the deposit leads to eventual corro-
sion and failure.
Neither the deposition of feedwater
corrosion products, nor the pres-
ence and concentration of phos-
phate, sometimes called phosphate
hideout, by themselves will lead to
acid phosphate corrosion; both are
required. Either of these two factors,
however, can be a contributing fac-
tor to a host of other problems as
well as being joint precursors to acid
phosphate corrosion.
There are a number of factors that
distinguish acid phosphate corro-
sion; these factors are best under-
stood through an examination of the
mechanism. A basic review of phos-
phate chemistry specific to acid
phosphate corrosion will set the
stage for subsequent analysis of the
damage mechanism.
2.2 Key aspects of phosphate
cycle chemistry
Chapter 3 of Volume 1 discusses the
effects of operating cycle chemistry
on boiler tube failures, including the
most common phosphate treatment
options and the recommended
action levels.
Figure 16-5 shows the operating
regimes of the different primary
phosphate treatments. A principal

10.0
TSP + 1 ppm NaOH
PT
9.5
pH at 25°C
EPT
9.0 Na: PO4 = 3.0
Na: PO4 = 2.8
Na: PO4 = 2.6
8.5
0 1 2 3 4 5
ppm PO4
Figure 16-5. Operating ranges of boiler water on equilibrium phosphate treatment
(EPT), congruent phosphate treatment (CPT) and phosphate treatment (PT). (TSP) is
tri-sodium phosphate. Source: R.B. Dooley, et al.5
root cause of acid phosphate corro-
sion is the improper use of either
mono- or disodium phosphate as a
means to maintain the cycle chem-
istry levels within the congruent
phosphate treatment (CPT) regime.
The problem arises most frequently
when “hideout” of phosphate
occurs, leading to the addition of
one of these two chemicals to
“chase” the hideout and try to bring
it back within the control range.
Subsequent concentration of the
now excess acid phosphate com-
pounds in the deposits of waterwall
tubes leads to the eventual attack
via this mechanism.
It should be emphasized that hide-
out, by itself, is not harmful and is
not a direct cause of acid phosphate
corrosion. Recent surveys have indi-
cated that while over 90% of the
units that are using CPT in the
United States experience phosphate
hideout, many operate without dam-
age in boiler tubes caused by acid
phosphate corrosion. Furthermore,
an international survey conducted
several years ago showed that a
netite was placed in a column and
the various alternative phosphate
Equivalent NaOH Concentration (ppm)
4.0 solutions flowed through at tempera-
3.0 tures similar to those expected in an
operating boiler up to 360°C (680°F).
Those studies have shown that
interaction with the magnetite and
1.0 the formation of maricite requires the
addition of mono- or di-sodium
CPT phosphate; it was not observed in
those tests with tri-sodium phosphate
0.4 solutions. The presence of maricite is
0.3 a key factor that can help distinguish
damage caused by acid phosphate
0.2 corrosion.
These findings are consistent with
6 7 8 9 10 the field experiences seen to date;
see for example, the case study in
this chapter which summarizes the
operating experience at thirteen units
that have recently experienced acid
phosphate corrosion.
The EPRI studies included a series
of tests on a model boiler and
looked at a variety of phosphate
number of countries operate without chemistries to evaluate the parame-
hideout or corrosion while using ters responsible for hideout.7 That
equilibrium phosphate treatment or a work reinforced the understanding of
phosphate treatment with a appropriate operating regimes for
sodium/phosphate molar ratio above phosphate, including those that
3; both treatments allow a small (1 allow up to 1 ppm of free NaOH.
ppm) level of free sodium hydroxide.
However, phosphate water treatment
should be carefully evaluated and
2.3 Developing acid phosphate
controlled, particularly for boiler corrosion
pressures above 2400 psi where Damage by acid phosphate corro-
phosphate hideout, carryover and sion requires a breakdown or
subsequent problems are most removal of the protective magnetite
likely. Details about those findings layer on the boiler tube which
and cycle chemistry recommenda- occurs as a fluxing reaction. This
tions are presented in Chapter 3, loss of the protective magnetite layer
Volume 1. contrasts with hydrogen damage,
where growth of an oxide layer
Recently, research on the specific occurs on the tube surface but by a
effects of phosphate chemistries has modified mechanism which results in
been conducted by the Canadian a layer that is internally stressed.
Electrical Association (CEA) and Hydrogen damage will thus not
EPRI. occur with acid phosphate corrosion
as the two mechanisms are com-
The CEA-sponsored work concen-
pletely different in the way that the
trated on laboratory investigations to
protective magnetite layer is
identify possible hideout and corro-
removed.
sion reactions between magnetite
and the various phosphate chemi-
cals (mono-, di-, and tri-sodium
phosphate).6 In those tests mag-
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-7
a a)

b)
aa
Addition of Di- and Mono-
Sodium Phosphate

Boiler water

Flow disruption
(physical or
thermal/hydraulic)

Boiler water

Deposits Fe3O4, Cu
Concentration of
low Na:PO4

feedwater corrosion products, usu-

ally at locations where the boiler
water flow is locally disrupted; some
of these are listed in Table 16-1. The
situation can be exacerbated by
localized overheating such as flame
impingement, burner misalignment,

16-8 Acid Phosphate Corrosion

Area of steam
blanket

source.
Na, PO4
Fe3O4, Cu

Deposits Fe3O4, Cu

Na Fe PO4
Tube

Fe3O4

Area of local steam blanket

Protective Fe3O4
Fe3O4, NaFePO4
Fluxing/corrosion

Figure 16-6. Schematic of the acid phosphate corrosion mechanism. (a) shows how
the initial flow disruption results in local regions of thicker deposits. (b) shows the con-
centration of the acid phosphate chemicals and subsequent corrosion. Note that there
is no protective oxide in the region of corrosion.

Damage by acid phosphate corro-

sion begins with the accumulation of
or a major change in the fuel

The combination of the initial

deposit, the addition of mono-
and/or di-sodium phosphate, and a
thermal-hydraulic concentrating
mechanism such as wick boiling,
local steam blanketing or boiling
within the deposit can cause
increasingly concentrated levels of
the acid phosphates and a locally
corrosive environment. Figure 16-6
shows a schematic representation of
the corrosion/fluxing process. This
results in local corrosion and signifi-
cant rates of damage accumulation.
Sodium phosphate salts exhibit ret-
rograde solubility, a decreasing sol-
ubility with increasing temperature,
which may also assist the local con-
centrations.
Reaction products may include dis-
solved species such as Fe(HPO4)2,
and compounds such as
NaFe(HPO4)2, NaFePO4, and
Na3Fe(OH)(HPO4)2.
A primary reaction product, useful
for distinguishing acid phosphate
corrosion, is maricite (NaFePO4). To
date, maricite has only been pro-
duced when magnetite is reacted
with mono- or di-sodium phosphate,
not tri-sodium phosphate. Possible
reactions include:
(i) 2Na2HPO4 + Fe + 1/2O2 ®
NaFePO4 + Na3PO4 +H2O

Fe2O3 +H2O
(di-sodium phosphate +

phosphate + hematite + water)

(iii) 3NaH2PO4 + Fe3O4 ®

3NaFePO4 + 1/2O2 + 3H2O
(16-1)
(di-sodium phosphate + boiler tube
material + oxygen ® maricite +

(ii)
tri-sodium phosphate + water)

2Na2HPO4 + Fe3O4 ®
NaFePO4 + Na3PO4 +
(16-2)

magnetite ® maricite + tri-sodium

(16-3)
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Acid Phosphate Corrosion:
Root Causes
1. Excessive deposits usually ini-
tiated by a flow disruption or
thermal-hydraulic conditions
and often exacerbated by fire-
side impingement or burner
misalignment.
2. A concentration of the acid
phosphate salts added to a
boiler because of a phosphate
hideout condition. The addi-
tion of mono-sodium phos-
phate and/or an excess of di-
sodium phosphate is required.
(monosodium phosphate +
magnetite ® maricite +
oxygen + water)
It should be emphasized here that
there is currently no quantitative
understanding of the phosphate
concentration mechanism in tube
deposits, nor of the phosphate cor-
rosion product interaction.8
Once a locally corrosive environ-
ment is formed at the tube surface,
loss of tube material occurs and the
end result is a gouged area with
extensive and characteristic
deposits as described above. If left
unchecked, wall thinning continues
until the tube fails when the local
pressure exceeds the strength of the
remaining tube material. Gouging is
not necessarily limited to localized
areas; large areas of the waterwall
can be affected.
The corrosive process can be
stopped if the boiler is chemically
cleaned and the water chemistry is
changed to a phosphate treatment
where hideout is minimized or elimi-
nated and only tri-sodium phosphate
is added. Although some tubes may
have suffered wall loss, they may
still be able to function with the
reduced section and proportionately
higher stress levels.
Concurrent with acid phosphate cor-
rosion, there can be material degra-
dation associated with overheating
of the tube in the locations of local-
ized boiling. As illustration, in one
case of acid phosphate corrosion,
inside tube metal temperatures were
estimated to have been at least
82°C (148°F) hotter than the local
bulk water temperature and the
degree of spheroidization indicated
a temperature gradient in the range
48°C to 60°C (~120 to 140°F) across
the tube wall.4 This observation sug-
gests that elevated tube tempera-
tures may assist acid phosphate
corrosion, although overheating is
not required to cause acid phos-
phate corrosion.
3.1 Introduction
Acid phosphate corrosion requires
both the formation of deposits and
the concentration of phosphate
salts. As with the other underdeposit
corrosion mechanisms, multiple
sources may be involved in forming
these precursors. The summary of
root causes and actions to confirm
is divided into separate discussions
of excessive deposits and of phos-
phate concentration.
Table 16-2 summarizes the possible
root causes, their confirmation, and
corrective actions.
3.2 Influence of excessive
deposits
Deposition is normally most pro-
nounced in areas where boiling first
initiates and in areas of maximum
heat flux. Additionally, excessive
deposits can form when local flow is
disrupted by one or more causes,
typical conditions are listed in Table
16-1. Independent of their source,
the following are actions to confirm
that this is a root cause of the
problem:
(a). Analysis of results from cycle
chemistry monitoring and instrumen-
tation to determine the level of corro-
sion products entering the boiler at
the economizer inlet. Particularly
important indicators of corrosion
product transport that cause deposit
formation are Fe and Cu levels at
the economizer inlet; other factors
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-9
Table 16-2
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause
Influences
3.2 Excessive Deposits
3.2.1 Flow disruption:
- weld backing bar/ring
- poor weld geometry, pad
welds, canoe piece
repairs, etc.
- deposits
- locally high heat flux or
steam quality
- bends or sharp changes in
tube direction
- horizontal or near horizontal
tubing
- local regions of DNB
3.2.2 Fireside Conditions
- flame impingement
- burner misalignment
- major change in fuel source
3.3 Phosphate Concentration
16-10 Acid Phosphate Corrosion
Actions to Confirm
(a). Analysis of results from chemistry mon- • See long-term actions.
itors mainly for levels of Fe and Cu.
(b). Selective tube sampling for deposit
measurement.
(c). Check efficacy of chemical cleaning.
(d). Boiler inspection for susceptible sites.
(e). Sampling for distinctive “bathtub ring”
deposits.
(f). Circulation testing.
(g). Inspect furnace wall for evidence of
flame impingement.
(h). Check burner operation for possible
direct flame impingement.
(i). Measure heat flux at selected locations.
(j). Evaluate boiler water; black boiler water
samples are an indication that severe
corrosion is taking place over large
areas of the waterwall.
Immediate Actions
and Solutions
• See long-term actions.
• Adjust burners, etc.
• Depending upon sever-
ity, initiate established
procedures for unit shut-
down and chemical
clean, as needed.
Long-Term Actions and
Prevention of Repeat Failures
• Optimize chemical cleaning procedures.
See summary of practices in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
• Keep deposits to an acceptable level.
See guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
• Minimize feedwater corrosion products
through control of chemistry particu-
larly pH and O2 scavenger additions; Fe
< 5 ppb and Cu < 2 ppb at economizer
inlet. See also Chapter 3, Volume 1.
• Monitor for effectiveness of chemistry
control.
• Remove all pad welds.
• Replace weld repairs, canoe piece
repairs, as needed to ensure good flow
conditions.
• Remove weld backing rings.
• Modify tube geometry.
• Use rifled tubing if other primary
measures are unsuccessful.
• Design modifications, as needed.
• Periodic re-inspection for proper burner
alignment.
• Develop optimum phosphate treatment
or move to AVT.
• Implement appropriate chemistry
guidelines and instrumentation. See
Chapter 3, Volume 1.
• Avoid chasing hideout.
• Avoid use of mono- and di-sodium
phosphate. Add only tri-sodium
phosphate.
• Install appropriate control room alarms
and monitoring systems.
Table 16-2
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions (Continued)
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.3.1 Use of improper cycle (k). Determine if boiler has a persistent
chemistry controls, problem with phosphate hideout: review
particularly “chasing” plant chemistry control logs, on-line
phosphate hideout by cycle chemistry records, chemical addi-
using mono-sodium tions to the boiler and/or alarms.
and/or an excess of (l). Review phosphate control additions,
di-sodium phosphate. tabulate monthly usage of mono- and
di-sodium phosphate for at least past
two years.
(m).Perform metallurgical analysis to con-
firm nature of deposits.
• As above. • Consider change to equilibrium phos-
phate treatment (EPT) or phosphate
treatment (PT) to control hideout prob-
lem. See Figure 16-5; also Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
• Alternatively, if the unit has a conden-
sate polisher, consider changing to AVT
following the next chemical clean.

that affect the cleanliness of the
cycle chemistry are levels of pH,
cation conductivity, and oxygen.
Normal guidance is to keep the iron
level below 5 ppb and copper below
2 ppb at the economizer inlet.
(b). Selective boiler waterwall tube
sampling from suspect regions to
measure deposition. Examples of
possible locations are indicated
in Table 16-1. Tube sampling prac-
tices and test methods are briefly
summarized in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
(c). Check the efficacy of prior
chemical cleaning operations, such
as for the remnants of scab-like
deposits, to determine whether an
appropriate frequency is being used
or whether the boiler has been
allowed to exceed the guideline val-
ues which are summarized in
Chapter 4, Volume 1.
Specific areas of preferential deposi-
tion include those of geometric flow
disruption and fireside conditions
addressed in order below.
3.2.1 Flow disruption Typical
causes of flow disruption are
included in Table 16-1. In several of
these locations there can be a strati-
fication of steam to the top of the
tube and water to the bottom. The
condition termed “steam blanketing”
can lead to higher tube wall temper-
atures where the steam phase
occurs, leading to faster deposition
rates, as well as accelerated corro-
sion and deposition at the interface
between the two phases. Potential
for steam blanketing to occur is
highest when the velocity of the fluid
is not high enough to maintain turbu-
lence and produce thorough mixing,
such as at low loads and full pres-
sure. Stepped and bathtub patterns
of corrosion are characteristic when
local areas are experiencing steam
blanketing.
Smaller and more local areas of
steam blanketing can also be initi-
ated by local features such as tube
laps, backing rings, and even
deposits. These areas may be as
small as a few millimeters in diameter.
Actions to confirm will generally be
indirect and focus on whether
deposits have begun to form or
whether the necessary pre-existing
conditions for deposition exist; that
is, actions should be taken to deter-
mine the cleanliness of the waterwall
tubes. In addition to those actions
listed in (a) through (c) above, addi-
tional steps may include:
(d). Examine boiler and mainte-
nance history for evidence of poten-
tial flow disruption sites particularly
pad welds, canoe pieces, poor
repairs, etc.
(e). Sampling for distinctive “bath-
tub ring” deposits, especially on
tubes that are not vertical.
(f). Circulation testing has also been
suggested as a means to measure
directly individual waterwall tube
flow rates, heat fluxes, and metal
temperatures as a function of load
level.
3.2.2 Fireside conditions such as
flame impingement, burner misalign-
ment, or a major change in fuel
source. Fireside conditions can
allow deposits of feedwater corro-
sion products to form rapidly at high
steaming rates and high metal tem-

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-11

peratures. Higher steaming rates
and tube temperatures can also be 200
experienced with a major change in
fuel source, such as (i) changing to
a higher BTU value coal, (ii) some Net
140
necessary (forced) dual firing with Megawatts
gas, or (iii) changeover to oil- or
gas-firing where the local heat flux is
dramatically increased. 80
Note that such conditions can also Na/PO4
2.5
lead to other boiler tube failure Molar
mechanisms such as thermally Ratio 2.0
induced departure from nucleate 10
boiling, overheating, and subse- pH @
quent premature failure by creep. 25°C
Actions to confirm consist of: 8
10
(g). Inspect furnace water wall slag
patterns for evidence of flame ppm
PO4 7
impingement
(h). Check burner operation for 4
direct flame impingement on the ppm 0.2
(side) water wall. NH3
0
Cond. 40
(i). Measure heat flux at selected
locations. ppm 0.10 Conductivity
SiO2 25 (mmhos/cm)
SiO2

3.3 Sources of phosphate con- 0.06 10

1500

2000

0100

0500

0900
tamination
One action to confirm which may be
Time
very noticeable in the case of acid
phosphate corrosion is:
(j). Black boiler water samples are Figure 16-7. The effect of load changes on phosphate hideout and return.
an indication that severe corrosion is Source: C.C. Scheerer and J.K. Maxwell9
taking place over large areas of the
waterwall.
3.3.1 Use of improper cycle chem-
istry controls, particularly, ÒchasingÓ
phosphate hideout by using mono-
sodium phosphate and/or an excess
of di-sodium phosphate. As dis-
cussed in the mechanism section
above, laboratory investigations of
the reaction of sodium phosphates

16-12 Acid Phosphate Corrosion

4. Determining the Extent of Damage
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Acid Phosphate Corrosion:
Immediate Solutions and Actions
1. Address the source of phos-
phate concentration, chemi-
cally clean if tube deposits are
extensive, and/or replace tub-
ing where significant wall thin-
ning has occurred.
2. Most other actions can be
postponed until the next
scheduled outage.
with iron oxides in a boiling water
environment have indicated that the
reaction to form maricite6, and sub-
sequent damage due to acid phos-
phate corrosion, has been produced
only with the addition of mono-
and/or di-sodium phosphate.
Phosphate hideout can lead unit
hideout. Review plant chemistry
control logs, on-line cycle chemistry
records, chemical additions to the
boiler, or instrumentation alarms. Of
particular importance is a pervasive
problem with phosphate hideout and
compensation with mono-sodium
phosphate and/or an excess of di-
sodium phosphate. Monitoring boiler
water pH, phosphate level and spe-
cific conductivity as a function of
load will indicate whether phosphate
operators to compensate by the use
of these two chemicals which can
lead to a problem with acid phos-
phate corrosion.
Actions to confirm consist of:
(k). Determine if boiler has a per-
sistent problem with phosphate
hideout is occurring. Typically during
a shutdown or reduction in load, the
phosphate, which hid out during
load increase, will come back into
the boiler water. The problem can be
detected by the associated pH
decrease and a conductivity
increase. Figure 16-7 illustrates this
phenomenon.
(l). Review phosphate control chem-
ical additions and tabulate the
mono- and/or di-sodium phosphate
usage on a monthly basis for at least
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-13
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of
Repeat Failures
Acid Phosphate Corrosion:
Long-Term Actions
1. Minimize deposits by keeping
the boiler clean and taking
steps to reduce the ingress of
feedwater corrosion products
into the boiler.
2. Initiate cycle chemistry mea-
sures to reduce or eliminate
phosphate hideout and the
use of mono-sodium phos-
phate, and to minimize the
use of di-sodium phosphate.
See discussion in Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
3. Other actions include minimiz-
ing sources of flow disruption,
ensuring proper adjustment of
fireside conditions, adjusting
operating procedures to pre-
vent hot spot formation, etc.
16-14 Acid Phosphate Corrosion
the past two years.
(m). Perform metallurgical examina-
tion of damaged tubes, with particu-
lar attention to the composition of
any deposits present. Because the
smooth corrosion surface and thick
deposits typical of acid phosphate
corrosion are similar in visual
appearance to those present for
caustic gouging, it is important to
perform a thorough metallurgical
evaluation to identify the mechanism
properly. This will include the use of
x-ray diffraction to identify the pres-
ence of maricite.
Acid phosphate corrosion is mani-
fested by tube thinning, so that NDE
methods which can detect this dam-
age form, such as ultrasonic testing
(UT), have been applied to deter-
mine the extent of affected tubes.
UT has also been applied to mea-
sure the extent of waterside tube
deposits and thus characterize a
critical precursor to acid phosphate
corrosion. Reviews of standard
methods of NDE for wall thinning
and recent developments for deposit
measurement are provided in
Chapter 9, Volume 1.
Table 16-2 includes a summary of
immediate actions and solutions.
Most actions can be initiated during
the next scheduled outage as out-
lined in the section on long-term
actions. Certain obvious or immedi-
ate steps may be required such as
addressing the source of acid phos-
phate, chemical cleaning if tube
deposits are extensive, and/or
replacement of tubing if significant
wall thinning has occurred.
Repair and replacement procedures
for boiler tubes are summarized in
Chapter 11, Volume 1. It is most
important that damage caused by
acid phosphate corrosion is not
repaired locally by the use of pad
welding or canoe/window welds.
Penetration of the repair to the tube
ID can disrupt the boiler water flow
and start the acid phosphate corro-
sion cycle again. These repair meth-
ods can also result in copper embrit-
tlement and failure.
Prevention of acid phosphate corro-
sion is very much parallel with that
for the other under-deposit waterwall
corrosion mechanisms; that is, steps
should be taken to reduce the level
of deposits and minimize their future
formation, and to eliminate the
sources of harmful phosphate addi-
tions. Table 16-2 includes a sum-
mary of the long-term actions asso-
ciated with each of the root causes.
Since both deposits and a source of
phosphate salts are required to initi-
ate acid phosphate corrosion, pre-
vention begins with keeping the
boiler clean, minimizing the ingress of
feedwater corrosion products into the
boiler, and taking other steps neces-
sary to keep deposits to an accept-
ably low level. This is a major preven-
tive step for a number of other boiler
tube failure mechanisms in addition
to acid phosphate corrosion.
A significant effort has gone into
developing specific cycle chemistry
targets, action levels and shutdown
policies to maintain good boiler
cleanliness. As a minimum, steps to
eliminate phosphate hideout, or at
least not to “chase” it, and the use
of mono- and di-sodium phosphate
should be taken. It is important that
these changes be set up correctly,
since there is special concern about
the possibility of free hydroxide with
the use of equilibrium phosphate
treatment.
Of course, contamination can and
will occur into the cycle; the reaction
in all cases should be to increase
blowdown. Phosphate additions
may have to be made to neutralize
any caustic inleakage; this is the
only case in which mono-sodium
phosphate should be added.5
Action levels and shutdown limits on
cycle chemistry should be devel-
oped for each boiler for either phos-
phate treatment (PT) or equilibrium
phosphate treatment (EPT). In addi-
tion, at least the minimum levels of
instrumentation should be imple-
mented. These issues are examined
in more detail in Chapter 3, Volume
1.
Although not as desirable as avoid-
ing deposit buildup via proper feed-
water chemistry control, an opti-
mized chemical cleaning program to
remove corrosion product deposits
can be a critical part of the preven-
tion of failures by acid phosphate
corrosion. Optimized procedures for
deposition levels and chemical
cleaning are summarized in Chapter
4, Volume 1.
Where possible, modifications
should be made to prevent flow dis-
ruptions in susceptible locations.
Such modifications might include for
example, elimination of weld back-
ing rings or other internal surface
contour irregularities, and removal of
all previous pad welds, “canoe” sec-
tion, and window weld repairs. This
is good practice even if acid phos-
phate corrosion has not been a
problem as pad welds can lead to
several other BTF mechanisms.
Internally-ribbed or rifled tubing can
create more turbulence in the nor-
mal flow conditions and thus main-
tain nucleate boiling on the wall.
This lessens the chance of local
steam blanketing, buildup of
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-15
7. Case Studies
Acid Phosphate Corrosion Case Study I:
Field Experience
deposits, and wick boiling.
However, reliance on these as a
primary solution will not be likely to
solve a problem with acid phos-
phate corrosion where one or more
other root cause factors are occur-
ring. In fact, acid phosphate corro-
sion has occurred to serious levels
on a number of boilers with
ribbed/rifled tubing.
Modification of boiler operating
conditions such as excessive over-
firing or underfiring, misaligned
burners, gas channeling, and inad-
equate circulation rates may be
required to mitigate local thermal
hydraulic upsets. Furnace wall slag
pattern observation, burner inspec-
tion and adjustment to prevent
flame impingement, and identifica-
tion of burner misalignment, should
be a part of normal periodic
inspection practice. Certainly, if
any of these has been a root cause
of the acid phosphate corrosion,
then correction of the problem is
indicated.
Analysis of deposits found in tube
samples can help determine the
16-16 Acid Phosphate Corrosion
extent of deposition as well as the basis; and eliminating weld protru-
likelihood that phosphate concen- sions and other features that can
tration is occurring. Chapter 9, disrupt the local boiler water flow.
Volume 1 provides more detail
about tube sampling procedures.
It has been shown (see Case
Study I which follows this section)
that acid phosphate corrosion can
be prevented by use of the tech-
niques outlined above, especially
optimizing the boiler’s phosphate
treatment following a chemical
clean. As a result, it should not be
necessary to consider substi-
tution of more resistant materials to
confront the problem.
In summary, the long-term preven-
tion of acid phosphate corrosion
will include the following steps:
control of boiler phosphate levels;
reducing the incidence of phos-
phate hideout; keeping a clean
boiler; having monitoring systems
for detecting, and procedures for
dealing with, breakdowns in cycle
chemistry; ensuring that chemical
cleaning procedures are effective
and performed on the required
Table 16-3
Comparison of Key Factors in Field-Observed Acid Phosphate Corrosion(8)
Did Unit Mono- Was Di- Did Was Extensive Average Was
Boiler Experience Sodium Sodium WaterWalls Depth of Internal Corrosion Maricite
Pressure Phosphate Phosphate Phosphate have Rifled Gouged Corrosion Rate Found in
Unit (psi) Na:PO4 Hideout? Added? Added? Tubes? Areas (µm) Observed? (µm/yr) Deposits?

A 2000 2.6:1 Yes Yes Yes No Had gouges, No N/A N/A

depth N/A

B 2500+ 2.6:1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 2030 Yes 145 Yes

C 2500+ 2.8:1 Yes Yes, Yes Yes 5600 Yes, 1860 Yes
Extensive Extensive

D 2500+ 2.6:1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 9100 Yes, 830 Yes
Extensive

E 2600 2.6:1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4800 Yes 1200 Yes

F 2500+ 2.6:1 Yes No Yes No Had gouges, No N/A N/A

depth N/A

G 1850 2.5-2.6 Yes Yes Yes No 790 No 26 Yes

H 2600 2.6:1 Yes No Yes Yes 1300 Yes 90 Yes

I 1000 2.6:1 Yes No Yes No 3800 No 270 Yes

J 2500 2.6:1 Yes No Yes No Had gouges, No N/A Yes

depth N/A

K 2500 2.6:1 Yes Yes Yes, No 8890 No 740 Yes

Extensive

L 2600 2.2-2.6 Yes Yes Yes No Had gouges, No N/A N/A

depth N/A

M 2600 2.6:1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 6800 No 860 Yes

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-17

7. Case Studies (continued)

Acid Phosphate Corrosion Case Study II:

Metallurgical Analysis

Table 16-3 summarizes the key
characteristics of plant design,
operation, cycle chemistry, boiler
tube failures and the nature of the
deposits for thirteen units that have
recently experienced acid phos-
phate corrosion. In all cases the
utility had identified the cause of
the problem as caustic gouging. In
all cases, careful work subse-
quently identified acid phosphate
corrosion. There are a number of
important factors about the causes
of the problem that are highlighted
in this table:
1. Acid phosphate corrosion does
not occur in just high pressure
units. Although it has been more
predominant in those units oper-
ating above 2400 psi, it has been
observed down to 1000 psi.
2. All units were operated in a
Na:PO4 molar ratio regime
(around 2.6:1) where control was
difficult. This is the congruent
phosphate treatment regime. All
of the subject boilers were expe-
riencing phosphate hideout. This
necessitated the use of either
mono- and/or di-sodium phos-
phate as a control addition to
overcome the problem of phos-
phate hideout. In some cases a
ratio of 10:1, di- to tri-sodium
phosphate had been added to
the unit for control. These large
amounts of di-sodium phos-
phate (sometimes over 60
lbs./month) are considered
excessive.
3. Tube gouging and/or boiler tube
failures occurred in every unit. In
some units very extensive inter-
nal corrosion occurred over
large surface areas of the water
walls. No protective magnetite
was present on the tube sur-
face.
4. Although tubes from each boiler
were examined metallographi-
cally, for some of the units the
composition of deposits was
not determined; however,
maricite was confirmed in most
of the units where deposit com-
position was evaluated by x-ray
diffraction.
5. In a couple of units rifled tubes
had been installed during origi-
nal construction and six units
had rifled tubing when acid
phosphate corrosion occurred.
6. A very interesting and key
observation was made on one
unit. The corrosion and tube fail-
ures were so severe that the
boiler was chemically cleaned
and some of the worst tubes
were replaced. The chemical
control was switched from con-
gruent to equilibrium phosphate
treatment with only tri-sodium
phosphate being added. No
other changes to the unit took
place. A tube was removed one
year later and metallographically
analyzed. The previously
“gouged areas” had continued

Figure 16-8. Waterside surface of the tube segment showing the gouging corrosion.
The "railroad track" pattern of corrosion is indicative of local steam blanketing.
Detailed metallography was performed across the left hand deep gouge and is shown
in Figures 16-9 to 16-11.

16-18 Acid Phosphate Corrosion

Figure 16-9. Cross section of one of the gouged regions in Figure 16-8.
At this location, the corrosion had penetrated approximately 30% of the
wall thickness. Note the thick deposit in the corroded region and the
pad repair weld on the outside surface of the tube.

Figure 16-10. Enlarged view of the corrosion deposit shown in Figure 16-9 (MAG:16X)

Figure 16-11a, b. Detailed view of the

waterside deposit in the gouged area.
The deposit consisted of an inner layer
(a) with alternating dense and porous
regions covered by an outer layer (b)
which appeared to be relatively porous
and comprised of two phases. Also note
the absence of an indigenous (locally
formed) iron oxide at the deposit/metal
interface. This indicates that the corro-
sion rate was very severe.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-19

Figures 16-12a, b. Secondary electron image (a) and energy dispersive X-ray spectra
(b) of the inner layer shown in Figure 16-11a. This deposit consists of a tightly packed
crystalline material comprised primarily of sodium (Na), iron (Fe), and phosphorus (P).

16-20 Acid Phosphate Corrosion

to cause flow disruption and heavy deposits were pre-
sent in the gouge; however, no active corrosion sites
were found and a continuous layer of protective oxide
(Fe3O4) was present at the tube interface.
Unit Description: The unit is a drum-type natural circula-
tion boiler. Burners fire down onto slope tubes. Chemistry
control had included the use of mono-, di- and tri-sodium
phosphate additions.
Visual Examination of Failed Tube: An eight inch tube
segment was taken from the furnace side of a lower
waterwall slope tube. The waterside surface was covered
with a grayish-black corrosion deposit. In areas where
that deposit had sloughed-off a copper deposit was
observed. The waterside surface also manifested two
parallel corrosion grooves indicative of localized steam
blanketing approximately 2-inches long, along with three
round corrosion gouges (Figure 16-8). The deepest
gouge had penetrated the 0.89 cm (0.35 inch) wall thick-
ness.
Waterside Deposit Evaluation: The composition and mor-
phology of the deposits were characteristic of acid phos-
phate corrosion. Figure 16-9 shows one of the gouged
regions and covering deposits. The deposit was 1.27 mm
(0.05 inch) thick, and colored grayish-black as shown in
Figure 16-10. Distinct layering of alternating dense and
porous regions within the deposit is illustrated in Figures
16-11a and b. There was no locally formed protective
Fe3O4 scale at the deposit/metal interface indicating a
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-21
ACTIONS for Acid Phosphate Corrosion
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of acid
phosphate corrosion begin here.
The goal of these actions is to
see if further investigation of acid
phosphate corrosion is war-
ranted or whether another BTF
mechanism should be investi-
gated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and acid phosphate
corrosion is the likely mecha-
nism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by acid phosphate corrosion.
16-22 Acid Phosphate Corrosion
rapid rate of corrosive attack.
Energy dispersive X-ray (EDAX)
analyses were performed at two lev-
els in the deposit: (i) near the tube
wall (Figures 16-12a and b) and (ii)
in the middle of the cross section. In
both cases the constituents were pri-
marily Na, Fe and P with an EDAX
spectrum very similar to that for
maricite (NaFePO4). X-ray diffraction
analysis of the deposits confirmed
that maricite was indeed present.
The deposit near the tube wall
showed larger crystalline structure
than the finer particles of the middle
deposit region.
Tube Microstructure: The midwall
microstructure, in a severely cor-
roded region with thick deposits,
consisted of ferrite and pearlite.
There was no evidence of severe
overheating. These findings were
consistent with under-deposit cor-
rosion induced by steam blan-
keting.
Other Observations: A local pad
repair weld was found on the fireside
surface adjacent to the corroded
region. It was of poor quality and as
noted in the text, if such welds
cause flow disruption, that is, if the
bead penetrates the tube wall, they
can lead to more significant prob-
lems with deposit formation and sub-
sequent corrosion.
8. References
1Howell,
A., “Boiler Waterwall
Corrosion Damage Due to
Concentration of Phosphate in
Deposits”, Corrosion 95, NACE
International, Houston, TX, 1995.
2Mort,
T., M.E. Rogers, B. Skinner,
and R. Parson, “CO Boiler Reliability:
Examination of Failure Mechanisms,
Root Causes, Corrective Actions,
and Monitoring Required”, Corrosion
95, Paper #620, NACE International,
Houston, TX, 1995.
3Marginer,L.V. and K.A. Selby,
“Case History: Boiler Failure Due to
Acid Phosphate Corrosion”,
Watertech 92, pp. 68-73.
4Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S.
Moser, and H. Vaillancourt, Boiler
Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume
2: Appendices, Research Project
1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, October, 1993.
5Dooley, R.B., A. Aschoff, and F.
Pocock, Cycle Chemistry Guidelines
for Fossil Plants: Phosphate
Treatment for Drum Units, Final
Report TR-103655, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
December, 1994.
6Tremaine, et al., Sodium Phosphate
Chemistry Under High Pressure
Utility Drum-Boiler Conditions,
Volumes 1 through 3, Project 913
G730, Canadian Electric
Association, October, 1992.
7Goodstine, S.L., Behavior of Sodium
Phosphates under Boiler Conditions,
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is acid
phosphate corrosion.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being acid phosphate
corrosion damage (Action 1a).
Action 2 should clearly identify
acid phosphate corrosion as the
primary mechanism or point to
another cause. The actions listed
will be executed by removing
representative tube sample(s),
followed by visual examination
and detailed metallographic
analysis.
Final Report TR-102431, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto,
CA, June, 1994.
8Dooley, R.B. and S. Paterson,
“Phosphate Treatment: Boiler Tube
Failures Lead to Optimum
Treatment”, Proceedings of the 55th
International Water Conference,
Pittsburgh, PA, October 31 -
November 2, 1994.
9Scheerer, C.C. and J.K. Maxwell,
“Phosphate hideout: An On-Line
Indication of Boiler Cleanliness”,
Proceedings of the American Power
Conference, Vol. 52, April, 1990, pp.
1044-1050.
➠ Analyze in detail the failure sur-
face. Is the failure surface a pin-
hole, thin-edged crack, and/or
ductile in appearance?
➠ Determine extent of internal cor-
rosion and/or deposits. Is there
evidence of internal corrosion
and/or deposits?
➠ Analyze deposits. If deposits are
present, do they contain maricite
(NaFePO4)?
➠ Examine tube microstructure for
signs of decarburization and
microfissuring. Does tube
microstructure show distinctive
decarburization, particularly
acute at inside surface, and
microfissuring?
➠ Examine tube microstructure for
signs of overheating. Does tube
microstructure show presence
of transformation products
(martensite, retained austenite,
etc.)? Does it show signs of
creep damage?
Probable mechanism is acid phos-
phate corrosion
➠ Review Table 7-1 (Chapter 7,
Volume 1) to contrast with other
underdeposit corrosion mecha-
nisms.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
Brittle failures and/or thick-edged
fractures with significant wall thin-
ning by internal corrosion and with
deposits are more probably hydro-
gen damage.
Problem is probably not acid phos-
phate corrosion. If, for example,
there are deposits but no internal
corrosion, mechanism may be
overheating – either long – or
short-term. See separate discus-
sion of these mechanisms
Deposits with detectable chloride
are more indicative of hydrogen
damage mechanism; the presence
of sodium ferroate or sodium ferroite
are indicators of caustic gouging.
Mechanism is probably hydrogen
damage.
Transformation products are likely
to be indicative of short-term over-
heating, creep damage or long-
term overheating; suspect one of
these mechanisms particularly if
there is no corrosion or gouging of
tube inside surface.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-23
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the acid phosphate
corrosion
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as acid phosphate corro-
sion (Action 2) or a precursor to
acid phosphate corrosion has
occurred (Action 1b). The goal of
this Action 3 is for the BTF Team
to review the potential root
causes of acid phosphate corro-
sion, identify probable ones, and
take those actions that are
needed to confirm which are
operative in the unit. This step
must be taken so that the proper
actions can be taken to prevent
future BTF from occurring by this
mechanism. Execute, in parallel,
Action 4 to determine the extent
of damage.
16-24 Acid Phosphate Corrosion
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and acid phosphate cor-
rosion is the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of acid phosphate corrosion:
➠ Review Figure 16-4 for
typical boiler regions.
➠ Review Table 16-1 for
susceptible locations.
➠ Confirm that both of the neces-
sary precursors to acid phos-
phate corrosion are probably pre-
sent: waterside deposits and the
use of mono- and/or di-sodium
phosphate.
➠ Investigate whether a problem
with phosphate hideout is preva-
lent.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Thinned tube wall
• Thin-edged fracture surface
• Tube gouging under deposits
(Figures 16-2, 16-8)
• Thick layered deposits
(Figures 16-1, 16-10)
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
• More detailed discussion about the actions to confirm can be found in
the main text (this chapter) under the section number shown or in the
cross-references.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Analysis of results from chemistry
monitors mainly for levels of Fe and Cu.
➠ (b). Selective tube sampling for deposit
measurement.
➠ (c). Check efficacy of chemical cleaning.
➠ (d). Boiler inspection for susceptible sites.
➠ (e). Sampling for distinctive “bathtub ring”
deposits.
➠ (f). Circulation testing.
➠ (g). Inspect furnace wall for evidence of
flame impingement.
➠ (h). Check burner operation for possible
direct flame impingement.
➠ (i). Measure heat flux at selected locations.
➠ (j). Evaluate boiler water; black boiler water
samples are an indication that severe
corrosion is taking place over large areas of
the waterwall.
➠ (k). Determine if boiler has a persistent
problem with phosphate hideout: review
plant chemistry control logs, on-line cycle
chemistry records, chemical additions to
the boiler and/or alarms.
➠ (l). Review phosphate control additions,
tabulate monthly usage of mono- and
di-sodium phosphate for at least past two
years.
➠ (m). Perform metallurgical analysis to
confirm nature of deposits.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Evaluation will be
based on detection of (i)
wastage and wall thinning, or (ii)
indirectly, by the buildup of
waterside deposits. It is critical
that all tubing with acid phos-
phate corrosion damage or sig-
nificant wall loss be identified
since these regions are espe-
cially susceptible to ongoing cor-
rosion.
➠ Identify all locations to be examined. Refer to Section
1.2 of main text, Figure 16-4, and Table 16-1 for
typical locations. Missed locations are sites for future
failures.
➠ Perform UT survey to (i) measure extent of damage
via wall thinning or (ii) as an indirect indication of the
potential for damage by measuring the thickness of
waterside deposit buildup. A review of UT methods is
provided in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
➠ Perform tube sampling to confirm results of NDE
inspection, and to determine the degree of damage,
type, extent and thickness of deposits.
➠ Use results interactively with Action 3.
➠ Go to Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate
Solutions and Actions.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-25
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
pick a more likely candidate. Action 1b: If a precursor has
The BTF Team must ensure that occurred in the unit that could
repairs and immediate solutions lead to future BTF by acid phos-
are directly tied to the underlying phate corrosion.
cause. Most actions can be con-
sidered for the longer-term ➠ Determine whether one or more of
(Action 6) but several underlying the following precursors has been
problems can be dealt with in found or is likely to have occurred
the short-term. in the unit:
• Evidence of a persistent prob-
lem with phosphate hideout,
particularly where control has
been by the use of mono-
sodium phosphate or an excess
of di-sodium phosphate.
• Excessive waterside deposits.
• Boiler water samples that
appear black, indicative of
heavy corrosion over large
areas.
• Sources of flow disruption. See
Table 16-1 for a comprehensive
list.
• Fireside conditions that could
lead to overheating of the
tubes. See Table 16-1 for a list
of typical conditions.
➠ These precursors can be root
causes for acid phosphate corro-
sion. If one or more has occurred,
go to Action 3 which outlines the
steps to confirm the influence of
each.

16-26 Acid Phosphate Corrosion

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on clear identification of
the underlying root cause (Action
3) and an economic evaluation
to ensure that the optimum strat-
egy has been chosen.
Major Root Cause Influences
References to other sources of detailed information:
• Main text (this chapter) provides the background to mechanism and the
development of acid phosphate corrosion.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Optimize chemical cleaning procedures.
See summary of practices in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
➠ Keep deposits to an acceptable level. See
guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
➠ Minimize feedwater corrosion products
through control of chemistry particularly pH
and O2 scavenger additions; Fe < 5 ppb and
Cu < 2 ppb at economizer inlet. See also
Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Monitor for effectiveness of chemistry
control.
➠ Remove all pad welds.
➠ Replace weld repairs, canoe piece repairs,
as needed to ensure good flow conditions.
➠ Remove weld backing rings.
➠ Modify tube geometry.
➠ Use rifled tubing if other primary measures
are unsuccessful.
➠ Design modifications, as needed.
➠ Periodic re-inspection for proper burner
alignment.
➠ Develop optimum phosphate treatment or
move to AVT.
➠ Implement appropriate chemistry guidelines
and instrumentation. See Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
➠ Avoid chasing hideout.
➠ Avoid use of mono- and di-sodium
phosphate. Add only tri-sodium phosphate.
➠ Install appropriate control room alarms and
monitoring systems.
➠ Consider change to equilibrium phosphate
treatment (EPT) or phosphate treatment (PT)
to control hideout problem. See Figure 16-
5; also Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Alternatively, if the unit has a condensate
polisher, consider changing to AVT
following the next chemical clean.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 16-27
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of acid
phosphate corrosion damage or
its precursors. Most of the root
causes of acid phosphate corro-
sion can also cause other unit
problems, therefore avoiding the
following root causes will have
benefit throughout the unit: (i)
excessive deposits, (ii) overtem-
perature in tubes, (iii) flow dis-
ruption, and (iv) improper cycle
chemistry.
16-28 Acid Phosphate Corrosion
Acid Phosphate Alert for Other Cycle
Corrosion Aspect Components
Deposits indicate high • Poor feedwater chem-
feedwater corrosion istry control (probably iron
products levels at the economizer
inlet are > 10 ppb).
• High Cu levels in
deposits might indicate Cu
deposition in HP turbine.
Potential BTF by overheat-
ing and creep.
Excessive deposits Potential BTF by overheat-
ing and creep.
Geometric boiler water • Potential for excessive
flow disruptions deposit buildup.
• Potential for tube
failures by overheating.
Phosphate hideout Not a problem by itself;
however, “chasing” the
hideout problem through
the use of mono- and/or an
excess of di-sodium phos-
phate can lead to excess
phosphate throughout the
boiler with possible carry-
over into the turbine.
Excessive phosphate in Possibility for transport
steam and deposit in SH/RH and
turbine.
Fireside problems • Possible BTF by fireside
(flame impingement, corrosion of waterwall
burner alignment, tubing.
major fuel change). • Possible BTF by
overheating.
➠ Actions Indicated
➠ Implement stricter cycle chemistry
control program, and instrumentation
(see Chapter 3, Volume 1).
➠ Develop monitoring program to opti-
mize feedwater chemistry and use of O2
scavengers (see Chapter 3, Volume 1).
➠ Sampling to determine nature and
extent of deposit problem. See Chapter
6, Volume 1 for metallographic methods
overview; Chapter 9, Volume 1 for sam-
pling methods.
➠ Apply guidelines for chemical
cleaning. See summary in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
➠ Remove pad welds and other
improper repairs.
➠ Identify and remove other sources for
flow disruption.
➠ Optimize phosphate treatment without
excessive use of phosphate additives;
various alternatives are available, see
discussion in Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Check steam chemistry and carry-
over.
➠ Inspect and adjust as required.
Chapter 17 • Volume 2
Caustic Gouging
Introduction
Caustic gouging is the third of three
waterside under-deposit corrosion
mechanisms discussed in this book.
It occurs when boiler water caustic
concentrates to high pH levels within
tube deposits formed from feedwa-
ter corrosion products. Under such
conditions, the normally protective
magnetite layer is dissolved and
rapid corrosion of the tube material
occurs. Waterside deposits are
porous, in contrast to protective
magnetite, and thus serve as a trap
for corrosive impurities such as
caustic, chlorides and acid sulfates.
Steam bubbles forming in deposits
help to concentrate corrodents up to
10,000 times the bulk boiler water
concentration.
Caustic gouging has also variously
been called: “caustic attack”, “caus-
tic corrosion”, or “ductile gouging”.
Hydrogen damage, caustic gouging,
and acid phosphate corrosion, all
waterside under-deposit corrosion
mechanisms, can produce features
that may appear to be superficially
similar. This means that attention
must be paid to more subtle distin-
guishing characteristics. The root
causes are vastly different and thus
the routes to prevention of repeat
failures are also quite different. The
distinctions among the three are dis-
cussed throughout this chapter; ref-
erence can also be made to Chapter
7, Volume 1 for a more detailed dis-
cussion of the features that distin-
guish the three.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 17-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
Caustic Gouging:
Identification Keys
1. Gouging on the tube inside
surface with the presence of
distinctive layered deposits
generally containing crystals
of sodium ferroate and/or
sodium ferroite.
2. Needs a source of caustic
above that required for chem-
istry control using normal
caustic treatment or an addi-
tion of caustic made to correct
pH in all-volatile treatment.
3. Susceptible locations in the
boiler are where both deposits
and an excess concentration
of caustic can occur.
4. Distinguished from hydrogen
damage or acid phosphate
corrosion by the composition
of the deposits formed and
by cycle chemistry operating
history.
17-2 Caustic Gouging
1.1 Features of failure
A typical macroscopic feature of
caustic gouging is the presence of
distinct hemispherical or elliptical
depressions on the inside surface of
the tube usually filled with a thick,
layered deposit (Figures 17-1 and
17-2). A feature that distinguishes
caustic gouging from other underde-
posit corrosion mechanisms is the
presence of deposits which contain
distinctive crystals of sodium fer-
roate and/or sodium ferroite in the
layered deposits (Figure 17-3).
After removal of the deposits, tube
gouging is generally evident as a
smooth, undulating surface as
shown in Figure 17-4. Final failure
will be caused by progressive wall
thinning, leading to a thin-edged
fracture or as a pinhole in a region
of reduced wall thickness.
Microstructurally, unlike hydrogen
damage, there is no iron carbide
reaction with hydrogen, nor is there
microstructural deterioration as a
Figure 17-1. Thick deposits and gouged tube metal on the downstream side of a
weld. A large amount of copper is deposited and the deposit is laminated.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1
result of the under-deposit corrosion
process. There may be some over-
heating evident in the tube steel as
evidenced by the spheroidization of
pearlite if the deposition process has
led to localized tube overheating.
There is superficial similarity among
caustic gouging, hydrogen damage
and acid phosphate corrosion; all
are waterside, underdeposit corro-
sion processes that result in tube
gouging and usually result in the
presence of extensive deposits. The
differences among the three mecha-
nisms are discussed in detail in
Chapter 7, Volume 1.
1.2 Locations of failure
The regions of the boiler where
caustic gouging commonly appears
are similar to those for hydrogen
damage and for acid phosphate
corrosion, as shown in Figure 17-5.
Table 17-1 lists the specific charac-
teristics of susceptible locations.
On a given tube, failure will gener-
ally initiate on the hot (heat adsorp-
tion) side of the tube. The higher
heat transfer rates cause faster
deposition of feedwater corrosion
products, of locally generated corro-
sion products, and of caustic con-
centrations. This in turn leads to the
earlier interruption on this side of the
tube of the free exchange of water
between the metal surface and the
bulk fluid.

Figure 17-3. Needle shaped crystals in the deposits. Source: S.R.

Paterson, et al.1

Figure 17-4. Smooth, undulating tube surface at an area of caustic gouging. Deposits
have been removed by glass bead blasting. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Figure 17-2. Cross section through the

thick, layered deposit shown in Figure
17-1. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 17-3

 Table 17-1
Local Tube Conditions Which
Can Lead to Initial Deposits
Locations where the water/fluid flow
adjacent to the tube wall is disrupted
• Welded joints such as:
• Joints with backing rings
• Poor repair welds such as pad welds,
“canoe” pieces or window welds
• Poor weld overlay (penetrating to the
inside surface)
• Locations with existing internal deposits
caused by:
• A deposition mechanism
• Deposits left from improper chemical
cleaning
• Locally high heat flux
• Locally high steam quality
• Geometric features
• Bends around burners or openings
• Sharp changes of direction (such as
the nose of the furnace)
• Tubes bending off lower headers and
Figure 17-5. Typical boiler locations drums
where caustic gouging occurs.
Locations with a high heat flux
Locations where boiling first initiates
Locations with thermal-hydraulic flow
disruptions
• Locations with local very high steam
quality
• Locations with horizontal or inclined
tubing heated from above or below
Localized overheating of the tube
(fireside conditions)
• Flame impingement
• Burner misalignment
• Operating conditions such as overfiring or
underfiring, gas channeling, or inadequate
circulation rates
• Major change in fuel source, such as
higher BTU value coal, dual firing with
gas, changeover to oil or gas firing where
heat flux increases.

17-4 Caustic Gouging

2. Mechanism of Failure
Caustic Gouging: Mechanism
1. Caustic gouging requires a
local breakdown of the nor-
mally protective oxide on the
tube inside surface, which
occurs via a fluxing of the pro-
tective oxide.
2. Facilitating conditions include
localized flow disruption, local
steam blanketing, formation of
deposits from feedwater cor-
rosion products, presence of
crevices, and the presence of
sodium hydroxide.
3. Caustic gouging requires both
a local concentrating mecha-
nism (e.g. deposits or
crevices) and the presence of
caustic.
2.1 Introduction
Caustic gouging occurs because of
a breakdown in the normally protec-
tive oxide layer (see Chapter 2,
Volume 1 for a discussion of the
nominal condition within a tube and
sources for its breakdown). As with
the other underdeposit corrosion
mechanisms, caustic gouging dam-
age normally begins with disruption
of the fluid flow (water/steam) adja-
cent to the tube wall and/or the for-
mation of deposits, in which a con-
centration of caustic leads eventu-
ally to failure. Neither the deposition
of feedwater corrosion products, nor
the presence of caustic by them-
selves lead to caustic gouging,
although each can be a contributing
factor to a host of other problems as
well as precursors (jointly) to caustic
gouging.
2.2 Key aspects of sodium
hydroxide in cycle chemistry
treatment alternatives
Sodium hydroxide is a primary con-
trol chemical for several alternative
cycle chemistry treatments. It is, of
course, predominant in sodium
hydroxide treatment, but is also
used with AVT, and is increasingly
recognized as a primary source of
control for phosphate treatments.
The potential for caustic gouging has
been recognized for many years. In
the early 1960s, a study by the
Research Committee on Boiler
Feedwater Studies of the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) was conducted to identify
types of corrosion occurring in units
operated in the range from 800 to
2600 psi.2-5 One of the conclusions
from that study, applicable to the
analysis of caustic gouging potential,
was that AVT did not provide protec-
tion from corrosion upon the ingress
of seawater; but such corrosion
could be reduced by adding sodium
phosphate or sodium hydroxide to
increase boiler water pH. However,
the addition of sufficient sodium
hydroxide to arrest seawater corro-
sion, when accompanied by tube
deposits, led to caustic attack, par-
ticularly in high flux zones.
Masterson, Castle and Mann6 con-
cluded that the combination of a
buildup of thick, porous oxide
deposits with high temperatures and
wick boiling could result in concen-
tration factors of up to 10,000.
Figure 17-6 illustrates schematically
the concentrating gradients that can
develop for sodium hydroxide.
The experience base indicates that
the predominant source of caustic
concentration is higher than normal
levels of caustic for units operating
with caustic treatment, or excessive
additions of caustic during startup
or to neutralize acid contaminants in
units operating with AVT. As a rule of
thumb, for a 2400 psig unit an
excessive caustic level would be >>
2 ppm in the boiler especially when
the walls are dirty.
Another source of excessive caustic
could be a breakdown in the water
treatment plant. Sulfuric acid and
sodium hydroxide are typically used
to regenerate ion exchange resins in
the condensate polisher or make-up
system. Inadequate rinsing of
sodium hydroxide following regener-
ation can be a source of caustic in
the feedwater.
Note that caustic gouging will not
generally occur on units under con-
gruent phosphate treatment; in these
cases boiler tube failures that are
caused by an under-deposit corro-
sion mechanism will nearly always
turn out to be acid phosphate corro-
sion (Chapter 16).
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 17-5
a aa
Temperature, °F
750

725

700

675

650

Boiler water
DTm=85°

(low pH conditions)

Deposit

Tube steel
DTf=15°

Anode: Fe0 - 2e
Film

Gradient

H+
650° 100

Fe++

Fe0
2e
Anode

Cathode: 2H+ + 2e
Fe++
2H0
ppm NaOH
665° - 220,000
655° - 100,000
652° - 50,000

Temperature

Saturation - 2200 psig

DTm - Change in tube metal temperature

DT - Change in film temperature

Figure 17-6. Illustration of the "concentrating film" theory. When

wall deposits form, the internal tube temperature increases and the
temperature of the water in the film along the wall rises. Highly cor-
rosive caustic concentrations can be produced by this elevation in
temperature. As shown here, a 15°F film gradient (650°F to 665°F)
will allow an increase in sodium hydroxide concentration from 100
ppm in the boiler water to 220,000 ppm at the tube surface.
Source: H.A. Grabowski and H.A. Klein7

H+

2H0
H+
105

H+

H+

Cathodes
H+

2H0

H0 = Hydrogen atom
H+ = Hydrogen ion

Figure 17-7a. Electrochemical corrosion cell for hydrogen damage. An acidic upset in
boiler water conditions results in concentration of hydrogen ions in the deposit and dif-
fusion of hydrogen into the tube steel. Source: G.A. Lamping and R.M Arrowood, Jr.9

17-6 Caustic Gouging

106

104

103

102

H+

2e
Fe0

Anode
Sodium Hydroxide Concentration, ppm

Fe++

Fe0 = Iron atom

Fe++ = Iron ion
e = Electron
H+
There is justified concern about the
potential for boiler tube failures and
other detrimental effects (such as
caustic gouging in the boiler, carry-
over into the steam, and damage to
austentitic materials in superheaters
and to turbine materials) in the opera-
tion of units under high levels of
sodium hydroxide and sodium phos-
phate treatment such as were
employed in the 1950s and 1960s.
As sodium hydroxide becomes more
widely used to improve the control of
phosphate treatments, care must be
taken so that a problem with exces-
sive caustic does not occur.
However, modern control practices
utilize significantly lower levels, and
strict controls can be established that
will prevent the detrimental effects of
excessive caustic. A conservative
approach is to limit the free sodium
hydroxide to 1 ppm maximum.8

2.3 Developing caustic

gouging damage
Damage by caustic gouging begins
with the accumulation of feedwater
corrosion products, usually as a
result of a surface flow disruption
similar to those listed in Table 17-1.
The situation can be exacerbated by
fireside conditions such as flame
impingement or burner misalign-
ment. In fact, any feature that gives
rise to an increase in steam quality
locally, can lead to caustic gouging.
High corrosion rates occur in tube
steel in either low pH or high pH
conditions. Just as hydrogen dam-
age is the result of local low pH con-
ditions, caustic gouging occurs in
locally high pH conditions. In the low
pH environment, there is a concen-
tration of hydrogen ions in the
deposit and hydrogen atoms diffuse
into the tube steel. That diffusion of
hydrogen leads to degradation of
the microstructure through the
process described in Chapter 15 on
hydrogen damage. Figure 17-7a
shows the electrochemical cell that
causes hydrogen damage.
In the caustic case, there is a con-
centration of hydroxide ions in the
deposit and the escape of hydrogen
gas into the boiler water as illus-
trated in Figure 17-7b; there is no
diffusion of hydrogen into the tube
steel. As a result, there is no
microstructural change in the tube
steel.
The concentrated NaOH
dissolves/fluxes the oxide and/or

a
metal. Once saturation is passed
there is a precipitation of character-
istic sodium ferroate or sodium fer-
roite crystals. Local thermal-
hydraulic conditions such as wick
boiling or steam blanketing increas-
ingly concentrate caustic in the
deposits; this will result in the situa-
tion shown in Figure 17-8. The tube
inside surface will have a thin layer
of magnetite, much reduced from its
normal protective thickness, or per-
haps, depending on the corrosion
rate, non-existent. Covering any
remaining oxide is a layer of concen-
trated NaOH. It is at this interface
that the corrosion reaction occurs
between the concentrated NaOH
and either oxide or tube metal. The
concentrated NaOH dissolves away
(or fluxes) the oxide layer, or if the
reaction is rapid, the tube metal
directly.
Typical reaction of the protective
magnetite with caustic is:
Fe3O4 + 4NaOH ® 2NaFeO2
+ Na2FeO2 + 2 H2O
and with iron is:
2NaOH + Fe ®
Na2FeO2 + H2(gas)
(17-1)

(17-2)
As a result of the concentration of
caustic in deposits, the corrosion
rate increases and leads to concur-
rent wall thinning. The end result is a
gouged area containing significant
deposits. If the process continues,
the tube fails when the local pres-
sure exceeds the strength of the
remaining tube material. It is often
manifested as a small pinhole leak.
Caustic concentration can lead to
high rates of attack (up to 2 mm/year),
but not as high as with acidic contam-
ination, such as hydrogen damage,
where corrosion rates can be > 10
mm/year. Masterson, et al.,6 empha-
size the point that in order to give
comparable corrosion rates, sodium
aa
Boiler water
(High pH conditions)

Deposit

Tube steel
H+

Cathode

Anode: Fe0 - 2e

Boiler
water
H+

2H0

Cathode: 2H++ 2e

Crystals of sodium
ferroate and ferroite
H2

Fe++
2H 0

Region of influence of
concentrated NaOH
2e

H2

hydroxide must concentrate by a fac-

tor of ten to one hundred times more
strongly than acid chloride. This
explains why an ingress of caustic
from a breakdown in the makeup sys-
tem is less likely to result in caustic
gouging than an ingress in acid is to
cause hydrogen damage.
The corrosive process can be
stopped if the boiler is chemically
cleaned and the water chemistry is
OH-

OH-
Fe++

Fe0
OH-

Fe++

Anode

H+ = Hydrogen ion
Fe0
OH-

2e

products
H+

Concentrated
NaOH

Protective
Fe3O4
H+

2H0

Tube wall

Figure 17-8. Schematic of caustic gouging beneath a region of heavy deposition.

Depending on the rate of corrosion there may be a layer of protective Fe3O4 beneath
the concentrated NaOH.

corrected. Although some tubes

H2

Cathode

H0 = Hydrogen atom Fe0 = Iron atom e = Electron

Fe++ = Iron ion OH- = Hydroxide ion

Figure 17-7b. Electrochemical corrosion cell for caustic gouging. A caustic upset in
boiler water conditions results in concentration of hydroxide ions in the deposit and
generation of hydrogen gas at the boiler water/deposit interface.
Source: G.A. Lamping and R.M Arrowood, Jr.9

Corrosion
products
Feedwater corrosion

may have suffered wall loss, they

may still be able to function with the
reduced section and proportionately
higher hoop stress levels. However,
the remaining gouges can act as
flow disrupters and thus it is impor-
tant to keep the feedwater corrosion
products and NaOH levels at, or
below, normal guideline values.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 17-7

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Caustic Gouging: Root Causes
1. Excessive deposits usually
occur in areas of flow disrup-
tion, high heat flux, or where
boiling first initiates, often
exacerbated by fireside
impingement or burner mis-
alignment.
2. Concentration of caustic in the
deposits is usually triggered
by (i) too high a level of caus-
tic under caustic treatment, (ii)
the addition of too much caus-
tic under AVT or phosphate
treatment, or (iii) ingress of
caustic from regeneration of
condensate polishers or
makeup resins.
17-8 Caustic Gouging
3.1 Introduction
Since both deposits and contamina-
tion by locally high pH solutions are
required for damage to accumulate
by caustic gouging, the description
of root causes is divided into sepa-
rate sections for excessive deposits
and for caustic concentration. Table
17-2 summarizes the possible root
causes, their confirmation, and cor-
rective actions.
3.2 Influence of excessive
deposits
Deposits allow concentration of
available caustic; caustic levels in
the bulk of as low as 10 ppm have
been found to cause significant
caustic gouging problems if there
are excessive deposits on the tube
surface. This limit can be lower
under high heat flux conditions
such as in oil-fired units. Deposits
normally begin to form when any of
several conditions are present, such
as listed in Table 17-1. Independent
of their source the following are
actions to confirm.
(a). Analysis of results from cycle
chemistry monitoring and instrumen-
tation to determine the level of cor-
rosion products entering the boiler
at the economizer inlet. Particularly
important indicators of corrosion
product transport that cause deposit
formation are Fe and Cu levels at
the economizer inlet; other factors
that affect the cleanliness of the
cycle chemistry are levels of pH,
cation conductivity, and oxygen.
Normal guidance is to keep the iron
level below 5 ppb and copper
below 2 ppb at the economizer inlet.
(b). Selective boiler waterwall tube
sampling from suspect regions to
measure deposition. Examples of
possible locations are indicated in
Table 17-1. Tube sampling practices
and test methods are briefly sum-
marized in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
(c). Check the efficacy of prior
chemical cleaning operations, such
as for the remnants of scab-like
deposits, to determine whether an
appropriate frequency is being used
or whether the boiler has been
allowed to exceed the guideline val-
ues which are summarized in
Chapter 4, Volume 1.
Specific areas of preferential deposi-
tion include those of geometric flow
disruption and fireside conditions
addressed in order below.
3.2.1 Flow disruption. Typical
causes of flow disruption are
included in Table 17-1. In several of
these locations there can be a strati-
fication of steam to the top of the
tube and water to the bottom. The
condition termed “steam blanketing”
can lead to higher tube wall temper-
atures where the steam phase
occurs leading to faster deposition
rates, as well as accelerated corro-
sion and deposition at the interface
between the two phases. Potential
for steam blanketing to occur is
highest when the velocity of the fluid
is not high enough to maintain turbu-
lence and produce thorough mixing,
such as at low loads and full pres-
sure. Stepped and bathtub patterns
of corrosion are characteristic when
local areas are experiencing steam
blanketing.
Smaller and more local areas of
steam blanketing can also be initi-
ated by local features such as tube
laps, backing rings, and even
deposits. These areas may be as
small as a few millimeters in diameter.
Actions to confirm will generally be
indirect and focus on whether
deposits have begun to form or
whether the necessary pre-existing
conditions for deposition exist; that
is, actions should be taken to deter-
mine the cleanliness of the waterwall
Table 17-2
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause
Influences
3.2 Excessive Deposits
3.2.1 Flow disruption:
- weld backing bar/ring
- poor weld geometry, pad
welds, canoe piece repairs,
etc.
- deposits
- locally high heat flux or
steam quality
- bends or sharp changes in
tube direction
- horizontal or near horizontal
tubing
- local regions of DNB
3.2.2 Fireside Conditions
- flame impingement
- burner misalignment
- major change in fuel source
3.3 Sources of Caustic Concentration
3.3.1 Elevated caustic level
over time (units on
caustic treatment)
3.3.2 Excessive caustic
addition to units
on AVT
Actions to Confirm
(a). Analysis of results from chemistry
monitors mainly for levels of Fe and Cu.
(b). Selective tube sampling for deposit
measurement.
(c). Check efficacy of chemical cleaning.
(d). Boiler inspection for susceptible sites.
(e). Sampling for distinctive “bathtub ring”
deposits.
(f). Circulation testing.
(g). Inspect furnace wall for evidence of
flame impingement.
(h). Check burner operation for possible
direct flame impingement.
(i). Measure heat flux at selected locations.
(j). Review plant chemistry control logs,
on-line cycle chemistry records, or
instrumentation alarms.
(k). Review plant chemistry control logs,
on-line cycle chemistry records, or
instrumentation alarms.
Immediate Actions
and Solutions
• See long-term actions.
• See long-term actions.
• Adjust burners, etc.
• Depending upon sever-
ity, initiate established
procedures for unit shut-
down and chemical
clean, as needed.
• As above, plus
• Reduce levels of NaOH
addition.
• As above, plus
• Use blowdown more
effectively to minimize
NaOH additions.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes
Long-Term Actions and
Prevention of Repeat Failures
• Optimize chemical cleaning procedures.
See summary of practices in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
• Keep deposits to an acceptable level
See guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
• Minimize feedwater corrosion products
through control of chemistry particu-
larly pH and O2 scavenger additions;
Fe < 5 ppb and Cu < 2 ppb at econo-
mizer inlet. See also Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
• Monitor for effectiveness of chemistry
control.
• Remove all pad welds.
• Replace weld repairs, canoe piece
repairs, as needed to ensure good flow
conditions.
• Remove weld backing rings.
• Modify tube geometry.
• Use rifled tubing if other primary
measures are unsuccessful.
• Design modifications, as needed.
• Periodic re-inspection for proper burner
alignment.
• Implement appropriate chemistry guide-
lines and minimum instrumentation.
• Install appropriate control room alarms.
• Revise cycle chemistry procedures to
prevent recurrence; may include operat-
ing changes, alarms, additional moni-
toring, etc.
• As above.
17-9
Table 17-2
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions (Continued)
Major Root Cause
Influences Actions to Confirm
3.3.3 Excessive caustic (l). As above.
addition to control
phosphate treatment
3.3.4 Water treatment plant (m). Check/confirm operation and records
upset leading to high of regeneration of water treatment plant
pH condition equipment.
(regeneration of
condensate polishers
or makeup water ion
exchange resins,
for example)
tubes. In addition to those actions
listed in (a) through (c) above, addi-
tional steps may include:
(d). Examine boiler and mainte-
nance history for evidence of poten-
tial flow disruption sites: particularly
pad welds, canoe pieces, poor
repairs, etc.
(e). Sampling for distinctive “bath-
tub ring” deposits, especially on
tubes that are not vertical.
(f). Circulation testing has also been
suggested as a means to measure
directly individual waterwall tube
flow rates, heat fluxes, and metal
temperatures as a function of load
level.
3.2.2 Fireside conditions such as
flame impingement, burner misalign-
ment, or a major change in fuel
source. Fireside conditions can
allow deposits of feedwater corro-
sion products to form rapidly at high
steaming rates and high metal tem-
peratures. Higher steaming rates
and tube temperatures can also be
experienced with a major change in
fuel source, such as (i) changing to
a higher BTU value coal, (ii) some
necessary (forced) dual firing with
17-10 Caustic Gouging
Immediate Actions
and Solutions
• As above. plus
• Set-up optimum phos-
phate treatment control
range.
• Shut down unit, remove
excess sodium hydrox-
ide, chemically clean
unit.
gas, or (iii) changeover to oil- or
gas-firing where the local heat flux is
dramatically increased.
Note that such conditions can also
lead to other boiler tube failure
mechanisms such as thermally
induced departure from nucleate
boiling, overheating, and subse-
quent premature failure by creep.
Actions to confirm consist of:
(g). Inspect furnace water wall slag
patterns for evidence of flame
impingement
(h). Check burner operation for
direct flame impingement on the
(side) water wall.
(i). Measure heat flux at selected
locations.
3.3 Influence of caustic con-
centration
3.3.1 Elevated caustic level over a
period of time during normal opera-
tion for those units operating on
caustic treatment. As discussed
above, the historical experience
base suggests that operation for a
long period of time under caustic
treatment with levels in excess of
Long-Term Actions and
Prevention of Repeat Failures
• As above.
• As above, plus
• Revise regeneration procedures to
encompass safety measures on
operation of valves.
that required for normal control is
the most likely source for a concen-
tration of caustic. High levels of
caustic, greater than 10 ppm, in the
boiler water of boilers operating
above 1600 psig for long periods
and in the presence of high feedwa-
ter product transports (for example
iron > 10 ppb and/or copper > 5
ppb) are indicators of conditions
that might lead to caustic gouging.
In a few boilers operating above
2400 psi, NaOH concentrations as
low as 2-3 ppm can be sufficient to
cause caustic gouging.10
Actions to confirm consist of:
(j). Review plant chemistry control
logs, on-line cycle chemistry
records, or instrumentation alarms
for evidence of long-term levels of
sodium hydroxide.
3.3.2 Excessive caustic addition to
all-volatile treatment (AVT) during
startup and to overcome contamina-
tion.
Actions to confirm consist of:
(k). Review plant chemistry control
logs, on-line cycle chemistry
records, instrumentation alarms, and
chemical additions to boiler.
3.3.3 Excessive caustic addition as
a control chemical in units operating
under phosphate treatments There
are no known instances to date of
caustic gouging being caused by
this possible root cause. It is cur-
rently thought, after reviewing the
experience base for units with con-
gruent phosphate treatment, that
acid phosphate corrosion is much
more likely to underlie most of the
observed waterwall, waterside
underdeposit corrosion problems
than is caustic gouging. However,
because of recent developments in
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Caustic Gouging: Immediate
Solutions and Actions
Address the source of caustic
concentration, chemically clean
if tube deposits are extensive,
and/or replace tubing where sig-
nificant wall thinning has
occurred.
control philosophy methods for units
under phosphate control, discussed
in Chapter 3, Volume 1, it is likely
that sodium hydroxide may be pre-
sent in more phosphate-treated
units.8
Actions to confirm consist of:
(l). Review plant chemistry control
logs, on-line cycle chemistry records,
or instrumentation alarms. Of particu-
lar interest is when operation is
occurring outside of the Na/PO4 con-
trol range and, importantly, what
chemicals have been added to the
boiler water.
As caustic gouging is manifested by
tube thinning, ultrasonic testing (UT)
is the main NDE method to deter-
mine the extent of affected tubes.
UT has also been applied to mea-
sure the extent of waterside deposits
Table 17-2 includes a summary of
immediate actions and solutions.
Most actions can be taken at the
next outage, as outlined in the next
section. Certain obvious steps may
be required immediately such as
addressing the source of NaOH,
particularly if it is a result of a major
upset (such as water treatment plant
failure), chemical cleaning if tube
deposits are extensive, and/or
replacement of tubing if significant
wall thinning has occurred.
3.3.4 Ingress of caustic from regen-
eration of ion exchange resins for
condensate polishers or makeup
water. Ingress of sodium hydroxide
caused by improper valving opera-
tion or inadequate rinsing after
regenerating ion exchange resins in
the condensate polisher or make up
system, could be a potential source
for concentration. This is much rarer
than instances of acid (from regen-
eration) entry into the boiler water to
cause hydrogen damage.
Actions to confirm consist of:
(m). Check the records of, and con-
firm regeneration operations.
and thus characterize a critical pre-
cursor to caustic gouging. Reviews
of standard methods of NDE for wall
thinning and recent developments
for deposit measurement are pro-
vided in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
Repair and replacement procedures
for boiler tubes are summarized in
Chapter 11, Volume 1. It is most
important that damage caused by
caustic gouging is not repaired
locally by the use of pad welding or
canoe/window welds. Penetration of
the repair to the tube ID can disrupt
the boiler water flow and start the
caustic gouging cycle again. These
repair methods can also result in
copper embrittlement and failure.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 17-11
6. Background to Long-term Actions and Prevention of
Repeat Failures
Caustic Gouging:
Long-Term Mitigation
1. Minimize deposits by keeping
boiler clean and taking steps
to reduce the ingress of feed-
water corrosion products into
the boiler.
2. Initiate chemistry control mea-
sures to ensure that excessive
levels of caustic are not pre-
sent in the cycle.
3. Other actions include minimiz-
ing sources of flow disruption,
ensuring proper adjustment of
fireside condition, adjusting
operating procedures to pre-
vent hot spot formation, etc.
17-12 Caustic Gouging
Prevention of caustic gouging is
very much parallel with that for the
other under-deposit waterwall corro-
sion mechanisms; that is, steps
should be taken to reduce the level
of deposits and minimize their future
formation, and to minimize the level
of concentration, in this case caus-
tic. Table 17-2 includes a summary
of the long-term mitigation steps
associated with each root cause.
Since both deposits and caustic
concentration are required to initiate
caustic gouging, prevention begins
with keeping the boiler clean, mini-
mizing the ingress of feedwater cor-
rosion products into the boiler, and
taking other steps necessary to
keep deposits to an acceptably low
level. This is a major preventive step
for a number of other boiler tube fail-
ure mechanisms as well as caustic
gouging. Optimized deposition lev-
els and procedures for chemical
cleaning are summarized in Chapter
4, Volume 1.
A significant effort has gone into
developing specific cycle chemistry
targets, action levels and shutdown
policies to maintain good boiler
cleanliness. Available guidelines
and information sources are dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 3,
Volume 1. As a minimum, normal tar-
gets, action levels, and shutdown
limits should be developed for each
boiler. It is also extremely important
that the feedwater chemistry is opti-
mized. Among a number of key fac-
tors, optimizing the use of oxygen
scavengers is of paramount impor-
tance in controlling feedwater corro-
sion products at the economizer
inlet. Also at least the minimum lev-
els of instrumentation should be
implemented as outlined in Chapter
3, Volume 1.
Where possible, modifications
should be made to prevent flow dis-
ruptions in susceptible locations.
Such modifications might include for
example, elimination of weld back-
ing rings or other internal surface
contour irregularities, and removal of
all previous pad welds, “canoe” sec-
tion, and window weld repairs. This
is good practice even if caustic
gouging has not been a problem as
pad welds can lead to several other
BTF mechanisms. Design modifica-
tions to eliminate inadequate circula-
tion and the resultant steam blanket-
ing may also be required.
Internally-ribbed or rifled tubing can
create more turbulence in the nor-
mal flow conditions and thus main-
tain nucleate boiling on the wall.
This lessens the chance of local
steam blanketing, buildup of
deposits, and wick boiling. If flow
problems are the principal root
cause of the caustic gouging, the
use of rifled tubing may be appropri-
ate. Substituting a more resistant
material may also be considered if
other mitigation measures have not
been successful. For example,
caustic gouging was overcome on a
unit operating with caustic treatment
by using a combination of rifled
tubes and/or 9Cr-1Mo alloys, reduc-
ing the limits for chloride and
sodium hydroxide, and installing
condensate polishers.11
In another case, exposed floor tubes
in high heat flux areas which had
been subject to dry-out and caustic
gouging were protected by refracto-
ries.12 Reliance on material substitu-
tion is a secondary mitigation choice
to keeping a cleaner boiler and elim-
inating sources of caustic concen-
tration.
6. Background to Long-term Actions and Prevention of
Repeat Failures (continued)
Modification of boiler operating con-
ditions such as excessive overfiring
or underfiring, misaligned burners,
gas channeling, and inadequate cir-
culation rates may be required to
mitigate local thermal hydraulic
upsets. Furnace wall slag pattern
observation, burner inspection and
adjustment to prevent flame
impingement, and identification of
burner misalignment, should be a
part of normal periodic inspection
practice. Certainly, if any of these
has been a root cause of the caustic caustic levels; keeping a clean
gouging, then correction of the boiler; having monitoring systems
problem is indicated. for detecting, and procedures for
dealing with, breakdowns in cycle
Analysis of deposits found in tube
chemistry; ensuring that chemical
samples can help determine the
cleaning procedures are effective
extent of deposition as well as the
and performed on the required
likelihood that caustic concentration
basis; and eliminating weld protru-
is occurring. Chapter 9, Volume 1
sions and other features that can
provides more detail about tube
disrupt the local boiler water flow.
sampling procedures.
In summary, the long-term preven-
tion of caustic gouging will include
the following steps: controlling boiler
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 17-13
7. Case Study
Caustic Gouging Case Study:
Analysis of Failed Tubes
Failure Location: The failure
occurred in a sloping tube with a
weld intrusion into the inside sur-
face of the tube. The failure mani-
fested both a pinhole leak and sig-
nificant thinning through-wall into
an adjacent welded attachment as
shown in Figure 17-9. The unit had
periodically used caustic addition
as part of AVT cycle treatment to
overcome acid contamination (pH
depressions in the boiler water).
Examination of Failed Tube and
Deposits: A thick scale and
deposit was found downstream of
the weld intrusion. Figure 17-1
shows the appearance of this
deposit. The gouged tube was
filled with layered magnetite and
loosely deposited material as
Figure 17-9. Cross section through failed tube showing the internal
attack which has occurred. Figures 17-1, 17-2 and 17-3 show detail of
the thick deposit and scale at the failure location.
17-14 Caustic Gouging
shown. Figure 17-2 shows a cross
section through the layered deposit
with a close-up in Figure 17-3. The
presence of significant levels of
sodium in the characteristic crys-
tals was confirmed. The tube
microstructure, especially in areas
where significant wall thinning had
occurred, showed overheating.
Other Observations: This was the
second tube with a similar failure
appearance in the same unit within
a two month period. As a result of
the preliminary diagnosis of caustic
gouging as the operative failure
mechanism, a survey of the unit
was conducted to determine the
extent of the problem and cycle
chemistry logs and monitors were
reviewed to evaluate the need for
changes to future operations.
Actions That Resulted from Failure
Analysis: Several actions were
taken as a result of the identifica-
tion of caustic gouging as the pri-
mary boiler tube failure mecha-
nism. The actions addressed both
the source of excessive deposits
and of excessive caustic. The
cleanliness of the complete cycle
was improved. Procedures were
developed that established action
levels for feedwater contamination.
As a result of these actions, the fre-
quency and severity of pH depres-
sions was much reduced. In turn,
there was less need for further
large additions of NaOH as a con-
trol chemical. A limit of 1 ppm was
placed on NaOH.
8. References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
2Klein,H.A. and J.K. Rice, “Research Study on Internal
Corrosion of High Pressure Boilers”, Trans ASME, 88 (A),
3, 1966, pp. 232-242.
3Goldstein,P., I.B. Dick and J.K Rice, “Internal Corrosion
of High Pressure Boilers”, Trans. ASME 89(A), 3, 1967,
pp. 378-395.
4Goldstein,P., “A Research Study on Internal Corrosion
of High Pressure Boilers”, Trans. ASME 90(A), 1, 1968,
pp. 23-37.
5Goldstein, P. and C.L. Burton, “A Research Study on
Internal Corrosion of High Pressure Boilers - Final
Report”, Trans. ASME 91(A), 1969, pp. 75-101.
6Masterson, H.G., J.E. Castle, and G.M.W. Mann,
“Waterside Corrosion of Power Station Boiler Tubes”,
Chemistry and Industry, September 6, 1969, pp. 1261-
1266.
7Grabowski, H.A. and H.A. Klein, “Corrosion and
Hydrogen Damage in High Pressure Boilers”, 2nd Annual
Educational Forum on Corrosion, National Association of
Corrosion Engineers, September, 1964.
8Dooley, R.B., A. Aschoff, and F. Pocock, Cycle
Chemistry Guidelines for Fossil Plants: Phosphate
Treatment for Drum Units, Final Report TR-103655,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
December, 1994.
9Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.
10Personal Communication from P. Daniel (Babcock &
Wilcox) to R.B. Dooley, 2-15-95.
11Chojnowski,B. and R.D.B. Whitcutt, “Corrosion Failure:
One Cause and a Cure in an Operational Boiler”, CEGB
Research, No. 3, December, 1975, pp. 3-10.
12Ball, M., Sodium Hydroxide for Conditioning the Boiler
Water of Drum-Type Boilers, Research Project 9000-20,
Final Report TR-104007, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, California, January, 1995. See also M.
Ball, “Caustic Treatment for Drum Boilers”, R.B. Dooley
and R. Pate, eds., Fourth International Conference on
Cycle Chemistry in Fossil Boilers, held in Atlanta,
Georgia, September 7-9, 1994, Final Report TR-104502,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, January,
1995.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 17-15
ACTIONS for Caustic Gouging
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of caus-
tic gouging damage begin here.
The goal of these actions is to
see if further investigation of
caustic gouging is warranted or
whether another BTF mechanism
should be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and caustic gouging
is the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by caustic gouging.
17-16 Caustic Gouging
Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and caustic gouging is
the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of caustic gouging:
➠ Review Figure 17-5 for
typical boiler regions.
➠ Review Table 17-1 for
susceptible locations.
➠ Confirm that both of the neces-
sary precursors to caustic goug-
ing are present: waterside
deposits and a source of caustic.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Thinned tube wall
• Thin-edged fracture surface
• Tube gouging under deposits
(Figure 17-4)
• Thick layered deposits (Figure
17-2)
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by caustic
gouging.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Excessive waterside deposits.
• Sources of flow disruption. See
Table 17-1 for a comprehensive
list.
• Fireside conditions that could
lead to overheating of the
tubes. See Table 17-1 for a list
of typical conditions.
• A source of caustic that is in
excess of normal for the unit or
at a level that could lead to
concentration in tube waterside
deposits. Excess caustic may
occur, for example:
• In units on caustic
treatment
• In units on AVT with
caustic additions (for
example, Is NaOH added
frequently?)
• In units on phosphate
treatments with caustic as a
control chemical.
• Because of a water
treatment plant upset that
leads to high pH conditions.
➠ These precursors can be root
cause influences for caustic
gouging. If one or more has
occurred, go to Action 3 which
outlines the steps to confirm the
influence of each.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is
caustic gouging.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being caustic gouging
damage (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify caustic
gouging as the primary mecha-
nism or point to another cause.
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by removing representa-
tive tube sample(s), followed by
visual examination and detailed
metallographic analysis.
References to other sources of
detailed information:
• Main text (this chapter) provides
the background to mechanism
and the development of caustic
gouging.
• Summary of the steps and meth-
ods of metallurgical investigation
of boiler tube failures can be
found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
• Hydrogen damage and acid
phosphate corrosion are the most
likely mechanisms to be confused
with caustic gouging; they are the
subjects of Chapters 15 and 16,
respectively, and should be
reviewed if there is doubt about
which underdeposit corrosion
mechanism is active.
➠ Analyze in detail the failure sur-
face. Is the failure surface a pin-
hole, thin-edged crack, and/or
ductile in appearance?
➠ Determine extent of internal cor-
rosion and/or deposits. Is there
evidence of internal corrosion
and/or deposits?
➠ Analyze deposits. Do deposits
contain crystals of sodium fer-
roate and/or ferroite and
hematite?
➠ Examine tube microstructure for
signs of decarburization and
microfissuring. Does tube
microstructure show distinctive
decarburization, particularly
acute at inside surface, and
microfissuring?
➠ Examine tube microstructure for
signs of overheating. Does tube
microstructure show presence
of transformation products
(martensite, retained austenite,
etc.)? Does it show signs of
creep damage?
Probable mechanism is caustic
gouging
➠ Review Table 7-1 (Chapter 7,
Volume 1) to contrast with other
underdeposit corrosion mecha-
nisms.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
Brittle failures and/or thick-edged
fracture with significant wall thin-
ning by internal corrosion and with
deposits are more probably hydro-
gen damage.
Problem is probably not caustic
gouging. If, for example, there are
deposits but no internal corrosion,
mechanism may be overheating -
either long- or short-term. See
separate discussion of these
mechanisms.
Deposits with detectable chloride
are more indicative of hydrogen
damage mechanism; the presence
of maricite (NaFePO4) is an indica-
tor of acid phosphate corrosion.
Mechanism is probably hydrogen
damage.
Transformation products are likely
to be indicative of short-term over-
heating, creep damage or long-
term overheating; suspect one of
these mechanisms particularly if
there is no corrosion or gouging of
tube inside surface.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 17-17
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the caustic gouging
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as caustic gouging
(Action 2) or a precursor to caus-
tic gouging has occurred (Action
1b). The goal of this Action 3 is
for the BTF Team to review the
potential root causes of caustic
gouging, identify probable ones,
and take those actions that are
needed to confirm which are
operative in the unit. This step
must be taken so that the proper
actions can be taken to prevent
future BTF from occurring by this
mechanism. Execute, in parallel,
Action 4 to determine the extent
of damage.
17-18 Caustic Gouging
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
3.2 Excessive Deposits ➠ (a). Analysis of results from chemistry
monitors mainly for levels of Fe and Cu.
➠ (b). Selective tube sampling for deposit
measurement.
➠ (c). Check efficacy of chemical cleaning.
3.2.1 Flow disruption: ➠ (d). Boiler inspection for susceptible sites.
• weld backing bar/ring ➠ (e). Sampling for distinctive “bathtub ring”
• poor weld geometry, pad welds, canoe piece deposits.
repairs, etc. ➠ (f). Circulation testing.
• deposits
• locally high heat flux or steam quality
• bends or sharp changes in tube direction
• horizontal or near horizontal tubing
• local regions of DNB
3.2.2 Fireside Conditions ➠ (g). Inspect furnace wall for evidence of
• flame impingement flame impingement.
• burner misalignment ➠ (h). Check burner operation for possible
• major change in fuel source direct flame impingement.
➠ (i). Measure heat flux at selected locations.
3.3 Sources of Caustic Concentration
3.3.1 Elevated caustic level over time (units ➠ (j). Review plant chemistry control logs,
on caustic treatment) on-line cycle chemistry records, or
instrumentation alarms.
3.3.2 Excessive caustic addition to units on ➠ (k). Review plant chemistry control logs,
AVT on-line cycle chemistry records, or
instrumentation alarms.
3.3.3 Excessive caustic addition to control ➠ (l). As above.
phosphate treatment
3.3.4 Water treatment plant upset leading to ➠ (m). Check/confirm operation and records
high pH condition (regeneration of condensate of regeneration of water treatment plant
polishers or makeup water ion exchange equipment.
resins, for example)
• More detailed discussion about the actions to confirm can be found in the
main text (this chapter) under the section number shown.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Evaluation will be
based on detection of (i)
wastage and wall thinning, or (ii)
indirectly, the buildup of water-
side deposits. It is critical that all
tubing with caustic gouging
damage or significant wall loss
be identified since these regions
are especially susceptible to
ongoing corrosion.
➠ Identify all locations to be examined. Refer to Section
1.2 of main text, Figure 17-5, and Table 17-1 for
typical locations. Missed locations are sites for future
failures.
➠ Perform UT survey to (i) measure extent of damage
via wall thinning or (ii) as an indirect indication of the
potential for damage by measuring the thickness of
waterside deposit buildup. A review of UT methods is
provided in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
➠ Perform tube sampling to confirm results of NDE
inspection, and to determine the degree of damage,
type, extent and thickness of deposits.
➠ Use results interactively with Action 3.
➠ Go to Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate
Solutions and Actions.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 17-19
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
The BTF Team must ensure that
repairs and immediate solutions
are directly tied to the underlying
cause. Most actions can be con-
sidered for the longer-term
(Action 6) but several underlying
problems can be dealt with in
the short-term.
• Actions from NDE Survey (Action
17-20 Caustic Gouging
• Actions if fireside conditions such
of affected tubes as misadjusted burners, flame
➠ See Chapter 11, Volume 1 impingement, etc. are a contribu-
for summary of applicable tube tor to the problem.
repair techniques. ➠ Adjust burners, etc.
• Do not pad weld.
• Do not use canoe/window
References to other sources of
weld repairs.
detailed information:
➠ Repair any obvious mechan-
ical problems that lead to an
• Main text (this chapter) provides
additional detail on repairs, imme-
ingress or excess of caustic
diate solutions and actions. See
such as a water treatment plant
also Table 17-2 which relates
malfunction.
short- and long-term mitigation
options to underlying root causes.
4)
• Chapter 11, Volume 1 provides
➠ Develop a plan to replace information about repair and
affected tubing including an replacement of boiler tubes.
economic assessment of the
• Chapter 4, Volume 1 summarizes
future possible failure rate and
chemical cleaning procedures
the resulting optimal extent of
and timing.
new tubing.
➠ Chemically clean if it is indi-
cated that excessive deposits
have contributed to this prob-
lem or are likely to contribute to
a future problem with caustic
gouging. Chapter 4, Volume 1
summarizes chemical cleaning
procedures and timing.
➠ Consider hydrostatic test to
1.5 times operating pressure.
➠ Place the unit back in
service.
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on the clear identification
of the underlying root cause
(Action 3) and an economic eval-
uation to ensure that the opti-
mum strategy has been chosen.
Major Root Cause Influences
Excessive Deposits
Flow disruption:
• weld backing bar/ring
• poor weld geometry, pad welds, canoe piece
repairs, etc.
• deposits
• locally high heat flux or steam quality
• bends or sharp changes in tube direction
• horizontal or near horizontal tubing
• local regions of DNB
Fireside Conditions
• flame impingement
• burner misalignment
• major change in fuel source
Sources of Caustic Concentration
Elevated caustic level over time (units on caus-
tic treatment)
Excessive caustic addition to units on AVT
Excessive caustic addition to control phosphate
treatment
Water treatment plant upset leading to high pH
condition (regeneration of condensate polish-
ers or makeup water ion exchange resins, for
example)
References to other sources of information:
• Main text (this chapter) provides additional detail on the reasoning behind
these options.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Optimize chemical cleaning procedures.
See summary of practices in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
➠ Keep deposits to an acceptable level. See
guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
➠ Minimize feedwater corrosion products
through control of chemistry particularly pH
and O2 scavenger additions; Fe < 5 ppb and
Cu < 2 ppb at economizer inlet. See also
Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Monitor for effectiveness of chemistry
control.
➠ Remove all pad welds.
➠ Replace weld repairs, canoe piece repairs,
as needed to ensure good flow conditions.
➠ Remove weld backing rings.
➠ Modify tube geometry.
➠ Use rifled tubing if other primary measures
are unsuccessful.
➠ Design modifications, as needed.
➠ Periodic re-inspection for proper burner
alignment.
➠ Implement appropriate chemistry guidelines
and minimum instrumentation.
➠ Install appropriate control room alarms.
➠ Revise cycle chemistry procedures to
prevent recurrence; may include operating
changes, alarms, additional monitoring, etc.
➠ As above.
➠ As above.
➠ As above, plus
➠ Revise regeneration procedures to
encompass safety measures on operation
of valves.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 17-21
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of caus-
tic gouging damage or its pre-
cursors. Most of the root causes
of caustic gouging can also
cause other unit problems, there-
fore avoiding the following root
causes will have benefit through-
out the unit: (i) excessive
deposits, (ii) overtemperature in
tubes, (iii) flow disruption, and
(iv) improper cycle chemistry.
17-22 Caustic Gouging
Caustic Gouging Alert for Other Cycle
Aspect Components
Deposits indicate high • Poor feedwater chem-
feedwater corrosion istry control (probably iron
products levels at the economizer
inlet are > 10 ppb).
• High Cu levels in
deposits might indicate Cu
deposition in HP turbine.
Potential BTF by overheat-
ing and creep.
Excessive deposits Potential BTF by overheat-
ing and creep.
Geometric boiler water • Potential for excessive
flow disruptions deposit buildup.
• Potential for tube
failures by overheating.
Elevated caustic level Potential for carryover into
over a long period steam; damage to austen-
(units on caustic treat- titic superheaters and to
ment) turbine.
Excessive caustic addi- Same as above.
tions in units on AVT
Excessive caustic addi- Same as above.
tions in units on phos-
phate treatment.
Ingress from water Same as above.
treatment plant defi-
ciency
Fireside problems • Possible BTF by fireside
(flame impingement, corrosion of waterwall
burner alignment, tubing.
major fuel change). • Possible overheating
tube failures.
➠ Actions Indicated
➠ Implement stricter cycle chemistry
control program, and instrumentation
(see Chapter 3, Volume 1).
➠ Develop monitoring program to
optimize feedwater chemistry and the
use of O2 scavengers (see Chapter 3,
Volume 1).
➠ Sampling to determine nature and
extent of deposit problem. See Chapter
6, Volume 1 for metallographic methods
overview; Chapter 9, Volume 1 for sam-
pling methods.
➠ Apply guidelines for chemical
cleaning. See summary in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
➠ Remove pad welds and other
improper repairs.
➠ Identify and remove other sources for
flow disruption.
➠ Consider additional monitoring for
feedwater, boiler water and steam.
➠ Ensure that steam limits are not
exceeded.
➠ Consider additional monitoring and
alarms to prevent recurrence.
➠ Consider additional monitoring and
alarms to prevent recurrence.
➠ Check/confirm operation of conden-
sate polishers (particularly regeneration)
and ion exchange resins of makeup
water system.
➠ Inspect and adjust as required.
Chapter 18 • Volume 2
Waterwall Fireside
Corrosion
Introduction
Fireside corrosion can affect both
waterwalls and superheater/reheater
(SH/RH) tubes. As a result, fireside
corrosion is divided into three sepa-
rate discussions in this book. Here
the focus is on waterwalls in coal-
fired units; SH/RH fireside corrosion
is covered in Chapters 33 and 34 in
Volume 3 for coal- and oil-fired units,
respectively.
In coal-fired units larger than 400
MW, all waterwall tubing failures rep-
resent about a 2.0% annual avail-
ability loss, with fireside corrosion
accounting for a very small portion
of the total in the United States. One
of the primary causes of this mecha-
nism is thought to be a locally
“reducing” environment such as
may be caused by improper burner
adjustment, non-uniformity of mixing
of fuel and air in the flame, or by low
excess air. As more units implement
low excess air strategies for NOx
control, there should be increased
vigilance to ensure that this mecha-
nism does not become more promi-
nent, particularly for those units uti-
lizing over-fire air.
Coal composition is a major contrib-
utor to fireside corrosion in water-
walls and in SH/RH. To take advan-
tage of the range of available coal
resources, a review of how coal
composition may affect the develop-
ment of fireside corrosion is pro-
vided.
In many cases, forced outages from
fireside corrosion have been repeat
failures in the same locations,
caused by inappropriate corrective
actions.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical locations
Waterwall Fireside
Corrosion (Coal-Fired Units):
Identification Keys
1. Significant wall thinning
across a number of tubes on
the fireside. Longitudinal, or in
some cases, particularly in
supercritical units, circumfer-
ential cracking may also be
evident.
2. Hard, fired deposits (inner lay-
ers) on tubes with loosely
bonded ash on the outer lay-
ers. Unburned carbon, iron
oxides and iron sulfides are
typically found in sintered
scale/deposits and are indica-
tive of poor combustion or
local reducing conditions.
3. Corrosion is found most com-
monly in locations where there
is a locally “reducing” environ-
ment, usually around burners,
and in a zone from near the
bottom burner level to about
10 feet or so above the top
burners.
18-2 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
1.1 Features of Failure
Macroscopically, waterwall tubes
affected by fireside corrosion will
demonstrate a large loss of wall
thickness on the fireside of the tube.
The damage usually affects more
than one tube at any given location.
Figure 18-1 illustrates the typical
appearance.
The maximum attack is generally
found at the crown of the tube facing
the flame and usually encompassing
about 120° of the tube circumferen-
tially. If a tube burst occurs, it is often
in this location. Longitudinal crack-
ing may be evident.
Damage is usually found with hard,
fired inner-layer deposits on tubes
with loosely bonded ash on the
outer layers. Unburned carbon, iron
oxides and iron sulfides are found in
scale overlaid by sintered deposits.
These are indicative of poor com-
bustion or local reducing conditions.
This is shown in Figure 18-2. In
some cases intergranular penetra-
tions are also found.
Analysis of the scales and deposits
may also indicate ferrous chloride as
a thin layer next to the metal; this lat-
ter constituent is particularly promi-
Figure 18-1. Typical appearance of damage caused by waterwall fireside corrosion.
nent in units burning coals with high
chlorine content such as typically
used in the United Kingdom.
After removing scale and oxides, the
tube surface may have grooving con-
sistent with an “alligator hide”
appearance as shown in Figure 18-3.
Final failure is by loss of wall thick-
ness which leads to an increase in
hoop stress, and subsequently to
final failure which is generally mani-
fested by longitudinal, thin-edged
cracks.
1.2 Locations of failure
Typical failure locations are shown in
Figure 18-4. Corrosion is generally
localized to regions on the side and
rear walls near burners. Most com-
mon locations are where there is a
locally “reducing” or, more accu-
rately, a substoichiometric environ-
ment, usually around burners, and
most commonly in a zone from near
the bottom burner level to about 10
feet or so above the top burners. In
some wall-fired designs the worst
areas are the sidewalls approxi-
mately midway between the front
and back walls, roughly at the height
of the burners.
a Tube
metal

Intergranular
penetration
a FeS lamellae

Fly ash spheres

Spheres of unburnt
coal particles

FeS islands

Fe3O4 matrix

Figure 18-2. The general structure of the corrosion scale formed

on a furnace waterwall tube under reducing conditions. Scale
thickness is approximately 0.01 inch.
Adapted from: A.J.B. Cutler, et al.1

Figure 18-3. Grooving of the tube's external surface, known as

"alligator hide", associated with oil and coal-ash corrosion. The
fireside oxide scale and ash deposit were removed by glass
bead blasting. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.2
Other common locations include: (i)
where the combustion zone
approaches the wall because of
burner adjustment, wear of burner
nozzles or changes in coal charac-
teristics, (ii) where air distribution
has been modified to meet NOx
requirements, (iii) areas of highest
heat flux, or (iv) hopper slopes
especially if coal is too coarse.3
The role of alkali pyrosulfates and of
alkali-iron trisulfates in the resulting
corrosion of waterwalls is an on-
going point of discussion. Certainly
wherever slag contacts metal walls
there will be the potential for very
rapid corrosion. This is particularly a
problem in cyclone-fired boilers
where reducing slag flows over
cyclone and lower furnace surfaces.
Increased vaporized alkali can also
contribute to increased corrosion on
downstream boiler surfaces.

Figure 18-4. Typical boiler locations

where fireside corrosion can occur.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-3

2. Mechanism of Failure
Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
(Coal-Fired Units): Mechanism
1. Three mechanisms have been
proposed for fireside corro-
sion in boilers: (i) formation of
pyrosulfates, (ii) formation of
alkali-iron trisulfates, and (iii)
sulfidation (“reducing atmos-
phere”) corrosion. For water-
walls, the last of these is the
most common.
2. Whichever is the dominant
mechanism, the result is a dis-
ruption of the normally protec-
tive oxide layer, potentially
rapid corrosion and wall thin-
ning, followed by rupture
when the tube wall falls below
the minimum thickness
needed to contain pressure.
3. Coal composition can be at
the root of fireside corrosion
problems.
18-4 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
2.1 Introduction to mechanism
Coal composition and the subse-
quent release of gaseous, molten or
solid components via the combus-
tion process, are primary determi-
nants of the potential severity of fire-
side corrosion. A general discussion
of fireside effects can be found in
Chapter 2, Volume 1. This Chapter
begins with a brief review of how
these variables affect fireside corro-
sion.
Gaseous species released by the
combustion of coal contain a num-
ber of potential corrodents. The
most important are (i) sulfur, present
as sulfur dioxide, sulfur trioxide, or
as hydrogen sulfide, (ii) vapors of
alkali metal salts in the form of
oxides, hydroxides or sulfates, and
(iii) chlorine compounds.4 The con-
densable vapor species will deposit
on contact with surfaces that are at
temperatures lower than their
respective condensation tempera-
tures. This in turn results in the
deposit of flyash and the accumula-
tion of alkali and sulfur species.
The corrosiveness of these deposits
seems to increase with increasing
coal sulfur content up to about 2 per-
cent.5 For coals above this level,
increasing sulfur content seems to
have less effect than increasing
alkali metal compounds.4 Corrosive-
ness has also been linked to the
chlorine content in high-chlorine
United Kingdom coals. This topic is
still unresolved and review of the
effects of the chlorine content in the
coal, based on the most recent
research results available, is pro-
vided in Section 2.3. Some level of
compounds such as MgO and CaO
in the ash can reduce the corrosivity
of the deposits by raising the melting
temperature of the complex sulfates.
2.2 Mechanism for waterwall
fireside corrosion in coal-fired
units
Three explanations have been pro-
posed for waterwall fireside corro-
sion. The most commonly accepted
mechanism for waterwalls is sulfida-
tion attack, which is also termed
reducing atmosphere corrosion. Two
alternative mechanisms have also
been proposed that relate to the dis-
ruption of the protective oxide by
molten slag which forms from either
pyrosulfates and/or complex sul-
fates. These latter two are the domi-
nant mechanisms in higher tempera-
ture boiler sections.
The presence of a substoichiometric
environment is the most commonly
reported mechanism by which
waterwall fireside corrosion occurs.
Reducing conditions (i) lower the
melting temperatures of deposited
slag, thus increasing its ability to
dissolve normal oxide scales on the
tubes and (ii) produce hydrogen sul-
fide which is considerably more cor-
rosive than the sulfur dioxide that
predominates under oxidizing condi-
tions. Also, analyses indicate that
the molten slags themselves can be
reducing and sulfidizing.
A reducing atmosphere can be
caused by poor burner adjustment,
non-uniformity of mixing of fuel and
air in the flame, operation with low
excess air which can create a
reducing atmosphere near the burn-
ers, or simply due to flame impinge-
ment on the walls.
Under excess air conditions, iron
oxides Fe3O4 and Fe2O3, are the
expected corrosion products, while
a mixture of Fe3O4 and iron sulfide is
expected under substoichiometric
conditions. Sulfide scales allow
higher rates of transport of iron
cations than oxides, and are thus
less protective. They are also brittle
and poorly adherent, so they readily
crack and spall. The greater the
thermal gradient through the
deposit, caused by heat flux, the
faster will be the diffusion process.
Alloys that form chromium oxide
scales do so under either the oxidiz-
ing or the reducing conditions (low
partial oxygen pressure) that exist at
the waterwall (see the Pourbaix dia-
gram in Figure 13-10, Chapter 13),
and thus, not surprisingly, exhibit
good corrosion resistance in these
circumstances.
Alternating oxidizing and reducing
conditions cause alternating
changes in scale chemistry and vol-
ume which cause the scale on car-
bon and low-alloy steels to spall or
disintegrate. The spalling process
exposes bare metal which is then
subject to renewed attack.
Accelerated wastage occurs
because of (i) removal of the protec-
tive oxide by mechanical loss, (ii)
oxidation-sulfidation attack caused
by sulfur in the slag, or (iii) via a
fluxing of the oxide by the molten
pyrosulfates and attack of the sub-
strate metal.
Alkali sulfates deposited on the
waterwalls may react with SO2 and
SO3 to form pyrosulfates such as
K2S2O7 and Na2S2O7 if conditions of
high partial SO3 pressures exist.
Attack of the tube metal by the pyro-
sulfates may be via a reaction such
as:
K2S2O7 + 3Fe ® FeS + Fe2O3
+ K2SO4 (18-1)
Pyrosulfates have not been analyti-
cally identified in coal-fired boilers.6
This reaction and the removal of
protective oxide scale will lead to
accelerated wastage through fluxing
of the oxides and attack of the sub-
strate metal.
The formation of alkali-iron trisulfates
(Na, K)3 Fe (SO4)3 is a primary
cause of fireside corrosion in super-
heater/reheater tubes. In the fur-
nace, the waterwall tube tempera-
tures are usually lower than the
range of trisulfate formation.
However, the materials of construc-
tion in waterwalls are more suscepti-
ble to such attack than those in
SH/RH tubes and if local overheat-
ing of a tube occurs because of any
of a number of root causes, there
could be the rapid corrosion consis-
tent with molten alkali salt attack.
Further, melting points may be
depressed by the presence of Cu,
Pb, and Zn.7
Overall, the waterwall fireside corro-
sion mechanism is a very complex
and dynamic process with many
chemical and physical combinations
being possible. Independent of the
mechanism by which fireside corro-
sion proceeds, the final failure is
generally characterized by a signifi-
cant loss of wall thickness, and a
concurrent increase in hoop stress,
which eventually leads to tube fail-
ure characterized by a longitudinal
thick-edged crack.
2.3 Corrosion indices and the
effect of coal composition
No indices have been shown to pre-
dict totally corrosion behavior. Given
the wide range of sulfur, chlorine,
and alkali concentrations that exist
in coals now used in the U.S., a cor-
rosion index that includes all these
factors, together with the metal and
gas temperatures, is needed,
including perhaps separate indices
for Eastern and Western U.S. coals,
because of the large differences in
composition.
A criteria which was developed by
the former CEGB was based on the
operating experience in England for
British coals, which generally con-
tain more chlorine and less sulfur
than U.S. coals. In those coals, the
sulfur levels are usually high enough
to convert all sodium and potassium
to alkali-iron trisulfates. They devel-
oped a formula for estimating the
corrosion of furnace walls based on
the chlorine content of a coal5:
Corrosion rate (nm/hr) =
1380 Cl (wt %) - 290 (18-2)
According to this formula, in order to
limit the corrosion rate to less than
about 25 nm/hr (8.6 mils/year), the
coal would have to have a limit of
about 0.23 weight percent chlorine.
Although data from other stations
was used, this relationship was pri-
marily based on the results of one
station that burned coal from a sin-
gle mine; the chlorine content of the
coal, however, had varied over the
years.8
As more data became available, the
extent of applicability of the correla-
tion become less clear, since it was
based on low pressure units with
furnace wall temperatures of about
370°C (~700°F), that is for pres-
sures in the range around 1450 psi
(100 bar), and was not found to hold
for higher pressure, 2465 psi (170
bar) units which had furnace wall
temperatures on the order of 450°C
(~840°F).9 Based on the analysis of
four U.S. units that had moderately
high levels of chlorine, it was con-
cluded that the CEGB criterion
would give reasonable predictions
of corrosion rates for high-chlorine
U.S. coals. As there were relatively
few high chlorine coals at that time
however, the application of such cri-
teria were deemed to be limited.4
A more recent review of the CEGB’s
position on the relationship of chlo-
rine in coal to fireside corrosion can
be found in Latham, Meadowcroft,
and Pinder8. One of their conclu-
sions was that there was no quanti-
tative relationship between furnace
wall corrosion and coal chlorine
content, although equation 18-2
could be used as a rough guide for
determining the likely increase in
corrosion rate for a known increase
in chlorine content for boilers that
were experiencing rapid waterwall
corrosion. Additional key aspects
including both plant and laboratory
results, as they pertain to fireside
corrosion in waterwalls were as fol-
lows:
• The source for chlorine in U.K.
coals is mostly as weakly bound
ions associated with organic mat-
ter with the balance being NaCl.
Chlorine is released as HCl, at a
rate of about 80 ppm for each
0.1% chlorine in the coal.
• A chlorine-rich phase found at the
tube metal interface will be indica-
tive of the importance of chlorine
in the waterwall fireside corrosion
process. With high chlorine coals
(> 0.2%), there is often intergranu-
lar attack of the tube material.
• Laboratory tests in support of the
field experience initially used
N2 - O2 - H2O - SO2 gas mix-
tures to simulate the gas compo-
sition near the walls. The corro-
sion rates were parabolic and the
addition of 400 - 2,000 ppm HCl
did not greatly influence the cor-
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-5
 rosion rate. When the oxygen in
the gas was replaced by CO, the a)
corrosion rates were parabolic in
200
the absence of HCl. When 400
ppm HCl was introduced, linear

Metal Loss (mm)

kinetics were observed (Figure
18-5). Once transition to linear
kinetics had occurred, there was
little subsequent dependence of
corrosion rate when the HCl was
increased to 2,000 ppm.
• Scales were multi-layered, loosely
adherent, large grained and con-
sisted of a porous outer layer of
FeS surmounting several inner
bands of FeS and Fe3O4.10
Although the scale morphology
and corrosion rates obtained in
those laboratory tests were com-
parable to plant behavior, no
chloride was detected at the
scale-metal interface and the
intergranular penetrations, often a
feature of plant scale, were not
evident.
• Further laboratory work11where
the SO2 was replaced by H2S
showed that the corrosion rates
were linear whether HCl was pre-
sent or not.
• Because of the inability to repro-
duce plant behavior, particularly
in high alloy materials, work con-
tinues on laboratory investigations
of the effects of heat flux and of
free radicals in combusting
gases.
• An optimal preventive strategy
would be a priori to prevent the
development of reducing condi-
tions since they play such a domi-
nant role in fireside corrosion,
without or with a contribution from
chlorine. However, as that is often
not possible, change to more
resistant materials in the bulk, or
as coatings or co-extruded tubes
as discussed below, is often
used.
100
0 HCl
400 ppm HCl
2000 ppm HCl
500 1000 1500
Time (hours)
b)
1000
0 HCl
800 400 ppm HCl
Metal Loss (mm)
2000 ppm HCl
600
400
200
0
500 1000 1500
Time (hours)
Figure 18-5. Metal loss data for mild steel in N2-10% CO-10%H2O-0.5% SO2 with HCl
concentrations as shown (a) 400°C (750°F). (b) 500°C (930°F).
Source: S. Brooks and D.B. Meadowcroft10
It should be repeated that this work Further field testing and laboratory
and the understanding of the effects work is currently being initiated to
of chlorine on high temperature cor- determine if plant operating para-
rosion is only applicable to U.K. meters specific to UK plant may
coals at the moment. A number of have been responsible for the
U.S. utilities have been burning emphasis on the role of chlorine,
coals with elevated chlorine levels and to better understand the chlo-
(up to 0.4 wt. %) from the Illinois rine effects in U.S. coals. There may
basin and have not, to date, experi- be a difference in the way that chlo-
enced the extensive corrosion that rine is bound in the coal and
has been observed in U.K. plants. released in the flame between U.S.
and U.K. coals.

18-6 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
(Coal-Fired Units): Root Causes
The most common cause is a
local “reducing” environment.
Additional causes are (ii) the
occurrence and deposit of pyro-
sulfates, (iii) fuel factors, primar-
ily burning coals with unusually
aggressive ash, and (iv) direct
impingement of carbonaceous
particles.
3.1 Introduction
Table 18-1 lists the root causes,
actions to confirm, and general
strategies for dealing with waterwall
fireside corrosion.
3.2 Influence of a sub-
stoichiometric environment
The most common cause of fireside
corrosion in waterwalls is the pres-
ence of a “reducing” (substoichio-
metric) environment as character-
ized by high CO or low O2 in the flue
gases adjacent to the wall. This can
also be inferred by monitoring at the
economizer outlet. This condition
can result from a number of root
causes as noted below. To evaluate
which fireside corrosion mechanism
is active, the following action is rec-
ommended:
(a). Energy dispersive x-ray and/or
x-ray dot mapping of metallographic
cross sections through damaged
tubes can be used to detect the
presence and distribution of S, C,
Na, K, and Cl. Such an analysis can
determine whether the corrosion
process is following one of the
mechanisms discussed above.
3.2.1 Poor combustion conditions
will lead to a reducing condition par-
ticularly in localized regions near
walls around burners. A typical loca-
tion is in the highest heat flux zone
from near the bottom burner level to
about 10 feet or so above the top
burners. It could also occur as a
result of changing combustion con-
ditions to burn a new fuel, for exam-
ple. Actions to confirm include:
(b). Monitor for levels of O2, H2S,
and CO. High levels of CO (> 1%)
and low levels of oxygen (< 0.1%)
near tube walls are of particular con-
cern.9 The level of CO can also be
measured in the flue gas at the
economizer outlet or after the ID
fans. Oxygen levels can also be
sampled at the economizer exit. It is
important to note that measurements
at the economizer outlet only pro-
vide an indication of the overall
combustion in the boiler and not of
the local environment at the corrod-
ing waterwall locations.
(c). Field testing may be required to
determine the combustion condi-
tions in regions that are experienc-
ing severe fireside corrosion. Such
tests might include the use of water-
wall deposition probes to collect
deposits or the use of devices to
determine the heat fluxes in the cor-
rosion areas.
3.2.2 Where air distribution has
been modified such as for imple-
mentation of low excess air strate-
gies, where burner modifications
have been made to meet low NOx
requirements, or where low NOx
burners have been installed with
over-fire air.
Actions to confirm include:
(d). As in (b) and (c) above.
3.2.3 Poorly adjusted or worn
burners.
Actions to confirm:
(e). Visual examination to ensure
that flame impingement is not occur-
ring, which could lead to a local
reducing condition as well as possi-
ble local overheating of the tube.
(f). Monitor for slagging conditions,
as a sudden increase in local slag-
ging in the furnace chamber can
indicate a faulty burner.9 Again, this
could be identified by using a water-
wall deposition probe.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-7
Table 18-1
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause
Influences
3.2 Influence of a substoichiometric environment
3.2.1 Poor combustion
conditions (general)
3.2.2 Where air distribution
has been modified
3.2.3 Poorly adjusted or
worn burners
3.3 Influences of the deposition of salts
3.3.1 Overheated tubes
18-8 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
Actions to Confirm
(a). Metallographic analysis to detect key
contaminants in deposits to confirm
which fireside corrosion mechanism
is active.
(b). Monitor for levels of O2 (< 0.1%), H2S,
and CO (> 1%).
(c). Field testing to detect combustion
conditions in susceptible areas with
waterwall deposition probes to collect
deposits or heat flux measurement in
corrosion areas.
(d). As in (b) and (c).
(e). Visual examination to detect localized
flame impingement.
(f). Monitor for change in furnace slagging
conditions. Use waterwall deposition
probe, as needed.
(g). Analytical techniques to identify melting • As above.
points of compounds in deposits.
(h). Metallographic analysis to detect key
contaminants in deposits.
(i). Measure pressure drop across waterwall • As above, plus
circuits that would be indicative of
increasing deposits on waterside.
(j). Direct metal temperature measurements
with thermocouples or heat-flux meters.
(k).Selective sampling to determine internal
deposit amount and composition.
(l).Analysis of internal oxide and deposits.
(m).Analysis of cycle chemistry monitoring
devices.
Immediate Actions
and Solutions
• Choose repair strategy
based on severity of cor-
rosion rate.
• Implement long-term
strategy from choices
in Figure 18-6 in con-
junction with on-going
program of remaining
life assessment and
monitoring.
• As above.
• As above.
• As above.
• Chemically clean water-
walls waterside surfaces.
See Chapter 4, Volume 1
for additional guidance
on chemical cleaning.
Long-Term Actions and
Prevention of Repeat Failures
• Choose long-term strategy from those
shown in Figure 18-6.
• Implement on-going program of
remaining life assessment and monitor-
ing. See Chapter 8, Volume 1 for addi-
tional detail.
• As above, plus
• Develop a fireside testing program.
Guidance is provided in reference 20.
• As above.
• As above, plus
• Alternate burner designs, as needed.
• Choose long-term strategy from those
shown in Figure 18-6.
• Implement on-going program of
remaining life assessment and monitor-
ing. See additional detail in Chapter 8,
Volume 1.
• As above, plus
• Develop optimum feedwater chemistry
strategy so as to minimize ingress of
feedwater corrosion products.
• Investigate the use of oxygenated
treatment as a means to eliminate the
internal boiler deposits.
Table 18-1
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions (Continued)
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.4 Influences related to fuel factors

• As above. • As above.

3.4.1 Change in fuel to coal
with high corrosivity
(n). Analysis of propensity for coal cor-
rosivity via available index methods.
• As above. • As above, plus
• Develop a fireside testing program.
Guidance is provided in reference 20.
• Investigate coal changes with Coal
Quality Impact Model (CQIM) or equiv-
alent, including economics evaluation.

3.5 Root causes of direct carbon deposition

• As above. • Choose repair strategy based on
severity of corrosion rate.
• Implement long-term strategy from
choices in Figure 18-6 in conjunction
with on-going program of remaining life
assessment and monitoring.

3.5.1 Carbon particle
impingement
(o). Visual and metallographic examination • As above, plus • As above, plus
to detect key contaminants in deposits • Adjust mill • Develop a fireside testing program.
to confirm which fireside corrosion classification. Guidance is provided in reference 20.
mechanism is active.
(p). Periodic sampling from mills to ensure
proper level of coal fineness.

3.3 Influences of the occur-
rence and deposition of salts
This cause of waterwall fireside cor-
rosion is less common than the
problem caused by a reducing
atmosphere, mostly because of the
limitations on temperatures and SO3
found on waterwall tubes which nor-
mally puts them outside the suscep-
tible temperature range. The melting
points of typical salts can be found
in the discussion of fireside corro-
sion in superheater/reheaters of
coal-fired units (Chapter 33,
Volume).
Actions to confirm may include:
(g). If liquid ash corrosion is sus-
pected, thermogravimetry (ASTM
E1131)12 or differential thermal
analysis (ASTM E794)13 can identify
melting points of compounds in the
waterwall deposits or those col-
lected on deposition probes.2
(h). Energy dispersive x-ray and/or (j). Direct measurement of tube
x-ray dot mapping of metallographic temperatures. Metal temperatures
cross sections through damaged can be measured directly with ther-
tubes can detect the presence and mocouples or by using heat-flux
distribution of S, C, Na, K, and Cl. meters.
(k). Selective tube sampling to
3.3.1 Overheated tubes. There are
determine whether internal deposit
a number of underlying causes of
buildup has been significant, and to
overheated tubes, any one of which
determine the composition and mor-
could create temperatures high
phology of deposits. Here formation
enough to allow local attack by
of “ripple” magnetite is very impor-
molten alkali salts. Such conditions
might include excessive internal tant in once-through units in elevat-
ing tube temperatures. Deposits
deposits such as rippled magnetite
deposits in supercritical units, over- present in excess of 20 mg/cm2
(18.7 g/ft2) should be considered
heating from other sources of
potentially harmful in elevating tube
restricted water flow, direct flame
temperatures.
impingement, excessive flue gas
temperature or heat flux. (l). Analysis of internal oxide and
deposits to estimate tube tempera-
Actions to confirm may include:
tures.
(i). Direct measurement of pressure
drop across waterwall circuits to
detect an increase in waterside
deposits.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-9

(m). Analysis of cycle chemistry
monitoring devices, particularly to
detect high levels of feedwater cor-
rosion products at the economizer
inlet.
3.4 Influences related to fuel
factors
3.4.1 Change of fuel to a coal with
unusually corrosive ash. The com-
position of the coal can have a dom-
inant effect on fireside corrosion.
Although no quantitative index to
coal corrosivity exists, corrosion
potential increases with higher levels
of Cl, Na, S, and K, and decreases
with an increase in alkaline earth
oxides (CaO and MgO). Also co-fir-
ing of municipal or industrial waste
can accelerate fireside corrosion.
Corrosive constituents of these
18-10 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
wastes can include lead, zinc,
sodium, potassium and chlorine.
Actions to Confirm:
(n). Evaluate changes in coal com-
position using available corrosivity
indices as a judge of relative
propensity for increased fireside
corrosion.
3.5 Root causes of the direct
deposition of carbon.
The impingement of incompletely
combusted coal particles can cause
corrosive attack directly by creating
a locally reducing environment. This
could be caused by defective pul-
verization or classification.9
3.5.1 Carbon particle impingement
Actions to confirm include:
(o). Visual and metallographic
examination.
(p). Analysis of pulverized fuel (PF)
exiting the pulverizers will provide
an indication that the fineness is
acceptable. The usual procedure
involves sampling the PF and ana-
lyzing the amount of residue that
remains after passing a sample
through 60 (213mm) and 200 (74mm)
mesh sieves. Such an analysis has
the ability to indicate whether a
large percentage of large particles
(> 200mm) is the result of poor mill
classification or inadequate grind-
ing. The distribution riffles are also
important in ensuring even flow to
the burners and their adjustment
should be checked.
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
(Coal Fired Units):
Immediate Solutions and Actions
Actions to prevent fireside corro-
sion will generally fall into two
major categories: (i) materials
strategies, i.e., providing protec-
tion or replacing the tubing, and
(ii) design or operating strate-
gies. For the most part both are
longer term options.
The primary means to establish the
extent of damage will be to use
ultrasonic techniques to detect wall
thinning. Surveys should be con-
ducted in conjunction with remaining
life assessment techniques to deter-
mine the rate of wastage. The
acceptable rate of wastage will
depend on an analysis of the
desired remaining life. However, as
a rule of thumb, any wastage rate
detected over 40 nm/hr (~ 14
mils/yr) will require further consider-
ation. Chapter 9, Volume 1 reviews
5.1 Importance of linking
repairs and actions to an
assessment of remaining life.
For many of the boiler tube failure
mechanisms, the choice of correc-
tive measures is limited to a single
option, directly tied to the root cause.
Fireside corrosion, in waterwalls and
for superheaters/ reheaters, is one of
the mechanisms where there are
multiple options and a careful evalu-
ation of the economics, as well as
the engineering is critical.
It is likely that the engineering and
economic reality because of avail-
able fuel, required combustion con-
ditions, etc. is that a certain level of
corrosion wastage will occur. A
remaining life analysis will help
determine the implications of such
constraints, including the develop-
ment of a plan for periodic replace-
ment of the most seriously affected
tubes. Chapter 8, Volume 1 dis-
cusses remaining life assessment
methods in more detail.
5.2 Repairs
Repairs intended to be short-term
can use either the same material in
a direct replacement or can use a
palliative coating. Pad welding of
thinned tubes has been used as a
temporary measure until the next
scheduled outage. It is not recom-
mended as a regular repair proce-
the use of ultrasonic testing for wall
thinning measurements.
Locations should be chosen among
those which are most susceptible as
shown in Figure 18-4 and described
above in Section 1.2. Emphasis
should be on finding the locations of
maximum damage, not an average
rate of wastage.
Surveys should be conducted prior
to, and after, change of fuel supply
or retrofitting low NOx burners.
dure for waterwalls nor as a long-
term “fix” of the problem because it
will almost certainly result in repeat
failures. Chapter 11, Volume 1
reviews boiler tube repair proce-
dures including a discussion of the
problems that can be introduced by
pad welding.
Over the longer term, the choice of
repair strategy will depend on the
severity of the corrosion problem.
Rules of thumb are:
• If the corrosion rate is on the order
of 40 nm/hr (~ 14 mils/year) the
tubing can be replaced with the
same alloy and will last approxi-
mately the same length of time.
• If the corrosion rate is > 40 nm/hr
(~ 14 mils/year) then the use of
an alternate alloy or a faceted
tube containing a thicker crown
should be considered.
• If the corrosion rate is >> 40
nm/hr, for example, as high as
300-500 nm/hr (~ 100 to 175
/mils/year), then the use of a co-
extruded tube should be consid-
ered. In such a composite, the
inner material should be mild
steel to provide waterside protec-
tion and pressure containment,
with an outer coating of a resis-
tant material such as Alloy 310.
Additional discussion of material
changes is given below.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-11
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of
Repeat Failures
Waterwall Fireside
Corrosion (Coal Fired Units):
Long-Term Actions
1. Actions to reduce fireside cor-
rosion will generally fall into
two major categories: (i) mate-
rials strategies, i.e., providing
protection or replacing the
tubing, and (ii) design or
operating strategies to try to
control the local gaseous envi-
ronment.
2. Specific actions should be
chosen in conjunction with an
analysis of remaining life and
long-term plan for monitoring
and periodic re-evaluation.
18-12 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
It may not be possible to remove
completely the root cause for many
fireside corrosion problems.
Knowing how to minimize the
wastage rate and the application of
a remaining life assessment
process, including periodic inspec-
tion and monitoring, will be the keys
to economic handling of fireside cor-
rosion problems.
If an initial design condition is at the
root cause of a fireside corrosion
problem, there are three approaches
that can be taken: correct the prob-
lem, accept the fault and the corre-
sponding corrosion rates and expect
an increased outage frequency, or
accept the fault and seek a material
solution.
Figure 18-6 outlines most of the
available strategies for waterwall
fireside corrosion. As shown in that
figure, there are two primary and not
mutually exclusive routes that can
be followed: (i) materials solutions
and (ii) operating options. The cir-
cled numbers in Figure 18-6 are
used to identify options for the dis-
cussion that follows and no ranking
of the possible solutions is thus
implied; however, boxes outlined in
bold indicate those options which
have been the most successful.
Remaining life assessment
(option 1, Figure 18-6)
Utilities with fireside corrosion of
waterwalls should initiate a system-
atic program of baseline measure-
ment, monitoring rates of wastage,
application and monitoring of control
measures, and assessment of
remaining life. Such an assessment
will include establishing a baseline
condition, predicting expected
wastage rates, and periodic re-
inspection. It is required to relate the
rate of corrosion wastage to the
desired life of the unit, or the time
available to implement a prevention
strategy, for example, at the next
scheduled outage. Therefore a
remaining life assessment should be
undertaken in parallel with any
course of correction; periodic
reassessment of condition will help
avoid forced outages. Remaining life
methods are discussed in Chapter
8, Volume 1.
Wall thickness measurements should
be made where a problem has been
identified, usually with UT and
preferably on grit-blasted surfaces.
Monitoring of the flue gas, metal and
steam temperatures, combustion
conditions, and fuel composition
should also be considered as these
can determine corrosion rates while
the unit is still on-line.9 Particularly
important are step changes in key
parameters.
Coatings (option 2)
A variety of processes have been
suggested for applying metallized
coatings to tubes in situ as a means
of increasing corrosion resistance.
The advantage of coatings is that
very corrosion-resistant materials
can be applied at specific suscepti-
ble sites, so it is not necessary to
replace entire sections of tubing to
overcome localized problems.
Among the coating methods that
have been tried are: surface nitrid-
ing, chromizing and aluminizing.
Flame- or plasma spraying with and
without subsequent heat treatment
have also seen significant develop-
ment work. The various coatings and
application techniques have had
variable and generally poor results
in U.S. utilities. The primary prob-
lems have been getting the coatings
to remain on the tubes, the repro-
ducibility of coating techniques, and
the need to have very well prepared
surfaces. In general, coatings
should be regarded as a quick fix
which will require continued mainte-
nance.
It is very important that a full assess-
ment of the tube condition is made
prior to coating. This should include
knowledge of the minimum wall
thickness and composition of any
internal tube deposits. If the applica-
tion of coatings results in a flow dis-
ruption at the internal tube surface,
then it becomes a precursor to
underdeposit corrosion mecha-
nisms, such as hydrogen damage.
Furthermore, if copper is present in
internal tube deposits it can become
molten during the coating operation, Coatings were evaluated two years
leading to copper embrittlement of after their application in boiler trials.
the grain boundaries. Corrosion was found to be less than
the accuracy of the measurement
The former CEGB has tried a num-
technique and less than 1% of the
ber of coatings for corrosion and
coated surface area had spalled.
erosion resistance.14, 15 As a result
Protection by coating was adopted
of many trials, alloys with composi-
for widespread use, implemented by
tions 50Cr-50Ni or 65Cr-35Ni have
mechanized spraying for most
been found to have the best combi-
straight waterwall tubing and by a
nation of corrosion resistance and
manual process for curved tubing or
resistance to spalling as caused by
small isolated areas.15 Additional
thermal cycling.15

Corrosion rate confirmed

Extent determined

Remaining life assessment 1

Materials solutions Operating solutions

Provide Replace 8 Modify Modify combustion

protection component fuel and/or flow conditions
2
Coatings Ð Change fuel
Ð Blending
Ð Washing
More Same
resistant Gas side Water side
material
material

6 Monolithic Soot Chemical

Increased 9 clean
blowing
7 Co-extruded thickness deposits
10
4 Same 11 14
geometry Mills Check
Burners combustion
5 Different
geometry 12

Original Air
thickness 3 13 curtaining

Notes: a) Remaining life assessment (1) is almost mandatory to decide which option should be adopted
b) Boxes outlined in bold indicate options that have been most successful
c) Numbers refer to main text

Figure 18-6. Strategies for preventing repeat failures by waterwall fireside corrosion in coal-fired units.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-13

important features described
included the following14:
• Importance of clearly specifying
the areas to be coated, materials
to be used and thickness
required. Time available and other
restrictions to site applications
should also be clearly specified.
• Importance of surface preparation
to provide a contaminant-free,
roughened surface.
• Importance of taking samples
throughout the application as a
check that process parameters
are producing consistent and
acceptable quality.
Trials of other coating types have
included some refractory/ceramic
coatings; in cyclone-fired units,
refractories are used routinely in the
furnace zone from around the loca-
tion of the burners down to the slag
hoppers
Replacement with the same material
of either the same thickness (option
3), increased thickness (option 4), or
a changed geometry (option 5)
If the corrosion rate is only slightly
higher than that required to reach
the desired life as determined from a
remaining life assessment, tube
replacement can be made in-kind.5
For a target lifetime of about
100,000 hours for waterwall tubes,
the wastage rate should be much
less than 40 nm/hr (~ 14 mils/year).
If significantly higher corrosion rates
than allowable are being experi-
enced, then the options might be
thicker tubes of the same alloy or a
change of tube geometry.
Asymmetrically-walled tubes, also
called faceted, profiled, or omega
tubes, have a thicker side oriented
toward the flame where the most
rapid wastage is experienced; they
have been used in the petrochemi-
cal industry but generally not in the
utility industry.4 The tubes are
designed to fit into standard wall-
tube spacing. The advantage is that
more material is at the locations
where corrosion is a problem. The
18-14 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
disadvantages are such tubes are
more expensive, more difficult to
bend and install, and there is some
reduction in heat transfer so that the
external wall surface temperatures
could be increased.
Change to a more resistant
ÒmonolithicÓ material (option 6)
If it is necessary to go to a more
resistant alloy, that is, where the cor-
rosion rate is > 40 nm/hr (~ 14
mils/year), experience has shown
that there is little difference in the
resistance of ferritic materials with
Cr levels up to 9%.4 Therefore, it
has been recommended that a
change in alloy be made to a mater-
ial such as 9Cr-1Mo or higher. The
principal disadvantage is cost,
which can be several times the cost
of the original material.
Change to a more resistant
composite material such as
co-extruded tubing (option 7)
It is possible to use tubes that are
co-extruded so that an inner layer of
load-bearing mild steel is metallurgi-
cally bonded with an outer layer of
corrosion-resistant material, usually
one that forms Cr2O3 in the furnace
environment, as this restricts the for-
mation of sulfides. The objective is
to take advantage of the corrosion-
resistant outer material without the
expense incurred by using it for the
entire tube.
The former CEGB has used such
tubes on a large-scale since 1976.
By 1984 about 230 km of tubing had
been installed in twelve CEGB units.
Such a materials solution has been
found to be the most economical
approach to dealing with fireside
corrosion problems which are
caused by the aggressive nature of
the coals burned in U.K. boilers.16
The majority of furnace wall applica-
tions were in tangent wall construc-
tion through 1984. The primary
material for the outer layer was Type
310 stainless (25 Cr 20 Ni) or a
modified Type 310 which had
increased silicon content to 0.75 -
1.5%, chromium to a minimum of
25%, and niobium to a minimum of
8X the carbon level. Note that sul-
fide scales have been found to form
on co-extruded T310 which is a
strong chromia former.7 The inner
layer has typically been carbon
steel.
After 30,000 hours of operation in
the first membrane wall trials carried
out by the CEGB, a performance
improvement of 2.5 over adjacent
carbon steel tubes was measured.
Tubes were 63.5 mm (2.5 in.) out-
side diameter with 3.4 mm (0.13 in.)
Type 310 on 3.0 mm (0.12 in.) car-
bon steel.
Tube bending characteristics of co-
extruded material have been found
to be identical to monolithic materi-
als.16 Weld procedures have gener-
ally matched weld metals to the
base metal to maintain property lev-
els. Conventional welding tech-
niques and normal quality control
have been found sufficient to ensure
good weld quality. The CEGB expe-
rience base was more than 70,000
welds through 1984, without weld
failure. No preheat or post-weld heat
treatments have been required.
Additional information about welding
co-extruded tubes can be found in
Chapter 11, Volume 1.
Fuel change, blending, washing
(option 8) If the root cause of the
problem is an aggressively corrosive
coal, some change in fuel supply
such as a change of source, clean-
ing or blending, can be beneficial.
However, such procedures can often
be economically prohibitive as trans-
portation and/or handling costs
increase. Further, there are usually
overriding considerations not related
to corrosion, such as to SO2 require-
ments.
A method of investigating the poten-
tial effects of coal changes, blend-
ing, and washing is the application
of the Coal Quality Impact Model
(CQIM).17,18 Such a method will
provide information on the total eco-
nomic impact, as well as about the
potential for fireside corrosion.
Change frequency, check effective-
ness of sootblowing (option 9)
Increased wall blowing can be tried.
This is usually determined by slag-
ging conditions and is not usually
practiced for corrosion control.
Combustion process changes to
prevent local ÒreducingÓ conditions
(option 10) Generally, changes in
operating conditions are limited and
consist of bringing the furnace back
to design points. An exception
would be where there has been a
significant fuel change from the
design coal. Nonetheless there are
a number of operating checks that
can be considered.
One of the first courses of remedial
action is to ensure present settings
for burners and fuel nozzles match
the design values unless there has
been a change in coal type.
Improvements to the stoichiometric
balance of coal and air distribution
to each burner can be tried, particu-
larly to reflect changes in coal from
design conditions. For example, in
many front-wall fired boilers, sec-
ondary air registers can be used to
control airflow and swirl. If adjust-
ments are made, only one burner at
a time should be adjusted with inter-
mediate measurements of the CO
levels in critical locations.
A further approach to avoid substoi-
chiometric regions might be to oper-
ate the unit at an increased excess
air level. However, there have been
no known cases where increases in
air flow have been used as a corro-
sion prevention technique.
Furthermore, this may come into
direct conflict with modifications
specifically aimed at NOx reduction,
and the increased mass flow might
contribute to downstream erosion
problems
Checks can be made for oxygen at
the economizer exit and carbon
dioxide level after the ID fans to
determine changes in the overall
combustion process. However, lack
of significant CO at the discharge to
the ID fan does not preclude the
existence of reducing conditions
near furnace wall tubes.
Mills (option 11) Equally loaded
mills and equal pressure drop along
the pulverized fuel lines to the burn-
ers will help ensure even fuel distrib-
ution. It is also possible that
changes in coal fineness could be
made to ensure complete combus-
tion.19 This will help to avoid
impingement of partially burnt coal
particles. In practice, changes are
generally not made except to
restore original specifications.
Pulverized fuel in each burner line
should be sampled to ensure that
the fineness specification is met
(see Section 3.5.1).
Inspection and adjustment of burn-
ers (option 12) As with general
changes of the combustion process,
there are only a few modifications of
existing burners that can be made
economically, and there are often
overriding technical issues such as
NOx control that will take prece-
dence. However, some adjustments
to burners might be indicated such
as centering the fireball and ensur-
ing that it is of proper size and
shape, adjustment or maintenance
of the burners to account for
changed air distribution and/or to
avoid flame impingement, and
checking and adjusting fuel nozzle
tilt and aiming. Burners with sepa-
rate air and coal ports may have
separate adjustment problems.
Air blanketing or air curtaining
(option 13) One approach is to try
to prevent substoichiometric zones
by redistribution of air in the flame
or arranging for some portion of the
air to blanket the waterwalls in
affected locations. A number of utili-
ties have tried air blanketing or cur-
taining, which is included as stan-
dard practice for one boiler manu-
facturer, A difficulty is to verify that
the desired level of air is present
near the walls. One of the findings
has been that a monitoring or diag-
nostic device which could provide
an instantaneous reading of the
local oxygen partial pressure would
be useful.4
Chemical cleaning to remove
waterside deposits (option 14)
If the excessive temperatures in
waterwall tubes are caused by
excessive internal deposits, chemi-
cal cleaning should be conducted
followed by a monitoring campaign
to optimize the feedwater chemistry.
Additional detail about the cycle
chemistry targets can be found in
Chapter 3, Volume 1, and about
chemical cleaning in Chapter 4,
Volume 1. This aspect is also dis-
cussed in Chapter 19 on supercriti-
cal waterwall cracking.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-15
7. Case study
Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
Case Study: Field Experience
The most recent survey of experi-
ence with fireside corrosion and fly-
ash erosion in the United States
was in 1987.4 The survey included
21 utility telephone contacts and
10 plant visits. In total, information
was obtained from 42 coal-fired
stations. Boilers ranged in age
from 2 to 34 years, and in size from
75 to 1300 MW. Five boiler manu-
facturers were represented in the
data base and a variety of coal
types were fired.
Eleven of the 42 stations reported
fireside corrosion of waterwalls as
a serious problem and an addi-
tional 13 as a moderate problem.
About half of the units reporting
serious or moderate problems with
fireside corrosion of waterwalls
were cyclone-fired units. Table 18-2
summarizes the magnitude of the
fireside corrosion problem at four
of the ten utilities visited.
As an example, at Utility T, signifi-
cant problems with fireside corro-
sion were encountered. About 60
percent of the waterwall tube fail-
ures in one boiler were caused by
this mechanism. The primary
cause was a reducing atmosphere
brought about by maladjusted air
while maintaining load. At $25 per
MWhr, forced outages caused by
waterwall fireside corrosion in this
unit still resulted in replacement
power costs estimated to be about
$1.7 million per year.
Table 18-2
Magnitude of Fireside Corrosion Problems (Annual) for Four Survey Utilities
Source: D.N. Williams, et al.4
18-16 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
Units exhibiting serious problems
were generally fired with Eastern
coals with relatively high sulfur
content. Problems appeared
related not only to the composition
of the coal, but also to operating
conditions. The most common
cause was presence of reducing
conditions near the waterwalls or
where there were short periods of
overheating. Slagging problems
were not well correlated with the
incidence of fireside corrosion.The
most common remedial actions
reported were readjustment of
combustion parameters, including
coal fineness, burner positioning
and nozzle adjustments, to provide
uniform distribution of coal and air
to each burner. The use of air blan-
keting had been tried in a few units
with mixed opinion about the effec-
tiveness. Of the material substitu-
tion alternatives, sprayed coatings
had been tried at a number of utili-
ties, thicker walled tubes at a few,
and co-extruded tubing had gener-
ally been considered too expensive
except for the lower furnace
regions of cyclone boilers.
Part of the problem in assessing
the effectiveness of the various
solutions is the interrelated nature
of corrosion and other fireside
problems. One factor cited was
that the effect of recent coal source
and firing procedural changes to
meet environmental constraints
Days Lost to
Utility Forced Outages
T 4.9
Q 3.1
P 2.0
M —
was still unknown. The survey con-
cluded that: “Overall, as judged by
the response of the utility person-
nel contacted to questions con-
cerning reducing atmosphere cor-
rosion, fireside corrosion of the
waterwalls appears to be a prob-
lem of increasing importance.”
Another example was utility P in
the survey (see Table 18-2).
Fireside corrosion was a continuing
problem at one station that con-
sisted of four 800 MW supercritical
boilers constructed in the early
1970s. The units operated base
load and burned Eastern coal that
was not washed. All four units have
been affected and replacement of
as much as 2000 sq. ft. of water-
wall per unit had occurred. About
two forced outages per year per
unit had occurred as a result of
fireside corrosion of waterwall
tubes in the early years of opera-
tion. Corrosion damage attributed
to reducing atmosphere conditions
was observed in moderately large
areas of the waterwalls located at,
and somewhat above, the burner
elevation. Adjustment of burners,
air supply, etc. was tried but had
not been successful; installation of
a curtain air system was at that
time being considered. Best con-
trol of the problem had been
obtained by metallizing the
affected areas on a repetitive basis
at most planned outages.
Forced Outage Power Number of Tube
Costs, MWhr Leaks
68,800 —
44,800 6.2
52,600 —
— 5 to 10
8. References
1Culter,
A.J. B., T. Flatley and K.A. Hay, CEGB Research,
October, 1978.
2Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
3Personal Communication from D. French (David N.
French, Inc.) to R.B. Dooley, February, 1995.
4Williams, D.N., H.R. Hazard, H.H. Krause, L.J. Flanigan,
R.E. Barrett, and I.G. Wright, Fireside Corrosion and Fly
Ash Erosion in Boilers, Research Project 2711-1, Final
Report CS-5071, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, February, 1987.
5Holmes, D.R. and D.B. Meadowcroft, “Fireside
Corrosion and Problems of Tube Life Prediction”,
Symposium on Thermal Utilities Boiler Reliability,
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, May, 1983.
6Personal Communication from P. Daniel (Babcock &
Wilcox) to R.B. Dooley, February 15, 1995.
7Personal
Communication from P. James and J. Davison
(PowerGen, U.K.) to R.B. Dooley, February, 1995.
8Latham, E., D.B. Meadowcroft, and L. Pinder, “The
Effects of Coal Chlorine on Fireside Corrosion”, Chlorine
in Coal, J. Stringer and D.D. Banerjee, eds., Elsevier
Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1991, pp. 225-246.
9Laxton, J.W., D.B. Meadowcroft, F. Clarke, T. Flatley,
C.W. King, and C.W. Morris, The Control of Fireside
Corrosion in Power Station Boilers, Third edition, Central
Electricity Generating Board, 1987.
10Brooks, S. and D.B. Meadowcroft, in Corrosion
Resistant Materials for Coal Conversion Systems, D.B.
Meadowcroft and M.I. Manning, eds., Applied Science,
London, 1983.
11Personal Communication S. Brooks and K.S. Gilroy to
E. Latham, et al., cited in Reference 8, 1984.
12American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E1131-86, “Standard Test Method for Compositional
Analysis by Thermogravimetry, 1992 Annual Book of
ASTM Standards: General Methods and Instrumentation,
Volume 14.02, American Society for Testing and
Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1992.
13American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E794-85 (1989), “Standard Test Method for Melting
Temperatures and Crystallization Temperatures by
Thermal Analysis, 1992 Annual Book of ASTM
Standards: General Methods and Instrumentation,
Volume 14.02, American Society for Testing and
Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1992.
14Morgan-Warren,
E.J., “Thermal Spraying for Boiler
Tube Protection”, Welding and Metal Fabrication,
Jan/Feb, 1992, pp. 25-31.
15Bennett, A.P. and M.B.C. Quigley, “The Spraying of
Boiler Tubing in Power Plants”, Welding and Metal
Fabrication, November, 1990, pp. 485-489.
16Flatley, T. and T. Thursfield, “Review of Corrosion
Resistant Co-Extruded Tube Development for Power
Boilers”, in R.D. Sisson, Jr., ed., Coatings and Bimetallics
for Aggressive Environments, American Society for
Metals, Metals Park, OH, 1985.
17Davidson, P.G, et al., Development and Application of
the Coal Quality Impact Model: CQIMTM, Research
Project 2256-2, Final Report GS-6393, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1990.
18Pavlish,J.H., P.R. Miller, N.C. Craig, and A.K. Mehta,
“CQIM - An Analytical Tool Used to Evaluate
Performance and Economic Issues”, Proceedings: Ninth
Annual International Pittsburgh Coal Conference,
October, 1992.
19Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec,
November, 1983.
20Sotter,J.G., et al., Guidelines for Fireside Testing in
Coal-Fired Power Plants, Research Project 1891-3, Final
Report CS-5552, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, March, 1988.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-17
ACTIONS for Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of water-
wall fireside corrosion damage
begin here. The goal of these
actions is to see if further investi-
gation of fireside corrosion is
warranted or whether another
BTF mechanism should be
investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a water-
wall BTF has occurred and
fireside corrosion is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by waterwall fireside corro-
sion.
18-18 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
Action 1a: If a waterwall BTF Action 1b: If a precursor has
has occurred and fireside corro- occurred in the unit that could
sion is the likely mechanism. lead to future BTF by fireside cor-
rosion.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi- ➠ Determine whether one or more of
cal of waterwall fireside corrosion: the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
➠ Review Figure 18-4 for typi-
in the unit:
cal boiler regions.
• Any evidence of wall loss
➠ Review main text, section 1.2
observed or measured.
for description of susceptible
locations such as: at a local • Evidence of a locally substoi-
“reducing” (substoichiometric) chiometric environment.
environment, usually around • Change to a more aggressive
burners. coal.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic • Evidence of carbon particle
appearance of the failure includes impingement or flame impinge-
such features as: ment.
• Significant wall thinning across • Evidence that tubes may be
a number of tubes on the fire- overheating.
side.
➠ These precursors can signal the
• Maximum attack at the crown of potential for waterwall tube fail-
the tube facing the flame and ures by fireside corrosion. If one
extending around 120° of the or more has occurred, go to
circumference. Action 3 which reviews root
• Grooving at tube surfaces with causes and outlines the steps to
grooving consistent with “alliga- confirm the influence of each.
tor hide” appearance. See
Figure 18-3.
• Hard, fired deposits at tube sur-
face (inner layer) with loosely
bonded ash on the outer layers.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is fireside
corrosion.
A waterwall tube failure has
occurred which the BTF team
has tentatively identified as
being fireside corrosion damage
(Action 1a). Action 2 should
clearly identify fireside corrosion
as the primary mechanism or
point to another cause. The
actions listed will be executed by
confirming the macroscopic
appearance of the failure, remov-
ing representative tube
sample(s) followed by detailed
visual and metallographic analy-
sis. A primary objective is to
identify constituents of the exter-
nal tube deposits which are dis-
tinctive of fireside corrosion.
➠ Evaluate locations of failure. Are
tubes subject to wastage in loca-
tions common to a “reducing”
environment? See Section 1.2
main text for detailed list of typi-
cal locations.
➠ Characterize extent of damage.
Is there significant wall thinning
across a number of tubes on the
fireside?
➠ Characterize nature of damage
on a failed tube. Is maximum
attack on crown of the tube fac-
ing the flame?
➠ Analyze external tube deposits.
Does metallographic analysis of
deposits detect the presence of
(i) pyrosulfates, sulfides, or other
evidence of attack by sulfidation,
(ii) unburned carbon or other evi-
dence of poor combustion or
local reducing conditions, or (iii)
chlorides in the layer next to the
tube?
Probable mechanism is fireside
corrosion.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
Underlying root cause is probably
not related to a locally substoichio-
metric condition; however, mecha-
nism may still be fireside corrosion.
Continue through flow chart for
alternative cause resolution.
If damage is localized, it may be
flyash or coal particle erosion
damage or overheating; however
continue through flow chart, partic-
ularly deposit analysis.
May still be waterwall fireside cor-
rosion caused by an off-center fire-
ball.
Mechanism is probably not fireside
corrosion. Review other possibilities
including an erosive process such
as flyash erosion (Chapter 14) or
coal particle erosion (Chapter 28),
or overheating (Chapter 23).
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-19
Action 3: Determine root cause of fireside corrosion
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as fireside corrosion
(Action 2) or a precursor to fire-
side corrosion has occurred
(Action 1b). The goal of this
Action 3 is for the BTF Team to
review the potential root causes
of fireside corrosion, identify
probable ones, and take those
actions that are needed to con-
firm which are operative in the
unit. This step must be taken so
that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
18-20 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
References to other sources of infor-
mation:
• Main text (this chapter) reviews the
mechanism and the distinctive
nature of external tube deposits.
• A summary of the typical steps in a
metallurgical examination can be
found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Metallographic analysis to detect key
contaminants in deposits to confirm which
fireside corrosion mechanism is active.
➠ (b). Monitor for levels of O2 (< 0.1%),
H2S, and CO (> 1%).
➠ (c). Field testing to detect combustion
conditions in susceptible areas with
waterwall deposition probes to collect
deposits or heat flux measurement in
corrosion areas.
➠ (d). As in (b) and (c).
➠ (e). Visual examination to detect localized
flame impingement.
➠ (f). Monitor for change in furnace slagging
conditions. Use waterwall deposition probe,
as needed.
➠ (g). Analytical techniques to identify
melting points of compounds in deposits.
➠ (h). Metallographic analysis to detect key
contaminants in deposits.
➠ (i). Measure pressure drop across
waterwall circuits that would be indicative
of increasing deposits on waterside.
➠ (j). Direct metal temperature measurements
with thermocouples or heat-flux meters.
➠ (k). Selective sampling to determine
internal deposit amount and composition.
➠ (l). Analysis of internal oxide and deposits.
➠ (m). Analysis of cycle chemistry
monitoring devices.
➠ (n). Analysis of propensity for coal
corrosivity via available index methods.
➠ (o). Visual and metallographic examination
to detect key contaminants in deposits to
confirm which fireside corrosion
mechanism is active.
➠ (p). Periodic sampling from mills to ensure
proper level of coal fineness.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Evaluation will be
based on detecting wall thinning.
Wastage rates in excess of
40 nm/hr (~14 mils/yr) are of
concern.
➠ Identify all locations to be examined. Refer to Section
1.2 of main text and Figure 18-4 for typical locations.
Damage may be widespread and missed locations are
sites for future failures.
➠ Perform UT survey to measure extent of damage via
wall thinning. A review of UT methods is provided in
Chapter 9, Volume 1.
➠ Perform tube sampling to confirm results of NDE
inspection and to determine the degree of damage.
➠ Use results interactively with Action 3.
➠ Go to Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate Solutions
and Actions. Begin remaining life assessment.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-21
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
3.2 Influence of a substoichiometric salts
The most important actions for environment
the BTF team are to: (i) initiate a
remaining life assessment based
on the assessment of wastage 3.3.1 Overheated tubes
3.2.1 Poor combustion conditions (general)
rate derived from the NDE
survey, (ii) choose a repair
strategy based on remaining life
assessment, and (iii) coordinate
long-term strategy from options
shown in Figure 18-6.

3.2.2 Where air distribution has been modi-

fied
3.2.3 Poorly adjusted or worn burners
3.4 Influences related to fuel factors

3.4.1 Change in fuel to coal with high

3.3 Influences of the deposition of alkali

18-22 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on clear identification of
the underlying root cause and an
economic evaluation to ensure
that the optimal strategy has
been chosen. It will also include
an analysis of remaining life.
Major Root Cause Influences
corrosivity
3.5 Root causes of direct carbon deposi-
tion
3.5.1 Carbon particle impingement
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠Choose long-term strategy from those
shown in Figure 18-6.
➠ Implement on-going program of remaining
life assessment and monitoring. See
Chapter 8, Volume 1 for additional detail.
➠ As above, plus
➠ Develop a fireside testing program.
Guidance is provided in reference 20.
➠ As above.
➠ As above, plus
➠ Alternate burner designs, as needed.
➠ Choose long-term strategy from those
shown in Figure 18-6.
➠ Implement on-going program of remaining
life assessment and monitoring. See
Chapter 8, Volume 1 for additional detail.
➠ As above, plus
➠ Develop optimum feedwater chemistry
strategy so as to minimize ingress of
feedwater corrosion products.
➠ Investigate the use of oxygenated treatment
as a means to eliminate the internal boiler
deposits.
➠ As above.
➠ As above, plus
➠ Develop a fireside testing program.
Guidance is provided in reference 20.
➠ Investigate coal changes with Coal Quality
Impact Model (CQIM) or equivalent,
including economics evaluation.
➠ Choose repair strategy based on severity of
corrosion rate.
➠ Implement long-term strategy from choices
in Figure 18-6 in conjunction with on-going
program of remaining life assessment and
monitoring.
➠ As above, plus
➠ Develop a fireside testing program.
Guidance is provided in reference 20.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 18-23
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of fire-
side corrosion in the waterwalls
or by its precursors.
18-24 Waterwall Fireside Corrosion
Waterwall Fireside Alert for Other Cycle ➠ Actions Indicated
Corrosion Aspect Components
Corrosive coal • Potential for super- ➠ Develop a fireside testing program
heater/reheater fireside such as provided in reference 20.
corrosion see Chapter 33, ➠ Investigate coal changes with Coal
Volume 3. Quality Impact Model (CQIM) or equiva-
• Potential for back-end lent, including economics evaluation.
corrosion. ➠ Mitigate negative aspects of coal
composition if possible by fuel switch,
blending, or washing.
Poor combustion • Low unit efficiency. ➠ Combustion adjustments to improve
conditions • Poor mill performance. unit efficiency.
• Combustion is delayed ➠ Correct mill performance.
and occurring in the con-
vective passes, which
could lead to corrosion of
SH/RH surfaces.
Tube overheating by • Overheating in tubes. ➠ Chemical clean unit if necessary.
thick internal deposits • Alert of poor feedwater See guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
or ripple magnetite treatment or controls. ➠ Implement program to clean up and
ensure proper cycle chemistry.
See overview of issues in Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
Chapter 19 • Volume 2
Supercritical Waterwall
Cracking
Introduction
In its most common manifestation,
this damage type appears as cir-
cumferential cracking in the water-
walls of coal-fired supercritical units.
Although not as common, such
damage has also been found in
subcritical units. The underlying
mechanism has been termed corro-
sion-enhanced thermal fatigue.
A related damage type can also
occur in oil-fired/gas-fired units
where the higher heat flux leads to
more rapid tube temperature
increases and damage accumulates
as oxidation-enhanced creep
cracking; cracks are found in either
circumferential or longitudinal orien-
tations.
Wastage, caused by fireside corro-
sion, has been found in some cases
to be associated with this type of
cracking.
The problem of circumferential
cracking in waterwalls has been
fairly widespread in supercritical
units in the U.S. and in a number of
other countries. Research over the
last twenty years has helped to clar-
ify the situation and successful pre-
vention is in hand, although a com-
plete explanation of the basic phe-
nomenon is still evolving.
Cracks are often not detected until a
failure occurs unless care is taken to
remove all of the scale from tube
surfaces. They are usually not
observed until a unit has been in
service for a number of years, but
once detected and repaired, seem
to return within a matter of months.
This type of cracking has been
called by a number of names,
including circumferential cracking,
horizontal cracking, transverse
cracking, craze cracking, elephant
hiding, and alligator-skin cracking.
Note that some care in interpreting
these names is needed as many of
them have also been applied to
damage other than that addressed
in this chapter.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 19-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
Supercritical
Waterwall Cracking:
Identification Keys
1. Damage generally forms as
regular, parallel cracking,
typically oriented circumferen-
tially. It is most commonly
found on the fireside of water-
walls and membranes
between tubes of coal-fired
supercritical units.
2. In cross-section, the cracks
are found to be sharp, vee- or
“dagger”-shaped, generally
transgranular and filled with
oxide. The presence of a
sulfur-containing central
spline and sulfur in the oxide
is typical.
3. Highest heat flux zones are
the most susceptible.
19-2 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking
1.1 Features of failure
Damage typically consists of multi-
ple, parallel cracks perpendicular to
the direction of maximum tensile
stress. Most often cracking is cir-
cumferential, however incidences of
longitudinal cracking have also been
observed, particularly in oil-fired and
gas-fired units. Figure 19-1 shows
the general nature of the cracking.
This sample was removed from an
800 MW supercritical boiler and
illustrates the multiple, parallel, vee-
shaped cracks.
There is great variability in the
cracking density from tube to adja-
cent tube, even within parallel water-
wall tubes in a single pass. Cracks
on a given tube are often uniformly
spaced with a density that is typi-
cally 20-40 cracks per tube inch.
Figure 19-1. Cracked waterwall tubes from an 800 MW supercritical
boiler. Source: M.D. Kurre, F.B. Stulen and I.G. Wright1
Although regularly spaced, adjacent
cracks are usually of different
lengths.1
Tubes containing these types of
cracks may be found in conjunction
with significant fireside wastage, up
to 50% of the tube wall thickness in
some units. However, there have
also been may cases in which
cracks occurred with little wastage.2
Chapter 18 discusses fireside
wastage in water-touched tubes.
Circumferentially-oriented cracks are
sharp, vee-shaped or finger-like in
cross section. Figures 19-2a and b
show details of the typical appear-
ance of cracking. Figure 19-2a
shows typical sharp-pointed trans-
granular cracking. An oxide coating
along the depth of the crack is
shown. A central spline containing
Figure 19-2a. Cross section showing the
typical appearance of cracking: sharp-
pointed features and the oxide (dark) Figure 19-2b. Closeup of typical cracking indicating appearance at crack tip and pres-
and sulfide (light) corrosion products. ence of a minor amount of intergranular sulfidation at the tip. The right hand of the two
Source: M.D. Kurre, F.B. Stulen, and I.G. photographs is of etched material. Source: M.D. Kurre, F.B. Stulen, and I.G. Wright1
Wright1

oxide (dark) and sulfide (light) corro-

sion products is shown. Figure 19-2b
shows a close-up of a typical crack
tip showing the presence of inter-
granular sulfidation at the crack tip.
The presence of spheroidization and
graphitization near only the outside
surface indicates that there was a
significant thermal gradient at that
location. However, this is not a con-
sistent feature as other tubes
removed from service with circumfer-
ential cracking were found to have a) b)
no microstructural changes consis-
tent with overheating.1
The formation of waterside mag-
netite with a “ripple” appearance is
typical. Figures 19-3a-d show the
macroscopic appearance and its
details.
In oil-fired/gas-fired units, cracking
is typically oriented longitudinally
and is found, upon examination, to
be essentially creep; that is, such
cracks have creep voids at crack
tips and an appearance that is simi- c) d)
lar to long-term overheating failures.
Figure 19-3. Scanning electron micrographs of rippled magnetite surface. (a) View
along the tube. (b) Details of the structure of a ripple. (c) Magnetite crystals at the
crest of a ripple (area “A” in Figure 19-3b). (d) Magnetite crystals in the trough of the
ripple (area “B” in Figure 19-3b). Source: M.D. Kurre, F.B. Stulen, and I.G. Wright1

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 19-3

1.2 Locations of failure
Failures are located primarily on the Degree of Grooving
fireside of waterwall tubing and to Slight Moderate Severe
some extent in the membranes
between tubes. Usually cracks are
the deepest at the fireside crown of
the tube. Cracking tends to be very
Firing circle Firing circle
localized, it may be limited to a spe-
cific pass of multiple tube passes in
the radiant section, and tends to be
limited to a narrow range of eleva-
tions in the boiler, usually related to
the maximum heat flux zone at the
burner level. This is illustrated in
Figure 19-4 which is a map of cir-
cumferential cracking made during a
field survey.
B
This type of cracking has also been u
r
observed in tube bends, particularly n
e
near burners. Cracking has also r
been seen on the hopper slope C
tubes.5 o
r
n
Fireside wastage, if it occurs, is also e
r
in the same areas.
1 2 3 4

50 100 150 200 250 50 100 150 200 250

Tube Numbers Tube Numbers
Front Wall

Figure 19-4. Typical areas of supercritical waterwall cracking.

Source: A.L. Plumley and W.R. Roczniak4

19-4 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking

2. Mechanism of Failure
Supercritical Waterwall
Cracking: Mechanism
1. The basic mechanism is cor-
rosion-enhanced thermal-
fatigue.
2. A number of factors that tend
to increase the likelihood of
damage and its severity have
been identified. However, it
has been found that control-
ling the internal “ripple” mag-
netite deposits will eliminate
the problem, leading to a
focus on this as the primary
contributing factor.
3. Once excessive amounts of
internal deposits accumulate,
the superposition of stress
and temperature cycles from a
variety of causes, notably the
slagging/ deslagging process,
in conjunction with a corrosive
fireside environment, will lead
to the rapid accumulation of
damage.
2.1 Introduction and brief
review of the international
experience base
A brief overview of the international
experience base will help set the
stage for a discussion of the current
thinking on the mechanism, and of
the possible approaches to preven-
tion outlined later.
A 1986 survey conducted on 56
coal-fired supercritical units in the
U.S. found about 45% had experi-
enced cracking/tube failures by this
mechanism. Twenty units (36 per-
cent of the total) had experienced
cracking considered to be “severe”
by the operators. Analysis of the
gathered information failed to
uncover simple, direct relationships
between the propensity for cracking
and (i) the nature of the coal burned,
(ii) unit design, (iii) operation, or (iv)
maintenance parameters.
Pressure Drop (bar)
Boiler ÒAÓ AVT
50
The survey did provide the basis for
lines of inquiry into causative factors.
Identified factors that tended to pro-
mote cracking in the units surveyed
were2: (i) heat flux into the waterwall
tubes at levels above design, (ii) low
levels of fireside excess oxygen,
resulting in “reducing” conditions, (iii)
excessive deposits on the internal
tube surfaces, (iv) furnace-pressure
cycles in balanced-draft units, (v)
rapid startup procedures, and (vi)
frequent load cycling. Section 2.2
below reviews the work conducted
as a follow-on to this early study,
including a refinement to some of
these factors, and the addition of
several more.
The experience base with circumfer-
ential cracking in the front and rear
waterwalls of Russian supercritical
units6 provides some excellent
insight as to the nature of the prob-
lem. The cracking reported had
Oxygenated

40

✽ ✽ ✽ Chemical clean
30
Boiler ÒBÓ AVT Oxygenated
50

40
✽
30

Boiler ÒCÓ
50

40
Oxygenated

30
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10,000 12,000
Time (hours)

Figure 19-5. Typical boiler pressure drop recorded in three German supercritical units.
Note: 1 bar = 14.504 psi. Source: A. Bursik9

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 19-5

features similar to those described minimize the formation of ripple mag-
above and the cause was stated to netite, and many use spiral-wound or
be corrosion fatigue driven by serpentine waterwall construction
stresses induced by thermal which can provide more uniform heat
changes such as fluctuations in heat flux distribution than vertical water-
flux7 or from slagging and deslag- wall designs; these two factors are
ging8. The widespread introduction thought to be primarily responsible
of oxygenated feedwater treatment for the avoidance of this damage
has drastically reduced the deposi- type. It should be noted that prior to
tion in waterwall tubes and greatly changing to oxygenated treatment,
decreased the incidence of circum- both German and Japanese units
ferential cracking in these boilers.1 had experienced problems with
The case study later in this chapter pressure drop losses associated with
presents some specific results from ripple magnetite. Figure 19-5 shows
these units. this experience. Pressure drop (left
axis) is a measure of the amount of
This form of cracking has not been
internal tube deposits, usually as rip-
reported in German supercritical
ple magnetite. Chemical cleaning to
units. Those units typically employ
remove deposits, or changing to oxy-
oxygenated treatment, intended to
genated treatment have been shown
70 50
4000 psia
60 40
m,10-6 lbm/sec. ft
to minimize pressure drop (tube
internal deposition).
2.2 Contributing factors to cir-
cumferential cracking damage
During the past five years, a signifi-
cant research effort has continued to
identify specific factors that may
contribute to this form of damage,
particularly in supercritical units. This
section reviews those factors cur-
rently thought to be most impor-
tant.1,10 The underlying process, as it
occurs in coal-fired units, continues
to be considered by many investiga-
tors to be corrosion-enhanced ther-
mal fatigue. It has been suggested
that corrosion effects include
enhancement of crack initiation by
corrosive attack along grain bound-
aries and cracks in the external
oxide/scale, and enhancement of
crack growth by corrosion-product
wedge opening of cracks.2

Density (r) When first placed into operation, or

50
30 after a chemical clean, T11 tube

r, lb/ft3
40 material, typical of waterwall con-
20 struction, develops an internal pro-
30 Viscosity (m)
tective oxide of Fe3O4 as discussed
20 10
in detail in Chapter 2, Volume 1.
10 0 There is relatively little deposition on
the inside tube surface, and normal
35 1400 tube metal temperatures are gener-
30 4000 psia ally found to be in the range of 400-
k, 10-2 Btu/h.ft. °F

1200 425°C (~ 750-800°F). As with other

25 damage types, the problems begin
H, Btu/lb

Thermal Enthalpy (H) when conditions change from the

20 1000
conductivity (k) nominally protective situation.
15 The two major influences on the
800
10 mechanism seem to be (i) increased
tube surface temperature because
5 600 of the formation of internal magnetite
deposits and (ii) tube metal temper-
ature excursions because of slag-
8
ging/deslagging. Other potential
SH, 3000 psia
SH, 4000 psia influences that have been identified
Cp, Btu/lb °F

6 include (iii) the fireside conditions

and (iv) cyclic stresses such as
4 caused by unit load changes, flow
instabilities, and local variations in
2 heat flux. These variations are partic-
ularly important in supercritical units
0 because at fluid temperatures above
600 650 700 750 800 850 900 390°C (~ 735°F), the ability of the
Fluid Temperature, °F
fluid to absorb heat changes
markedly, as illustrated in measures
Figure 19-6. Temperature dependence of some properties of supercritical steam. of specific heat, thermal conductivity,
Data from ASME steam tables. Compiled by: I.G. Wright, et al.10 density and viscosity (Figure 19-6).

19-6 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking

2.2.1 Increased tube temperatures
as result of internal magnetite
deposits. As a result of the trans-
port of feedwater corrosion prod-
ucts, there is a gradual buildup of
internal tube deposits. In supercriti-
cal units, the first layer next to the
tube surface is the compact protec-
tive magnetite; above this layer are
porous deposits of magnetite, often
in the form of “rippled” magnetite as
illustrated in Figure 19-3. Such
deposits have several effects. The
temperature of the tube wall
increases as a result of the insula-
tion of the tube metal from the cool-
ing effects of the fluid flow. Figure
19-7 shows that the temperature
increase is a function of local heat
flux: the higher the heat flux and the
greater the deposit weight, the
greater the increase in tube temper-
ature. Tube metal temperatures can
easily reach an average of 450°C (~
840°F) with measured maximum
tube temperatures as high as 475°C
(~ 890°F).10
As illustrated in Figure 19-5, units
that control the buildup of internal
deposits, either by using oxy-
genated treatment or by periodic
chemical cleaning, have been able
to control boiler pressure drop
losses and tube temperatures and
are thus less prone to cracking. An
analysis of the experience in
Russian units indicated that thermal
excursions from fireside slagging
processes, discussed below, would
by themselves not cause a problem,
but that in conjunction with the
increased metal temperature as a
result of the buildup of internal
deposits, would cause cracking.8
Flow instabilities can also result from
the buildup of rippled deposits.
Such instabilities can lead to addi-
tional tube-to-tube variations in flow,
heat absorption, and, as a result,
tube metal temperatures and
propensity for cracking.10
Finally the observation that there
tends to be more deposition of mag-
250
Deposit Temperature Drop (°F)
200
150
100
50
0 0
0 10
Figure 19-7. Illustrating increasing temperature drop across the internal deposit as a
function of incident heat flux.
netite in regions of highest heat flux
is consistent with the typical loca-
tions of most significant cracking.
The case study in this chapter pro-
vides confirmatory evidence that the
internal deposits are the primary
factor in the development of dam-
age by this mechanism.
2.2.2 Surface temperature excur-
sions as a result of slagging/ deslag-
ging. Complex reactions between
the external tube surface and fire-
side environment are also occurring,
as described in Chapter 2, Volume
1. The formation of fireside scale
may include a mixture of iron oxide
and sulfide. A layer of slag will
develop which controls the fireside
corrosive environment and insulates
the tube. Significant thermal cycling
of the tube occurs with the slagging
and deslagging of tubes, either natu-
rally or by sootblowing operations.
Figure 19-8 illustrates the result
schematically: a gradually increasing
tube temperature caused by buildup
of internal deposits of ripple mag-
netite is overlain with thermal excur-
sions caused by the
slagging/deslagging process.
Figure 19-9 shows measurements
obtained from an instrumented unit.
139
Deposit Temperature Drop (°C)
Heat flux
300,000
Fluid Temp. 700°F Btu/ft2Ðhr 111
Pressure 3800 psi
Porosity 0.65 83
200,000
56
100,000
28
20 30 40
Deposit Weight (g/ft2)
It is a plot of the temperature of a
clean tube with a nominal tempera-
ture around 400°C (~ 750°F).
Significant spikes in temperature, up
to 68°C (124° F), resulted from a
large slag fall that occurred at 4.6
hours. The highest spikes were in
those temperatures at 72° around
the tube (fireside crown at 90°), and
at the fireside web thermocouple.
Interestingly, the fluid temperature
increased only about 5.5°C (10°F)
and then settled back to the steady-
state level. Temperature spikes up to
140°C (~ 250°F) caused by deslag-
ging, and occurring in less than 30
seconds, have been observed.10
As the ash layer reformed, the metal
temperatures returned to normal.
Measurements of “dirty” tubes, those
with extensive internal deposit
buildup, have shown that they can
also be subject to significant thermal
spikes caused by deslagging of up
to 167°C (300°F).
Improper sootblowing, in which
water was inadvertently or intention-
ally blown on tubes has also led to
thermal shock and thermal fatigue
damage of tubes.11
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 19-7
 2.2.3 The contribution of other fire-
Temperature, °F side conditions
2.2.3.1 Oxide crack formation.
Temperature spikes due to deslagging; Stress analysis results indicate that
gradually increasing peak temperatures compressive stresses develop on
1000 the fireside crown of a tube after
slag fall. That stress results in axial
950 creep strain which permanently
900 shortens the tube near the crown of
the tube. With slag cover, tempera-
850 tures return to their normal levels,
800 the tube surface is then placed in
Gradually increasing base tube metal tension, and small, regularly-spaced
temperature due to internal deposits
750 cracks in oxide/scale layers can
form, which allow attack of the
external tube surface by corrosive
processes.10
Chemical Time
Clean Modeling and analysis of oxide lay-
ers has shown that damage is often
manifested as a surprisingly regular
Figure 19-8. Schematic representation of increasing tube wall temperature caused by array of cracks. This phenomenon
internal deposits and slag falls. and how it relates to corrosion
fatigue damage is discussed in
Chapter 13. It has been suggested
that the cracking process results in
stress relaxation in the oxide, with
Temperature (°F) the highest relaxation adjacent to
900 the crack. Therefore, the maximum
remaining (unrelaxed) stress will be
centered between cracks. With an
increasing strain applied to the
oxide layer, the next crack will then
form at this center location between
the existing cracks assuming a layer
800 with uniform properties. Figure 19-
10 illustrates salient features of the
model. The spacing between cracks
is a function of the applied strain
level. This model explains nicely the
72 72 regular array of parallel cracks that
45 45 forms.
700 22 22
FW, CW FW By this process, a number of equally
FL FL spaced penetrations of the oxide
CC CW are formed with “V”-shaped open-
CC ings (Figure 19-11a). These cracks
can then fill with oxide and be
“wedged open” causing further
crack propagation during thermal
600
0 2 4 6 8
cycling (Figure 19-11b), and hence
the formation of transgranular,
Time (hours) straight cracks. The presence of a
sulfide spline in the oxides filling the
cracks suggests the repeated
Figure 19-9. Typical rapid changes of tube temperatures caused by a slag fall. (72, cracking of the oxide and the
45, and 22) are the thermocouples at those angles to the membrane; fireside crown replenishment of the corrodent at
would be 90°; (FW and CW) are the temperatures of the fireside and cold side of the the crack tip.10
membrane, respectively; (CC) is the crown on the cold side; (FL) is the temperature of
the fluid. Source: I.G. Wright, et al.10

19-8 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking

 ash species. Molten ash deposits
d can form if tube metal temperatures
b are elevated into the regime of the
w lower melting point compounds.
When liquid compounds form on the
waterwalls, the bond between slag,

Stress in
Ds
film (s)
o
Figure 19-10. Schematic representation of the development of a regular array of
evenly-spaced cracks in supercritical waterwall cracking. (sf ) is fracture stress; (Ds(x))
is a measure of stress relaxation. Source: A.G. Crouch and R.B. Dooley12
a)
"V" shaped cracks
b)
Propagating crack with
central spline
Figure 19-11. Development of a regular array of cracks on supercritical waterwalls.
(a) The regularly spaced cracks in the oxide (see Figure 19-10) develop penetrations
of oxide into the tube material. (b) The cracks propagate and develop a central sulfur
"spline".
2.2.3.2 Effect of a substoichiometric
environment. The fireside environ-
ment can influence the development
of supercritical waterwall cracking in
two distinct ways: (i) fireside corro-
sion caused by a substoichiometric
environment, and (ii) the presence of
low melting point ash species. Both
of these effects are exacerbated by
the increased surface temperatures
( d2 )
s¦
x quent increased oxide strain can
Fireside
oxide
Tube material
which occur by internal magnetite
buildup and slagging/deslagging.
If a substoichiometric environment
exists at the waterwall then it can be
a direct cause of fireside corrosion
by the mechanism discussed in
Chapter 18. Under these local envi-
ronmental conditions, and with ele-
vated tube metal temperatures, there
will be severe wall loss via the fire-
side corrosion mechanism. However,
such wall loss has not been in evi-
dence in all cases of supercritical
waterwall cracking, so this aspect of
the problem is not universal.
or ash cover, and the tube metal
surface may be weakened.13
Subsequently, slag shedding more
readily occurs, increased tube metal
temperatures result, and the conse-
lead to crack formation. Such a
sequence would allow for the forma-
tion of waterwall cracking without
the presence of fireside corrosion.
2.2.4 Other possible contributors:
the role of cyclic stresses and opera-
tion Work by Getsfrid, et al.8, indi-
cated that damage from circumfer-
ential cracking of waterwalls was
dominated by large thermal gradi-
ents. Large numbers of cycles with
small temperature differences, such
as might be expected from flame
fluctuations, were negligible; how-
ever, large fluctuations in tempera-
ture resulted in a significant loss of
tube life. A number of conditions
that could cause thermal excursions
of this extent can be postulated,
including (i) slag shedding, (ii) unit
load cycling, (iii) rapid unit startups,
and (iv) a pressure imbalance
between forced-draft and induced-
draft fans that induces additional
slag shedding because of waterwall
vibrations, and also imposes direct
bending stresses.10
The temperature of waterwall tubes,
particularly in supercritical units,
can also be subject to significant
excursions above normal conditions
because of the “sensitivity” of the
circuit.10 This is the result of varia-
tion in heat absorption in waterwalls
resulting from differences in (i) per-
formance or aiming of burners, (ii)
coal slag characteristics and
deslagging tendency, and (iii) the
pattern of operation of the sootblow-
ers. This problem may be particu-
larly acute in supercritical circuits
where the tube-to-tube variations
that result will be accentuated by
the reduced ability of supercritical

2.2.3.3 Effect of low melting point

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 19-9

fluid to accept heat.
2.3 Implications
As noted above, the thermal cycles
of slagging/deslagging alone are not
thought to be sufficient to cause the
development of cracks8; the neces-
sity of increased baseline tube tem-
peratures and associated boiler
pressure drop losses because of
internal deposits have been con-
firmed on a number of units in a
number of countries.9,14 The conver-
sion to oxygenated treatment in
those units and the concurrent elimi-
nation of the problem as a result,
also lends credence to the view that
19-10 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking
internal deposit buildup is the key
contributor to the cracking problem,
particularly as the fireside condi-
tions, and slagging/deslagging
occurrences, do not change with
the conversion to oxygenated treat-
ment. Further evidence is that in the
U.S., units that have been chemi-
cally cleaned on a 11/2 to 2 year
cycle rather than a 3 year cycle
have drastically reduced the occur-
rence of failures.
2.4 A note on waterwall
cracking in oil/gas-fired
supercritical units
The initial stage in the development
of longitudinal cracking in oil-/gas-
fired units is similar to that
described for coal-fired units; that
is, internal deposits begin to accu-
mulate thus raising the average tube
metal temperature. However in the
case of oil- and gas-fired units, the
much greater heat flux accelerates
the fluid side deposition rate and in
a much shorter period of time tube
temperatures reach a point where
creep damage begins to accumu-
late. The deposits again are always
rippled. Subsequent tube failures by
long-term overheating (creep) are
the result. Very little thermal cycling
because of repeated slagging and
deslagging occurs in these units
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Supercritical Waterwall
Cracking: Root Causes
1. The primary root cause, and
the one which is most pre-
ventable, is the buildup of
excessive internal deposits in
the tubes.
2. The second major root cause
is slagging/deslagging that
leads to the imposition of ther-
mal or stress cycles; the role
of fireside corrosion in the
direct wastage of tubes is also
influential in some units.
due to the fact that there is little slag
on the tubes with gas- and oil-firing.
3.1 Introduction
It is becoming clearer that the pri-
mary root cause influence, and the
one which is the most preventable for
this damage type, is the buildup of
excessive internal deposits in the
tubes. Once tube temperatures begin
to rise, the superposition of stress
cycles, particularly those which are
induced thermally, along with the cor-
rosive effects of the fireside environ-
ment, result in the accumulation of
damage and possible fireside corro-
sion. There are some other factors
that have been identified as also
influencing the accumulation of dam-
age. A review of the range of root
cause influences follows; Table 19-1
summarizes the potential root cause
influences, and actions to confirm,
and corrective actions.
3.2 Influence of excessive
internal deposits leading
to increased tube metal
temperatures
The effect of increased waterwall
deposits as a function of deposit
weight and heat flux is shown in
Figure 19-7. Research results have
shown that the formation of such
deposits and the resulting increase
in tube metal temperature are a nec-
essary and sufficient precondition to
this type of damage.8
Such a gradual increase in deposits
is the result of improper or non-opti-
mum feedwater treatment and corro-
sion product control. It can also be
regarded as the result of the
expected normal operating condi-
tion in those units operating under
deoxygenated (with N2H4) all-volatile
treatment. Figure 19-5 shows the
gradual increase in unit pressure
drop measured in three units; the
first two, boiler “A” and “B” show
typical pressure increases with oper-
ating hours. The marked decrease in
pressure drop after a chemical clean
is also clearly illustrated for boiler
“A” at the 4,000 operating hours
mark. The positive effect of chang-
ing to oxygenated treatment in these
units is also evident.
Actions to confirm this root cause:
(a). Metallurgical analysis of the
tube and internal deposits, specifi-
cally to determine the presence and
extent of ripple magnetite.
(b). Evaluate unit pressure drop,
even if pressure drop is not a normal
operating constraint. A plot of pres-
sure drop with operating hours such
as shown in Figures 19-5 and 19-12
can clearly identify a buildup of
internal deposits.
(c). Evaluate chemical cleaning fre-
quency and records. The continual
need to clean the unit is another sign
that excessive deposition is occur-
ring. Conversely, units which have
been kept the cleanest, through the
use of OT or by frequent chemical
cleaning, appear to be less prone to
circumferential cracking.
(d). Evaluate chemical records,
particularly for levels of feedwater
oxygen and corrosion products.
Monitoring results will indicate very
low oxygen levels, perhaps 1 ppb or
less at the economizer inlet, Fe lev-
els between 5-10 ppb, and a very
reducing environment, probably
below - 300 mV measured with an
ORP meter.
3.3 Influence of thermal
cycling caused by
slagging/deslagging
Large, sudden increases in tube
metal temperatures (up to 167°C
(300°F)) have been measured dur-
ing the deslagging process. Such
extreme thermal cycles have been
shown to cause crack development
in laboratory tests. Field research
has indicated that the cycles from
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 19-11
Table 19-1
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.2 Excessive internal deposits (a). Metallurgical analysis of tube and inter- • Determine extent of • Control formation of internal deposits,
leading to increased tube nal deposit, specifically to determine the damage, institute appro- preferably by use of oxygenated treat-
metal temperatures. presence and extent of ripple magnetite. priate repairs or replace- ment. If not possible, implement control
(b). Evaluate boiler pressure drop even if it ments. See Chapter 11, steps such as periodic and frequent
has not been an operating constraint. Volume 1 for an chemical cleaning, minimizing feedwa-
Plot pressure drop measured versus overview of tube repairs. ter corrosion product production and
operating hours. See Figures 19-5 and • Perform chemical clean- transport. See additional information in
19-12 for examples. ing if indicated by the Chapter 3, Volume 1.
(c). Evaluate chemical cleaning frequency level of deposits that
and records. have formed. Plot pres-
(d). Evaluate chemical records, particularly sure drop before and
for levels of feedwater oxygen and after.
corrosion products.

3.3 Thermal cycling caused
by slagging/deslagging.
(e). Analyze temperature transients (magni- • Periodic testing of soot- • Optimize use of sootblowers through
tude, frequency and timing) by the blowers to ensure proper fireside testing. See additional detail
installation of chordal thermocouples. operation such as func- in discussion of sootblower erosion
(f). Evaluate sootblower operation and tion of the water removal (Chapter 22).
maintenance to determine whether systems.
excessive conditions have occurred.
See also separate writeup on sootblower
erosion (Chapter 22).

3.4 Fireside conditions.
(g). If significant fireside wastage is evident,
review Chapter 18 for actions to pinpoint
the most prominent causes. As
a minimum, metallurgical analysis to
determine extent and nature of fireside
deposits is indicated.
• Review materials options if fireside
corrosion is a significant contributor to
the circumferential cracking damage.
See the discussion in Chapter 18.

3.5 Large, cyclic stresses and (h). Review unit operating records for
other influences of sources of cyclic stresses, number of
operation. starts, ramp rates, etc.
(i). Install chordal thermocouples and review
tube temperatures as in (e) above.

19-12 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking

 Actions to confirm the influence of
Boiler Pressure Drop Ð psi this factor are:
600 (g). If significant fireside wastage is
(Chemical clean evident in the tubes, for example at
Nov. 92) a rate > 25 nm/hr (8.6 mils/yr),
550
review Chapter 18 for a series of
actions to confirm the most promi-
500 nent causes and to implement cor-
Hydrazine Oxygen rective actions. Metallurgical analy-
450 feed injection sis of the damage and nature of the
stopped started fireside deposits is required, as a
minimum.
400

350 3.5 Influence of large, cyclic

300
31 22 11
Jan March May
Figure 19-12. Pressure drop with time in a U.S. boiler. The pressure drop can be
reduced by eliminating the feedwater N2H4 and injecting oxygen.
Source: R.B. Dooley, et al.15
slagging/deslagging operations
alone will not cause the develop-
ment of cracks without increased
average tube metal temperatures
from internal deposits.
Actions to confirm:
(e). Analyze temperature transients
by the installation of chordal thermo-
couples. The magnitude, frequency
and timing of thermal transients can
be confirmed for such operations as
sootblower operation and for slag
falls.
(f). Evaluate sootblower operation
and maintenance to determine
whether excessive conditions or too
frequent operation have occurred.
For example, condensate introduced
into the sootblower media can cause
30 19 8 27
June Aug Oct Nov
1993
excessive thermal shock to tubes.
See also the discussion of sootblower
operation and maintenance issues
that is provided in Chapter 22.
3.4 Influence of fireside
conditions
A variety of factors can lead to an
increased propensity for fireside cor-
rosion of waterwalls; they are
reviewed in Chapter 18. Such fac-
tors include the influence of a sub-
stoichiometric environment, the
development and deposition of alkali
sulfates, change to a fuel with a
higher corrosivity, and direct carbon
deposition. Chapter 18 should be
reviewed for actions to confirm and
solutions if it appears that fireside
wastage is a significant contributor
to the development of circumferen-
tial cracking.
stresses and operation
The most significant damage seems
to be done by a few, large tempera-
ture cycles. Thermal excursions and
the corresponding cyclic stresses
can influence the amount of tube life
that is consumed by this damage
type. Such cyclic stresses might
arise from (i) significant unit load
changes, (ii) excessive thermal
excursion caused during rapid unit
starts, or (iii) a pressure imbalance
between forced-draft and induced-
draft fans.
In a supercritical unit there can also
be significant tube-to-tube variation
in temperature caused by such dif-
ferences as (i) performance or aim-
ing of burners, (ii) coal slag charac-
teristics and deslagging tendency,
and (iii) the pattern of operation of
the sootblowers. The result will be
additional tube temperature variation
leading to an increase in damage
accumulation in the hotter areas.
To confirm:
(h). Review of unit operating
records for number of starts and
ramp rates on start, to identify
potential sources of excessive cyclic
stresses.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 19-13

4. Determining the Extent of Damage
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Supercritical Waterwall
Cracking: Immediate Solutions
and Actions
Immediate actions are to replace
damaged tubes and, if appropri-
ate, to remove excessive internal
deposits by chemical cleaning.
Most other activities can be per-
formed as part of a longer term
strategy.
19-14 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking
(i). Installation of chordal thermo-
couples and review of tube tempera-
tures as in (e) above.
Once an initial failure has occurred,
by grit-blasting. Wall loss can be
measured by standard ultrasonic
surveys; such methods are
described in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
In addition to determining the extent
of damage, the first steps to be
taken are the repair/replacement of
affected tubes. Chapter 11, Volume
1 discusses repair and replacement
methods in more detail.
Control of the buildup of excessive
a survey of susceptible areas should
be instigated. Locations, of highest
heat flux, (see Figure 19-4 for a typi-
cal pattern), as well as those listed
in Section 1.2 should be included.
Cracks are often not visible until
oxide and scale have been removed
internal tube deposits is a primary
consideration. Most of the options to
do so are long-term solutions.
However, if excessive deposits are
found, such as in tube samples
removed when repairs are made,
a proper chemical cleaning is
indicated.
If other unit problems have been
identified as root causes, such as
incomplete water removal from soot-
blowers, improper water level control
and drains in ash hoppers, etc.,
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of
Repeat Failures
Supercritical Waterwall
Cracking: Long-Term Actions
1. Controlling tube temperatures
by limiting the formation of
excessive internal tube
deposits is the optimal long-
term solution.
2. Oxygenated treatment can be
employed for units with all-fer-
rous metallurgy in the feedwa-
ter train.
3. The use of more resistant
materials, particularly chromiz-
ing of standard waterwall
materials, has been shown to
be partially effective in those
cases where fireside corrosion
is a significant contributor to
the problem.
then these deficiencies should be
corrected as soon as feasible and
thus may fall into the category of
immediate repairs.
6.1 Options for the control of
internal deposits
The most complete solution to the
problem of controlling waterwall
deposits in supercritical units is oxy-
genated treatment (OT). Additional
detail on this topic can be found in
Chapter 3, Volume 1; its use in pre-
venting supercritical waterwall crack-
ing is reviewed here. OT has been
shown to reduce iron feedwater cor-
rosion products to less than 1 ppb at
the economizer inlet and the water-
wall deposition rate to less than 0.5
mg/cm2/1000 hrs (see Figure 3-10,
Volume 1). This means that deposi-
tion is minimized, and at these lev-
els, it is likely that the unit will not
require chemical cleaning over the
expected service life. The case
study that follows provides some
data from the field experience indi-
cating specific deposit reductions.
If it is not possible to change the
unit to full oxygenated treatment,
then a series of control steps to pre-
vent excessive deposition are indi-
cated. These include:
• A periodic and frequent program
of chemical cleaning. Chapter 4,
Volume 1 discusses some of the
key aspects of waterwall chemical
cleaning.
• Optimizing the feedwater treat-
ment process to minimize the pro-
duction and transport of corrosion
products. This might include for
example, eliminating N2H4 if the
feedwater train is all ferrous or
optimizing the use of O2 scav-
engers if a mixed metallurgy
feedwater system is used. Figure
19-12 illustrates an example of
eliminating N2H4 in a U.S. unit.
Additional information can be
found in the case study later in
this chapter.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 19-15
6.2 Overview of materials
options
A materials solution may be indi-
cated in those cases where fireside
corrosion is a significant problem
and its presence exacerbates the
development and propagation of cir-
cumferential cracking. Such a solu-
tion will not address the underlying
root cause and thus requires careful
7. Case study
Supercritical Waterwall Cracking:
Field Experience
dropped from about 45 to less than
10 and the lost availability at the
unit dropped from 8% to less than
2%, which was attributed to the
use of chromized panels.
The chromizing process promotes
diffusion of chromium into the sur-
face of a boiler tube; the alloy layer
that results is usually 0.20 to 0.38
mm (0.008 to 0.015 inches) thick
and ranges in chromium content
from almost 80% at the surface to
18% at the interface with the base
material.17 Some problems with
chromized tubes have been
encountered including17:
(i) degradation in butt welds made
with low-alloy steel weld materials,
a solution is to apply stainless steel
caps on the butt welds by E308 or
E309 filler,
(ii) spalling of the chromized layer,
the solution is control the quality of
the chromized layer by ensuring
uniform thickness and by minimiz-
ing voids,
(iii) cracking of the chromized
layer which can be controlled by
ensuring a minimum layer thick-
ness of 0.254 mm (0.010”) as thin-
ner layers have cracked in field
19-16 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking
economic appraisal which considers
future repeat failures.
A variety of materials have been
evaluated for their ability to address
the combined effects of this mecha-
nism and particularly the fireside
corrosion.4,16,17 Chromized panels
service,
(iv) decarburization can reduce
material hardness and strength
and thus make the tubes more sus-
ceptible to failures by short-term
overheating. This can be controlled
by normalizing the panels after
chromizing,
(v) removal of chromized layer by
abrasives used in ash and scale
removal processes prior to inspec-
tions, this can be prevented by the
use of high pressure water only.
have shown good results. For
example, in side-by-side testing,
chromized tubing showed essen-
tially no fireside wastage over a four
year period, during which adjacent
bare metal tubes had wall losses in
the range 1.78 to 2.29 mm (0.070 to
0.090 inches).17 In one case, the
annual number of tube failures
There is now a significant world-
wide experience (estimated to be
nearly 320 units) with the conver-
sion of supercritical units to oxy-
genated treatment (OT) and of the
ability of such conversion to elimi-
nate the problem of waterwall
cracking and wastage. This case
study summarizes the international
experience.
In Russian coal-fired units, peak
heat flux is on the order of 250-300
kW/m2. The experience of units
operating on AVT indicated that
chemical cleaning was required
about every 20,000 hours at a
deposit level in excess of 30
mg/cm2 (~ 28 g/ft2). At these levels
of deposits, tube temperatures
reached 525-530°C (~ 975 to
985°F), and a significant number of
tube failures occurred by the
mechanism described in this chap-
ter. Change to OT typically resulted
in significantly less deposition; for
example, over 100,000 hours of
operation has resulted in accumu-
lated deposits in an amount less
than 10 mg/cm2 (~ 9.3 g/ft2). Tube
temperatures remained in the nor-
mal (clean tube) range and tube
failures stopped.14
For oil-fired units, peak heat flux is
on the order of 500-550 kW/m2.
Units operating under AVT typically
required cleaning after as few as 5,000 operating hours.
Tube temperatures were reaching levels on the order of
600°C (~ 1110°F) and failures occurred by overheating
(creep). Here, as with the coal-fired units, tube failures
essentially stopped occurring by this mechanism follow-
ing the change to OT, and chemical cleaning is no
longer required.
Figure 19-5 shows data from three German units. The
buildup of deposits is indicated by the increasing pres-
sure drop experienced in the waterwall circuits plotted
versus operating hours. Fairly significant pressure drops
are recorded over only a few thousand hours of opera-
tion on AVT. An immediate improvement can be seen
for chemical cleaning (see Boiler “A” at the 4,000 hours
mark), with a subsequent buildup of deposits following
the clean. The decrease in deposits with units switched
over to OT from AVT (Boilers “A” and “B”) and the con-
stant level of deposits indicated for the unit on
OT from the start (Boiler “C”) show the advantage of OT.
As noted in Figure 19-7, there is a direct correlation
between deposit weight and tube metal tempera-
ture, and as shown in field testing, between
increased tube metal temperatures and the propensity
for damage by circumferential cracking.
The Japanese experience with deposits and changing
from AVT to OT was consistent with that shown in Figure
19-5.14 With AVT, there was a typical increase in deposits
and thus pressure drop in the unit. The change to OT
resulted in a dramatic improvement and reversal of the
deposit process.
Finally, a U.S. unit showed the similar pattern upon the
change to OT, as dramatically illustrated in Figure 19-12.
A leveling off of the pressure drop occurred when N2H4
feed was stopped. The institution of oxygen treatment
began to reverse the trend of increasing pressure drop.
Although the unit had neither a problem with circumfer-
ential cracking nor excessive pressure drop, the favor-
able indicators of lower waterwall deposits as indicated
by unit pressure drop, bode well for avoiding future prob-
lems and the need for periodic, frequent chemical
cleans.
8. References
1Kurre, M.D., F.B. Stulen, and I.G. Wright, Circumferential
Cracking on the Waterwalls of Supercritical Boilers,
Volume 1: Background to the Problem and Experimental
Approach, Research Project 1890-8, Final Report TR-
104442, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
December, 1995.
2Cialone,H.J., and I.G. Wright, R.A. Wood, and C.M.
Jackson, Circumferential Cracking of Supercritical Boiler
Water-Wall Tubes, Research Project 1890-4, Final Report
CS-4969, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto,
CA, December, 1986.
3Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
4Plumley, A.L. and W.R. Roczniak, “Practical Prevention
of Waterwall Distress: A Metallurgical Approach”, in B.
Dooley, ed., Proceedings: International Conference on
Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil Plants, held in San Diego,
California November 5-7, 1991, Proceedings TR-100493,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April,
1992, pp. 3-45 through 3-81.
5Personal Communication from D. French (David N.
French, Inc.) to R.B. Dooley, February, 1995.
6Degtev, O.N., et al., “Analyzing the Reasons for
Corrosion-Fatigue Damage to the Waterwalls of P-57 and
PK-39 Boilers”, Teploenergetika, Volume 35, No. 11,
1988, pp. 39-43.
7Shakhsuvarov, K.-L.V., V.A. Chetverikov, and A.Y. Yalova,
“Influence of Temperature Fluctuations on Lower Radiant
Section Tubes on Their Service Life”, Teploenergetika,
Volume 24, No. 6, 1977, pp. 25-28.
8Getsfrid, W.I., M.A. Petrov, and A.V. Rudyka, “Evaluation
of the Life of Tubes in the Lower Radiant Section of a P-
57 Boiler with Random Fluctuations in Temperature and
an Increase in Internal Deposits”, Telpoenergetika,
Volume 34, Number 3, 1987, pp. 150.
9Bursik,
A., “Eight Years of Modified AVT with Elevated
Oxygen Level for Once-Through Steam Generators”,
Proceedings of the International Water Conference,
Volume 47, 1986, pp. 227-231.
10Wright, I.G., D. Anson, H.J. Cialone, G.O. Davis, M.D.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 19-17
ACTIONS for Supercritical Waterwall Cracking
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of super-
critical waterwall cracking begin
here. The goal of these actions is
to see if further investigation is
warranted or whether another
BTF mechanism should be
investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and supercritical
waterwall cracking is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by supercritical waterwall
cracking.
19-18 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking
Kurre, and F.B. Stulen, “Root Cause and D. Broske, eds., Boiler Tube
of Circumferential Cracking in the Failures in Fossil Power Plants:
Waterwalls of Supercritical Boilers: A Conference Proceedings,
Report on Work in Progress”, in op. Conference held in Atlanta, Georgia,
cit. reference 4, pp. 3-1 through 3- November 10-12, 1987, CS-5500-SR,
37. Electric Power Research Institute,
11Ellery, Palo Alto, CA, 1988, pp. 2-85
A.R., T.R. Johnson, and J.D.
through 2-100.
Newton, “Investigation into the
17Bonnington,
Likelihood of Thermal Fatigue A.J. and T.M Cullen,
Damage to Furnace and “Mitigation of Circumferential
Superheater Tubes Caused by On- Cracking and Fire-Side Corrosion in
Line Water Deslagging”, Supercritical Boilers by the
Transactions of the ASME, April, Installation of Chromized Waterwall
1974, pp. 138-144. Panels”, Proceedings of the EPRI
12Crouch, A.G. and R.B. Dooley, Conference on Welding and Repair
“The Mechanical Integrity and Technology, held in Williamsburg,
Va, March 20-25, 1994, TR-104588,
Protective Performance of Silica
Electric Power Research Institute,
Coatings”, Corrosion Science,
Palo Alto, CA, in publication.
Volume 16, 1976, pp. 341-347.
13French, D.N., “Circumferential
Cracking and Thermal Fatigue in
Fossil-Fired Boilers”, Paper No. 133,
presented at the NACE
Conference/Corrosion 88, St. Louis,
Mo, 1988.
14Bursik, A., B. Dooley, and B.
Larkin, Guidelines for Oxygenated
Treatment for Fossil Plants, Research
Project 1403-45, Final Report TR-
102285, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December,
1994.
15Dooley, R.B., J. Mathews, R. Pate,
and J. Taylor, “Optimum Chemistry
for ‘All-Ferrous’ Feedwater Systems:
Why Use an Oxygen Scavenger?”,
Proceedings of the 55th International
Water Conference, Pittsburgh, PA,
October 31-November 2, 1994.
16Bakker, W.T., E.C. Lewis, and A.
Plumley, “The Use of Diffusion
Coatings and Claddings for Fireside
Corrosion Prevention” in B. Dooley
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is supercritical
waterwall cracking.
A tube failure has occurred
which the BTF team has tenta-
tively identified as being super-
critical waterwall cracking
(Action 1a). Action 2 should
clearly identify supercritical
waterwall cracking as the pri-
mary mechanism or point to
another cause. The actions listed
will be executed by removing
representative tube sample(s),
followed by visual examination
and detailed metallographic
analysis.
Action 1a: If a waterwall BTF has occurred and supercritical waterwall
cracking is the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has occurred in a location that is typical of
➠ Analyze internal scale.Is there
evidence of a buildup of “ripple”
magnetite?
➠ Analyze appearance of cracking.
Are cracks sharp, “vee”-shaped
or “dagger”-shaped? Are they
oxide filled?
➠ Evaluate the extent of fireside
corrosion. Is there evidence of
extensive fireside corrosion?
➠ Analyze oxide in cracks. Is there
evidence of sulfide in the oxide?
In particular, is there a central
spline of sulfide present?
➠ Analyze the microstructure of the
tube metal, particularly near the
fireside surface. Is there signifi-
cant evidence of overheating
such as spheroidization or
graphitization?
Probable mechanism is supercriti-
cal waterwall cracking.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
supercritical waterwall cracking:
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes
Lack of internal deposits, unless
removed by the failure event itself,
indicates that the mechanism is
probably not waterwall cracking.
May still be one of the varieties of
supercritical waterwall cracking,
particularly in oil-/gas-fired units, or
longitudinal cracks which may evi-
dence creep voids at or near crack
tips.
Circumferential cracking may or
may not be associated with fire-
side corrosion; see also fireside
corrosion in Chapter 18.
Circumferential waterwall cracking
may or may not be accompanied
by signs of significant overheating.
Longitudinal waterwall cracking will
generally have associated material
degradation and overheating.
19-19
Action 3: Determine root cause of the supercritical
waterwall cracking
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as supercritical waterwall
cracking (Action 2) or a precur-
sor has occurred (Action 1b).
The goal of this Action 3 is for
the BTF Team to review the
potential root causes, identify
probable ones, and take those
actions that are needed to con-
firm which are operative in the
unit. This step must be taken so
that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
19-20 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
• On the fireside of waterwall
tube, particularly at the crown,
or in the membranes between
tubes.
• In the highest heat flux loca-
tions, such as in a narrow range
of elevations around the burn-
ers.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Multiple, parallel cracks ori-
ented circumferentially; may be
longitudinal in oil-fired/gas-fired
units.
• Variability of crack density from
tube to adjacent tube.
• May be found with significant
external wastage, for example,
up to 50% of the tube wall
thickness.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Metallurgical analysis of tube and
internal deposit, specifically to determine the
presence and extent of ripple magnetite.
➠ (b). Evaluate boiler pressure drop even if it
has not been an operating constraint. Plot pres-
sure drop measured versus operating hours.
See Figures 19-5 and 19-12 for examples.
➠ (c). Evaluate chemical cleaning frequency
and records.
➠ (d). Evaluate chemical records, particularly
for levels of feedwater oxygen and corrosion
products.
➠ (e). Analyze temperature transients (magni-
tude, frequency and timing) by the installation
of chordal thermocouples.
➠ (f). Evaluate sootblower operation and
maintenance to determine whether excessive
conditions have occurred. See also separate
writeup on sootblower erosion (Chapter 22).
➠ (g). If significant fireside wastage is evi-
dent, review Chapter 18 for actions to pinpoint
the most prominent causes. As a minimum,
metallurgical analysis to determine extent and
nature of fireside deposits is indicated.
➠ (h). Review unit operating records for
sources of cyclic stresses, number of starts,
ramp rates, etc.
➠ (i). Install chordal thermocouples and
review tube temperatures, as in (e) above.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

Damage is generally easy to

detect by visual examination
once external oxide and scale is
removed by grit-blasting. If
wastage is occurring, use of
ultrasonic testing to detect the
extent of damage in typical sur-
vey mode is indicated.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

The primary immediate action is

to execute the appropriate
repairs and replacements. Most
other actions can be considered
long-term. Any obvious prob-
lems, such as condensate in the
sootblower media, etc., should
be corrected immediately.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by supercritical
waterwall cracking.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Problems controlling feedwater
corrosion product levels, evi-
dence of erosion/corrosion in the
feedwater system, and/or evi-
dence of fouling on other feed-

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 19-21

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF Team. The proper
choice of long-term actions will
be based on clear identification
of the underlying root cause
(Action 3) and an economic eval-
uation to ensure that the opti-
mum strategy has been chosen.
Major Root Cause Influences
water or boiler parts such as the
BFP or orifices, for example.
• Evidence of excessive deposit
buildup on inside surface of
tubes especially of ripple
Fe3O4. Linked with the need to
clean on a frequent (² 2 years)
basis.
➠ These precursors can signal the
potential for future tube failures by
supercritical waterwall cracking. If
one or more has occurred, go to
Action 3 which reviews root
causes and outlines the steps to
confirm the influence of each.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Control formation of internal deposits,
preferably by use of oxygenated treatment. If
not possible, implement control steps such as
periodic and frequent chemical cleaning, mini-
mizing feedwater corrosion product production
and transport. See additional information in
Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Optimize use of sootblowers through fire-
side testing. See additional detail in discussion
of sootblower erosion (Chapter 22).
➠ Review materials options if fireside corro-
sion is a significant contributor to the circum-
ferential cracking damage. See the discussion
in (Chapter 18).

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of
supercritical waterwall cracking,
or its precursors.
Supercritical Alert for Other Cycle ➠ Actions Indicated
Waterwall Components
Cracking Aspect
High levels of feedwater • Erosion and/or corro- ➠ Need to develop an optimized cycle
corrosion products. sion may be occurring in chemistry control program, preferably by
the feedwater system: in the instituting oxygenated treatment, but
feedwater heaters, deaera- consisting at a minimum of periodic
tors, piping, or at the econ- chemical cleaning and optimizing feed-
omizer inlet. water treatment.
• Corrosion products
have probably deposited in
other locations such as the
boiler feed pump and at
boiler orifices. The latter
could lead to BTF by over-
heating.

Improper feedwater • Various problems ➠ As above.

treatment process such throughout cycle, such as
as use of N2H4 (all fer- condenser tube problems
rous) or excessive use caused by ammonia
of O2 scavengers grooving.
(mixed metallurgy).

19-22 Supercritical Waterwall Cracking

Chapter 20 • Volume 2
Thermal Fatigue
Economizer Inlet
Header Tubes
Introduction
Waterside-initiated cracking in car-
bon steel economizer inlet headers
is a relatively recently recognized
boiler tube damage mechanism.
The generic mechanism is induced
primarily by cyclic or transient ther-
mal loading; the damage has the
characteristics of thermal fatigue
and the cracking has a morphology
similar to corrosion fatigue. It is
manifested by multiple cracks per-
pendicular to the principal direction
of stress, with one crack usually
becoming dominant and causing
wall penetration. The stub tube fail-
ures that result can cause costly
forced outages, and damage to the
header is a serious safety issue
which could keep a unit unavailable
until a new header is fabricated and
installed.
Effective solutions include (i)
improved operating conditions to
limit through-wall thermal gradients,
along with (ii) improved header
design details that have served to
reduce inherent stress concentration
factors.
This is one of three mechanisms that
affects the same general location on
the economizer header inlet tubes.
The other two are flexibility-driven
fatigue (initiated from the OD) and
an erosion-corrosion damage mech-
anism (on the ID). All three are com-
pared in Chapter 7, Volume 1. Some
comments are provided in this
Chapter on distinguishing the dam-
age caused primarily by thermal
cycling from the other two damage
types. The erosion-corrosion mecha-
nism is the subject of Chapter 21.
This damage mechanism has arisen
in conjunction with the cycling of
traditionally base-loaded units. Its
root cause has been established
and corrective actions have been
fully characterized.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 20-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure lead to replacement of the header
Thermal Fatigue in Cracks can begin to form at any because of the large number of
Economizer Inlet Header Tubes: location along the header where the boreholes, difficulty of access for
Identification Keys cyclic thermal stress is sufficiently repair, and questions about safety
1. Thermal fatigue damage in high. Damage is initiated at stress and reliability of the header.
economizer inlet header tubes concentrations associated with the Microscopic examination will show
will generally occur at the toe bore hole and the tube attachment the cracking to consist of straight
of header-to-stub tube attach- to the header (Locations A and B on transgranular cracks, filled with
ment welds and be first Figure 20-1). The first appearance of oxide; i.e., damage that is typical of
noticed as a pin-hole leak. thermally-induced damage is often a a thermal fatigue mechanism with
pin-hole leak in the toe of the weld some corrosion signs. Figure 20-3
2. Further examination will gen-
at the header-to-stub tube attach- shows the typical crack appearance.
erally reveal numerous longitu-
ment weld of economizer inlet head-
dinal cracks with morphology
ers. As shown in Figure 20-2, the
typical of thermally-induced 1.2 Location of failures
inside surface of the damaged tube
fatigue with possible enhance-
stub will manifest numerous longitu- Service experience indicates that
ment by corrosion, i.e.,
dinal cracks. The cracks may be the worst damage is usually found in
straight, transgranular cracks
distributed completely around the tubes closest to the feedwater inlet.
filled with oxide. They will be
bore of the tube, or may appear only However, damage can also occur
located on the inside surface
in the higher stress locations. away from the inlet tee in areas
of the tube stub, in the header
Cracks that begin to form in the affected by service loading, the con-
borehole and then extending
header near tube penetrations can dition of the water, the header geom-
across ligaments between
progress across the ligament etry, or header composition. Stub
boreholes on the header
between two tubes (Figure 20-1). tube failures have generally
inside surface.
Extensive cracking will invariably occurred at the toe of the fillet weld
3. Careful consideration of the on the tube side.
damage mechanism is
required to distinguish
between (i) thermal fatigue
Typical longitudinal cracks
induced damage (this chap-
ter), (ii) flexibility-induced Tube leak location
fatigue, and (iii) erosion-corro-
sion. All affect similar areas of
the economizer header inlet Economizer inlet
tubes, but will require different header stub tubes
corrective actions.

Weld

A Tube
thickness
ID ligament
spacing B

CL tube

Header
thickness

Figure 20-1. Cross section through economizer inlet header and tubes showing stub
tube leak location and typical longitudinal pattern of cracking in the tube and header
bore. Source: R.B. Dooley1

20-2 Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes

Figure 20-2. Damage developed from a tube penetration in an economizer inlet
header.

Figure 20-3. Typical thermal fatigue cracking morphology.

Note regular spacing of cracks and that they become thinner and
straighter with propagation.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 20-3

2. Mechanism of Failure
Thermal Fatigue in
Economizer Inlet Header Tubes:
Mechanism
The mechanism is one of
thermally-induced fatigue, with
possible corrosion assistance,
primarily caused when relatively
cold feedwater is introduced into
the hot header during transient
operations such as startup,
restart and shutdown, and
off-line drum top-up periods.
20-4 Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes
Figure 20-4 shows that large header
temperature differentials are associ-
ated with rapid changes in the feed-
water flow typical of a unit hot start.
Tests have shown that ÆT values in
excess of 80°C (~ 175°F) are possi-
ble.3 Note also that there are several
peaks per startup which are all
associated with large spikes of feed-
water for drum top-up as shown in
the simplified schematic of Figure
20-5. Similar temperature spikes are
experienced during shutdown.
Evidence of enhancement of the
damage by corrosion, such as the
presence of heavy oxide thickness
associated with the thermal fatigue
cracks, has also been observed.
Pitting is very often found in this
region attributable to poor shutdown
practices.
Criteria to determine whether head-
ers are likely to have developed
damage or to be susceptible for
developing future cracks are:
• Header has accumulated a large
number of operating cycles.
• Unit is being converted to cyclic
operation.
• Ligament spacing between bore
holes is small (on the order of
3.5 cm (1-3/8 inch) or less).
• Thickness of the header is well
above minimum code thickness.
• Header-to-stub tube joint is a par-
tial fillet weld (as in Figures 20-1
and 20-2), as compared to a full
penetration weld (Figure 20-9).
• The header has experienced stub
tube leaks.
• The design of the header has a
history of problems at other
power plants.
• The header experiences large
through-wall thermal gradients.
• Feedwater has been introduced
intermittently at high flow rates
during start-ups and off-line drum
top-ups.
The mechanism may be misdiag-
nosed as a flexibility problem. Stub
tube leaks can develop because of
flexibility problems related to header
support, rotation, tube routing, etc.
In that case, damage will appear
generally above the fillet weld and
cracks will propagate in the circum-
ferential direction. Tube leaks
caused by flexibility problems are
generally restricted to the ends of
the headers. The key difference is
that these cracks initiate from the
outside surface at the stress con-
centration, e.g., at the toe of the
attachment weld to the tube.
The thermal fatigue mechanism
may also be confused with erosion-
corrosion which can occur in this
region. Erosion-corrosion failures
also occur from the inside surface.
A primary means of distinguishing
the two will be visual inspection of
the tube ID. Erosion-corrosion fail-
ures will typically have an “orange
peel” appearance. Additional detail
about this mechanism can be found
in Chapter 21.
Additional discussion of the distinc-
tions between all three mechanisms
can be found in Chapter 7, Volume 1.
 90
Econ. header DT (difference between inner and
outer temperature)
Metal Temperature DT (F°)

60 Outer temp. > inner temp. = positive D T

1. Feedwater flow (kg/s) Hot start
30 2. Unit Load (MW)
3. Drum level (+20 in -20 in)

Load and FW Flow

2
-30 3 20 3 300
1
-60 0 150

-90 -20 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Time (hours)

Figure 20-4. Header temperature gradients during a unit hot start before operating
changes were made to the economizer inlet flow rate. Source: G.G. Stephenson2

0
Economizer header DT

0
Drum level

0
Feedwater flow

0
Turbine speed

Start firing
Time

Figure 20-5. Simplified schematic of an economizer inlet header ÆT

during shutdown/startup. Note: Temperature spikes which corre-
spond to drum top-up during shutdown

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 20-5

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Thermal Fatigue in
Economizer Inlet Header Tubes:
Root Causes
1. The most common root cause
is operating conditions that
produce large through-wall
thermal gradients in the
header. This condition usually
accompanies increased cyclic
operation of the unit.
2. Header design and construc-
tion provide locations of stress
concentration that can exacer-
bate the basic problem.
20-6 Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes
3.1 Introduction
Table 20-1 summarizes potential
root causes, actions to confirm, and
corrective actions for this damage
mechanism. To confirm that this is
the active damage mechanism:
(a). Metallurgical analysis of
removed tube samples is the princi-
pal action to distinguish thermally-
induced fatigue from flexibility-
induced cracking or erosion-
corrosion.
3.2 Influence of large through-
wall temperature gradients
The most common root cause of this
damage is a large temperature dif-
ferential induced by the introduction
of relatively cold feedwater into the
hot header during transient opera-
tions such as startup, restart and
shutdown. Off-line drum top-up with
cold water is a common and neces-
sary occurrence.
Actions to confirm will consist of:
(b). Measure thermal gradients dur-
ing all operation periods. Thermo-
couples need to be attached to the
surface of the header and installed
in a drilled hole within one centime-
ter of the inside surface. The pre-
ferred location is adjacent to the
feedwater inlet, but other locations
can be monitored as well.2 A typical
set of thermocouple locations is
illustrated in Figure 20-6. Thermal
gradients should be monitored dur-
ing all typical operating procedures
and shutdown.
3.3 Influence of stress concen-
trations
Header design and construction
details will introduce stress concen-
trators that may exacerbate the
problem.
Actions to confirm will include:
(c). Analysis of inspection informa-
tion to highlight the locations of max-
imum damage and determine if they
are associated with known stress
concentrations. For example, if the
bole hole surfaces on the ID have
been radiused, the stresses devel-
oped will be lower than if there is no
radius. Full penetration welds will
have lower stress concentrations
than “paste-on” or socket welds. A
primary use of this information will
be as input to the redesign of head-
ers if replacement is indicated.
Table 20-1
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.1 For all root cause (a). Metallurgical analysis of removed tube
influences sample to confirm orientation, initiation
sites and extent of cracking. Ensure that
damage is in fact thermally-induced and
not either flexibility-induced or caused
by erosion-corrosion.
• Analysis with tools such as fracture
mechanics and fatigue analysis to
assess the safety of continued opera-
tion, for example leak-before-break.
• Repair, replace, run decision required.

3.2 Cyclic operation that
introduces large ÆT
excursions through the
wall of the header.
(b). Measure through-wall thermal gradients • Confirm mechanism.
during all operating periods, including • Inspect to determine the
feedwater flow, drum top-up, and during extent of damage.
shutdown. • For minor damage,
repair, modify operating
procedures and institute
long-term monitoring.
• For major damage,
replace header, modify
operating procedures,
institute long-term
monitoring.
• Long-term monitoring and alarm of
through-wall temperatures, particularly
for ÆT.
• Introduction of trickle feed system to
prevent spikes of cold feedwater and to
minimize ÆT. See main text for discus-
sion of this and additional operating
options.
• Set re-inspection intervals to confirm
efficacy of modifications, and to moni-
tor damage accumulation.
• Set re-evaluation period and execute
periodic life assessment.

3.3 Stress concentrations
(c). Evaluate inspection data indicating
locations of damage.
• See long-term • Possible header redesign to lower
strategies. stress concentrations, and stress levels
caused by temperature differentials
(when replacing header). See Figure
20-9 for typical modifications.

South End of Feed Recirculation

Header, S Line, F Line, R

S3 S2 F3 F2 R3 R2
S4 F4 R4

1st 36th Top row R5 10th

platen platen F5
of tubes platen
(S-N) (S-N) R6 (N-S)

Wall
S1 Wall F1 F3 R1 position
S3 position F5 R3

S4 F4 R4 R5 R6

Valve
S2, F2, R2, surface OD thermocouples
between adjacent longitudinal stub tubes

Figure 20-6. Schematic of typical thermocouple locations on economizer inlet header.

Thermocouple locations are designated by a letter (S, F, R) followed by an identifying
number. Source: G.G. Stephenson2

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 20-7

4. Determining the Extent of Damage

a
20-8
a
Determining the extent of damage
may be difficult because of access
restrictions. Figure 20-1 indicates
locations where damage has been
typically found. Since the worst dam-
age is expected around the feedwa-
ter inlet, tubes removed should be
from this area. The stub tube should
be examined metallurgically to
assess the degree of damage.
Visual inspection of the borehole
and across the inside ligament will
indicate if the header is cracked. If
cracks are detected, random checks
across the header can be used to
indicate the extent of damage. This
can be done by videoprobe.Other
areas to be checked might include
(i) header boreholes, (ii) the liga-
ment region between boreholes on
the inside of the header, (iii) the
external stub tube to header welds
that have not been removed, and
(iv) the ID of the stub tubes that
have not been removed.

MP

Visual/DP/MP
Visual
Visual examination, dye penetrant,
magnetic particle or ultrasonic test-
ing (UT) may be used depending on
the location to be examined and
access, as shown in Figure 20-7.
Surface preparation will depend on
the technique to be used. None is
required for visual examination of
the ID, scale removal is required for
dye penetration or magnetic particle
inspection; grinding is necessary to
prepare the outside surface for UT.
Sizing of cracks may be difficult.
Grinding or UT techniques may be
used to determine crack depth if
access and geometry permit.
Procedures are available for sizing
locations in ligament, girth weld and
tee locations. An example of UT siz-
ing with tandem probes is given in
reference 4. Alternative methods of
current injection and eddy-current
inspection for shallow cracks are
also possible.3

MP

MP

Figure 20-7. Inspection methods and areas to be inspection. (MP) - magnetic particle
inspection, (DP) - dye penetrant inspection. Source: G.G. Stephenson2

Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes

5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Thermal Fatigue in
Economizer Inlet Header Tubes:
Immediate Solutions and Actions
1. Apply step-by-step method to
assess header condition;
repair damage or replace
header as indicated by the
condition assessment.
2. Modify operating procedures
if possible to minimize damag-
ing conditions.
3. Include periodic inspection of
susceptible areas as a long-
term action.
5.1 Assessment methodology
Once damage has been identified, a
condition assessment methodology
should be applied to analyze its
severity. In fact, a utility should initi-
ate the use of the methodology
when (i) existing tube or header
damage is found, (ii) cyclic unit
operation is begun or contemplated,
or (iii) an inspection is required for
life assessment studies.
The basic methodology consists of
confirming the root cause, assessing
condition of the tubes and of the
header body, evaluating the effect of
observed temperature excursions,
determining the significance of
cracking and damage found, per-
forming a residual life assessment of
the header, performing the indicated
repairs, modifying operation to mini-
mize the conditions that promote
cracking, and monitoring for effec-
tiveness of the imposed solutions
and for continued crack growth.
Damaged headers should be moni-
tored for temperature differentials,
which are the primary driving force
behind the accumulation of damage
via this mechanism. As noted above,
thermocouples should be installed
at the surface and in drilled holes
within 1 cm (0.39 in.) of the inside
surface. These deep wall thermo-
couples or thermowells5 are recom-
mended because the analysis of
surface temperatures alone does not
appear to be sufficient to monitor
rapid thermal through-wall
gradients.3
Monitoring across the full range of
operating procedures is required,
including shutdown periods.
Operating parameters such as load,
feedwater flow, and pressure should
be compiled along with the header
thermal gradient. This information is
then used in a stress analysis and
fracture mechanics analysis to
determine whether the stresses
induced by thermal excursions are
sufficient to propagate existing
cracks. Note that the analysis of
condition, by these methods is not a
simple process. Complexities
include, but are not limited to: the
need to use accurate material prop-
erties for weld metal, base metal,
and heat-affected zones, realistic
models of geometry, accurate evalu-
ations of stresses, and realistic flaw
sizes and shapes.2,3,6
The methods starting with the exist-
ing crack depth, will evaluate the
expected incremental crack growth
as a function of measured levels of
ÆT-induced stresses and other
stress components, and determine
the expected number of cycles to
failure depending on the final allow-
able crack size. The analysis should
also indicate the maximum thermal
gradients that can be tolerated with-
out crack growth.
It should be emphasized that head-
ers with significant cracking, e.g.,
cracks extending across the liga-
ment, require analysis to determine
whether they are safe to operate in
that condition or need immediate
replacement. The stress and fracture
analysis should provide the informa-
tion needed to make this decision.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 20-9

90
Metal Temperature DT (F°)
60
30
0
-30
-60
-90
0 1
Figure 20-8. Header temperature gradients during a unit hot start following operating
modifications. Source: G.G. Stephenson2
5.2 Modifications
Once the monitoring and assess-
ment has been performed, then a
decision can be made about
changes to operating procedures to
minimize future damage. It has been
clearly established that such modifi-
cations can reduce the thermal tran-
sients that are the responsible dri-
ving mechanism. For example, an
attempt should be made to intro-
duce the feedwater into the header
on a more even basis. If this is not
20-10 Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes
Econ. header DT (difference between inner and
outer temperature)
Outer temp. > inner temp. = positive DT
1. Feedwater flow (kg/s) Hot start
2. Unit Load (MW)
3. Drum level (+20 in -20 in)
Load and FW Flow
20 300
12 3
0 150
-20 0 lem will result in repeat failures.
2 3 4 5 6
Time (hours)
possible, then the solutions should
be sought among options such as
(i) the use of a trickle feed system,
(ii) intermittent feedwater admission
by valving or (iii) increasing the
feedwater temperature.
Figure 20-8 shows temperature gra-
dients during a unit startup on the
same unit detailed in Figure 20-4
after procedure changes were intro-
duced. Specifically, feedwater is
now trickled into the header on a
continuous basis and as a result the
ÆT is much lower.
5.3 Repairs/Replacement
The repair of cracks on the inside
surfaces of economizer inlet head-
ers cannot normally be economi-
cally justified because of the large
number of tube bore holes and the
problem of access. Therefore,
unless it can be shown by fracture
mechanics and fatigue analysis that
a cracked header can be operated
safely and reliably by minimizing
and monitoring crack propagation,
the header will require replacement.
It is important to recognize that any
repair program which does not
address the base cause of the prob-
If the analysis, including monitoring
and fracture mechanics, specifies a
maximum ÆT that will not cause
cracks to initiate and grow, and if
this is easily achievable with modi-
fied operating procedures such as
suggested above, then the current
header with minor repairs can be
used. If cracking was found to be
too severe then a new, replacement
header will be needed.
If cracking was found to be serious
and steps to reduce thermal excur-
sions to acceptable levels would be
an operating restraint, then a new
header design is indicated.
Improved design features are mostly
targeted at reducing stress concen-
trations inherent in past designs. A

Full penetration tube
attachment welds
Contoured inner
hole radii
Increased
ligament
length
Decreased
header
thickness
Figure 20-9. Schematic of modified header design. Source: G.G. Stephenson2
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
failures
The long term strategy to prevent
failures will extend those activities
outlined above. Whether the existing
header is used or new (and/or
redesigned), it will be necessary to
include a program of monitoring
with appropriate alarms in the con-
trol room on the ÆT levels in the
header. An understanding of how
those thermal gradients will affect
redesigned header will include such
modifications as:
• Decreased header thickness
within design Code allowables.
• Full penetration welds for the
tube attachments.
• A radius on the hole lips on the
inside surface of the header.
• Designing the pitch on the tube
holes to maximize all ligament
areas on the header.
• Installing headers outside the gas
path.
Figure 20-9 shows a schematic of
some of these design improve-
ments.
Options must be reviewed in con-
junction with geometric and operat-
ing characteristics. Decreased wall
thicknesses will tend to reduce
through-wall temperature gradients.
The use of materials with higher
fatigue resistance, such as 1 CrMo
steel may also be considered.
Economic evaluations are required
to judge which options are cost
effective, and will include such con-
siderations as number of stub tube
failures, condition of the economizer,
the extent of header cracking,
expected type of operation, and the
desired life of the header and unit.
header tube cracking should be in
hand from the stress and fracture
mechanics analysis.
These actions should be performed
in conjunction with periodic rein-
spection and confirmation that dam-
age has been controlled to within
acceptable levels.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 20-11
7. Case study
Thermal Fatigue in Economizer Inlet Header Tubes:
Case Study: Field Experience
A survey of thirteen North
American utilities was conducted
during 1989. All had found some
level of damage to economizer
inlet header tubes. Table 20-2 illus-
trates that some common features
were evident among those utilities.
The following conclusions were
reached:
1. For most utilities the first signs of
damage were stub tube failures
with leaks occurring at the toe of
the fillet weld on the tube side or
just above it.
2. Crack orientation was longitudi-
nal.
3. Highest incidence of failure was
at the feedwater inlet, although
there was some cracking away
Source: G.G. Stephenson2
20-12 Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes
from the inlet region that was
probably related to additional
system stresses.
4. There was a strong correlation
between unit cycling and tube
and header cracking, found by
comparing cracked and
uncracked headers.
5. Design and fabrication features
that were directly related to
cracking included (i) use of
socket welds instead of full pen-
etration welds to join the stub
tube to the header and (ii) lack
of radii on inside edges of holes
versus radiusing the hole lip
such as required in German
TRD design codes.
6. All U.S. boiler manufacturers’
headers have experienced
cracking.
7. At the time of the survey, only a
few utilities had instituted modi-
fied operating procedures to
reduce the level of ÆT in the
headers, typically by trickle
feeding or raising the feedwater
temperature before it was admit-
ted to the header. A continuous
slow feed of feedwater was also
practiced; this was accom-
plished with either a low flow
control valve or a low-capacity,
variable-speed, boiler feed
pump.
Table 20-2
Economizer Inlet Header Tube Cracking: Case Study Summary of Root Cause Similarities in Field Failures
Number of ID Ligament
Stub Tube Headers Cycling Spacing ÆT Throughwall T Limits?
Utility Leaks? Replaced Operation? (inches) Measured? T/C? (°F)

A Yes 0 Yes 1 Yes Yes 70

B Yes 0 Yes 13/8 No No None

C No 1 Yes /
78 No No None

D Yes 9 Yes /
12 No No None

E Yes 8 Yes /
38 Yes Yes 55

F Yes 1 Yes - No No None

G No 0 Yes - No No None

H No 1 Yes /
12 No No None

I Yes 1 Yes 11/2 No No 50-100

J Yes 0 Yes - Yes Yes 43

K Yes 0 Yes /
34 Yes Yes None

L Yes 2 Yes - No No None

M Yes 3 Yes 13/8 No No None

8. References
1Dooley,R.B., “Status of Economizer Inlet Header
Cracking in Ontario Hydro Boilers”, Ontario Hydro Report
TG31030, October 1, 1981.
2Stephenson, G.G., Guidelines for the Prevention of
Economizer Inlet Header Cracking in Fossil Boilers,
Research Project 1890-6, Final Report GS-5949, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, November,
1989.
3Parker, J.D., et al., Condition Assessment Guidelines for
Fossil Fuel Power Plant Components, Research Project
2596-10, Topical Report GS-6724, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, March, 1990.
4Moles, M.D.C. and A.L. Allen, “Tandem Probe Ultrasonic
Measurement of Cracks in Economizer Inlet Header
Sections”, Materials Evaluation, May, 1984.
5Dunn, K.M., J.R. Scheibel, and E. Schwarz, “Monitoring
for Life Extension”, Combustion Engineering Report No.
TIJ-PSG-85-001/.
6Mukherjee, B., M.L. Vanderglas, and D.M. McCluskey,
“Toughness Measurement and Structural Integrity
Considerations of a Pressure Vessel”, Fifth International
Conference on Pressure Vessel Technology, Volume 2,
San Francisco. September, 1984.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 20-13

ACTIONS for Thermal Fatigue in Economizer Inlet Header Tubes:
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of ther-
mal fatigue in the economizer
inlet header begin here. The goal
of these actions is to see if fur-
ther investigation of this mecha-
nism is warranted or whether
another BTF mechanism should
be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and thermal fatigue
is the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by thermal fatigue in the econ-
omizer inlet.
20-14 Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred
and thermal fatigue is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of thermal fatigue, such as
shown in Figure 20-1.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Pin-hole leaks or cracks at the
toe of header-to-stub tube
welds. See Figure 20-1.
• Cracks extending across liga-
ments.
• Damage to the inside surface of
tube stubs (Figure 20-2).
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF in the econo-
mizer inlet header by thermal
fatigue.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Has the unit recently been con-
verted to cycling duty?
• Has the header accumulated a
large number of operating
cycles?
• Has the header experienced
large thermal gradients?
• Is the spacing of the ligament
holes in the header small
( < 3.5 cm (1-3/8 inch)?
• Is the thickness of the header
well above Code minimum?
• Are header to stub tube joints
made with partial fillet welds?
• Does this header design have a
history of problems at other
power plants?
• Has feedwater been introduced
intermittently at high flow rates
during start-ups and off-line
top-ups?
➠ These precursors can be root
cause influences on thermal
fatigue. If one or more has
occurred, go to Action 3 which
outlines the steps to confirm the
influence of each.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is thermal
fatigue

A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being thermal fatigue
(Action 1a). Action 2 should
clearly identify thermal fatigue as
the primary mechanism or point
to another cause. The actions
listed will be executed by (i)
visual inspection of tubes and
bore holes, and (ii) metallo-
graphic analysis of removed
tube(s).
➠ Evaluate location along header.
Is damage located primarily near
to the feedwater inlet?
➠ Evaluate location on tube. Is
damage initiation on the tube ID?
See Figures 20-1 and 20-2.
➠ Evaluate location relative to weld.
Is damage associated with the
toe of a weld, particularly with a
partial fillet weld (as opposed to
a full penetration weld)?
Problem may be flexibility induced
cracking.
Problem is more likely to be flexi-
bility induced cracking.
Damage is more likely to have
been caused by erosion-corrosion,
however, continue with flowchart to
confirm.

➠ Evaluate damage appearance. Mechanism is more likely to be

Does sample of cracked/ dam- erosion-corrosion.
aged material show an appear-
ance like an orange peel?

Probable mechanism is thermal

fatigue. Steps to confirm will
include:
➠ Sampling to confirm evidence of
ID, bore hole damage.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 20-15

Action 3: Determine root cause of thermal fatigue damage
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con- ➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
firmed as thermal fatigue (Action
2) or a precursor to thermal
fatigue is evident (Action 1b). Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
The goal for this Action 3 is for
the BTF team to review the root 3.1 For all root cause influences ➠ (a). Metallurgical analysis of removed tube
causes of thermal fatigue at the sample to confirm orientation, initiation sites
economizer inlet header and and extent of cracking. Ensure that damage is
take those steps needed to con- in fact thermally-induced and not either flexi-
firm that they are operative. This bility-induced or caused by erosion-corrosion.
step must be taken so that the
condition assessment, which is
3.2 Cyclic operation that introduces large ÆT ➠ (b). Measure through-wall thermal gradi-
central to correction, can be per-
excursions through the wall of the header. ents during all operating periods, including
formed. Execute, in parallel,
Action 4 to determine the extent feedwater flow, drum top-up, and during
of damage. shutdown.

3.3 Stress concentrations ➠ (c). Evaluate inspection data indicating

locations of damage.

20-16 Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis) the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Access is a key con-
cern; for accessible locations,
standard NDE inspection meth-
ods are usable.
➠ Determine the areas and extent of the inspection from
review of header design, operating history, and stub
tube failures. Refer to Figure 20-1 and main text for
typical locations to inspect.
➠ Pre-inspection activities. Install scaffolding and
remove insulation. Remove a handhole cap or cut a
stub tube to provide access since worst damage is
expected around the feedwater inlet.
➠ Take tube samples to assess the degree of damage.
➠ Surface preparation if any. None required for ID visual
examination, scale removal for dye penetrant or mag-
netic particle inspection, grinding to prepare outside
surface for UT. See Figure 20-7 for sample locations.
➠ Perform NDE. Perform visual, dye penetrant, mag-
netic particle, and/or UT examination as required. If
cracks are detected, determine their depth by grind-
ing or UT if access permits; alternative methods
include current injection and eddy-current inspection
for shallow cracks.
➠ Use results in conjunction with condition assessment.
➠ Go to Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate Solutions
and Actions.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 20-17
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
The BTF Team must ensure that
repairs and immediate solutions
are directly tied to the underlying
cause. The following flowchart
indicates importance of the con-
dition assessment in choosing
the correct immediate actions.
20-18 Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes
Do results of header inspection
indicate that there is severe
cracking?
Yes
Does an analysis of the damage,
including stress analysis and
fracture mechanics, indicate that
Yes
header can continue to be oper-
ated?
No
No
Is existing design sufficient to
achieve desired life?
No
➠ Redesign header, replace. See
Figure 20-9 for typical design
modifications.
➠ Install thermocouples and mon-
No itor ÆT levels for the full range
of operation including feedwa-
ter flow and drum top-up, as
well as shutdown periods.
➠ Perform stress analysis and
fracture mechanics analysis of
the severity of damage, includ-
ing results of inspection for
extent of damage, and results
of thermocouples for ÆT.
Can existing header, with or with-
out repairs, continue in service? Yes
➠ Replace header in-kind.
Yes
➠ Evaluate whether changes in
operating procedures are
needed to lower ÆT and thus
achieve desired life.
➠ See Action 6: Long-Term
Solutions to Prevent Repeat
Failures
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on clear identification of
underlying root cause (Action 3)
and an economic evaluation to
ensure that the optimal strategy
has been chosen.
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
The final step for the BTF team is
to review the ramifications to
other cycle components that are
implied by thermal fatigue of the
economizer inlet header. For this
BTF, if poor shutdown conditions
contributed to pitting in the econ-
omizer inlet tubes, similar pitting
may occur in other economizer
regions.
Major Root Cause Influences
For all root cause influences
Cyclic operation that introduces large ÆT
excursions through the wall of the header.
Stress concentrations
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Analysis with tools such as fracture
mechanics and fatigue analysis to assess the
safety of continued operation, for example
leak-before-break.
➠ Repair, replace, run decision required.
➠ Long-term monitoring and alarm of
through-wall temperatures, particularly for ÆT.
➠ Introduction of trickle feed system to pre-
vent spikes of cold feedwater and to minimize
ÆT. See main text for discussion of this and
additional operating options.
➠ Set re-inspection intervals to confirm
efficacy of modifications, and to monitor dam-
age accumulation.
➠ Set re-evaluation period and execute peri-
odic life assessment.
➠ Possible header redesign to lower stress
concentrations, and stress levels caused by
temperature differentials (when replacing
header). See Figure 20-9 for typical modifica-
tions.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 20-19
20-20 Thermal Fatigue Economizer Inlet Header Tubes
Chapter 21 • Volume 2
Erosion/Corrosion
in Economizer Inlet
Headers
Introduction
This is one of three boiler tube fail-
ure mechanisms for stub tubes in
economizer inlet headers. The other
two are thermal fatigue, covered in
Chapter 20, and flexibility-driven
fatigue, covered in Chapter 26. As
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure
Failures by erosion/corrosion will be
manifested as tube wastage on the
inside surface. The surface appear-
ance is that of “orange peel”.
Progressive wall thinning leads
eventually to failure by ductile over-
load. Figure 21-1 shows the typical
appearance. A cross section
through this failed tube is shown in
Figure 21-2. Note the absence of
protective magnetite on the inside
tube surface.
Some care is required to distinguish
failures by erosion-corrosion from
the other two mechanisms which
can occur in the same location.
Primary distinguishing features will
be (i) the damage manifestation, (ii)
all three can occur in the same gen-
eral area, there is a possibility of
misdiagnosing the active mecha-
nism even through they are distinctly
different. Distinguishing characteris-
tics of the three are compared in
Chapter 7, Volume 1.
its location of origin, and (iii) the ori-
entation. Manifestation: damage
caused by thermal fatigue and flexi-
bility-induced fatigue will be mani-
fest as cracks, erosion-corrosion as
wastage. Location: erosion-corrosion
and thermal fatigue are ID-initiated;
flexibility-induced cracking, OD-initi-
ated. Orientation: thermal-fatigue will
typically be oriented longitudinally
(parallel) to the stub tube axis, flexi-
bility-induced cracking is generally
circumferential around the toe of the
weld, and erosion-corrosion damage
will depend on local flow character-
istics, appearing finally as a ductile
overload in the middle of the largest
gouge on the inside surface.
Additional detail can be found in
Chapter 7, Volume 1.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 21-1
1.2 Typical locations
The most common location is in
economizer inlet header stub tubes
nearest to the point of the feedwater
inlet. Wastage by erosion/corrosion
is found on the tube inside surface
and generally extends to a length of
approximately 10 to 12 cm (~ 4 to
5”) from the inside surface of the
header. Figure 21-3 shows the typi-
cal location.

Figure 21-1. Appearance of an economizer inlet tube that failed by erosion-corrosion.

The weld is the header nipple weld about 2 inches from the header. The "orange-peel"
appearance of erosion-corrosion is clearly visible.

Figure 21-2. Cross-section of the failed tube shown in Figure 21-1.

Note the almost complete absence of protective magnetite on the
inside surface.

21-2 Erosion/Corrosion in Economizer Inlet Headers

a ID ligament
spacing
a
Tube failure
location

CL tube

2. Mechanism of Failure
These tubes
have lost tube
wall thickness

Weld

Header
thickness
Economizer inlet
header stub tubes

Tube
thickness

Figure 21-3. Cross section through the economizer inlet header and tubes showing
locations of erosion-corrosion in the tubes. The tube bore shows the "orange-peel"
appearance. This erosion-corrosion peaks after a distance of about 1-2 inches into the
tube.

The mechanism is a combination of

flow-induced corrosion (erosion/cor-
rosion) caused by the local flow of
water turning into the tubes from the
inlet header, and corrosion caused
by reducing feedwater conditions.
Under normal operating conditions
there is a balance between the
growth of Fe3O4 (discussed at
length in Chapter 2, Volume 1) and
its flow-induced removal. Attack by
an erosion/corrosion process results
when the removal (dissolution) of the
oxide occurs faster than its growth
and thus leads to attack of the tube
surface.
Ironically, this boiler tube failure
mechanism occurs predominantly
when the feedwater has very low O2
levels ( << 1 ppb at the economizer
inlet) and high levels of oxygen
scavenger such as N2H4 ( >> 20
ppb). Under these conditions the
feedwater becomes very reducing
(typically << - 300 mV). The result is
opposite of the aim to preserve the
formation of protective oxide Fe3O4.
In fact, under these conditions, the
feedwater causes greater dissolution
of the Fe3O4 throughout the feedwa-
ter train and exacerbates the flow-
induced damage.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 21-3

2. Mechanism of Failure (continued)
To date these failures have always
occurred in feedwater systems with
all-ferrous metallurgy. A particular
feature has been that the HP feed-
water heaters are constructed in
austenitic stainless steel; sometimes
the LP heaters are also manufac-
tured in austenitic stainless.
Essentially this means that more
N2H4 (or oxygen scavenger) is pre-
sent (residual) at the economizer
inlet than when the HP heaters are
carbon steel because not as much
is consumed in reducing reactions.
Monitoring at the normal economizer
inlet sampling point will provide an
indication of the O2 content and oxi-
dation-reduction potential (ORP), but
will not provide an indication of the
elevated Fe levels coming from the
economizer inlet tubing.1
A number of factors have been
found to influence the extent of ero-
sion-corrosion.2 The following apply
to the occurrence of erosion-corro-
sion throughout the feedwater cycle:
• pH. Increasing pH (9.0-9.6)
decreases erosion-corrosion
because of the influence of pH on
the solubility and dissolution
kinetics of the magnetite film.
However, increasing pH, by itself,
is usually not sufficient to elimi-
nate erosion-corrosion damage
and can have harmful effects in
other parts of the cycle.
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
The mechanism is caused by flow-
induced corrosion under conditions
of low oxygen activity, thus the pri-
mary actions to confirm the mecha-
nism will involve reviewing chemistry
records and monitoring systems to
determine whether (i) reducing con-
ditions exist (<< - 300 mV), or (ii)
21-4 Erosion/Corrosion in Economizer Inlet Headers
• Flow effects. Increased mass
transfer, because of geometry
effects, tends to increase erosion-
corrosion with a dependence that
is greater than linear. Practical
changes in flow rates will gener-
ally not drastically reduce ero-
sion-corrosion.
• Temperature. The erosion-corro-
sion rate in single phase water is
maximum in the temperature
range around 130-140°C (~ 265-
285°F), and can remain acceler-
ated up to 280°C (~ 535°F). The
process is controlled by oxide
dissolution at lower temperatures
and by mass transfer limitations
at higher temperatures.
• Materials. Incorporating even a
small amount of chromium into
mild steels (0.1%) has clear tech-
nical benefits.
• Dissolved oxygen. As discussed
above, it has been clearly estab-
lished that operating with less
than 1 ppb oxygen in feedwater
drastically increases the rate of
erosion-corrosion. The addition of
even small amounts of oxygen,
for example, > 5 ppb to high
purity water (cation conductivity <
0.15 mS/cm), provides a substan-
tial reduction of erosion/corrosion
transported feedwater corrosion
products.
levels << 1 ppb O2 at the econo-
mizer inlet and >> 20 ppb N2H4 in
the feedwater are present. High Fe
levels at the economizer inlet (>> 5
ppb) may also indicate a feedwater
chemistry problem.
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
Thinning can be detected by ultra-
sonic testing of the stub tubes near-
est to the location where the feedwa-
ter enters the economizer inlet
header.

5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions

About the only immediate action is
replacement of damaged tubes.
However, the decision about
whether to replace in-kind with car-
bon steel or upgrade to a material
containing Cr such as T11 will
depend upon (i) the desired unit life,
(ii) an estimate of the time-to-failure
and (iii) perhaps most importantly,
with larger considerations involved
with other components in the feed-
water train, as discussed in the next
section.

6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat

Failures
Erosion-corrosion in the feedwater
system because of the chemical
environment indicated above can
occur in a number of locations
including: (i) economizer inlet
header tubes, (ii) HP heater inlet
tubes and tube sheet, (iii) the deaer-
ator shell, and (iv) connecting
pipework. Thus, while the immediate
problem for the first can be over-
come by using T11 tubes, the opti-
mum approach for all areas is to
address the root cause: the feedwa-
ter chemistry.
The steps to be taken will depend
on whether the feedwater train is all-
ferrous or mixed metallurgy. For
either case, a series of steps can be
implemented over time as follows:
• For all-ferrous feedwater systems.
The O2 scavenger (or N2H4) can
be eliminated. As shown in Figure
21-4, the removal of N2H4 (or the
O2 scavenger) will increase the
oxidation-reduction potential
(ORP) to between 0 and +100
mV, i.e., into the oxidizing range.
The feedwater at the economizer
inlet should be monitored for Fe,
O2, cation conductivity, and ORP
to ensure that the elimination of
N2H4 produces the desired effect.
The preferred approach is to con-
vert the unit to oxygenated treat-
ment (OT). In this case, the O2
level at the economizer inlet
depends on whether the unit is
once-through or drum. For either
of these approaches, the use of
carbon steel for replacement tub-
ing should suffice, as the oxidiz-
ing environment will eliminate the
erosion-corrosion. This is illus-
trated in the tube cross section
shown in Figure 21-5. This tube,
from the same unit as manifested
the failed tube shown in Figures
21-1 and 21-2, shows that after
conversion to OT, a protective
magnetite layer has been
reestablished on the inside tube
surface.
• If the feedwater train has mixed
metallurgy it is necessary to keep
the reducing environment to pro-
tect the Cu-based heater tubes.
In this case, the monitoring cam-
paign is specifically to optimize
the feedwater chemistry, i.e., to
balance the feed of O2 scav-
engers with the Fe, Cu levels at
the economizer inlet. In this case,
it may be necessary to replace
the tubes with a Cr-containing
alloy such as T11.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 21-5

 ORP N2H 4 Fe
mV ppb ppb
200 50 16

14
100
40
ORP 12
0
30 10

-100 8
Fe
20
6
-200
N 2H 4
4
10
-300
2
Figure 21-5. Economizer inlet tube removed from a unit which
-400 0 0 had previously experienced failure by erosion-corrosion (see
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Figures 21-1 and 21-2). This drum unit was converted to oxy-
Time (days) genated treatment (OT); as a result, as can be seen here, the
protective magnetite, previously lacking, has been restored.
Importantly no further loss of wall thickness occurred after
Figure 21-4. Change in the oxidizing-reducing potential (ORP) operating on OT for a year.
and total iron with the reduction in hydrazine in the feedwater.
Note that ORP increases into the oxidizing regime and the iron
levels decrease markedly, indicating lower erosion-corrosion
rates. Source: D. Platt and D.A. Vinnicombe3

7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.

8. References
1Dooley, R.B., J. Mathews, R. Pate, and J. Taylor,
“Optimum Chemistry for ‘All-Ferrous’ Feedwater Systems:
Why Use an Oxygen Scavenger?”, Proceedings of the
55th International Water Conference, Pittsburgh, PA,
October 31-November 2, 1994.
2Bates, A.J., G.J. Bignold, K. Garbett, W.R. Middleton, D.
Penfold, K. Tittle, and I.S. Woolsey, “The Central
Electricity Generating Board Single-Phase Erosion-
Corrosion Research Programme”, Nuclear Energy, No. 6,
December, 1986, pp. 361-370.
3Platt,D. and D.A. Vinnicombe, “Operating of a Drum
Boiler Without Hydrazine”, ESKOM, Johannesburg, South
Africa, June, 1994.

21-6 Erosion/Corrosion in Economizer Inlet Headers

ACTIONS for Erosion/Corrosion in Economizer Inlet Header Tubes
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of ero-
sion/corrosion begin here. The
goal of these actions is to see if
further investigation of
erosion/corrosion is warranted or
whether another BTF mechanism
should be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred in economizer inlet
header stub tubes and ero-
sion/corrosion is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
which indicates that there
could be a future BTF by ero-
sion/corrosion.
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred Action 1b: If a precursor has
in economizer inlet header stub occurred in the unit that could
tubes and erosion/corrosion is the lead to future BTF by erosion/
likely mechanism. corrosion:
➠ Determine whether the failure has • Erosion-corrosion seen during
occurred in typical locations i.e. maintenance inspection in the HP
in those stub tubes nearest to the feedwater heater inlet tubes or
point of feedwater inlet, on the tube sheet, on the deaerator
tube inside surface, and over the shell, or in connecting pipework.
first 10 to 12 cm (4 to 5”) of tube
• Fouling of orifices or BFP
length from the header. See
impellers are other indications
Figure 21-3.
that excessive erosion-corrosion
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic is taking place in feedwater sys-
appearance of the failure includes tems.
the features shown in Figure 21-1,
• Evidence of persistent reducing
including:
feedwater conditions (<< - 300
• Wall thinning mV) or monitoring results that
show levels << 1 ppb O2 at the
• Orange peel surface
appearance economizer inlet and >> 20 ppb
N2H4 in the feedwater.
• Ductile final fracture
➠ If these indicators have been
➠ Determine whether the protective found, go to Action 3 which out-
magnetite is missing from the lines the steps needed to confirm
inside surface of tube, such as the influence of each.
shown in Figure 21-2.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 21-7
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is
erosion/corrosion.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being erosion/corrosion
(Action 1a). Action 2 should
clearly identify erosion/corrosion
as the primary mechanism or
point to another cause. The
actions listed will be executed by
removing representative tube
sample(s), followed by visual
examination and detailed metal-
lographic analysis.
➠ Analyze the macroscopic Suspect that damage may be ther-
damage I. Does damage have mal fatigue (Chapter 20) or if dam-
features including: inside surface age is OD-initiated it is more likely
damage, wall thinning, orange to be flexibility-induced fatigue
peel appearance, thin-edged (Chapter 26).
failure surfaces or pin-hole leaks?
➠ Analyze the macroscopic Suspect thermal fatigue (Chapter
damage II. Is there longitudinal 20).
cracking on the inside tube sur-
face, and particularly in the bore
of the header or between bore
holes?

➠ Probable mechanism is
erosion/corrosion.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination.

Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the erosion/corrosion

A BTF failure has occurred and the mechanism has been confirmed as
erosion/corrosion (Action 2), or a precursor has occurred (Action 1b).
Although the underlying mechanism has contributors from both flow-
induced corrosion and chemistry-induced corrosion, the controllable
aspect is the latter. Therefore, the goal of this Action 3 is for the BTF Team
to review the feedwater conditions to determine whether reducing condi-
tions exist (<< - 300 mV), or monitoring shows levels << 1 ppb O2 at the
economizer inlet and >> 20 ppb N2H4 in the feedwater. High Fe levels at
the economizer inlet (>> 5 ppb) may also indicate a feedwater chemistry
problem.

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root cause analysis), the BTF Team should deter-
mine the extent of damage. Subject to access constraints, detection of
erosion/corrosion is possible through ultrasonic examination for wall thin-
ning. Chapter 9, Volume 1 provides some summary information.

21-8 Erosion/Corrosion in Economizer Inlet Headers

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Routine repairs and replacement practices are generally sufficient to deal

with the immediate failure. A decision needs to be made whether to
replace in-kind with carbon steel which will eventually result in a repeat
failure, or to upgrade to a Cr-Mo steel such as T11. The decision will be
based, in part, on the desired remaining life of the unit, the expected time
to failure for carbon steel material, and on the choice of long-term actions
discussed in (Action 6).

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

The correction of the underlying problem(s) and the prevention of repeat

failures are priorities for the BTF team. Long-term options will depend on
whether the feedwater train is all-ferrous or mixed metallurgy.
In the case of all-ferrous feedwater systems actions will consist of (i) elimi-
nating oxygen scavengers such as N2H4 to raise the ORP into the oxidizing
range, (ii) monitor Fe, O2, cation conductivity, and ORP to ensure desired
effect, or (iii) convert the unit to oxygenated treatment. If these steps are
taken then carbon steel will be sufficient as replacement materials.
For mixed metallurgies, a reducing environment must be maintained to
protect Cu-based heater tubes. A monitoring campaign should be used to
optimize feedwater chemistry, i.e., balance the feed of oxygen scav-
engers with the levels of Fe and Cu measured at the economizer inlet.
Replacing carbon steel tubes with a Cr-containing material such as T11
may be required.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

The final step for the BTF team is to review the possible ramifications to
other cycle components implied by the presence of erosion/corrosion
damage or its precursors. A primary consideration is the potential for
development of erosion/corrosion problems elsewhere in the feedwater
train, i.e., deaerators, high-pressure carbon steel feedwater heater tubes
and tube sheets, and feedwater connecting pipework. This is very impor-
tant because in each known instance of erosion-corrosion in economizer
inlet tubes, a subsequent inspection of the deaerator has found erosion-
corrosion on the shell. Erosion-corrosion of the pipework could be a safety
problem. Actions such as outlined in Action 6 above will be useful for con-
trol in these components as well.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 21-9

21-10 Erosion/Corrosion in Economizer Inlet Headers
Chapter 22 • Volume 2

Sootblower Erosion
(Water-Touched Tubes)

Introduction
This chapter covers aspects of soot-
blower erosion that are particular to
water-touched tubes. The main dis-
cussion, and thus additional detail on
sootblower erosion can be found in
the description of that mechanism in
SH/RH tubes (Chapter 38, Volume 3).

1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations

1.1 Features of failure
Macroscopic features of failure from
sootblower-induced erosion will be
those common to other erosive
processes: (i) wall thinning caused
by external tube surface wastage,
and (ii) little or no ash deposits on
the tube. Thermal fatigue cracking
may also be present if there is water
in the first steam flow from a soot-
blower.
Since waterwall tubes are exposed
across only one half of their circum-
ference, the appearance of wall
blower erosion will be somewhat dif-
ferent from the symmetric wastage
flats seen for sootblower erosion in
SH/RH tube. As a result, the erosion
pattern will be angled to the tubes
from the direction of the blow.
Waterwall tubes subjected to soot-
blower erosion will have little or no
ash on the tube surface and, in
common with other erosive
processes, a distinguishing feature
is the formation of fresh rust on
tubes only a few hours after boiler
washing which indicates that the
protective scale has been removed.
As erosion becomes more severe,
tubes begin to thin, flattened areas
develop, and eventually internal
pressure leads to tube rupture. If the
erosion is rapid, the failure may be
thin-edged, a pin-hole shape or a
long, “thin” blowout.
1.2. Locations of failure
Typical failure locations for soot-
blower erosion in water-touched
tubes are in a circular pattern
around wall blowers. The corner
effects are important.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 22-1

2. Mechanism of Failure
Sootblower-induced erosion causes
accelerated tube wastage by direct
material removal, and removal of the
fireside oxide also increases the fire-
side oxidation rate. The rate and
extent of all of the erosive processes
are affected by impacting particle or
fluid velocity, angle of impact, parti-
cle composition and shape, and ero-
sive resistance including composi-
tional and temperature variations of
the tube surface. The separate
writeup on flyash erosion in Chapter
14 provides a detailed discussion of
erosion in general.
Sootblower erosion can be caused
by either solid particles, essentially
an acceleration of existing ash parti-
cles caused by the sootblowing
operation, or by liquid “jets” when
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Primarily, sootblower erosion is
caused by improper operation and
maintenance, such as incorrectly
setting the blowing temperature,
excessive use of the sootblowers, or
malfunction of sootblowers.
Condensation in steam or air supply
lines can result from a variety of
causes including2: (i) improper
drainage, (ii) temperature changes,
(iii) insufficient steam superheat
temperature, and (iv) inadequate
aftercooling of sootblower air com-
pressors.
Table 22-1 summarizes the possible
root causes, actions to confirm that
this is indeed the operative root
22-2 Sootblower Erosion (Water-Touched Tubes)
condensed water gets into the soot-
blowing media. Either projectile
results in characteristic wear pat-
terns on the tube. For example, con-
densate in the blowing media will
generally originate at the sootblower
valve and continue along the blower
path until the moisture is cleared
from the blower.
There can also be the appearance
of gouges on the external tube sur-
face where eddying of the steam
occurs between adjacent tubes.1
Final failure generally occurs as a
result of stress rupture when the
thinned tube wall can no longer sup-
port the internal pressure; the final
failure appearance is ductile and
thin walled.
cause, immediate and long-term
actions appropriate to prevent
recurrence of failures by sootblower
erosion.
Actions to pinpoint the particular
shortcoming that is causing the
boiler tube wear include:
(a). Visual examination can detect
misalignment, etc.
(b). Calibration and testing to mea-
sure key parameters such as blow-
ing temperature and pressure or
operation of moisture traps.
Table 22-1
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

Improper maintenance or
operation of sootblowers:
- Incorrect setting of blowing
temperature (insufficient
superheat)
- Condensate in blowing
media
- Improper operation of
moisture traps
- Excessive sootblowing
pressures
- Improper location of
sootblower
- Misalignment of sootblower
- Malfunction of sootblower
- Excessive sootblowing
(a). Visual examination to determine obvi-
ous maintenance shortcomings or
blower problems.
(b). Calibration and testing to measure key
parameters:
- blowing temperature and pressure
- operation of moisture traps
- checking travel and sequence times.
• Evaluate the extent of • Determine the optimal period of soot-
wall thinning and ero- blowing. It should not be simply a
sion damage to deter- matter of once/shift or once/day.
mine whether repairs/ Fireside testing with probes to deter-
replacements are mine the rate of buildup of ash on tubes
required. is useful.
• Effect applicable • Success has been achieved by having
repairs/replacements. a sootblower maintenance team so that
See Chapter 11, Volume maintenance is performed on a regular
1 for an overview of the basis and not on an as-needed basis.
applicable methods. • Institute periodic visual examination
• Avoid the use of and a program of calibration and testing
temporary measures of sootblower operation to prevent
such as pad welding, future failures.
shielding and/or coat- • Make needed modifications to hardware
ings unless they are or operating procedures to prevent
absolutely required to condensate from forming in blowing
get unit to next sched- media.
uled outage.
• Repair sootblower inad-
equacies and/or modify
operation to prevent
repeat failures.

4. Determining the Extent of Damage

As with other erosion processes,
visual examination may identify a
serious sootblower erosion problem
where significant wastage has
occurred, or it may uncover indirect
signs of a problem, such as rusted
tube locations within a few hours of
a boiler wash, indicating the removal
of protective surface oxides.
Damage should be localized to a
circular pattern around the wall
blowers. An ultrasonic testing (UT)
survey to detect wall thinning can
determine the degree of damage
that has occurred, a necessary pre-
cursor to rational repair/replace
decisions. Chapter 9, Volume 1 pro-
vides an overview of the use of UT
to detect wall thinning.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 22-3

5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Table 22-1 lists the available imme-
diate actions and solutions.
Where the loss of wall thickness is
not significant, the damaged tubes
should be evaluated as to whether
they can remain in service, or
whether they will require repair or
replacement. Chapter 8, Volume 1,
addresses remaining life calcula-
tions; procedures for the repair and
replacement of tubes are discussed
in Chapter 11, Volume 1.
Palliative solutions such as the use
of pad welds and spray coatings to
increase the wear resistance of the
tube, or shielding to protect local
eroded areas, should only be used
as emergency repairs to get the unit
back on-line. They should be
replaced at the next scheduled out-
age as these weld measures can
themselves introduce further prob-
lems such as copper embrittlement
or introduction of flow disruption if
the weld bead penetrates to the
inside surface. The pitfalls of these
repair methods are covered in
Chapter 11, Volume 1. It is also
important to recognize that if the
underlying sootblower problem is
not addressed, the result will be on-
going repeat failures.
Tube failures by sootblower erosion
are preventable through improved
maintenance or operation of soot-
blowers, and setting of optimized
sootblowing parameters and fre-
quency. Since a modern boiler can
have over 100 sootblowers and they
are subject to a harsh environment,
they present a constant mainte-
nance chore, to the point where
some utilities keep dedicated crews
22-4 Sootblower Erosion (Water-Touched Tubes)
to perform sootblower maintenance
on a regular basis.1 This is consid-
ered to be the optimum approach.
Periodic checking of steam traps
and drains are essential to keep
water out of the system, as is regular
blowdown of the sootblowing air
lines for compressed air systems.
Thermocouples have been used in
steam trap lines to detect the pres-
ence of water. If condensate is form-
ing in the blowing media then appro-
priate actions may include3: (i)
allowing for steam warmup, (ii) com-
pletely draining the supply piping
through thermal drain valves or
impulse condensate drain valves, or
(iii) the use of air dryers. Excessive
blowing pressures will increase the
likelihood for erosion to occur since
the rate of erosion is a function of
velocity to an exponent that ranges
from 2 to 4, depending upon a num-
ber of factors.
Long-term, the prevention of failures
will also be found in a program that
confirms, by visual inspection and
calibration of the sootblowers and
components, that the optimum oper-
ation continues to be achieved.
Fireside testing with probes in the
area to determine the rate of ash
buildup on tubes will allow the opti-
mum intervals between sootblowing
to be set. Sootblowing should not
be simply performed once/shift or
once/day, but on an as-needed
basis.
Alignment problems, which can
develop as a result of inadvertent
forces during operation, can be
found by inspection of tubes adja-
cent to sootblowers during planned
maintenance outages.
7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.

8. References
1Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and 3Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31, Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec, Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
November, 1983. Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.
2Pack, R.W. and P.J. Resetar, State-of-the-Art
Maintenance and Repair Technology for Fossil Boilers
and Related Auxiliaries, Research Project 2504-1, Final
Report CS-4840, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, March, 1987.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 22-5

ACTIONS for Sootblower Erosion (Water-Touched)
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of soot-
blower erosion begin here. The
goal of these actions is to see if
further investigation of soot-
blower erosion is warranted or
whether another BTF mechanism
should be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and sootblower ero-
sion is the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by sootblower erosion.
22-6 Sootblower Erosion (Water-Touched Tubes)
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred
and sootblower erosion is the
likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred near to a wall blower
and shows wastage pattern con-
sistent with erosion.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by sootblower
erosion.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Burnishing or polishing of the
tube in the blower path. This is
typical of the early stages of an
erosion problem.
• Flat spots, ovality and formation
of edges on straight tube sec-
tions typical of erosion in an
advanced stage.
• Fresh rust found on tubes fol-
lowing a boiler washing.
➠ Determine whether inspection or
testing of sootblowers indicates
such problems as (i) misalign-
ment of sootblowers or soot-
blower stuck in one position, (ii)
incorrect blowing temperature, (iii)
presence of condensed water in
blowing medium, or (iv) improper
drainage.
➠ If one or more of these indicators
have been found, go to Action 3
which outlines the steps to con-
firm the influence of each.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is sootblower
erosion.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being sootblower erosion
damage (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify sootblower
erosion as the primary mecha-
nism or point to another cause.
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by visual examination of
affected areas and removal of
representative tube sample(s) for
analysis.
➠ Evaluate the extent of damage. Is
damage localized in a circular
pattern around blower?
➠ Eliminate other erosive processes
as candidates. Is the damage
found in the blower path and/or
obviously associated with soot-
blowing?
➠ Evaluate appearance of damage.
Is wear manifested as wastage of
the tube angled back toward the
blower?
Probable failure mechanism is
sootblower erosion.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
If spread over a wide area, prob-
lem may be generalized corrosion
or generalized erosion; however
continue with balance of flowchart
to eliminate sootblower erosion as
the cause.
Possibility that another erosive
mechanism - flyash (Chapter 14),
coal particle (Chapter 28), or
falling slag (Chapter 29) is respon-
sible for the damage. Should be
able to distinguish by tube loca-
tion; see discussion of these alter-
native erosion mechanisms if there
is uncertainty in diagnosis
Damage may be flyash erosion if
evidenced by smooth, polished
wastage of the tube, particularly
on the side facing into the gas
flow.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 22-7
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of sootblower erosion
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as sootblower erosion
(Action 2) or a precursor has
been identified (Action 1b). The
goal of this Action 3 is for the
BTF Team to review the potential
root causes of sootblower ero-
sion, identify probable ones, and
take those actions that are
needed to confirm. This step
must be taken so that the proper
actions can be taken to prevent
future BTF from occurring by this
mechanism. Execute, in parallel,
Action 4: to determine the extent
of damage.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Evaluation will be
based on detecting obvious
signs of erosion and wall thin-
ning. Ultrasonic testing can be
used to measure the amount of
wall thinning.
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
The most important actions for
the BTF team are to (i) make the
tube repairs necessary to get the
unit on-line and (ii) fix the under-
lying sootblower problem.
22-8 Sootblower Erosion (Water-Touched Tubes)
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
Improper maintenance or operation of soot-
blowers:
• Incorrect setting of blowing temperature
(insufficient superheat)
• Condensate in blowing media
• Improper operation of moisture traps
• Excessive sootblowing pressures
• Improper location of sootblower
• Misalignment of sootblower
• Malfunction of sootblower
• Excessive sootblowing
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
of affected tubes as identified
from the NDE Survey (Action 4).
➠ See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
➠ Temporary pad welds, spray
coating, or shielding may be
used, but are not long-term
solutions, as they will most likely
lead to continual repairs. Plan
to remove at the next outage.
➠ Perform sootblower maintenance
as required.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Visual examination to determine obvi-
ous maintenance shortcomings or blower
problems.
➠ (b). Calibration and testing to measure key
parameters:
• blowing temperature and pressure
• operation of moisture traps
• checking travel and sequence times
➠ Modify sootblower operation as
required. Most important is to
develop an understanding of
when sootblowing is needed
and thus move away from an
automatic sootblowing cycle.
Other modifications to sootblow-
ing operation may include
changing sootblowing parame-
ters, regular blowdown of soot-
blowing air lines to avoid con-
densation, and installation of
thermocouples in steam trap
lines to detect water.
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. Optimized long-
term actions will include periodic
inspection and calibration of the
sootblower and its components.
Modifications to prevent the
development of condensate in
the blower media may be indi-
cated. As always, the required
steps will be based on the clear
identification of the underlying
root cause (from Action 3).
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
Major Root Cause Influences
Improper maintenance or operation of soot-
blowers:
• Incorrect setting of blowing temperature
(insufficient superheat)
• Condensate in blowing media
• Improper operation of moisture traps.
• Excessive sootblowing pressures
• Improper location of sootblower
• Misalignment of sootblower
• Malfunction of sootblower
• Excessive sootblowing
None for this mechanism.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Determine the optimal period of sootblow-
ing. It should not be simply a matter of
once/shift or once/day. Fireside testing with
probes to determine the rate of buildup of ash
on tubes is useful.
➠ Success has been achieved by having a
sootblower maintenance team so that mainte-
nance is performed on a regular basis and not
on an as-needed basis.
➠ Institute periodic visual examination and a
program of calibration and testing of soot-
blower operation to prevent future failures.
➠ Make needed modifications to hardware or
operating procedures to prevent condensate
from forming in blowing media.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 22-9
22-10 Sootblower Erosion (Water-Touched Tubes)
Chapter 23 • Volume 2
Short-Term
Overheating in
Waterwall Tubing
Introduction
Short-term overheating in water-
cooled tubes occurs because of
abnormal coolant flow or excessive
combustion gas temperature. As a
result, the tube is subjected to
excessively high temperature, often
hundreds of degrees above design,
which results in rapid failure.
Long-term overheating (creep) fail-
ures can occur in water-touched
tubing but are much less prominent
than in steam-touched tubes. As a
result, only brief mention is made of
long-term overheating in this chap-
ter. A review of the more common
case of creep in SH/RH tubing can
be found in Chapter 32, Volume 3;
short-term overheating of super-
heater/reheater tubing is covered in
Chapter 36, Volume 3.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 23-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure which, depending upon the underly-
Damage by short-term overheating ing cause, may be over only a small
will display distinctive characteristics circumferential arc of tube metal,
depending upon the temperatures and (ii) a ductile final failure showing
experienced by the tube. The most a thin-edged fracture surface and
general features for short-term over- “fish-mouth” appearance. Thick-
heating include (i) a considerable edged failure surfaces are also pos-
increase (> 5%) in the inside or out- sible under two distinct overheating
side diameter of affected tubes, conditions, as discussed below.
Pronounced microstructural changes
are evident in this type of failure;
those changes can be used as a
a)
Delta iron diagnostic to estimate the tube tem-
3000 (1649)
Delta iron + liquid Liquid
perature reached at burst.1 Three lev-
2800 (1538) els of “short-term” overheating have
2600 (1427) been classified depending on
Cementite
2400 (1316) Delta iron + liquid whether the temperature at burst was
+ Austenite Austenite
+ liquid
(i) below the lower critical tempera-
2200 (1204) ture, A1, (termed subcritical short-
Temperature, °F (°C)

Austenite
term overheating), (ii) between A1

Cementite Ledeburite
2000 (1093)

1800 (982)
and A3 - the upper critical tempera-
Austenite,
Eutectic +
ture (termed intercritical short-term
1600 (871) Ferrite + Austenite Cementite overheating), or (iii) above A3 (termed
Austenite +
1400 (760) Cementite upper critical short-term overheating).
Figures 23-1a and b show the equi-
0.80 % Eutectoid

4.3% C Eutectic

1200 (649)
Pearlite + Pearlite + Cementite, librium diagram for iron-iron carbide;
(Ledeburite)

Ferrite Cementite Pearlite +

(Pearlite)

1000 (538) transformed they show the regions where these

2.0% C

Eutectic
Irons temperature ranges are operative.
Steels Cast irons
The defining characteristics of each
32 (0)
0 0.5 1 2 3 4 5
of the three degrees of overheating
Carbon, % are summarized in Table 23-1.
The typical base metal has a
microstructure consisting of ferrite
and pearlite; the normal limit on its
b)
1800 (982) operating temperature is about
Upper-critical 440°C (~ 825°F). As shown in Table
shor t-term overheating
23-2, at this temperature, a minimum
1600 (871)
A3 time to rupture of about 33 years is
Inter-critical shor t- estimated for a tube operating at 55
ter m overheating
Temperature, °F (°C)

1400 (760) MPa (8 ksi).2 As the temperature

A1 experienced by the tube increases,
1200 (649) Subcritical shor t-term the time to failure decreases and the
overheating
0.80% C Eutectoid

resulting microstructure upon cool-

1000 (538)
Long-ter m overheating ing will change.
826 (441) Nor mal tube
At temperatures just above the
design allowable design allowable for the material, the
tube metal is in the long-term over-
heating regime where the dominant
Steels mechanism will be creep. If the tem-
32 (0)
0.5 1 perature experienced by the tube is
significantly higher, then the mecha-
nism will become short-term over-
Figure 23-1 (a.) Equilibrium diagram for iron-iron carbide. (b.) Detail of
heating. For example, at a tube
equilibrium diagram, showing short-term overheating and long-term over- metal temperature of 510°C (950°F),
heating regimes, along with the normal tube design allowable. the predicted life is only 70 days.

23-2 Short-Term Overheating in Waterwall Tubing

Table 23-1
Distinguishing Features of the Three Levels of Short-Term Overheating for Waterwall Materials
Type of Temperature Fracture Extent of Fracture Microstructure Hardness
Overheating Range Surface Tube Swelling Mechanism (for ferritic tubing) Characteristics

Subcritical short- > Design Thin-lipped, Considerable Transgranular Ferrite and spheroidized Near that of original
term overheating < Lower critical “fish-mouth” void formation pearlite or bainite. hardness.
temperature, A1 by power law
creep.

Intercritical Between the lower Thin-lipped, Considerable Transgranular or Ferrite, transformational Variable, with hard-
short-term critical temperature, “fish-mouth” mixed inter- and products (pearlite, bainite, ness near transfor-
overheating A1and the upper transgranular and/or martensite). Some mation products
critical temperature, void formation spheroidized pearlite or being higher than
A3 by power law bainite may also be present. the original.
creep.

Upper critical > Upper critical tem- Thick-lipped, Little Inter- or trans- Near rupture, transforma- Above original.
short-term perature, A3 “fish-mouth” granular creep tional products (pearlite,
overheating fracture. bainite, and/or martensite).
Some ferrite may also
be present.

Table 23-2 The effect of even higher tempera-

Sample Minimum Rupture Times as a Function of Tube Temperature tures on expected life is shown in
Table 23-2.
Minimum Time to Rupture
Temperature, °C (°F) at 55 MPa (8 ksi) The explanation for why the micro-
structural differences occur for differ-
Design Allowable 441°C (826°F) 288,000 hrs. (33 yrs.) ent levels of overheating can be seen
in that portion of the iron-iron carbide
455°C (~ 850°F) 100,000 hrs. (11 yrs.) phase diagram pertinent to waterwall
materials, Figures 23-1a and b.
510°C (~ 950°F) 1686 hrs. (70 days) If the temperature before burst
exceeds the A1 temperature, the
565°C (~ 1050°F) 49 hrs. (2 days) pearlite will be transformed to
austenite. If the A3 temperature is
exceeded the original material will
620°C (~ 1150°F) 2 hrs.
all be transformed to austenite and
because of the quenching effects of
675°C (~ 1250°F) 0.14 hrs (8.5 minutes) tube rupture, upon examination the
microstructure will consist of marten-
Lower critical temperature 0.01 hrs. (36 seconds) site and bainite. Thus the maximum
737°C (1358°F) temperature reached can be deter-
mined by the relative amounts of fer-
> 737°C (1358°F) < 30 seconds rite, bainite, and martensite in sam-
ples of the failed tubing.
For SA-210 Grade A-1.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.2

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 23-3

In the case of overheating to levels Table 23-3
above the A3 temperature, the final Typical Locations for Short-Term Overheating
fracture will generally be thick-
edged as indicated in Table 23-1. It Failures usually do not occur where the interruption of tube flow occurs, but in the higher (or
will also show microstructural evi- highest) heat flux zone above. Failure locations might therefore include:
dence of the complete transforma- Above places where flow has been partially or completed blocked by prior maintenance
tion of the ferrite structure to austen- activities such as:
ite, and subsequent transformation
• In tubes where weld repairs have been performed and weld spatter has been left in the tube, or
to martensite or bainite on cooling.
• Where tools or repair materials have been left in tubing
Thick-edged failures can occur as a
result of overheating under a second Above those orifices in lower waterwalls where blockage or restricted flow results from deposition of
set of conditions in waterwall and feedwater corrosion products across the orifice.
water-touched tubing: when there
has been only slight overheating of Locations, such as horizontal tubing, which are affected when a “slug” of steam comes down the
the material and the failure is by downcomer from the steam drum.
long-term creep. Under these
conditions, the thick-edged fracture
will be found in conjunction with
microstructural changes that include
secondary cracking and intergranu-
lar cavitation. Care should be taken
to distinguish such thick-edged
failures, indicative of lower tempera-
tures from those of the more typical
failures by short-term overheating in
waterwall tubes. See also low-
temperature creep of water-touched
tubing in Chapter 24.

1.2 Locations of failure

Short-term overheating in waterwall
tubing results from the partial or full
interruption of flow of water in tubes.
Such flow interruptions are distinct
from the local flow disruption that
can be an integral part of underde-
posit corrosion mechanisms. The
most common locations of failures
by short-term overheating are shown
in Table 23-3. As noted in that table,
the failure usually does not occur
where the interruption of flow takes
place but rather in the higher (or
highest) heat flux zone. Regions of
the waterwalls where overheating Figure 23-2. Typical boiler locations
where short-term overheating in water-
failures have occurred are high- walls can occur.
lighted in Figure 23-2.

23-4 Short-Term Overheating in Waterwall Tubing

2. Mechanism of Failure
Once flow conditions are interrupted
as described above, the normal
cooling effects of the water no
longer occur and the tube metal
temperature rises rapidly.
Pronounced local bulging occurs
because of the decrease in strength
of the tube metal. Failure can occur
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
3.1 Introduction
The primary causes of short-term
overheating in waterwalls are related
to sources of flow interruption. Three
primary causes are (i) partial block-
ages due to maintenance activities,
(ii) feedwater corrosion product
deposits on orifices, and (iii) poor
drum level control. One other sec-
ondary cause, the loss of coolant
because of an upstream failure, is
also discussed below. Table 23-4
summarizes the potential root
causes, actions to confirm, immedi-
ate and long-term actions.
3.2 Partial blockage caused by
maintenance activities
This is a common cause of short-
term overheating failures in waterwall
tubing. Typical problems stem from
(i) tools left in tubes after a repair or
(ii) improperly executed weld repairs
that leave materials in the tube such
as tube shavings from the weld
preparation, tube preparation materi-
als, or weld spatter. Such repair
debris drops to the lowest point in
the tube and causes partial or com-
plete blockage. Failures by this root
cause usually occur relatively soon
after a unit overhaul or tube repair.
Actions to confirm:
(a). Check flows through tubes
and/or for signs of obvious blockage
such as tools remaining in tubes.
(b). Review repair records to see
whether the tube circuit was recently
repaired.
within a matter of minutes as indi-
cated in Table 23-2. The level of
overheating (subcritical, intercritical
or upper critical) will depend on the
temperature reached by the tube
and the length of time of the tran-
sient or operating feature that under-
lies the problem.
3.3 Plugging of orifices by
feedwater corrosion products
Orifices are used in controlled circu-
lation units to distribute flow evenly
around the waterwalls, and in other
units where flow control is needed.
Feedwater corrosion products flow
into the economizer inlet and can
deposit at the orifices; the deposi-
tion mechanism is not completely
understood, however, it appears to
be controlled by zeta potential or
streaming potential effects.3 The
deposits accumulate with time, lead-
ing to a progressive decrease in
flow in that particular waterwall tube
until there is insufficient cooling
water flow and a BTF then occurs by
short-term overheating. The deposits
are those typical of feedwater corro-
sion products, containing Fe and Cu
and are very soft: they can usually
be blown off.
Usually if a tube fails by short-term
overheating due to this cause, there
will not be any deposits left on the
orifice; however, it is necessary to
check the conditions on all of the
remaining orifices of the unit for evi-
dence of deposition.
The actions to confirm this cause
are:
(c). Inspect orifices in other lower
waterwall areas for evidence of
blockage.
(d). Check records of pressure drop
across boiler circulation pumps.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 23-5
Table 23-4
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.2 Partial blockage caused (a). Check flows through tubes, and/or for • Institute repair and • Develop maintenance procedures and
by maintenance activities: signs of obvious blockage. replacement as required. welding practices for optimized repair of
- tools left in tubes (b). Review repair records to see whether the tubing. See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for a
- poor maintenance tube circuit was recently repaired. summary of methods.
practices, particularly • Institute additional quality control steps
improperly executed to prevent welding process errors.
weld repairs such as
where weld spatter is
allowed to fall into
a tube

3.3 Plugging of waterwall
orifices by feedwater
corrosion products
(c). Inspect orifices in other lower waterwall • Clean orifices.
areas for evidence of blockage.
(d). Check records of pressure drop across
boiler circulation pumps.
• Chemically clean.
• Institute repair and • Keep deposits to acceptable level. See
replacement as required. guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
• Minimize feedwater corrosion products
through control of chemistry particu-
larly pH and O2 scavenger additions;
Fe < 5 ppb and Cu < 2 ppb at econo-
mizer inlet. See also Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
• Monitor for effectiveness of chemistry
control.
• Monitor pressure drop across pumps
on a continuous basis.

3.4 Poor control of drum level. (e). Review operating records including • Institute repair and • Modify operating procedures or
drum level control. replacement as required. improve monitoring instrumentation to
• Check drum internals prevent recurrence of low flow and low
and operation. drum water levels.

3.5 Loss of coolant because (f). Review of past BTF locations in relation • Institute repair and • Develop and institute a boiler tube fail-
of upstream tube failure. to current problem. replacement as required. ure repair philosophy that checks the
whole waterwall tube circuit.

3.4 Poor control of drum level
A large steam bubble can descend
the downcomer and enter the water-
wall tubes, particularly on startup, if
the drum level is too low and a swell
occurs. Carryover of steam down
the downcomers can also be
caused by low hydraulic pressure.
These events will cause an instanta-
neous temperature increase and
tube blow out. Monitoring of tube
temperatures with thermocouples
will not provide sufficient warning for
operators to prevent the problem
because the effects are large and
instantaneous. Horizontal tubes are
most affected. Failures by this
means generally manifest upper crit-
ical short-term overheating features
because of the rapid heating and
high temperatures reached.
(e). A review of operating records
including drum level and control will
provide a confirmation of this root
cause of short-term overheating.
3.5 Loss of coolant because of
an upstream tube failure
Action to confirm:
(f) Compare the locations and tim-
ing of tube failures, which should
indicate if there is a cause and
effect relationship. The failure by
short-term overheating either occurs
at the same time as the primary BTF
or when the unit is brought back on-
line after repair. Bulging upstream of
obvious tube ruptures should not be
overlooked.

23-6 Short-Term Overheating in Waterwall Tubing

4. Determining the Extent of Damage
As short-term overheating failures
can occur over a very short period,
it is important that inspection be suf-
ficient to ensure that there are no
additional tubes affected. That is, if
the root cause is likely to be wide-
spread, such as header debris that
blocks a number of tubes, then
extensive inspection may be
required. If recent, improper weld
repairs caused an isolated problem,
then only those potentially affected
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
It is important for this mechanism
that the problem is immediately
identified. Both the specific root
cause and the extent of the problem
should be addressed before the unit
goes back on line in order to avoid
the predictable forced outage that
will occur otherwise. Removal of all
tube blockages and repair/replace-
ment of all affected tube bends
should be performed prior to the
unit being returned to service. This
is particularly applicable if the root
cause is poor maintenance prac-
tices associated with whole water-
wall panel replacements.
If the failure was a result of the
blockage of a waterwall orifice, all
orifices should be inspected. If
areas need to be examined.
It is important that the entire tube
length be checked for signs of
bulging, particularly above the short-
term overheating failure.
NDE methods to detect wall thin-
ning, tube blockage, excessive
internal tube deposits or tube
swelling are appropriate. Chapter 9,
Volume 1, provides an overview of
the available methods and their use.
additional deposition is found, the
likely case, two options are possible:
(i) the deposits can be blown off,
which is very time consuming, or (ii)
the unit can be chemically cleaned.
It should be noted that the timing of
periodic chemical cleans is often
tied to a specified drop in pressure
across the circulation pumps. If
waterwall orifices are blocked, pres-
sure readings may seem to indicate
a dirty boiler overall and thus cause
the utility to perform the chemical
clean too early.
If poor drum level control is at the
root of the problem, procedures
need to be established that allow
the level to be maintained and
ensure that swell is not large enough
to allow the entry of steam bubbles
into the downcomers.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 23-7
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Longer term corrective actions
involve instituting measures (i) to
ensure that blockages of tubes do
not occur by developing optimized
maintenance and welding/repair
procedures4, (ii) to ensure control of
drum water levels via appropriate
operating procedures, and (iii) to
ensure coolant circulation.
Keeping the boiler clean and
deposits to an acceptably low level
is a major preventive step for this as
well as other failure mechanisms.
Overall optimization of feedwater
treatment is the key to prevention.
Chapter 3, Volume 1 summarizes
key requirements, including recom-
mended steps to reduce the levels
of Fe and Cu at the economizer inlet
by optimizing the treatments chosen.
Guidance about chemical cleaning
of waterwalls, including when it is
needed and major steps in the
process, can be found in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
Redesign of tubing may be neces-
sary, or relocation of inclined or hori-
zontal tubing may be required, to
prevent future failures.

7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.

8. References
1French, D.N., Metallurgical Failures in Fossil-Fired
Boilers, John Wiley & Sons, Wiley-Interscience
Publications, New York, 1993.
2Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.
3Warwood, B.K., “Fundamental Mechanisms of Deposition
in Power Plants”, in R.B. Dooley and R. Pate, eds.,
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Fossil
Plant Cycle Chemistry, held in Atlanta, Ga, September,
1994, Final Report TR-104502, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, January, 1995, pp. 30-1.
4Stephenson, G.G. and J.W. Prince, Guidelines on Fossil
Boiler Field Welding, Research Project 2504-02, Final
Report TR-101699, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, January, 1993.

23-8 Short-Term Overheating in Waterwall Tubing

ACTIONS for Short-Term Overheating In Waterwall Tubing
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of short-
term overheating in waterwalls
begin here. The goal of these
actions is to see if further investi-
gation of short-term overheating
is warranted or whether another
BTF mechanism should be
investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a water-
wall BTF has occurred and
short-term overheating is the
likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by short-term overheating.
Action 1a: If a waterwall BTF
has occurred and short-term over-
heating is the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of short-term overheating:
➠ Review Figure 23-2 for typi-
cal boiler regions.
➠ Review main text, section 1.2
and Table 23-3 for description
of susceptible locations
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Considerable increase in tube
diameter (“swelling”)
• Ductile failure with “fish-mouth”
appearance.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by short-term
overheating.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Pressure drop across circulation
pumps indicating that the
waterwall orifices are plugging.
• Indications of high levels of
feedwater corrosion products.
• Any upstream tube leaks.
• Indication that previous mainte-
nance activities may have been
poor.
• Extensive waterwall/panel
replacement.
• Any outbreak of blocked tubes.
➠ These precursors can signal the
potential for waterwall tube fail-
ures by a short-term overheating
mechanism. If one or more has
occurred, go to Action 3 which
reviews root causes and outlines
the steps to confirm the influence
of each.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 23-9
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is short-term
overheating.
A waterwall tube failure has
occurred which the BTF team
has tentatively identified as
being short-term overheating
(Action 1a). Action 2 should
clearly identify short-term over-
heating as the primary mecha-
nism or point to another cause.
The primary identifiers will be the
ductile appearance of the failure
and pronounced microstructural
changes due to the overheated
material.
➠ Confirm ductile nature of failure.
Is fracture thin-edged? Does it
have a “fish-mouth” appearance?
Is it accompanied by significant
swelling of the tube?
➠ Evaluate microstructure of the
tube. Are microstructural transfor-
mation products consistent with
one of the three levels of short-
term overheating listed in Table
23-1?
An overheating failure manifesting
signs of brittle failure may be
caused by long-term overheating
(creep).
Lack of transformation products
may indicate another mechanism
is operative, causing wall thinning.
The subsequent ductile failure may
not be because of overheating,
but caused by low temperature
creep (Chapter 24), or from wall
loss by flyash erosion (Chapter
14), sootblower erosion (Chapter
22), etc.

➠ Check hardness of material near If material is softened near point of

fracture. Is material harder near failure, suspect a long-term over-
fracture surface than in base heating mechanism.
material removed from the failure
point?

Probable mechanism is short-term

overheating.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

References to other sources of detailed information:

• Main text (this chapter) provides the background to mechanism and its
development.
• Summary of the steps and methods of metallurgical investigation of boiler
tube failures can be found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.

23-10 Short-Term Overheating in Waterwall Tubing

Action 3: Determine root cause of the short-term overheating
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as short-term overheating
(Action 2) or a precursor to short-
term overheating has occurred
(Action 1b). The goal of this
Action 3 is for the BTF Team to
review the potential root causes,
identify probable ones, and take
those actions that are needed to
confirm which are operative in
the unit. This step must be taken
so that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
3.2 Partial blockage caused by maintenance ➠ (a). Check flows through tubes, and/or for
activities: signs of obvious blockage.
• tools left in tubes ➠ (b). Review repair records to see whether
• poor maintenance practices, particularly the tube circuit was recently repaired.
improperly executed weld repairs such as
where weld spatter is allowed to fall into a tube
3.3 Plugging of waterwall orifices by feedwa- ➠ (c). Inspect orifices in other lower waterwall
ter corrosion products areas for evidence of blockage.
➠ (d). Check records of pressure drop across
circulation pumps.
3.4 Poor control of drum level. ➠ (e). Review operating records including
drum level control.
3.5 Loss of coolant because of upstream tube ➠ (f). Review of past BTF locations in relation
failure. to current problem.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 23-11
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage or affected areas.
Damage accumulation by this
mechanism is not progressive,
that is, it is unlikely that “a little”
short-term overheating can be
identified and then monitored
over a period of time. Detection
will be indirect, looking for evi-
dence of a precursor to short-
term overheating - poor weld
repairs, excessive waterside
deposits, developing tube block-
ages, and the like.
23-12 Short-Term Overheating in Waterwall Tubing
➠ Identify all locations to be examined. Refer to Section
1.2 of main text and Figure 23-2 for typical locations.
Because failure is very rapid, missed precursors
will cause failure soon after unit re-start. Also, missed
damage, farther up the tube, will fail on restart/
repressurization.
➠ Perform NDE survey to (i) measure tubes for indica-
tions of swelling, (ii) detect tube blockages (may
require radiographic or UT methods), (iii) measure
waterside deposits, if they are suspected of being a
potential problem. A review of the basics of these
NDE methods is provided in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
➠ Perform tube sampling to confirm results of NDE
inspection and to determine the degree of damage by
analysis of the transformation products in the
microstructure. See additional detail on metallo-
graphic methods in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
➠ Perform visual inspection of remaining waterwall tube
circuit for bulging and other signs of obvious tube dis-
tress.
➠ Use results interactively with Action 3 to confirm root
cause.
➠ Go to Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate Solutions
and Actions.
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
The most important immediate
actions for the BTF team are to
(i) correct all sources of tube
overheating before the unit goes
back on line, and (ii) effect
required tube repairs or replace-
ments.
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on the clear identification
of the underlying root cause
(Action 3).
➠ Identify sources of tube block-
ages and remove, if applicable.
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
of affected tubes as identified
from the NDE Survey (Action 4).
➠ Ensure that the full extent of
damage is removed as indi-
cated by the results of the NDE
examination.
➠ See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
➠ Address blocked orifices by
chemically cleaning waterwalls or
by local removal of deposits (very
time consuming).
Major Root Cause Influences
Partial blockage caused by maintenance
activities:
• tools left in unit
• poor maintenance practices, particularly
improperly executed weld repairs.
Plugging of waterwall orifices by feedwater
corrosion products
Poor control of drum level.
Loss of coolant because of upstream tube
failure.
References to other sources of
detailed information:
• Main text (this chapter) and Table
23-4 provide additional detail on
repairs, immediate solutions and
actions and relates them to
underlying root causes.
• Guidance on chemical cleaning
can be found in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Develop maintenance procedures and weld-
ing practices for optimized repair of tubing.
See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for a summary of
methods; reference 4 for detailed discussion.
➠ Institute additional quality control steps to
prevent welding process errors.
➠ Chemically clean.
➠ Keep deposits to an acceptable level. See
guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
➠ Minimize feedwater corrosion products
through control of chemistry particularly pH
and O2 scavenger additions; Fe < 5 ppb and Cu
< 2 ppb at economizer inlet. See also Chapter
3, Volume 1.
➠ Monitor for effectiveness of chemistry
control
➠ Monitor pressure drop across pumps on a
continuous basis.
➠ Modify operating procedures or improve
monitoring instrumentation to prevent recur-
rence of low flow and low drum water levels.
➠ Develop and institute a boiler tube failure
repair philosophy that checks the whole water-
wall tube circuit.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 23-13
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
that might be implied by the
presence of short-term overheat-
ing in waterwalls, or by its pre-
cursors.
23-14 Short-Term Overheating in Waterwall Tubing
Waterwall Short-term Alert for Other Cycle
Overheating Aspect Components
Orifice deposits may • Poor feedwater chem-
indicate high levels of istry control (probably iron
feedwater corrosion levels at the economizer
products inlet are > 10 ppb and Cu
levels are > 5 ppb).
• High Cu levels in
deposits might indicate Cu
deposition in HP turbine.
Excessive deposits Potential BTF by overheat-
ing and creep
➠ Actions Indicated
➠ Implement stricter cycle chemistry
control program and instrumentation.
See Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Develop monitoring program to opti-
mize feedwater chemistry and use of O2
scavengers. See Chapter 3, Volume 1.
➠ Sampling to determine nature and
extent of deposit problem. See Chapter
6, Volume 1 for metallographic methods
overview; Chapter 9 for sampling
methods.
➠ Apply guidelines for chemical clean-
ing. See Chapter 4, Volume 1.
Chapter 24 • Volume 2
Low-Temperature
Creep Cracking
Introduction
Creep damage accumulates over
time through the synergistic effects
of stress and temperature. Creep
damage is most commonly associ-
ated with high temperatures and as
such is not typically a consideration
in water-touched tubing. It is, how-
ever, one of the most common dam-
age forms in high temperature
SH/RH tubing as discussed in
Chapter 32, Volume 3, and is life lim-
iting for SH/RH tubes.
In this chapter a second manifesta-
tion of creep is discussed. It is pri-
marily stress-driven and occurs in
relatively low temperature tubing. It
can be found in either water-touched
or steam-touched tubing as it occurs
over the temperature range 300-
420°C (~ 570-790°F). The tubing
involved is typically located in the
low temperature reheater, primary
superheater, or economizer. This
damage type has also been
observed in cold bent steam piping.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 24-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure
Cracking typically initiates in high
stress locations, notably the outside
surface of tube bends. The direction
of propagation will depend on the
applied and residual stress fields;
circumferentially oriented cracks are
common, but longitudinal cracks on
economizer bends have also been
observed. The appearance of typi-
cal cracking is seen in Figure 24-1
that shows a reheater tube con-
structed with SA210-A1. The final
failure is thick-edged.
Figure 24-1. Low-temperature creep in the 135° bend of a reheater
tube. Source: J. Hickey (ESB Ireland)1
24-2 Low-Temperature Creep Cracking
Microscopically, cracking is found to
be predominantly intergranular with
significant branching and associ-
ated secondary cracking. Cracking
may also be transgranular, particu-
larly for higher stresses and lower
hardnesses.2
A low-temperature creep failure may
appear to be superficially similar to
stress corrosion cracking or fatigue
cracking. Low-temperature creep
cracking will generally display evi-
dence of grain boundary creep cavi-
tation and the formation of creep
voids as shown in Figure 24-2; these
features will not accompany stress
corrosion cracking.
Fatigue damage also will not show
manifestation of microscopic creep
damage. Observing a fatigue crack
surface under scanning electron
microscopy may also indicate the
presence of either beach marks or
ratchet marks typical of fatigue.
Damage may accumulate over a
long period. If it does, evidence of
fracture surface oxide, extensive
secondary cracking and creep cavi-
tation will generally be seen. The
crack shown in Figure 24-2 contains
approximately 16 mm of oxide after
approximately 40,000 hours of ser-
vice.1

1.2 Typical locations

By definition, failures are associated
with high stress locations, most
commonly in tube bends, where
high residual stresses remain from
fabrication, in conjunction with high
service stresses. Failures will be
found in higher temperature regions
of economizer tubes, lower tempera-
ture regions of the reheater, and pri-
mary superheater. This mechanism
does not occur in very low or very
high temperature regions.

Figure 24-2. Micrograph of section through cracking. Indicative of

low-temperature creep damage are the intergranular fracture, associ-
ated secondary cracking, grain boundary creep cavitation, and creep
voids in the tube material. Source: J. Hickey (ESB Ireland)1.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 24-3

2. Mechanism of Failure
The failure mechanism is creep
cracking where the dominant factor
is high stress. Failures by this mech-
anism have been preceded by a
period of stable crack growth, which
can be either transgranular or inter-
granular. Failures by this mechanism
are typically in carbon-manganese
or low-carbon steels, such as SA210
and occur in conjunction with
sources of high stresses such as:
• High residual stresses from the
cold forming process, which may
be particularly important in initiat-
ing cracks.
• Enhanced membrane stresses
caused by pipe ovality at bends.
Figure 24-3 shows an ovality > 8%
in a reheater tube which failed by
low-temperature creep cracking.
• High service stresses which may
be most important in propagating
the initial cracks.
It has also been suggested that
there is a correlation between failure
probability and hardness of the tube
material with harder bends being the
more likely to fail. Figure 24-4 shows
the results of hardness tests on two
failed reheater tube bends, an intact
tube bend and an intact straight
section of adjacent tubing. The
intact bend and straight tubing show
hardnesses below about 200 HV
whereas the failed bends have hard-
nesses above 220 HV.
24-4 Low-Temperature Creep Cracking
As a rule of thumb, bends with oval-
ity greater than 8% or hardness
greater than 220-240 HV are consid-
ered to be at the greatest risk.
There is some evidence that high ini-
tial stresses, primarily residual
stresses from forming, may be suffi-
cient to initiate cracking. Although
these stresses will relax with operat-
ing time, service stresses, if high
enough can continue to drive the
cracking to fail in later years.2
Pre-straining, such as induced by
cold forming has two effects on
creep crack propagation. The first
effect is an increase in immobile dis-
location density which will increase
crack propagation rates. It will retard
the relaxation of crack tip stresses
and thus favor cavitation or micro-
cracking. This effect will also inhibit
the relaxation of stress concentra-
tions at microstructural features such
as carbides, inclusions, and grain
boundaries. The second effect of
pre-straining is the generation of
internal stress fields due to the for-
mation of dislocation pile-ups. Both
of these effects of pre-straining can
result in transgranular creep failure
which is often observed during the
crack initiation phase.
Initiation has also been reported to
often be associated with surface
defects such as pipe-making laps or
indentations from hammer blows.
Figure 24-3. Cross-section through a failed reheater tubes showing
ovality in excess of 8%. Source: J. Hickey (ESB Ireland)1

Fracture
Hardness Hv (20kg) Failed bend
Intact bend
240 Straight tube
Failed bend
220

200

180

160

140

120

100
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Circumferential Position (Degrees)

Figure 24-4. Plot of tube hardness as a function of circumferential position. The failed
tubes demonstrated maximum hardnesses that exceeded 220 HV; unfailed tubes had
maximum hardnesses that were typically less than 200 HV.
Source: J. Hickey (ESB Ireland)1

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 24-5

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Unanticipated sources of high stress
are at the root of BTF by this mecha-
nism. A combination of high residual
and/or service stresses, or high
hardness are root causes. Actions to
help pinpoint the most dominant
underlying root cause include:
(a). Perform an in-situ hardness
test.
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
Cracks will be surface-connected so
that methods such as visual exami-
nation and magnetic particle exami-
nation may be used. However,
access is generally difficult, and if
the problem is likely to be wide-
spread i.e., affecting a number of
bends, the time to implement a
tube-by-tube inspection will be pro-
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
All affected tube bends should be
replaced. Access will probably be
difficult.
24-6 Low-Temperature Creep Cracking
(b). Measure distortion (ovality) in
susceptible locations.
(c). Measure residual stresses. This
action may not be definitive as relax-
ation during service or removal of
the tube from the boiler may have
lowered initial stresses.
hibitive. In these cases, a hydrotest
has been suggested as the best
means to determine whether there
are leaking tubes. Note that this will
not necessarily find all cracked
tubes, only those with damage
which has progressed to the leaking
stage, or induced to be so by the
hydrotest itself.
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Over the long-term, the key objec-
tive is to determine how widespread
the problem is. Is it limited to a few
bends? Is it limited to only one mate-
rial? It is possible that the tubes sub-
ject to the lowest temperature will be
out of the creep range altogether
and the higher temperature tubes
hot enough to permit thermally acti-
vated recovery to restore creep duc-
tility?
A fracture mechanics analysis
including an analysis of crack
growth rates, if possible, in conjunc-
tion with stress analysis may enable
a prediction of times to failure.
Sizing the existing defects and
determining the distribution of dam-
age will be subject to the problems
outlined in Section 4 above.

7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.

8. References
1Personal Communication from J. Hickey (ESB Ireland) to
R.B. Dooley, February 16, 1995.
2Gooch, D.J., “Creep Crack Growth in Cold Formed
Carbon Manganese Steels at 320-380°C”,
TPRD/L/2529/R83, Central Electricity Generating Board,
November, 1983.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 24-7

ACTIONS for Low-Temperature Creep cracking
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of low-
temperature creep cracking
begin here. The goal of these
actions is to see if further investi-
gation of low-temperature creep
cracking is warranted or whether
another BTF mechanism should
be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and low-temperature
creep cracking is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
which indicates that there
could be a future BTF by low-
temperature creep cracking.
24-8 Low-Temperature Creep Cracking
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred Action 1b: If a precursor has
and low-temperature creep crack- occurred in the unit that could
ing is the likely mechanism. lead to future BTF by low-temper-
ature creep cracking.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in typical locations, i.e. • Routine inspection and/or tube
does it appear to be associated sampling finds an indication of
with a weld, tight hair-pin bend, or significant hardness or ovality,
other cold bend? particularly associated with tube
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic bends.
appearance of the failure includes ➠ If this indicator has been found,
such features as: go to Action 3 which outlines the
steps to confirm its influence.
• OD-initiated
• Thick-edged failure
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) or for
steam-touched tubing (Table 31-1)
to pick a more likely candidate.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is
low-temperature creep cracking.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being low-temperature
creep cracking (Action 1a).
Action 2 should clearly identify
low-temperature creep cracking
as the primary mechanism or
point to another cause. The
actions listed will be executed by
removing representative tube
sample(s), followed by visual
examination and detailed metal-
lographic analysis.
➠ Analyze the macroscopic dam-
age. Does damage have features
including: thick-edged failure
surface, obvious OD-initiation,
and association with a tight
tubing bend?
➠ Analyze microscopic appearance
of cracking. Do signs of creep
damage accompany the crack-
ing? Such evidence may include
creep cavitation and creep void
formation in the tube material.
Is cracking intergranular?
Damage may not be low-tempera-
ture creep cracking. If final failure
is thin-edged suspect an external
wastage mechanism as caused by
flyash erosion (Chapter 14). If
damage is ID-initiated, suspect
corrosion fatigue (Chapter 13).
Cracking is more likely to be either
(i) a corrosion-assisted mecha-
nism, such as corrosion fatigue in
waterwalls (Chapter 13) or stress
corrosion cracking (Chapter 37,
Volume 3) or (ii) caused by fatigue
(see Chapter 26, Volume 2 or
Chapter 39, Volume 3).

Probable mechanism is low-

temperature creep cracking.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

References to other sources of detailed information:

• Summary of the steps and methods of metallurgical investigation of boiler
tube failures can be found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 24-9

Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the low-temperature
creep cracking
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con- ➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
firmed as low-temperature creep
cracking (Action 2) or a precur-
sor has occurred (Action 1b). Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
The goal of this Action 3 is for
the BTF Team to review the Unanticipated sources of high residual or ➠ (a). Perform an in-situ hardness test.
potential root causes of low-tem- service stress and/or high hardness material. (Hardness is over 220 HV).
perature creep cracking, identify ➠ (b). Use a visual examination or
probable ones, and take those dimensional measurement to detect tube
actions that are needed to con- ovality (> 8%).
firm which are operative in the ➠ (c). Measure residual stresses with rosette
unit. This step must be taken so strain gauges prior to removing the tube bend
that the proper actions can be
from the boiler.
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Subject to access con-
straints, detection of low-temper-
ature creep cracking is possible
through routine NDE methods
that detect surface cracking
such as magnetic particle and
visual examination. Chapter 9,
Volume 1 provides additional
information. Hydrotesting may be
required, if damage is wide-
spread, to ensure that all leaking
tubes have been detected.

24-10 Low-Temperature Creep Cracking

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Tube replacement is needed for

failures associated with bends.
Pad welding/grinding should not
be employed. Thereafter, most
actions should be considered for
the longer-term (Action 6).

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

The correction of the underlying Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Long-Term Actions
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for Unanticipated sources of high residual or ➠ Perform fracture mechanics analysis to
the BTF team. The proper choice service stress and/or high hardness material. determine probable replacement needs.
of long-term actions will be
based on the clear identification
of the underlying root cause
(Action 3), a knowledge of the
extent of affected material (Action
4), and an economic evaluation
to ensure that the optimum strat-
egy has been chosen.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

None for this mechanism.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 24-11

24-12 Low-Temperature Creep Cracking
Chapter 25 • Volume 2
Chemical Cleaning
Damage: Waterwalls
Introduction
Two types of improper chemical
cleaning of waterwalls can result in
an increased incidence of boiler
tube failures. The first, is where
excessive deposits are left as a
result of incomplete cleaning or
flushing. Such residual deposits can
lead to failures by underdeposit cor-
rosion mechanisms via (i) hydrogen
damage given a source of acid con-
tamination, (ii) acid phosphate corro-
sion in the presence of mono- and/or
and excessive di-sodium phosphate,
or (iii) caustic gouging with a con-
centration of sodium hydroxide.
A second form of boiler tube dam-
age is generalized corrosion caused
by one or more improper operations
during the cleaning process. This
chapter provides some general
comments about the effects on
tubes of these types of chemical
cleaning errors.
A brief review of the chemical clean-
ing process for waterwalls and
economizer tubing is included in
Chapter 4, Volume 1. Here the focus
is on damage done to tubes as a
direct result of the chemical clean-
ing process.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 25-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
The primary problem is chemical
attack, manifested as generalized
corrosion of affected tube surfaces,
Figure 25-1. Depending upon the
severity of the problem, the appear-
ance of the affected tubes will be as
jagged, rough, straight-sided or
undercut pits (see Figures 25-2a
and b) or as generalized wall thin-
ning that can occur around the
entire tube circumference. If the
damage is found relatively soon
after chemical cleaning then pitting
will be found to be relatively free of
oxides and deposits.1

Figure 25-1. Internal surface of failed tube exhibiting a rough pitted appearance typi-
cal of acid cleaning corrosion (MAG:1.2X) Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

25-2 Chemical Cleaning Damage: Waterwalls

Figure 25-2. Cross sections of the pitted region revealing straight-
sided and undercut pit morphologies associated with acid cleaning
corrosion. Note also the absence of deposits within the pits, also char-
acteristic of acid cleaning corrosion. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 25-3

2. Mechanism of Failure
The failure is corrosion of the base
tube metal by the solvent used in, or
remaining after, chemical cleaning,
particularly for hydrochloric acid
cleans.

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm

The root causes of this form of dam-
age are one or more improper oper-
ations in the chemical cleaning
process including:
• Use of an inappropriate cleaning
agent
• Excessively strong acid concen-
tration
• Excessively long cleaning times
• Too high a temperature
• Failure to neutralize, drain and
rinse after cleaning
• Breakdown of inhibitors as a
result of temperature excursions.
Inhibitors are used to prevent cor-
rosion of the base tube material
after the scale and deposits have
been removed. Most inhibitors
have a maximum temperature
above which they will decompose
or lose effectiveness.2
Monitoring of the chemical cleaning
process by means of a side loop,
particularly for Fe in the cleaning
solution, can access corrosion by
this mechanism. If, at some later
date, tube failures are suspected to
have been caused by this mecha-
nism, actions to confirm consist of:
(a). Review of chemical cleaning
procedures, chemical pumping sys-
tems, and chemical control logs.
Items of particular concern are
those listed above which would lead
to significant damage.
(b). Review of cycle chemistry mon-
itoring records to detect a pH
depression on start-up of the unit
after cleaning, indicating improper
rinsing of acid from the unit.
(c). Sampling of affected tubes to
allow examination of the inside sur-
face for evidence of generalized
corrosion. Part of an optimized pro-
cedure for chemical cleaning will be
sampling of selected tubes to con-
firm the efficacy of the cleaning
process. These samples can be
used to determine whether exces-
sive damage has accumulated. Wall
thickness measurements can pro-
vide a quick screening as to whether
excessive tube corrosion has
occurred.

4. Determining the Extent of Damage

The primary means to assess the
extent of damage will be measure-
ments at suspect locations for
evidence of wall thinning. Ultrasonic
test methods for doing so are dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 9,
Volume 1.

25-4 Chemical Cleaning Damage: Waterwalls

5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Immediate solutions will consist of
repairing or replacing the damaged
tubes (see Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
a discussion of these methods) and
immediate chemical clean followed
by proper neutralizing and rinsing.

6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat

Failures
If procedures were inadequate to
control the chemical cleaning
process, including sampling for
deposit extent and composition, sol-
vent choice, planning, cleaning pro-
cedures, post-cleaning inspection,
etc., then proper procedures must
be established as a means to pre-
vent recurrence of the problem. See
summary of guidance in Chapter 4,
Volume 1 or other available refer-
ence.3

7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.

8. References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H. 3Bartholomew, R.D., W.E. Chesney, R.D. Hopkins, J.S.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide, Poole, J.W. Siegmund, J.P. Williams, and S. Yorgiadis,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices, Guidelines for Chemical Cleaning of Fossil-Fueled Steam-
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433, Generating Equipment, Research Project 2712-06, Final
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, Report TR-102401, Electric Power Research Institute,
October, 1993. Palo Alto, CA, June, 1993.
2Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 25-5

ACTIONS for Waterwall Chemical Cleaning Damage
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of chem-
ical cleaning damage begin
here. The goal of these actions is
to see if further investigation is
warranted or whether another
BTF mechanism should be
investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and chemical clean-
ing damage is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
because of chemical cleaning
damage.
25-6 Chemical Cleaning Damage: Waterwalls
Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and chemical cleaning
damage is the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether damage
appears to be generalized corro-
sion over a large number of
affected surfaces.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
extensive pitting (jagged, rough,
straight-sided or undercut) or is
manifested as generalized wall
thinning. If found relatively soon
after chemical cleaning, pits
might be relatively free of
deposits of oxides.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by chemical
cleaning damage.
➠ Determine whether there may
have been one or more of the fol-
lowing during a recent chemical
cleaning operation:
• Use of an inappropriate clean-
ing agent
• Excessively strong acid con-
centration
• Excessively long cleaning times
• Too high a temperature
• Failure to neutralize, drain and
rinse after cleaning
• Breakdown of inhibitors.
➠ Determine whether monitoring
during the chemical cleaning
process indicated that the level of
Fe in the cleaning solution contin-
ued to increase instead of level-
ing out to indicate that the chemi-
cal clean had finished.
➠ Determine whether one of more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Wall thinning found during a
routine inspection
• Excessive waterside deposits
found relatively soon after a
chemical clean.
➠ These precursors can signal the
potential for BTF because of an
improper chemical clean. If one
or more has occurred, go to
Action 3 which reviews root
causes and outlines the steps to
confirm the influence of each.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is chemical
cleaning damage.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being caused by chemi-
cal cleaning (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify this as the
primary mechanism or point to
another cause. The actions listed
will be executed by removing
representative tube sample(s),
followed by visual examination
and detailed metallographic
analysis.
Action 3: Determine root cause of chemical cleaning damage
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as chemical cleaning
damage (Action 2) or a precur-
sor has occurred (Action 1b).
The goal for this Action 3 is to
pinpoint the particular source of
damage and in conjunction with
Action 4, to determine the extent
of the affected area so that
appropriate repairs can be
implemented.
➠ Review extent of damage (in
conjunction with Action 4). Is
damage manifested as general-
ized attack over affected tube
surfaces?
➠ Characterize nature of damage.
Does damage have the appear-
ance of jagged, rough, straight-
edged or undercut pits?
Probable mechanism is chemical
cleaning damage.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
One or more improper operations during the
chemical cleaning process
In parallel, determine the extent of affected area, Action 4.
Very localized attack may be via a
pitting mechanism, also review
underdeposit corrosion mecha-
nisms for “gouging”-like appear-
ance. See discussion of hydrogen
damage, acid phosphate corro-
sion and/or caustic gouging in
Chapters 15-17 respectively..
Compare to pitting damage
(Chapter 27).
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Review chemical cleaning procedures,
chemical pumping systems, and chemical
control logs for evidence of (i) inappropriate
cleaning agent, (ii) excessively strong solvent
concentration, (iii) excessively long cleaning
times, (iv) failure to properly neutralize, drain
and rinse after cleaning, (v) levels of Fe that
continue to increase in cleaning solution,
(vi) breakdown of inhibitors, (vii) too high a
temperature.
➠ (b). Review cycle chemistry monitoring
records for pH depression on startup, indicat-
ing a hideout and return of acid.
➠ (c). Sample affected tubes for evidence of
generalized corrosion.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 25-7
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3, the BTF team should determine the extent of the
affected area.

➠ Determine the areas and extent to be inspected from a

review of the chemical cleaning operation and likely
problems.

➠ Perform NDE. Ultrasonic examination of suspect loca-

tions to detect wall thinning extent. See Chapter 9,
Volume 1 for additional background on methods.

➠ Selective tube sampling to confirm results of NDE

survey.

➠ See Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate Solutions

and Actions.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

➠ Implement repairs or replacement
The primary immediate objective
for the BTF team is to ensure that
a proper cleaning occurs and
that tube damage which has
compromised minimum wall
requirements is repaired or the
affected tubes replaced.
of affected tubes as identified
from the NDE survey (Action 4).
Immediate repair will be required
for those tubes which fall below
minimum wall. Over the longer
term it will be necessary to
replace other roughened surfaces
as they provide sites of flow dis-
ruption that can lead to underde-
posit corrosion failures.
➠ See Chapter 11, Volume 1
for summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.

25-8 Chemical Cleaning Damage: Waterwalls

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
Tubes which still have wall thickness
in excess of minimum wall require-
ments, but which have been dam-
aged, need careful attention over
the long term. Specifically, the
roughened or pitted tube internal
surface provides a site for flow dis-
ruption, which in conjunction with a
source of concentration, can lead to
BTF by an underdeposit corrosion
mechanism (see separate discus-
sions of hydrogen damage, acid
phosphate corrosion, and/or caustic
gouging in Chapters 15-17). Those
sites can also act as points of initia-
tion for corrosion fatigue (Chapter
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
13). Careful monitoring of cycle
chemistry is thus also indicated. A
tube replacement program to
address the worst damage will prob-
ably be required.
If procedures or controls for the
chemical cleaning processes were
inadequate they should be modified
to include: sampling for deposit
extent and composition, solvent
choice, planning, cleaning proce-
dures, post-cleaning inspection. See
the summary provided in Chapter 4,
Volume 1 or other available guid-
ance.3
There is a concern here with volatile
carryover, especially if the root
cause of the problem was an exces-
sive temperature. The chemical “car-
ries over” and inadvertently “cleans”
the superheater. Since these steam
circuits are not rinsed, material
removed by the chemical clean
remains in the tubes, causing block-
ages and subsequent failures by
short-term overheating. This type of
damage is discussed in more detail
in Chapter 36, Volume 3.
Reference may be made to the sep-
arate Chapter 43, Volume 3, that
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 25-9
25-10 Chemical Cleaning Damage: Waterwalls
Chapter 26 • Volume 2
Fatigue in Water-
Touched Tubes
Introduction
This chapter discusses boiler tube
failures caused essentially by fatigue
without regard to the source of the
cyclic stresses e.g., thermal,
mechanical, vibration etc. All the fail-
ures in this category are manifested
by cracking that is OD-initiated, are
predominantly transgranular, and are
not primarily attributable to the effect
of either the fireside or water envi-
ronment. That is, for the failures
described here, the effect of envi-
ronment is so small that even if all
environmental effects were removed,
the failure would still occur. Cyclic
stresses are obviously also an
important contributor to cracking
mechanisms that do have a major
contribution from the environment,
such as corrosion fatigue (Chapter
13), and stress corrosion cracking
(Chapter 37, Volume 3), and creep-
fatigue interactions. This chapter
provides some means to distinguish
among these effects; however, it
concentrates on fatigue as the domi-
nant failure mechanism.
Two specific BTF that are caused
predominantly by thermal fatigue,
and are thus similar to those
described in a more generic way in
this chapter, are covered in separate
chapters: (i) failures at the tube stub
in economizer inlet headers
(Chapter 20), and (ii) circumferential
cracking of waterwall tubes in super-
critical units (Chapter 19). These two
mechanisms merit an independent
look because of (i) their relatively
widespread occurrence in numerous
units during the past few years, (ii)
the specific locations affected, and
(iii) the specific long term solutions.
Two general classifications of BTF
caused by fatigue are reviewed in
this chapter: tubing-related and
header-related. A separate chapter
addresses fatigue failures in
steam-touched tubing (Chapter 39,
Volume 3).
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 26-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure
Fatigue failures, either tubing- or
header-related, generally result in
thick-edged failures. Figure 26-1
shows the fatigue failure of a wall
tube from a once-through boiler. A
micrograph taken through the
fatigue crack, Figure 26-2 illustrates
the predominant characteristic that
the cracking tends to be straight
and transgranular. The appearance
of beach marks or ratchet marks is
typical, although they may be totally
obliterated by oxidation. Cracking
can be intergranular when occurring
in creep damaged materials.
Depending upon the service condi-
tions, the cracks may be filled with
oxide.
Fatigue failures originate on the out-
side surfaces of tubes in contrast to
corrosion fatigue failures which are
ID-initiated. Table 26-1 lists several
characteristics that distinguish cor-
rosion fatigue in particular from ther-
mal- or mechanical-fatigue in water-
touched tubing.

Figure 26-1. Fatigue failure of a wall

tube from a once-through boiler. The
tube is a finned tube and forms part of a
man-hole door opening. The failure initi-
ated on the O.D. of the tube, at the toe
of the fin/tube weld. The tube is shown
here with the fin removed by mechanical
grinding to allow removal from the boiler.
Source: J. Hickey, Irish Electricity Supply
Board

Figure 26-2. Micrograph taken through

the crack showing transgranular crack-
ing typical of fatigue. Source: J. Hickey,
Irish Electricity Supply Board

26-2 Fatigue in Water-Touched Tubes

1.2 Typical locations Table 26-1
Tubing-related failures are generally Distinguishing Corrosion Fatigue from Mechanical Fatigue of Water-Touched Tubes
found in locations associated with
(i) attachments, particularly solid Characteristic Corrosion Fatigue Mechanical Fatigue
attachments or jammed sliding
attachments, or (ii) bends in tubing. Initiation Location • Inside surface • Outside surface
At attachments, failures by fatigue
are often associated with weld- Proximity to stress riser at • Possible, especially if the weld • Typical condition exactly at
ments, particularly in cases where outside surface, such as is the attachment weld of the tube the toe of the weld.
the weld or condition of the attach- the toe of a weld to a non-pressure part. Cracking
ment does not allow for thermal may be slightly removed from the
expansion. Examples are (i) the end exact toe position.
of the membrane of waterwall tub-
ing, either in the lower slope region Appearance when grinding •Damage appears to increase as • Damage decreases as
near the ash hopper or at the top of out defect grinding proceeds from outside grinding progresses from out-
the rear wall at the entrance to the surface. Flaw increases in size side surface inward.
rear gas passage, or (ii) at tie bars,
towards its initiating site at inside
K bars or beams. Figure 26-3 shows
typical spacers and sliding attach- surface.
ment details where fatigue in water-
touched tubes can occur. Timing of appearance • Usually later in life of boiler • Usually earlier in life of
boiler
The force of the failure may cause
the attachment to be ripped from
adjacent tubes. Also, if the attach-
ment is large, then it can be cor-
roded (fireside) indicating that it
reached severe temperatures.
a) C and T b) Large Rigid c) Sliding
At bends in the tubing, particularly ÒSlidingÓ Spacer or or Rigid
“U”-bends, failures can be initiated Spacer Beamer Support
at the intrados, extrados or neutral
axis as shown in Figure 26-4.
Header-related fatigue failures occur
most frequently at the end of the
header and are related to flexibility
of the header and/or thermal expan-
sion problems. A common location
is at the nipple or stub tube welds Cracks
as shown in Figure 26-5. In water-
touched tubes a primary location of Cracks
concern is the economizer inlet
header where flexibility-induced Cracks
stresses are at the root of the prob-
lem. Failures have also been experi- Economizer
enced near the welded connection circuit
to the lower waterwall inlet header.1
Failures from gas-flow-induced
vibration fatigue can occur in
welded tie-type spacers between Vertical
vertical waterwalls and horizontal waterwall
economizer tubing (Figure 26-3), or
other water touched tubes.
Poor weld geometry or execution Figure 26-3. Typical spacers or sliding supports where fatigue in water-touched tubing
can occur.
such as overfill, poor fillet weld pro-
file, or undercut, may also lie at the
root of a fatigue problem.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 26-3

 Neutral axis

Extrados
Intrados

Figure 26-4. Three possible locations for tubing-related fatigue fail-

ures in tight 180° bends.

a) Cold b) Hot

Outlet
header

Outlet tubes Cracks

at weld
...Water wall...

c) Close-Up of Tube
Attachment to
Header and Crack
Location

Crack

Figure 26-5. Schematic illustrating failures caused by inflexibility to the movement

between header and waterwall.

26-4 Fatigue in Water-Touched Tubes

2. Mechanism of Failure
Fatigue is the phenomenon of dam-
age accumulation caused by cyclic
or fluctuating stresses. It is mani-
fested as the initiation and stable
propagation of a crack. Final failure
ensues when a critical crack size is
reached and failure occurs by frac-
ture or overload. Fatigue is depen-
dent upon the frequency and magni-
tude of the stress cycles and is gen-
erally independent of stress dura-
tion. With the exception of flow-
induced vibration failures, these
fatigue failures are low-cycle and
usually related to the operation or
cycling of the unit. Obviously, at high
temperatures where creep fatigue
becomes the dominant mechanism,
there is dependence on stress dura-
tion. Stress cycling may be induced
mechanically or thermally.
Fatigue in boiler tubes is generally
driven by excessive local stress lev-
els, typically in welded connections.
Such connections may be tube
attachments and supports or at
header nipple and stub welds, as
described above. Stresses may be
induced by (i) excessive (unantici-
pated) mechanical loads, (ii)
restrained thermal expansion, (iii)
vibration such as produced by the
flow of combustion gases, or (iv) as
a result of a poor weld geometry,
such that, although the global
stresses are within the design, they
are locally excessive because of the
geometry of the joint. In many cases,
the excessive stresses, particularly
thermally-induced, are produced by
unit cycling or two-shift operation,
leading to conditions that did not
arise during baseload operation.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 26-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
3.1 Introduction
Unanticipated or excessive cyclic
stresses (strains) are the primary
cause of fatigue failures in boiler
tubes. Three basic sources of exces-
sive strains were discussed above:
those caused by constraint of thermal
expansion, excess mechanical loads,
or flow-induced vibration. The first of
these is responsible for the bulk of
tube failures experienced by this
mechanism. Excessive stresses can
also arise in welded connections if
the expansion of the welded joint is
inadequate. These four causes are
discussed below. A summary of the
appropriate actions to confirm, imme-
diate and longer term actions for
each are summarized in Table 26-2.
3.2 Excessive strains caused
by constraint of thermal expan-
sion
The typical locations for the occur-
rence of this problem were dis-
cussed above. Actions to confirm
the influence of this root cause
include:
(a). Visual examination to detect
distortion or bending of adjacent
tubes. Tubes at headers may also
be physically distorted or even
pulled away.
(b). Strain gauging of susceptible
locations to determine the level of
strains experienced during thermal
excursions of the unit, such as
cycling operation.
(c). LVDT measurements to monitor
the relative movement of the header/
tube during transients.
26-6 Fatigue in Water-Touched Tubes
3.3 Poor design and/or manu-
facture giving rise to excessive
mechanical stresses
Actions to confirm this root cause
include:
(d). Strain gauging of susceptible
locations to indicate unexpected
mechanical loads in excess of
design assumptions.
(e). as in (c) above.
(f). For tight, hair-pin bends, may
need to determine if residual
stresses are high.
3.4 Vibration (flue gas-
induced) by direct flow or vor-
tex shedding
Actions to confirm include:
(g). Metallurgical examination and
location usually provide confirma-
tion. Also if vibration is occurring, it
is extremely noisy and thus obvious.
3.5 Poor welding, particularly
poor geometry of final joint
Actions to confirm this root cause
include:
(h). Analysis of weld profile and
quality to determine whether poor
welding was a likely contributor to
the failure.
Table 26-2
Major Root Cause Influence, Confirmation and Corrective Actions

Major Root Cause Actions to Confirm Immediate Actions and Long-Term Actions and and Prevention
Influence Solutions of Repeat Failures

3.2 Excessive strains caused
by constraint of thermal
expansion.
(a). Visual examination for distor-
tion or bending in adjacent tubes.
(b). Strain gauging of suspect loca-
tions to evaluate strains during unit
starts and cycling operation.
(c). LVDT measurements to monitor
the relative movement of the
header/tube during transients.
• Identify similar damaged
locations.
• Repair/replace affected
tubes. See Chapter 11,
Volume 1 for an overview of
methods.
• Evaluate modifications to attachment
design or to header/tube connection to
reduce stress levels.
• Institute periodic inspection program, par-
ticularly of susceptible header locations in
units that are being, or to be, cycled.
• Improve header/tube flexibility and con-
firm with LVDT.

3.3 Poor design and/or
manufacture giving rise to
excessive mechanical
stresses.
(d). Strain gauging to measure
actual strains experienced at the
local area during operation.
(e). As in (c) above.
(f). For tight, hair-pin bends, deter-
mine whether residual stresses are
high.
• As above. • Evaluate modifications to attachment
design or to header/tube connection to
reduce stress levels.
• Institute periodic inspection program, par-
ticularly of susceptible header locations in
units that are being, or to be, cycled.

3.4 Vibration (flue gas- (g). Metallurgical examination to • As above. • Evaluate and install modifications such as
induced) by direct flow or determine high cycle fatigue. snubbers or vibration restraints to reduce
vortex shedding. (h). Visual and microscopic exami- stresses induced by vibration.
nation of weld quality.

3.5 Poor welding, particu- • As above. • Institute program of weld quality control
larly poor geometry of final based on guidelines such as provided in ref-
joint. erence 2.

4. Determining the Extent of Damage

Detection of fatigue damage once a
crack has initiated is well estab-
lished by a number of methods
including liquid penetrant, magnetic
particle, eddy current, ultrasonic
testing, and radiography. Since
fatigue cracks in boiler tubes are
OD-initiated, identification of
cracked locations is generally
straightforward, within the con-
straints of access. The analysis of
fatigue is likewise well established
and sufficient materials data exist for
all common constructional materials
to allow complete analysis of the
expected life of components subject
to fatigue.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 26-7

5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Cracks can usually be ground out
and rewelded as a temporary mea-
sure. Tight “U” bends should be
replaced. Most of the rest of the
actions can be taken over the longer
term.

6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat

Failures
Longer-term actions will consist of In the case of vibration-induced
modifications to prevent a recur- strains, solutions are typically found
rence of the problem. For example, in the installation of vibration baffles
if the problem was at an attachment to break up the critical vibration
and strains were caused by differen- modes for gas flow, or by using
tial thermal expansion, modifications snubbers and vibration restraints.
to the attachment design should be
A periodic inspection program is
made to reduce the stress level. It is
indicated for susceptible locations,
important to establish clearly that
particularly in the header-related
the stresses in the new design are in
locations and if the unit is cycled.
fact lower than those of the original
design.

7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.

8. References
1Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.
2Stephenson, G.G. and J.W. Prince, Guidelines on Fossil
Boiler Field Welding, Research Project 2504-02, Final
Report TR-101699, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, January, 1993.

26-8 Fatigue in Water-Touched Tubes

ACTIONS for Fatigue in Water-touched Tubes
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of
fatigue begin here. The goal of
these actions is to see if further
investigation of fatigue is war-
ranted or whether another BTF
mechanism should be investi-
gated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and fatigue is the
likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
which indicates that there
could be a future BTF by
fatigue.
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred
and fatigue is the likely mecha-
nism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in typical locations, i.e.
does it appear to be associated
with a weld, tight hair-pin bend,
and either tubing-related or
header-related?
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• OD-initiated
• Thick-edged failure
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by fatigue.
• Routine inspection and/or tube
sampling finds an indication of
cracking, broken or bent tubing or
other macroscopic evidence of
fatigue.
• If unit has recently been con-
verted to cycling or two-shifting
duty, the potential for fatigue-
related tube failures will increase.
Check the flexibility of water-
touched headers and connecting
tubes.
➠ If these indicators have been
found or are in effect, go to Action
3 which outlines the steps to con-
firm the influence of each.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 26-9
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is fatigue.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
➠ Analyze the macroscopic dam-
age. Does damage have features
fied as being fatigue (Action 1a).
including: thick-edged failure sur-
Action 2 should clearly identify
face or pin-hole leak, obvious
fatigue as the primary mecha-
OD-initiation, association with a
nism or point to another cause.
weld or tight tubing bend? Also
The actions listed will be exe-
there should be no material loss
cuted by removing representa-
on the OD.
tive tube sample(s), followed by
visual examination and detailed
metallographic analysis.
➠ Analyze microscopic appearance
of cracking. Is cracking trans-
granular? Is cracking from the
OD?
➠ Probable mechanism is fatigue.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
References to other sources of detailed information:
• Summary of the steps and methods of metallurgical investigation of boiler
tube failures can be found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
26-10 Fatigue in Water-Touched Tubes
Damage may not be fatigue. If
final failure is thin-edged suspect
an internal wastage mechanism as
caused by either acid phosphate
corrosion (Chapter 16) or caustic
gouging (Chapter 17). If internal
wastage accompanies a thick-
edged failure, suspect hydrogen
damage (Chapter 15). If damage
is ID-initiated, suspect corrosion
fatigue (Chapter 13).
Intergranular cracking may still be
primarily fatigue-related; however it
may also indicate that a corrosion-
assisted mechanism, such as cor-
rosion fatigue (in waterwalls) or
stress corrosion cracking, is in
effect, or that the damage is a
combination of creep and fatigue.
Confirm the latter with a determi-
nation of whether creep damage is
seen such as void formation, etc.
See also Chapter 24 on low-tem-
perature creep cracking.
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the fatigue
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as fatigue (Action 2) or a
precursor has occurred (Action
1b). The goal of this Action 3 is
for the BTF Team to review the
potential root causes of fatigue,
identify probable ones, and take
those actions that are needed to
confirm which are operative in
the unit. This step must be taken
so that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
3.2 Excessive strains caused by constraint of ➠ (a). Visual examination for distortion or
thermal expansion. bending in adjacent tubes.
➠ (b). Strain gauging of suspect locations to
evaluate strains during unit starts and cycling
operation.
➠ (c). LVDT measurements to monitor the
relative movement of the header/tube during
transients.
3.3 Poor design and/or manufacture giving ➠ (d). Strain gauging to measure actual
rise to excessive mechanical stresses. strains experienced at the local area during
operation.
➠ (e). As in (c) above.
➠ (f). For tight, hair-pin bends, determine
whether residual stresses are high.

3.4 Vibration (flue gas-induced) by direct flow ➠ (g). Metallurgical examination to determine
or vortex shedding. high cycle fatigue.

3.5 Poor welding, particularly poor geometry ➠ (h). Visual and microscopic examination of
of final joint. weld quality.

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root cause analysis), the BTF

Team should determine the extent of damage. Subject to
access constraints, detection of fatigue is possible
through a variety of routine NDE methods. Chapter 9,
Volume 1 provides additional information.
Results of the survey for damage will be used interac-
tively with Action 3 to determine root cause and with
Actions 5 and 6 to develop a rational prevention strategy.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Routine weld repairs are generally sufficient to deal with

the immediate attachment or header-related failures. Tube
replacement is needed for failures associated with bends.
Pad welding/grinding are not satisfactory. Thereafter,
most actions should be considered for the longer-term
(Action 6).

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 26-11

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on the clear identification
of the underlying root cause
(Action 3) and an economic eval-
uation to ensure that the opti-
mum strategy has been chosen.
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
26-12 Fatigue in Water-Touched Tubes
Major Root Cause Influences
Excessive strains caused by constraint of ther-
mal expansion.
Poor design and/or manufacture giving rise to
excessive mechanical stresses.
Vibration (flue gas-induced) by direct flow or
vortex shedding.
Poor welding, particularly poor geometry of
final joint.
None for this mechanism.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Evaluate modifications to attachment design
or to header/tube connection to reduce stress
levels.
➠ Institute periodic inspection program, par-
ticularly of susceptible header locations in
units that are being, or to be, cycled.
➠ Improve header/tube flexibility and confirm
with LVDT.
➠ Evaluate modifications to attachment design
or to header/tube connection to reduce stress
levels.
➠ Institute periodic inspection program, par-
ticularly of susceptible header locations in
units that are being, or to be, cycled.
➠ Evaluate and install modifications such as
snubbers or vibration restraints to reduce
stresses induced by vibration.
➠ Institute program of weld quality control
based on guidelines such as provided in refer-
ence 2.
Chapter 27 • Volume 2
Pitting in Water-
Touched Tubes
Introduction
Pitting is a form of damage that can
occur throughout the boiler. In
water-touched tubing, especially
economizers, it is primarily a result
of poor shutdown practices with
oxygen-saturated, stagnant water. It
may also be caused by direct acidic
attack as a result of poor chemical
cleaning practice; this topic is dis-
cussed separately in Chapter 25.
Pitting in steam-touched tubes as a
result of shutdown practices or car-
ryover of Na2SO4 which combines
with moisture from condensate to
form an aggressive agent, is also
discussed separately (Chapter 41,
Volume 3). Damage caused by
improper chemical cleaning in
SH/RH sections is discussed in
Chapter 43, Volume 3.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 27-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure
Pitting is localized part- or through-
wall dissolution of tube metal. Pits
associated with low pH conditions
tend to be numerous and closely
spaced. The affected metal is usu-
ally clean and free of deposits (if
found soon after the acid attack);
the surface is jagged and rough.
Pits are generally sharp-walled and
free of oxide or corrosion products if
fresh. Damage from excessively
aggressive chemical cleaning in
water-touched tubes is of this type;
reference should be made to
Chapter 25 for additional detail
about its appearance.
The second type of pitting results
from stagnant, oxygen-saturated
water formed during shutdown. That
damage, particularly in the econo-
mizer, is the subject of this chapter.
Such pits can either be numerous
and closely spaced, or isolated.
They are often covered with caps of
corrosion products as shown in
27-2 Pitting in Water-Touched Tubes
Figure 27-1. Such pitting is generally
found to be filled with corrosion
products, particularly red hematite
iron oxide (Fe2O3) which is the ther-
modynamically favored reaction of
iron with oxygen under conditions of
high oxygen activity (see Figure 2-3,
Volume 1). This form of pitting may
undercut the surface.
Figure 27-2 shows a cross section
through an oxygen pit showing it to
be filled with corrosion products and
topped by a distinctive corrosion
cap.
1.2 Locations of failure
Pitting typically appears in those
locations where boiler water stag-
nates in the tubes during unit shut-
down and/or layup periods. This will
occur as a result of improper vent-
ing, draining, shutdown and storage
procedures.
Figure 27-1. Oxygen pitting in a carbon steel economizer tube. Pits are covered with
caps of corrosion products (arrow) (MAG:1.6X) Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Figure 27-2. Cross section through oxygen pit showing corrosion prod-
uct cap and corrosion products in the pit. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 27-3

2. Mechanism of Failure
2.1 Development of pitting
corrosion
Pitting is a form of corrosion that is
distinguished by the aspect ratio of
the damage: it tends to be deep
through-wall relative to the defect
length. It is an insidious form of
damage because (i) a relatively
small amount of metal loss can lead
to through-wall failure with cata-
strophic results, (ii) the small size
coupled with the fact that pits are
often filled with corrosion products
makes them hard to detect, (iii) pits
often undercut the surface, which
can complicate their detection, (iv)
laboratory simulation of field pitting
is difficult, and (v) perhaps most
interesting, pitting is autocatalytic;
that is, conditions within the pit stim-
ulate the continued activity of the
corrodant.2
A breakdown in the passivity of a
metal surface initiates the pitting
process. An electrolytic cell is
formed, the anode is a small area of
active metal, the cathode a large
area of passive metal.3 A large
potential difference exists (about 0.5
V for 300-series stainless steels)
which results in considerable current
flow and rapid corrosion. Figure 27-3
shows the process for the growth of
a pit in a metal M caused by a con-
centrated solution of aerated NaCl.
Dissolution of metal in the pit forms
metal ions (M+) which results in the
inward migration of Cl- from solution
to maintain charge neutrality. The
metal chloride (M+Cl-) formed com-
bines with water to form hydroxide
and free acid:
(M+Cl-) + H2O ® MOH + H+Cl-
(27-1)
Although the pH of the bulk solution
remains neutral, the concentration of
acid in the pit lowers the pH values
(to the range 1.5 to 1.0).3 This accel-
erates the dissolution of the metal.
At the same time, a cathodic reac-
tion such as oxygen reduction, is
occurring on nearby surfaces which
suppresses corrosion on these adja-
cent areas. The suppression of cor-
27-4 Pitting in Water-Touched Tubes
rosion around the edges of the pit
and the acceleration of corrosion
within the pit result in increasing
rates of damage accumulation.
This model for pitting initiation and
growth provides an explanation for
other observations about pitting. For
example, pitting generally displays
long initiation periods followed by
what can be quite rapid propaga-
tion. Why? Initiation is thought to
require a momentarily high concen-
tration of metal dissolution to start
the process.4 Such an initial concen-
tration might be caused by a sur-
face scratch, dislodged defect or
random solution variation.2 However,
just as it forms, the initial concentra-
tion could be swept away by the
flow along the surface. Thus initia-
tion might nearly start and stop
many times before a “permanent’
concentration forms that is sufficient
to initiate a pit. In tubing, other pos-
sible initiators are deposits of feed-
water corrosion products, which
might contain a number of different
cations (such as Fe, Cu, Ni, Zn, etc.)
and anions (Cl, SO4, etc.). A number
of theories have been proposed to
explain pitting initiation. Two general
classifications are: (i) kinetic theories
that explain breakdown of passivity
based on competitive absorption
between chloride ions in solution
and oxygen on the metal surface,
and (ii) thermodynamic theories that
consider that the critical pitting
potential to be the potential where
chloride ions are in equilibrium with
the oxide film.3,5,6,7
Pit growth is influenced by gravity, a
fact that is also explained by the
mechanistic process described
above. The formation of a dense,
concentrated solution and its reten-
tion favors the propagation of the pit,
a process that is facilitated if the pit
is oriented to the pull of gravity.
Similarly, it is now clear why pitting
is most prominent in stagnant condi-
tions. The fact that the fluid is static
allows the initiation of pitting to
occur unimpeded and stagnant con-
ditions allow for the concentrations
 Na+

Cl- O2
O2
Na+
Na+

O2
Na+
Cl-
O2
Cl-
O2
Na+ Cl-
Cl-
Na+ Cl- O2
Cl- Cl-
O2
O2 O2 O2 O2 Cl- O2 O2
M+
M+ Cl-
OH- OH- OH- M+ Cl- OH- OH-
M+ M+
H+ M+ M+ M+ M+
Cl- M+ Cl- H+
Cl- Cl-
Cl- Cl-
Cl- H+ M+
Cl- H+
Cl- M+
M+ M+
H+ M+
H+
Cl- M+ Cl-
M+

e e e e
e

Figure 27-3. Autocatalytic processes occurring in a corrosion pit. From: M.G. Fontana
and N.D. Greene, Corrosion Engineering, 1967, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.
Reproduced with permission of the McGraw-Hill Companies.

needed to accelerate the attack. It should be noted that this effect of

Once initiation has begun, such as oxygen in stagnant water as a cause
during shutdown of the unit, the of pitting should not be confused
continued growth of the pit under with the effects of oxygenated treat-
the more turbulent conditions of ment (OT) as a cycle chemistry
operation can continue unabated. option. OT when properly applied,
does not cause pitting. The levels of
Pitting remains a topic of active
oxygen under OT are on the order of
research interest. Additional infor-
30-150 ppb as opposed to the ppm
mation about pitting mechanisms
levels under stagnant shutdown
and activities can be found in refer-
conditions. In OT the levels are care-
ences 5, 8 and 9.
fully controlled to encourage the
growth of protective oxides through-
2.2 Development of pitting out the feedwater train. Very little of
from oxygen-saturated, stag- the economizer tubing is affected
nant condensate (passivated) by the OT and, of
course, the oxygen injection should
The most common cause of pitting
be turned off at least an hour prior to
in economizer tubing is the pres-
shutdown and when the cation con-
ence of oxygen-saturated, stagnant
ductivity of the feedwater exceeds
water during unit shutdown periods
0.3 mS/cm. Additional background
caused if improper blanketing
on this important topic can be found
and/or protection procedures were
in Chapter 3, Volume 1 and in refer-
employed to shut down the unit.
ences 10 and 11.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 27-5

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
3.1 Introduction
Table 27-1 summarizes the major
root causes of pitting, actions to
confirm each, and the correspond-
ing immediate and long-term
actions. Pitting will result in water-
touching tubing as a result of
improper acid cleaning which is
covered in Chapter 25, or by poor
shutdown practices.
3.2 Influence of poor shut-
down practice (presence of
stagnant, oxygen-saturated
water)
As discussed above, pitting can
form if shutdown procedures allow
accumulations of stagnant, oxy-
genated water. Actions to confirm
this root cause include:
(a). Analysis of corrosion products
present in and around the pitting will
help to pinpoint the source of the
problem. In the case of oxygenated
attack, hematite (Fe2O3) should typi-
cally be found.
(b). Selective tube sampling can be
used to evaluate whether localized
corrosion cells have been formed.
(c). A critical evaluation of shut-
down procedures and unit condi-
tions during shutdown should be
performed to ensure that they are
optimal for the unit. Such proce-
dures are provided in Chapter 4 of
Volume 1. A review of the chemistry
logs of analyses performed during
the shutdown will provide clues. A
partial list of questions to be
answered might include the follow-
ing: (i) If the boiler pH was
increased to around 10 with ammo-
nia and around 200 ppm of
hydrazine, were these monitored
during shutdown/layup periods? (ii)
Were nitrogen blanketing and caps
properly applied and checked? (iii)
Was sufficient N2H4 added,? (iv)
Have sources of air inleakage been
detected?

Table 27-1
Major Root Cause Influence, Confirmation and Corrective Actions

Major Root Cause Actions to Confirm Immediate Actions and Long-Term Actions and
Influence Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.2 Influence of poor shut-
down practice (presence of
stagnant, oxygenated water)
(a). Analyze corrosion products in and around
pits; specifically looking for presence of
hematite. Methods of metallurgical examination
are reviewed in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
(b). Selective tube sampling to evaluate for
localized corrosion cells.
(c). Perform critical evaluation of shutdown
procedures and of unit condition during shut-
down.
• Identify damaged locations.
• Replace affected tubes. See
Chapter 11, Volume 1 for an
overview of methods.
• Initiate implementation of
long-term options.
• Confirm or establish unit
shutdown and layup procedures
that will prevent pitting precur-
sors. See additional discussion
in Chapter 4, Volume 1.

27-6 Pitting in Water-Touched Tubes

4. Determining the Extent of Damage
Pitting can be difficult to detect
unless it is extensive. If there has
been significant loss of wall thick-
ness, the standard method of NDE is
ultrasonic testing. Typical problems
with access and with surface prepa-
ration will be present. Chapter 9,
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
The primary immediate actions are
to (i) identify damaged locations,
(ii) replace the affected tubes, and
(iii) repair obvious contributing con-
ditions such as sources of air in-
leakage, etc., and (iv) revise shut-
down/layup procedures. Procedures
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Long-term actions will consist of
establishing procedures to prevent
precursor conditions from occurring.
A detailed discussion of appropriate
shutdown and layup procedures is
presented in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
A brief overview of key considera-
tions is provided here. There are five
general approaches to protecting
components during layup:
• Exclude impurities such as oxy-
gen and carbon dioxide by nitro-
gen blanketing or by filling with
specially treated layup water, and
maintaining a positive pressure.
• Maintain an alkaline pH in the
layup water.
• Keep surfaces dry and clean.
• Maintain the highest purity boiler
water with no additives.
• Protect surfaces with vapor-phase
corrosion inhibitors.
Of particular usefulness to prevent
pitting are the first and third general
Volume 1 provides an overview of
UT methods as applied to wall thick-
ness measurement.
Selective tube sampling and metal-
lographic analysis can be used to
detect localized corrosion cells.
for tube replacement are summa-
rized in Chapter 11, Volume 1.
The balance of actions can be con-
ducted as a part of long-term strate-
gies.
approaches. For short-term layups,
keeping high quality water and pro-
tective blanketing with nitrogen,
including a 5 psig overpressure, are
the most common procedures. For
longer term, layups either raising the
pH of the water with ammonia and
adding significant hydrazine with a
nitrogen cap or a dry layup with
nitrogen overpressure are the opti-
mum choices.
Although lay-up with clean, dry,
dehumidified air is seldom used in
U.S. units, it can offer significant
benefit, particularly where pitting or
generalized corrosion during layups
has been a problem. Even if reason-
able draining and venting proce-
dures for unit shutdown are used to
reduce the amount of moisture that
condenses in susceptible tubes, the
presence of high humidity (greater
than 60%) can significantly increase
the potential for corrosion of unpro-
tected tubes.
All layup conditions should be moni-
tored to ensure that layup water or
air quality is being maintained.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 27-7
7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.
8. References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S.Moser, H. Vaillancourt,
Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide, Volume 1:
Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices, Research
Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October, 1993.
2Fontana, M.G. and N.D. Greene, Corrosion Engineering,
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967.
3Asphahani, A.I. and W.L. Silence, “Pitting Corrosion” in
Metals Handbook Volume 13: Corrosion, ASM
International, Metals Park, OH, 1987.
4Evans, U.R., Corrosion, Volume 7, Number 238, 1951.
5Shreir, L.L, R.A. Jarman, and G.T. Burstein, eds.,
Corrosion Volume 1: Metal/Environment Reactions, 3rd
Edition, Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 1994.
6Uhlig,
H.H. and J. Gilman, Corrosion, Volume 19, 1963,
p. 261t.
27-8 Pitting in Water-Touched Tubes
7Vermilyea,
D., Journal of the Electrochemistry Society,
Volume 118, 1971, p. 529.
8Isaacs, H., U. Bertocci, J. Kruger, S. Smialowska,
Advances in Localized Corrosion, NACE-9, National
Association of Corrosion Engineers, p. 221.
9Evans, U.R., The Corrosion and Oxidation of Metals,
Arnold, London, 1961.
10Dooley,R.B., J. Mathews, R. Pate, and J. Taylor,
“Oxygenated Treatment for Fossil Plants”, Paper IWC-92-
16, Proceedings of the 53rd International Water
Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, October, 1992.
11Bursik,A., B. Dooley, and B. Larkin, Guidelines for
Oxygenated Treatment for Fossil Plants, Research
Project 1403-45, Final Report TR-102285, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December, 1994.
ACTIONS for Pitting in Water-touched Tubes
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of pitting
begin here. The goal of these
actions is to see if further investi-
gation of pitting is warranted or
whether another BTF mechanism
should be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and pitting is the
likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by pitting.
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred
and pitting is the likely mecha-
nism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in typical locations.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Obvious corrosion pits on
tube ID.
• Corrosion product “caps”. See
Figures 27-1 and 27-2.
• Pits are deep, relative to their
length.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by pitting:
➠ Determine whether there is evi-
dence of a shortcoming during a
unit shutdown/layup such as:
• Uncertainty about the water
and/or air quality maintained
during the shutdown or layup
period.
• Inadequate nitrogen blanketing.
• Insufficient N2H4.
• Evidence of air inleakage.
• Indication that stagnant,
oxygenated water may have
remained in tubes.
➠ Determine whether routine
inspection and/or tube sampling
finds indication of localized corro-
sion cells, measurable wall thin-
ning or evidence of pitting.
➠ If one or more has occurred, go
to Action 3 which outlines the
steps to confirm the influence of
each.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 27-9
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is pitting.

A failure has occurred which the

BTF team has tentatively identi-
➠ Analyze the macroscopic
damage. Does damage consist
fied as being pitting (Action 1a).
of pits that are deep relative to
Action 2 should clearly identify
their length, with corrosion
pitting as the primary mecha-
“caps”, and evidence of
nism or point to another cause.
deposits?
If the cause is pitting, the source
of the problem (low pH or stag-
nant oxygenated water) should
be identified through reliance on Probable mechanism is pitting.
analysis of any deposits found in
and around the pits.
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by removing representa-
tive tube sample(s), followed by ➠ Analyze deposits in and around • Deposits primarily of hematite
visual examination and detailed pits to help determine root provide evidence that pitting
metallographic analysis. cause. most likely is a result of oxy-
genated, stagnant condensate
during shutdown.
• If deposits are missing, as is
surface oxide, suspect chemi-
cal cleaning damage. See
Chapter 25.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

References to other sources of detailed information:

• Main text (this chapter) provides the background to mechanism and the
development of pitting.
• Summary of the steps and methods of metallurgical investigation of boiler
tube failures can be found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.

27-10 Pitting in Water-Touched Tubes

Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the pitting
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as pitting (Action 2) or a
precursor has occurred (Action
1b). The goal of this Action 3 is
for the BTF Team to review the
potential root causes of pitting,
identify probable ones, and take
those actions that are needed to
confirm which are operative in
the unit. This step must be taken
so that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
3.2 Influence of poor shutdown practice ➠ (a). Analyze corrosion products in and
(presence of stagnant, oxygenated water) around pits; specifically looking for presence
of hematite. Methods of metallurgical examina-
tion are reviewed in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
➠ (b). Selective tube sampling to evaluate for
localized corrosion cells.
➠ (c). Perform critical evaluation of shutdown
procedures and of unit condition during shut-
down. Check records or logs of the chemistry
during shutdown periods.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 27-11
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root cause
analysis), the BTF Team should
determine the extent of damage.
Detection of extensive pitting may
be possible with ultrasonic testing
(UT), otherwise sampling for local-
ized damage in suspect locations
(see main text) will be required.
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
The BTF Team must ensure that
repairs and immediate solutions
are directly tied to the underlying
cause. Most actions can be con-
sidered for the longer-term
(Action 6) but several underlying
problems can be dealt with in
the short-term.
27-12 Pitting in Water-Touched Tubes
Sampling may also be required to
confirm the root cause.
Results of the survey for damage
will be used interactively with
Action 3 to determine root cause
and with Actions 5 and 6 to
develop a strategy to prevent
repeat failures.
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
of affected tubes
➠ Develop a plan based on
results of NDE survey (Action 4)
to replace affected tubing,
including an assessment of the
anticipated future failure rate.
➠ See Chapter 11, Volume 1
for summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
➠ Repair any obvious mechan-
ical problems that are contribut-
ing to the problem, for example,
by allowing the ingress of oxy-
gen during shutdown.
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

The correction of the underlying Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Long-Term Actions
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for Influence of poor shutdown practice (presence ➠ Confirm or establish unit shutdown and
the BTF team. The proper choice of stagnant, oxygenated water) layup procedures that will prevent pitting pre-
of long-term actions will be cursors. See additional discussion in main text
based on the clear identification this chapter and Chapter 4, Volume 1.
of the underlying root cause
(Action 3) and an economic eval-
uation to ensure that the opti-
mum strategy has been chosen.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

The final step for the BTF team is

to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of pit-
ting damage or its precursors.
In particular, improper shutdown/
layup procedures can also lead
to problems in other areas such
as feedwater heaters, the con-
denser and turbine.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 27-13

27-14 Pitting in Water-Touched Tubes
Chapter 28 • Volume 2
Coal Particle Erosion
Description of Coal Particle
Erosion and its Manifestation
Coal-particle erosion is one of five
fireside erosion mechanisms dis-
cussed in this book. The others are
flyash erosion, falling slag erosion,
sootblower erosion, and the erosion
of in-bed tubes of bubbling fluidized
bed units.
Coal particles can cause erosion in
some designs when protective
devices no longer perform their func-
tion because of wear or damage.1
Two primary problems have been
observed. The first, in cyclone burn-
ers, is the wear of replaceable wear
liners located near the end of the
burner and of refractories covering
waterwall tubes in the furnace. High
velocity combustion air is used to
impart a whirling motion to coal parti-
cles. The impact of these particles
can wear out resistant liners and
refractory coatings that are intended
to protect tube surfaces; thereafter
direct erosion of the tube occurs.
The second kind of problem occurs
in burners, particularly front- or rear-
fired, where the direct impact of the
coal stream, before ignition, erodes
tubes in the throat or quarl region.
The problem is particularly acute if
refractory protection is missing or
deficient.
Features of failed tubes by a coal
particle erosion mechanism include:
wall thinning, external wastage flats,
little or no surface ash, a shallow
layer of surface hardening caused
by the particle impact, and in some
cases, grooving of the tube surface
by abrasion. As with other erosion
processes, final failure of the tube
occurs when the thinned wall of the
tube is no longer able to contain
service stresses and a ductile failure
occurs.
Visual examination of refractory
coatings and wear-resistant liners
can verify the mechanism.
Ultrasonic testing (UT) can also
detect the extent of wall thinning.
Observation of flow patterns estab-
lished in the burner by the introduc-
tion of secondary and tertiary air
may reveal locations where signifi-
cant wear will occur.2
Actions to minimize future failures
will consist of (i) a periodic program
of inspection and replacement of
wear-resistant liners and refractory
coatings as needed to protect tube
surfaces, and (ii) adjustment of sec-
ondary and tertiary air inlet
dampers, as needed, to change
flow patterns and control erosion
rates on liners and coatings.2
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 28-1
References
1Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.
28-2 Coal Particle Erosion
2Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
ACTIONS for Coal-Particle Erosion
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of coal
particle erosion begin here.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and coal particle
erosion is the likely mecha-
nism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by coal particle erosion.
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred Action 1b: If a precursor has
and coal particle erosion is the occurred in the unit that could
likely mechanism. lead to future BTF by coal particle
erosion.
➠ Determine if there is tube damage
in (i) a cyclone burner and ➠ Determine whether one or more of
whether there is evidence of the following precursors has been
extensive wear to protective found or is likely to have occurred
devices (wear liners and/or in the unit:
refractories), or (ii) in the throat or • Extensively eroded wear liners
quarl of conventional front/rear or refractories.
wall burners.
• Deteriorating refractory in
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic throat/quarl of burner.
appearance of the failure includes
such features as: ➠ These can be precursors to coal
particle erosion. If one or more
• Tube wall thinning or wastage has occurred, go to Actions 2-4
flats on the tube surface for further steps.
• Thin-edged, ductile failures, or
the formation of pin-holes, or a
long “thin” blowout
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 28-3
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is coal particle
erosion.
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of coal particle erosion.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has identified as being
coal particle erosion damage
(Action 1a). Actions 2, 3 and 4
should clearly identify coal parti-
cle erosion as the primary mech-
anism, confirm the root cause
and determine the extent of
damage. The actions listed will
be executed by visual examina-
tion and an ultrasonic survey of
wall thinning, along with the
removal of representative tube
sample(s) for analysis if needed.
28-4 Coal Particle Erosion
➠ Confirm the condition of wear Damage is probably not coal
liners and refractories (cyclone particle erosion. Check for possi-
bility that damage is caused by
units) and throat/quarl of conven-
tional front/rear wall burners. Are fireside corrosion (Chapter 18).
there signs that either wear or
damage has occurred in these
locations?
➠ Determine the extent of damage
via visual examination and UT
(where needed) to quantify wall
thinning.
➠ Evaluate appearance of damage. Damage is probably not coal parti-
Is tube damage consistent with cle erosion. Check for possibility
an erosive process characterized that damage is caused by fireside
by: wall thinning, external corrosion (Chapter 18).
wastage, thin-edged ductile
failure, and/or external grooving
consistent with abrasion?
Failure mechanism is probably by
coal particle erosion.
➠ Go to Action 5: Implement
Repairs, Immediate Solutions and
Actions
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

The most important actions for

the BTF team are to (i) make the
tube repairs necessary to get the
unit on-line, and (ii) fix the under-
lying problem with wear liners or
refractories.

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

Long-term actions will include (i)

periodic inspection and replace-
ment of wear-resistant liners and
refractory coatings as needed to
protect tube surfaces, and (ii)
adjustments, if needed, to sec-
ondary and tertiary air inlet
dampers to change the flow pat-
terns and control erosion rates
on the liners and coatings.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

None for this mechanism.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 28-5

28-6 Coal Particle Erosion
aa
Chapter 29 • Volume 2

Falling Slag Damage

aa
Description of Falling Slag
Damage and its Manifestation
Falling slag damage results from
impacts by fused coal ash deposits
or resolidified molten material (slag)
that detach from furnace walls and
superheater pendants. The slag is
directed toward the bottom ash hop-
per by the lower furnace sloping
wall as illustrated schematically in
Figure 29-1. Damage from either
erosion or mechanical impact results
to waterwall tubing in either sloping

Rear wall

1Ð2% of total ash/ft of

furnace hopper bottom
wall tubes and/or the ash hopper. As
shown in Figure 29-1, the ash does
not fall evenly along the length of the
furnace bottom opening; it is con-
centrated in the first 0.9 to 1.2 m (3
to 4 ft) along each end. As a result,
these are the locations of the heavi-
est erosion damage.
As with other erosion processes,
tube wastage occurs on a progres-
sive basis leading eventually to a
final failure of the tube when the
thinned wall is no longer able to

Side wall

Front wall

20Ð25% of total
ash at each end

Figure 29-1. Distribution of falling ash along furnace hopper opening.

The higher concentrations of falling ash through the first 3-4 feet at
each end of the bottom opening result in significant fireside wall thin-
ning. Source: Combustion Engineering, Inc.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 29-1

contain service stresses. The frac-
ture will be thin-edged with ductile
characteristics. Additional detail on
the contributing factors to erosion
failures can be found in Chapter 14
on flyash erosion.
Mechanical damage from impacts
can cause (i) short-term overheating
failures higher in the furnace as a
result of the flow restriction, or (ii)
breakage of tubes and
attachments.1

a
Slagging propensity is determined
by the boiler design and by the
fuel.2 A larger furnace plan area will
have a larger wall and lower gas
velocities, leading to more falling
ash. The slagging potential of the
coal can be determined from an
ASTM Standard3 used to evaluate
the potential for this type of damage.
Coal properties used to estimate
slagging potential include: (i) ash-
fusibility temperatures and tempera-
ture range, (ii) the base/acid ratio,
(iii) the iron/calcium ratio, (iv) the sil-
ica to alumina ratio, (v) the iron to
calcium ratio, (vi) the dolomite per-
centage, (vii) the ferric percentage,
and (viii) the silica percentage.2 In
general, high fusion temperatures
result in low slagging potential.2
Tube failures will be part of the cost
associated with burning highly slag-
ging coal. Some additional time
between tube failures can be pur-
chased by using tubes of increased
wall thickness or by installing sacrifi-
cial material such as wear bars
shown schematically in Figure 29-2.

References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
7¤16" hex bar

Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,

1993.
2Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.

29-2 Falling Slag Damage

Weld
a
3American
Panel tube
(furnace side)

Web

1) Increased Wall Thickness

Panel tube
(furnace side)

2) 7¤16" Hexagonal Wear Bar

Web

Panel tube
(furnace side)

Web

3) Weld-Deposit Wear Bar

Figure 29-2. Options available for furnace bottom slope tube protec-
tion from falling slag. Source: Combustion Engineering, Inc.

Society for Testing and Materials, Standard

D1857-87 (1994), “Standard Test Method for Fusibility of
Coal and Coke Ash”, 1994 Annual Book of ASTM
Standards: Gaseous Fuels; Coal and Coke, Volume
05.05, American Society for Testing and Materials,
Philadelphia, PA, 1994.
ACTIONS for Falling Slag Damage
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of falling
slag damage begin here.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and falling slag dam-
age is the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by falling slag damage.
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred Action 1b: If a precursor has
and falling slag damage is the occurred in the unit that could
likely mechanism. lead to future BTF by falling slag
damage.
➠ Determine if the tube damage in
waterwall tubing, particularly slop- ➠ Determine whether a high slag-
ing wall tubes is concentrated in ging coal is being used, or
the first 0.9 to 1.2 m (3 to 4 ft) whether its use is anticipated in
along each end of the furnace the future.
bottom opening, or in the ash
➠ Determine whether one of more of
hopper. the following precursors has been
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic found or is likely to have occurred
appearance of the failure includes in the unit:
features consistent with either • Broken sloping tube attachment
erosion damage or mechanical points.
impact damage:
➠ Determine whether there have
• Tube wall thinning or wastage been overheating failures in
flats on the tube surface; thin- waterwalls that seem to lack an
edged, ductile failures (erosion identifiable root cause.
damage characteristics)
• Impact damage visible on
➠ These can be precursors to
falling slag damage. If one or
tubes, or tube failures where
more has occurred, go to Actions
mechanical impacts are located
2-4 for further steps.
remote from the failure site such
as might occur if the secondary
mechanism was overheating
failures or breaking of attach-
ments.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 29-3
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is falling slag
damage.
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of falling slag damage
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has identified as being
falling slag damage (Action 1a).
Actions 2, 3 and 4 should clearly
identify falling slag damage as
the primary mechanism, confirm
the root cause and determine the
extent of damage. The actions
listed will be executed by visual
examination and an ultrasonic
survey of wall thinning, along
with the removal of representa-
tive tube sample(s) for analysis if
needed.
29-4 Falling Slag Damage
➠ Determine the extent of damage Damage is probably not falling
via visual examination and UT slag damage.
(where needed) to quantify wall
thinning. Is damage primarily
concentrated in typically suscep-
tible locations such as sloping
wall tubes within 0.9 to 1.2 m (3
to 4 ft) of the furnace bottom
opening and ash hoppers?
➠ Evaluate appearance of damage. Damage is probably not falling
Is tube damage consistent with slag damage.
either (i) an erosive process
characterized by wall thinning,
external wastage, thin-edged
ductile failures, and/or external
grooving consistent with abra-
sion, or (ii) mechanical impact
damage?
Failure mechanism is probably
falling slag damage.
➠ Go to Action 5: Implement
Repairs, Immediate Solutions
and Actions
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

The most important actions for

the BTF team are to (i) make the
tube repairs necessary to get the
unit on-line, (ii) understand the
implications of burning a high
slagging coal and evaluate the
costs (in future boiler tube fail-
ures) to do so, and (iii) gather
the needed information to deter-
mine the long-term options.

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

Long-term actions will include

choices among: (i) accepting
tube failures, (ii) burning coals
with lower slagging potential, (iii)
replacing existing at-risk tubes
with thicker walled substitutes,
(iv) designing and installing sac-
rificial materials such as wear
bars.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

None for this mechanism.

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 29-5

29-6 Falling Slag Damage
Chapter 30 • Volume 2
Acid Dewpoint
Corrosion
(Economizer)
Introduction
This damage mechanism, which is
variously termed “low temperature
corrosion”, “cold end corrosion”,
“acid dew point corrosion”, or sim-
ply, “dew point corrosion”, is not
generally a problem for boiler tubes;
however, it can be of considerable
concern in the “back-end” of a unit
(in air heaters, duct work, flue gas
cleaning equipment, etc). If operat-
ing temperatures in the economizer
were to fall below the acid dew-
point temperature, corrosion could
occur as a result of the condensa-
tion of sulfuric acid from the flue
gas. The mechanism can also occur
in the colder regions of heat recov-
ery steam generators (HRSG) which
are becoming more popular in asso-
ciation with combined cycles. This
chapter provides some brief com-
ments about the mechanism in the
unlikely event of its occurrence.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 30-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure 1.2 Locations of failure
Manifestations of this mechanism in Low temperature corrosion will
economizer tubing will be those of a appear in locations where (i) the
general corrosion process: boiler tube metal temperatures are
below the acid dew point so that
• The normal fireside oxide scale condensate forms on the metal sur-
will probably be thin or absent in
face, or (ii) where flue gas tempera-
affected regions;
tures are below the acid dew point,
• The corroded surface of the tube, so that the condensate will form on
after removing fireside deposits, if the fly ash particle.1
any, will have a gouged or
Oil-fired, stoker-fired and cyclone-
“orange peel” appearance;
burner-fired (coal) boilers are more
• The final failure will be overpres- likely to experience dew point corro-
surization caused by wall thinning sion as these types of units produce
and therefore the fracture will less fly ash which acts to neutralize
appear thin-edged, transgranular any acid formed.1
and ductile;
• Because the attack is by sulfuric
acid, the presence of sulfur in ash
deposits remaining on the tube is
likely. A white layer of iron sulfate
may be present at the tube
deposit interface.

30-2 Acid Dewpoint Corrosion (Economizer)

2. Mechanism of Failure
Acid Dew Point Corrosion
(Economizer): Mechanism
1. Acid dewpoint corrosion is pri-
marily a result of the oxidation
of SO2 to SO3 which com-
bines with moisture to form
sulfuric acid; it subsequently
condenses onto surfaces
which are below the conden-
sation temperature, resulting
in corrosion.
2. There are a variety of factors
that influence the acid dew
point temperature, although
control is usually not by lower-
ing the dewpoint, but by
ensuring that the metal tem-
perature is high enough to
avoid condensation.
2.1 Introduction
The oxidation of SO2 to SO3 in com-
bination with moisture forms sulfuric
acid. When temperatures are low-
ered to the dewpoint, the sulfuric
acid condenses, leading to corro-
sion and exacerbating the fouling of
the affected surface.
The temperature at which conden-
sate first appears depends upon a
number of factors; however, for a 10
ppm SO3 concentration, dew point
is about 140°C (~285°F). Since
feedwater temperatures for most util-
ity boilers are above this tempera-
ture and SO3 levels are usually
below 10 ppm, low temperature cor-
rosion of boiler tubing is seldom
encountered.
The mechanism is of considerable
concern for the operation of air
heaters and other “back-end” com-
ponents. A number of parameters
can affect the rate of acid dewpoint
corrosion in these components
where the normal operating temper-
atures can be around the acid dew-
point. With the understanding that
condensation is seldom at issue for
temperatures typical of economizer
operation, a brief review of factors
that can affect the acid dewpoint is
included here: effect of fuel type,
excess oxygen level, fuel firing,
moisture level, surface temperature
and air in-leakage.
2.2 Effect of fuel type
Fouling and corrosion potential is a
function of fuel type(s) utilized,
including firing of single or multiple
fuels and fuel switching.
Gas firing, because there is little or
no sulfur and ash in the fuel, gener-
ally has little potential for corrosion.
Oil-firing does have a greater poten-
tial for corrosion and at a higher
temperature.2 The back-end compo-
nents of oil-fired boilers can be sus-
ceptible to low-temperature corro-
sion because of the presence of
vanadium in the fuel ash which is a
good catalyst for converting SO2 to
SO3 and because of the small quan-
tity of ash, which can serve as a
buffer, in the flue gases. Sodium in
the fuel oil can also contribute to
high temperature conversion of SO2
to SO3. Acid dew points with resid-
ual oils generally range from 132-
148°C (~ 270-300°F) depending on
sulfur content.3 Distillate oil combus-
tion usually produces flue-gas acid
dew points in the range 115-135°C
(~ 240-275°F).
There is a peak in the rate of acid
deposition depending upon temper-
ature, which various investigations
have found to be within the range
22-55°C (~ 40-100°F) below the dew
point.4-7
Coal-firing can also present an acid
dewpoint corrosion problem. The
most significant difference between
oil and coal firing is the lower rate of
conversion of sulfur to SO3. The ash
in coal also acts as a physical barrier
between iron-oxide coated surfaces
and SO2 in the gas stream. Coal con-
tains about 100 times more ash than
residual oil, much of it as alkaline
compounds, which theoretically are
present in sufficient quantities to neu-
tralize all of the SO3/H2SO4 produced
during combustion. Acid dew points
range from 120-140°C (~ 250-285°F)
which correspond to SO3 concentra-
tions of 2-20 ppm, respectively.8
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 30-3
2.3 Effect of excess oxygen
The higher the level of excess oxy-
gen in the combustion process, the
more SO2 that will be converted to
SO3 and the higher the acid dew
point. SO3 levels are extremely sen-
sitive to residual oxygen levels
below 2.0%. By controlling excess
oxygen at a maximum of 1-2%, it is
possible to avoid the formation of
fully oxidized vanadium and sulfur
compounds and thereby reduce
boiler fouling and corrosion prob-
lems. Unfortunately, the amount of
solids deposited and combustibles
(carbon carryover) will increase at
low O2 levels and may become a
problem.9
2.4 Effect of fuel firing
In addition to excess oxygen, other
fireside conditions such as furnace
design, furnace temperature, firing
conditions and burner performance
will affect the production of SO3.
Furnace design. Cyclone-fired boil-
ers depend on the use of coals that
produce fusible slags of moderate
viscosity at their operating tempera-
tures. High combustion tempera-
tures, on the order of 1650°C (~
3000°F), produce high NOX and SO3
values, and volatize some ash com-
ponents such as silica. SO3 levels
encountered in these units are
higher than those on pulverized coal
equipment.10
30-4 Acid Dewpoint Corrosion (Economizer)
Furnace temperature. Oxidizable
sulfur compounds in the fuel are
converted predominantly to SO2
during high temperature combus-
tion. Very low levels of SO3 can be
formed by direct oxidation from SO2
because equilibrium favors SO2 at
flame temperatures. Theoretical
investigations have shown that the
maximum rate of SO3 formation
occurs at a temperature of about
1100°C (~2010°F), which is three
times the rate in effect at 900°C (~
1650°F) and ten times the rate at
800°C (~ 1470°F). About 80% of the
SO3 that forms is formed in the
range 930-1330°C (~ 1705-2425°F).
Firing conditions. Staged combus-
tion, used to control NOX formation,
can increase excess air and the
amount of SO3 produced. The addi-
tional amount of SO3 may necessi-
tate a change in additive control
strategy.10
Burner performance. Poor atomiza-
tion of liquid fuels will contribute to
deposit formation. If combustion is
poor or incomplete, the various con-
stituents, separately or in combina-
tion, can form deposits. Carbon,
while not corrosive itself, can carry
free sulfuric acid and increase the
severity of the corrosion attack if it is
present in the flue gas.
Pulverized coal fineness.
Inadequately pulverized coal, i.e.
excessive amounts retained on the
50 mesh screen, can also contribute
to high carbon carryover and
deposit buildup.
2.5 Effect of moisture level
The higher the moisture level, the
more SO3 that will be converted to
sulfuric acid.
2.6 Effect of surface tempera-
ture
The first temperature at which sulfu-
ric acid condenses depends on the
partial pressures of SO3 and water
vapor and is usually around 120-
150°C (~ 250 to 300°F). The HCl
dewpoint is below this point. The
peak corrosion rate occurs at about
40°C (~ 70°F) below the H2SO4
dewpoint.
2.7 Effect of air in-leakage
Air in-leakage providing oxygen and
cooling effects can increase the cor-
rosion rate. In balanced draft boilers
where the back end of the boiler is
under negative pressure, air ingress
can occur through poorly sealed
inspection doors, expansion joints,
and corroded duct work.6
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Acid Dew Point Corrosion
(Economizer): Root Causes
The root cause of boiler tube fail-
ures by acid dew point corrosion
can be that either the tempera-
tures are below the dew point in
the economizer, or that a high
dew point is caused by a variety
of unit factors.
3.1 Introduction
Acid dewpoint corrosion in the econ-
omizer can occur when economizer
temperatures are below the conden-
sation point. As discussed above,
this is generally a major concern for
air heaters but not for economizers.
3.2 Economizer tube tempera-
tures below the acid dew point
This can occur, for example, when a
number of feedwater heaters are out
of service, or during unit shutdown
or startup. Startup is of less conse-
quence because of the short period
of time involved.
Actions to confirm:
(a). Measure economizer tempera-
tures and compare to calculated or
measured acid dewpoint. That cal-
culation will be based on fuel type,
fuel composition, firing conditions,
excess air and air ingress, and
moisture level. Dew point and depo-
sition rates have been measured
with dew point meters and gold disc
deposition probes, although their
application is mostly for setting
operating conditions relative to air
heaters. For pulverized coal-fired
boilers, corrosion occurs only well
below the calculated dewpoint. If
corrosion seems to be occurring
during shutdown periods, deposition
rates can be monitored with deposi-
tion probes.
3.3 High acid dewpoint caused
by fuel or operating choices
The second root cause of a problem
with acid dewpoint corrosion is if
fuel and operating practices are
such that the dewpoint is raised. A
variety of possible control options
are available if this is the case as
outlined below.
Actions to confirm:
(b). Perform an evaluation of dew-
point, or measurement with deposi-
tion probes, and determine the sen-
sitivity to key operating and fuel
parameters (fuel composition, addi-
tive choices, excess air levels, etc.)
3.4 Local air inleakage
Locally low gas temperatures
caused by air inleakage can create
a problem.11 High oxygen levels in
the flue gas at the boiler outlet, coin-
ciding with high carbon in the ash
can, apart from mill or burner prob-
lems, indicate a leakage of air after
the combustion chamber. While the
operator is controlling outlet air he is
really only reducing furnace air with
often dire consequences.11 High air
inleakage at the air heater can lead
to poor burner air distribution and
poor combustion.
Actions to confirm:
(c). Examine for localized wastage
patterns such as downstream from
door openings.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 30-5
4. Determine the Extent of Damage
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
6. Background to Long Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Acid Dew Point Corrosion
(Economizer): Actions
1. Immediate actions will include
confirming the extent of dam-
age and making the neces-
sary tube repairs or replace-
ment. Some minor operating
changes may also be feasible
but most steps are longer-
term.
2. Long-term actions will involve
either (i) raising the gas and
metal temperatures or (ii) low-
ering the acid dew point
through a variety of operating
options.
3. Eliminate sources of air
ingress, e.g., around inspec-
tion doors.
4. For serious conditions, moni-
toring with deposition probes
or dew point meters is indi-
cated.
30-6 Acid Dewpoint Corrosion (Economizer)
Inspection for damage will include
visual examination for signs of corro-
sion and the use of ultrasonic testing
(UT) to survey for wall thinning.
Chapter 9, Volume 1 discusses this
use of UT in more detail. Constraints
The necessary repairs should be
effected once the extent of damage
is determined. Chapter 11, Volume 1
reviews boiler tube repair proce-
dures. Over the longer term, solu-
tions will involve raising the gas and
metal temperatures above the acid
dew point or lowering the acid dew
point; the latter has far more options
available.
If acid dewpoint corrosion is a prob-
lem, it can be mitigated by a variety
of steps to reduce the level of sulfu-
ric acid produced. This in turn
implies reducing the SO3 in the flue
gas. Although a complete descrip-
tion of options is beyond the scope
of this book, some possible actions
might include (i) using a lower sulfur
fuel, (ii) periodic removal of ash
deposits, (iii) reducing the amount of
excess air in the furnace, or (iv)
injecting an additive into the fuel. A
discussion of additives used in oil-
fired units can be found in the
writeup on SH/RH fireside corrosion
in Chapter 34, Volume 3. Those of
on accessibility may limit how much
UT examination is possible.
Deposition probes can be used to
determine the corrosion potential for
various fuel/additive/excess air com-
binations, if required.
benefit for controlling that form of
damage, such as MgO, have also
been shown to be beneficial for lim-
iting acid dew point corrosion in
economizers.
It is likely that such actions will be
triggered by considerations other
than the low temperature corrosion
of economizer tubes, such as air
heater fouling or corrosion, or desire
to decrease SOX emission levels.
Such positive steps, would, of
course, also further protect against
economizer corrosion.
One control challenge when the
economizer is expected to be at a
temperature below the dewpoint, is
during unit shutdown. The applica-
tion of a corrosion inhibitor to tube
surfaces following cleaning of exter-
nal deposits and drying can be con-
sidered if a problem develops.12
Humidity control during shutdown
has also been used to limit corrosion
damage.
7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.
8. References
1Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.
2Macduff,E.J. and N.D. Clark, “Ljungstron Air Preheater
Design and Operation - Part II: Corrosion and Fouling”,
Combustion, March, 1976.
3Bennett, R. and B. Handelman, “Solving Cold End
Boiler Problems Through Innovative Chemical
Technology”, Combustion, January, 1977.
4Clark,N.D., et al., “Boiler Flue Gas Measurements
Using a Dewpoint Meter”, ASME Paper 63-WA-108.
5Frisch, N.W., “Analysis of Air Heater-Fly Ash-Sulfuric
Acid Vapor Interactions”, in F.A. Ayer, compiler,
Proceedings: Fifth Symposium on the Transfer and
Utilization of Particulate Control Technology, Volume 2,
held in Kansas City, MO, August 27-30, 1984, Research
Project 1835-6, Proceedings CS-4404, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February, 1986, p. 28-1.
6Hernandez, J.J., “Dewpoint Corrosion in Oil-Fired
Boilers in Cycling Service”, in Proceedings: Fossil Plant
Retrofits for Improved Heat Rate and Availability, held in
San Diego, CA, December 1-3, 1987, Proceedings
GS-6725, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto,
CA, December, 1989, pp. 31-1 through 31-10.
7Sirois,
R.H. and G. Furman, “Acid Dewpoint: New
Concern for an Old Problem in Fossil Plant Design”, pre-
sented at the 1986 American Power Conference,
Chicago, IL, April 14-16, 1986.
8Sotter,J.G., J.A. Arnot, and T.M. Brown, Guidelines for
Fireside Testing in Coal-Fired Power Plants, Research
Project 1891-3, Final Report CS-5552, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, March, 1988.
9Stein,F., et al., “Effect of Excess Air on Acid Deposition
in a Regenerative Air Preheater”, presented in
Proceedings: 1986 EPRI Power Plant Performance
Monitoring and System Dispatch Improvement Workshop,
Washington, D.C., 1986.
10Radway, J.E. and M.S. Hoffman, Operations Guide for
the Use of Combustion Additives in Utility Boilers,
Research Project 1839-3, Final Report CS-5527, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December, 1987.
11Personal Communication from T. Healy (ESB Ireland) to
R.B. Dooley, February, 1995.
12Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 30-7
ACTIONS for Acid Dewpoint Corrosion
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of acid
dewpoint corrosion begin here.
The goal of these actions is to
see if further investigation of this
mechanism is warranted or
whether another BTF mechanism
should be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and acid dewpoint
corrosion is the likely mecha-
nism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by acid dewpoint corrosion.
30-8 Acid Dewpoint Corrosion (Economizer)
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred Action 1b: If a precursor has
and acid dewpoint corrosion is occurred in the unit that could
the likely mechanism. lead to future BTF by acid dew-
point corrosion.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi- ➠ Determine whether one or more of
cal of acid dewpoint corrosion, the following precursors has been
such as a low-temperature sec- found, or is likely to have
tion of the economizer, during occurred in the unit:
shutdown periods, and preferen-
• Evidence of particularly corro-
tially in oil-fired, stoker-fired or
sive combustion products in
cyclone-burner coal-fired units.
back-end portions of the boiler.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic • Routine inspections of the
appearance of the failure includes
economizer that find evidence
such features as:
of corrosion damage - such as
• Wall thinning wall thinning or lack of fireside
oxide or deposits on tubes.
• Fireside scale that is thinned or
missing entirely • Operation over an extended
period with a number of feed-
• External surface with corroded
water heaters out of service.
or “orange peel” appearance
after removing deposits, if any ➠ These precursors can be indica-
• Final failure with ductile charac- tive of attack by an acid dewpoint
teristics such as thin-edged corrosion mechanism. If one or
fracture surface. more has occurred, go to Action 3
which outlines the steps to con-
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent firm the root cause.
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is acid
dewpoint corrosion.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
➠ Analyze in detail the failure sur-
face. Is the failure surface a thin-
fied as being acid dewpoint cor-
edged crack, and/or ductile in
rosion damage (Action 1a).
appearance?
Action 2 should clearly identify
acid dewpoint corrosion as the
primary mechanism or point to
another cause. The actions listed ➠ Analyze deposits. If deposits are
will be executed by removing present, do they contain sulfur?
representative tube sample(s),
followed by visual examination
and detailed metallographic
analysis. ➠ Evaluate ash. Is pH of ash in
deionized water acidic?

➠ Determine extent of external cor- Smooth external surface and

rosion. Is there evidence of exter- material removal may be caused
nal corrosion (“orange peel” by sootblower erosion, see
appearance) of tube after remov- Chapter 22.
ing deposits?

Probable mechanism is acid dew-

point corrosion.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 30-9

Action 3: Determine root cause of acid dewpoint corrosion
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as acid dewpoint corro-
sion (Action 2) or a precursor to
acid dewpoint corrosion has
occurred (Action 1b). The goal of
this Action 3 is for the BTF Team
to review the potential root
causes, identify probable ones,
and take those actions that are
needed to confirm which are
operative in the unit. This step
must be taken so that the proper
actions can be taken to prevent
future BTF from occurring by this
mechanism. Execute, in parallel,
Action 4 to determine the extent
of damage.
30-10 Acid Dewpoint Corrosion (Economizer)
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
3.2 Economizer tube temperatures are below ➠ (a). Measure economizer temperatures and
the acid dewpoint during operation, such as compare to calculated or measured acid dew-
with a number of feedwater heaters out of ser- point. If corrosion seems to be occurring dur-
vice, or during shutdown ing shutdown periods, deposition rates can be
monitored with deposition probes.
3.3 Excessively high dewpoint caused by fuel ➠ (b). An evaluation of dewpoint or measure-
or operating conditions. ment with deposition probes. The sensitivity to
key operating and fuel parameters such as fuel
composition, additive choices, excess air lev-
els, etc. should be determined. See main text
discussion of mechanism for key variables.
3.4 Locally low gas temperatures caused by ➠ (c). Examine for localized wastage patterns,
local air ingress. such as downstream from door openings.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Evaluation will be
based on detecting (i) wastage
and wall thinning, or (ii) obvious
(visual) signs of corrosion.
➠ Identify all locations to be examined. Missed locations
are sites for future failures.
➠ Perform UT survey and visual inspection to:
(i) measure extent of damage via wall thinning or
(ii) detect signs of corrosion.
A review of UT methods is provided in Chapter 9,
Volume 1.
➠ Perform tube sampling to confirm results of NDE
inspection, as needed.
➠ Install deposition probes or dew point meters to moni-
tor rates, as needed.
➠ Use results interactively with Action 3.
➠ Go to Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions
and actions.
Volume 2: Water-Touched Tubes 30-11
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

➠ Implement repairs or replacement
Immediate actions (Action 5) will of affected tubes based on NDE
be primarily to repair and survey (Action 4)
replace damaged tubes as
required. Most actions can be ➠ Develop a plan to replace
considered for the longer-term affected tubing, including an
(Action 6) although several economic assessment of the
underlying problems can be future possible failure rate and
dealt with in the short-term. the resulting optimal extent of
new tubing.
➠ See Chapter 11, Volume 1
for summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
➠ Place the unit back in
service.
➠ Monitor economizer temperatures,
dew point temperature or deposi-
tion rates, as needed, to track
development of problem.
➠ Evaluate economics of available
options for controlling problem
including:
• Fuel effects.
• Additive options.
• Combustion options such as
changes in excess oxygen

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

level.
• Unit shutdown frequency
• Expected rates of wastage
under various alternatives for
control and replacement cost
of expected number of tube
failures based on those rates.
References to other sources of
detailed information:
• Main text (this chapter) pro-
vides additional detail on the
effects on mechanism of vari-
ous fuel and operating options.

30-12 Acid Dewpoint Corrosion (Economizer)

Index
Acid contamination, 15-10 through
15-12
Acid deposition, 30-2, 30-3
Acid dewpoint corrosion (economizer),
30-1 through 30-12
actions, 30-8 through 30-12
determining the extent of
damage, 30-6, 30-11
features of failure, 30-2, 30-8
locations of failure, 30-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
30-6, 30-12
mechanism, 30-3, 30-4, 30-9
precursors, 30-8
ramifications/ancillary problems,
30-12
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 30-6, 30-12
root causes and actions to
confirm, 30-5, 30-10
Acid phosphate corrosion, 16-1
through 16-28
actions, 16-22 through 16-28
case study, 16-16 through 16-20
deposit characteristics, 7-1
through 7-4, 16-2, 16-4, 16-6,
16-19, 16-20
determining the extent of
damage, 16-13, 16-25
distinguishing from hydrogen
damage or caustic gouging,
7-1, 7-2, 16-3
features of failure, 7-1, 7-2, 16-2
through 16-4, 16-18 through
16-20, 16-22
locations of failure, 16-4, 16-5
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
16-14, 16-15, 16-27
mechanism, 16-6 through 16-8,
16-23
precursors, 16-22
ramifications/ancillary problems,
16-28
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 16-13, 16-26
root causes and actions to confirm,
7-4, 16-9 through 16-12, 16-24
Additives, oil-fired units, 34-10, 34-11,
34-18, 34-19
Air inleakage, 13-24, 27-6, 27-7, 27-9,
30-4, 30-5, 41-6
Alkali iron trisulfates, 33-2, 33-7, 33-8
Alkali salts, 33-2, 33-7, 33-8
All-volatile treatment (see also
Feedwater treatment), 1-18, 3-9,
3-13
“Alligator hide”, 32-2, 33-3, 33-4, 34-5
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) Codes
design, 2-2 through 2-6
non-destructive examination, 11-3
welding 11-3, 11-4
Ammonia, 3-8, 3-9
Ash analysis, 33-12
Austenitic welds (in dissimilar metal
welds), 11-7, 35-2 through 35-9,
35-15
Availability losses and improvement,
1-20
Backing rings, 2-14, 11-4
Baffles (erosion), 14-12
Bell-shaped corrosion curve, 33-7,
33-8
Black boiler water samples, 16-11
Boiler pressure drop losses, 19-5,
19-6
Boiler Tube Failure (BTF) Reduction
Program, 1-20, 5-1 through 5-3
corporate directives for BTF
reduction, 5-2
goals, 1-20, 1-21, 5-2
multidisciplinary teams for BTF
reduction, 5-2
Boiler tube failures
formalizing programs for
reduction of, 1-20, 5-1 through
5-6
historical developments in
identification, correction and
prevention, 1-16, 1-18
importance, 1-1
importance of operation and
maintenance procedures in
preventing, 4-1
influence of cycle chemistry, 1-18,
3-1 through 3-2
influence of fuel options, 1-18
influence of operating conditions,
1-18
influence of unit lay-up, 4-9
influence of unit transients, 4-8, 4-9
influencing or influenced by
chemical cleaning, 4-2
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
largest availability losses, 1-1, 1-2
precursors to, 1-4, 1-10 through
1-15, 1-16, 12-7 through 12-12,
31-7 through 31-13
repeat failures, 1-20, 1-21
reporting and report form, 5-3
through 5-5
resulting from breakdown of
protective magnetite in
water-touched tubing, 2-11
resulting from breakdown of
protective oxide in steam-
touched tubing, 2-15
resulting from fireside conditions,
2-21
screening table, steam-touched
tubes, 1-8, 1-9, 31-4, 31-5
screening table, water-touched
tubes, 1-6, 1-7, 12-4, 12-5
steps in generic investigation 1-4,
1-5, 1-16, 12-2, 12-3, 31-2, 31-3
with significant microstructural
changes, 10-2
worldwide statistics, 1-1
Boiler tubes (see also Superheater/
reheater tubes and Waterwalls
and economizer tubes)
design considerations, 2-2
through 2-6
materials and alloys, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6
maximum design and oxidation
temperatures, 2-4, 23-2, 23-3
Boiler water treatment, 3-1 through
3-8
all-volatile treatment (see also
Feedwater treatment), 1-18,
3-9, 3-13
caustic treatment,
and caustic gouging, 17-5, 17-6,
17-10
guidelines for, 3-5, 3-6, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18,
3-5, 17-5
success factors for use of, 3-5
comparison of options, 3-6
effect on boiler tube failures
3-1, 3-2
factors during unit transients, 4-8
optimization of, 3-6 through 3-8
I-1
 phosphate treatments, 3-3 through
3-5, 16-6
and acid phosphate corrosion,
16-6 through 16-8, 16-11,
16-12,16-16, 16-17
effect of chemical additions on
operating regimes, 3-4
guidelines for, 3-5, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18,
3-3
Borio index, 33-9
Bubbling-bed FBC units, 47-1
through 47-12
chromized tubes, 47-10
plasma coatings, 47-10
tube armoring, 47-10
Burner misalignment, 15-10, 16-11,
17-10
Carbides, 10-5, 10-6
Carryover, 37-5, 37-6
of Na2SO4, 41-2, 41-5, 41-6
Caustic gouging, 17-1 through 17-22
actions, 17-16 through 17-22
case study, 17-14
deposit characteristics, 7-1
through 7-3, 17-2, 17-3, 17-6,
17-7
determining the extent of
damage, 17-11, 17-19
distinguishing from hydrogen
damage or acid phosphate
corrosion, 7-1, 7-2, 17-2
electrochemical corrosion cell,
17-6, 17-7
features of failure, 7-1, 7-2, 17-2,
17-3, 17-16
locations of failure, 17-2 through
17-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
17-12, 17-13, 17-21
mechanism, 2-11, 2-14, 17-5
through 17-7, 17-17
precursors, 17-16
ramifications/ancillary problems,
17-22
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 17-11, 17-20
root causes and actions to
confirm, 7-4, 17-8 through 17-10,
17-18
Caustic treatment (see also Boiler
water treatment),1-18, 3-5, 3-6,
3-13, 17-5,17-6, 17-10
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-2
Chemical cleaning (see also Chemical
cleaning damage in super
heater/reheater tubes and
Chemical cleaning damage:
waterwalls)
as indicator of non-optimized
feedwater chemistry, 3-2
boiler tube failures influenced by,
4-2, 36-6, 36-8
effect of changing to oxygenated
treatment, 3-11, 3-12
FBC units, 4-8
superheaters/reheaters, 4-5
through 4-7, 32-21, 33-21,
34-19, 37-5 through 37-10
importance of sampling, 4-6
locations to clean, 4-6
monitoring, 4-7
process optimization, 4-6, 4-7
reasons to perform, 4-5
solvent choice, 4-6
typical operations for, 4-7
when to clean, 4-6
waterwalls, 4-1 through 4-5
assessing cleanliness and
deposit levels, 4-2, 4-3
guidelines for, 4-1
importance, 4-1
inhibitor breakdown, 25-4
monitoring Fe levels to
determine finish, 4-5
possible problems that could
lead to damage, 25-4
solvent choice, 4-3, 4-4
typical operations for, 4-5
when to clean, 4-2
Chemical cleaning damage in
superheater/reheater tubes,
43-1 through 43-8
actions, 43-5 through 43-8
determining the extent of
damage, 43-3, 43-7
features of failure, 43-2, 43-5
locations of failure, 43-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
43-4, 43-8
mechanism, 43-2, 43-6
precursors, 43-5
ramifications/ancillary problems,
43-8
repairs and immediate
solutions/actions, 43-4, 43-8
root causes and actions to
confirm, 43-3, 43-7
Chemical cleaning damage: water
walls, 25-1 through 25-9
actions, 25-6 through 25-9
determining the extent of
damage, 25-4, 25-8
features of failure, 25-2, 25-3, 25-6
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
25-5, 25-9
mechanism, 25-4, 25-7
precursors, 25-6
ramification/ancillary problems,
25-9
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 25-5, 25-9
root causes and actions to
confirm, 25-4, 25-7
Chlorine in coal, 18-5, 18-6, 33-10,
33-11, 47-6
Chordal thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
Chromizing waterwalls, 19-15, 19-16
Circulating-bed FBC units, 48-1
through 48-4
coatings, 48-2
erosion/abrasion, 48-2 through
48-4
underdeposit corrosion, 48-2
Coal composition (see also
Combustion process and/or
Fireside scale/ash)
and corrosiveness, 18-4 through
18-6, 33-8 through 33-11
and erosiveness, 14-5 through
14-7
effect of chlorine content on fire
side corrosion in steam-
touched tubes, 33-10, 33-11
effect of chlorine content on
fireside corrosion in water-
touched tubes 18-5, 18-6
effect of sulfur level on fireside
corrosion in water-touched
tubes, 18-4
Coal particle erosion, 28-1 through
28-5
actions, 28-3 through 28-5
description and manifestation, 28-1
Coal Quality Impact Model (CQIM)
2-22, 33-14, 33-20
Coatings, 22-4, 48-2
for fireside corrosion in steam-
touched tubing, 33-18, 34-16,
34-17
for fireside corrosion in water-
touched tubing, 18-12 through
18-14
for sootblower erosion, 38-5
Cold air velocity test (CAVT) (see also
Flyash erosion), 14-12 through
14-18
Co-extruded tubing
for fireside corrosion in steam-
touched tubes, 33-20, 34-17
for fireside corrosion in water-
touched tubes, 18-14
welding, 11-7
Cold bent tubes and low-
temperature creep, 24-4
Cold end corrosion, 30-1
Combustion process,
ash formation, erosiveness, and
deposition, 2-22 through 2-24
formation of gaseous species, 2-22,
18-4
Commissioning of units,
activities to prevent future boiler
tube failures, 4-9, 4-11
Concentration in deposits, 2-13, 2-14,
15-4 through 15-6, 15-8, 15-10,
16-5 through 16-7, 17-4, 17-6, 17-7
Condenser leaks, 15-10, 15-11, 37-6
Congruent phosphate treatment
(see also Boiler water treatment),
3-4, 16-6
Coordinated phosphate treatment
(see also Boiler water treatment),
3-3, 3-4
Core monitoring parameters for
cycle chemistry, 3-14
Corporate commitment needed to
solve boiler tube failures, 5-1, 5-2
Corporate directives for BTF
reduction, 5-2
Corrosion
indices, 18-5, 18-6, 33-8 through
33-11
rates as a determinant of repair
choices, 18-11
Corrosion fatigue, 13-1 through
13-41
actions, 13-35 through 13-41
analysis of field experience, 13-13
through 13-15
breakdown of magnetite, 13-10
through 13-12
case study, 13-30 through 13-32
determining the extent of
damage, 13-26, 13-38
distinguishing from OD-initiated
fatigue, 7-6, 7-7
environmental effects on initiation
and propagation, 13-16
through 13-20
features of failure, 13-2 through
13-5, 13-35
Influence Diagram for the analysis
of corrosion fatigue, 13-24
through 13-26, 13-30 through
13-32
locations of failure, 13-6 through
13-9
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
13-28, 13-29, 13-40
mechanism, 2-11, 13-10 through
13-20, 13-36
oxygenated treatment, effect on
corrosion fatigue, 13-20
phosphate treatment, effect on
corrosion fatigue, 13-18, 13-20
precursors, 13-35
ramifications/ancillary problems,
13-41
repairs and immediate
solutions/actions, 13-27, 13-39
root causes and actions to con
firm, 13-21 through 13-26, 13-37,
13-38
stress effects on initiation and
propagation, 13-15, 13-16
Corrosion products, 1-17, 3-1, 3-2
Creep (see also Long-term overheat-
ing and Low-temperature creep
cracking), 6-8, 7-6, 7-8, 24-1
through 24-11, 32-1 through 32-32
Creep cavitation, 10-6
Creep damage
assessment techniques, 10-5
through 10-8
Larson-Miller Parameter (LMP),
10-2 through 10-6
Cycle chemistry (see also Boiler
water treatment and Feedwater
treatment),
core monitoring parameters, 3-14
developing unit-specific
guidelines, 3-12 through 3-13
diagnostic parameters, 3-14
goals for improvement program,
3-1, 3-2
guidelines documents for, 3-13
instrumentation and monitoring,
3-14
setting action levels, 3-12, 3-13
Cycling of units, 4-8, 4-9, 13-24, 20-4,
26-5, 35-12, 39-5
effect on boiler tube failures, 4-8,
4-9
effect on thermal fatigue in
economizer inlet header tubes,
20-2
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Departure from nucleate boiling
(DNB), 2-12, 2-13
Deposit density, 4-2
Deposit weight, 4-2, 4-3
Deposits (see Waterside deposits,
Feedwater corrosion products,
Concentration in deposits, Oxides
internal in steam-touched tubes,
Oxides internal in water-touched
tubes, Fireside scale/ash), 15-2,
15-4, 16-2 through 16-5, 17-2
through 17-4, 19-5
Diffusion screens (erosion), 14-14,
14-16 through 14-18
Dissolved oxygen, 13-11, 13-12,
13-16 through 13-20, 21-3, 21-4
Dissimilar metal welds, 35-1 through
35-25
actions, 35-19 through 35-25
case study, 35-17
determining the extent of
damage, 35-12, 35-13, 35-22
features of failure, 35-2 through
35-5, 35-19
influence of welding variables,
35-7 through 35-9
locations of failure, 35-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
35-15, 35-16, 35-24
mechanism, 35-6 through 35-9,
35-20
microstructural changes in
service, 35-6, 35-7
precursors, 35-19
ramifications/ancillary problems,
35-25
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 35-14, 35-23
root causes and actions to
confirm, 35-10 through 35-12,
35-21
Distorted or misaligned tubes, 14-3,
14-4, 14-11, 33-6, 33-15, 33-21,
34-5, 34-15, 34-19, 35-10, 39-5,
40-1, 40-3
Distribution screens (erosion), 14-14,
14-16 through 14-18
DMW LIFE code, 35-16
Drum boiler water treatment, 3-3
through 3-8
Drum level control, 23-6, 37-6, 41-6
“Dutchman” repair, 11-7, 35-23
Economizer inlet header tube
failures (see Erosion-corrosion of
economizer inlet header tubes
and/or Thermal fatigue in econo-
mizer inlet header tubes)
I-3
Electric resistance flash welding, 45-1
through 45-3
Equilibrium phosphate treatment (see
also Boiler water treatment), 3-3,
3-5, 16-14
Erosion (see also Flyash erosion, Coal
particle erosion, Falling
slag damage, Sootblower
erosion in superheater/reheater
tubes, Sootblower erosion in
water-touched tubing,
Fluidized-bed combustion
(FBC) units)
abrasion index, 14-6, 14-7
basics of damage mechanism,
14-5
erosiveness of ash constituents,
2-23, 2-24, 14-5, 14-6
wear propensity calculation, 14-6,
14-7
Erosion-corrosion,
general 3-9, 21-3, 21-4
Erosion-corrosion of economizer
inlet header tubes, 21-1 through
21-9
actions, 21-7 through 21-9
determining the extent of
damage, 21-5, 21-8
distinguishing from thermal
fatigue and flexibility-induced
cracking, 7-6, 7-7
features of failure, 21-1, 21-2,
21-7
locations of failure, 21-2, 21-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
21-5, 21-9
mechanism, 21-3, 21-8
precursors, 21-7
ramifications/ancillary problems,
21-9
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 21-5, 21-9
root causes and actions to
confirm, 21-4, 21-8
Excess oxygen,
high excess air in oil-fired units,
34-14, 34-19
low excess air, 18-1, 18-7, 34-14
Exfoliation of SH/RH steamside oxide,
2-17 through 2-21, 36-5, 36-7
effect of unit chemistry on, 2-21
effects, 2-17, 2-18, 2-21
failure criterion, 2-18, 2-20
rating severity of, 2-18, 2-19
susceptible materials, 2-18, 2-20,
2-21
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-4
Failure mechanisms
fluidized-bed units, Chapters 47
and 48
list, 1-3
steam-touched tubes, Volume 3
waste-to-energy units, Chapter
49, Volume 3
water-touched tubes, Volume 2
Falling slag damage, 29-1 through
29-6
actions, 29-3 through 29-6
description and manifestation,
29-1, 29-2
Fatigue in superheater/reheater
tubes, 39-1 through 39-12
actions, 39-9 through 39-12
determining the extent of
damage, 39-7, 39-11
features of failure, 39-2, 39-9
locations of failure, 39-3, 39-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
39-7, 39-12
mechanism, 39-5, 39-10
precursors, 39-9
repairs and immediate
solutions/actions, 39-7, 39-12
root causes and actions to
confirm, 39-5, 39-6, 39-11
Fatigue in water-touched tubes, 26-1
through 26-12
actions, 26-9 through 26-12
determining the extent of
damage, 26-7, 26-11
distinguishing from corrosion
fatigue, 7-6, 7-7, 26-3
features of failure, 26-2, 26-9
locations of failure, 26-3, 26-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
26-8, 26-12
mechanism, 26-5, 26-10
precursors, 26-9
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 26-8, 26-11
root causes and actions to
confirm, 26-6, 26-7, 26-11
Feedwater corrosion products,
1-17, 3-1, 3-2, 15-4, 15-14, 16-4,
16-5, 16-14, 17-2 through 17-4,
17-12, 23-5
Feedwater treatment, 3-8 through
3-12
all-volatile treatment (AVT), 3-9
guidelines for, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18
comparing AVT and oxygenated
treatment, 3-9, 3-11, 3-12
factors during unit transients, 4-8,
4-9
importance of proper choice of,
3-8
optimizing for all-ferrous
feedwater trains, 3-9 through
3-11, 21-5, 21-6
optimizing for mixed metallurgy
feedwater trains, 3-11, 21-5,
21-6
oxygen scavenger use, 3-8 through
3-10, 21-3, 21-6
oxygenated treatment (OT), 3-9
through 3-11
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-20
effect on oxide growth and
exfoliation, 2-21
guidelines for in once-through
and drum units, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18
to reduce deposition in
waterwalls, 19-5, 19-6, 19-11,
19-13, 19-15
problems with erosion-corrosion
throughout unit, 3-9
Fe-Fe carbide equilibrium diagram,
7-5, 23-2
FeO, 2-7, 32-9
Fe2O3, 2-7, 2-16, 2-17, 2-20, 32-9
Fe3O4, 2-7, 2-16, 2-17, 2-20, 32-9
Ferric oxide hydrate (FeOOH), 3-10
Film boiling, 2-12, 2-13
Finite element analysis for analyzing
corrosion fatigue, 13-29
Fireside corrosion in SH/RH tubes
(coal-fired units), 33-1 through
33-30
actions, 33-24 through 33-30
case study, 33-22
determining the extent of
damage, 33-15, 33-27
distinguishing from long-term
overheating, 6-8, 7-6 through
7-8, 33-4, 33-5
features of failure, 7-6, 7-8, 33-2
through 33-5, 33-24
locations of failure, 33-6
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
33-17 through 33-21, 33-28,
33-29
mechanism, 33-7 through 33-11,
33-25
precursors, 33-24
ramifications/ancillary problems,
33-30
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 33-16, 33-28
 root causes and actions to
confirm, 33-12 through 33-15,
33-26, 33-27
use of indices to predict
likelihood of, 33-8 through
33-10, 33-15
Fireside corrosion in SH/RH tubes
(oil-fired units), 34-1 through
34-26
actions, 34-21 through 34-26
determining the extent of
damage, 34-14, 34-24
distinguishing from long-term
overheating, 6-8, 7-6 through
7-8, 7-9, 34-5, 34-6
features of failure, 7-6, 7-8, 34-2
through 34-5, 34-21
locations of failure, 34-5
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
34-16 through 34-19, 34-25
mechanism, 34-7 through 34-10,
34-22
precursors, 34-21
ramifications/ancillary problems,
34-26
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 34-15, 34-24
root causes and actions to
confirm, 34-11 through 34-14,
34-23
Fireside corrosion in water-touched
tubes, 18-1 through 18-24
actions, 18-18 through 18-24
case study, 18-16
determining the extent of
damage, 18-11, 18-21
effect of coal chlorine content on,
18-5, 18-6
features of failure, 18-2, 18-3, 18-18
locations of failure, 18-2, 18-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
18-12 through 18-15, 18-23
mechanism, 18-4 through 18-6,
18-19
precursors, 18-18
ramifications/ancillary problems,
18-24
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 18-11, 18-22
root causes and actions to
confirm, 18-7 through 18-10
summary of field experience, 18-16
Fireside scale/ash,
compositional analysis of, 33-12,
33-15
development on SH/RH tubing,
32-10
metallurgical analysis of, 6-9
Flame impingement, 15-10, 16-11,
17-10
Fluidized-bed combustion (FBC) units
boiler tube failures in bubbling-
bed units, 47-1 through 47-12
boiler tube failures in circulating-
bed units, 48-1 through 48-4
chemical cleaning of, 4-8
Fluxdome, 9-9
Flux meter, 9-9
Flyash erosion, 14-1 through 14-29
actions, 14-23 through 14-29
case studies, 14-19 through
14-21
cold air velocity test (CAVT),
14-12 through 14-18
determining the extent of
damage, 14-11, 14-26
distinguishing from sootblower
erosion in SH/RH tubes, 7-9
estimating solids loading, 14-16
features of failure, 14-2, 14-3,
14-23
locations of failure, 14-3, 14-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
14-12 through 14-18, 14-28,
14-29
mechanism, 14-5 through 14-7,
14-24
precursors, 14-23
protection options, 14-16 through
14-18
ramifications/ancillary problems,
14-29
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 14-11, 14-27
root causes and actions to
confirm, 14-8 through 14-10,
14-25
Forging laps, 45-1, 45-2, 45-3
Fossil-fuel power plants, primary com-
ponents, 1-16
Fretting, 40-1 through 40-5
Fuel changing, blending, washing,
14-10, 18-10, 18-14, 30-3, 30-5,
30-6, 33-15, 33-20, 34-7
Gas-touched length (GTL), 32-8, 34-5
plotting as a diagnostic tool,
32-15, 33-12, 33-15
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW),
11-4, 11-6, 11-7
Gouging of tubes, 15-2, 15-3, 16-2,
16-3, 17-2, 17-3
Graphitization, 42-1 through 42-11
actions, 42-9 through 42-11
determining the extent of damage,
42-6, 42-11
distinguishing from dissimilar metal
weld failures, 42-3
distinguishing from long-term
overheating (creep), 7-9, 42-3
features of failure, 42-2, 42-3, 42-9
kinetics of growth, 42-4, 42-5
locations of failure, 42-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
42-8, 42-11
mechanism, 42-4, 42-5, 42-10
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 42-7, 42-11
root causes and actions to
confirm, 42-6, 42-11
Hardness
assessing changes in, 10-4, 10-5
metallurgical analysis, 6-7
Header flexibility, 39-4
Heat flux
effects of high levels, 15-10,
16-11, 17-10, 18-9
measuring with Fluxdome, 9-9
measuring with a flux meter, 9-9
monitoring, 9-9
Heat recovery steam generators
(HRSG), 30-1
Hideout of phosphate, 3-4, 3-8,
16-6, 16-11, 16-12
Hydrazine, 3-8, 3-9, 21-4, 27-7
Hydrogen damage, 15-1 through
15-30
actions, 15-21 through 15-30
case studies, 15-16 through
15-19
deposit characteristics, 7-1
through 7-4, 15-3
determining the extent of
damage, 9-1, 9-6, 9-7, 15-13,
15-25
distinguishing from caustic
gouging or acid phosphate
corrosion, 7-1, 7-2, 15-3
electrochemical corrosion cell, 17-6
features of failure, 7-1, 7-2, 15-2,
15-3, 15-7, 15-21
locations of failure, 15-4
I-5
 long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
15-14, 15-15, 15-27
mechanism, 2-11, 2-14, 15-5
through 15-7, 15-22, 15-23, 17-6
microstructural changes, 7-3, 15-2,
15-3, 15-7
precursors, 15-21
ramifications/ancillary problems,
15-29
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 15-14, 15-26
root causes and actions to
confirm, 7-4, 15-8 through 15-12,
15-24
Hydrogen sulfide, 18-4
Hydrostatic testing, 9-10
In-bed wastage (in bubbling-bed FBC
units), 47-5 through 47-8, 47-11,
47-12
Induction pressure welds (in dissimilar
metal welds), 35-2, 46-2
Influence diagram, 13-24 through
13-26, 13-30 through 13-32
Inhibitor breakdown during chemical
cleaning, 25-4
Inspection, 9-1 through 9-12
acoustic monitoring, 9-8
codes and standards, 9-3
eddy current testing, 9-1, 9-2, 9-7,
9-8
importance, 9-1
liquid penetrant testing, 9-1, 9-2,
9-7
magnetic particle testing, 9-1, 9-2,
9-7
NDE for different weld types, 46-4
radiographic testing, 9-1, 9-2, 9-7
ultrasonic testing, 9-1 through 9-7
detecting microstructural
changes, 9-6, 9-7, 15-13
measuring steamside oxide
thickness, 9-4 through 9-6
measuring wall thickness, 9-4
measuring waterside deposits,
9-6
Union Electric technique for
dissimilar metal welds, 35-12,
35-13
visual examination, 9-7
Instrumentation for cycle chemistry
monitoring, 3-14
Intergranular stress corrosion
cracking (see also Stress corrosion
cracking), 37-1 through 37-3
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-6
Lack of fusion weld defect (see also
Welding/repair defects), 45-1
through 45-3
Laning of gas passages, 14-8,
32-16, 33-15, 34-14
Larson-Miller Parameter (LMP), 10-2
through 10-5
Lay-up, 4-9 through 4-11, 27-7,
41-5, 41-6, 41-8
Lifetime, tubes (see also Remaining
life of tubes and Boiler tubes,
design considerations), 2-2 through
2-6, 4-5, 8-1 through 8-8, 18-12,
23-2, 23-3, 32-18, 32-19
Long-term overheating (creep), 32-1
through 32-32
actions, 32-24 through 32-32
case study, 32-22
determining the extent of
damage, 32-16, 32-29
distinguishing from fireside
corrosion, 6-8, 7-6, 7-8, 7-9, 32-2
through 32-6
distinguishing from graphitization,
7-9
distinguishing from short-term
overheating, 32-5
features of failure, 7-6, 7-8, 32-2
through 32-6, 32-24
locations of failure, 32-6 through
32-7
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
32-18 through 32-21, 32-31,
32-32
mechanism, 32-8 through 32-10,
32-25, 32-26
precursors, 32-24
ramifications/ancillary problems,
32-32
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 32-17, 32-30
root causes and actions to
confirm, 7-6, 7-8, 32-11
through 32-16, 32-27, 32-28
Low excess air for Nox control, 18-1,
18-7
Low melting point ashes (see Melting
points of fireside ashes)
Low-temperature corrosion, 30-1
Low-temperature creep cracking,
24-1 through 24-11
actions, 24-8 through 24-11
determining the extent of
damage, 24-6, 24-10
features of failure, 24-1, 24-2, 24-5,
24-8
locations of failure, 24-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
24-7, 24-11
mechanism, 24-4, 24-5, 24-9
precursors, 24-8
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 24-6, 24-11
root causes and actions to
confirm, 24-6, 24-10
Magnetite, strain tolerance, 1-18, 2-18,
2-20, 13-10
Maintenance, effects on boiler tube
failures, 4-1 through 4-12
Maintenance damage, 44-1 through
44-6
actions, 44-3 through 44-6
as a possible cause of short-term
overheating in waterwall
tubing, 23-5
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 44-1, 44-2
Maricite, 16-2 through 16-4, 16-7, 16-8
Material flaws, 45-1 through 45-6
actions, 45-4 through 45-6
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 45-1 through
45-3
Melting points of fireside ashes
coal-fired, 33-7, 33-8
oil-fired, 34-2, 34-3, 34-7 through
34-10
waste-to-energy units, 49-3
through 49-5
Membrane fins, failures associated
with, 45-1 through 45-3
Metallurgical analysis, 6-1 through
6-10
fireside scale/ash analysis, 6-9
flowchart of steps for, 6-2
importance of, 6-1
metallographic samples, 6-6, 6-7
oxide scale thickness and
morphology, 6-7, 6-8
required background information,
6-4
ring sampling for dimensional
checks, 6-6
sample evaluation form, 6-5
sample removal and shipping, 6-4
waterside deposits/scale analysis,
6-8, 6-9
MgO - V2O5 phase diagram, 34-10
Microstructure
assessing changes in austenitic
stainless steels, 10-4 through
10-5
assessing changes in ferritic
steels, 10-1 through 10-4
Microvoids, 10-6 through 10-8
Misaligned or distorted tubes, 14-3,
14-4, 14-11, 33-6, 33-15, 33-21,
34-5, 34-15, 34-19, 35-10, 39-5,
40-1, 40-3
Molten deposits, 2-22 through 2-24
Molten salt attack, 32-10, 33-7
Monitoring
displacements and strains, 9-10
heat flux, 9-9
temperatures, 8-6, 9-8, 9-9
Multidisciplinary teams for BTF reduc-
tion, 5-2
Multilaminated oxides, 2-16, 2-17
Municipal solid waste (MSW) units,
BTF issues in, 49-1 through 49-7
Nickel-based welds (in dissimilar
metal welds), 11-7, 35-2, 35-3, 35-5
through 35-9, 35-15
Nitrogen blanketing (see Layup)
Nucleate boiling, 2-12, 2-13
Oil composition
and corrosiveness, 34-7, 34-8
effect of additives on corrosive-
ness, 34-9, 34-10, 34-15, 34-18,
34-19
Oil-fired boilers
fireside corrosion in, 34-1 through
34-26
maintenance damage while
washing, 44-1
Operation and maintenance, effects
on boiler tube failures, 4-1 through
4-12
Orifice plugging, 23-5
Ovality of tubes, 24-4, 24-5
Over-fire air, 18-1, 18-7
Oxide notch, 35-3, 35-4, 35-6
Oxide thickness (see also Oxides,
internal in steam-touched tubes),
2-14 through 2-21, 4-5, 4-6, 6-7,
6-8, 8-2 through 8-6, 9-4 through
9-6, 10-2, 32-9
Oxides internal in steam-touched
tubes,
development and breakdown, 2-14
through 2-21, 10-2, 32-2, 32-9
exfoliation, 2-17 through 2-21,
36-5 through 36-7
failure criterion, 2-18, 2-20
growth on austenitic materials,
2-17, 8-4, 8-5
growth on ferritic materials, 2-16,
2-17, 8-4, 8-5, 10-2
influence on tube metal tempera-
tures, 4-6, 8-4, 8-5, 9-4, 9-5, 32-2
life assessment analysis of, 8-2
through 8-4
life improvement by chemical
cleaning of, 4-5
measuring by ultrasonic testing,
9-4 through 9-6
metallurgical analysis of, 6-7, 6-8
spalling, 2-17 through 2-21, 36-5,
36-6
Oxides, internal in water-touched
tubes,
comparing most common forms,
2-7
formation, 2-6 through 2-12, 19-7
general nature of, 1-18
model explaining regular array of
cracking, 13-10, 13-11
Pourbaix diagram, 13-11, 13-12
protective magnetite breakdown
and resulting boiler tube
failures, 1-18, 2-10, 2-11, 13-10
through 13-13
protective magnetite growth, 2-8
strain tolerance of magnetite, 2-11,
13-10
Oxygen (see also Dissolved oxygen)
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-16
through 13-20
Oxygen scavengers 3-8, 3-9, 3-10,
21-3 through 21-6
Oxygenated treatment (see also
Feedwater treatment), 1-18, 3-9
through 3-11, 3-13, 19-5, 19-6,
19-11, 19-13, 19-15
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-20
effect on growth and exfoliation,
2-21, 19-5, 19-6, 19-11, 19-13,
19-15
Pad-type thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
Pad welding (see also Repair and
replacement of boiler tubes), 11-5,
11-6, 13-27, 15-15, 16-13, 16-14,
17-11, 17-12, 22-4, 38-6, 46-2, 46-3
Personnel, importance of training,
5-2
pH depression, 13-16 through
13-20, 13-23, 13-24, 15-10 through
15-12, 15-14, 15-15
pH elevation, 17-5
Phosphate control, 3-3, 3-4, 16-6
through 16-8
Phosphate control diagrams, 3-3,
3-4, 16-7
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Phosphate hideout, 3-4, 3-8, 16-6,
16-11, 16-12
Phosphate treatment (see also Boiler
water treatment), 1-18, 3-3
through 3-5, 3-13, 16-6 through
16-8, 16-12, 16-14, 16-16, 16-17
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-18,
13-20
Pitting in superheater/reheater
tubes, 41-1 through 41-14
actions, 41-10 through 41-14
determining the extent of
damage, 41-8, 41-12
features of failure, 41-2, 41-3, 41-10
locations of failure, 41-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
41-8, 41-13
mechanism, 41-4, 41-11
precursors, 41-10
ramifications/ancillary problems,
41-13
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 41-8, 41-12
root causes and actions to
confirm, 41-6, 41-7, 41-12
Pitting in water-touched tubes (see
also Chemical cleaning damage:
waterwalls), 27-1 through 27-13
actions, 27-9 through 27-13
determining the extent of
damage, 27-7, 27-12
features of failure, 27-2, 27-3, 27-9
initiation, 27-4
locations of failure, 27-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
27-7, 27-13
mechanism, 27-4, 27-5, 27-10
precursors, 27-9
ramifications/ancillary problems,
27-13
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 27-7, 27-12
root causes and actions to con
firm, 27-6, 27-11
Plasma coating (see Coatings)
PODIS (Prediction of Damage in
Service) code, 35-15, 35-16
Polythionic acid, 37-5, 37-6
Post-exposure testing of tubes 10-6,
10-8
Pourbaix diagram, iron, high tempera-
ture, 13-11, 13-12
Pressure drop across circulation
pumps (orifices plugging), 23-4,
23-5
I-7
Pressure drop losses in boiler, 19-5,
19-6
Protective oxide, 1-18, 2-6 through
2-21
Pyrites (effect on erosion), 2-23, 2-24,
14-5 through 14-7
Quartz (effect on erosion), 2-23, 2-24,
14-5 through 14-7, 47-6
Reducing fireside conditions, 18-1
through 18-5, 18-7
Reducing feedwater conditions, 21-3,
21-4
Refuse-derived fuel (RDF) units (see
also Waste-to-energy units) 49-1
through 49-7
Remaining life computer codes, 8-3
through 8-6
NOTIS, 8-3
TUBECALC, 8-3
TUBELIFE, 8-3 through 8-6, 10-8
TUBEPRO, 8-3
Remaining life of tubes,
accelerated creep rupture testing,
8-5, 8-6
assessment, 8-1 through 8-8,
32-18, 32-19
assessment methods for SH/RH
tubes, 8-1 through 8-7, 32-18,
32-19, 33-17, 33-18, 34-16
assessment methods for water-
walls and economizer tubes, 8-7
assessment to optimize actions
for fireside corrosion, 18-12
computer codes, 8-3 through 8-6
for graphitization in SH/RH tubes,
42-4, 42-5
improvement by chemical
cleaning of SH/RH tubes, 4-5
roadmap for analysis of, 8-3
statistical analysis, 8-6, 8-7
Repair and replacement of boiler
tubes (see also Welding/repair
defects), 11-1 through 11-8
boiler tube buildup, 11-6
codes for weld repair, 11-3
dissimilar metal welds 11-7
general requirements, 11-4
pad welding, 11-5, 11-6, 13-27,
15-15, 16-13, 16-14, 17-11,
17-12, 22-4, 38-5, 46-2, 46-3
repair strategies, 11-1, 11-2
roadmap for weld repair, 11-2
tube section replacement, 11-4,
11-5
welding co-extruded tubes, 11-7
welding problems that can lead to
boiler tube failures, 46-2
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-8
window welding (canoe piece
repairs), 11-6, 11-7, 15-15,
16-13, 17-11
Residual oils, 34-7
high vanadium, 34-7
low vanadium, 34-8
Mexican, 34-8
Rifled tubes, 2-13, 15-15, 16-14, 17-12
“Ripple” magnetite, 2-10, 19-3
Root passes in welding repairs, 11-4,
11-5
Rubbing/fretting failures, 40-1 through
40-5
actions, 40-3 through 40-5
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 40-1, 40-2
Rupture times, 23-2, 23-3
Rust on tubes following washing,
14-2, 22-1, 38-2
Sampling, 9-10
Secondary tube failures, identifying,
7-10, 7-11
Shielded metal arc welding (SMAW),
11-4, 11-6, 11-7
Shields
for corrosion resistance, 33-18,
33-19, 34-16
for erosion resistance, 14-12, 22-4
Short-term overheating in super-
heater/reheater tubes, 36-1
through 36-16
actions, 36-12 through 36-16
case study, 36-10
determining the extent of
damage, 36-9, 36-15
distinguishing from long-term
overheating, 36-2, 36-3
features of failure, 36-2 through
36-4, 36-12
locations of failure, 36-3, 36-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
36-10, 36-16
mechanism, 36-4, 36-13
precursors, 36-12
ramifications/ancillary problems,
36-16
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 36-9, 36-15
root causes and actions to
confirm, 36-5 through 36-8,
36-14
Short-term overheating in waterwall
tubing, 23-1 through 23-14
actions, 23-9 through 23-14
determining the extent of
damage, 23-7, 23-12
distinguishing among the three
levels of, 7-5, 7-6, 23-2 through
23-4
features of failure, 23-2 through
23-4, 23-9
locations of failure, 23-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
23-8, 23-13
mechanism, 23-5, 23-10
precursors, 23-9
ramifications/ancillary problems,
23-14
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 23-7, 23-13
root causes and actions to
confirm, 23-5, 23-6, 23-11
Shutdown of units, 4-8, 4-9, 27-6,
37-10, 41-4 through 41-6
Sigma phase of austenitic stainless
steels, 10-4, 10-5, 32-3
Slagging, 2-22, 2-23, 19-6 through
19-8, 29-2, 36-12
Slagging propensity, 29-2
Solid particle erosion in the turbine,
32-32, 36-5, 36-12, 36-16
Solvent choice for chemical cleaning,
4-3, 4-4, 4-6
Sootblower erosion in superheater/
reheater tubes, 38-1 through
38-10
actions, 38-7 through 38-10
determining the extent of
damage, 38-5, 38-9
distinguishing from flyash erosion,
7-9, 38-3
features of failure, 38-2, 38-3,
38-7
locations of failure, 38-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
38-5, 38-6, 38-10
mechanism, 38-4, 38-8
precursors, 38-7
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 38-5, 38-10
root causes and actions to
confirm, 38-4, 38-9
Sootblower erosion in water-touched
tubing, 22-1 through 22-9
actions, 22-6 through 22-9
determining the extent of damage,
22-3, 22-8
features of failure, 22-1, 22-6
locations of failure, 22-1
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
22-4, 22-9
 mechanism, 22-2, 22-7
precursors, 22-6
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 22-4, 22-8
root causes and actions to
confirm, 22-2, 22-3, 22-8
Sootblower operation and mainte-
nance practices (see also
Sootblower erosion in
superheater/reheater tubes and
Sootblower erosion in water-
touched tubes), 22-2
Spacers, 26-3
Spalling of SH/RH steamside oxide,
2-17 through 2-21, 36-5, 36-6
Spray coatings (see Coatings)
Spheroidization, 10-3, 32-3, 42-4
Stagnant water, 27-1, 27-4, 27-5, 41-2,
41-4, 41-5
Startup of units, 4-8, 4-9, 27-6
Steam blanketing, 2-12, 2-13, 15-5,
15-6, 16-6 through 16-8, 17-5
through 17-7
Steam flow redistribution, 32-19
through 32-21, 33-21, 34-19
Steam impingement, importance of
identifying, 7-10, 7-11
Steam monitoring, 3-14, 41-8
Steamside oxide (see Oxides, internal
in steam-touched tubes)
Strain age embrittlement, 45-1
Strains, monitoring, 9-10
Stress analysis for analyzing corrosion
fatigue, 13-29
Stress corrosion cracking, 37-1
through 37-16
actions, 37-12 through 37-16
case study, 37-10
determining the extent of
damage, 37-8, 37-15
distinguishing from stress
corrosion cracking and inter-
granular corrosion, 7-10
features of failure, 37-2, 37-3, 37-12
locations of failure, 37-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
37-9, 37-16
mechanism, 37-4, 37-5, 37-13
precursors, 37-12
ramifications/ancillary problems,
37-16
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 37-8, 37-15
root causes and actions to
confirm, 37-6 through 37-8,
37-14
Substoichiometric fireside conditions,
18-1 through 18-5, 18-7
Sulfidation, 18-4, 33-7, 33-8
Supercritical steam properties, 19-6
Supercritical waterwall cracking, 19-1
through 19-22
actions, 19-19 through 19-22
case study, 19-16
chromizing waterwalls, 19-15, 19-16
determining the extent of
damage, 19-14, 19-21
features of failure, 19-2, 19-3, 19-18
in oil-/gas-fired units, 19-10
international experience base, 19-5,
19-6, 19-16
locations of failure, 19-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
19-15, 19-16, 19-22
mechanism, 19-5 through 19-10,
19-19
precursors, 19-18
ramifications/ancillary problems,
19-22
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 19-14, 19-21
root causes and actions to
confirm, 19-11 through 19-13,
19-20
Superheater/reheater chemical clean-
ing (see also Chemical clean-
ing), 4-5 through 4-7
solvent choice, 4-6
Superheater/reheater tubes,
basics, 2-5, 2-6, 32-8
failure mechanisms screening
table, 1-8, 1-9, 31-4, 31-5
maximum metal temperatures,
32-8, 32-9
temperature distribution in, 32-11,
32-14, 32-15
Supports, 26-3, 35-10, 35-11, 39-3,
39-4
Temperature measurements,
in economizer inlet headers, 20-6,
20-7, 20-10
in SH/RH tubes, 32-11, 32-14
10 o’clock - 2 o’clock flats, 32-2,
32-10, 33-2, 33-3,
Thermal-hydraulic regimes in boiler
tubes, 2-12 through 2-14
conditions that lead to deposit
formation, 2-13, 2-14
global, 2-12, 2-13
local, 2-13, 2-14
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Thermal fatigue in economizer inlet
header tubes, 20-1 through
20-19
actions, 20-14 through 20-19
assessment methodology, 20-9
case study, 20-12, 20-13
determining the extent of
damage, 20-8, 20-17
distinguishing from erosion-
corrosion and flexibility-
induced cracking, 7-6, 7-7, 20-4
features of failure, 20-2, 20-3, 20-14
locations of failure, 20-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
20-11, 20-19
mechanism, 20-4, 20-5, 20-15
precursors, 20-14
ramifications/ancillary problems,
20-19
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 20-9 through 20-11,
20-18
root causes and actions to
confirm, 20-6, 20-7, 20-16
Thermocouples, 8-6, 9-8, 9-9
chordal thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
pad-type thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
Thermogravimetry analysis, 33-12,
33-15
Transgranular stress corrosion crack-
ing (see also Stress corrosion
cracking), 37-1 through 37-3
TUBELIFE, 8-3 through 8-6, 10-8
Tube blockage, 23-5, 36-5
Tube build-up, 11-6
Tube manufacturing laps, 45-1, 45-2,
45-3
Tube ovality, 24-4, 24-5
Tube temperatures
increased by increasing oxide
thickness, 4-5, 8-3, 8-4, 9-4
measuring via thermocouples, 8-6,
9-8, 9-9
predicted by oxide growth laws
compared to thermocouple
measurements, 8-4 through 8-6
Two phase flow, 2-12, 2-13
U-bends in tubes as fatigue site, 26-3,
26-4, 39-3
Ultrasonic measurement of oxide
thickness, 4-6, 9-4 through 9-6,
32-11
I-9
Underdeposit corrosion,
acid phosphate corrosion, 16-1
through 16-28
caustic gouging, 17-1 through
17-22
distinguishing among the types,
7-1 through 7-5
hydrogen damage, 15-1 through
15-30
in bubbling-bed FBC units, 47-3,
through 47-5, 47-9
in circulating-bed FBC units, 48-2
Unit lay-up,
as a cause of boiler tube failures,
4-9, 27-7, 41-1, 41-6, 41-8
options, 4-9 through 4-11, 27-7,
41-8
Unit startup and shutdown,
effect on boiler tube failures, 4-8,
4-9
effect on pitting in water-touched
tubes, 27-6
effect on pitting in SH/RH tubes,
41-6
effect on stress corrosion
cracking in SH/RH tubes,
37-10
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-10
V2O5 - MgO phase diagram, 34-10
V2O5 - Na2O phase diagram, 34-3
Vanadates, 32-2, 32-3
Vibration in tubes as cause of fatigue,
26-6, 39-6, 39-11
Vortex shedding, 26-6, 39-6, 39-11
Waste-to-energy units, BTF issues
in, 49-1 through 49-7
additives, 49-5
erosion, 49-2, 49-3, 49-7
fireside corrosion of SH/RH, 49-3
through 49-6
fireside corrosion of waterwalls,
49-3 through 49-6
high chlorides, 49-2
Water chemistry (see Boiler water
treatment and/or Feedwater treat-
ment)
Waterside fireside corrosion (see
Fireside corrosion in water-touched
tubes)
Water-steam cycle
ingress, corrosion and deposition
in drum units, 1-17
ingress, corrosion and deposition
in once-through units, 1-17
introduction to 1-16
Waterwall deposits,
effect on tube metal temperatures,
19-7, 19-8
local tube conditions that can
cause, 2-13, 2-14, 15-4, 15-5,
15-6, 15-8, 15-10, 16-5, 17-4
measuring by ultrasonic testing, 9-6
metallurgical analysis of, 6-8, 15-2,
15-3, 16-2, 16-3, 16-18 through
16-20, 17-2, 17-3
rate of accumulation, 2-9
Waterwalls and economizer tubes,
basics, 2-4, 2-5
failure mechanisms screening
table, 1-6, 1-7, 12-4, 12-5
Weld build-up, 11-6
Welding/repair defects, 45-1, 46-1
through 46-7
actions, 46-5 through 46-7
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 46-1 through
46-4
Welding repairs (see also Repair and
replacement of boiler tubes), 11-1
through 11-8
Wick boiling, 2-13, 2-14
Window welds (canoe piece repairs),
11-6, 11-7, 15-15, 16-13, 17-11
Boiler Tube Failures:
Theory and Practice
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes

R. B. Dooley
Electric Power Research Institute

and

W. P. McNaughton
Cornice Engineering, Inc.

i
 About EPRI
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ii
Table of Contents Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes

Chapter Page
31 Introduction to Volume 3 31-1
31.1 Subject Matter and Objectives for This Volume 31-1
31.2 Organization of Volume 3 31-1
31.3 Optimizing the Use of this Volume 31-2
31.4 For BTF Mechanisms Not Covered by This Book 31-2
32 Long-Term Overheating/Creep 32-1
Introduction 32-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 32-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 32-8
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 32-11
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 32-16
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 32-17
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 32-18
7. Case Study 32-22
8. References 32-23
ACTIONS 32-24
33 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units 33-1
Introduction 33-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 33-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 33-7
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 33-12
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 33-15
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 33-16
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 33-17
7. Case Study 33-22
8. References 33-22
ACTIONS 33-24
34 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units 34-1
Introduction 34-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 34-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 34-7
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 34-11
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 34-14
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 34-15
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 34-16
8. References 34-20
ACTIONS 34-21

iii
Table of Contents Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes (continued)

Chapter Page

35 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures 35-1

Introduction 35-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 35-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 35-6
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 35-10
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 35-12
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 35-14
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 35-15
7. Case Study 35-17
8. References 35-18
ACTIONS 35-19
36 Short-Term Overheating in SH/RH Tubing 36-1
Introduction 36-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 36-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 36-4
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 36-5
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 36-9
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 36-9
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 36-10
7. Case Study 36-10
8. References 36-11
ACTIONS 36-12
37 Stress Corrosion Cracking 37-1
Introduction 37-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 37-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 37-4
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 37-6
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 37-8
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 37-8
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 37-9
7. Case Study 37-10
8. References 37-11
ACTIONS 37-12
38 SH/RH Sootblower Erosion 38-1
Introduction 38-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 38-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 38-4
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 38-4
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 38-5
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 38-5
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 38-5
8. References 38-6
ACTIONS 38-7

iv
Table of Contents Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes (continued)

Chapter Page
39 Fatigue in Steam-Touched Tubes 39-1
Introduction 39-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 39-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 39-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 39-5
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 39-7
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 39-7
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 39-7
8. References 39-8
ACTIONS 39-9
40 Rubbing/Fretting Steam-Touched Tubes 40-1
Description of Boiler Tube Failure and Its Manifestation 40-1
References 40-2
ACTIONS 40-3
41 Pitting in Steam-Touched Tubes 41-1
Introduction 41-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 41-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 41-4
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 41-6
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 41-8
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 41-8
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 41-8
8. References 41-9
ACTIONS 41-10
42 Graphitization 42-1
Introduction 42-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 42-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 42-4
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 42-6
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 42-6
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 42-7
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 42-8
8. References 42-8
ACTIONS 42-9
43 Chemical Cleaning Damage: SH/RH 43-1
Introduction 43-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 43-2
2. Mechanism of Failure 43-2
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 43-3
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 43-3
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 43-4
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 43-4
8. References 43-4
ACTIONS 43-5

v
Table of Contents Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes (continued)

Chapter Page

44 Maintenance Damage 44-1

Description of Boiler Tube Failure and Its Manifestation 44-1
References 44-2
ACTIONS 44-3
45 Rubbing/Fretting Steam-Touched Tubes 45-1
Description of Boiler Tube Failure and Its Manifestation 45-1
References 45-3
ACTIONS 45-4
46 Welding/Repair Defects 46-1
Description of Boiler Tube Failure and Its Manifestation 46-1
References 46-4
ACTIONS 46-5
47 BTF Issues in Bubbling Bed FBCs 47-1
Introduction 47-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations 47-3
2. Mechanism of Failure 47-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm 47-7
4. Determining the Extent of Damage 47-9
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions 47-9
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention
of Repeat Failures 47-10
8. References 47-12
48 BTF Issues in Circulating Bed FBCs 48-1
BTF Issues in Circulating Bed FBCs 48-1
Erosion-Abrasion of Waterwall Tubes 48-2
Potential for Waterside Corrosion in Horizontal Tubing 48-4
References 48-4
49 Issues in BTF of Waste-to-Energy Units 49-1
Introduction 49-1
Types of Boilers Combusting MSW 49-1
Overview of the Demands Placed on Boiler Tubes in WTE Units 49-2
Mechanism: Waterwall Thinning Along the Grate Line 49-3
Mechanism: Corrosion by Deposits Containing
Low-Melting Point Chlorides and Sulfates 49-3
Mechanism: Corrosion by Combustion Gases 49-6
Mechanism: Erosion-Assisted Corrosion 49-7
References 49-7
Index I-1

vi
 A: B:
BTF - BTF -
Mechanism Unknown Known Mechanism
(Table 31-2)
Compare Macroscopic Tentative identification of
Appearance to Table 12-1, mechanism(s). Go to
Volume 2 (Water-touched) Volume 2 (Water-touched)
or Table 31-1, or Volume 3 (Steam-
(Steam-touched) Tubes to touched) Tubes.
identify candidate(s) Follow actions
Action 1a: Perform
Screening Analysis: Is it
possible that this boiler tube
No
failure is caused by this
mechanism?
Yes
Action 2: Determine
(confirm) mechanism
Action 3: Determine root
cause
Action 4: Determine extent
of damage or affected
areas
Action 5: Implement
repairs, immediate
solutions and actions
Action 6: Implement
long-term solutions to
prevent repeat failures
Action 7: Determine possible
ramifications/ancillary unit
problems
C:
Chapter 31 • Volume 3
Anticipating Future BTF
(Table 31-3)
Tentative identification of
Introduction and Use
mechanism(s). Go to
Volume 2 (Water-touched)
or Volume 3 (Steam-
touched) Tubes.
Action 1b: Screening
Analysis:
¥ Review precursor list in
of Volume 3
mechanism chapter
¥ Remove tube sample to
determine extent of
damage
Yes Are BTF likely to occur in
the future by this
mechanism?
No
31.1 Subject Matter and 31.2.1 Theory and Background Ð
Objectives for This Volume the first half of each chapter The
The primary objective of this volume Theory and Background matter gen-
is to provide the most recent knowl- erally includes the following topics:
edge about boiler tube failures 1.0 Features of Failure and Typical
(BTF) in steam-touched tubing of Locations
conventional fossil-fueled power
plants. Constituent objectives are: 2.0 Mechanisms of Failure
• To provide sufficient theory and 3.0 Possible Root Causes and
background information so that Actions to Confirm
the reader can: (i) identify boiler 4.0 Determining the Extent of
tube failure mechanisms, (ii) Damage
determine their root cause, and
5.0 Background to Repairs,
(iii) apply immediate solutions to
Immediate Solutions and
correct the problem, and (iv)
Actions
implement longer-term strategies
to prevent their reoccurrence. 6.0 Background to Long-Term
Actions and the Prevention of
• To provide direct, easy-to-follow
Repeat Failures
actions to be taken in the event
that a boiler tube failure or pre- 7.0 Case Studies
cursor has occurred. 8.0 References
31.2 Organization of Volume 3 A key part of each Theory and
Background section is a Table that
Each chapter deals with a specific
ties together the possible root
boiler tube failure mechanism. With
causes, actions to confirm, immedi-
only a few exceptions each chapter
ate actions/solutions and long-term
consists of two parts. The first half
actions.
covers the Theory and Background
about the mechanism; the second It is crucial that the root cause of the
half addresses Actions to be taken. damage be clearly identified so that
the correct actions (short- and long-
term) can be properly chosen. To fail
in either identification or correction is
to open the door to repeat failures.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 31-1
31.2.2 Actions - the second half of
each chapter The second half of
each chapter contains Actions to be
followed by the investigator or BTF
team if (i) a boiler tube failure has
occurred and a particular mecha-
nism is suspected, or (ii) if a unit pre-
cursor has occurred that might lead
to a future BTF by this mechanism.
Note that throughout the three vol-
umes, actions are generally marked
with a special symbol, “➠”. The
Actions are numbered in a manner
consistent with the Theory and
Background section. That is, Action
2 corresponds to Section 2.0 of the
Theory and Background section; the
former details specific actions to be
taken to confirm the mechanism, the
latter provides additional information
about the mechanism, why these
specified actions are to be taken
and how the mechanism develops.
31.3 Optimizing the Use of this
Volume
Figure 31-1 shows that three
avenues are open to the investigator
or BTF team depending upon the
status of the BTF event:
• A: BTF with mechanism
unknown. If a BTF in steam-
touched tubing has occurred and
the mechanism is not known, then
Table 31-1 should be consulted.
The aim of this table is to provide
a starting point for the investiga-
tion based on the macroscopic
appearance of the failure and a
description of typical locations.
From it, a preliminary choice of
mechanism can be made, then
the Actions for that mechanism
followed to confirm that the
choice was correct. Note that as
shown in Table 31-1, two BTF
mechanisms (those caused by
low temperature creep cracking
and flyash erosion), common to
both steam-touched and water-
touched tubing, are covered in
Volume 2.
31-2 Introduction and Use of Volume 3
• B: BTF with known
mechanism. If the BTF Team has
knowledge from past failures that
a particular mechanism is the
likely cause, then Table 31-2, an
index to Volumes 2 and 3, can be
used to go directly to the appro-
priate chapter.
• C: Anticipating future BTF.
The BTF Team should continually
anticipate possible failures by
reviewing key unit/boiler operat-
ing events, that can lead to future
BTF. Table 31-3 is a tool that can
help to anticipate BTF. It is orga-
nized as a series of “unit precur-
sors”. These are events or condi-
tions that experience has shown
should be cause for detailed
evaluation of the potential for
future BTF, even though no BTF
has yet occurred. The process is
not unlike routine inspection of
components; it may take only one
identification of an incipient failure
to justify the cost-effectiveness of
the practice to even the most
cost-conscious management.
Table 31-1 is organized in five sec-
tions: (1.0) inspection results or
appearance, (2.0) cycle chemistry
events, (3.0) maintenance-related,
(4.0) operation-related, and (5.0)
specific equipment events.
The BTF Team or investigator may
find that the best way to implement
this table is to work through each
precursor and ask: “Has this precur-
sor occurred in our utility/unit?”, or
“Have we taken this action
recently?” If the answer to either is
“yes”, then a review of the mecha-
nism(s) indicated in the final column
may be indicated. Note that this
table includes both water-touched
and steam-touched tubing.
In compiling this table, an attempt
has been made to limit the “precur-
sor” list to those which (i) can be
easily identified, (ii) are important
observations and will be useful for
indicating a potential BTF problem,
(iii) are not direct indications of
boiler tube damage (an inspection
that finds cracks at the toe of a
tube/attachment weld would be a
direct indicator of a BTF), and (iv)
are reasonably likely to lead to a
BTF based on past evidence.
Clearly, it is not possible to put
every possible precursor in Table
31-3, but it is hoped that two objec-
tives are achieved. First, that forced
outages by BTF are reduced by
anticipating the pre-conditions to the
most common mechanisms.
Second, that a first step will be
taken to improve the understanding
of the complex, interconnected
nature of cycle chemistry, operating
practice, combustion processes,
and maintenance effects on BTF.
As a final note, the list should not
pre-empt good engineering judg-
ment. If a precursor is found that
you think should be an alert of a
future problem, follow it up, even if it
is not in this particular list.
31.4 For BTF Mechanisms Not
Covered in this Book
If, having gone through the above
procedure, it appears that the BTF
experienced is not covered in this
book, or if multiple mechanisms
appear to be operative, then the
generic investigation procedure
shown in Figure 31-1 is still applica-
ble. Specifically, it is important that
the following sequence be followed:
Understand the mechanism
¯
Determine the root cause
¯
Apply proper long-term solution
Removal of a tube sample and use
of metallurgical techniques should
enable an understanding of the
underlying damage processes (ero-
sion, corrosion, overheating, creep,
fatigue, environmentally-assisted
cracking, etc.) and may facilitate
assignment of the BTF to one of the
categories discussed here, which
will then provide additional guid-
ance to the investigator.
 A: B: C:
BTF - BTF - Anticipating Future BTF
Mechanism Unknown Known Mechanism (Table 31-3)
(Table 31-2)

Compare Macroscopic Tentative identification of Tentative identification of

Appearance to Table 12-1, mechanism(s). Go to mechanism(s). Go to
Volume 2 (Water-touched) Volume 2 (Water-touched) Volume 2 (Water-touched)
or Table 31-1, or Volume 3 (Steam- or Volume 3 (Steam-
(Steam-touched) Tubes to touched) Tubes. touched) Tubes.
identify candidate(s) Follow actions

Action 1a: Perform Action 1b: Screening

Screening Analysis: Is it
possible that this boiler tube
No
failure is caused by this
mechanism?
Yes
Action 2: Determine
(confirm) mechanism
Analysis:
¥ Review precursor list in
mechanism chapter
¥ Remove tube sample to
determine extent of
damage
Yes Are BTF likely to occur in
the future by this
mechanism?

No
Action 3: Determine root
cause

Action 4: Determine extent

of damage or affected
areas

Action 5: Implement
repairs, immediate
solutions and actions

Action 6: Implement
long-term solutions to
prevent repeat failures

Action 7: Determine possible

ramifications/ancillary unit
problems

Figure 31-1. Flowchart of actions for identifying, evaluating, and anticipating boiler tube failures.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 31-3

Table 31-1
Screening Table for Steam-Touched Boiler Tube Failures
Typical Fracture Other Likely Macroscopic and Possible Chapter in Volume 3
Surface Appearance Metallographic Features Typical Locations Mechanism (or 2 as noted)

Thick-Edged Fracture Surface

Thick-edged Outside surface initiated, inter-
granular crack growth with
evidence of grain boundary creep
cavitation and creep voids.
Predominant in lower temperature Low-Temperature Chap. 24
regions in tube bends, particularly Creep Cracking Volume 2
at intrados on outside surface, and
other locations subject to high
residual, forming, or service stresses.

Thick-edged Internal thick scales, may be accom-
panied by external wastage at 10
o’clock and 2 o’clock positions;
generally longitudinal (axial)
orientation; damage on heated side
of tube.
Highest temperature locations: near Long-Term 32
material transitions, where there is a Overheating
variation in gas-touched length, in or (Creep)
just beyond cavities, in the final leg
of tubing just prior to the outlet
header.

Thick-edged, leak Usually fusion line cracking on low At dissimilar metal welds. Dissimilar Metal 35
alloy side of weld, circumferential Weld Failure
orientation.

Thick-edged Cracking is transgranular or inter-
(may manifest as granular usually with significant
a pin-hole) branching; initiation can be at ID
(most common) or on OD,
circumferential or longitudinal
orientation.
Bends and straight tubing with low Stress Corrosion 37
spots; high stress locations are Cracking
particularly susceptible at bends,
welds, tube attachments, supports
or spacers.

Thick-edged Transgranular cracking, OD-initiated Tubing-related failures associated Fatigue 39

and associated with tubing (at tube with attachments or bends in tubing;
bends or attachments) or headers header-related generally at ends of
(particularly at the ends) header.

Thick-edged, leak Most commonly in HAZ of C or Adjacent to weld fusion line at heat Graphitization 42
C-Mo steel tubes; key is affected zone most common.
microstructure appearance of
graphite particles or nodules

Thin-Edged Fracture Surface

Thin-edged External polishing of tube surface; Most prominent in backpass regions; Flyash Erosion Chap. 14
(unless creep-assisted) very localized damage bends near to walls. Volume 2

31-4 Introduction and Use of Volume 3

Table 31-1
Screening Table for Steam-Touched Boiler Tube Failures (continued)
Typical Fracture Other Likely Macroscopic and Possible Chapter in Volume 3
Surface Appearance Metallographic Features Typical Locations Mechanism (or 2 as noted)

Thin-Edged Fracture Surface (continued)

Thin-edged External damage; wastage at 10 Highest temperature tubes: leading Fireside Corrosion 33 (Coal-fired units)
and 2 o’clock (flue gas at 12 o’clock); tubes, near transitions, tubes out of (coal-fired units
longitudinal cracking; perhaps alignment, tubes around radiant and oil-fired units) 34 (Oil-fired units)
“alligator hide” appearance; real key cavities.
to identification will be the presence
of low-melting point ash in external
deposits

Thin-edged Often shows signs of tube bulging Most commonly near bottom bends Short-Term 36
or “fish-mouth” appearance, in vertical loops of SH/RH; outlet Overheating
longitudinal orientation. legs, and near material transitions.

Thin-edged, External wastage flats at 45° around First tubes in from wall entrance of Sootblower 38
pin-hole or “thin” tube from sootblower direction, little retractable blowers; tubes in direct Erosion
longitudinal blowout or no ash. path of retractable blowers.

Thin-edged External damage; obvious metal-to- Rubbing/ Fretting 40

metal contact on tube surface

Pinhole Damage

Pitting Internal tube surface damage. For pitting: Tubes where condensate Chemical 41 or 43
can form and remain during shut- Cleaning Damage
down: bottoms of pendant loops on or Pitting
either SH or RH, low points in
sagging horizontal tubes.

Various Other Damage Types

Depends on the Usually obvious from type of damage Maintenance 44

underlying cause and correspondence to past Damage
maintenance activity

Depends on defect Materials Flaws 45

Usually thick-edged Care required to separate weld Welding Flaws 46

or pinholes defects from another problem located
at a weld

Note: This table is based on simple, macroscopic features of failure and should be used as a guide to a particular chapter for further analysis. The more detailed discus-
sions, starting with Actions can then be used for identification and confirmation of the actual mechanism.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 31-5

Table 31-2
Index to BTF Mechanisms
Chapter Chapter
Steam-Touched Tubes In Volume 3 Water-Touched Tubes In Volume 2

Chemical cleaning damage in SH/RH tubes 43 Acid dewpoint corrosion 30

Dissimilar metal weld failures 35 Acid phosphate corrosion 16

Fatigue in steam-touched tubes 39 Caustic gouging 17

Fireside corrosion in SH/RH tubes (coal-fired units) 33 Chemical cleaning damage 25

Fireside corrosion in SH/RH tubes (oil-fired units) 34 Coal particle erosion 28

Flyash erosion 14 (Volume 2) Corrosion fatigue 13

Graphitization 42 Erosion-corrosion (economizer inlet headers) 21

Long-term overheating/creep 32 Fatigue in water-cooled tubes 26

Low-temperature creep cracking 24 (Volume 2) Falling slag erosion 29

Maintenance damage 44 Fireside corrosion (coal-fired units) 18

Material flaws 45 Flyash erosion 14

Pitting in steam-touched tubes 41 Hydrogen damage 15

Short-term overheating 36 Low-temperature creep 24

Sootblower erosion in SH/RH tubes 38 Maintenance damage 44 (Volume 3)

Stress corrosion cracking 37 Material flaws 45 (Volume 3)

Rubbing tubes/fretting 40 Pitting in water-touched tubes 27

Welding flaws 46 Short-term overheating 23

Sootblower erosion in water-cooled tubes 22

Supercritical waterwall cracking 19

Thermal fatigue of economizer inlet headers 20

Welding flaws 46 (Volume 3)

31-6 Introduction and Use of Volume 3

Table 31-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment
Category Precursor
1.1 Water-touched Excessive waterside deposits ( >> 30 mg/cm2) for high-
tubes (waterside) pressure boilers.
Excessive waterside deposits, such as ripple Fe3O4 in once-
through (O/T) and supercritical units.
Boiler water samples that appear black (high suspended
solids).
Corrosion/erosion in feedwater system; fouling in boiler feed
pump or orifices.
Pressure drop across circulation pumps (orifices are
plugging).
1.2 Water-touched Flame impingement due to burner change or misalignment,
tubes (fireside) leading to excessive tube deposits.
Excessive furnace slagging that could lead to overheating in
convective passes (or fuel change).
Fresh rust found on tubes after unit washing, external flat
spots, burnishing or polishing.
Failed tubes, any upstream tube leaks, as a warning to scout
for the potential short-term overheating.
Significant hardness or ovality, particularly associated with
tube bends, found during routine inspection.
1.3 Steam-touched Excessive steamside oxide (detected by UT measure of oxide
tubes (steamside) thickness, or analysis of removed tube samples, evidence of
excessive exfoliation like solid particle erosion in turbine).
Steamside deposits in RH tubing - particularly of sodium
sulfate, or high Na or SO4 levels in steam.
Mechanism(s) of Concern
(Chapter, Volume)
Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
(16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2), short-term overheating
(23,V2)
Supercritical waterwall cracking (19,V2)
Acid phosphate corrosion (16,V2)
• For supercritical or O/T units: supercritical waterwall
cracking (19,V2)
• For subcritical or non-O/T units - hydrogen damage
(15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion (16,V2), or caustic
gouging (17,V2)
• Erosion-corrosion of economizer inlet header (21,V2)
Short-term overheating in waterwall tubing (23,V2)
Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
(16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2), fireside corrosion (18,V2)
Short-term overheating in SH/RH tubing (36,V3)
Flyash erosion (14,V2), sootblower erosion - waterwalls
(22,V2), coal particle erosion (28,V2)
Short-term overheating in waterwall tubing (23,V2)
Low-temperature creep cracking (24, V2)
Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside corro-
sion (33&34,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3),
short-term overheating (36,V3)
Pitting and failure in steam-touched tubes (41,V3)
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 31-7
Table 31-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance (continued)
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment
Mechanism(s) of Concern
Category Precursor (Chapter, Volume)

1.4 Steam-touched Excessive flue gas temperature, displaced fireball, delayed Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside
tubes (fireside) combustion, periodic overfiring or uneven firing of burners. corrosion (33&34,V3)

High levels of excess oxygen. SH/RH fireside corrosion: oil-fired units (34,V3)

Blockage or laning of boiler gas passages observed during Flyash erosion (14,V2), long-term overheating/creep (32,V3),
boiler inspection. SH/RH fireside corrosion: coal/oil units (33&34,V3)

Excessive temperatures measured by thermocouples in Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), dissimilar metal weld
vestibule or header area. failures (35,V3)

Evidence of “alligator hide” appearance on external tube Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside
surface, observed during boiler inspection, associated with corrosion (33&34,V3)
wall loss or thinning.

Fresh rust found on tubes after unit washing, external flat Flyash erosion (14,V2), sootblower erosion in SH/RH (38,V3)
spots, burnishing or polishing.

Significant hardness or ovality, particularly associated with Low-temperature creep cracking (24, V2)
tube bends, found during routine inspection.

Distortion or misaligned tube rows found during routine Flyash erosion (14,V2), SH/RH fireside corrosion
inspection. (33&34,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3), fatigue of
steam-touched tubing (39,V3), rubbing/fretting (40,V3),

Failed tube supports and lugs, location of dissimilar metal Fatigue of steam-touched tubing (39,V3), dissimilar metal
welds close to fixed supports. weld failures (35,V3)

31-8 Introduction and Use of Volume 3

Table 31-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment
Mechanism(s) of Concern
Category Precursor (Chapter, Volume)

2.1 All units Problem with high levels of feedwater corrosion products;
operating ranges for pH, cation conductivity or dissolved
oxygen consistently outside recommended ranges, including
persistent reducing conditions or excessive use of oxygen
scavengers.
Corrosion fatigue (13,V2), hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid
phosphate corrosion (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2), water-
wall fireside corrosion (18,V2), supercritical waterwall crack-
ing (19,V2), erosion/corrosion in economizer inlet header
(21,V2), short-term overheating in waterwall tubing (23,V2),

Carryover of volatile chemicals from boiler, such as NaOH for Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3), pitting in steam-touched
units on caustic treatment, or excess of Na, SO4, and/or tubes (41,V3)
chloride; steam limits exceeded.

Major acid contamination event (pH < 8) when unit is at full Hydrogen damage (15,V2)
load; condenser leak, or breakdown of makeup or condensate
polisher regeneration chemical.

2.2 Units on Evidence of a persistent problem with phosphate hideout, Acid phosphate corrosion (16,V2)
Phosphate particularly where mono-sodium and/or an excess of
Treatments di-sodium phosphate has been added to the boiler.

Persistent phosphate hideout with phosphate return causing a Corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
pH depression (7-8).

Caustic level in excess of that necessary for optimal control Caustic gouging (17,V2)
(>> 2 ppm).

2.3 Units on AVT Caustic, used in excess of that necessary for optimal control Caustic gouging (17,V2)
of contaminant ingress (to counteract pH depressions on
startup).

pH depression during shutdown and early startup (pH around Corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
7-8). Hideout/return of sulfate.

2.4 Units on Caustic, used in excess of that necessary for optimal control Caustic gouging (17,V2)
Caustic (>> 2 ppm).
Treatment

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 31-9

Table 31-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment
Mechanism(s) of Concern
Category Precursor (Chapter, Volume)

3.1 Chemical Evidence of shortcoming in chemical cleaning process such Chemical cleaning damage in waterwalls (25,V2) or SH/RH
cleaning as inappropriate cleaning agent, excessively strong concen- (43,V3), short-term overheating (23,V2 & 36,V3).
tration or long cleaning time, too high a temperature, failure
to neutralize, breakdown of inhibitor, inadequate rinse.

Shortcoming in SH/RH cleaning process such as inadequate Short-term overheating in SH/RH tubing (36,V3)
rinse, improper flow verification.

Evidence that level of Fe in cleaning solution continued to Chemical cleaning damage in waterwalls (25,V2) or SH/RH
increase instead of leveling out when cleaning process was (43,V3)
ended.

Need for excessive cleaning in supercritical units (interval < 2 Supercritical waterwall cracking (19,V2)
years).

Contamination in SH/RH (particularly by chlorides) during Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3)

chemical clean of SH/RH (breakdown of inhibitors or
improper flushing of solvents) or waterwalls (caused by
poor backfill procedures that failed to protect SH circuits).

3.2 Repairs In water-touched tubes: use of backing rings, pad welds, Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
canoe pieces, weld overlay that penetrates to inside surface - (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2)
as a source of flow disruption and excessive deposits.

Application of shielding, baffles, palliative coatings to Flyash erosion (14,V2)

mitigate flyash erosion without the use of a cold-air
velocity test.

In water-touched tubes, Cu in water-side deposits. Hydrogen damage (15,V2), welding defects (46,V3)

31-10 Introduction and Use of Volume 3

Table 31-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment
Mechanism(s) of Concern
Category Precursor (Chapter, Volume)

4.1 Startup Feedwater introduced intermittently into economizer inlet at Economizer inlet header thermal fatigue (20,V2)
Procedures high flow rates during startups and particularly during
off-line top-ups.

Rapid unit startups that cause the reheater to reach tempera- SH/RH fireside corrosion (33&34,V3)
ture before full flow starts (no furnace exit gas temperature
control).

4.2 Combustion Heat flux change caused by change to higher BTU-value coal, Hydrogen damage (15,V2), acid phosphate corrosion
conditions dual firing with gas, changeover to oil- or gas-firing leading (16,V2), caustic gouging (17,V2), fireside corrosion (18,V2)
to excessive tube deposits in waterwalls; new burners
causing impingement.

Implementing low excess air strategies for NOx control and Waterwall fireside corrosion (18,V2)
the potential for waterwall fireside corrosion (note that unlike
the other precursors in this Table, this is a possibility based
on understanding the mechanism; to date no failures have
been directly attributed to this cause).

Operation with high levels of excess oxygen in oil-fired units SH/RH fireside corrosion in oil-fired units (34,V3)
(> 1%).

4.3 Fuel choices Change to a fuel that either contains more ash or contains Flyash erosion (14,V2)
and changes elements which are more erosive such as quartz.

Change to a more corrosively-aggressive coal, particularly Waterwall fireside corrosion (18,V2), acid dewpoint corrosion
one high in chlorine, Na, K, or S contents. (30,V2), SH/RH fireside corrosion (33&34,V3)

Use of Mg-based additives (oil-fired units) leading to coating Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside
of waterwalls, reflecting heat into convection passes. corrosion in oil-fired units (34,V3)

4.4 Cycling Conversion of the unit to cycling operation or an increase in Corrosion fatigue (13,V2), economizer inlet header thermal
the number of cycles. fatigue (20,V2), fatigue in water-touched (26,V2) or steam-
touched tubing (39,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures
(35,V3)

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 31-11

Table 31-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related (continued)
5.0 Specific Equipment
Mechanism(s) of Concern
Category Precursor (Chapter, Volume)

4.5 Shutdown Evidence of a shortcoming during unit shutdown/layup such Pitting in water-touched (27,V2) or steam-touched tubes
or layup as uncertainty about water and/or air quality during period, (41,V3), and maybe corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
insufficient nitrogen blanketing, insufficient N2H4, evidence of
air inleakage.

Indication that stagnant, oxygenated water may have rested in Pitting in water-touched (27,V2) or steam-touched tubes
tubes during shutdown or layup particularly in economizer (41,V3)
and RH.

Evidence that condensate is forming in SH/RH bends during Short-term overheating in SH/RH tubes (36,V3), pitting in
unit shutdown, exacerbated if steam purity is not good (as steam-touched tubes (41,V3)
determined by elevated levels of SO4).

4.6 Other Operation above the maximum continuous design rating, with Flyash erosion (14,V2)
excess air flow settings above design, with unbalanced fans
or air heaters - leading to nonuniform gas flows.

Low drum level. Short-term overheating (23,V2)

31-12 Long-Term Overheating/Creep

Table 31-3
Unit Precursors and Potential Future BTF (continued)
1.0 Inspection/Appearance
2.0 Cycle Chemistry
3.0 Maintenance Related
4.0 Operation Related
5.0 Specific Equipment
Mechanism(s) of Concern
Category Precursor (Chapter, Volume)

5.1 Condensers Major condenser leaks or minor leaks that have occurred Hydrogen damage (15,V2)
over a long period of time.

Condenser leak leading to condenser cooling water con- Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3)
stituents in attemperator spray water.

5.2 Water treatment Upset in water treatment plant or condensate polisher regen- Hydrogen damage (15,V2)
plant/condensate eration chemicals leading to low pH condition in boiler
polisher (pH < 8).

Upset in water treatment plant or condensate polisher regen- Caustic gouging (17,V2)
eration chemicals leading to high pH condition.

5.3 Drum Carryover test indicates high mechanical carryover. Stress corrosion cracking (37,V3), pitting in steam-touched
tubing (41,V3)

Operating with high drum level allowing excessive carryover Pitting in steam-touched tubing (41,V3)
into steam.

5.4 Sootblowers Poor sootblower maintenance. Sootblower erosion in waterwalls (22,V2), SH/RH sootblower
erosion (38,V3)

5.5 Low temperature Header has large number of operating hours, has experienced Economizer inlet header thermal fatigue (20,V2)
headers large thermal gradients, spacing of ligament holes is small
(< 3.5 cm), header thickness is well above Code minimum,
header-to-stub tube joints made with partial penetration
welds.

5.6 High temperature Excessive relative movement of header/ tube during unit Fatigue in steam-touched tubing (39,V3).
headers transients, restricted movement, header is not allowed to
expand freely (maybe ash-related), unit change to cycling.

5.7 Turbine A problem with solid particle erosion (SPE) in the turbine. Short-term overheating SH/RH tubing (36,V3), long-term
overheating /creep (32,V3)

5.8 SH/RH Circuit Redesign of the SH/RH circuit may change the absorption Long-term overheating/creep (32,V3), SH/RH fireside corro-
(redesign) patterns through other SH/RH sections and increase tube sion (33 & 34,V3), dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3)
temperatures.

5.9 Supports/ Addition of supports without consideration of their impact on Dissimilar metal weld failures (35,V3)
Attachments the stresses of dissimilar metal welds.
(redesign)
Redesign of waterwall tube attachments to increase flexibility Corrosion fatigue (13,V2)
without analysis to determine whether solution is actually
beneficial.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 31-13

31-14 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
 Chapter 32 • Volume 3
Large fracture
opening
Long-Term
Overheating/Creep
Introduction
Superheater (SH) and reheater (RH)
tubes operate in a regime where
creep is significant and oxidation
resistance is important. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, Volume 1,
SH/RH tube design involves a
choice of wall thickness and alloy
type to withstand the expected pres-
sures and temperatures and still pro-
vide at least a minimum specified
level of life.
Creep damage is strongly depen-
dent on stress level and on tube
metal temperature. Therefore condi-
tions which are only a slight depar-
ture from design levels leading to
increased stress (such as wall thin-
ning by oxidation, corrosion or ero-
sion) or increased temperature
(such as caused by the buildup of
internal oxide scale) will result in
operating tube lives that are signifi-
cantly shorter than expected. In a
typical SH/RH tube, each 0.001 inch
(0.0254 mm) of internal oxide
buildup increases the tube metal
temperature by approximately 3°F
(1.7°C).1 Thus, for a 0.020 inch (0.51
mm)-thick internal scale, tube metal
temperatures increase by about
60°F (~ 33°C), which corresponds to
a five-fold increase in accumulation
of damage by creep.
Higher than expected temperatures
in SH/RH tubes can be a contributor
to a number of damage types. The
reader is specifically directed to
discussions of other mechanisms
which might be confused with long-
term overheating such as fireside
corrosion (Chapter 33 for coal-fired
units and Chapter 34 for oil-fired
units), and short-term overheating
(Chapter 36).
Failure by high temperature creep
remains a significant cause of boiler
tube failures in the United States.
The proper assessment of the
remaining life of SH/RH tubes is one
of the primary challenges of an inte-
grated program for boiler tube fail-
ure prediction and control.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
Long-Term Overheating/Creep:
Identification Keys
1. Final failure by creep will man-
ifest features of low ductility,
usually longitudinal (axial) in
orientation. In superheater
tubing, failures will be thick-
edged, they will be somewhat
thinner in reheater tubing
because of the thinner walls.
2. Thick, internal oxide scales,
often longitudinally cracked,
are indicative of overheating
in ferritic materials.
3. Microstructural features
indicative of overheating and
creep damage will be present.
In ferritic materials such fea-
tures include spheroidization
and decreased fireside sur-
face hardness. In austenitic
stainless steels, the presence
of sigma phase microstruc-
ture, sensitization and grain
boundary cavities will be char-
acteristic.
4. Care should be taken to dis-
tinguish failures by a long-
term overheating mechanism
from those caused primarily
by fireside corrosion. The
presence of low melting point
ash components on the exter-
nal tube surface and a higher
ratio of wall thinning to steam-
side oxide scale buildup will
be characteristic of fireside
corrosion.
32-2 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
1.1 Features of failure
Final failures by long-term overheat-
ing/creep are generally longitudinal
(axial to the tube), and located on
the heated side of the tube. Failures
are generally thick-edged, corre-
sponding to low ductility. The range
of final failure appearance in ferritic
materials is shown schematically in
Figure 32-1. A typical appearance is
shown in the failed tube pictured in
Figure 32-2. In reheater tubes,
because of the thinner-walled mate-
rials, final failures tend to look more
ductile than in superheater tubes.
Primary evidence for the overheating
of SH/RH tubes is thickened external
scales, often with Y-shaped grooves
which give the appearance of an
alligator hide. Often there are also
thick, internal oxide scales, cracked
longitudinally.
BLISTER OVERHEATING
Localized Axially
A A
Little or no creep
swelling away from
blistered area
Small fracture
opening
Little or no wall loss in
non-blistered area
"A-A"
Figure 32-1. Types of high temperature creep failure in ferritic tubing. Source: G.A.
Lamping and R.M Arrowood, Jr.2
Precursors to final failure may
include wastage flats on the tube at
the 10 o’clock and 2 o’clock posi-
tions (flue gas at 12 o’clock) with the
maximum amount of “alligator hide”
in the middle of the flats. Note that
the flats can be present at other
tube locations depending on tube
alignment in the bundle.
Microscopically, there will be evi-
dence of damage to the material
microstructure by overheating and
intergranular or transgranular creep;
distinguishing features will be mater-
ial and stress level dependent.
Ferritic materials will demonstrate:
• A critical thickness of steamside
oxide, which may often be exfoli-
ated. A discussion of the growth
and exfoliation of such oxide lay-
ers is presented in Chapter 2,
Volume 1.
FISHMOUTH OVERHEATING
General Along Tube Axis
A A
Large fracture
opening
Measurable creep swelling usually greater
than 10% in very rapid overheating. In
longer term failures less creep swelling is
present, but there is always some
measurable creep, even if only 1%, in very
long-term stress rupture.
"A-A"
Some creep reduction in
wall away from fracture
in rapid overheating
Considerable wall reduction (knife edge)
in very rapid failure. Fracture edge in
longer term overheating shows less of a
reduction, with extremely long-term
failures showing little creep wall loss.
• A spheroidized microstructure as
illustrated in Figure 32-3. Chapter
10, Volume 1 discusses levels of
spheroidization and their interpre-
tation; additional information can
be found in reference 1.
• A reduction in material hardness,
usually with a decarburized layer
at the fireside interface. This
effect is illustrated in Figure 32-4.

Austenitic stainless steels will mani-

fest damage with sigma phase
microstructure and grain boundary
cavities. Note that improper etching
may etch out sigma phase and give
the appearance of creep cavities.4
Graphitization may be present in
carbon or carbon molybdenum
steels.
The nucleation, growth and interlink-
ing of creep voids or cavities, Figure 32-2. Long-term creep failure in a 2 1/4 Cr- 1 Mo reheater tube.
termed creep cavitation, will occur
at the crack tip, as shown in Figure
32-5. However, such voids will not
be found in the bulk of the tube
away from the crack.
It is important that the root cause of
the failure be identified accurately.
In particular, the fireside wastage
mechanisms, such as fireside corro-
sion or erosion, can lead to wall thin-
ning which will then result in the
accumulation of creep deformation.
Before settling on long-term over-
heating as the primary damage
mechanism, it is important to evalu-
ate whether these other mechanisms
are also contributors.
Table 32-1 lists some key distin-
guishing differences among long-
term overheating, short-term over-
heating, and fireside corrosion in
SH/RH tubing. This topic is also dis-
Figure 32-3. Enlarged view of the secondary cracking and spher-
cussed in Chapter 7, Volume 1.
oidization associated with long-term creep damage. Source: S.R.
Paterson, et al.1

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-3

 With a Knoop indentor and a 300 gram load
170
80 HRB

Rockwell Hardness Conversion

160
Knoop Hardness

75 HRB
150

140 70 HRB

130 65 HRB
Cold side away
from rupture
120
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Distance from Rupture Line (inch)

Figure 32-4. Microhardness traverse to illustrate the loss in hardness in the vicinity of
a long-term overheat failure. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Figure 32-5. Typical grain boundary creep cavitation/microcracking at and adjacent to

a crack. Source: J. Hickey, Irish Electricity Supply Board

32-4 Long-Term Overheating/Creep

Table 32-1
Comparison of Characteristics of Long-Term Overheating/Creep, Short-Term Overheating,
and Fireside Corrosion (Coal-Fired Units) In Superheater/Reheater Tubing
Characteristic
Fracture Surface and
Appearance of Failure
Internal Scale?
External Scaling?
Outside surface appearance
after removal of scale/deposits
Composition of External Scales/
Deposits
Wall Thinning?
Ratio of wall loss to steamside
oxide thickness
Tube Material Degradation
Change in material hardness
Long-Term Overheating
• Generally thick-edged, brittle final
failure.
• Generally accompanied by external
tube wastage at the 10 o’clock
and 2 o’clock positions.
Yes, generally extensive, multi-
laminated and exfoliating.
•Yes, thick, laminated and often
longitudinally cracked.
• Usually two layers - (i) a hard,
porous outer layer with composi-
tion typically that of flyash, and
(ii) a black glossy inner layer
mostly oxide but may contain
some sulfates and sulfides of iron.
Characteristic longitudinal grooving
and pitting (“alligator hide”).
Does not contain low melting point
ash compounds such as alkali iron
sulfates
Typically wastage flats at 10 o’clock
and 2 o’clock positions caused by
accelerated oxidation. Can be at
other locations depending on tube
position. There is always a layer of
oxide adjacent to the tube.
Typically less than 3:1
Yes, generally extensive signs of
overheating and/or of creep damage,
particularly near crack tips. Creep
voids will not be found removed
from crack tip.
Localized softening near the
rupture is typical.
Short-Term Overheating
• Usually thin-edged, ductile final
failures.
• Swelling of tubes without
ovalization.
• “Fish-mouth” appearance of tube
rupture.
Not necessarily thick.
Depends on age of tube at failure.
Not necessarily thick.
Swelling, stretch marks on tube
metal.
Not relevant.
Only because of bulging of tube
material.
Not relevant.
Depends on the material and the
maximum temperature reached.
Localized hardening near the
rupture is likely.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes
Fireside Corrosion
• Tube wastage, particularly at the
10 and 2 o’clock positions.
• Longitudinal cracking, final fail-
ure can be (but not necessarily)
by overheating.
Yes, particularly if tube metal over-
heating was an influencing factor.
Yes, with multi-layers: (i) a hard,
porous layer - composition typically
of flyash, (ii) an intermediate layer
containing complex alkali sulfates,
and (iii) a black, glossy inner layer
mostly of oxides, sulfates, and
sulfides of iron.
Characteristic longitudinal grooving
and pitting (“alligator hide”). Some-
times the corroded area is smooth
and featureless. Sometimes “orange
peel” appearance at extremities of
severe corrosion.
Does contain low melting point
compounds such as alkali-iron
sulfates (coal-fired units).
Primary feature of failure, may be
worse at the 10 and 2 o’clock posi-
tions. Can be at other locations
depending on tube position.
Depending upon the rate of corro-
sion, a protective oxide layer may
remain on the tube or may have
been fluxed off.
Typically greater than 3:1; for ratios
greater than 5:1 fireside corrosion
or erosion is the dominant
mechanism.
If overheating has been a problem,
yes; otherwise, no. Fireside corro-
sion can occur in a tube at design
temperatures.
Hardness change is not necessary;
if there has been no overheating,
there will be no change in hardness.
32-5
In evaluating the contributing mech-
anisms, distinguishing between fire-
side corrosion and long-term over-
heating is perhaps the most com-
mon cause of confusion. A key dif-
ference is that if corrosive attack has
occurred, external deposits will con-
tain low melting-point ash compo-
nents. Figure 32-6 illustrates a sec-
ond, although less definitive, means
of distinguishing between the two
damage types: the ratio of loss of
wall thickness to internal oxide thick-
ness. If this ratio is large, certainly
greater than five and perhaps as low
as three or more, then a wastage
mechanism such as fireside corro-
sion is operative. If the ratio is small,
i.e., relatively little wall thinning rela-
tive to the build-up of steamside
oxide, then overheating is probably
the predominant problem.
Note that long-term overheating,
where the damage accumulates
because of temperatures that are
somewhat over the design level,
should also not be confused with
short-term overheating where a
pressurized tube is heated to well
above its design temperature and
failure occurs in a much shorter
time. SH/RH tube failures by short-
term overheating are the subject of
Chapter 36.
1.2 Locations of failure
Figures 32-7 a and b show the typi-
cal locations of damage by long-
term overheating/creep. The follow-
ing locations are susceptible5:
• The most common location is
near material changes, such as in
the middle of a tube circuit just
32-6 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
Reheater Tube With Long-term Overheating/Creep
0.2
Flue gas flow Y = 5X
Probable mechanism
0.15
Wall Loss (Inches)
A is fireside corrosion
F B Y = 3X
0.1
E C
A B
D
0.05 Probable mechanism
D F is long-term
E overheating/creep
C
0
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Steamside Oxide Scale Thickness (Inches)
Figure 32-6. Schematic representation of steamside oxide scale thickness versus
tube wastage (wall loss). Such a plot can be used to distinguish between overheat-
ing/long-term creep and fireside corrosion mechanisms. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1
before the change to a higher • On the lowest tube in a horizontal
grade of material. This location platen or the leading tube in a
represents the severest condition pendant section.
for the lower grade material as it • Either in a cavity or just beyond a
is subjected, even under normal cavity, where radiant effects can
conditions, to the highest temper- lead to higher tube temperatures.
atures.
• In the final leg of tubing just
• Near changes in wall thickness in before the outlet header, where
the same alloy. steam temperatures are the high-
• Where there is a variation in the est.
gas-touched length among tubes
of the same material, leading to
the earlier failure of those sub-
jected to higher temperatures.
 (a) VerticalTube Circuits

321H

E
F D B
G C
H A
N
M
Outlet header
P T-22

T-11

D
C E G
Hanger Hanger Hanger Front B F
water A H
(b) Horizontal Tube Circuits wall

Inlet header

Figure 32-7. Typical boiler locations where long-term overheating/creep failures can
occur in vertical platen elements (a) and in horizontal platens (b). Solid circles repre-
sent typical failure locations; letters in circles indicate locations of interest described in
the main text in Section 3.2.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-7

2. Mechanism of Failure
Long-Term Overheating/Creep:
Mechanism
1. Superheater/reheater tubing
is designed for finite, but long
(> 100,000 hours) lifetimes by
allowing for a prescribed
amount of creep damage.
2. A number of factors can lead
to elevated tube temperatures;
only slight elevation (about 10-
15°F) of the temperature
above that anticipated in the
design can lead to a signifi-
cant reduction in tube life.
3. The growth of internal scale is
a major contributor to
increased tube temperatures;
careful diagnosis of the extent
of scaling can provide useful
information about past service
temperatures as well as about
expected remaining tube life.
4. Final failure occurs by creep
attributable to degraded
material, reduced wall thick-
ness, increasing hoop
stresses, reduced wall thick-
nesses and cracking of the
internal and external oxides.
32-8 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 2, Volume 1 discusses the
fundamental constraints associated
with the design of and material
choices for SH/RH tubing. A few
brief remarks are made here to set
the stage for the discussion of the
creep damage mechanism.
In the absence of other boiler tube
failure mechanisms, it is not unex-
pected that creep will be the life-lim-
iting damage type for SH/RH tubing.
In fact, such tubing is designed for a
finite life based on a conservative
creep criterion. Design temperatures
can range from 400 to 600°C (752 to
1112°F) depending upon location.
Increasingly higher tube metal tem-
peratures demand either increased
wall thickness and/or material
changes. Carbon steel can therefore
be used in primary stages, whereas
low-alloy steels which exhibit
increased creep and oxidation resis-
tance are used for most of the
SH/RH, except for the finishing
stages where austenitic stainless
tubes are normally used. On the
basis of laboratory oxidation experi-
ments each manufacturer specifies
a maximum operating temperature
for each material. Representative
values are shown in Table 32-2.
There can be major differences
(100-150°F) between the operating
temperature and the temperature
expected for the design. This can
lead to significant shortening of
actual tube life. Figure 32-8 shows
the effects of stress and temperature
on the length of time to failure for a
typical boiler tube material.
A number of other factors, dis-
cussed in the root cause section
below, can result in higher than
expected temperatures. In addition
to poor initial design (such as tubes
with gas-touched length longer than
the design estimate), the main fac-
tors are (i) the growth of internal
oxide which insulates the tube from
the cooling effects of the steam flow,
(ii) the loss of wall thickness caused
by accelerated oxidation in the case
of overheating, but may also be
caused by fireside corrosion or ero-
sion, or (iii) excessive operating con-
ditions such as high flue gas tem-
perature, displaced fireball, periodic
overfiring, or uneven firing of fuel
burners, etc.
2.2 The accumulation of
creep damage in
superheater/reheater tubes
The effects on material microstruc-
ture that occur as a result of expo-
sure to temperatures consistent with
creep damage are discussed in
Chapter 10, Volume 1. Here the
manifestation of creep in SH/RH
tubes is reviewed.
The accumulation of creep damage
can occur through an elevation of
tube metal temperature or stress as
noted above. Tube stresses increase
primarily as a result of localized wall
thinning and correspondingly higher
hoop stresses. Processes which
occur on both the steamside and
fireside of the tube can contribute to
premature tube failures by creep.
Table 32-2 2.2.1 Steamside processes
Maximum Tube Metal Temperatures A protective oxide forms on carbon
and low-alloy steels when they are
ASME B&W Max.2 C-E Max.3 Riley exposed to steam. The initial forma-
Tube Steel ASME Max.1 °F °F °F Max.4 °F tion is rapid and “parabolic” in
Type Spec. No. (°C) (°C) (°C) (°C) nature in the absence of heat flux.
The oxide formed is stable and
Carbon steel SA-178 C 1000 950 850 850 tenacious. In addition to a protective
(538)5, 6 (510) (454) (454) function, oxide layers on the steam-
side of carbon and low-alloy steel
SA-192 1000 950 850 850 tubing are important because they
(538)5, 6 (510) (454) (454) provide useful information about the
service temperatures to which the
SA-210 Al 1000 950 850 850 tube has been exposed. An excess
(538)5, 6 (510) (454) (454) of steamside scale can lead to an
increased tube temperature which is
a contributor to damage in super-
Carbon Moly SA-209 T1 1000 — 900 900
heater/reheater tubes by long-term
(538)7 (482) (482) and short-term overheating, fireside
corrosion, and graphitization mech-
SA-209 T1a 1000 975 — — anisms.
(538)7 (524)
Three solid phase iron oxides can
form: wustite (FeO), magnetite
Chrome Moly SA-213 T11 1200 1050 1025 1025 (Fe3O4), and hematite (Fe2O3),
(649) (566) (552) (552) depending on oxygen activity and
temperature. The various oxides
SA-213 T22 1200 1115 1075 1075 form in layers in the order listed
(649) (602) (580) (580) from the tube metal outward, e.g.,
wustite, if it forms will be between
Stainless SA-213 321H 1500 1400 — 1500 the tube metal and magnetite;
(816) (760) (816) hematite is normally found in the
outer layer of steamside oxide.
SA-213 347H 1500 — 1300 — The oxides of steam-touched mate-
(816) (704) rials normally form in two distinct
layers; the inner layer forming by the
SA-213 304H 1500 1400 1300 — inward diffusion of oxygen ions (oxi-
(816) (760) (704) dizing the base metal) and the outer
layer growing by the outward diffu-
Notes: sion of iron.10 The buildup of steam-
1. From reference 6, Table PG-23.1. This is the highest metal temperature for which maximum allowable stress side scale insulates the tubes from
values are given. cooling steam which is reflected in
2. From reference 7, 1978 edition, p. 29-11, Table 3. an increase in metal temperature.
3. From reference 8, 1981 edition, p. 6-43, Table IV. This also accelerates the accumula-
4. From reference 9, 1983 edition, p. 263, Table VI. tion of creep damage and will even-
5. Upon prolonged exposure to temperatures above about 800°F (427°C), the carbide phase of carbon steel tually lead to failure by creep, even
may be converted to graphite. in the absence of all the external
6. Only killed steels shall be used above 850°F( 454°C). tube effects described above. As
7. Upon prolonged exposure to temperatures above about 875°F (468°C), the carbide phase of carbon-
molybdenum steel may be converted to graphite.
the metal temperature increases, the
rate of oxide growth also increases,
Direct comparison of maximum metal temperatures is not meaningful without information on design heat leading to even faster failure times.
transfer analysis and actual material properties. A detailed discussion of the mecha-
nism of steamside oxide growth and
Compilation source: G.A. Lamping and R.M Arrowood, Jr.2 the various effects of exfoliate of that
oxide can be found in Chapter 2,
Volume 1.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-9

 2.2.2 Fireside effects
Stress, 1000 psi In the normal (design) condition, a
50 protective oxide scale forms on the
exterior of SH/RH tubing. Ash accu-
mulates on the side of the tube fac-
1.0 hr. to rupture ing into the flow of flue gas as
40 shown in Figure 32-9a. On a tube
that operates above the design con-
dition, there can be a reduced thick-
ness of ash at the 10 and 2 o’clock
30 10 positions (flue gas flow at 12
o’clock) due to aerodynamic factors.
Several consequences result: (i) the
100 thinner layer of ash at the 10 and 2
20 o’clock positions allows for higher
heat transfer rates and more radiant
1000 effects which raise the temperature
of the tube, (ii) the easier access to
10 10,000 the tube metal allows for increased
oxidation rate leading to thinner
100,000 tubes and thus higher stress levels,
and (iii) an increased corrosion rate
0 occurs (oxidation in a sulfur-contain-
1000 1050 1100 1150 1200 ing environment) which also leads to
Temperature, °F material removal and thus higher
stress levels. The latter two conse-
1000 psi = 6.9 MPa quences also change the kinetics of
oxide growth from parabolic to linear
and, as a result, it becomes non-
Figure 32-8. Time-to-rupture curves for 2 1/4 - 1 Mo SA-213 T22 steel. protective (Figure 32-9b).
The increasing stress level and
overtemperature in the tube acceler-
ate the creep process leading to
Operating Above tube failure.
Normal Design Temperature
The process can be further acceler-
Wastage
(b) flats ated if tubes are also subject to
attack by other corrosive processes,
Corrosion rate

such as “molten salt” attack, the

Steam Linear Steam topic of Chapters 33 (for coal-fired
(locally)
units) and 34 (for oil-fired units).
(a) Tubing attack by erosive processes,
Ash Ash such as flyash erosion (Chapter 14,
Parabolic Volume 2) can further exacerbate
Thin
the tubing degradation.
Time Thick
Flue insulating Flue ash In summary, creep damage will
gas ash layer gas layer accumulate at a rate higher than the
(a) (b) design estimates if there is (i) a rela-
tively continuous period of slight
overheating such as caused by
shortcomings in the initial design, (ii)
Figure 32-9. Schematic of the development of long-term overheating failures.
a slowly increasing level of tempera-
(a) Represents the normal situation. (b) Shows the development of "flats" at 10 and 2
o'clock. The flats can be present at other tube locations, such as the tube crown, ture such as by increasing internal
depending on tube alignment in the bundle. oxide thickness, or stress caused by
decreasing wall thickness, or (iii) the
accumulation of periods of excessive
overheating due to operating factors.

32-10 Long-Term Overheating/Creep

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Long-Term Overheating/Creep:
Root Causes
1. Overheating of the tube metal
by a variety of causes, and/or
increased tube stress level
primarily because of wall thin-
ning, is at the root of tube fail-
ures by a creep mechanism.
2. Important causes relate to
inadequate initial design and
material choices. These are
exacerbated by the normal
increase of oxide thickness.
3.1 Introduction
Table 32-3 summarizes the major
root cause influences, actions to
confirm each, and corrective
actions.
Verification of long-term overheat-
ing/creep, independent of cause,
can be direct or indirect. Direct veri-
fication and an indicator of the cur-
rent temperatures can be obtained
by thermocouples. Indirect verifica-
tion and an indication of the history
of tube metal temperatures can be
obtained from analysis of the steam-
side oxide scale.
Independent of the source of over-
heating the following four actions are
used to confirm that the condition
exists. Additional actions pertinent to
specific root causes are provided
below.
(a). Direct measurement by thermo-
couples.
Thermocouples can be used to
measure tube temperatures directly
and also to determine furnace gas
temperatures; in the latter case, they
verify abnormal flow patterns. The
placement of thermocouples and
interpretation of results is compli-
cated by the variations in tempera-
ture around an individual tube
(Figure 32-10) and across a super-
heater or reheater (Figure 32-11).
General guidance can be obtained
from the temperature profiles across
the unit that are recorded in the
vestibule or header area on the per-
manently installed operating thermo-
couples. More detail about thermo-
coupling of SH/RH tubes can be
found in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
(b). Perform metallographic analysis
of tube samples.
Ferritic steels form an oxide scale in
high temperature steam. The thick-
ness of the layer formed is a func-
tion of tube metal temperature and
time. Given one of the variables,
usually time, the other can be deter-
mined. The thickness of the oxide
scale can be measured non-
destructively or directly via tube
sampling. Tube sampling can also
be used to check for blockages and
flow restrictive deposits.
Metallographic analysis is used to
determine the degradation of the
tube material.
(c). Measure steamside scale
buildup non-destructively.
Ultrasonic and eddy current meth-
ods have been applied to measure
steamside scale non-destructively.
An estimate of the oxide thickness,
in conjunction with analysis as
described in Chapter 8, Volume 1
can then estimate tube metal tem-
peratures.
(d). Visual examination to look for
evidence of slag buildup, laning,
bowed or misaligned tubes acting
as leading tubes.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-11
Table 32-3
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause
Influences
3.1 All causes of overheating
3.2 Influences of initial design and/or material choice
• Original alloy inadequate for
actual operating temperatures.
• Inadequate heat treatment
of original alloy.
• Tubes at failure location
have gas-touched lengths
longer than design estimate
and/or row-to-row variation
in gas-touched length.
• Side-to-side or local gas
temperature differences.
• Radiant cavity heating effects.
• Lead tube/wrapper tube material
not resistant enough to
temperature.
3.3 Build-up of internal oxide scale
32-12 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
Actions to Confirm
(a). Direct measurement of temperatures
by thermocouples.
(b). Metallurgical analysis of tube
structure and oxide thickness and
morphology of selected tube samples.
(c). Ultrasonic testing for direct measure-
ment of steamside oxide thickness.
(d). Visual examination for evidence of
slag buildup, laning, bowed or mis-
aligned tubes acting as leading tubes.
(e).Review temperature data from
thermocouples installed in vestibule or
across the header.
(f). Review SH/RH circuit material
diagrams, calculate and plot GTL as
a function of steam and metal
temperatures, plot positions of failures.
(g). See items (a) - (c).
Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures
• Local repairs as appro- • Determine remaining life of affected
priate. tubes based on actual temperatures,
• Perform selective stress levels and materials properties.
sampling and/or ultra- See Chapter 8, Volume 1 for additional
sonic measurement to detail.
determine extent of • Make the change to a higher grade of
problem. steel (next higher chromium level).
• Perform remaining life • Tube/circuit realignment; consider
estimate of affected steam flow redistribution. See main text
tubes. for summary of methodology.
• See long-term actions. • Major SH/RH redesign and replacement.
• Redesign tube bank.
• Retube with same material depending on
expected and desired life of the SH/RH.
• As above. • As above: steam flow redistribution will
be particularly applicable for correcting
side-to-side and local variations in tem-
perature, upgrading will be particularly
applicable in cases where the original
alloy was insufficient or where the tube
has a gas-touched length that is longer
than the design estimate.
• Chemical cleaning to • Address underlying cause of overheat-
remove deposits. ing or
• Periodic chemical cleaning to mitigate
effects. See Chapter 4, Volume 1 for
additional detail about the methods and
determining timing.
• Determine remaining life of affected
tubes based on actual temperatures,
stress levels and materials properties.
See Chapter 8, Volume 1 for additional
information about the methods of oxide
scale analysis.
• See additional options on primary list
from above.
Table 32-3
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions (continued)
Major Root Cause
Influences Actions to Confirm
3.4 Overheating because of restricted steam flow due to chemical or other deposits, scale, debris, etc.
(h). Selective sampling of suspect loca-
tions to verify whether local blockage
is leading to excessive temperatures.
3.5 Operating conditions or changes in operation
3.5.1 Previous similar (i). Check temperature distribution through • As above.
problems in adjacent the circuit by performing analysis of
SH/RH GTL and measured temperatures;
see (e) and (f) above.
3.5.2 Combustion conditions (j). Monitor gas temperatures with
can lead to tube pyrometers or infrared instruments.
overheating.
• Excessive flue gas temperature
• Displaced fireball
• Delayed combustion
• Periodic overfiring or uneven
firing of fuel burners.
3.6 Blockage or laning of boiler gas passages
(k). Can be recognized using cold air
velocity technique. See flyash erosion
mechanism for a discussion of the
technique.
(l). Visual examination to identify local
flow blockages.
3.7 Increases in stress due to wall thinning
(m). NDE evaluation to determine the
extent of wall thinning.
(n). If another mechanism (corrosion,
erosion) is suspected, initiate actions
to confirm their involvement.
Immediate Actions
and Solutions
• Clean out tubes and
remove source of
blockages.
• Local repairs as
appropriate.
• Perform selective sampl-
ing and/or ultrasonic
measurement to deter-
mine extent of problem.
• Perform remaining life
estimate of affected tubes.
• See long-term actions.
• As above, plus
• Restore boiler design (or
optimized) conditions.
• Initiate procedures to
identify source of tube
wastage - of particular
concern are fireside
corrosion or flyash/soot-
blower erosion processes
that may be contributing
to an increased oxidation
rate.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes
Long-Term Actions and
Prevention of Repeat Failures
• Introduce measures to prevent future
blockages.
• Optimization of operation and fireside
conditions must be the emphasis. See
compilations of the applicable methods
(reference 12).
• Optimization of fireside conditions. See
reference 12.
• Controlled with flow distribution
screens; in practice is difficult to imple-
ment because of high temperatures in
SH/RH. See Chapter 14, Volume 2 on
flyash erosion for control of high local
velocities through the use of the cold
air velocity technique.
• Check long-term actions in wastage
mechanism chapters particularly fire-
side corrosion (Chapters 33 and 34)
and fly ash erosion (Chapter 14,
Volume 2).
32-13
 3.2 Influences of initial design
1052 °F and/or material choice
1085 °F 1035 °F The aim of the design process is to
1028 °F provide a structure that functions
1055 °F 1017 °F within maximum allowable stresses
and oxidation rates. As the tempera-
1105 °F 1033 °F ture capability of each grade of tube
1069 °F 1014 °F material is reached, the designer
specifies a transition to a higher
107 1018
grade material. If the actual operating
0 °F Steam Fluid °F temperatures exceed those foreseen
1108 °F Temperature 1036 °F in the design, then overheating will
+ 950 °F result. Figure 32-7b illustrates several
Gas flow Reheater examples of how this may occur:
1069 1014 tube outside
°F °F • Differences in gas-touched length
metal surface of tube. On Figure 32-7b, location
1105 °F 1033 °F
“M” is the transition between T22
1055 °F 1017 °F and the more resistant 321H in
1028 °F Tube “B”. Location “N” is the
1085 °F 1035 °F material transition for Tube “D”.
1052 °F Although the transitions occur in
about the same place, the dis-
tance from the inlet header to
location “N” is greater than to “M”,
Figure 32-10. A reheater tube that contains steam at 510°C (950°F) will have varying
metal temperature around its circumference and through its wall according to: gas flow thus the tube temperatures at “N”
direction, ash deposit patterns, and internal scale formations. Typically the highest will be greater and therefore the
metal temperature will be achieved on the surface facing the gas flow. chances are greater that the lower
Source: G.A. Lamping and R.M Arrowood, Jr.2 grade material may be inadequate
for the temperatures actually
experienced. This difference in
gas-touched length can some-
times be as large as 20-30 feet.
Steam Temperature, °F
• Radiant cavity heating effects.
747 MW Tubes in a cavity or that surround
1020 a cavity, such as Tube “D” at
location “P” in Figure 32-7b, or
just past a cavity may experience
excessive temperatures because
940 575 MW of radiant absorption effects.
• Other effects of location. Tube “A”
in Figure 32-7b is the lead or
wrapper tube and thus will pick
980 up more heat than tubes “B” -
9 23 37 51 65 79 93 104 118 132 146 160 174 188
2 16 30 44 58 72 86 97 111 125 139 153 167 181 “H”. There can also be side-to-
Tube Number side or local gas differences;
tubes in the center run hotter.

Figure 32-11. Typical thermocouple measurements across a superheater showing that

the actual tube metal temperatures can vary significantly with tube location and boiler
power level. G.A. Lamping and R.M Arrowood, Jr.2

32-14 Long-Term Overheating/Creep

Economy measures to minimize the
use of the higher grade material or
poor original design estimates of
tube temperature can also be at the
root of why a material experiences
temperatures above its normal limits.
Inadequate heat treatment in the
original alloy, resulting in too low a
creep strength, may also lead to fail-
ure by creep. Many creep failures
have been observed to be caused
by inadequate heat treatment fol-
lowed by failures due to additional
stresses which were not known dur-
ing the design process or were
underestimated.4
For any of these reasons, the transi-
tion to a higher grade material
should have been made earlier in
the circuit. Actions to confirm this
root cause will include (a) through
(c) above, plus
(e). Review temperature data taken
from across the tubes in the
vestibule or header space. The array
of thermocouples attached to tubing
coming out of the header (used by
operators for steam temperature
control) should be used. See Figure
32-11 for an example of the process.
(f). Perform an analysis of gas-
touched length (GTL) and location of
the tube failures. Review SH/RH cir-
cuit material diagrams and calculate
the GTL to the position(s) of failure.
Plot the manufacturers recom-
mended temperature limits (based
on acceptable oxidation rates as
discussed in Section 2.1 above) for
each material in the circuit.
Superimpose any information on
measured steam and tube metal
temperatures to determine whether
the actual temperatures are over the
design limits. Figure 32-12 shows
how such a plot has been used as a
diagnostic in a unit that had experi-
enced a significant number of tube
failures by long-term overheating.
The lower temperature band in
Figure 32-12 indicates the manufac-
turers estimate of tube temperatures.
The shaded boxes above represent
Maximum oxidation
Actual range temperature for T22
of measured 621
Metal and Steam Temperature, °C
temperatures
1100 593
565
Metal and Steam Temperature, °F
1000 Maximum oxidation
538
temperature for T11 510
design steam
900 temperature 482
ManufacturerÕs design 454
estimate of tube
800 temperature range 427
399
700 371
600
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Gas Touched Length (ft)
Figure 32-12. Illustrates design steam and tube temperatures in a superheater along
with the maximum oxidation temperatures for T11 and T22 materials. Field measure-
ments of actual tube temperature ranges at four locations are also shown.
the oxidation limits for the two materi- 3.3 Buildup of internal oxide
als, T11 and T22 in the sample SH scale
section. Various temperature mea- To confirm that the buildup of steam-
surements are plotted as vertical side oxide is a primary influence on
ranges at the gas-touched length for the damage observed:
which they were measured. Note that
the T11 tubes with gas-touched (g). Institute any of the actions (a)
lengths greater than 55 ft are experi- through (c) outlined above.
encing maximum temperatures that
exceed the allowable oxidation limits.
3.4 Overheating because of
At certain times, the temperatures
experienced by the T11 material
restricted steam flow.
were as high as 50°C (90°F) over the Partial blockages can sometimes
oxidation limit. These locations were occur from chemical deposits, scale,
consistent with the locations of tube debris or deposits. Usually they will
failures by long-term overheating in result in short-term overheating fail-
the unit and clearly indicated that the ures (Chapter 36).
extra gas-touched length was the (h). Selective sampling of suspect
primary cause. It is recommended locations can verify whether a local
that this method be used to confirm blockage condition is responsible for
this root cause when it is suspected. excessive tube temperatures.
The process will also provide an alert However, the usual sequence of
of the potential for other boiler tube identification is a tube failure and
failure mechanisms that are exacer- then assessment of adjacent cir-
bated by excessive temperatures cuits.
such as fireside corrosion.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-15
3.5 Operating conditions or
changes
3.5.1 Previous similar problems in
adjacent SH/RH. Overheating can
occur in a SH/RH circuit if absorp-
tion patterns are changed as a result
of a redesign in another circuit. Such
redesign may have been necessi-
tated by prior failures.
(i). Check the temperature distribu-
tion through the circuit by perform-
ing an analysis of gas-touched
length and measured temperatures,
as described in (e) and (f) above.
3.5.2 Combustion conditions
Combustion conditions can lead to
tube overheating. Such conditions
include: excessive flue gas tempera-
ture, displaced fireball, delayed
combustion, periodic overfiring or
uneven firing of fuel burners.
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
32-16 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
(j). Gas temperature monitoring with
various suction pyrometers or
infrared measurements.
3.6 Blockage or laning of
boiler gas passages
Actions to confirm:
(k). The cold air velocity technique
discussed at length in the chapter
on flyash erosion can be used to
identify locations of locally high gas
velocities.
(l). Visual examination can often
identify local flow blockages.
3.7 Increases in stress due to
wall thinning
The previous root cause influences
have dealt primarily with increases
in tube metal temperature as a con-
tributor to excessive damage accu-
mulation by creep. Any of the
Determining the extent of damage
will involve identifying locations with
the thickest steamside oxide and
thinnest walls. Ultrasonic testing is
the most applicable and inexpensive
NDE method for measuring both
oxide thickness and wall thinning.
More detail about the processes
involved is given in Chapter 9,
Volume 1.
Note that among the hundreds of
tubes in each superheater/reheater
bank in a boiler there will be a distri-
bution of gas and metal tempera-
tures. As a result there will be an
equivalent distribution of creep and
corrosion rates. Therefore the key to
a successful prevention program will
involve a search for the highest risk
processes by which tube wall thin-
ning can occur, such as excessive
oxidation, fireside corrosion, or ero-
sion, can lead to increased tube
hoop stresses which will also
increase creep damage. Specific
confirmation of wall thinning can be
conducted by:
(m). NDE methods, such as ultra-
sonic testing, can determine the
extent of wall thinning.
(n). If another mechanism is sus-
pected, e.g., fireside corrosion, ero-
sion, etc., actions to confirm those
processes should be implemented.
Reference to the chapter of this
book dealing with each mechanism
will provide a list of recommended
actions.
locations, and assessment of their
conditions, not of the mean condi-
tion. Wall thickness measurements
around the entire tube will be useful,
particularly to distinguish the devel-
opment of tube “flats”.
Sacrificial tube samples are
removed from select locations and
subjected to laboratory metallurgical
analysis and/or isostress rupture
testing to confirm NDE results and to
refine the estimates of accumulated
damage.
Potentially affected areas can also
be identified by reviewing data from
existing thermocouples or by
installing thermocouples in at-risk
locations.
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Long-Term Overheating/Creep:
Immediate Solutions and Actions
1. Effect repairs locally as
needed.
2. Determine extent of damage
and initiate an assessment of
expected remaining life along
with consideration of desired
remaining economic life for
the unit. This will lead to the
correct choice among long-
term options.
3. Correct off-design conditions
such as displaced fireball,
uneven firing, or tube block-
ages and flow restriction.
5.1 Need for remaining life
assessment
Any immediate solution or repair
strategy should consider that a
remaining life methodology be
implemented. Such programs are
discussed in detail in Chapter 8,
Volume 1, and are summarized
below under long-term options.
5.2 Repairs
If the problem is highly localized, it
may be possible to replace the
affected tubes either with an
upgraded material or the same
material, depending upon how long
the existing tube lasted and how
long the desired life is. Care should
be taken with this quick replacement
method. It is important to remove the
full extent of the damaged area, as
indicated by wall loss, tube “flats”,
or “alligator hide”. Removing an
insufficient amount of damaged area
will result in a repeat boiler tube fail-
ure. Repair methods are reviewed in
Chapter 11, Volume 1.
Pad welding should not be used for
repair because of the uncertainty of
tube conditions, particularly the
presence and depth of creep
cracks, and the condition of the
internal surface of the tube.
Coatings are not recommended as a
long-term solution for creep.
Coatings may be useful as a pallia-
tive if the problem is fireside corro-
sion; discussion of coatings for that
purpose is described in Chapters 33
and 34.
5.3 Correction of Òoff-designÓ
conditions
In this category are those actions
that can correct obvious conditions
including tube blockages and fire-
side combustion problems such as
displaced fireball, uneven firing or
fuel burners, correctable excess flue
gas temperatures, etc.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-17
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Long-Term Overheating/Creep:
Long-Term Actions
1. Long-term strategies mostly
fall into two major categories:
(i) materials approaches, such
as upgrading to a material
with better creep performance
or (ii) control of tube tempera-
tures by either design
changes, or in a limited num-
ber of cases, operating
changes.
2. An analysis of remaining life
and the development of a
plan for monitoring and peri-
odic re-evaluation will be cen-
tral to long-term prevention.
32-18 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
Figure 32-13 provides an overview
of the available options. The num-
bers in the figure are for reference to
the text only and do not imply a
ranking among options; however,
items outlined in bold indicate the
strategies that have been shown to
be the most successful.
Remaining life assessment is almost
mandatory in order to determine the
most economic strategy among the
available options. This includes
understanding (i) the extent of dam-
age, (ii) the expected remaining life
(RL) of affected areas, and (iii) the
desired life (DL) of the unit,
The two primary approaches to pre-
vent repeat failures are to (i) accept
the temperatures being experienced
at the location of interest and
upgrade the material used, or (ii)
Materials solutions
Replace
component
More
Same resistant
material
material
2 3
Notes: a) Remaining life (1) assessment is almost mandatory to decide which option should be adopted
b) Boxes outlined in bold indicate options that have been most successful
c) Numbers refer to main text
Figure 32-13. Strategies for preventing repeat failures by long-term overheating/creep.
institute through re-design or (less
commonly) operating changes to
lower the temperature at the suscep-
tible location.
The review of long-term options
looks first briefly at the remaining life
assessment of SH/RH tubes.
Remaining life assessment
(option 1, Figure 32-13)
The importance of a comprehensive
remaining life assessment cannot be
overstated. It is a prerequisite to the
optimal choice of long-term solu-
tions. During the past twenty years a
number of techniques have been
developed to assess remaining life
of superheater/reheater tubing sub-
ject to high temperature creep and
corrosion. The most universally
applied analysis method utilizes
Overheating (creep) confirmed
and extent determined
Remaining life assessment 1
Design solutions Operating solutions
Major SH/RH Redistribute
redesign and steam Steam side Gas side
replace flow
4 5
6 8
Chemical Adjust
clean
fireside
oxide conditions
Remove Minimize
blockages laning
7 9
measurements of steamside oxide
scale thickness and tube wall thick- 1.00
nesses to predict the remaining
creep life of superheater/reheater

Creep Damage Ratio

tubing. The methodology is dis- 0.80 This region is
cussed in detail in Chapter 8, expanded in the
Volume 1. lower graph.
0.60
If significant wall thinning and the
concomitant accumulation of creep
damage is occurring, an acceptable 0.40
rate of wastage should be estab-
lished on the basis of the desired 0.20
remaining life and the rate of dam-
age accumulation. As a rule of
thumb, rates of wastage above 25 0
nm/hr (~ 9 mils/yr) are generally 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280
considered to require some residual Operating Time (103 Hours)
life activity, such as an annual evalu-
ation of residual life, formalized peri-
odic re-inspection and analysis, etc.;
1.00 -0°F -10°F -20°F -30°F
rates above 50 nm/hr (~ 18 mils/yr)
indicate a serious decrease in the
Creep Damage Ratio

life of the tubing. In the latter case,

remaining life should be estimated 0.95
and the appropriate actions initiated
if that life is unacceptable. If fireside
corrosion is a contributing mecha- 0.90
nism, see separate chapters for
available options.
0.85
Replacement with same
material (option 2)
Replacement in-kind is a repair 0.80
0 20 40 60 80
option. More generally, the actual
service conditions are locally more Remaining Life (103 Hours)
extreme than anticipated, which
suggests the need to use a more
resistant material. The decision will Figure 32-14. Creep damage accumulation showing life extension
be based on (i) the expected life- obtained by reducing the metal temperature. Source: K. Hara, et al.11
time of a new tube constructed of
the same material as the original
design, (ii) the desired lifetime of the Major SH/RH redesign and Redistribute steam flow
unit, and (iii) the length of time to the replacement (option 4) (option 5)
next major outage when an alterna- If the overheat problem is directly The technique of steam flow redistri-
tive could be evaluated and imple- related to poor initial design of the bution in superheaters has seen
mented. superheater or reheater, such as recent significant development.11
poor circuit design or different gas- Superheaters and reheaters are can-
Change to a more resistant touched lengths of the tubes didates for this method if the tubes
material (option 3) between headers, then re-design are mostly not at the end of
might be the optimal economic solu- expected life and there are signifi-
Tubes can be changed to a more
tion. The main criteria should be to cant temperature differences among
resistant material, such as a higher
equalize the gas-touched length of the tubes. Redistribution of steam
chromium content ferritic steel or an
the tubes and to avoid large radiant flow can then serve to equalize the
austenitic stainless steel if better
cavities. tube metal temperatures across the
temperature resistance is the most
superheater.
economic option.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-19


Inlet
header
SFC location
Approximately
Wall thickness 1 ft. in length
equal to
superheater
tubing wall
thickness
Steam Flow Controller
Figure 32-15. Schematic of a steam flow controller (SFC) and typical location in a
superheater tube bank. Source: K. Hara, et al.11
With steam flow controllers (orifices)
of different sizes and lengths in the
tubes coming out of the inlet header,
the flow can be decreased in “cold”
tubes, which increases their temper-
atures. This change will also
increase the steam flow to “hot”
tubes with a concurrent decrease of
the metal temperatures. Figure 32-
14 shows that the decrease in tube
metal temperature can lead to signif-
icant increase in the remaining life of
tubes. This tube which has operated
32-20 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
Outlet
header
Roof
OD equal to
superheater
tubing OD
3:1 taper
for approximately 200,000 hours
would have an expected life of
about 27,000 more hours.
Decreasing the tube metal tempera-
ture by 30°F (~ 17°C) would
increase the expected life to over
75,000 hours.
Steam flow redistribution occurs by
modifying the tube-to-tube steam
flow resistance through the use of
steam flow controllers (SFCs), Figure
32-15. The tube inner diameter is
increased or decreased for a spe-
cific length, not with a sharp-edged
orifice but with a tapered section.
Typically the SFC is installed just
downstream from the inlet header in
the penthouse, which allows easy
access to tubes and places the SFC
out of the heat flux region.
A roadmap of the overall process,
which includes both technical and
economic considerations, is shown
in Figure 32-16. Steps in the process
include11:
• Analyzing existing information,
sampling, and field measurement
to determine the current distribu-
tion of tube metal temperatures.
• Analysis of the steamside oxide
scale to determine tube tempera-
tures and creep life expended to
date and remaining.
• Determining the locations and
dimensions of SFCs required to
achieve the desired tube metal
and steam temperatures.
• Estimating the expected creep life
improvement.
• Evaluating the economic and
technical tradeoffs of identified
options.
• Performing the optimal modifica-
tions.
• Validation testing and long-term
monitoring of the results.
Technical factors to be considered
include11: (i) analyzing the increase
in pressure drop across the super-
heater because too much plugging
or flow restriction can lead to a heat
rate penalty, although this has been
found to be very minor, (ii) the opti-
mal inside diameter of each SFC
including some minimum value to
avoid plugging, typically 12 mm (0.5
in.) or so, (iii) the number of SFCs,
(iv) the number of plugged and
replaced tubes, and (v) the temper-
atures of tubes after redistribution.

Obtain superheater
(Step 1) design and test data
Candidate for
(Step 2) steam flow
redistribution?
Yes
Perform steam flow
(Step 3) redistribution design
and economic analysis
Acceptable
(Step 4) cost
savings?
Yes
Perform superheater
(Step 5) modifications
(Step 6)
Perform validation testing
(Step 7) and long-term monitoring
Figure 32-16. Road map for achieving improved superheater longevity by steam flow
redistribution. Source: K. Hara, et al.11
An overall strategy for the super-
heater will include consideration of
SFCs along with selective tube plug-
ging and tube replacement. Plugging
of tubes that are near the end of their
expected lives will not only extend
the time to first failure but will have
the additional advantage of increas-
ing flow that can be directed to
decrease the temperature of “hot”
tubes. Selective tube replacement
will also extend the time to failure.
For a typical 400 MW unit, the cost
to perform a steam flow redistribu-
tion modification is around $210,000
No
No
Make
run/repair/replace
decision
($525/MW). A condition assessment
based on the oxide scale technique
in a similar size unit is around
$25,000 (~ $60/MW).
Chemical cleaning to
remove steamside oxide layer
(option 6)
If excessive temperature in the
SH/RH tubes has been exacerbated
by the presence of increasing
steamside oxide scale thickness, a
solution involving chemical cleaning
may be in order. Typical benefits are
illustrated in Figure 4-2, Volume 1.
Details on chemical cleaning of
SH/RH circuits are found in Chapter
4, Volume 1. Precautions should be
taken to avoid stress corrosion
cracking of stainless steel tubes
during cleaning. This option has the
added advantage of reducing exfoli-
ation that can lead to solid particle
erosion of HP/IP turbines.
Clean tubes and remove
sources of blockage (option 7)
Similarly, if the source of overheating
is a blocked or partially blocked
tube, high pressure fluid flushing or
chemical cleaning may be neces-
sary, depending on the problem.
This can be a time consuming and
repetitive option, which involves
radiography of the bends, removal
and replacement of tubes, or clean-
ing of the accumulated scale, debris
or deposits.
Adjust fireside combustion
conditions and/or burners
(option 8)
This involves quantification of the
problem through use of fireside test-
ing and optimization. Reference
should be made to compilations of
the appropriate procedures.12
Minimize laning of gases
(option 9)
Laning or channeling of gases
through certain tube sections can
lead to overheated tubes. This is
very difficult to overcome; it can be
recognized and monitored by way of
the cold air velocity technique which
is described at length in the chapter
on the flyash erosion damage mech-
anism. However, the application of
flow distribution screens, a means to
control locally high velocities, is
made more difficult in the SH/RH by
the high temperature environment.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-21
7. Case Study

Long-Term Overheating/Creep Case Study: Field Experience

Table 32-4 summarizes the key
characteristics for four units that
have recently experienced boiler
tube failures by long-term overheat-
ing. There are a number of impor-
tant factors about the causes of the
problem that are evident from the
field experiences in these units:
1. The majority of the failures were
in ferritic materials, with the most
prominent failure location being
adjacent to the transition to a
material containing a higher Cr
content.
2. There was evidence of very 5. Temperatures were found to
thick internal oxide scale. The have been higher than the man-
scales were usually multi-lami- ufacturer’s oxidation limits.
nated and suffering exfoliation. 6. Damage was usually detectable
3. The affected tubes always mani- by performing a gas-touched
fested the physical appearance length/materials evaluation such
of tube flats, “alligator hide”, and as shown in Figure 32-12.
longitudinal failures that origi-
nated in the middle of the flats.
4. There was no contribution from
fireside corrosion; no low melting
point compounds were detected
in the fireside tube deposits.

Table 32-4
Comparison of Key Factors in Field-Observed Long-Term Overheating
Were
Tube Flats, Oxide
Adjacent Fireside Alligator Scale Estimated Other
Failure (next) Operating Corrosion Hide Thickness Temperature, Corrective Unit
Unit Location Material Material Hours (see Note 1) Found? (µm) °C Action Problems

A RH 9Cr 304H > 100,000 No Yes > 100 > 630 Replacement SPE
(see Note 3)

B RH T11 T22 80,000 No Yes > 250 610 - 620 Upgrade SPE

C RH 9Cr 321H 60,000 No Yes n/a > 630 Replacement None

(see Note 2)

D SH T11 T22 85,000 No Yes N/a 565 - 615 Redesign DMW

(see Note 4)

Notes:
1. Was fireside corrosion involved and/or was a low melting point deposit/ash found?
2. Replacement plus operational changes were used to correct high reheat temperatures during sliding pressure operation.
3. Solid particle erosion (SPE) in turbine due to thick and exfoliating steamside oxide.
4. Dissimilar metal weld (DMW) failures.

32-22 Long-Term Overheating/Creep

8. References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
2Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.
3Grunloh, H.J. and R.H. Ryder, Life Assessment of Boiler
Pressure Parts, Volume 7: Life Assessment Technology
for Superheater/Reheater Tubes, Research Project 2253-
10, Final Report TR-103377-V7, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, November, 1993
4Personal Communication from E. Tolksdorf (VGB) to R.B.
Dooley, February 16,1995.
5Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec,
November, 1983.
6American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code: Section I: Rules for Construction
of Power Boilers, ASME, New York. Data for Table 32-2
from 1983 edition.
7Stultz,S.C. and J.B. Kitto, Steam: Its Generation and
Use, Babcock & Wilcox Company, Barberton, Ohio. Data
for Table 32-2 from 1978 edition.
8Singer, J.G., ed., Combustion Fossil Power: A Reference
Book on Fuel Burning and Steam Generation,
Combustion Engineering, Inc., Windsor, Connecticut.
Data for Table 32-2 from 1981 edition.
9French, D.N., Metallurgical Failures in Fossil-Fired
Boilers, John Wiley & Sons, Wiley-Interscience
Publications, New York. Data for Table 32-2 from 1983
edition.
10Eberle,F. and J.H. Kitterman, “Scale Formation on
Superheater Alloys Exposed to High Temperature
Steam”, The Babcock & Wilcox Company, Alliance, Ohio.
11Hara, K., C. Lee, R. Moser, T. Rettig, and K. Clark,
Improved Superheater Component Longevity by Steam
Flow Redistribution, Research Project 1893-13, Final
Report TR-101697, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, December, 1992.
12Sotter, J.G., J.A. Arnot, and T.M. Brown, Guidelines for
Fireside Testing in Coal-Fired Power Plants, Research
Project 1891-3, Final Report CS-5552, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, March, 1988.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-23
ACTIONS for Long-term Overheating/Creep
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of long-
term overheating damage begin
here. The goal of these actions is
to see if further investigation of
long-term overheating is war-
ranted or whether another BTF
mechanism should be investi-
gated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and long-term over-
heating/creep is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by long-term overheating/
creep.
32-24 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and long-term overheat-
ing/creep is the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure
has occurred in a location that is
typical of long-term overheating/
creep:
➠ Review Figure 32-7a and b
for typical boiler regions.
➠ Review main text, Section
1.2 for description of suscepti-
ble locations.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Thick-edged fracture surface.
• Thick, external scales, often
with Y-shaped grooves, “alliga-
tor hide” appearance.
• Tube “flats” on outside of tube,
particularly with fracture or the
maximum amount of “alligator
hide” occurring in the flats.
• Thick layered internal scale.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by long-term
overheating/creep.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Excessive temperatures
detected during monitoring of
installed thermocouples in the
vestibule or header area.
• Observation of “alligator hide”
during routine inspections.
• Detection of an excessive level
of steamside oxide either by
ultrasonic measurements taken
during periodic inspection or
by analysis of removed tube
samples.
• A problem with solid particle
erosion in the turbine.
• Fireside conditions that could
lead to overheating of the
tubes.
➠ These precursors can signal the
potential for tube failures by long-
term overheating/creep. If one or
more has occurred, go to Action 3
which reviews root causes and
outlines the steps to confirm the
influence of each.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is long-term
overheating/creep.
A failure has occurred which
the BTF team has tentatively
identified as being long-term
overheating (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify long-term
overheating as the primary
mechanism or point to another
cause. The actions listed will be
executed by confirming the
macroscopic appearance of the
failure, removing representative
tube sample(s) and subjecting
them to detailed visual and
metallographic analysis. A
primary objective is to ensure
that the mechanism is not
fireside corrosion.
continued on next page
➠ Evaluate locations of failure. Are
failed tubes in a location suscep-
tible to long-term overheating
such as near material transitions,
where there is variation in gas-
touched length, in or just beyond
a cavity, in highest temperature
locations?
➠ Characterize failure surface. Is
failure “thick-edged”?
➠ Analyze internal scales. Do sec-
tioned tubes (of ferritic materials)
show thick, internal oxide scales?
➠ Calculate ratio of wall thinning
loss to internal oxide scale
buildup. See Figure 32-6. Is the
ratio greater than five?
➠ Calculate ratio of wall thinning
loss to internal oxide scale
buildup. Is the ratio greater than
three?
➠ Analyze composition of external
ash/ deposits. Are there low melt-
ing point ash components in
external deposits?
Problem may be fireside corrosion.
Review susceptible locations for
that failure mechanism.
Ductile failures will be more indica-
tive of a wastage mechanism. See
fireside corrosion, an erosion
mechanism, or short-term over-
heating.
Problem is probably not long-term
overheating, see erosion and fire-
side corrosion.
Problem is almost certainly a
wastage mechanism, either fire-
side corrosion or erosion.
Problem is likely to be influenced
by wastage mechanism, either fire-
side corrosion or erosion.
Fireside corrosion is likely to be
a primary contributor to the
damage.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-25
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is long-term
overheating/creep (continued).

Probable mechanism is long-term

overheating/creep. Steps to con-
firm will include evaluation for
signs of creep damage or over-
heating:
• In ferritic materials spheroidiza-
tion and decreased fireside sur-
face hardness
• In austenitic stainless steels the
presence of sigma phase and
grain boundary cavities.
• Graphitization may be present in
carbon or carbon molybdenum
steels.
• Note that creep voids will typi-
cally be found only adjacent to
the cracking, not in the bulk
material.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

References to other sources of information:

• Main text (this chapter) provides the background to the mechanism and the
development of long-term overheating.
• Summary of the steps and methods of metallurgical investigation of boiler
tube failures can be found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
• Fireside corrosion is the mechanism most likely to be confused with long-
term overheating. It is the subject of two separate writeups, Chapter 33 for
coal-fired units and Chapter 34 for oil-fired units, which should be reviewed
for clarification of the differences.

32-26 Long-Term Overheating/Creep

Action 3: Determine root cause of long-term overheating/creep
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as long-term overheating
(Action 2) or a precursor has
occurred (Action 1b). The goal of
this Action is for the BTF Team to
review the potential root causes
of long-term overheating, identify
probable ones, and take those
actions that are needed to con-
firm which are operative in the
unit. This step must be taken so
that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
3.1 All causes of overheating
3.2 Influences of initial design and/or
material choice
• Original alloy inadequate for actual
operating temperatures.
• Inadequate heat treatment of original alloy.
• Tubes at failure location have gas-touched
lengths longer than design estimate and/or
row-to-row variation in gas-touched length.
• Side-to-side or local gas temperature
differences.
• Radiant cavity heating effects.
• Lead tube/wrapper tube material not
resistant enough to temperature.
3.3 Build-up of internal oxide scale
3.4 Overheating because of restricted steam
flow due to chemical or other deposits, scale,
debris, etc.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Direct measurement of temperatures by
thermocouples.
➠ (b). Metallurgical analysis of tube structure
and oxide thickness and morphology of
selected tube samples.
➠ (c). Ultrasonic testing for direct measure-
ment of steamside oxide thickness.
➠ (d). Visual examination for evidence of slag
buildup, laning, bowed or misaligned tubes
acting as leading tubes.
➠ (e). Review temperature data from thermo-
couples installed in vestibule or across the
header.
➠ (f). Review SH/RH circuit material dia-
grams, calculate and plot GTL as a function of
steam and metal temperatures, plot positions
of failures.
➠ (g). See items (a) - (c).
➠ (h). Selective sampling of suspect loca-
tions to verify whether local blockage is lead-
ing to excessive temperatures.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-27
Action 3: Determine root cause of long-term overheating/creep
(continued)
Major Root Cause Influences
3.5 Operating conditions or changes
in operation
3.5.1 Previous similar problems in adjacent
SH/RH
3.5.2 Combustion conditions can lead to tube
overheating.
• Excessive flue gas temperature
• Displaced fireball
• Delayed combustion
• Periodic overfiring or uneven firing of fuel
burners.
3.6 Blockage or laning of boiler gas passages
3.7 Increases in stress due to wall thinning
32-28 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (i). Check temperature distribution through
the circuit by performing analysis of GTL and
measured temperatures; see (e) and (f) above.
➠ (j). Monitor gas temperatures with pyrome-
ters or infrared instruments.
➠ (k). Can be recognized by way of cold air
velocity technique. See flyash erosion mecha-
nism for a discussion of the technique.
➠ (l). Visual examination to identify local flow
blockages.
➠ (m). NDE evaluation to determine the extent
of wall thinning.
➠ (n). If another mechanism (corrosion, ero-
sion) is suspected, initiate actions to confirm
their involvement.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. A key for remaining life
assessment, which is central to
proper choice of long-term
actions, is an evaluation of
steamside oxide thickness. That
determination is the primary
objective of the survey of
affected areas; an analysis of
wall thickness and direct moni-
toring of tube temperatures are
also important parts of this
Action 4.
➠ Identify all locations to
be examined. See
typical locations in
Figure 32-7a and b and
listed in the main text,
Section 1.2
Examine for indirect Examine for direct Examine for signs of
signs of overheating signs of overheating wall thinning as con-
tributor to creep dam-
age.
➠ Perform UT survey ➠ Monitor tube tem- ➠ Perform UT survey
to determine oxide peratures. Install to determine extent
scale thicknesses. thermocouples (T/C) and distribution of
See Chapters 8 and and/or monitor exist- wall thinning. See
9, Volume 1 for ing T/C for signs of Chapter 9, Volume 1
more detail. local overheating. for more detail.
➠ Perform selective tube
sampling to confirm
NDE results, evaluate
the nature and extent of
oxide buildup.
➠ Use results interactively
with Action 3 (Root
cause evaluation).
➠ Begin remaining life
assessment. Go to
Action 5: Immediate
Solutions and Actions
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-29
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
The most important actions for
the BTF team are to (i) initiate a
remaining life assessment based
on oxide thickness and wall thin-
ning derived from NDE survey,
and (ii) make a quick repair
using the same material if, after
calculating the expected degra-
dation rate, there is assurance
that it will survive to the next out-
age. Other actions that can be
executed in the short-term are
also noted.
32-30 Long-Term Overheating/Creep
➠ Gather sufficient information so
that a remaining life assessment
of affected tubes can be initiated.
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
of affected tubes identified from
the NDE Survey (Action 4).
➠ See Chapter 11, Volume 1
for summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
➠ Develop a plan to replace
affected tubing, including an
economic assessment that con-
siders the estimated rate of
future failures.
➠ Ensure that the full extent of
damage is removed, as indi-
cated by wall loss, the presence
of “alligator hide” or tube “flats”.
Failure to do so will result in
immediate repeat failures.
➠ Temporary pad welds
should not be used because of
the uncertainty associated with
the base metal condition (the
depth and extent of creep
cracks, and the condition of the
inside tube surface).
➠ Adjust off-design conditions such
as tube blockages, displaced
fireball, uneven firing or fuel
burners, excess flue gas temper-
atures, etc.
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will include
the analysis of remaining life
based on the oxide scale
methodology and an economic
evaluation to ensure that the
optimal strategy has been
chosen.
Major Root Cause Influences
All causes of overheating
Influences of initial design and/or material
choice
• Original alloy inadequate for actual
operating temperatures.
• Inadequate heat treatment of original alloy.
• Tubes at failure location have gas-touched
lengths longer than design estimate and/or
row-to-row variation in gas-touched length.
• Side-to-side or local gas temperature
differences.
• Radiant cavity heating effects.
• Lead tube/wrapper tube material not
resistant enough to temperature.
Build-up of internal oxide scale
Overheating because of restricted steam flow
due to chemical or other deposits, scale,
debris, etc.
Operating conditions or changes in operation
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Determine remaining life of affected tubes
based on actual temperatures, stress levels and
materials properties. See Chapter 8, Volume 1
for additional detail.
➠ Make the change to a higher grade of steel
(next higher chromium level).
➠ Tube/circuit realignment; consider steam
flow redistribution. See main text for summary
of methodology.
➠ Major SH/RH redesign and replacement.
➠ Redesign tube bank.
➠ Retube with same material, depending on
expected and desired life of the SH/RH.
➠ As above: steam flow redistribution will be
particularly applicable for correcting side-to-
side and local variations in temperature;
upgrading will be particularly applicable in
cases where the original alloy was inadequate
or where the tube has a gas-touched length
that is longer than the design estimate.
➠ Address underlying cause of overheating or
➠ Periodic chemical cleaning to mitigate
effects. See Chapter 4, Volume 1 for additional
detail about the methods and determining
timing.
➠ Determine remaining life of affected tubes
based on actual temperatures, stress levels and
materials properties. See Chapter 8, Volume 1
for additional information about the methods of
oxide scale analysis.
➠ See additional options on primary list from
above.
➠ Introduce measures to prevent future
blockages.
➠ Optimization of operation and fireside con-
ditions must be the emphasis. See compila-
tions of the applicable methods (reference 12).
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 32-31
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
(continued)
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Long-Term Actions

Previous similar problems in

adjacent SH/RH

Combustion conditions can lead to tube over- ➠ Optimization of fireside conditions.

heating. See reference 12.
• Excessive flue gas temperature
• Displaced fireball
• Delayed combustion
• Periodic overfiring or uneven firing of fuel
burners.

Blockage or laning of boiler gas passages
➠ Controlled with flow distribution screens; in
practice is difficult to implement because of
high temperatures in SH/RH. See Chapter 14,
Volume 2 on flyash erosion for control of high
local velocities through the use of the cold air
velocity technique.

Increases in stress due to wall thinning ➠ Check long-term actions in wastage mecha-
nism chapters, particularly fireside corrosion
(Chapter 33 and 34) and flyash erosion
(Chapter 14, Volume 2).

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
that might be implied by the
presence of long-term overheat-
ing damage or its precursors.
Long-Term Alert for Other Cycle
Overheating Aspect Components
Tube overheating as • Potential for exfoliation
evidenced by build-up of oxide which can carry-
of internal oxide scale over into turbine sections.
• Exfoliating scale can
lead to tube blockage and
failures by short-term over-
heating (see Chapter 36).
➠ Actions Indicated
➠ Chemical cleaning of SH/RH
sections. See Chapter 4, Volume 1 for
more detail.
➠ Monitoring plan to assess the
severity of oxide buildup in affected
tubes, including UT inspection for direct
measurement of oxide scale, and tube
sampling to confirm type and extent of
scale.

Total redesign of the May change absorption ➠ Check temperatures in the redesigned
superheater or reheater. patterns through the SH/RH section, and other sections.
sections and may increase
temperatures in other
circuits.

32-32 Long-Term Overheating/Creep

Chapter 33 • Volume 3
SH/RH Fireside
Corrosion/Coal-Fired
Units
Introduction
Superheater/reheater (SH/RH) fire-
side corrosion (also called “molten
salt” attack or “coal ash” corrosion
or “liquid-phase” corrosion) is not
currently a major problem for U.S.
units using 538°C or 541°C (1000°F
or 1005°F) steam. Historically, it has
been a significant problem for units
operating in the U.S. at higher
steam temperatures above 565°C
(1050°F), and in those burning coals
with high fractions of chlorine such
as is common in the United
Kingdom (U.K.).
It is important to review the current
understanding of this damage type
as advanced coal-fired units may
operate at higher main steam
temperatures as one means of
achieving higher unit efficiencies.
Further, as the opportunity to burn
coals of various compositions devel-
ops, it is important to understand
the effects of coal composition on
fireside corrosion.
A third reason for reviewing the fire-
side corrosion mechanism is that it
is often confused with damage
occurring by long-term overheating
in superheater and reheater tubes
(Chapter 32); field experience
indicates long-term overheating is
currently the more prevalent of the
two. Both mechanisms eventually
result in creep failure and share
some common features of failure.
However, corrective actions differ as
do the underlying causes.
Discussion of fireside corrosion in
waterwalls of coal-fired units
(Chapter 18, Volume 2), and in
superheater/reheater tubing of oil-
fired units (Chapter 34) can be
found in separate chapters.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations

aSuperheater/Reheater Fireside
Corrosion (Coal-Fired Units):
Identification Keys
1. Macroscopically, fireside cor-
rosion will generally be ac-
companied by tube wastage
at the 10 and 2 o’clock posi-
tions (12 o’clock is the
upstream position) and by
the presence of multi-layered
fireside scale and ash.
2. Distinctive deposits, contain-
ing low melting ash compo-
nents and the presence of
alkali iron trisulphates (Na,
K)3Fe(SO4)3 are characteristic
of the most common mode of
fireside corrosion.
3. A second mode is a sulfida-

33-2
tion mechanism which will
result from carburization of
stainless steel tubing and pro-
duce evidence of discrete iron
sulfides in the grain bound-
aries of affected locations.
4. Comparing the amount of wall
thinning to the buildup of
steamside oxide can deter-
mine the extent to which fire-
side corrosion or erosion has
been a contributor relative to
long-term overheating.
5. As fireside corrosion is super-
ficially similar to long-term
overheating in superheater/
reheater tubes, some care in
diagnosis of the underlying
mechanism is required.
a
1.1 Features of failure
Macroscopically, there will usually
be a multilayered fireside scale and
ash deposit. The deposits found are
generally tightly bound to tubes at
room temperatures and will typically
consist of three layers1, 2:
1. A hard, brittle and porous outer
layer, which makes up the bulk of
the deposit and has a composi-
tion similar to that of boiler flyash.
2. A white intermediate layer con-
sisting of compounds of complex
alkali sulfates including alkali iron
trisulfates. When this layer has a
chalky consistency, corrosion has
been found to be mild or non-
existent; when fused and semi-
glossy, corrosion has been found
to be severe.
3. A black, glossy inner layer, com-
posed primarily of oxides, sulfates
and sulfides of iron.

Deposits adjacent to the metal oxide

are the ones that directly influence
corrosion of the substrate. Such
deposits, if tightly bonded, should
be suspected of covering corrosion
sites, whereas loosely bonded dust

S team

Flue gas
flow
or thick, friable ash layers are less
likely to be covering corrosion sites.3
Fireside corrosion damage will be
primarily distinguished from long-
term overheating by the presence of
low melting point ash compounds.
The fireside scale and ash should
be examined metallographically and
chemically; the presence of low
melting point (in the range 550°C to
620°C (~ 1025°F to 1150°F)) con-
stituents in the ash is indicative of
fireside corrosion. Similarly, the
presence of the alkali iron trisul-
phates (Na, K)3Fe(SO4)3 , particu-
larly in the middle layer, is a further
indicator of an active fireside corro-
sion mechanism. The innermost lay-
ers will be superficially similar for
both mechanisms.
Figure 33-1 shows the three deposit
types schematically.
Tube wastage will often be evident
and manifested as flat spots on the
tube at the 10 o’clock and 2 o’clock
positions (12 o’clock is the upstream
position). A typical cross-section
showing this wastage and the pres-
ence of significant deposits can be
seen in Figure 33-2. In this case

Inner layer

I ntermediate
layer (molten)

Outer layer
(fly ash)

Figure 33-1. Schematic representation of fireside corrosion develop-

ment for superheaters and reheaters involving a molten intermediate
layer (alkalis, sulfates). This case shows maximum wastage at the 10
and 2 o'clock positions.

SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units

tube thinning will be most evident
around the edges of the deposit.
Alternatively, the maximum wastage
can occur at the 12 o’clock position.
Figure 33-3 shows two tube sections
with fireside corrosion and long-term
overheating/creep damage.
Depending on the corrosion rate,
removal of the fireside scale and ash
deposit will reveal the smooth con-
toured appearance typical of a fluxed
corrosion reaction (the right hand
tube segment in Figure 33-3) or dis-
tinctive longitudinal grooving termed
“alligator hide” as shown in Figure
33-4, and at the 10 o’clock and 2
o’clock positions in Figure 33-3.
Greatest wall loss will generally be
seen in tubes that have been oper-
ated at the highest temperatures
over a period of time. The measure-
ment of steamside oxide thickness
by ultrasonic or laboratory measure- Figure 33-2. Tube sample exhibiting fireside corrosion. Note the presence of multi-lay-
ment will usually confirm this obser- ered scale along with wastage flats at the 10 and 2 o'clock positions of the tube's cir-
vation. The ratio of maximum wall cumference. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4
loss to oxide scale thickness at any
location will give an indication of the
degree to which fireside corrosion is
a problem relative to long-term over-
heating. Figure 33-5 indicates that if
the ratio is greater than five either
fireside corrosion or erosion is defi-
nitely active. For ratios less than
three, long-term overheating is the
primary mechanism.4
On austenitic steels, the external
magnetite and spinel oxides become
non-adherent when they reach a
thickness of about 0.2 mm (~ 0.008
in.) and tend to spall off along with
any deposits that have formed when
the boiler cools. Bare metal can
result and lead to rapid corrosion
rates. Any oxide scale that is thicker
than about 1 mm (0.04 in.) should be
considered as evidence of a fast
corrosion rate.3 There may also be
localized, overlapping pits 0.5 - 2
mm (~ 0.02 - 0.08 in.) in diameter.
Figure 33-3. Two tube sample segments showing fireside corrosion. The left shows
the ash pattern as-removed; the right shows the tube with the ash removed. On this
segment, the 12 o'clock position shows a smooth contour typical of a fluxing fireside
corrosion reaction, and the 10 and 2 o'clock positions show alligator hide typical of
long-term overheating/creep.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-3

 The 300 series stainless steels can
also be rapidly corroded if attacked
by hydrogen sulfide gas, H2S, which
can be formed in flue gas that has
high CO levels. Identification keys
will include the carburization of the
stainless steel, the presence of iron
sulfide scale or discrete grain
boundary sulfides.
Fireside corrosion can be superfi-
cially similar to long-term overheat-
ing in superheater/reheater tubing.
The key differences between these
two mechanisms and short-term
overheating are highlighted in
Table 33-1. The most distinguishing
characteristic will be the presence
of low melting ash compounds in
the deposits formed for fireside
corrosion. The ratio of wall thickness
loss to oxide scale thickness as
shown in Figure 33-5 and described
above can also help identify the
prominent damage mechanism.
Figure 33-4. Grooving of the tube's external surface, known as "alliga-
tor hide", associated with coal ash corrosion. The fireside oxide scale
and ash deposit have been removed by glass bead blasting.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4

Superheater Tubes with Ash Corrosion

0.2 B
F Y = 5X

0.15
Wall Loss,Inch

Y = 3X
A
0.1
A
F B
0.05

C E C
E D
0 D
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Steamside Oxide Scale Thickness, Inch

Figure 33-5. Nondestructive field measurements of wall loss and steamside scale
thickness on a SA-213 T22 superheater tube sample are plotted. The greatest wall loss
was almost ten times greater than the steamside oxide thickness consistent with ash
corrosion or fireside erosion being dominant. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.4

33-4 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units

Table 33-1
Comparison of Characteristics of Long-Term Overheating (Creep), Short-Term Overheating,
and Fireside Corrosion (Coal-Fired Units) In Superheater/Reheater Tubing
Characteristic
Fracture Surface and
Appearance of Failure
Internal Scale?
External Scaling?
Outside surface appearance
after removal of scale/deposits
Composition of External
Scales/Deposits
Wall Thinning?
Ratio of wall loss to steamside
oxide thickness?
Tube Material Degradation
Change in material hardness
Long-Term Overheating
• Generally thick-edged, brittle final
failure.
• Generally accompanied by exter-
nal tube wastage at the 10 o’clock
and 2 o’clock positions.
Yes, generally extensive, multi-
laminated and exfoliating.
• Yes, thick, laminated and often
longitudinally cracked.
• Usually two layers - (i) a hard,
porous outer layer with composi-
tion typically that of flyash, and
(ii) a black glossy inner layer
mostly oxide but may contain
some sulfates and sulfides of
iron.
Characteristic longitudinal grooving
and pitting (“alligator hide”).
Does not contain low melting point
ash compounds such as alkali iron
sulfates.
Typically wastage flats at 10 o’clock
and 2 o’clock positions caused by
accelerated oxidation. There is
always a layer of oxide adjacent to
the tube.
Typically less than 3:1.
Yes, generally extensive signs of
overheating and/or of creep dam-
age, particularly near to the crack
tip. Creep voids will not be found
removed from crack tip.
Localized softening near the rup-
ture is typical.
Short-Term Overheating
• Usually thin-edged, ductile final
failures.
• Swelling of tubes without
ovalization.
• “Fish-mouth” appearance of tube
rupture.
• Not necessarily thick.
• Depends on age of tube at failure.
Not necessarily thick.
Swelling, stretch marks on tube
metal.
Not relevant.
Only because of bulging of tube
material.
Not relevant.
Depends on the material and the
maximum temperature reached.
Localized hardening near the
rupture is likely.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes
Fireside Corrosion
• Tube wastage, particularly at the
10 and 2 o’clock positions.
• Longitudinal cracking, final fail-
ure can be (but not necessarily)
by overheating.
Yes, particularly if tube metal over-
heating was an influencing factor.
Yes, with multi-layers: (i) a hard,
porous layer - composition typically
of flyash, (ii) an intermediate layer
containing complex alkali sulfates,
and (iii) a black, glossy inner layer
mostly of oxides, sulfates, and
sulfides of iron.
Characteristic longitudinal grooving
and pitting (“alligator hide”).
Sometimes the corroded area is
smooth and featureless. Sometimes
“orange peel” appearance at extrem-
ities of severe corrosion.
Does contain low melting point
compounds such as alkali-iron sul-
fates (coal-fired units).
Primary feature of failure, may be
worse at the 10 and 2 o’clock posi-
tions. Depending upon the rate of
corrosion, a protective oxide layer
may remain on the tube or may
have been fluxed off.
Typically greater than 3:1; for ratios
greater than 5:1 fireside corrosion
or erosion is the dominant
mechanism.
If overheating has been a problem,
yes; otherwise, no. Fireside corro-
sion can occur in a tube at design
temperatures.
Hardening is not necessary; if there
has been no overheating, there will
be no change in hardness.
33-5
 1.2 Locations of failure
Figure 33-6 shows typical locations
of concern. Corrosion will generally
be the worst in the highest tempera-
ture locations. Parts at highest risk
therefore include:
• Leading sides of all tubes in pen-
dant platens, especially hottest
(leading) tubes, and steam outlet
tubes
• Tubes out of alignment that act as
leading tubes
• Tubes in the outlet (final) sections
towards the header, because
these are at the highest tempera-
tures.
• Just prior to a change of material,
e.g., in T22 just prior to the
austenitic material, as the lower
Cr content material may be oper-
ating above its design point.
• Wrapper tubes
Figure 33-6. Typical locations where
fireside corrosion can occur.
33-6 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units
• Tubes that surround a radiant
cavity (i.e., they may pick up
more heat)
• At bottom bends of platens espe-
cially those facing the fireball.
• Tubes with a longer gas-touched
length (GTL). GTL is the distance
measured along the tube circuit
from the inlet header to the point
of corrosion.
• Spacers and uncooled hangers,
and the fins and studs on tubes.
As noted above, on a particular
tube, failure will often be at the 10
o’clock or 2 o’clock position (flue
gas impinging at the 12 o’clock
position). Alternatively, the maximum
corrosion damage may be at the
tube crown or on one side for a tube
out of alignment.
2. Mechanism of Failure
Superheater/Reheater Fireside
Corrosion (Coal-Fired Units):
Mechanism
1. Corrosion generally occurs as
the result of the formation of
low-melting point, liquid-
phase, alkali-iron trisulfates
(Na, K)3Fe(SO4)3. Flue gas
induced erosion may also play
a role in removing protective
oxides. Failure finally occurs
by long-term creep.
2. Coal composition such as Na,
K, and S, can be a primary
determinant of the wastage
rate; alkaline earth oxides
(CaO, MgO) suppress corro-
sion. There is no universally
applicable corrosivity index for
coal composition that allows,
a priori, a prediction of fireside
corrosion rates, although sev-
eral available indices provide
qualitative guidance.
3. There is a peak in the rate
of corrosion in the range of
650-750°C (~ 1200-1380°F).
The severity of the corrosion is
a function of the tube material,
gas temperature, and coal
composition. This observation
has led to placing limits on
tube metal temperatures
by limiting main steam tem-
perature.
4. Corrosion can also occur by a
sulfidation mechanism
whereby incomplete combus-
tion leads to high CO levels in
the flue gas and local carbur-
ization, resulting in the forma-
tion of hydrogen sulfide gas
H2S, subsequent sulfidation,
and as a result, rapid corro-
sion.
2.1 Mechanism of Attack by
Alkali Salts
Salts (alkali-iron trisulfates) of the
type (Na, K)3 Fe (SO4)3 form by the
reaction of alkali sulfates with iron
oxide in the presence of SO3. These
salts can have melting temperatures
as low as 552°C (1025°F) but are
generally in the range 600-650°C
(~ 1110-1200°F). This compares
with the much higher melting points
of the simple sulfates, for example at
884°C (1623°F) for Na2SO4 and
1069°C (1956°F) for K2SO4.
The formation of alkali-iron trisulfates
has an upper temperature bound set
by their stability, which is a function
of the partial pressure of SO3 at the
ambient temperature.4 In the super-
heater, combustion should be
complete and the gas temperatures
are lower than in the furnace, with
typical final superheater maximum
tube temperatures around 600-
650°C (~ 1110-1200°F). These
metal temperatures fall in the range
in which alkali metal salts, con-
densed from the flue gas, can react
with the tube surface oxides in the
presence of SO3, to form complex
liquid sulfates, a result that leads to
rapid corrosion.
The precise mechanism by which
corrosive attack occurs is still not
fully understood. It is presently held
that the alkali iron trisulfates disrupt
the protective tube oxide by a flux-
ing mechanism and there is a sub-
sequent transport of iron from the
tube surface to form a non-protec-
tive oxide in the salt. Subsequently,
accelerated oxidation occurs
because of (i) removal of the protec-
tive oxide by mechanical loss, (ii)
oxidation-sulfidation attack caused
by sulfur in the slag, and (iii) via flux-
ing of the oxide and sulfidation
attack of the substrate metal
In a recent investigation of alloys for
use in the SH/RH sections of
advanced steam plant6, laboratory
and field probe tests indicated that
the mechanism of coal-ash corrosion
in those tests was an accelerated
oxidation/sulfidation process. In low-
corrosion-resistant, low-chromium
alloys, oxidation/sulfidation occurred
at a linear rate indicative of a fluxing
action. In the higher chromium-con-
taining alloys, an initial resistance
was broken down by a diffusion-
controlled step - the formation of a
chromium oxide layer which caused
depletion of the underlying zone and
rendered it more susceptible to oxi-
dation/sulfidation.
Although the precise mechanism is
still unknown, the results are well
established. The wastage rate is a
function of metal temperature as
shown in Figure 33-7 for 21/4 Cr fer-
ritic steel and 18Cr-8Ni stainless
steel and in Figure 33-8 for many
other alloys. This characteristic bell-
shaped curve has been confirmed
by both laboratory work and plant
probe trials for a wide range of
materials.2,3,8
Figures 33-7 and 33-8 show several
important factors. There is a rapidly
increasing rate of corrosion with
temperature to a maximum around
700°C (~ 1300°F). If steam tempera-
tures are controlled to around 538°C
(1000°F), tube metal temperatures
should be limited to approximately
595°C (~ 1100°F) which is outside
the zone where the maximum attack
occurs. Thus, the consideration of
fireside corrosion has lead, in part,
to placing limitations on super-
heater/reheater tube temperature as
an operating consideration. A sec-
ond response to fireside corrosion in
SH/RH tubes has been to use a
more resistant material. The
increased resistance of the high Cr
alloys like IN 671 (50 Cr - 50 Ni) is
indicated in Figure 33-8.
Because the wastage rate is a
strong function of tube metal tem-
perature, the propensity for rapid
corrosion can be exacerbated by
any of a number of problems that
lead to even slightly elevated tube
temperatures, such as the presence
of thick internal oxide scale, or a
variety of operating conditions such
as excessive flue gas temperatures
or local hot spots.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-7
 This sensitivity to temperature also
Weight Loss in 100 hrs, %
explains why damage typically
100 occurs at the 10 o’clock and 2
o’clock positions on the tubes.
Deposits are usually thinner at these
80 locations because of the flow
around the tube (Figure 33-1) and,
as a result, these locations are gen-
60 erally slightly hotter than the bal-
ance of the tube. Furthermore, a
T22 (2 1/4% Cr) minimum level of SO3 (on the order
40 ferritic steel of 250 ppm) is required for the cor-
rosion process to occur, and access
of SO2 to the tube surface is also
20 18 CrÐ8 Ni easier in those locations of the tube
stainless steel because of the thinner deposits.
The accelerated wastage results in
0 loss of wall thickness which causes
538 593 649 704 760 816 871 an increase in hoop stress and
(1000) (1100) (1200) (1300) (1400) (1500) (1600)
leads to eventual creep failure.
Metal Temperature, °C (°F)

2.2 Sulfidation of Stainless

Figure 33-7. Effect of metal temperature on fireside corrosion rate. Steels
Source: A.J. Blazewicz and M. Gold1
Sulfidation is a second mechanism
that may cause fireside corrosion in
superheater/reheater tubes.
316H 1 Stainless steels are rapidly corroded
321H 2 at high temperatures by hydrogen
4 347H 3 sulfide gas, H2S; this can be formed
in flue gas that has high CO levels,
310S 4
such as caused by incomplete com-
17 Ð 14 CuMo 5
bustion or low excess air levels.
Esshete 1250 6
Sulfidation attack and carburization
3 Incoloy 800H 7
of the stainless steel will result in
Weight Loss Ratio

AISI 314 8
discrete iron sulfides at the grain
TEMPALOY A-2 9
boundaries of the corroded region.
HK 4M 10
It has also been proposed that a
Inconel 617 11 5
2 local carburizing atmosphere can
IN 671 12
be created during startup oil firing
Incoloy 807 13
1 when unburned oil coats the tubes.
4 When this deposited oil subse-
6
3 quently burns, a carburizing atmos-
9
1 2 10 8 phere is created which then makes
7
the stainless steel more susceptible
11 to sulfidation.
13
12
0 2.3 Coal composition and
600 650 700 750 corrosivity indices
(1110°F) (1210°F) (1290°F) (1380°F)
A basic introduction to the effects of
Test Temperature °C (°F)
coal composition on boiler tube fail-
Synthetic ash: 37.5 mol% Na2SO4 Synthetic gas: 80%N2, 15% CO2, 4% O2 ures was presented in Chapter 2,
37.3 mol% K2SO4 1% SO2, including
25 mol% Fe2O3 saturated H2O Volume 1. Some additional com-
Exposed time: 50 hrs ments specific to fireside corrosion
in superheater/reheater tubes is pro-
Catalyst: V2O5
vided here.

Figure 33-8. Weight loss ratio of various materials as a function of test temperature.
Source: S. Kihara, et al.7

33-8 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units

The most important species respon-
sible for fireside corrosion in coal- Relationship of Coal Constituents to High Temperature Corrosion*
fired boilers are alkali metal com- 900
800
pounds and sulfur. 750 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 8.0 12.0
700
sis)
As a general rule, for U.S. coals, (ppm coal ba 650
e Na 2O 600 sis)
Acid so
lubl 550 l ba
eastern high-sulfur coals can be coa
500 (%
400 O3
Fe 2
corrosive and prone to low melting 0-300
sulfate or alkali-iron trisulfate forma-
tion, whereas western low-sulfur 0 10 12 14 16 18 20
coals usually do not cause a coal- Acid Soluble K20 (expressed as
0
2
Na2O Eq., ppm x 10 coal basis)
ash corrosion problem, but can 0.4
0.8
Corrosion Index
cause slagging and fouling because 22
1.2

ion
1.6

n
of the high levels of sodium and cal-

io
n 20 ) 2.0
tio

uct

ct
sis

0% Corrosion Reduction
uc

du
ed ion 18 l ba 2.4

red
cium in the coal.6 uct coa

re
nr red
16 2.8

n
sio %

io
.

ion
o on eq 3.2

s
orr 14
osi

rro
r aO 3.6

ros
c
cor sC

co
12
There is some evidence that the cor- 75
%
0% da 4.0

cor

%
10 10 s e
res

50
rosiveness of these deposits exp

25%
8
O(
6 Mg
increases with increasing coal sulfur 4 Ca
O +

content over about 2 percent.9 2

However, in general, for coals with
sulfur levels above about 2 percent,
changes in the content of volatile
alkali metal compounds have a
stronger influence on corrosion than
do changes in sulfur content.2
The mitigating properties of CaO
and MgO have also been docu-
mented. Most recently in an investi-
gation of alloys for advanced steam
plant, it was found that a 21/2% addi-
tion of CaO was beneficial in reduc-
ing the rate of fireside corrosion,
particularly for the less-resistant
materials.10 Calcium oxide lowers
the potential for sulfur at the tube
surface by forming a layer of cal-
cium sulfate in the deposit; this is
expected to result in a lower corro-
sion rate. In the field experience,
there is often such a layer found.
The effect could also be due to
increasing melting point.
Several corrosion indices have been
proposed to determine the likeli-
hood that a given coal will lead to a
potential fireside corrosion problem,
including methods proposed by
Borio, et al.11, Raask12, and Shigeta,
et al.13
The index developed by Borio, et
al.11 was based on an experimental
study of U.S. coals from six mines,
specifically for Eastern U. S. coals.
The index produced a value ranged
0 50
* (1) Probe temperatures maintained at average of 1100 °F
(2) Probe metal Ð 321 SS
Figure 33-9. Nomograph for determination of corrosive index of coal.
Source: R. Borio, et al.11
from 0-22, with the potential for cor-
rosion increasing with higher index
values. It considered the effect of
alkali metals (Na + K), alkaline earth
metals (Ca + Mg) and sulfur (as FeS)
on the corrosion potential of the coal.
For example, the presence of CaO
and MgO in coals elevates the melt-
ing point of sulfates and lessens the
possibility of molten salt attack. A
nomograph (Figure 33-9) was devel-
oped that incorporated four coal
composition factors: (i) acid soluble
K2O, (ii) acid soluble Na2O, (iii) iron
oxide Fe2O3, and (iv) CaO + MgO.
This work lead to practical applica-
tions such as the blending of coal to
adjust levels of CaO + MgO as a
function of the Na, K and S content
of coal. The peak temperature and
the corrosion-temperature relation-
ship at each temperature are likely
to be different if coals are blended
100 150 200 250 300 350
CaO Equivalent (% coal basis)
Example (coal F)
Acid SOL K2O (expressed as Na2O eq.)
Acid SOL Na2O
CaO + MgO (expressed as CaO eq.)
Fe2O3
Quantity of CaO eq. required to reduce corrosion rate by 100% (1 hour)
(All values are measured on coal basis)
0
400 450
1410 ppm
540 ppm
0.50%
1.9%
160%
or washed to meet emission stan-
dards, or if coals of different compo-
sition, such as Western coals are
considered.
The Borio index has had some suc-
cess in ranking the potential for cor-
rosion in units using Eastern U.S.
coals, as most recently confirmed in
field probe tests of seven materials
under consideration for advanced
plant conditions.6 Two units were
part of the test program and burned
high sulfur subbituminous coal with
Borio index ratings of 2.5 and 3.5
For five of the seven alloys tested,
the index ordered the corrosion
behavior. However, an evaluation of
the use of the index to correlate with
units which had severe corrosion
problems and burned a wider range
of coal types met with only limited
success.2

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-9

This limited applicability would indi-
cate that other factors need to be a) 1.0
considered when looking for predic- 4

Weight Loss (mg/cm2/hr)

Coefficient (K, Na)

tive methods associated with fireside
0.8
corrosion, and that use of the Borio

Na2O/K2ORatio
3
index should probably be limited to
0.6
bituminous coals of the type used to
establish in the index. 2
0.4
Raask12 proposed a simple ranking
system based on the sum of the per- 1 Example: Ash contains 12% Na2O
and 8% K2O. Ratio is 6 to 4. Enter 0.2
centages of water-soluble sodium figure at that ratio on X-axis.
and potassium in coal as deter-
mined on the bomb residue from the Na2O 0 2 4 6 8 10
measurement of coal calorific value. K2O 10 8 6 4 2 0
The three categories are: Na2OÐK2O Weight Ratio
b) 1.0

Coefficient (CaO), and (MgO)

4

Weight Loss (mg/cm2/hr)

CaO and MgO Content
Water-soluble Na + K, Corrosiveness
0.8
weight percent 3 MgO

0.6
< 0.5 Low
2
CaO 0.4
0.5 - 1.0 Medium
1 0.2
> 1.0 High
0 4 8 12 16 20
Contents of CaO, MgO (%)
A third index based on an extensive
c) 1.6
study of boiler deposits, test probe
deposits, and laboratory corrosion
coupons was developed by Shigeta,
1.2
Coefficient (SO2)

et al.13 It relates weight loss to the

SO2 Content

amounts of Na2O and K2O, and their

ratio, the amount of SO2, and the
inhibitive effects of CaO and MgO.
The expression developed is shown
in equation at bottom of this page.
The four coefficients are read from
Figures 33-10a, b, and c. The
expression was validated for Type
347H stainless steel and Alloy 17-14
CuMo in 6,000 hour probe tests.
Expected weight loss for other alloys
was also determined and a ratio
between the response of Type 347H
and the alloy of choice can be deter-
mined from Figure 33-8 as a function
of expected metal temperature.
These indices can provide a qualita-
tive guide to the effect of coal com-
position on the propensity for fire-
Weight loss (mg/cm2) = -0.08 + 0.13 (wt % acid soluble Na2O + K2O)
x CNa2O/K2O x CCaO x CMgO x CSO2 x time (hrs.)
0.8
0.4
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
SO2, ppm
Figure 33-10. Derivation of coefficients and effects of weight loss as a function of
Na2O/K2O ratio, content of CaO, MgO and SO2. Source: J. Shigeta, et al.13
side corrosion. This is one of the 2.4 Effect of Cl in Coal
tools necessary to confirm the root Chlorine appears to play a role in
cause of SH/RH tube failures, as is releasing the alkalis from the coal,
outlined in Section 3 below. but levels above about 0.2 weight
percent appear to be required.3
Corrosion rate has been observed to
(33-1) be a strong function of chlorine level
for U.K. coals; increasing essentially

33-10 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units

linearly for superheater/reheater
alloys with increase in chlorine con-
tent of the coal over the range 0.1%
to 0.5%.3 Past reasoning was that
the correlation with chlorine was
indirect. The release of sodium con-
tained in sodium chloride in the coal
triggered the release of potassium,
so that the chlorine acted as a cata-
lyst to the formation of sulfate or
trisulfate attack. There is also some
evidence that the formation of HCl in
the flame can destroy the protective
oxides such as Fe2O3.
A review of the effects of chlorine in
U.K. coals was made in 1991.5 U.K.
coals generally have significantly
higher levels of chlorine than typical
U.S. coals of up to 0.7 weight per-
cent (averaging around 0.25%). The
review includes details on fireside
corrosion and points to the linear
dependence on chlorine for corro-
sion rates of austenitic superheater
and reheater alloys. Additional key
aspects from that review are:
• Corrosion rates in plants burning
high chlorine coals can reach
well over 100 nm/hr (~ 35 mils/yr)
at surface metal temperatures of
630°C (~ 1165°F).
• The source for chlorine in U.K.
coals is mostly as weakly bound
ions associated with organic mat-
ter; with the balance being NaCl.
Chlorine is released as HCl,
about 80 ppm for each 0.1% Cl in
the coal.
• HCl plays a key role in releasing
both sodium and potassium from
coal ash which leads to aggres-
sive sodium-potassium sulfate
deposition.
• A correlation that relates corro-
sion rates to metal temperature,
gas temperature, coal chlorine
content, leading/non-leading tube
position and alloy composition
has been developed based on
CEGB operating experience and
plant corrosion measurements.14
It is of the form:
R = K L B (Cl-a) (Tm - b)c
(Tg - d)e (33-2)
Corrosion Rate (nm/h)
150
100
50
Corrosion rate for leading tubes,
normalized to metal temp 640°C,
gas temp 1050 °C
0
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55
Chlorine Content of Coal (% as received)
Figure 33-11. The linear dependence of corrosion rate on coal chlorine content for
austenitic steels. 50 nm/hr is approximately 18 mils/yr.
Source: W.H. Gibb and J.G. Angus15
where It should be repeated that this corre-
R = corrosion rate lation and the understanding of the
effects of chlorine on high tempera-
K, a, b, c, d, and e = empirically
ture corrosion is only applicable to
derived constants
U.K. utility operations. A number of
Cl = chlorine content in wt % U.S. utilities have been burning
Tm = surface metal temperature coals with elevated chlorine levels
(up to 0.4 wt. %) from the Illinois
Tg = gas temperature Basin and have not, to date, experi-
L = lead edge tube factor enced the extensive corrosion that
has been observed in U.K. plants.
B = alloy factor (unity for 300
series alloys) Further field testing and laboratory
work is currently being initiated to
The relationship has been found to understand the basis for the
hold for austenitic alloys 316, 321, emphasis on chlorine in U.K. utility
347 and Alloy E1250. The B factor experience, and the extent, if any, of
for more resistant alloys has also chlorine effects in U.S. coals. There
been evaluated and is: for Alloy 310 may be a difference in the way that
the chlorine is bound in the coal and
(B = 0.3) and 50% Cr-50% Ni (B=
released in the flame between U.S.
0.1). The chlorine relationship for
and U.K. coals. Alternatively, the
these more resistant alloys has not
coal chlorine content may simply be
been confirmed. Figure 33-11 shows
a useful measure of the availability in
a plot of corrosion rate versus chlo-
the coal of alkali metal salts that par-
rine content which has lead to the
ticipate in fireside corrosion of
observation that the increase in rate
superheater/reheater tubes.
is approximately linear with chlorine
content for U.K. coals.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-11
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Superheater/Reheater Fireside
Corrosion (Coal-Fired Units):
Root Cause
1. Major influences on acceler-
ated corrosion are overheating
of the tubing and the
deposition/formation of low
melting-point, complex alkali
salts.
2. Tube overheating can occur
as a result of a number of
design, operating, and/or
maintenance-related condi-
tions.
3. Fuel composition can affect
the propensity for molten alkali
salt formation.
33-12 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units
3.1 Introduction
Table 33-2 lists the primary root
cause influences. In general, there
are three groups of root causes: (i)
overheating of tubes, (ii) fuel factors,
and (iii) combustion factors.
Independent of the root cause there
are two actions that can be taken to
confirm that the likely failure mecha-
nism is fireside corrosion, or to moni-
tor its progress:
(a). Wall thinning can be identified
using non-destructive examination
techniques, primarily ultrasonic test-
ing. As illustrated in Figure 33-5 and
discussed previously, when the ratio
of wall loss to the buildup of steam-
side oxide scale is large (typically
greater than a factor of three and
certainly greater than five), then fire-
side corrosion (or erosion), not long-
term overheating, is the dominant
damage mechanism. Additional
detail about inspection and sam-
pling methods is provided in
Chapter 9, Volume 1.
(b). Ash analysis to measure the
melting point of ash layers, looking
for low melting point constituents.
Thermogravimetry (ASTM E1131)16
or differential thermal analysis
(ASTM E794)17 can be performed to
identify melting points of com-
pounds in the deposit. Differential
scanning calorimetry can also be
used to determine melting points of
specific species.
The three groups of root causes are
examined separately in the discus-
sion that follows.
3.2 Influence of overheating
of tubes
There are a number of underlying
causes of overheated tubes, any
one of which can elevate the tube
metal temperature into the highly
corrosive regime. Independent of
the underlying cause, the following
actions can be used to confirm
whether tube overheating is con-
tributing to a problem with fireside
corrosion in superheater/reheater
tubes:
(c). Oxide thickness measurements
(ultrasonically) at typical locations
provides an indication of tube tem-
peratures within the element. See
Chapter 8, Volume 1 for details of
the interpretation of oxide scale
thickness.
(d). Selective tube sampling and
metallurgical analysis can be used
to confirm the results of NDE mea-
sures of steamside oxide thickness
and tube metal wall thickness. Oxide
composition may also provide addi-
tional insight about temperatures
reached in the tubes. See additional
discussion of this point in Chapter 2,
Volume 1.
(e). Monitoring of thermocouples
permanently installed across the
SH/RH outlet legs in the vestibule
can provide an indication of the
hottest platens across the boiler.
This then pinpoints where steps (a)
and (c) should be performed.
Specific causes of overheating can
include:
3.2.1 Poor initial design Ð choice of
material. This aspect of poor design
may be evidenced by overheating
that leads to accelerated corrosion
at or near changes to higher grade
material, where the original design
should have changed to the higher
grade material sooner. Actions to
confirm are:
(f). See items (c) and (e) above.
3.2.2 Poor initial design Ð extra gas-
touched length. Poor initial design
can also result in extra gas-touched
length for similar (maybe adjacent)
tubes. This means that one tube will
run much hotter. Possible locations
where this might be a consideration
include accelerated corrosion of
lead or wrap-around tubes (leading
tubes are most affected), or a tube
that surrounded a radiant cavity and
therefore picks up excessive heat. A
discussion of gas-touched length of
tubes can be found in Chapter 32.
Particular reference to Figure 32-12
can be made for an example of how
a plot of location of tube failures and
Table 33-2
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause
Influences
3.1 Potential actions for all root causes of fireside corrosion
3.2 Influence of overheating of tubes.
3.2.1 Poor initial
design - choice
of material
3.2.2 Poor initial
design - extra
gas-touched length.
3.2.3 Internal oxide growth
which occurs during
operation.
3.2.4 High temperature
laning.
Actions to Confirm
(a). NDE measures (typically UT) to identify
wall thinning.
(b). Ash and deposit analysis to identify
presence of low melting point con-
stituents, particularly alkali iron
trisulfates.
(c). NDE of steamside oxide thicknesses.
(d). Selective tube sampling and metallur-
gical analysis to confirm steamside
oxide and wall thickness.
(e). Monitoring of thermocouples installed
across the SH/RH outlet legs in
vestibule to identify hottest platens
across the boiler.
(f). Items (c) and (e) above.
(g). Evaluate temperatures across the ele-
ment (via thermocouple or steamside
oxide measurements) to determine if
sections particularly near material
changes are running too hot. See
discussion of gas-touched length in
Chapter 32 and sample plot in
Figure 32-12.
(h). Items (c) and (d) above.
(i). Monitor temperatures as in (e) above.
(j). Laning can be identified with cold air
velocity technique. See Chapter 14,
Volume 2 on flyash erosion for a discus-
sion of the technique.
Immediate Actions
and Solutions
• Choose repair strategy
based on severity of
corrosion rate.
• Implement long-term
actions from choices in
Figure 33-12 in con-
junction with on-going
program of remaining
life assessment and
monitoring.
• As above.
• As above, primary
emphasis on upgrading
to a more resistance
material.
• As above.
• As in primary list above
(repairs, followed by
long-term strategy) plus
chemical cleaning of
steamside scale.
• As in primary list above
(repairs, followed by
long-term strategy).
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes
Long-Term Actions and
Prevention of Repeat Failures
• Perform remaining life assessment.
• Set up long-term monitoring and
re-evaluation program.
• Evaluate full range of available options
using roadmap in Figure 33-12.
• As above.
• As above, emphasis will be on identify-
ing locations where material upgrading
is required.
• May involve redesign of circuit to
extend the use of the higher grade
material.
• As above, emphasis will be on identify-
ing locations where material upgrading
is required.
• May involve redesign of circuit to
extend the use of the higher grade
material.
• As in primary list above, also see
actions for the long-term overheating/
creep of tubes (chapter 32).
• Controlled with flow distribution
screens; in practice is difficult to over-
come because of high temperatures in
SH/RH.
• Review primary list of alternatives in
Figure 33-12 for options.
33-13
Table 33-2
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions (continued)
Major Root Cause
Influences
3.2.4 Tube misalignment
(out of bank)
3.2.6 Operational problems
when coal type is changed
3.2.7 Rapid startups causing
reheater to reach
temperature before
full steam flow
3.3 Root causes related to fuel factors
3.3.1 Change to fuel with
unusually corrosive ash,
particularly those with
high S, Na, K, or Cl
3.4 Root causes related to incomplete or delayed combustion.
33-14 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units
Actions to Confirm
(k). Visual examination.
(l). Check startup probe and that initial gas
is limited to 1000°F (538°C) prior to
RH flow.
(m). Evaluate coal composition using corro- • As in primary list above
sivity index.
(n). Analysis for low melting point of ash
components using probes.
(o). Analysis of metallurgical cross
sections, particularly for Cl, S, C,
Na, and K.
(p). Install continuous readout corrosion
sensors if unit switches coal or uses
spot market coal.
(q). Monitor for levels of CO and O2.
(r). Check for unburnt startup oil.
Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures
• Realign tubes, imple- • Perform remaining life assessment.
ment on-going program • Set up long-term monitoring and
of remaining life assess- re-evaluation program.
ment and monitoring.
• Evaluate whether operat- • Perform remaining life assessment.
ing procedures such as See discussion of methods in
sootblowing can be eco- Chapter 8, Volume 1.
nomically changed to • Set up long-term monitoring and
protect SH/RH tubes. re-evaluation program.
• Evaluate full range of available options
using roadmap in Figure 33-12.
• Modify startup proce- • As above.
dures if feasible.
• As above.
• As above, plus
(repairs, followed by • Develop a fireside testing program
long-term actions). using guidance provided in fireside
testing guidelines.18
• Investigate coal changes with Coal
Quality Impact Model (CQIM)24-26 or
equivalent, including economics
evaluation.
• As in primary list above • Perform remaining life assessment.
(repairs, followed by See discussion of methods in
long-term actions.). Chapter 8, Volume 1.
• Evaluate full range of available options
using roadmap in Figure 33-12.
• Develop a fireside testing program
using guidance provided in fireside
testing guidelines.18
of gas-touched length can be used
as a diagnostic. Actions to confirm:
(g). Evaluate temperatures across
the element via thermocouple or
steamside oxide measurements to
determine if sections are running too
hot, particularly near material
changes.
3.2.3 Internal oxide growth which
occurs during operation. This
buildup of internal oxide gradually
increases the tube temperature until
it rises into the regime where the
corrosion rate rapidly increases.
(h). See items (c) and (d) above.
3.2.4 High temperature laning.
Actions to confirm consist of:
(i). Monitor temperatures as in (e)
above.
(j). Laning of gases can also be
detected using a cold air velocity
test (CAVT). The details of the test
are described in Chapter 14, Volume
2 on flyash erosion.
3.2.5 Tube misalignment (out of the
bank).
In addition to above indicated
actions:
(k). Visual inspection can detect if
there is a misalignment problem.
3.2.6 Operational problems when
coal type is changed. This may
change the relative absorption pat-
terns between furnace and convec-
tive sections.
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
3.2.7 Rapid startups can cause
reheater to reach temperature or
even overheat before full steam flow
and thus cause overheating.
An action to confirm is:
(l). Check startup probe and check
that the initial gas temperature is lim-
ited to 1000°F (538°C) prior to RH
flow.
3.3 Root causes related to fuel
factors
3.3.1 Change of fuel to a coal with
an unusually corrosive ash, particu-
larly those with high content of S,
Na, K or Cl.
Actions to confirm include:
(m). Evaluate coal composition
using corrosivity index for Eastern
coals.11 As noted above, there is no
universally applicable, quantitative
index to the corrosivity of coals,
however for Eastern U.S. coals, the
Borio index can give at least a quali-
tative indication of whether a fuel
change has lead to a potentially
more corrosive condition. Western
coals generally do not cause corro-
sion problems of this type because
of low sulfur and high alkaline earth
oxide levels, and are not amenable
to analysis by the Borio index.
(n). If liquid ash corrosion is sus-
pected, thermogravimetry (ASTM
E1131)16 or differential thermal analy-
sis (ASTM E794)17 can be performed
to identify melting points of com-
pounds in the deposit. Deposits can
Ultrasonic testing (UT) can be used
to measure both wall thinning and
steamside oxide thickness.
Locations should be chosen which
are the most susceptible to fireside
corrosion as described in Section
1.2 above. On a particular tube,
locations of maximum wastage
should be identified. Selective sam-
be collected using high temperature
probes; the methods and analysis
are described in reference 18.
(o). Energy dispersive x-ray and/or
x-ray dot mapping of metallographic
cross sections through damaged
tubes can be used to detect the
presence and distribution of S, C,
Na, K, and Cl. This type of analysis
is needed to confirm whether the
corrosive wastage is simple molten
salt attack or whether a local reduc-
ing or carburizing condition is also
leading to attack via sulfidation.
(p). Install corrosion sensors (con-
tinuous readout), especially if the
unit often switches coal or uses spot
market coal.
3.4 Root causes related
to incomplete or delayed
combustion
Actions to confirm
(q). Monitor for levels of O2, H2S,
and CO. High levels of CO (> 1%)
and low levels of oxygen (< 0.1%)
are of particular concern.3 The level
of CO can also be measured in the
flue gas at the economizer outlet or
after the ID fans. Oxygen levels can
be sampled at the economizer exit
to provide an overall indication of
the combustion process in the
boiler.
(r). Check for unburnt startup oil
deposits on tubes.
pling is recommended to confirm the
results of the NDE examinations and
to evaluate internal scale and exter-
nal deposits. Additional detail on UT
methods can be found in Chapter 9,
Volume 1. Methods of metallurgical
evaluation are reviewed in Chapter
6, Volume 1.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-15
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Superheater/Reheater Fireside
Corrosion (Coal-Fired Units):
Immediate Solutions and Actions
1. Immediate solutions should be
chosen in conjunction with: (i)
a knowledge of the severity of
corrosion, and (ii) an analysis
of remaining life discussed
under long-term actions
below.
2. Repairs should occur on two
levels depending upon the
severity of the problem. For
the short term, tubes can be
replaced with the same mater-
ial, or a palliative coating may
provide somewhat better
corrosion resistance; for the
long term, change to a more
resistant material is the pre-
ferred materials solution.
3. Other actions are possible
including limiting metal tem-
peratures, reducing main
steam temperatures, chemical
cleaning, tube alignment,
minimizing laning of gases,
fuel changes, or blending or
washing the coal. The choice
will depend on the root cause
of the problem and at least a
cursory economic analysis to
identify the most likely cost-
effective solution.
33-16 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units
5.1 Need for remaining life
assessment
Any immediate solution or repair
strategy should consider that a
longer term remaining life analysis
methodology should also be imple-
mented. Such programs are dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 8,
Volume 1, and are summarized
under long-term actions below.
5.2 Repairs
If the corrosion rate has been
relatively modest (< 25 nm/hr (~ 9
mils/yr)) and is likely to continue to
be so, an acceptable strategy is to
retube with the same alloy and moni-
tor closely the wastage rate. Another
alternative, but not a preferred
approach, is the use of a palliative
coating or tube shields. An overview
of options is provided under long-
term actions.
Pad welds should definitely not be
used as a repair measure because
of the uncertainty of the tube condi-
tion, such as the presence of creep
cracks and their depth, and the con-
ditions of the internal tube surface.
Further discussion about weld
repairs can be found in Chapter 11,
Volume 1.
For higher corrosion rates that are
resulting in rapid wastage of the
existing alloy, the replacement
should be with a more resistant
material.
In addition to the upgrading of mate-
rials, there are some steps that can
be taken over a short term to mini-
mize the severity of fireside corro-
sion. These include: taking interim
steps to limit tube metal tempera-
tures such as by limiting main steam
temperature or chemical cleaning to
remove steamside oxide, aligning
tubes, increasing sootblowing oper-
ation, and others. However, because
of the range of options and the inter-
connectedness of them, a complete
overview of all options is included in
the next section.
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Superheater/Reheater Fireside
Corrosion (Coal-Fired Units):
Long-Term Actions
Long-term strategies will gener-
ally fall into two major categories:
(i) materials strategies that pro-
vide increased protection or
replace the component, and (ii)
operating strategies to try to con-
trol tube temperatures or corro-
siveness of the coal.
As noted above, it may not be possi-
ble to remove the root cause for
many fireside corrosion problems.
Knowing how to minimize the
wastage rate and the application of
a predictive remaining life assess-
ment process, including periodic
inspection and monitoring, are the
keys to economic handling of fire-
side corrosion problems.
Figure 33-12 outlines most of the
available strategies for superheater/
reheater fireside corrosion. As
shown in that figure, there are two
primary, and not mutually exclusive,
routes that can be followed: (i) mate-
rials options and (ii) operating
options. If an initial design condition
is at the root cause of a fireside cor-
rosion problem there are three
approaches that can be taken: cor-
rect the problem; accept the fault
and the corresponding corrosion
rates and expect an increased out-
age frequency; or accept the fault
and seek a material solution.
The circled numbers in Figure 33-12
are used to identify options for the
discussion that follows; no ranking is
implied, however, boxes with bold
outline indicate those options which
have been the most successful.

Corrosion rate confirmed

Extent determined

Remaining life assessment 1

Materials solutions Operating solutions

Provide Replace Modify Control (limit)

protection component fuel tube temprature
2
Shielding Ð Change fuel
3 Coating 7 Ð Blending
Ð Washing

More Same Gas side Steam side

resistant material
material
Minimize Limit Chemical
5 Monolithic 12 laning of main clean
gases steam deposits
6 Coextruded
temp.
Soot- 9 11
Original 14 blowing
thickness operation
4
Excess Redistribute
15 air steam
Notes: a) Remaining life assessment (1) is almost strategies flow
mandatory to decide which option should
be adopted 10
b) Boxes outlined in bold indicate options Tube
that have been most successful 13
alignment
c) Numbers refer to main text

Figure 33-12. Strategies for preventing repeat failures by fireside corrosion in super-
heater/reheater tubes of coal-fired units.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-17

Remaining life assessment
(option 1, Figure 33-12)
A remaining life assessment is
required to relate the rate of corro-
sion wastage to the desired life or
to determine the time available to
implement the desired option.
Therefore such an assessment
should be undertaken in parallel
with any of the other options. A
systematic program will include:
baseline measurement, monitoring
rates of wastage, application and
monitoring of control measures, and
assessment of the effects on
remaining life.
Monitoring of the flue gas, metal and
steam temperatures, combustion
conditions, and fuel composition
should also be considered, as these
can determine corrosion rates while
the unit is still on-line.3 Particularly
important are step changes in key
parameters.
A critical step in determining the
remaining life of a tube and in
choosing the optimal solution is
knowing the rate at which damage is
accumulating. The lifetime of super-
heater/reheater tubes can be calcu-
lated using the oxide thickness tech-
nique as discussed in detail in
Chapter 8, Volume 1, which includes
the damage accumulation from both
fireside corrosion and long-term
overheating.
A key goal of the remaining life
assessment will be to establish the
acceptable rate of wastage, given
the desired remaining life of the unit
and an analysis of damage accumu-
lation. As a rule of thumb, rates of
wastage above 25 nm/hr (~ 9
mils/yr.) indicate the need for some
periodic activity such as annual
inspection and for the explicit deter-
mination of re-evaluation periods.
Rates above 50 nm/hr (~ 18 mils/yr.)
indicate a serious decrease in life of
the tubing; an estimate of remaining
life should be made and the appro-
priate actions taken if that life is
unacceptable.
33-18 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units
Shielding (option 2)
The most common temporary mea-
sure is the installation of shields to
the leading edges of affected tubes.
High chromium alloys such as Type
304 or 347 (austenitic stainless
steels) or 309 (25 percent Cr) are
often used. The shield is curved to
fit the tube surface and tack-welded
in place. As they are not cooled, the
metal temperatures of the shields
are above the range for extensive
attack as indicated in Figure 33-8.
Coatings (option 3)
A variety of processes have been
suggested for applying metallized
coatings to tubes in situ as a means
of increasing corrosion resistance.
The advantage of coatings is that
very corrosion-resistant materials can
be applied at specific susceptible
sites, so it is not necessary to replace
entire sections of tubing in order to
overcome localized problems.
Among the coating methods that
have been tried for fireside corrosion
resistance are chromizing and
aluminizing. Flame- or plasma-
spraying, with and without subse-
quent heat treatment, have also
seen significant development work.
The various coatings and applica-
tion techniques have had variable
and generally poor results in U.S.
utilities. The primary problems have
been adherence of the coating, the
reproducibility of coating tech-
niques, and the need to have very
well prepared surfaces. In general,
coatings should currently be
regarded as a quick fix which will
require continued maintenance.
The former CEGB has tried a num-
ber of coatings for use in corrosion
and erosion resistance.19,20 The pri-
mary use of coatings has been for
the prevention of fireside corrosion
in waterwalls of coal-fired units (see
the description of results in Chapter
18, Volume 2). There is less field
experience for coatings on super-
heater/reheater tubing in either coal-
or oil-fired units.
If used, important features of coat-
ings include19:
• Importance of clear specification
of the areas to be coated, materi-
als to be used and thickness
required. Time available and
other restrictions to site applica-
tions should be clearly specified.
• Importance of surface preparation
to provide a contaminant-free,
roughened surface.
• Importance of producing samples
throughout the application as a
check that process parameters
were producing consistent and
acceptable quality.
Currently, either replacement in-kind
or with a material of high corrosion
resistance, depending on the
wastage rate which has been expe-
rienced, are preferred options to the
application of coatings.
Replacement with same mater-
ial, same thickness (option 4)
If the corrosion rate is only slightly
higher than that required to reach
the desired life as calculated from
the remaining life assessment, tube
replacement can be made in-kind.9
Change to a more resistant
material, ÒmonolithicÓ (option
5)
An upgraded material can be used
where unit operation is at high tem-
peratures and fireside corrosion
remains a problem despite the
attempts at other fixes. A number
of alternatives have been used
successfully. The material chosen
will depend on what is currently
being used, and what the desired
resistance is to be. If the damage
is occurring on a ferritic material
then an appropriate change is to a
higher grade (Cr) or an austenitic
stainless steel.
If serious fireside corrosion of
austenitic materials is taking place,
then consideration may be given to
more resistant materials. There have

Weight Loss mg/cm2
30
347HSS
Esshete 1250
17-14 CuMo
253MA
20 310SS
Alloy 800H
35Cr-45Ni
10
0 following additional observations
0 600 650
Temperature, °C
Figure 33-13. Effect of test temperature on corrosion loss for various alloys in 0.25
vol% SO and 5 wt% alkali sulfate. Source: W. Wolowodiuk, et al.10
been a number of laboratory and
field investigations of superheater/
reheater corrosion of materials,
particularly for advanced steam
conditions. The following brief
review of some of the laboratory and
field investigations highlights some
of the key issues as they might
apply to materials choices in cur-
rently operating plant.
A laboratory investigation of the
response of eleven high-tempera-
ture alloys (7 cladding alloys for co-
extruded tubes and 4 chromized
steels) to a simulated field environ-
ment provided the following general
conclusions6:
• Corrosion rates increased with
increasing levels of alkali (Na2SO4
+ K2SO4). The effect of alkali level
was more significant than SO2 for
700 750
the more highly resistant materials.
• The relation between tube mater-
ial, temperature and corrosion rate
is shown for these laboratory tests
in Figure 33-13. The peak temper-
ature for corrosion loss is different
for different alloys, in part
because the temperature range in
which the molten salt is stable
depends on the surface character
of the metal. Corrosion products
can also affect the melting tem-
perature of salt. Generally, tem-
peratures tend to peak at a lower
level for more highly resistant
alloys. For example, the peak tem-
perature is about 700°C (~1300°F)
for low-resistance alloys like 17-14
CuMo and 600°C (~ 1100°F) for
highly resistant alloys like Type
310 stainless steel.
An extensive field evaluation of the
resistance of various materials was
also conducted using air-cooled,
retractable corrosion probes con-
structed of various materials.
Corrosion probes were exposed for
4,000 hours, 12,000 hours, and
16,000 hours at three facilities. Two
of the units burned eastern high-sul-
fur subbituminous coals with Borio
Index values of 2.5 and 3.5 respec-
tively; the third burned western low-
sulfur coal for which the Borio index
was not applicable.
Maximum wastage was observed
on the high sulfur subbituminous
probes at the 10 and 2 o’clock
positions (flue gas impinged at 12
o’clock) with an appearance that
confirmed the occurrence of liquid-
phase (coal-ash) corrosion. The
were noted:
• Resistance to coal-ash corrosion
increases with an increase in
chromium level in the alloy. A plot
of alloy chromium content versus
average metal loss is shown in
Figure 33-14. Results show that a
Cr content over 25% Cr was
required for stable corrosion
resistance.21 This has important
implications for the choice of
replacement materials.
• The rate of corrosion experienced
by Type 347 stainless steel could
be reduced by a factor of two by
using Type 310Nb stainless
(SA213-T310 CbN).
Further, some of the materials which
show the most promise have been
tested only in short-term tests, their
longer-term performance is as yet
relatively unknown.
As a general rule, the more resistant
the material, the more expensive it
will be. For this reason, it may be
preferable to use duplex tubing
such as discussed next. Such co-
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-19

Average Sound Metal Loss (mils)
100
80
60
40
20
0 through 1984 without weld failure.
5 10 15
Cr Content Wt%
Figure 33-14. Effect of chromium content on resistance to attack after 16,000 hours
exposure at three plants. Source: J.L. Blough, et al.6
extruded tubes can supply more
reliable resistance, but they are
rather expensive due to the com-
plexity in manufacturing. There is an
economic advantage in using high
strength and resistant monolithic
tubing, such as SA213-T310 CbN.
A trial calculation has suggested
that the increased cost of such tube
materials is around 10% compared
with the use of Type 347H for super-
heaters of advanced boiler designs,
i.e., steam condition of 566°C
(1050°F) and 31 MPa.10
Change to a more resistant
material, composite (such as
co-extruded) tubing (option 6)
Highly resistant materials such as
alloy 310 and 50% Cr- 50% Ni can
provide excellent resistance, but
since they have insufficient creep
strength their use is in the form of
co-extruded tubing. Metallurgically-
bonded processing provides supe-
rior tubes for use in utility boiler
33-20 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units
Plant A
Plant B
Plant C
20 25 30 35
applications when compared to
mechanically bonded or bi-metallic
tubes.22 Specifications for such
tubes have existed for several
years.23
The former CEGB has used such
tubes on a large-scale since 1976.
Over 230 km of tubing has been
installed in twelve units. Such a
materials solution has been found to
be the most economical approach to
dealing with fireside corrosion prob-
lems which are caused by the
aggressive nature of the coals
burned in U.K. boilers.22
The primary material for the outer
layer of superheater/reheater tubing
has been Type T310 stainless (25 Cr
20 Ni), or a modified Type 310 made
by increasing the silicon content to
0.75 - 1.5%, the chromium to a mini-
mum of 25%, and niobium to a mini-
mum of 8X the carbon level. Where
additional resistance has been
needed a 50Cr-50Ni alloy has been
used as the outer layer. The inner
layer has typically been Eshete 1250
(a high-temperature, high-strength
stainless steel). A typical application
used 54 mm (2.13 in.) outside diam-
eter 310 with 2.9 mm (0.11 in.) thick-
ness on 2.0 mm (0.08 in.) Eshete
1250 inner. Performance improve-
ment factors have ranged from 2-5
times better than the original
installed materials, depending upon
the particular application.22
Tube bending characteristics of co-
extruded material have been found
to be identical to monolithic materi-
als.22 Weld procedures have gener-
ally matched weld metals to the
base metal to maintain property lev-
els. Conventional welding tech-
niques and normal quality control
have been found sufficient to ensure
good weld quality. The CEGB expe-
rience base was over 70,000 welds
No preheat or post-weld heat treat-
ments have been required. A dis-
cussion on welding of co-extruded
tubing can be found in Chapter 11,
Volume 1.
Fuel change, blending, wash-
ing (option 7)
Fuel changing expressly for the
short-term control of fireside corro-
sion is unlikely; most often the moti-
vating factor is to reduce emission
levels, particularly of sulfur. However,
as discussed above, changes that
adjust the presence of corrosive
species, including fuel changes,
blending or washing, or that increase
the amount of mitigating species will
have positive effects on the corrosion
rate. Changing coals to some of the
Western varieties or lignite will offer
these benefits inherently. Analysis of
the likelihood that a change in fuel or
in fuel handling will be beneficial can
be made by evaluating the fuel com-
position with a corrosivity index. As
discussed at length above, however,
there is still no absolute agreement
on a particular index for all U.S. coal
types.
A method of investigating coal
changes, blending and washing,
such as the application of the Coal
Quality Impact Model (CQIM)24-26
can be used. Such a method will
provide information on the total eco-
nomic impact as well as on the
potential for fireside corrosion.
Limit tube temperatures
(option 8)
Given the strong correlation between
tube metal temperature and the
potential for corrosion damage, sev-
eral strategies can be implemented
that directly address root causes of
overtemperature in the tubes; they
are discussed separately below.
Limit steam temperature
(option 9)
One means to minimize tube metal
temperatures is to limit the main
steam temperature; this has histori-
cally been a primary strategy for the
control of superheater/reheater fire-
side corrosion. With tube surface
temperatures approximately 30 to
80°C (~ 50 to 150°F) higher than
steam temperatures, limiting the
steam temperature to around 538°C
(1000°F), or in some cases to
566°C (1050°F) should result in an
upper limit on tube temperature that
falls below the region of maximum
corrosion as shown in Figure 33-7.
This approach has governed
operating temperatures in the U.S.
since the late 1950s when extensive
problems with corrosion were expe-
rienced in boilers operating at 621°C
(1150°F) and 650°C (1202°F).27 It
has been estimated that as a result,
only about 8 percent of U.S. coal-
fired boilers are still operating at
1050°F (566°C) steam.
There are several problems with this
approach. The primary drawback is
that it is not efficient; there is a
severe heat rate penalty. Predicting
exactly what temperature is required
is difficult, given the considerable
scatter in the corrosion rate as a
function of temperature and its peak.
Finally, in a field survey of 42 operat-
ing units2 the relationship between
operating steam temperature and
fireside corrosion was found not to
be direct, but to involve the consid-
eration of the numerous other factors
such as coal ash composition and
flue gas temperature.
For these reasons, it was recom-
mended that if limits on main steam
temperature were to be used as a
control strategy, an empirical
approach be used to set steam tem-
perature by monitoring tube wastage
rates and ensuring that the rate was
less than 25 nm/hr (~ 9 mils/yr.).2
Redistribute steam flow
(option 10)
The technique of steam flow redistri-
bution in superheaters has seen
recent significant development.28
Significant nonuniformities in tube
temperature can exist across a
superheater from a variety of
causes. This results in a wide range
of tube metal temperatures and
damage accumulation by creep, as
well as making these tubes more
susceptible to fireside corrosion
because of the characteristic “bell-
shaped” curve of wastage.
Redistribution of steam flow can
serve to equalize the temperatures
across the superheater. With steam
flow controllers (orifices) of different
sizes and lengths in the tubes com-
ing out of the inlet header, the flow
can be decreased in “cold” tubes,
which increases their temperatures.
This change will also increase steam
flow to “hot” tubes with a concurrent
decrease of the metal temperatures.
In conjunction with selected tube
plugging and replacement, such a
method offers significant opportunity
for extending the life of superheaters
and reheaters.
This method was designed primarily
as a means of extending the creep
life of tubes subject to overheating.
If overheating of selected tubes is at
the root cause of fireside corrosion,
the technique could also be consid-
ered to selectively lower tube metal
temperatures and thus decrease
fireside corrosion. The method is
discussed in more detail in Chapter
32 on long-term overheating/creep
in superheater/reheater tubes.
Chemical cleaning to remove
steamside oxide scale
(option 11)
If excessive temperature in the
superheater/reheater tubes is a con-
tributing factor to the corrosion
process, and if that condition has
been exacerbated by the presence
of increasing steamside oxide scale
thickness, a solution involving chem-
ical cleaning may be in order. An
overview of chemical cleaning in
SH/RH circuits can be found in
Chapter 4, Volume 1.
Minimize laning of gases
(option 12)
Laning or channeling of gases
through certain tube sections can
lead to overheated tubes. This is
very difficult to overcome; it can be
recognized and monitored using the
cold air velocity technique
described at length in Chapter 14,
Volume 2 on flyash erosion.
However, the application of flow dis-
tribution screens, a means to control
locally high velocities, is made more
difficult in the SH/RH by the high
temperature environment.
Correct misalignment of tubing
(option 13)
If misalignment of tubes has resulted
in localized fireside corrosion, this
problem should be corrected by
realigning the affected tubes. This will
decrease the number of tubes that
are directly exposed to the gas flow.
Change frequency, check effec-
tiveness of sootblowing
(option 14)
This can be an important action
because it can stop the formation of
excessive deposits which result in
laning or channeling in adjacent
areas.
Lowering excess air (option 15)
Lowering excess air could reduce
the amount of SO3 and possibly the
stability of the alkali-iron trisulfates;
however, such a change may also
increase waterwall fireside corrosion
(see a more complete discussion in
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-21
7. Case study

Superheater/Reheater Fireside Corrosion Case Study: Field Experience

Chapter 18, Volume 2).
A utility survey conducted in 1987
reviewed the effect of steam tem-
perature and coal sulfur level on
the severity of SH/RH fireside cor-
rosion. The primary conclusions
from that work were:
1. The higher the main steam tem-
perature the more likely that the
unit would report a problem with
fireside corrosion. Nine of the 16
boilers operating at 566°C
(1050°F) reported severe prob-
lems. In contrast, only 12 of 36
2. The severity of corrosion was
ranked qualitatively (none, light,
moderate, severe) and was
found to be related to coal sulfur
level; the higher the sulfur con-
tent, the more severe the corro-
sion, particularly at sulfur con-
tents greater than 2.5%.
3. The bell-shaped curve was
found to be at best only a gen-
eral guide to the likelihood of
severe fireside corrosion, except
at the lowest operating tempera-
tures. In other words, tube metal
temperature was not the only
factor that determined whether
fireside corrosion would occur.
There also needed to be a cor-
rosive and molten (low-melting
point) ash. Not all coals are cor-
rosive. The need for a corrosive
coal to cause damage is a major
difference between fireside cor-
rosion and long-term overheat-
ing failures.
4. If unit temperatures are to be set
to avoid fireside corrosion, an
empirical approach that includes
monitoring of wastage rates
should be implemented. If corro-
sion rates exceed a level of
about 25 nm/hr (~ 9 mils/yr),
steam temperatures can be low-
ered until that level is achieved
or bettered.
Source: D.N. Williams, et al.2

8. References
1Blazewicz, A.J. and M. Gold, “High-Temperature Gas-
Side Corrosion in Coal-Fired Boilers”, presented at the
ASME Winter Annual Meeting, New York, December,
1979.
2Williams, D.N., H.R. Hazard, H.H. Krause, L.J. Flanigan,
R.E. Barrett, and I.G. Wright, Fireside Corrosion and Fly
Ash Erosion in Boilers, Research Project 2711-1, Final
Report CS-5071, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, February, 1987.
3Laxton, J.W., D.B. Meadowcroft, F. Clarke, T. Flatley,
C.W. King, and C.W. Morris, The Control of Fireside
Corrosion in Power Station Boilers, Third edition, Central
Electricity Generating Board, 1987.
4Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.
5Latham, E., D.B. Meadowcroft, and L. Pinder, “The
Effects of Coal Chlorine on Fireside Corrosion”, Chlorine
in Coal, J. Stringer and D.D. Banerjee, eds., Elsevier
Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1991, pp. 225-246.
6Blough, J.L., M.J. Krawchuk, G.J. Stanko, and W.
Wolowodiuk, Superheater Corrosion: Field Test Results,
Research Project 1403-19, Final Report TR-103438,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
November, 1993.
7Kihara,S., A. Ohtomo, I. Kajigaya, and F. Kishimoto,
“Recent Plant Experiences and Research Into Fireside
Corrosion in Japan”, Werkstoffe and Corrosion, 39, 1988,
pp. 69-83.
8Koopman, J.G., E.M Marselli, J. Jonakin, and R.C.
Ulmer, “Development and Use of a Probe for Studying
Corrosion in Superheaters and Reheaters”, Proceedings
of the American Power Conference, Volume 1, 1959, pp.
236-245.
9Holmes, D.R. and D.B. Meadowcroft, “Fireside Corrosion
and Problems of Tube Life Prediction”, Symposium on
Thermal Utilities Boiler Reliability, McMaster University,
Hamilton, Ontario, May, 1983.
10Wolowodiuk, W., S. Kihara, and K. Nakagawa,
Laboratory Coal Ash Corrosion Tests, Topical Report GS-
6449, Research Project 1403-19, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, July, 1989.

33-22 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units

11Borio, R., et al., “The Control of High-Temperature
Fireside Corrosion in Utility Coal-Fired Boilers”, U.S.
Office of Coal Research, Research and Development
Department, No. 41, April ,1969.
12Raask,E., Mineral Impurities in Coal Combustion -
Behaviour Problems and Remedial Measures,
Hemisphere Publishing Company, Washington, D.C.,
1985.
13Shigeta, J., Y. Hamao, H. Aoki, and I. Kajigaya,
“Development of a Coal Ash Corrosivity Index for High
Temperature Corrosion”, ASME Joint Power Conference,
Portland, Oregon, October, 1986.
14Meadowcroft, D.B, in T.N. Rhys-Jones, ed., Surface
Stability, The Institute of Metals, London.
15Gibb, W.H. and J.G. Angus, J. Inst. Energy, Volume 56,
1983, p. 149.
16American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E1131-86, “Standard Test Method for Compositional
Analysis by Thermogravimetry, 1992 Annual Book of
ASTM Standards: General Methods and Instrumentation,
Volume 14.02, American Society for Testing and
Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1992.
17American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
E794-85 (1989), “Standard Test Method for Melting
Temperatures and Crystallization Temperatures by
Thermal Analysis, 1992 Annual Book of ASTM Standards:
General Methods and Instrumentation, Volume 14.02,
American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia,
PA, 1992.
18Sotter, J.G., J.A. Arnot, and T.M. Brown, Guidelines for
Fireside Testing in Coal-Fired Power Plants, Research
Project 1891-3, Final Report CS-5552, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, March, 1988.
19Morgan-Warren, E.J., “Thermal Spraying for Boiler Tube
Protection”, Welding and Metal Fabrication, Jan/Feb,
1992, pp. 25-31.
20Bennett, A.P. and M.B.C. Quigley, “The Spraying of
Boiler Tubing in Power Plants”, Welding and Metal
Fabrication, November, 1990, pp. 485-489.
21Anon., “Approaches for Predicting Corrosion Rates of
Superheater Tubes in Coal-Fired Boilers”, Materials &
Components in Fossil Energy Applications, U.S.
Department of Energy and the Electric Power Research
Institute, No. 106, October, 1993.
22Flatley,T. and T. Thursfield, “Review of Corrosion
Resistant Co-Extruded Tube Development for Power
Boilers”, 1984 ASM Conference on Coatings and
Bimetallics for Energy Systems and Chemical Process
Environments, held at Hilton Head, South Carolina,
November 12-14, 1984.
23CEGB Standard 680 710, Engineering Documents Unit,
London.
24Davidson, P.G, et al., Development and Application of
the Coal Quality Impact Model: CQIMTM, Research
Project 2256-2, Final Report GS-6393, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1990.
25CQIM Computer Code and Manuals: Volume 1: CQIM:
User’s Manual and Theory Manual, Volume 2: Data
Collection Manual and Theory Manual, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December, 1990.
26Pavlish,J.H., P.R. Miller, N.C. Craig, and A.K. Mehta,
“CQIM - An Analytical Tool Used to Evaluate
Performance and Economic Issues”, Proceedings: Ninth
Annual International Pittsburgh Coal Conference,
October, 1992.
27Reid, W.T., External Corrosion and Deposits - Boilers
and Gas Turbines, Elsevier, New York, 1971.
28Hara, K., C. Lee, R. Moser, T. Rettig, and K. Clark,
Improved Superheater Component Longevity by Steam
Flow Redistribution, Research Project 1893-13, Final
Report TR-101697, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, December, 1992.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-23
ACTIONS for SH/RH Fireside Corrosion
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of
SH/RH fireside corrosion dam-
age begin here. The goal of
these actions is to see if further
investigation of fireside corrosion
is warranted or whether another
BTF mechanism should be
investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a SH/RH
BTF has occurred and fireside
corrosion is the likely mecha-
nism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by fireside corrosion.
33-24 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units
Action 1a: If a SH/RH BTF has
occurred and fireside corrosion is
the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of SH/RH fireside corrosion:
➠Review Figure 33-6 for typical
boiler regions.
➠Review main text, section 1.2
for description of susceptible
locations
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Multilayered fireside scale and
ash. See Figure 33-1.
• Maximum attack (wastage) at
the 10 o’clock and 2 o’clock
positions (may be at other
locations so that this is not
definitive).
• Tube surface smooth or with
“alligator hide” appearance
(see Figure 33-3).
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by fireside
corrosion.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Any evidence of molten salts
observed or measured.
• Any evidence of wall loss
observed or measured.
• Any evidence of “alligator hide”
observed or measured.
• Change to a more aggressive
coal.
• Evidence that tubes may be
overheating such as from ther-
mocouple readings or evidence
of excessive steamside scale
build-up.
➠ These precursors can signal the
potential for SH/RH tube failures
by a fireside corrosion mecha-
nism. If one or more has
occurred, go to Action 3 which
reviews root causes and outlines
the steps to confirm the influence
of each.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is fireside
corrosion.
A SH/RH tube failure has
occurred which the BTF team
has tentatively identified as
being fireside corrosion damage
(Action 1a). Action 2 should
clearly identify fireside corrosion
as the primary mechanism or
point to another cause. The pri-
mary identifier will be the pres-
ence of low melting point com-
ponents in the region adjacent to
the tube wall. Sample removal,
metallographic analysis and
deposits analysis will be used to
make this determination. A pri-
mary objective is to make sure
that the failure that has been
experienced is not primarily
long-term overheating/creep
(Chapter 32) and Table 33-1 for
distinctions.
References to other sources of information:
• Main text (this chapter) reviews the mechanism and the distinctive nature of
• A summary of steps in a typical metallurgical examination can be found in
➠ Characterize the extent of dam-
age. Is there significant wall thin-
ning across a number of tubes
on the fireside?
➠ Plot wall thinning against mea-
surements of steamside oxide
(Figure 33-5). Is the ratio of wall
thinning loss to steamside oxide
buildup greater than three?
➠ Analyze deposits. Does metallo-
graphic and melting point
analysis of deposits detect the
presence of low melting point
constituents such as alkali iron
trisulfates, indicative of the most
common mode of fireside
corrosion?
➠ Evaluate microstructure. If tubing
is stainless steel, is there evi-
dence of carburization and dis-
crete iron sulfides in the grain
boundaries of affected locations
(a sulfidation mechanism)?
Probable mechanism is fireside
corrosion.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
external tube deposits formed.
Chapter 6, Volume 1.
If damage is localized, it may be
flyash erosion damage (Chapter
14, Volume 2); however, continue
through flow chart, particularly
deposit analysis.
Mechanism more likely to be long-
term overheating/creep (Chapter
32); review that mechanism,
review analysis of deposits to
ensure that there is no evidence of
low melting point ash components
which would be indicative of fire-
side corrosion.
Mechanism is probably not fireside
corrosion. Review other fireside
failure mechanisms, particularly
long-term overheating/creep
(Chapter 32).
Mechanism is probably not
fireside corrosion. Review other
fireside failure mechanisms, partic-
ularly flyash erosion (Chapter 14,
Volume 2).
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-25
Action 3: Determine root cause of the fireside corrosion
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as fireside corrosion
(Action 2) or a precursor to fire-
side corrosion has occurred
(Action 1b). The goal of this
Action 3 is for the BTF Team to
review the potential root causes
of fireside corrosion, identify
probable ones, and take those
actions that are needed to con-
firm which are operative in the
unit. This step must be taken so
that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
33-26 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
3.1 Potential actions for all root causes
of fireside corrosion
3.2 Influence of overheating of tubes.
3.2.1 Poor initial design - choice of material
3.2.2 Poor initial design - extra gas-touched
length.
3.2.3 Internal oxide growth which occurs dur-
ing operation.
3.2.4 High temperature laning.
3.2.5 Tube misalignment (out of bank)
3.2.6 Operational problems when coal type is
changed
3.2.7 Rapid startups causing reheater to reach
temperature before full steam flow
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). NDE measures (typically UT) to identify
wall thinning.
➠ (b). Ash and deposit analysis to identify
presence of low melting point constituents,
particularly alkali iron trisulfates.
➠ (c). NDE of steamside oxide thicknesses.
➠ (d). Selective tube sampling and metallur-
gical analysis to confirm steamside oxide and
wall thickness.
➠ (e). Monitoring of thermocouples installed
across the SH/RH outlet legs in vestibule to
identify hottest platens across the boiler.
➠ (f). Items (c) and (e) above.
➠ (g). Evaluate temperatures across the ele-
ment (via thermocouple or steamside oxide
measurements) to determine if sections partic-
ularly near material changes are running too
hot. See discussion of gas-touched length in
Chapter 32 and sample plot in Figure 32-12.
➠ (h). Items (c) and (d) above.
➠ (i). Monitor temperatures as in (e) above.
➠ (j). Laning can be identified with cold air
velocity technique. See Chapter 14, Volume 2
on flyash erosion for a discussion of the
technique.
➠ (k). Visual examination.
➠ (l). Check startup probe and that initial gas
is limited to 1000°F (538°C) prior to RH flow.
Action 3: Determine root cause of the fireside corrosion (continued)

Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm

3.3 Root causes related to fuel factors

3.3.1 Change to fuel with unusually corrosive
ash, particularly those with high S, Na, K, or Cl
➠ (m). Evaluate coal composition using cor-
rosivity index.
➠ (n). Analysis for low melting point of ash
components using probes.
➠ (o). Analysis of metallurgical cross sec-
tions, particularly for Cl, S, C, Na, and K.
➠ (p). Install continuous readout corrosion
sensors if unit switches coal or uses spot mar-
ket coal.

3.4 Root causes related to incomplete or ➠ (q). Monitor for levels of CO and O2.
delayed combustion. ➠ (r). Check for unburnt startup oil.

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Evaluation will be
based on detecting wall thinning.
Wastage rates in excess of 25
nm/hr (~ 9 mils/yr) are of
concern.
➠ Identify all locations to be examined. Refer to Section
1.2 of main text and Figure 33-6 for typical locations.
Damage may be widespread and missed locations are
sites for future failures.
➠ Perform UT survey to measure extent of damage via
wall thinning and steamside oxide thickness. A review
of UT methods is provided in Chapter 9, Volume 1.

➠ Perform tube sampling to measure wall thinning and

steamside oxide buildup to confirm results of NDE
inspection and to determine the degree of damage.

➠ Use results interactively with Action 3.

➠ Go to Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate

Solutions and Actions. Begin remaining life
assessment.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-27

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
The most important actions for
the BTF team are to (i) initiate a
remaining life assessment based
on the wastage rate and extent
of steamside oxide as derived
from the NDE survey, (ii) choose
a repair strategy based on
remaining life assessment, and
(iii) coordinate the long-term
strategy from options outlined in
Figure 33-12.
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will include
the analysis of remaining life and
an economic evaluation to
ensure that the optimal strategy
has been chosen from those
shown on Figure 33-12 and
described in the main text.
33-28 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units
➠ Gather sufficient information so
that a remaining life assessment
of affected tubes can be initiated.
See Chapter 8, Volume 1 for sum-
mary of the oxide methodology.
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
of affected tubes as identified
from the NDE Survey (Action 4).
➠See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
➠Develop a plan to replace
affected tubing including an
economic assessment of the
future possible failure rate and
the resulting optimal extent of
new tubing.
➠Ensure that the full extent of
damage is removed as indi-
cated by wall loss, or the pres-
ence of "alligator hide". Failure
to do so will result in immediate
repeat failures.
Major Root Cause Influences
Potential actions for all root causes of
fireside corrosion.
Influence of overheating of tubes.
Poor initial design - choice of material.
Poor initial design - extra gas-touched length.
➠ Chemically clean, as needed to
remove excessive steamside
deposits.
➠ Adjust fireside conditions, as
needed.
References to other sources of
detailed information:
• Main text (this chapter) and Table
33-2 provide additional detail on
repairs, immediate solutions and
actions and the corresponding
root causes.
• Guidance on chemical cleaning
can be found in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
• Guidance on fireside testing can
be found in reference 18.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Perform remaining life assessment.
➠ Set up long-term monitoring and re-evalua-
tion program.
➠ Evaluate full range of available options
using roadmap in Figure 33-12.
➠ As above.
➠ As above, emphasis will be on identifying
locations where material upgrading is required.
➠ May involve redesign of circuit to extend
the use of the higher grade material.
➠ As above, emphasis will be on identifying
locations where material upgrading is required.
➠ May involve redesign of circuit to extend
the use of the higher grade material.
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
(continued)
Major Root Cause Influences
Internal oxide growth which occurs during
operation.
High temperature laning.
Tube misalignment (out of bank).
Operational problems when coal type is
changed.
Rapid startups causing reheater to reach tem-
perature before full steam flow.
Root causes related to fuel factors.
Change to fuel with unusually corrosive ash,
particularly those with high S, Na, K, or Cl.
Root causes related to incomplete or
delayed combustion.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ As in primary list above, also see potential
actions for the long-term overheating/creep of
tubes (Chapter 32).
➠ Controlled with flow distribution screens; in
practice is difficult to overcome because of
high temperatures in SH/RH.
➠ Review primary list of alternatives in Figure
33-12 for options.
➠ Perform remaining life assessment
➠ Set up long-term monitoring and re-evalua-
tion program.
➠ Perform remaining life assessment. See dis-
cussion of methods in Chapter 8, Volume 1.
➠ Set up long-term monitoring and re-evalua-
tion program.
➠ Evaluate full range of available options
using roadmap in Figure 33-12.
➠ As above.
➠ As above.
➠ As above, plus
➠ Develop a fireside testing program using
guidance provided in fireside testing
guidelines18.
➠ Investigate coal changes with Coal Quality
Impact Model (CQIM)24-26 or equivalent,
including economics evaluation.
➠ Perform remaining life assessment. See
discussion of methods in Chapter 8, Volume 1.
➠ Evaluate full range of available options
using roadmap in Figure 33-12.
➠ Develop a fireside testing program using
guidance provided in fireside testing
guidelines18.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 33-29
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of fire-
side corrosion in the SH/RH
tubes, or by its precursors.
Aspect of SH/RH Alert for Other Cycle
Fireside Corrosion Components
Corrosive coal. • Potential for waterwall
fireside corrosion
• Potential for back-end
corrosion
➠ Actions Indicated
➠ Develop a fireside testing program
using guidance such as provided in the
fireside testing guidelines.18
➠ Investigate coal changes with Coal
Quality Impact Model (CQIM)24-26
or equivalent, including economics
evaluation.
➠ Mitigate negative aspects of coal
composition if possible by fuel switch,
blending or washing.

Tube overheating • Potential for additional ➠ Chemical clean unit if necessary.

because of excessive tube failures by long- See guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
steamside oxide. term overheating/creep
(Chapter 32).
• Exfoliation of scale with
subsequent carryover
into turbine could lead
to solid particle erosion.
• Exfoliation could lead to
tube blockage and addi-
tional SH/RH failures by
short-term overheat-
ing/creep (Chapter 36).

Poor combustion • Low unit efficiency ➠ Combustion adjustments to improve

conditions. • Poor mill performance unit efficiency. See guidance in reference
18.
➠ Correct mill performance.

Total redesign of the • Would change absorp- ➠ Check temperatures in the redesigned
superheater or reheater. tion patterns through and other areas.
the SH/RH sections and
may increase tempera-
tures in other sections.

33-30 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Coal-Fired Units

Temperature (°C) Chapter 34 • Volume 3
900
PO2 (atm)
851
1.0
0.2
800

700
720
Liquid

SH/RH Fireside
Corrosion/Oil-Fired
670
645

602 605
600
575
562
NV

Units
NV6

N2 V

N3 V
525

500
V2O5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
MOL. % Na2O

Introduction Damage produced by fireside corro-

Fireside corrosion in oil-fired units
(also termed “oil ash corrosion” or
“liquid phase corrosion”) is generally
confined to the higher temperature
sections of the superheater (SH) and
reheater (RH) where metal tempera-
tures can exceed 600°C (~ 1100°F).
The melting points of ash compo-
nents, responsible for the corrosion
process are not low enough to
cause problems in lower tempera-
ture sections such as waterwalls.
sion is often confused with that from
long-term overheating/creep (see
Chapter 32). As several of the key
features of the two are similar, some
care is needed to correctly identify
the primary mechanism, and thus
take the proper corrective action.
Two other Chapters specifically
address fireside corrosion in coal-
fired units: that in waterwalls
(Chapter 18, Volume 2) and in
SH/RH tubes (Chapter 33).

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-1

1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
Superheater/Reheater Fireside
Corrosion (Oil-Fired Units):
Identification Keys
1. Macroscopically, fireside cor-
rosion in oil-fired units will
generally be uniformly located
on the side of the tube experi-
encing the highest tempera-
tures and highest heat flux. In
general it will have an undulat-
ing surface or the appearance
of unevenness.
2. Distinctive fireside deposits
containing low melting ash
components are key in the
identification of fireside corro-
sion. There is generally a
loose, blue/black outer
deposit and strongly adherent,
black oxide adjacent to the
tube. The latter will look
molten and shiny. For high
vanadium residual oils, typical
deposit compounds are vana-
dium sodium complexes such
as sodium vanadyl vanadate
(Na2O • V2O4 • 5V2O5).
3. In the case of low vanadium
residuals, the deposits that
form are essentially sulfatic
(sodium sulfates, Na2SO4 and
derivatives) with small
amounts of NV6 (Na2O •
6V2O5), sodium vanadates, of
V/Na ratio lower than 6, and
nickel vanadates.
34-2 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units
1.1 Features of failure
Macroscopically, tube wastage will
often be evident and manifested as
undulations and unevenness of the
tube surface. A typical cross-section
showing this wastage and the pres-
ence of significant deposits can be
seen in Figure 34-1. Tube thinning
will be most evident around the
edges of the deposit.
Greatest wall loss will generally be
seen in tubes that have been oper-
ated at the highest temperatures
over a period of time. The measure-
ment of steamside oxide thickness
(by ultrasonic or laboratory mea-
surement) will usually confirm this
observation. The ratio of maximum
wall loss to oxide scale thickness at
a location will give an indication of
the degree to which fireside corro-
sion is a problem relative to long-
term overheating. If the ratio is
greater than five then fireside corro-
sion (or erosion) is the more active
mechanism.
On austenitic steels, the magnetite
and spinel oxides become non-
adherent when they reach a thick-
ness of about 0.2 mm (0.008 in.)
and tend to spall off along with any
deposits that have formed when the
boiler cools. Bare metal can result
and lead to rapid corrosion rates.
Any oxide scale that is thicker than
about 1 mm (0.04 in.) should be
considered as evidence of a fast
corrosion rate.1 There may also be
localized, overlapping pits 0.5 - 2
mm (~ 0.02 - 0.08 in.) in diameter.
Unburnt oil on the upstream sur-
faces of tubes, such as caused by
excess oil during startup, is a
source of carbon contamination and
subsequent carburization of the
coated surface. This is particularly
critical for austenitic tube materials
which have a higher solubility for
carbon than ferritic materials.1
The tube will usually be coated with
a multilayered fireside scale and ash
deposits typically consisting of two
layers. Deposits adjacent to the
metal oxide are the ones that
directly influence corrosion of the
substrate. A black, glossy inner
layer, is typical and may be superfi-
cially similar to that which occurs as
a result of long-term overheating. If
this layer is glassy or shows signs of
having been molten against the tube
metal, then a very fast corrosion rate
has probably occurred. The
absence of a layer of protective
oxide adjacent to the tube surface is
indicative of the fastest corrosion
rates.
A hard, brittle, and porous outer
layer may have alternating
dark/black/blue and light bands.
Fireside corrosion will be primarily
distinguished by the presence of low
melting point ash compounds in
these deposit layers. The fireside
scale and ash should be examined
metallographically and chemically
for the presence of low melting point
constituents. Note that oil ash
deposits tend to be soluble in water
and are more easily removed than
coal ash deposits.
For high vanadium residuals these
constituents will be vanadium oxides
and/or vanadium sodium complexes
such as those listed in Table 34-1
and the eutectics shown on the
V2O5- Na2O phase diagram in
Figure 34-2. For low vanadium resid-
uals, these compounds will be
essentially sulfatic (sodium sulfates
Na2SO4 and derivatives) with small
amounts of NV6 and nickel vana-
dates. An example of the distinctive
layering and the presence of an
alkali vanadyl vanadate in the inner
layer as detected by energy disper-
sive x-ray is shown in Figure 34-3.
Figure 34-1. General appearance of a 9% Cr final superheater tube containing fireside
corrosion deposits (top of the figure) in an oil-fired boiler after 50,000 hours service.
The bottom of the figure shows a section of tubing having been acid cleaned to
remove the deposits and the ring section taken through the cleaned section shows the
general appearance of tube wastage on the outside surface.
Source: J. Hickey, Irish Electricity Supply Board

Table 34-1
Melting Point of Some Commonly Temperature (°C)
Observed Slag Deposits 900
Compound Melting Point, °C PO2 (atm)
851
1.0
V2O5 670
0.2
800 Liquid
V2O3 1,970

V2O4 1,970
720

Na2O • V2O5 605 700

670
2Na2O • V2O5 650 645

3Na2O • V2O5 850 602 605

600
575
Na2O • V2O4 • 5V2O5 625 562
NV
NV6

N 2V

N 3V

525
Na2O • V2O4 • 11V2O5 575
500
Na2SO4 884 V2O5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
MOL. % Na2O
Na3Fe(SO4)2 624

Note: See also the V2O5-Na2O phase diagram Figure 34-2. Equilibrium phase diagram for the V2O5-Na2O system showing PO2
(Figure 34-2) which shows eutectics down to 525°C dependence. (N) represents Na2O and (V) is V2O5. Source: J.R. Wilson2
(977°F).

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-3

 d)

a)

b) c)

Figure 34-3. (a) Shows a secondary electron image of an oil ash scale and deposit on 21/4 Cr - 1 Mo steel reheater tube that
exhibited oil ash corrosion. (b, c, and d) Show energy dispersive X-ray spectra from three layers in the ash. The spectra indicate that
the inner layer (b) may be an alkali vanadyl vanadate. Absence of significant iron in the inner layer suggests that the vanadium
compound is either directly attacking the tube material or is fluxing away the indigenous iron oxide as rapidly as it forms. The middle
layer (c) is probably iron oxide which has precipitated at the external surface of the molten layer. The outer layer (d) is comprised of
ash deposit constituents.

34-4 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units

Removal of the fireside scale and
ash deposit will reveal an undulating
surface and distinctive longitudinal
grooving and pitting appearance
(“alligator hide”) as shown in Figures
33-3 and 33-4, Chapter 33. Note
that the appearance of alligator hide
is indicative but not definitive as it
can also occur if the metal has been
thermally shocked such as by soot-
blower condensate.3 Final failure will
typically be as a longitudinal crack
associated with the alligator hide. If
failure has been long-term the frac-
ture surface will appear brittle, rapid
corrosion rates will result in fracture
surfaces that are ductile.
The key differences between fireside
corrosion and long-term overheat-
ing/creep are highlighted in Table 34-
2. The most distinguishing character-
istic will be the presence of low melt-
ing ash compounds in the deposits
formed as a result of fireside corro-
sion, and the ratio of wall thickness
loss to oxide scale thickness.
1.2 Locations of failure
Typical regions of the boiler subject
to tube failures by fireside corrosion
are shown in Figure 34-4. These
locations are basically the same as
those where long-term overheating/
creep and fireside corrosion in coal-
fired units can occur. However, in oil-
fired units, fireside corrosion tends
to occur in higher temperature com-
ponents, particularly those tubes
with metal temperatures in excess of
about 600°C (~ 1110°F). As a result,
failures may be more prevalent in
outlet sections and can occur in
either austenitic materials or in fer-
ritic materials exposed to the higher
temperatures.
Specific locations at the highest risk
therefore include:
• Leading sides of all tubes in pen-
dant platens, especially hottest
(leading) tubes, and steam outlet
tubes
• Tubes out of alignment that act as
leading tubes
• In the outlet (final) sections
towards the header because
these are at the highest tempera-
tures.
• Just prior to a change of material,
e.g., in T22 just prior to the
austenitic material, as the lower
Cr content material may be oper-
ating above its design point.
• Wrapper tubes
• Tubes that surround a radiant Figure 34-4. Typical boiler locations
cavity (i.e,, they may pick up were oil ash fireside corrosion can occur.
more heat)
• At bottom bends of platens espe-
cially those facing the fireball.
• Tubes with a longer gas touched
length (GTL). GTL is the distance
measured along the tube circuit
from the inlet header to the point
of corrosion.
• Spacers and uncooled hangers,
and the fins and studs on tubes.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-5
Table 34-2
Comparison of Characteristics of Long-Term Overheating/Creep, Short-Term Overheating,
and Fireside Corrosion (Oil-Fired Units) In Superheater/Reheater Tubing
Characteristic Long-Term Overheating
Fracture Surface and Appearance • Generally thick-edged, brittle final
of Failure failure.
• Generally accompanied by external
tube wastage at the 10 o’clock and
2 o’clock positions.
Internal Scale? Yes, generally extensive, multi-
laminated and exfoliating.
External Scaling? • Yes, thick, laminated and often lon-
gitudinally cracked.
• Usually two layers - (i) a hard,
porous outer layer with composi-
tion typically that of flyash, and (ii)
a black glossy inner layer, mostly
oxide but may contain some sul-
fates and sulfides of iron.
Outside surface appearance Characteristic longitudinal grooving
after removal of scale/deposits and pitting (“alligator hide”).
Composition of External Does not contain low melting point
Scales/Deposits ash compounds such as alkali iron
sulfates.
Wall Thinning? Typically wastage flats at 10 o’clock
and 2 o’clock positions caused by
accelerated oxidation. There is always
a layer of oxide adjacent to the tube.
Ratio of wall loss to steamside Typically less than 3:1.
oxide thickness?
Tube Material Degradation Yes, generally extensive signs of
overheating and/or of creep damage,
particularly near to the crack tip.
Creep voids will not be found
removed from crack tip.
Change in material hardness Localized softening near the rupture
is typical.
34-6 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units
Short-Term Overheating
• Usually thin-edged, ductile final
failures.
• Swelling of tubes without
ovalization.
• “Fish-mouth” appearance of tube
rupture.
Not necessarily thick. Depends on age
of tube at failure.
Not necessarily thick.
Swelling, stretch marks on tube metal.
Not relevant.
Only because of bulging of tube mate-
rial.
Not relevant.
Depends on the material and the max-
imum temperature reached.
For example, for the most rapid over-
heating failures, there will be rela-
tively little microstructural change.
Localized hardening near the
rupture is likely.
Fireside Corrosion
• Tube wastage in high
temperature/heat flux portions of
the tube.
• Longitudinal cracking, final failure
can be (but not necessarily) by
overheating.
Yes, particularly if tube metal over-
heating was a root cause.
Yes, with multi-layers: (i) a hard,
brittle and porous outer layers, which
may have alternating dark blue/black
bands and (ii) a black, glossy inner
layer strongly bonded to tube; has an
appearance of molten deposits and is
shiny.
Characteristic undulations or uneven-
ness of surface. In worst areas there
might be some “alligator hide” and
longitudinal cracking.
Does contain low melting point
compounds. In high vanadium oil will
be vanadium sodium complexes. In
low vanadium oil will be sulfatic
(sodium sulfates and derivatives).
Primary feature of failure, worse on
portion of tube subject to high tem-
peratures and/or high heat flux.
Typically greater than 3:1; for ratios
greater than 5:1 fireside corrosion or
erosion is the dominant mechanism.
If overheating has been a problem,
yes; otherwise, no. Fireside corrosion
can occur in a tube at design temper-
atures. Can be a carburized band
adjacent to the fireside deposits.15
Hardening is not necessary; if there
has been no overheating, there will be
no change in hardness. If carburiza-
tion is associated with corrosion, then
an increase in hardness may be
observed.15
2. Mechanism of Failure
Superheater/Reheater Fireside
Corrosion (Oil-Fired Units):
Mechanism
1. In residual oils containing a
high level of vanadium, molten
vanadates increase the corro-
sion of boiler tubes. The
mechanism is thought to be a
fluxing of the normally protec-
tive oxide and/or an increase
of the diffusion of oxidant to
the protective layer. Greater
wastage may occur if the tube
becomes carburized.
2. In the case of low vanadium
residuals, the deposits that
form are essentially sulfatic
(sodium sulfates Na2SO4 and
derivatives) with small
amounts of NV6 and nickel
vanadates, which also flux the
protective oxide.
3. Because of the low melting
points of ash constituents,
tube metal temperatures
around 600°C (~ 1110°F) or
lower are in the critical regime
to experience corrosion by
this mechanism.
2.1 Introduction
Low melting point compounds pro-
duced by the firing of residual oils
are aggressively corrosive to the
protective oxides which form on
SH/RH tubes. As liquid phases
begin to deposit and solidify on tube
surfaces, the temperature of the out-
side surface increases, leading to
additional deposition and melting of
the deposits.
The primary compositional determi-
nants from the fuel are the levels of
vanadium and sodium in the resid-
ual oil. The effects of two general
classifications of residual oils are
described here: high vanadium, low
sodium fuel typical of Venezuelan
sources, and low vanadium, low
sodium fuels typical of some of
those from the Persian Gulf. Typical
compositions of each are shown in
Table 34-3 along with a typical
Mexican fuel oil.15
For either fuel, corrosive slag occurs
when two preconditions have been
met: (i) operation occurs with a
residual oil that forms low melting
point compounds, particularly those
containing vanadium and sodium,
as well as sulfur, and (ii) tube metal
temperatures that are above 600°C
(~ 1110°F). Final failure occurs as a
stress rupture when thinned tube
walls are no longer able to contain
the requisite pressure.
One of the primary effects of oil-fir-
ing is that there is relatively little ash
produced (typically around 0.2%) in
comparison with coal-firing (around
20%) and therefore the beneficial
effects of ash components are not
present. It has been reported that
when both oil and coal are fired, that
the coal ash can dilute the vana-
dium content of deposits produced.1
Greater tube wastage has been
observed if the tubes become car-
burized during service.16
2.2 Effect of fuel composition
on the rate of corrosion
2.2.1 High vanadium residual oils. In
residual oils containing a high level
of vanadium, it is generally agreed
that the molten vanadates increase
the corrosion of boiler tubes by flux-
ing the normally protective metal
oxide layers, or by increasing the dif-
fusion of oxidant to the protective
layer.4 Although the exact mecha-
nism of attack is still being refined,
Figure 34-5 shows a ten-step
process of oxygen transport that
illustrates the relevant factors.
Table 34-1 summarizes the most
commonly observed tube deposits
that result from high vanadium oils.
Many have melting points that are
below the expected temperatures in
the hotter sections of the SH/RH.
Vanadium pentoxide (V2O5) is the
highest oxidation product of vana-
dium and is listed for completeness
although it is rarely observed in
operating boilers. Sodium vanadyl
vanadate (Na2O • V2O4 • 5V2O5) is
one of the many complex com-
pounds usually present in the ash
and is the most commonly reported
because there is X-ray data for it. In
fact, it is not present in the corroding
deposit because it absorbs oxygen
to become Na2O • 6V2O5 (referred to
as NV6) depending on the Na:V ratio.
Figure 34-2 is the equilibrium dia-
gram for the Na2O - V2O5 system
showing how the melting points vary
for these families of compounds.
The dotted line on the figure illus-
trates the liquidus for 0.2 atmos-
phere oxygen partial pressure; the
solid line for 1.0 atmosphere. The
substantial differences lead to a cor-
responding significant difference in
corrosion rates in pressurized fired
equipment.2 It also indicates how
operation at low levels of excess
oxygen can help mitigate the effects
of fireside corrosion by raising the
melting point of the vanadates.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-7
The greatest corrosion is not related Table 34-3
to the absolute levels of V and Na Impurity Levels of Residual Fuel Oils
but the ratio of their oxides and tem-
perature.14 The fastest corrosion rate Fuel Source Vanadium, ppm Sodium, ppm Sulfur, Wt %
(for temperatures up to about 900°C
(~ 1650°F)) is at a ratio of V2O5: Venezuelan 280-300 10-20 2.5
Na2O of 6:1 (NV6), which corre-
sponds to a Na:V ratio of about Persian Gulf 45-50 35-70 2.5
0.1:1. Thus for a typical Venezuelan
residual containing 300 ppm vana- Mexican15 150-340 1-100 3.2-4.5
dium, only about 30 ppm sodium is
required to form a very corrosive
medium. Other oxides at low con-
centrations exert little influence on
corrosion rates. The corrosivity can
also depend on the sulfur content of
Atmosphere
the oil-ash deposit in cases where
the sulfur content in the oil is greater 1. Diffusion of O 2
than 3%.15 The presence of refrac- through porous
oxide
tory oxides (MgO, CaO, Al2O3, and
SiO2) inhibit corrosion when present
at high concentrations in the ash, Porous Oxide
e.g., a ratio of 2:1, additive:ash by
weight.2

2.2.2 Low vanadium, low sodium 2. Adsorption of O 2 10. Formation of

by liquid vanadate porous oxide
residuals. With a typical Persian gulf
residual oil, for example, containing
50 ppm V, 70 ppm Na and 2.5
weight percent S, the deposits or 3. Transport of 9. Transport of metal
slags are essentially sulfatic (sodium oxygen species ions through melt
through melt
sulfates, Na2SO4 and derivatives)
with small amounts of NV6 and Liquid Vanadate
nickel vanadates. The fireside corro-
sion rate is controlled by the dissolu- 4. Adsorption of 8. Dissolution of
oxygen species metal oxide in
tion of otherwise protective scales in by metal oxide liquid vanadate
the liquid alkali sulfates.
Laboratory and corrosion probe tri- Metal Oxide
als have shown that the deposition 5. Transport of oxygen ion 7. Transport of metal ion
rate of sodium is proportional to its through metal oxide(s) through metal oxide
concentration, independent of the
presence of vanadium. The deposi- 6. Reaction of oxygen
tion of vanadium increases with ion with metal
vanadium content in the flue gas, Metal
but large amounts of sodium can
depress the rate. No realistic reduc-
tions in the fuel oil impurities will
markedly improve the rate of corro- Figure 34-5. Possible reactions that take place in liquid vanadate
sion which is of the same order as (oil-fired) corrosion. Source: J.R. Wilson2
those for vanadate corrosion. The
same sharp increase in rate for
austenitics above 600°C (~ 1110°F)
is evident.

34-8 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units

2.3 Effect of tube temperatures
on the rate of corrosion
Because of the much lower operat-
ing temperatures, fireside corrosion
in the waterwalls of oil-fired units is
unlikely, however, superheater/
reheater temperatures are in exactly
the right range during operation to
experience a problem. The higher
the temperature, the faster the corro-
sion rate in these temperature
ranges. As a result, if steamside
oxide buildup leads to higher tube
temperatures, or if unit firing rates
are increased to compensate for
insulated tubes, the resultant
increase in tube temperature can
lead to an outbreak of tube failures
by this mechanism.
2.4 Effect of tube material
composition
The corrosion rate increases sharply
for austenitic materials (less for fer-
ritic) between 600 and 650°C (~
1110 to 1200°F). With a Venezuelan
residual, for temperatures less than
600°C (~1110°F), the rate is less
than 50 nm/hr (~ 18 mils/yr),
whereas at 650°C (~ 1200°F), it can
be up to 200 nm/hr (~ 70 mils/yr).
Clearly, these higher rates can
cause a considerable problem if left
unchecked.
High chromium materials generally
have better corrosion resistance
than ferritic materials. Type 310 has
about a factor of three better resis-
tance than ferritic steels; an alloy of
50Cr 50 Ni, which has seen signifi-
cant development for applications
where corrosion has proven to be
particularly troublesome, has
extremely low corrosion rates partic-
ularly below 700°C (~ 1300°F). Its
use is generally in duplex or coex-
truded tubing so that the superior
corrosion resistance is combined
with a creep resistant core.
2.5 Effect of unit operation on
corrosion rates
The amount of excess air is a con-
tributing factor to the rate of corro-
sion. In high vanadium residual oil, a
level of excess air that is just above
the minimum stoichiometric require-
ment will reduce the corrosion
potential by preventing the oxidation
of vanadium to its highest oxidation
state (V2O5). The higher melting
point oxides V2O3 and V2O4 will be
more likely to form, and will not
deposit as corrosive compounds.
However, the addition of Mg addi-
tives will probably still be required to
reach acceptable corrosion rates.
The effect of such additives is
described in the next section. Note
that ashes containing vanadium
complexes are toxic and are slightly
water soluble which may lead to
groundwater contamination if used
for land fill.
In the case of low vanadium residu-
als, reasonable success has been
obtained by the correct control of
oxygen to just above stoichiometric
combustion requirements. Neither
further excess oxygen reductions,
nor the use of Mg additives has had
significant additional benefit. These
effects tend to confirm that the active
process is corrosion due to sulfatic
compounds; thus control of SO3 pro-
duction is an important criterion.
2.6 Effect of additives on
propensity for corrosion
A variety of additives, most notably
magnesium, but also including man-
ganese, aluminum, silicon, and cal-
cium, alone or in combination with
each other, have been used to con-
trol corrosion. It is important to
understand how they affect the
mechanism so that proper additive
choice can be made.
The three objectives of an additive
are (i) to raise the fusion point of the
ash, (ii) to combine chemically with
all the corrosive agents present, and
(iii) to not cause plugging or wear in
fuel systems. The use of magnesium,
as MgO, is based on increasing the
melting point of the vanadium com-
plexes and to eliminate the formation
of low melting point eutectics. Table
34-4 shows the success of that strat-
egy as the melting point of typical
complexes plus MgO increases.
Figure 34-6 shows the phase dia-
gram for the addition of MgO. The
aim is to form 3MgO•V2O5 which has
a melting point of 1071°C (1960°F).
The situation is complicated by the
presence of Na2O which reduces the
melting point, or requires more MgO
to control.
Table 34-4
Melting Points of MgO V2O5 Compounds
Compound Melting Point, °C
2MgO • 3V2O5 640
MgO • V2O5 742
2MgO • V2O5 980
3MgO • V2O5 1071
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-9
 To prevent corrosion, it is necessary
Temperature (°C) that the deposit on the tubes has a
melting point above the metal tem-
1100 1071 perature. It is difficult to control
vanadate corrosion by the use of
additives without accumulating large
1000 980 volumes of modified fly ash; thus, it
is important to add only enough
Liquid MgO to counteract the corrosive
vanadate. This entails fuel and slag
900
analysis, reference to the phase dia-
grams for the expected behavior of
the proposed combinations, and
800 analysis of oil and additive flow
742 rates. Excessive magnesium slag
buildup will cause sintering and fus-
700 ing of the outer layers, which may
670
640
be more difficult to remove by soot-
blowing or water washing.

Mg3(VO4)2
Mg2V6O17
604

Mg2V2O7
Mg V2O6
600 As noted above, the benefits of Mg
additives for use with low vanadium
residuals has not been as marked
500 as that for the high vanadium oils.
V2O5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
MOL. % MgO

Figure 34-6. Equilibrium phase diagram for the V2O5-MgO system showing that there
is no PO2 dependence. Source: J.R. Wilson2

34-10 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
3.1 Introduction
Table 34-5 lists the primary root
cause influences. In general there
are three groups of root cause influ-
ences: (i) fuel factors, (ii) excessive
tube metal temperatures, and (iii)
the effects of operating conditions.
Independent of root cause, the two
most important actions are:
(a). Analyze the composition and
melting point of deposits. A key con-
firmation that fireside corrosion is the
active mechanism is the presence of
low-melting point ash constituents.
Metallographic sampling and analy-
sis will be key identification tools.
Chemistry and constituents of the
deposits can be determined using
EDX mapping, spectrochemical
analysis, x-ray diffraction or atomic
absorption spectroscopy. Melting
temperatures of ash are measured
by the use of thermogravimetric
analysis and/or differential thermal
analysis. More information about
such analyses is provided in
Chapter 6, Volume 1.
(b). Monitor progression of wall thin-
ning on a periodic basis. When the
ratio of wall loss to the buildup of
steamside oxide scale is large (typi-
cally greater than a factor of three
and certainly at a ratio greater than
five), then fireside corrosion rather
than long-term overheating/creep is
dominant. Additional detail about
inspection and sampling methods is
provided in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
3.2 Influence of oil
composition
There is a significant effect of oil
composition on corrosion rate as
discussed at length in the mecha-
nism section above. Changing to a
more aggressive fuel can signifi-
cantly increase corrosion damage.
Actions to confirm that this is a pri-
mary factor in the appearance of
fireside corrosion are:
(c). Monitor oil corrosiveness by
placing controlled-temperature cor-
rosion probes or deposition probes
into susceptible locations in the
SH/RH.
(d). Analyze ash deposits using
methods outlined in (a) above to
periodically determine whether sig-
nificant deposition of low-melting
point constituents has begun or has
accelerated.
3.3 Influence of tube metal
temperatures
Unfortunately, the higher tempera-
ture sections of the SH/RH are well
within the temperature regime of sig-
nificant corrosion susceptibility.
Furthermore, increases in tube metal
temperatures, such as caused by
the buildup of steamside scale, can
increase the rate at which corrosion
occurs and increase the number of
tubes at risk. As deposits form on
the external tube surface, they will
insulate the tube metal but result in
higher ash temperatures.
Combustion conditions that lead to
higher flue gas temperatures can
cause localized tube overheating.
The influences are reviewed below.
3.3.1 Excessive temperatures
caused by steamside oxide buildup
Actions to confirm that steamside
oxide buildup and the resultant over-
heating is a contributing factor to the
appearance of fireside corrosion
include:
(e). Oxide thickness measurements
(ultrasonically) at typical locations
provides an indication of tube tem-
peratures within the element. See
Chapter 8, Volume 1 for details of
the interpretation of oxide scale
thickness and its relation to tube
metal temperatures. Chapter 9,
Volume 1 reviews the use of UT for
oxide thickness measurements.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-11
Table 34-5
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause
Influences
3.1 Potential actions for all root causes of fireside corrosion
3.2 Influence of oil composition
3.3 Influence of overheating of tubes.
3.3.1 Excessive temperatures
caused by steamside
oxide buildup.
3.3.2 Excessive temperatures
as caused by operating
conditions.
- high temperature laning of
gases
- changes in absorption
patterns between furnace and
convection sections,
- RH overheating because of
rapid startups
- tube misalignments
34-12 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units
Actions to Confirm
(a). Ash and deposit analysis to identify
presence of low melting point con-
stituents, particularly vanadium/
vanadium-sodium and sodium sulfate
complexes.
(b). NDE measures (typically UT) to identify
wall thinning and steamside oxide scale
buildup.
(c). Monitor oil corrosiveness using
corrosion or deposition probes.
(d). Analyze ash deposits as in item
(a) above.
(e). NDE of steamside oxide thicknesses.
(f). Selective tube sampling and metallurgi-
cal analysis to confirm steamside oxide
and wall thickness.
(g). Monitoring of thermocouples installed
across the SH/RH outlet legs in
vestibule to identify hottest platens
across the boiler.
(h). For high temperature laning: monitor
temperatures as in (g) above and con-
sider the use of the cold air velocity test
(CAVT). Details of the latter can be
found in Chapter 14, Volume 2 on
flyash erosion.
(i). For reheater overtemperature during start
sequences: check the startup probe and
limit temperatures to 538°C (1000° F)
prior to RH flow.
(j). Visual inspection can be used to detect
tube misalignments.
Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures
• Choose repair strategy • Perform remaining life assessment.
based on severity of • Continual check on the use of Mg-
corrosion rate. based additives.
• Implement long-term • Optimization of excess oxygen levels.
strategy from choices in • Set up long-term monitoring and re-
Figure 34-7 in conjunc- evaluation program.
tion with on-going • Evaluate full range of available options
program of remaining using roadmap in Figure 34-7.
life assessment and
monitoring.
• As above, plus • As above with emphasis on additives.
• On-going consideration
of the use of Mg-based
additives.
• Choose repair strategy • Perform remaining life assessment.
based on severity of • Consider program of periodic chemical
corrosion rate. cleaning. See Chapter 4, Volume 1.
• Implement long-term See also options for long-term over-
strategy from choices in heating of tubes (Chapter 32).
Figure 34-7 in conjunc- • Set up long-term monitoring and
tion with on-going pro- re-evaluation program.
gram of remaining life • Evaluate full range of available options
assessment and using Figure 34-7.
monitoring.
• Institute periodic chemi-
cal cleaning. See addi-
tional detail in Chapter
4, Volume 1.
• Modify operation to • Evaluate full range of available options
correct the specific using Figure 34-7.
problem.
• Implement long-term
strategy from choices in
Figure 34-7 in conjunc-
tion with on-going pro-
gram of remaining life
assessment and
monitoring.
Table 34-5
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions (continued)
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.4 Influence of operating factors

3.4.1 Operation with high levels

of excess oxygen and/or (k.) Check operating logs for typical excess • Modify operating proce-
periods of very low oxygen levels. dures, if economically
excess oxygen. feasible to reduce levels
of excess oxygen.
• Implement long-term
strategy from choices in
Figure 34-7 in conjunc-
tion with on-going pro-
gram of remaining life
assessment and
monitoring.

3.4.2 Poor sootblowing
operations
(l). Check sootblowing frequency, effective-
ness, and superheat level of blowing
medium.
• Evaluate whether operat- • Perform remaining life assessment.
ing procedures such as See discussion of methods in
sootblowing can be eco- Chapter 8, Volume 1.
nomically changed to • Set up long-term monitoring and
protect SH/RH tubes. re-evaluation program.
• Implement long-term • Evaluate full range of available options
strategy from choices in using Figure 34-7.
Figure 34-7 in conjunc-
tion with on-going pro-
gram of remaining life
assessment and
monitoring.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-13

(f). Selective tube sampling and
metallurgical analysis can be used
to confirm the results of the NDE
measures of steamside oxide and
tube metal wall thickness. The same
samples can be subjected to exter-
nal deposit analyses as outlined in
item (a) above.
(g). Monitoring of thermocouples
permanently installed across the
SH/RH outlet legs in the vestibule
can provide an indication of the
hottest platens. This action can help
prioritize where inspections and
sampling should occur.
3.3.2 Excessive temperatures
caused by operating conditions A
variety of operating conditions might
cause excessive tube temperatures:
high temperature laning, changes in
absorption patterns between the fur-
nace and convective sections, rapid
startups that cause the reheater to
reach temperature before full flow
starts, tube misalignments, etc. The
actions to confirm these conditions
are:
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
34-14 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units
(h). For high temperature laning:
monitor temperatures as in (g)
above. Laning of gases can also be
detected using a cold air velocity
test (CAVT). The details of the test
are described in Chapter 14,
Volume 2 on flyash erosion.
(i). For reheater overtemperature
during start sequences: check the
startup probe and limit initial gas
temperature to 538°C (1000°F) prior
to RH flow.
(j). For tube misalignment (out of
the bank): visual examination can
be used to detect a problem.
3.4 Influence of operating
factors
3.4.1 High levels of excess oxygen
and/or periods of very low excess
oxygen. The amount of excess air is
a contributing factor to the rate of
corrosion. In high vanadium residual
oil, a level of excess air that is just
above the minimum stoichiometric
requirement (< 1% excess oxygen)
will encourage the formation of
Ultrasonic testing (UT) can be used
to measure both wall thinning and
steamside oxide thickness.
Locations should be chosen which
are the most susceptible to fireside
corrosion as described in Section
1.2 above. Locations on a particular
tube should be investigated to find
maximum wastage. Selective sam-
pling is recommended to confirm the
results of the NDE examinations and
to evaluate internal scale and exter-
higher melting point constituents
that will not deposit as corrosive
compounds. There is relatively less
effect of excess air levels when
burning low vanadium residuals.
Actions to confirm include:
(k). Check operating logs for typical
excess oxygen levels.
3.4.2 Poor sootblowing operations
Typically, the first layer of deposit on
clean tube surfaces is dry and loose
because the tube metal temperature
is low enough that the ash deposits
are in solid form. Proper sootblow-
ing can easily remove these early
deposits. However, if sootblowing
operations are executed improperly,
deposits can remain on tubes, rais-
ing the outside deposit temperature,
resulting in the deposition of liquid-
phase ash which is difficult to
remove, and as described above,
begins the rapid corrosion of tube
surfaces. An action to confirm is:
(l). Check sootblowing frequency,
efficacy and superheat level of
blowing medium.
nal deposits. Additional detail on UT
methods can be found in Chapter 9,
Volume 1. Methods of metallurgical
evaluation are reviewed in Chapter
6, Volume 1.
Monitoring thermocouples, either
permanently placed or temporary
installations, can be used to detect
excessive metal temperatures that
might foster future accelerated
wastage or tube failures.
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Superheater/Reheater Fireside
Corrosion (Oil-Fired Units):
Immediate Solutions and Actions
1. Immediate solutions should be
chosen in conjunction with: (i)
a knowledge of the severity of
corrosion and (ii) an analysis
of remaining life discussed
under long-term actions
below.
2. A principal means to over-
come fireside corrosion in oil-
fired units is the use of Mg-
based additives.
3. Repairs can be considered on
two levels depending upon
the severity of the problem.
For the short term, or for mild
corrosion, tubes can be
replaced with same material,
or a palliative coating may
provide somewhat better cor-
rosion resistance; for the long
term or severe corrosion,
replacement should be made
with a more resistant material.
5.1 Need for remaining life Note that considerable care must be
assessment taken in any repairs, inspections or
movements within oil-fired units
Any immediate solution or repair
because of the extreme toxicity of
strategy should consider that a
vanadium dust. Breathing equip-
longer term remaining life analysis
ment or masks must be used for any
methodology should also be imple-
repairs. Note that as with other vana-
mented. Such programs are dis-
dium complexes, ashes containing
cussed in detail in Chapter 8,
these oxides are toxic. They are also
Volume 1, and are summarized
slightly water soluble which may
under the long-term actions below.
lead to groundwater contamination if
used for land fill.
5.2 Repairs
If the corrosion rate has been rela-
5.3 Use of Mg-based additives
tively modest (< 25 nm/hr (~ 9
mils/yr)) and is likely to continue to Utilities that are burning, or know that
be so, an acceptable strategy is to they will be burning, high vanadium
retube with the same alloy and moni- residual oils will generally use an
tor closely the wastage rate. Another additive as the most cost-effective
approach, although not preferred, is means to prevent fireside corrosion.
the use of a palliative coating or
tube shields An overview of options
5.4 Other short-term options
is provided under long-term actions.
Several other short-term options that
Pad welds should definitely not be can be considered depending on the
used as a repair measure because root cause might include (i) interim
of the uncertainty of the tube condi- steps to limit tube metal temperatures
tions such as the presence of creep such as by cleaning steamside
cracks and their depth, and the con- oxide, (ii) aligning tubes, and (iii)
ditions of the internal tube surface. improving sootblowing operation. A
Further discussion about weld complete overview of all options is
repairs can be found in Chapter 11, included in the next section.
Volume 1.
For higher corrosion rates that are
resulting in rapid wastage of the
existing alloy, the replacement
should be with a more resistant
material.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-15
6. Background to Long term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Superheater/Reheater Fireside
Corrosion (Oil-Fired Units):
Long-Term Actions
Corrective strategies will depend
on the type of oil burned. For
high vanadium residuals, consid-
eration should be given to (i) the
use of Mg-based additives, and
(ii) operation with low excess air
levels. For either high or low
vanadium residuals, additional
options generally fall into two
major categories: (i) materials
strategies that provide increased
protection or replace the compo-
nent, and (ii) design or operating
strategies to try to control tube
temperatures.
34-16 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units
As noted above, it may not be possi-
ble to remove the root cause for
many fireside corrosion problems.
Knowing how to minimize the
wastage rate and the application of
a predictive remaining life assess-
ment process including periodic
inspection and monitoring, are the
keys to economic handling of fire-
side corrosion problems.
Figure 34-7 outlines most of the
available corrective actions for
superheater/reheater fireside corro-
sion. As shown in that figure, three
primary, and not mutually exclusive,
routes that can be followed are: (i)
fuel options, primarily additives, (ii)
materials options, and (iii) operating
options.
The circled numbers used in Figure
34-7 are used to identify options for
the discussion that follows and no
ranking is implied; however, boxes
with bold outline indicate those
options which have been the most
successful.
Remaining life assessment
(option 1, Figure 34-7)
A remaining life assessment is
required to relate the rate of corro-
sion wastage to the desired life or to
determine the time available to
implement the desired option.
Therefore such an assessment
should be undertaken in parallel
with any of the other options. A sys-
tematic program will include: base-
line measurement, monitoring rates
of wastage, application and monitor-
ing of control measures, and
assessment of the effects on remain-
ing life. Monitoring of the flue gas,
metal and steam temperatures, com-
bustion conditions, and fuel compo-
sition should also be considered as
these can determine corrosion rates
while the unit is still on-line.1
Particularly important are step
changes in key parameters.
A critical step in determining the
remaining life of a tube and in
choosing the optimal solution is
knowing the rate at which damage is
accumulating. The lifetime of super-
heater/reheater tubes can be calcu-
lated using the oxide thickness tech-
nique as discussed in detail in
Chapter 8, Volume 1 which includes
the damage accumulation by both
fireside corrosion and long-term
overheating.
A key goal of the remaining life
assessment will be to establish the
acceptable rate of wastage, given
the desired remaining life of the unit
and an analysis of damage accumu-
lation. As a rule of thumb, rates of
wastage above 25 nm/hr (~ 9
mils/yr) indicate the need for some
periodic activity such as annual
inspections and for the explicit
determination of re-evaluation peri-
ods. Rates above 50 nm/hr (18
mils/year) indicate a serious
decrease in life of the tubing; an
estimate of remaining life should be
made and the appropriate actions
taken that life is unacceptable.
Shielding (option 2)
The most common temporary mea-
sure is the installation of shields to
the leading edges of affected tubes.
High chromium alloys such as Type
310 or 50Cr-50Ni are typically rec-
ommended. The shield is curved to
fit the tube surface and tack-welded
in place. As they are not cooled, the
metal temperatures are above the
range for extensive attack.
Coatings (option 3)
A variety of processes have been
suggested for applying metallized
coatings to tubes in situ as a means
of increasing corrosion resistance.
The advantage of coatings is that
very corrosion-resistant materials can
be applied at specific susceptible
sites, so it is not necessary to replace
entire sections of tubing in order to
overcome localized problems.
 therefore be necessary.1 It should be
Corrosion rate confirmed noted that there may not be signifi-
Extent determined cant improvement in the resistance
to fireside corrosion per se, but
longer times to failure may result
Remaining life assessment 1
because the upgraded material has
a lower creep rate and higher
strength (so that a thinner failure
Operating thickness is achieved).1 As a general
Materials solutions Fuel solutions solutions
rule, the more resistant the material,
9 15 the more expensive it will be.
Provide Replace Monitoring Use of Limit tube Excess air
protection component fuel change additives temperatures strategies
Change to a more resistant
7 8
2 3 material, composite such as
Shielding Coating co-extruded tubing (option 6)
Gas side Steam side
Co-extruded tubing, originally devel-
More
resistant Same
Redistribute oped for SH/RH applications in coal-
material Tube
material 13
alignment steam 11 fired units, could be used for severe
flow corrosion in oil-fired units. A 50Cr-
5 Monolithic
Soot-
50Ni alloy is used as the outer layer
Chemical
6 Coextruded 14 blowing clean 12 and is metallurgically bonded to a
operations SH/RH creep-resistant, but not corrosion
4 Same thickness
resistant core, typically Eshete 1250
Limit main
steam 10 (a high-temperature, high-strength
temperature stainless steel). Metallurgically-
Notes: a) Remaining life assessment (1) is almost mandatory to decide which option should be adopted
bonded processing provides superior
b) Boxes outlined in bold indicate options that have been most successful tubes for use in utility boiler applica-
c) Numbers refer to main text
tions when compared to mechani-
cally bonded or bi-metallic tubes.7

Figure 34-7. Strategies for preventing repeat failures by fireside corrosion in super-
heater/reheater tubes of oil-fired units.
Among the coating methods that
have been tried for fireside corrosion
resistance are chromizing and alu-
minizing. Flame- or plasma spray-
ing, with and without subsequent
heat treatment, have also seen sig-
nificant development work. The for-
mer CEGB has tried a number of
coatings for use in corrosion and
erosion resistance.5,6 The primary
use of coatings has been for the
prevention of fireside corrosion in
waterwalls of coal-fired units (see
the description of results in Chapter
18, Volume 2). There is less field
experience for coatings on super-
heater/reheater tubing in either coal-
or oil-fired units. Currently, either
replacement in-kind or with a mater-
ial of high corrosion resistance,
depending on the wastage rate
which has been experienced, are
preferred options to the application
of coatings.
Replacement with same mater-
ial, same thickness (option 4)
If the corrosion rate is only slightly
higher than that required to reach
the desired life as calculated from
the remaining life assessment, tube
replacement can be made in-kind.
Change to a more resistant
material, ÒmonolithicÓ (option
5)
An upgraded material can be used
where unit operation is at high tem-
peratures and fireside corrosion
remains a problem despite the
attempts at other fixes. The material
chosen will depend on what is cur-
rently being used and what the
desired resistance is to be. The cor-
rosion rate of 300 series austenitic
stainless steels, because of their
nickel content, is greater than for fer-
ritic stainless steels. Upgrading to
an alloy such as 12 Cr Mo V may
Tube bending characteristics of co-
extruded material have been found
to be identical to monolithic materi-
als.7 Weld procedures have gener-
ally matched weld metals to the base
metal to maintain property levels.
Conventional welding techniques
and normal quality control have been
found sufficient to ensure good weld
quality. The CEGB experience base
was over 70,000 welds through 1984
(mostly in coal-fired units) without
weld failure. No preheat or post-weld
heat treatments have been required.
A discussion about welding co-
extruded tubing can be found in
Chapter 11, Volume 1.
Monitoring of fuel changes
(option 7)
Monitoring for increases in vanadium
and sodium content whenever fuel
changes are made will highlight a

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-17

potential increase in corrosion rates. Table 34-6
Additives for High-Temperature Corrosion and Fouling from High-Sulfur Oila
Use of Mg-based additives Feed Point Sootblower
(option 8) Boiler Design with Fuel Furnace Injection Feed Point
A number of forms of magnesium
and combinations with other metals Coal converted to oil MgO-oil MgO dispersion Not recommended
have been found to be effective in dispersion (H2O or oil)
reducing fireside corrosion in oil- 2 to 7 microns 2 to 7 microns
fired units, particularly the use of
magnesium hydroxide Mg(OH)2 or Oil dispersion of
magnesia, MgO. The use of magne- MnO or
sium has been found to form a mag- MgO/MnO
nesium vanadate complex (3MgO • 2 to 7 microns
V2O5) which is desirable because of
it’s high melting point of 1071°C
Oil, or oil with As above but less As above but MgO-H2O
(1960°F) as shown in Figure 34-6.
coal potential than 1 micron higher in furnace slurry
The type of additive to be used will size reactive forms to avoid water
depend on fuel chemistry and boiler wall coating
design. The most effective product
forms have been either a slurry or a
Oil-soluble MgCl2 solution-
solution. The form will determine the
point of delivery and kind of delivery Mg/Mn emulsion
system. Treatment rates will depend
on a number of factors including: MgCl2 solution-
particle size and distribution, reac- emulsion
tivity of chosen additive, design of
boiler, mode of application, and Notes:
some trial and error.8 a. High sulfur (2-3.5%) and vanadium (300-700) ppm, low sodium/vanadium ratio.
b. Additives listed in preferred order of recommendation.
Choice and proper application of
additives is a complicated sub- Source: J.E. Radway and M.S. Hoffman8
ject.8,9 The most successful or opti-
mized additives for a number of fuel
oils are shown in Tables 34-6 and
34-7 for high vanadium, high sulfur the addition rate and its efficacy larly in coal-fired units when reduc-
and for a medium vanadium, low through the use of probes. ing the main steam temperature
sulfur oil respectively.8 These are from 565 to 538°C (1050 to 1000°F).
meant to be starting points as the Limit tube temperatures There are several problems with this
optimum additive choice for each (option 9) approach. The primary drawback is
boiler and type of operation will dif- that it is not efficient; there is a
fer. It is important to adjust for con- Given the strong correlation between
severe heat rate penalty. Predicting
ditions different from those pre- tube metal temperature and the
exactly what temperature is required
sented in these tables. potential for corrosion damage, sev-
may also be difficult.
eral strategies can be implemented
Deposition probes which can pro- that directly address root causes of For these reasons, it has been rec-
vide useful short-term information on overtemperature in the tubes; they ommended that if limits on main
the quantity and corrosiveness of are discussed separately below. steam temperature were to be used
depositing ashes should be used to as a control strategy that an empiri-
optimize the use of additives.10 cal approach be used to set steam
Limit steam temperature temperature by monitoring tube
The disadvantages of additives may (option 10)
include the relatively high continu-
ous operating cost and a substantial A specific strategy to minimize tube
increase in ash volume leading to metal temperatures is by limiting
additional downtime for cleaning.2 main steam temperatures; this has
Increased abrasive wear of oil gun historically been a primary strategy
components can also occur. Thus, for the control of superheater/
there is a need to continually check reheater fireside corrosion, particu-

34-18 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units

Table 34-7 (option 12)
Additives for High-Temperature Corrosion and Fouling for Intermediate-Sulfur Oila If excessive temperature in the
Feed Point Sootblower superheater/reheater tubes is a con-
tributing factor to the corrosion
Boiler Design with Fuel Furnace Injection Feed Point
process, and if that condition has
Coal converted Dispersion of Dispersion of Not recommended been exacerbated by the presence
to oil Mg/Al; Mg/Al Mn; Mg/Si Mg/Al of increasing oxide scale thickness, a
solution involving chemical cleaning
2 to 7 microns 2 to 7 microns
may be in order. An overview of
Oil, or oil with As above but less As above but MgO-H2O slurry chemical cleaning in SH/RH circuits
coal potential than 1 micron and higher in furnace can be found in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
more reactive forms to avoid water
wall coating of Correct misalignment of tubing
MgO/Al2O3 (option 13)
If misalignment of tubes has created
Oil-soluble Mg/Mn localized fireside corrosion, this prob-
lem should be corrected by realign-
MgCl2 solution-emulsion ing the affected tubes. This will
decrease the number of tubes that
Gas-oil Combustion catalyst High reactivity Not usually available are directly exposed to the gas flow.
MgO dispersion
Change frequency and check
Soluble additive Soluble additive effectiveness of sootblowing
(water or oil) (water or oil) (option 14)
This can be an important action
High-reactivity because it can stop the formation of
MgO dispersion excessive deposits which result in
laning or channeling in adjacent
Notes: areas.
a. 1 to 2% sulfur, 150 ppm vanadium, sodium/vanadium greater than 0.15.
b. Additives listed in preferred order of recommendation.
Lowering excess air
Source: J.E. Radway and M.S. Hoffman8 (option 15)
Operating with as low an excess air
as possible can help keep con-
wastage rates and ensuring that the designed primarily as a means of stituent ash melting points high and
rate was less than 25 nm/hr (~ 9 extending the creep life of tubes therefore limit deposition of the liq-
mils/yr).11 subject to overheating; however, if uid phase and the resulting rapid
overheating of selected tubes is at corrosion. The optimal level of
the root cause of fireside corrosion, excess oxygen has been found to
Redistribute steam flow the technique can selectively lower range from around 0.8%10 to 1%2
(option 11) tube metal temperatures and thus depending on local CO generation.
A technique of steam flow redistribu- decrease fireside corrosion. The There may be problems holding to
tion in superheaters has seen recent method is discussed in more detail these levels in older units because
significant development.12 Redistri- in Chapter 32 on long-term over- of leakage or incomplete combus-
bution of steam flow can serve to heating/creep of SH/RH tubes. tion leading to unburnt fuel as soot
equalize the temperatures across to the stack. Care must also be
the superheater. The method was taken to avoid lowering the excess
Chemical cleaning to remove
steamside oxide scale

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-19

7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.
air too much as carburization of the SH/RH tubing could
result.15
8. References
1Laxton,
J.W., D.B. Meadowcroft, F. Clarke, T. Flatley,
C.W. King, and C.W. Morris, The Control of Fireside
Corrosion in Power Station Boilers, Third edition, Central
Electricity Generating Board, 1987.
2Wilson,
J.R., “Understanding and Preventing Fuel Ash
Corrosion,” Corrosion 76, Paper No. 12, held March 22-
26, 1976, Houston Texas, 1976.
3Paterson,
S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.
4Pantony,
D.A. and K.I. Vasu, J. Inorg. Nucl. Chem., Vol.
30, 1986, p. 423.
5Morgan-Warren, E.J., “Thermal Spraying for Boiler Tube
Protection”, Welding and Metal Fabrication, Jan/Feb,
1992, pp. 25-31.
6Bennett, A.P. and M.B.C. Quigley, “The Spraying of
Boiler Tubing in Power Plants”, Welding and Metal
Fabrication, November, 1990, pp. 485-489.
7Flatley,T. and T. Thursfield, “Review of Corrosion
Resistant Co-Extruded Tube Development for Power
Boilers”, 1984 ASM Conference on Coatings and
Bimetallics for Energy Systems and Chemical Process
Environments, held at Hilton Head, South Carolina,
November 12-14, 1984.
8Radway, J.E. and M.S. Hoffman, Operations Guide for
34-20 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units
the Use of Combustion Additives in Utility Boilers,
Research Project 1839-3, Final Report CS-5527, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December,
1987.
9Krause, H.H., Action of Fuel Oil Additives Containing
Magnesium and Manganese on Superheater and
Reheater Surfaces, Final Report CS-3281, Research
Project 1839-1, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, Ca, December, 1983.
10Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec,
November, 1983.
11Williams, D.N., H.R. Hazard, H.H. Krause, L.J. Flanigan,
R.E. Barrett, and I.G. Wright, Fireside Corrosion and Fly
Ash Erosion in Boilers, Research Project 2711-1, Final
Report CS-5071, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, February, 1987.
12Hara, K., C. Lee, R. Moser, T. Rettig, and K. Clark,
Improved Superheater Component Longevity by Steam
Flow Redistribution, Research Project 1893-13, Final
Report TR-101697, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, December, 1992.
13Sotter, J.G., J.A. Arnot, and T.M. Brown, Guidelines for
Fireside Testing in Coal-Fired Power Plants, Research
Project 1891-3, Final Report CS-5552, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, March, 1988.
14Wong-Moreno, A., Y. Mujica Martinez, and L. Martinez,
“High Temperature Corrosion Enhanced Residual Fuel Oil
Ash Deposits”, Corrosion 94, Paper 185.
15PrivateCommunication from D. Lopez Lopez (IIE,
Mexico) to R. B. Dooley, May, 1995.
16Lopez Lopez, D., A. Wong Moreno, and L. Martinez,
“Unusual Superheater Tube Wastage Associated with
Carburization”, Materials Performance, Volume 33, No.
12, December, 1994, pp. 45-48.
ACTIONS for SH/RH Fireside Corrosion
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of
SH/RH fireside corrosion dam-
age begin here. The goal of
these actions to see if further
investigation of fireside corrosion
is warranted or whether another
BTF mechanism should be
investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a SH/RH
BTF has occurred and fireside
corrosion is the likely mecha-
nism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by fireside corrosion.
Action 1a: If a SH/RH BTF has
occurred and fireside corrosion is
the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of SH/RH fireside corrosion:
➠Review Figure 34-4 for typical
boiler regions.
➠Review main text, Section 1.2
for description of susceptible
locations
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Multilayered fireside scale and
ash (see Figure 34-1).
• General wastage, undulating
and uneven surface appear-
ance.
• Tube surface with grooving con-
sistent with “alligator hide”
appearance (see Figures 33-3
and 33-4, Chapter 33).
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-21
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is fireside
corrosion.
A SH/RH tube failure has
occurred which the BTF team
has tentatively identified as
being fireside corrosion damage
(Action 1a). Action 2 should
clearly identify fireside corrosion
as the primary mechanism or
point to another cause. The pri-
mary identifier will be the pres-
ence of low melting point com-
ponents in external ash. Sample
removal, metallographic analysis
and deposits analysis will be
used to make this determination.
A primary objective is to make
sure that the failure that has
been experienced is not primar-
ily long-term overheating/creep;
See Chapter 32 and Table 34-2
for distinctions.
➠ Characterize the extent of dam-
age. Is there significant wall thin-
ning across a number of tubes
on the fireside?
➠ Plot wall thinning against mea-
surements of steamside oxide.
Is the ratio of wall thinning loss
to steamside oxide buildup
greater than three?
➠ Analyze deposits. Does metallo-
graphic and melting point analy-
sis of deposits detect the pres-
ence of low melting point con-
stituents such as vanadium com-
plexes and/or vanadium-sodium
complexes (for high V oils) or
sodium sulfates and derivatives
(for low V oils)? Such deposits
are indicative of the most com-
mon mode of fireside corrosion
in oil-fired units.
If damage is localized, it may be
flyash erosion (Chapter 14, Volume
2); however, continue through flow
chart, particularly deposit analysis.
Mechanism more likely to be long-
term overheating/creep (Chapter
32); review that mechanism,
review analysis of deposits to
ensure that there is no evidence of
low melting point ash components
which would be indicative of fire-
side corrosion.
Mechanism is probably not fireside
corrosion. Review other fireside
failure mechanisms, particularly
long-term overheating/creep.

➠ Evaluate microstructure. If tubing Mechanism is probably not fireside

is an austenitic stainless steel, is corrosion. Review other fireside
there evidence of carburization failure mechanisms, particularly
and/or a sulfidation mechanism? flyash erosion (Chapter 14,
Volume 2).

Probable mechanism is fireside

corrosion.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

Action 1b: If a precursor has occurred in the unit that could lead to
future BTF by fireside corrosion.
➠ Determine whether one or more of the following precursors has been found
or is likely to have occurred in the unit:
• Any evidence of molten salts observed or measured.

34-22 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units

Action 3: Determine root cause of the fireside corrosion
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as fireside corrosion
(Action 2) or a precursor has
occurred (Action 1b). The goal of
this Action 3 is for the BTF Team
to review the potential root
causes of fireside corrosion,
identify probable ones, and take
those actions that are needed to
confirm which are operative in
the unit. This step must be taken
so that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
3.1 Potential actions for all root causes
of fireside corrosion.
3.2 Influence of oil composition.
3.3 Influence of overheating of tubes.
3.3.1 Excessive temperatures caused by
steamside oxide buildup.
3.3.2 Excessive temperatures as caused by
operating conditions.
• high temperature laning of gases
• changes in absorption patterns between
furnace and convection sections,
• RH overheating because of rapid startups
• tube misalignments
3.4 Influence of operating factors.
3.4.1 Operation with high levels of excess
oxygen and/or periods of very low excess
oxygen.
3.4.2 Poor sootblowing operations.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Ash and deposit analysis to identify
presence of low melting point constituents,
particularly vanadium/ vanadium-sodium and
sodium sulfate complexes.
➠ (b). NDE measures (typically UT) to identify
wall thinning and steamside oxide scale
buildup.
➠ (c). Monitor oil corrosiveness using corro-
sion or deposition probes.
➠ (d). Analyze ash deposits as in item (a)
above.
➠ (e). NDE of steamside oxide thicknesses.
➠ (f). Selective tube sampling and metallurgi-
cal analysis to confirm steamside oxide and
wall thickness.
➠ (g). Monitoring of thermocouples installed
across the SH/RH outlet legs in vestibule to
identify hottest platens across the boiler.
➠ (h). For high temperature laning: monitor
temperatures as in (g) above and consider the
use of the cold air velocity test (CAVT). Details
of the latter can be found in Chapter 14,
Volume 2 on flyash erosion.
➠ (i). For reheater overtemperature during
start sequences: check the startup probe and
limit temperatures to 538°C (1000° F) prior to
RH flow.
➠ (j). Visual inspection can be used to detect
tube misalignments.
➠ (k.) Check operating logs for typical excess
oxygen levels.
➠ (l). Check sootblowing frequency, effective-
ness, and superheat level of blowing medium.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-23
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Evaluation will be
based on detecting wall thinning.
Wastage rates in excess of 25
nm/hr (~ 9 mils/yr) are of
concern.
➠ Identify all locations to be examined. Refer to Section
1.2 of main text and Figure 34-4 for typical locations.
Damage may be widespread and missed locations are
sites for future failures.
➠ Perform UT survey to measure extent of damage via
wall thinning and steamside oxide thickness. A review
of UT methods is provided in Chapter 9, Volume 1.

➠ Perform tube sampling to measure wall thinning and

steamside oxide buildup and to determine the degree
of damage.

➠ Use results interactively with Action 3.

➠ Go to Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate Solutions

and Actions. Begin remaining life assessment.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

The most important actions for
the BTF team are to (i) initiate a
remaining life assessment based
on the wastage rate and extent
of steamside oxide as derived
from the NDE survey, (ii) choose
a repair strategy based on
remaining life assessment, and
(iii) coordinate a long-term strat-
egy from the options outlined in
Figure 34-7.
It is important that proper precau-
tions be taken prior to repairs,
inspections, or whenever move-
ments in an oil-fired boiler are
contemplated because of the tox-
icity of vanadium and derivative
compounds, and the health risk
thus posed.
• Any evidence of wall loss
observed or measured.
• Any evidence of “alligator hide”
observed or measured.
• Change to a more aggressive
oil.
• Evidence that tubes may be
overheating such as from
thermocouple readings or
excessive steamside scale
build-up.
• Any periods of high emission of
partially burnt particles.
➠ Determine whether operation has
occurred with high levels of
excess oxygen.
➠ These precursors can signal the
potential for SH/RH tube failures
by a fireside corrosion mecha-
nism. If one or more has
occurred, go to Action 3 which
reviews root causes and outlines
the steps to confirm the influence
➠ Consider the use of Mg-based
additives.
➠ Consider operation at low levels
of excess oxygen.
➠ Chemically clean, as needed to
remove excessive steamside
deposits.
➠ Adjust fireside conditions, as
needed.
References to other sources of
detailed information:
• Main text (this chapter) and Table
34-5 provide additional detail on
repairs, immediate solutions and
actions and relate them to under-
lying root causes.
• Guidance on additive use.8
• Guidance on chemical cleaning
can be found in Chapter 4,
Volume 1.
• Guidance on fireside testing.13

34-24 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will include
the analysis of remaining life and
an economic evaluation to
ensure that the optimal strategy
has been chosen from those
shown in Figure 34-7 and
described in the main text.
Primary options will be the use
of Mg-based additives and
operation at low levels of excess
oxygen.
Major Root Cause Influences
Potential actions for all root causes of fireside
corrosion.
Influence of oil composition.
Influence of overheating of tubes.
Excessive temperatures caused by steamside
oxide buildup.
Excessive temperatures as caused by operating
conditions.
• high temperature laning of gases
• changes in absorption patterns between
furnace and convection sections,
• RH overheating because of rapid startups
• tube misalignments
Influence of operating factors.
Operation with high levels of excess oxygen
and/or periods of very low excess oxygen.
Poor sootblowing operations.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Perform remaining life assessment.
➠ Continual check on the use of Mg-based
additives.
➠ Optimization of excess oxygen levels.
➠ Set up long-term monitoring and re-evalua-
tion program.
➠ Evaluate full range of available options
using roadmap in Figure 34-7.
➠ As above with emphasis on additives.
➠ Perform remaining life assessment.
➠ Consider program of periodic chemical
cleaning. See Chapter 4, Volume 1. See also
options for long-term overheating of tubes
(Chapter 32).
➠ Set up long-term monitoring and re-evalua-
tion program.
➠ Evaluate full range of available options
using Figure 34-7.
➠ Evaluate full range of available options
using Figure 34-7.
➠ Perform remaining life assessment. See
discussion of methods in Chapter 8, Volume 1.
➠ Set up long-term monitoring and
re-evaluation program.
➠ Evaluate full range of available options
using Figure 34-7.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 34-25
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of fire-
side corrosion in the SH/RH
tubes, or by its precursors.
34-26 SH/RH Fireside Corrosion/Oil-Fired Units
Superheater/ Alert for Other Cycle ➠ Actions Indicated
Reheater Components
Fireside Corrosion
Aspect
Use of additives. • Mg-based additives can coat the ➠ Monitor unit for signs of detri-
waterwalls of the furnace and cause mental effects of additives.
a reflection of heat into the convec-
tive passes. This could lead in turn
to higher temperatures for SH
and/or RH tubes and an increase in
boiler tube failures by long-term
overheating (see Chapter 32).
• Additives can also cause
increased erosion of burner compo-
nents and additive transport lines.
Tube overheating • Potential for additional tube fail- ➠ Chemical clean unit if neces-
because of excessive ures by long-term overheating sary. See guidance in Chapter 4,
steamside oxide. mechanism. Volume 1.
• Exfoliation of scale with subse-
quent carryover into turbine could
lead to solid particle erosion.
• Exfoliation could lead to tube
blockage and additional SH/RH fail-
ures by a short-term overheating
mechanism (Chapter 36).
Total redesign of the • Would change absorption pat- ➠ Check temperatures in the
superheater or reheater. terns through the SH/RH sections redesigned and other areas.
and may increase temperatures in
other sections.
Chapter 35 • Volume 3
Dissimilar Metal
Weld Failures
Introduction
Dissimilar metal welds (DMWs) are
used to join ferritic and austentitic
steel tubing in the final outlet sec-
tions of superheaters (SH) and
reheaters (RH). Prior to the mid-
1980s numerous outages occurred
as a result of failures via low ductility
cracking in the low alloy ferritic steel
immediately adjacent to the weld
fusion line. The problem was wide-
spread; it was estimated at the time
that 50% of all boilers in North
America with austenitic tubing had
DMW failures.1 There was wide vari-
ability in the times to first failure
ranging from as few as 30,000 hours
to over 150,000 hours.
A comprehensive effort over the last
ten years has characterized the
problem of DMW failures, provided
a set of analytical tools for analysis,
and provided appropriate solutions
to the problem.2-4
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures:
Identification Keys
1. DMW failures are found adja-
cent to the welds in the ferritic
alloy in a circumferential orien-
tation, and have thick-edged,
low ductility features.
2. The manner in which failure
develops will depend on
whether the weld metal used
was austenitic stainless steel
or nickel-based; damage
accumulation in either case
will be by creep with fatigue
assistance.
1.1 Features of failure
Dissimilar metal welds (DMWs) are
found in the superheater/reheater
where austenitic materials, generally
Types 304H, 321H or 347H, are
joined with ferritic materials, gener-
ally T22, T5, or T9. There are three
types of DMWs. The most common
weld is made with austenitic stain-
less steel filler (E309). A second
type of weld is made with a nickel-
based filler such as Inconel 132,
Inconel 182, Inconel 82, or Inco
Weld A; Inconel and Inco are trade-
marks of the International Nickel
Company. The third type is a pres-
sure induction weld; welds made by
this process will have features simi-
lar to fusion welds made with stain-
less steel filler metals.
Table 35-1 provides some key
means to distinguish between the
major types of DMW failures.
Table 35-2 summarizes macroscopic
features that will point to dissimilar
metal weld failures in contrast to
other SH/RH tubing failure mecha-
nisms. Failure is generally seen
macroscopically as a fusion line
crack occurring at or near the heat-
affected zone on the low-alloy side
of the joint (Figure 35-1). Cracking is
typically oriented circumferentially
around the tube. For induction
welds, the fracture may be flat and
featureless; for fusion welds, the
fracture will tend to follow the con-
tours of the fusion line. Final failures
occur with low-ductility and manifest
thick-edged fracture surfaces.

Table 35-1
Distinguishing Features (Microscopic) of Failures in Fe-Based Stainless Steel and
Ni-Base Filler Metals in DMWs

Characteristic Iron-Base Stainless Steel Nickel-Base Filler Metal

Filler Metal

Location of Cracking within Along prior austenite grain Immediately along weld interface
HAZ (generally) boundaries approximately 1-2 associated with carbide precipi-
grain diameters from fusion line. tation and creep cavitation.

Carbide Morphology Generally Type II. Predominantly Type I.

(See Section 2.2 starting
on page 35-6)

Nature of Carbide Diffuse array of smaller carbides. Planar array of globular carbides.

Do carbides encourage inter- No. Yes.

facial growth

Creep voids associated with No. Yes.

this carbide type?

Carbon activity gradient of Higher than for Ni-base fillers. Lower than Fe-base fillers.
filler with ferritic material?

Thermal expansion with fer- Worse than Ni-base fillers. Better than Fe-base fillers.
ritic materials

Time to final failure About 1/3 to 1/5 of times for Ni- Three to five times longer than
base filler metal welds. Fe-base filler metals.

Note: Induction welded DMW will have similar properties to those listed for Fe-based fusion welds above.

35-2 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures

Table 35-2
Macro-Features Common to all Dissimilar
Metal Weld Failures
Macro-features
• Thick-edged fractures with signs of
low-ductility.
• Circumferential cracking in the ferritic
material.
• Located near a dissimilar metal weld.
• Formation of an "oxide notch" on the
outside surface of the tube in the ferritic
material.
• Flat, featureless fracture surface (typical of
induction weld).
• Cracking following fusion line (typical of
fusion welds).
• Failures may be associated with bent tubes
or other signs of overstressing.
Damage accumulates primarily by
creep, possibly with some contribu-
tion by fatigue. Three microscopi-
cally distinct manifestations of the
basic creep mechanism in DMWs
have been identified; they can occur
singly or in combination, as follows:
• Development of cracks along
prior-austenite grain boundaries in
the low-alloy steel heat-affected
zone (HAZ) one to two grains
away from the fusion line. This is
commonly observed in welds
made with stainless steel filler
metal and occasionally in nickel-
based filler metal DMWs. Figure
35-2 shows a typical cross-sec-
tion.
• Development of cracking immedi-
ately at the weld interface on the
low-alloy side of the weld, along a
planar array of globular carbides.
This is commonly observed for
Figure 35-1. Typical appearance of a cracked dissimilar metal weld.
DMWs made with nickel-base
filler metal. Figure 35-3 shows this
type of cracking.
• Propagation of an oxide notch
from the external surface. Oxide
notches are almost universally
seen in DMWs pulled from
service; however, in many cases
the notches do not propagate.
Those that do are most commonly
seen in thin-walled tubing and
can be in either stainless steel or
nickel-base filler metals.
Failures in DMWs are generally
accompanied by, but not caused by,
carburization of the weld metal as
indicated by increased microhard-
ness. The degree of decarburization
on the ferritic side of the weld can
be seen in Figure 35-4 where the
dramatic increase in hardness at the
weld interface is also shown in
DMWs removed from service after
24 years.
Early stages of creep damage, such
as microvoid formation, particularly
in nickel-base filler metals, may not
be detectable by optical microscopy,
but can be detected by scanning
electron microscopy (SEM) tech-
niques.
DMW failures may have microstruc-
tures that show signs of overheating.
This can be detected by an analysis
of the oxide scale thickness on the
ferritic side of the joint, somewhat
removed from the DMW itself. A
detailed discussion of the use of
oxide scale measurements for analy-
sis of tube temperatures can be
found in Chapter 8, Volume 1.
1.2 Locations of failure
DMWs are located in the super-
heater, reheater, vestibule and pent-
house regions of the boiler in transi-
tions between austenitic and ferritic
materials.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-3
Figure 35-2. Typical cross-sectional appearance of a dissimilar metal weld failure after
long-time boiler service. This example is a DMW with stainless steel filler metal. Note
the oxide notch on the OD and the intergranular cracking adjacent to the weld line.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et.al.7. Inset shows further detail of the intergranular creep
cracking adjacent to a pressure weld. Note the cracking is oriented normal to the hoop
stress. Source: D. French.

35-4 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures

Figure 35-3. Detailed metallographic appearance of cracking along
the weld fusion line associated with a line of carbides. This is typically
observed in dissimilar metal welds made with nickel-base filler metals.

Distance from Interface (mm)

2.03 1.52 1.02 0.51 0 0.51 1.02 1.52 2.03

520 Weld Interface

500 Weld metal T22
▲
480 ▲▲
460 ▲ Unit A
▲
440 ▲ Unit B
420
400
380 ▲
360
Hardness (DPH)

340
320
▲
300
▲ ▲
280 ▲
▲
260 ▲ ▲
▲
240 ▲
220
200
180 ▲
▲
160 ▲
▲▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
▲▲ ▲
140
120
100
0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Distance from Interface (in.)

Figure 35-4. Microhardness profiles of dissimilar metal welds after 24 years of service
showing an increase in hardness near the weld interface. Source: K.H. Holko, et al.2d

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-5

2. Mechanism of Failure
Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures:
Mechanism
1. Failures in DMWs are driven
by service conditions arising
from higher than expected
service temperatures and
three types of stresses: (i) pri-
mary system stresses such as
caused by pressure and dead
weight, (ii) secondary system
stresses such as caused by
the constraint of thermal
expansion, and (iii) intrinsic or
self-stress caused by differen-
tial thermal expansion of the
joined materials.
2. In fusion welds with austenitic
weld metals and in induction
pressure welds, creep dam-
age accumulates at prior
austenite grain boundaries.
3. In the dominant mechanism for
fusion welds with nickel-base
weld metal, carbon diffusion
during service leads to a pla-
nar array of globular carbides
located at the weld interface
on the ferritic side of the joint.
Failure occurs when both a
sufficient density of carbides
has occurred and creep void
growth has initiated.
35-6 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
2.1 Introduction
Superheater/reheater design was
discussed in Chapter 2, Volume 1.
Design temperatures can range from
400 to 600°C (~ 750 to 1110°F)
depending upon location.
Increasingly higher tube metal tem-
peratures demand either increased
wall thicknesses and/or a material
change. Carbon steel is used in the
primary stages, whereas low alloy
steels are used for most of the
SH/RH, except for the finishing
stages where austenitic stainless
tubes are normally used.
The DMWs of concern are those that
join the ferritic materials to the
austenitic stainless steel. As noted
above, either fusion or induction
welding processes are used. Filler
metals are either nickel-based or
iron-based austenitic stainless
steels. Welds made by an induction
process have properties that are
similar to those for fusion welding
with austenitic filler metals thus the
comments made throughout the bal-
ance of this section pertaining to
austenitic filler metals will also apply
to induction welds.
Differences in thermal expansion
and creep behavior of the joined
materials, and local metallurgical
changes at the low-alloy steel to
weld metal interface make the DMW
more susceptible to failure than like-
material welds.
2.2 Microstructural changes in
DMWs during service
A brief review of microstructural
changes in DMWs is presented
here; additional detail can be found
in references 3-6.
The degradation of DMWs after long-
term service includes a number of
observable features, including (i)
oxidation of the ferritic steel, includ-
ing oxide notching, (ii) softening of
the ferritic steel HAZ, (iii) migration of
carbon from the HAZ into the weld
metal, (iv) precipitation and growth of
carbides at the weld interface and
the HAZ prior-austenite grain bound-
aries, and (v) the formation and
growth of creep voids. These
processes are strongly influenced by
stress, temperature and time. The
times to failure for field DMWs are
strongly influenced by service condi-
tions.
The two modes of damage accumu-
lation in DMWs were introduced
above: austenite grain boundary
cracking (dominant in iron-based
filler-metal welds), and weld inter-
face cracking (dominant in nickel-
base filler-metal welds).
There is a strong correlation between
creep cracking and carbide mor-
phology. Two types of carbide mor-
phologies form in DMWs in service.
Type I is a planar array of globular
carbide. This type is prevalent in
nickel-base filler metal welds, occur-
ring along about 80% of the weld
interface in a typical weld, and
encourages interfacial cracking.
Type II, is a diffuse array of generally
smaller carbides found in a wider
band. It is predominant in stainless-
steel filler metal welds and also
occurs in about 20% of the nickel-
base DMWs. Creep voids are only
associated with Type I precipitates.3
Type II carbides inhibit interfacial
growth, to the point where a crack
developing in Type I material will stop
or transfer to grain boundaries when
Type II material is encountered.
Decarburization occurs as a result of
the migration of carbon from low-
alloy steel to the weld metal. This
gross decarburization however, is
not thought to be a major factor in
DMW failures.
The ductility of low-alloy steels in the
presence of a triaxial stress field is
low. There is strong indication that
the development of a triaxial stress
state occurs within the weld when
an axial stress, such as caused by
bending, is imposed on the radial
and circumferential stresses caused
by differential thermal expansion.
Oxide notches that form at the out-
side surface in both nickel-base and
iron-base welds were previously
thought to initiate DMW failures.
However, it is now established that
damage can initiate at the outside
surface, mid-wall or inside surface
and that oxide notching is not a root
cause of the problem.
2.3 Influence of welding
variables
Various filler metals and weld con-
figurations/geometries can have sig-
nificant effects on the life of a DMW.
Table 35-3 provides the key results
of a comparison of different filler
types.2h
Other factors such as post weld heat
treatments, use of backing rings,
and presence of pre-existing weld
defects can, in some cases, influ-
ence performance, but are generally
not factors in the development of
DMW failures per se. Sources for the
design of, and procedures for,
improved dissimilar metal welds and
filler metals have been compiled.2h
A summary of those findings is pro-
vided here.
Under service conditions, nickel
based filler materials have longer
lives than stainless steel filler metals
by up to five times because2h (i) their
thermal expansion better matches
ferritic materials than stainless steel
fillers, and (ii) the carbon activity gra-
dients between ferritic steel and
nickel base weld metal are lower
than for stainless steel fillers, which
limits the carbon migration from the
ferritic material. Because the carbon
activity is significantly lower, the time
for a critical density of carbides to
form along the weld line is much
longer than the time for creep dam-
age to form in the ferritic material
adjacent to the stainless steel weld
metal, leading to longer times to fail-
ure in the nickel-base filler metals.
Service experience also indicates
that repairs made with nickel-base
fillers for welds originally made with
stainless steel fillers show consider-
able life improvement, even if part of
the original weld is left in place.

Table 35-3
Summary of Performance Characteristics of DMW Made With Various Filler Metals2h
Filler Expansion Tendency to Needs Thermal DMW Performance Conclusions Relative to
Difference with Form Type 1 PWHT? Stability Observations DMW Use
21/4 Cr - 1Mo Interfacial
(RT-1000°F) Carbides

Commercial alloys

E309 27% greater None No Fairly stable. Gives poorest performance. Use only in least arduous
applications.

Inco 92 5% greater Slight No Marked age Shows little tendency to Use limited by age hardening.
hardening. interfacial failure.

Inco 132 7% greater Marked No Fairly stable. Significantly better than E309 Better than E309 in most
(factor of 3-5X) but shows cases, widely used.
interfacial failure.

Inco 182 10% greater Marked No Considerable Significantly better than E309 Better than E309 in most
age hardening. (factor of 3-5X) but shows cases, widely used.
interfacial failure.

Inco 82 3% greater Marked No Fairly stable. Significantly better than E309 Better than E309 in most
(factor of 3-5X) but shows cases, widely used where TIG
interfacial failure. welding employed.

Inco A 3% greater Marked No Fairly stable. Significantly better than E309, Some indications that this is
last longer than most nickel the best of the commercial
welds but shows interfacial nickel fillers.
failure tendency.

Experimental Alloy

HFS6 7% greater None No Excellent. No tendency to interfacial: Microfissuring tendency needs

(See ref 2h) shows best life control before widespread use
possible.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-7

One potential drawback to the
nickel-base filler metals was noted
above. Once Type I carbides form at Standard S/S Scatter
the fusion line, the rupture strength 1 band
(E309)
of the weldment is equal to or less
than that for the stainless steel filler INCO 132 4.6 Life ratio relative
metal. Under usual service condi- to standard S/S
tions, the time required for such car- INCO A 5.1
bides to form is long relative to the
time for damage to accumulate in INCO 82(a) 5.1
the stainless steel filler. However, if
the weld is exposed to high temper- INCO 82(b) 5.6
atures, for example, above 595°C
(~ 1100°F), even for relatively short INCO 182 5.9
times, then the carbides can form.
INCO 132 +
The relative life of a number of stan- wide cap 7.7
dard nickel-base fillers compared to
a standard E309 stainless steel weld
in accelerated “discriminatory” tests (a) High heat input
(b) Low heat input
is shown in Figure 35-5.
Pressure welds have similar or
shorter lifetimes than conventionally Figure 35-5. Relative performance of dissimilar metal welds with different commercial
welded stainless steel (E309). filler metals and geometries under accelerated discriminatory testing.
Source: D.I. Roberts, et al.2h
Weld configuration was also found
to be a significant variable.
Evaluation of four configurations,
shown in Figure 35-6, indicated that 0°
cracking in service welds is more Filler
prevalent in regions of the interface
normal to the tube axis than those SS T22 0° weld angle
parallel to the tube axis. Under labo-
ratory conditions, the longest lives in CL
accelerated tests have been
obtained with DMWs having inter- 37-1/2°
faces at the greatest weld angles
(Figure 35-6). Weld interface angle Filler
is therefore considered to be an 37-1/2° weld angle
SS T22 (standard)
important parameter in DMW perfor-
mance and repair.
CL

2.4 Influence of stress and

temperature 60°
The most important factors govern- Filler
ing the life of DMWs are service SS T22 60° weld angle
conditions. Stresses of three general
types contribute to premature failure
in DMWs: (i) primary system CL
stresses such as caused by pres-
sure and dead weight loads, (ii) Wide
secondary system stresses such as cap
Filler
caused by the constraint of thermal
SS T22 Wide weld cap
expansion, and (iii) intrinsic or
self-stress caused by the differential
thermal expansion of the joined CL
materials.

Figure 35-6. Possible weld geometries for dissimilar metal welds.

Source: D.I. Roberts, et al.2h

35-8 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures

Note that the last of these, differen-
tial thermal expansion of the joint Weld Performance Factor
materials is not sufficient, by itself, 2.2
to cause failures during normal unit Austenitic DMWs
operation. For failures to occur, 2.1
additional, and usually abnormal,
loading or temperatures must gener- 2.0
ally exist at the DMW. The field
experience shows many examples 1.9
of the effect of local secondary sys-
tem stresses, such as constrained 1.8
thermal expansion, leading to DMW Inconel DMWs 1075°F 1050°F 1025°F
failures. Cases have been observed 1.7
of two sets of DMWs, one with
noticeable constraint of thermal 1.6
expansion which led to early tube
failures, and a nearby tube without 1.5
such constraint but identical in all
other ways, which had not failed. 1.4 1075°F 1050°F 1025°F
A means to demonstrate the effects 1.3
of stress level, service temperature, 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
and composition of weld metal is
Axial Stress, ksi
shown in Figure 35-7. That figure
shows the calculation of a weld per-
formance factor (WPF) which is the
Figure 35-7. Estimated weld performance factors for dissimilar metal weld joints made
ratio of the rupture stress of T22 fer-
using austenitic and nickel-based filler metals. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.7
ritic material remote from the weld-
ment to the rupture stress of the
DMW. The larger the value of WPF
the lower the performance of that
weldment compared to the ferritic
base material.
All of these influences have been
combined into several computer
codes, such as PODIS and DMW
LIFE, which are available to predict
the life of DMWs. Additional informa-
tion about such procedures are
included in the section on long-term
actions below.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-9

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures:
Root Causes
1. Improper location or design of
the original weld that does not
account for actual service
conditions of temperature and
stress are the main causes of
DMW failures.
2. Improper initial fabrication,
particularly in pressure induc-
tion joints, or changes in
operation that result in higher
stresses, higher temperature
or increased cycling, are also
contributors to DMW failures.
35-10 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
3.1 Introduction
Table 35-4 summarizes the potential
root causes, actions to confirm, and
corrective actions. One of the pri-
mary questions to be answered by
the boiler tube failure team is
whether the DMW BTF is driven pri-
marily by excessive stresses or
excessive temperatures.
3.2 Excessive tube stresses
such as caused by improper
initial design of tube supports,
or supports that have stopped
functioning in the designed
manner
One cause of DMW failures is if the
initial design did not anticipate and
properly accommodate loads on
tubes. For example, excessive
restraint on tubes, such as caused
by locating the DMW near to the
roof, furnace wall, or other fixed
points, can be a source of high
stresses. Improper tube supports
can also cause excessive weld
stresses. Support design faults can
include (i) weld placement in the
middle of a long span, and (ii)
design that does not allow ade-
quately for thermal expansion of the
tube. In addition to poor design of
supports, restraint on tubes can
result during operation if there are
support failures or if slag and other
debris accumulates so as to con-
strain tube thermal expansion.
Actions to confirm will include:
(a). Visual examination of unit to
determine whether there are likely
susceptible locations or evidence of
a problem such as bent tubes,
warpage, misalignment of tubes,
missing or broken supports, or other
visual signs of overstressing.
(b). Perform a stress analysis of
suspect locations. One such analy-
sis5 used a piping stress code to
calculate primary loads (pressure
and dead weight) and secondary
loads, such as constrained thermal
expansion. Although this can be
expensive and time-consuming, the
information can be invaluable, and
is a required input for all damage
assessment models.
3.3 Excessive local tube tem-
peratures
Excessive local temperatures will
increase thermally-induced stresses
and will also accelerate damage
accumulation in DMWs. These
causes include (i) variation of tem-
peratures across the SH/RH, (ii) tube
temperatures higher than design val-
ues, (iii) partial tube blockages
resulting in lower steam flows and
subsequently to higher tube metal
temperatures. Tube failures by long-
term overheating/creep can also
occur in the ferritic alloy near to the
transition between material types
(see Chapter 32). A knowledge of
operative temperatures is required
by damage assessment codes.
A number of methods can be used
to estimate temperatures, and thus
determine whether this is a primary
root cause. These include:
(c). Review available thermocouple
data from locations such as outlet
tubes in the penthouse, etc.
(d). Perform an evaluation of the
oxide scale. In addition to address-
ing the temperature needs for the
DMW analysis, this will also provide
a life assessment estimate of the fer-
ritic tubing. Such methods are dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 8,
Volume 1. Oxide thickness, the key
parameter, can be measured non-
destructively by ultrasonic methods
as outlined in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
Table 35-4
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause
Influences
3.2 Excessive tube stresses such as caused by improper initial design or improper tube supports.
• locating the DMW near the
roof, furnace wall or other
fixed points or near to the
header
• weld placement in the middle
of a long span
• inadequate allowance for
thermal expansion
• support failures or slag
accumulation leading to
constraint of thermal
expansion
3.3 Excessive local tube temperatures.
• tube temperatures above
those anticipated in the
design
• variation across the SH/RH
3.4 Changes in unit operation
• to increased unit cycling
• change of fuel causing
increased tube temperatures
• redesign of adjacent SH/RH
that results in higher tube
service temperatures
3.5 Initial fabrication defects.
Actions to Confirm
(a). Visual examination of the
unit to determine whether there are
suspect locations or evidence of a
problem such as bent tubes,
warpage of tubes, misalignment,
missing or broken supports.
(b). Perform a stress analysis of
suspect locations. Piping stress
codes can be used to determine
both primary and secondary
stresses.
(c). Review of available thermo-
couple data for indications of
overheating.
(d). Perform oxide scale thickness
evaluation including ultrasonic
measurement and analysis of
results.
(e). Review operating records with
an eye toward conditions that may
have increased either tube stresses
or temperatures.
(f). Metallographic samples should
be used to evaluate whether initial
weld defects such as incomplete
fusion or lack of penetration are a
contributing cause.
Immediate Actions and
Solutions
• Repair damaged locations
using either a "dutchman"
(preferred) or in-situ weld
repair with nickel-based filler
metal.
• Determine the extent of
damage through (i) visual
examination to detect
adjacent locations with
obvious signs of distress,
(ii) specialized radiography,
(iii) oxide scale measure-
ments and analysis, (iv)
selective sampling, as
required for confirmation.
• As above.
• As above.
• As above.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes
Long-Term Actions and Prevention of
Repeat Failures
• Implement a damage assessment code,
such as PODIS, to optimize a program of
control and prevention of DMW failures.
Actions may include predicting remaining
life, relocating welds, upgrading to higher
grade materials.
• Implement a periodic inspection
program for hangers, supports and spacers,
and a temperature monitoring program.
• Redesign SH/RH to locate DMWs in
areas of lower stress or lower temperature.
• Institute a program to measure and
interpret oxide scale thickness periodically
as a means of understanding tube tempera-
ture trends.
• Apply damage assessment code to
determine whether temperature is the
predominant factor.
• Redesign SH/RH so that the DMW is in
a lower temperature regime.
• Implement a damage assessment code,
such as PODIS, to optimize a program of
control and prevention of DMW failures.
Actions may include predicting remaining
life, relocating welds, upgrading to higher
grade materials.
• Determine what effects changes in
operation will have on DMWs.
• Implement a periodic inspection
program for hangers, supports and spacers,
and a temperature monitoring program.
• Monitor for outbreaks of similar
problems in other locations; a damage
assessment method such as PODIS may
provide guidance about general DMW life,
although it cannot specifically pinpoint
initial fabrication defects.
35-11
3.4 Changes in unit operation
Changes in operation can be at the
root of DMW failures. These might
typically include (i) a change from
base load to cycling of the unit, (ii) a
change of fuel causing increased
tube weld temperatures, and (iii) a
redesign of an adjacent SH/RH that
causes an increase in service tem-
peratures experienced by the tube.
Unit cycling in particular, can be a
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
35-12 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
major contributor to damage accu-
mulation in DMWs. Actions to con-
firm this root cause include:
(e). Review operating records to
determine if it is likely that changes
have caused an increase in primary
or secondary stresses, or the tem-
peratures of suspect tube locations.
Determining the extent of damage is
the first step in an assessment of
remaining life analysis for DMWs;
however, it can be tricky.
Visual inspection should note loca-
tions of obvious failures and general
information such as support loca-
tions and condition, platen distortion
caused by support failure or
slag/ash buildup, repairs or replace-
ments, alterations to the boiler.
The crux of the challenge is deter-
mining the degree of damage within
the DMW itself. Surface techniques
such as dye penetrant that detect
only the formation of an oxide notch
will be inadequate, particularly in
thick-walled tubes. Often such
notches may stop propagating and
final failure will be induced mid-wall.
A technique that can assess the full
extent of damage is therefore
needed. Another complicating factor
is that the damage occurs at the
interface between austentitic and
ferritic material, and therefore it can
be difficult to separate damage from
the interface signal with either ultra-
sonic or eddy current testing.
3.5 Initial fabrication defects
Initial fabrication defects can be a
direct cause of DMW failures, partic-
ularly improperly fabricated pres-
sure welds. To confirm:
(f). Metallographic samples of the
failed tubes should indicate an
incomplete or improper weld, such
as a lack-of-fusion defect.
A specialized radiographic tech-
nique, termed the Union Electric
technique for its source of origin,
can detect well-developed damage
in DMWs made with stainless steel
filler metal.5,8 The basics of the
method are shown in Figures 35-8
and 35-9. Although the method can
detect damage levels down to
about 5% of the interface, film inter-
pretation was found to be difficult
below about 15% damage. Good
correspondence between the
damage predictions by the tech-
nique and actual damage was con-
firmed for over 50 DMWs that had
damage levels ranging from 5 to
90% damage.5
For detecting creep damage with
nickel-base filler metal manifested
as small voids along the interface,
and for small amounts of damage in
all materials, sampling and destruc-
tive examination will be required.
This may be performed on complete
tube samples or boat samples of
selected areas. The use of SEM and
optical techniques to characterize
the extent of creep damage is
required. Chapter 10, Volume 1
reviews some of these methods.
a
a Weld
image
B
Radiation

Quarter section
of DMW (three
dimensional)
beam

Film

Source: H.J. Grunloh, et al.5

B
a
a Source - Iridium 192

and/or HAZ
cracking
Weld

Weld
image
centered on weld.

Lack of fusion
Source to film
distance 16 in.
¥

Single film - Dupont NDT 55

Overlap
ASTM E 94, type 1 or
double film - Dupont 70
and Dupont 45
Weld

Weld
image

Figure 35-8. Union Electric special radiographic technique for dissimilar metal welds.
Source: H.J. Grunloh, et al.5

Weld metal
Radiation from isotope source

Crown
Weld interface

T-22

Cracked regions near

interface

Projections of cracked
regions on film

Two dimensional
radiographic
image

Figure 35-9. Union Electric technique and multiple radiographic defect images.
Oxide scale thickness has been
measured by ultrasonic testing to
find high-temperature tubes that are
then subject to the more detailed
damage assessment available from
the Union Electric technique
described above. The use of oxide
scale for temperature analysis in fer-
ritic tubes is described in detail in
Chapter 8, Volume 1; UT measures
of oxide thickness are discussed in
Chapter 9, Volume 1.
Etching of DMWs is difficult because
of the variety of materials and the
range of their chemical reactivities.
One successful reagent is dilute
aqua regia. Its composition by vol-
ume is 42% HCl, 17% HNO3 with the
balance H2O. Success has also
been achieved with a double etch,
once with Nital, followed by elec-
trolytic oxalic acid.9

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-13

5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Repair methods that are relatively
simple to implement and have been
found to provide extended lives of
DMWs are briefly summarized here.
The optimal approach has been
found to be replacement of each
damaged DMW with a “dutchman”,
which is a short section containing a
dissimilar metal weld made in the
shop by an automatic TIG process.
Then two field welds to insert the
dutchman can be made in like mate-
rial: ferritic-to-ferritic and austenitic-
to-austenitic.
If it is not possible to obtain a shop-
welded dutchman, then the next
best approach is to insert a short
piece of new tube by making two
new field welds. This is a temporary
measure; the field-welded insertion
should be replaced with a proper
dutchman at the first opportunity.
In-situ weld repairs of the damaged
location are not recommended, how-
ever, if necessary for an emergency,
the following steps are used: (i)
remove all of the damaged weld
metal, leaving as little original weld
metal as possible; (ii) grind out base
metal to effect a large included
angle so that a large capping pass
can be used, see the bottom geom-
1400
1350
Temperature (°F)
1300
Decarburization
1250
No decarburization
1200
1150
1100
0.2 0.5 1.0
Time (hr)
Figure 35-10. Permissible time/temperature conditions for post-weld heat treatment of
dissimilar metal welds joining 21/4 Cr -1 Mo to 300-series stainless steel filler metal.
Source: D.I. Roberts, et al.2h
35-14 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
etry in Figure 35-6, for example; (iii)
make the repair weld with nickel-
base filler metals, independent of
the composition of the original weld
metal. Weld geometry should follow
the recommendations contained in
Section 2.3 above and illustrated in
Figure 35-6. Further, the in situ
repair should be replaced with a
dutchman at the next outage.
Nickel-base welds are more difficult
to make than those with stainless
steel filler, however the upgrade to
such welds that have more margin
against failure is recommended, par-
ticularly (i) if stresses and tempera-
tures are higher than prescribed lim-
its, (ii) if significant boiler cycling is
anticipated, or (iii) if there is signifi-
cant uncertainty about operating
conditions.
Post-weld heat treatment (PWHT)
has been found to have only a sec-
ondary effect on the lifetime of DMW,
but as that effect is detrimental,
PWHT should be avoided. If PWHT
is used with stainless steel filler
metal, limits similar to those in Figure
35-10 should be imposed. If used
with nickel-base filler metals, care is
required to avoid the formation of
Type I carbides.
760
740
720
Temperature (°C)
700
680
660
640
620
600
5.0 10.0 50.0
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
6.1 Overview of long-term
actions
A long-term program to ensure the
integrity of DMWs should be a part
of every BTF Team agenda. The use
of a damage assessment code such
as PODIS can be used to predict
DMW lifetimes, to identify where new
or replacement welds are required,
and to anticipate where future
actions may be needed.
Long-term actions may include
steps such as relocating DMWs,
e.g., placing them away from fixed
supports or in locations subjected to
lower temperatures. Where there is
uncertainty about the temperatures
that are being experienced, prudent
practice is to substitute with higher
grade material. If a total replace-
ment of the SH or RH is required,
the optimum DMW locations, weld
metal composition, and weld config-
urations should be “designed-in”.
A program of periodic inspection of
hangers, supports and spacers to
ensure that secondary loads do not
develop is also indicated. Periodic
checking of unit temperatures with
either direct measurement by ther-
mocouples or by measuring oxide
scale buildup is also recommended.
6.2 Damage assessment
codes
As noted previously, there are sev-
eral codes available to (i) predict the
level of damage that may be antici-
pated in a particular DMW, (ii) to
highlight potential failure locations,
and (iii) to evaluate options for cor-
rective actions. The features of one
such code, developed by EPRI and
designated Prediction of Damage in
Service (PODIS)2g are discussed
next as a means to introduce the
nature of the calculations that are
typically performed for such assess-
ments.
The PODIS code is an empirical
method based on the field experi-
ence and accelerated test results.
Life estimates are calculated from a
knowledge of, or estimate of, the
loading history to which the tubing
was and will be subjected. Loading
history is defined in terms of time,
weld metal temperature, weld metal
temperature change, number of
cycles of temperature change, axial
stress at the weld due to pressure,
deadweight, and restrained thermal
expansion loads within the tube
assembly.
Creep damage is imposed by three
types of stresses:
• Intrinsic damage (self damage).
• Damage caused by primary
(load-controlled) components of
the system loading on the weld,
including axial pressure loads
and dead weight.
• Damage caused by secondary
(strain-controlled) components of
the system loading on the weld
such as those from restricted
thermal expansion.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-15
Any method to evaluate the accu-
mulation of damage must provide
for estimates of these stresses so
that total damage can be estimated.
A number of steps are typically
required to accumulate and analyze
the needed information including2g:
• Plant inspection to determine
tube condition and contributing
factors to DMW failures, such as
support conditions, slag buildup,
misalignment, and tube warpage.
• Review operating history to obtain
background information neces-
sary to estimate tube temperature
levels and cycling.
• Analyze system load histories at
DMWs.
• Assessment of actual DMW dam-
age. See section on determining
the extent of damage above.
• Predict damage from a code
such as PODIS.
35-16 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
• Correlate actual damage mea- Further, the ability to analyze fireside
surement with that predicted from corrosion and/or long-term overheat-
PODIS to determine whether it is ing may be necessary to analyze
likely that all significant effects properly the remaining tube life. For
have been incorporated into the example, PODIS does not take
analysis. account of the effects of fireside
corrosion which will reduce tube
• Predict residual life based on pro-
jection of future unit operations. wall thickness and thus increase
stress levels. Modifications to PODIS
Some knowledge is required of the have used data from the literature
conservatism in each code. For and limited field corrosion test
example, the availability of field fail- results to include corrosion factors
ure experience to calibrate the in the DMW LIFE code. Finally,
neither the effects of long-term over-
empirical constants in the PODIS
heating/ creep in tubing nor oxide
model have led to a conservative
notch propagation are considered in
treatment, particularly for Ni-based
PODIS.
welds. The degree of conservatism
has been explored in research
funded by Empire State Electric
Energy Research Corporation
(ESEERCO).10,11 As a result, a pro-
gram called DMW LIFE was devel-
oped which removes some of the
conservatism in the PODIS analysis
of Ni-based welds via an analysis of
industry experience.
7. Case Study
Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures Case Study: Field Experience and Integrated Analysis
Unit Description. The unit is a
base-loaded, 350 MW, coal-fired
unit put on line in 1970 with
165,000 operating hours.
Superheater outlet design condi-
tions are 2,500 psig at 540°C
(1005°F); reheater outlet design
conditions are 594 psig at 540°C
(1005°F).
Weld Locations. The unit contains
approximately 1,675 DMWs
located in the division panels,
superheater platen, reheater front
pendant, and superheater front
pendant. Original welds were
made with stainless steel filler
metal. Although no failures had yet
occurred, a similar unit had experi-
enced DMW failures so that a pro-
gram of analysis and preventive
measures was considered prudent.
Four regions were evaluated: SH
penthouse, SH furnace, RH pent-
house, and RH furnace.
NDE and Metallography. Ultrasonic
testing was used to determine
oxide scale thickness in three of
the four regions, the exception was
the SH furnace tubes owing to
access constraints. Every third
tube containing a DMW in the fer-
ritic material was measured close
to the DMW so as to provide an
indication of joint temperatures, but
removed from the weld geometry
and associated discontinuities.
Radiographic testing by the Union
Electric Technique8 was performed
on 65% (1,081) of the unit’s DMWs.
The method had previously been
validated by comparison with
removed samples. Twenty-five
percent of the DMWs radiographed
indicated interfacial damage rang-
ing from 5 to 90%. The majority of
the damage was found in the RH
furnace.
Metallographic samples were taken
of selected DMWs with extensive
damage to confirm the mechanism
and further confirm the accuracy of
the RT.
Temperature Estimates. Oxide
thickness measurements and sub-
sequent analysis of the results
were used in conjunction with
available thermocouple data to
estimate tube temperatures.
Boiler-wide temperature estimates
were made.
Stress Analysis. A piping stress
analysis code was used to esti-
mate primary (dead weight) and
secondary (primarily restrained
thermal expansion) stresses.
Pressure stresses were calculated
and added to the results. Results
for SH tubes found a range in sec-
ondary stresses from 14 to 18,501
psi; for primary stresses the range
was 1,522 to 3,016 psi.
Damage Analysis. Current temper-
atures were estimated from the
inspection results and stress levels.
A damage assessment code was
used to formulate a strategy for
DMW actions. DMWs with more
than 50% interfacial damage were
repaired immediately. A total of 13
DMWs in the RH and 5 DMWs in
the SH were repaired. Repairs
were performed by grinding out the
original weld metal as nearly com-
pletely as possible, grinding a 60°
angle on the ferritic side, and weld-
ing with either Inconel 182 or Inco-
weld A filler metal. Plans for future
replacements with a “dutchman”
were formulated.
Source: This case study is a sum-
mary of an evaluation first reported
by H.J. Grunloh, R.H. Ryder, and
R. Hellner.5
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-17
8. References
1Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec,
November, 1983.
2Prager, M., et al., Dissimilar-Weld Failure Analysis and
Development Program, Research Project 1874-1, Final
Report CS-4252, 8 Volumes, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA.
a. Prager, M., Volume 1: Executive Summary,
November, 1985.
b. Roberts, D.I., C.C. Li, and R.D. Nicholson, Volume 2:
Metallurgical Characteristics, November, 1985.
c. Ryder, R.H., H.J. Grunloh, R.F. Stetson, K.J. Tong,
K.H. Holko, D.I. Roberts, F.V. Ellis, M.P. Borden, S.N.
Cato, and B.W. Roberts, Volume 3: Accelerated
Discriminatory Tests, November, 1986.
d. Holko, K.H., C.C. Li, R.H. Ryder, D.I. Roberts, and
C.F. Dahms, Volume 4: Utility Plant Results;
November, 1985.
e. Roberts, D.I., H.J. Grunloh, and K.H. Holko, Volume
5: Evaluation of Acoustic Emission and Enhanced
Radiography, November, 1985.
f. Prager, M., H.J. Grunloh, J.R. Foulds, R.H. Ryder,
C.F. Dahms, and M. Krishnan, Volume 6: Weld
Condition and Remaining Life Assessment Manual,
August, 1988
g. Ryder, R.H., C.F. Dahms, M. Krishman, H.J. Grunloh,
and J.R. Foulds, Volume 7: Prediction of Damage in
Service (PODIS) Code - Background Document,
May, 1988.
h. Roberts, D.I., R.H. Ryder, H.J. Gurnloh, and B.E.
Thurgood, Volume 8: Design and Procedure Guide
for Improved Welds, November, 1989.
3Roberts, D.I., R.H. Ryder, and R. Viswanathan,
“Performance of Dissimilar Welds in Service”, Journal of
Pressure Vessel Technology, Volume 107, August, 1985.
4Li,C.C., R. Viswanathan, and R.H. Ryder, “The
Microstructure and Remaining Life of Dissimilar Metal
Weldments After Service in Fossil-Fired Boilers”,
Proceedings of the ASME International Conference on
Advances in Life Prediction Methods, April 18-20, 1983,
Albany, New York.
35-18 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
5Grunloh, H.J., R.H. Ryder, and R. Hellner, “Damage
Assessment and Predictive Maintenance of Dissimilar
Metal Welds in Superheater and Reheater Tubes”, in B.
Dooley, ed., Proceedings: International Conference on
Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil Plants, held in San Diego,
California November 5-7, 1991, Proceedings TR-100493,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April,
1992, pp. 7-51 through 7-76.
6Ryder, R.H., D.I. Roberts, and R. Viswanathan,
“Dissimilar Metal Weld Failure Reduction” in B. Dooley
and D. Broske, eds., Boiler Tube Failures in Fossil Power
Plants: Conference Proceedings, Conference held in
Atlanta, Georgia, November 10-12, 1987, CS-5500-SR,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1988,
pp. 2-63 through 2-72.
7Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
8Gurnea,
R.F, “Radiographic Technique for Detecting
Cracks in Dissimilar Weld Joints”, in R. Viswanathan and
D.A. Roberts, eds., Proceedings: Seminar on Dissimilar
Welds in Fossil-Fired Boilers, held in New Orleans, LA.,
February 23-24, 1984, Research Project 1874-1,
Proceedings CS-3623, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, July, 1985, pp. 4-47 through 4-60.
9Personal Communication from S. Paterson (Aptech
Engineering Services, Inc.) to R.B. Dooley, February,
1995.
10Sherlock,T.P. and D.N. French, Dissimilar Metal Weld
Assessment Program, Final Report, ESEERCO Project
91-20, Empire State Electric Energy Research
Corporation, New York, NY, December, 1991.
11Sherlock,T.P. and D.M. Conklin, Dissimilar Metal Weld
Assessment Program, Final Report, ESEERCO Project
91-20, Phase II, Empire State Electric Energy Research
Corporation, New York, NY, May, 1994.
ACTIONS for Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of DMW
failures begin here. The goal of
these actions is to see if further
investigation is warranted or
whether another BTF mechanism
should be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a SH/RH
BTF has occurred and DMW
failure is the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
in DMWs.
Action 1a: If a SH/RH BTF has
occurred and DMW is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure is
adjacent to a weld between dis-
similar metals.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Circumferential cracking adja-
cent to the heat affected zone
on the low- alloy (ferritic) side of
the joint.
• Thick-edged fracture with other
signs of low ductility.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future SH/RH BTF in
DMWs:
➠ Determine if there has been a
change to more unit cycling.
➠ Determine whether a life exten-
sion of the unit is anticipated
which would require an analysis
of the effect of DMW on the
desired unit lifetime.
➠ Determine if oxide dating of fer-
ritic materials has indicated
higher than anticipated operating
temperatures.
➠ Determine if there have been indi-
cations of wide variations in tube
temperatures.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Evidence of tube bowing or
other signs of excessive tube
distortion.
• Evidence of tube rubbing.
• Repetitively failed supports.
• Slag buildup and hot spots
induced by resulting hot gas
flow.
• Slag buildup at movable sup-
ports.
• Slag or ash buildup beneath
vertical platens.
• DMWs located close to fixed
supports, such as furnace walls
and roofs.
➠ Determine whether there have
been the addition of supports
without consideration of their
impact on stresses in DMWs.
➠ If one or more has occurred, go
to Action 3 which outlines the
steps to confirm the influence of
each.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-19
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is a DMW
failure.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being specifically related
to a DMW (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify this as the
primary mechanism or point to
another cause. The actions listed
will be executed by removing
representative tube sample(s),
followed by visual examination
and detailed metallographic
analysis.
35-20 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
➠ Analyze the macroscopic dam-
age. Does damage have fea-
tures similar to those listed in
Table 35-2 indicative of DMW
failures, such as circumferential
cracking near the ferritic mater-
ial’s HAZ, located near a DMW,
thick-edged cracks, and/or the
presence of an “oxide notch”?
➠ Analyze microstructure. Is there
evidence of creep damage and
cracking at a distance of about
1-2 grain diameters away from
the fusion line along prior
austenite boundaries for
austenitic weld metals? Is there
evidence of Type I carbides and
cracking associated with creep
cavitation immediately adjacent
to the weld fusion line for Ni-
based welds?
Probable mechanism is related to
the dissimilar metal weld.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
A crack that is oriented axially
(longitudinal to the tube) is more
likely to be caused by overheating
(see Chapter 32). Excessive wall
thinning which would likely lead to
a ductile, thin-edged fracture sur-
face is more likely to be caused by
a wastage mechanism. See sepa-
rate discussions of flyash erosion,
(Chapter 14, Volume 2) and soot-
blower erosion (Chapter 38) as
well as fireside corrosion
(Chapters 33 or 34).
Failure may be caused by fatigue,
see Chapter 39. This is particularly
true for DMWs out of the gas
pass/near to the header. Tubes at
the ends of the header are likely to
be most affected in this case. One
mechanism of failure may also
mask another underlying cause, so
some caution is required in inter-
pretation.
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the DMW failure
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as directly caused by the
DMW (Action 2) or a precursor
has occurred (Action 1b). The
goal of this Action 3 is for the
BTF Team to review the potential
root causes of such failures,
identify probable ones, and take
those actions that are needed to
confirm which are operative in
the unit. This step must be taken
so that actions can be taken to
prevent future BTF from occur-
ring by this mechanism. Execute,
in parallel, Action 4 to determine
the extent of damage.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
3.2 Excessive tube stresses such as caused
by improper initial design or improper tube
supports.
• locating the DMW near the roof, furnace
wall or other fixed points or near the header
• weld placement in the middle of a long span
• inadequate allowance for thermal expansion
• support failures or slag accumulation
leading to constraint of thermal expansion
3.3 Excessive local tube temperatures
• tube temperatures above those anticipated
in the design
• variation across the SH/RH
3.4 Changes in unit operation
• to increased unit cycling
• change of fuel causing increased tube tem
peratures
• redesign of adjacent SH/RH that results in
higher tube service temperatures
3.5 Initial fabrication defects.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Visual examination of the unit to deter-
mine whether there are suspect locations or
evidence of a problem such as bent tubes,
warpage of tubes, misalignment, missing or
broken supports.
➠ (b). Perform a stress analysis of suspect
locations. Piping stress codes can be used to
determine both primary and secondary
stresses.
➠ (c). Review of available thermocouple data
for indications of overheating.
➠ (d). Perform oxide scale thickness evalua-
tion including ultrasonic measurement and
analysis of results.
➠ (e). Review operating records with an eye
toward conditions that may have increased
either tube stresses or temperatures.
➠ (f). Metallographic samples should be used
to evaluate whether initial weld defects such as
incomplete fusion or lack of penetration are a
contributing cause.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-21
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Results of the survey
for damage will be used interac-
tively with Action 3 to determine
root cause and with Actions 5
and 6 to develop a rational
approach to prevention.
35-22 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
➠ Identify all locations to be examined. This step may
consist of one or both of the following:
➠ Find highest risk tubes via NDE examination (UT) of
oxide thickness. Chapter 9, Volume 1 presents the
NDE method; Chapter 8, Volume 1 discusses the
oxide technique for temperature estimates.
➠ Visual inspection for obvious signs of mechanical dis-
tress: bent tubing, missing or deformed supports,
excessive slag buildup, etc.
➠ Perform visual examination to detect obvious signs of
cracking.
➠ Perform radiographic survey to determine the
extent of DMW interface damage. See discussion of
the “Union Electric” technique in the main text,
Section 4.0
➠ Perform tube sampling to confirm results of NDE
inspection and to determine the degree of damage.
➠ Use results interactively with Action 3.
➠ Go to Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate
Solutions and Actions.
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
The BTF Team must ensure that
repairs and immediate solutions
are directly tied to the underlying
cause. It is important to start
analysis by PODIS or another
method to judge the effective-
ness of both short- and long-
term solutions.
➠ Initiate the application of PODIS
of affected tubes/welds or alternative methodology that
can evaluate the potential remain-
• The preferable method is to use
ing life of non-failed DMW loca-
“dutchmen” in which the DMW
tions and judge the effectiveness
is made in the shop and then
of potential solutions.
two like-metal welds are made
in the field. ➠ Correct any maintenance or oper-
ating shortcomings that have con-
• Second in preference is to
tributed to the problem, such as
remove damaged weld metal
excessive slagging, missing sup-
completely and weld in a new
ports, etc.
short section of tube.
Replacement of this temporary ➠ In conjunction with longer-term
arrangement with a dutchman strategy, consider relocating the
as described above should be dissimilar metal welds to lower
made at the next opportunity. temperature or lower stress loca-
tions. PODIS or equivalent is
• In an emergency, a temporary,
needed in this determination.
in-situ weld repair, which should
be replaced at the first opportu-
nity with a proper dutchman
repair, can be made as follows:
(i) grind out damaged weld
metal leaving as little original
weld metal as possible, 1.5 mm
(~ 1/16”), in the root or less, (ii)
grind out the base metal so that
a large capping pass can be
used (see Figure 35-6), and (iii)
make the repair with nickel-
base filler metal. See Figure 35-
5 for an example of the poten-
tial improvement in DMW life
with Ni-based filler metal.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 35-23
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on the clear identification
of the underlying root cause
(Action 3) and an economic eval-
uation to ensure that the opti-
mum strategy is chosen. In par-
ticular, an analytical tool such as
PODIS will aid in identifying the
specific underlying conditions
that require correction.
35-24 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
Major Root Cause Influences
Excessive tube stresses such as caused by
improper initial design or improper tube
supports.
• locating the DMW near the roof, furnace
wall or other fixed points or near to the
header
• weld placement in the middle of a long span
• inadequate allowance for thermal expansion
• support failures or slag accumulation
leading to constraint of thermal expansion
Excessive local tube temperatures
• tube temperatures above those anticipated
in the design
• variation across the SH/RH
Changes in unit operation
• to increased unit cycling
• change of fuel causing increased tube
temperatures
• redesign of adjacent SH/RH that results in
higher tube service temperatures
Initial fabrication defects.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Implement a damage assessment code,
such as PODIS, to optimize a program of con-
trol and prevention of DMW failures. Actions
may include predicting remaining life, relocat-
ing welds, upgrading to higher grade materials.
➠ Implement a periodic inspection program
for hangers, supports and spacers, and a tem-
perature monitoring program.
➠ Redesign SH/RH to locate DMWs in areas
of lower stress or lower temperature.
➠ Institute a program to measure and interpret
oxide scale thickness periodically as a means
of understanding tube temperature trends.
➠ Apply damage assessment code to deter-
mine whether temperature is the predominant
factor.
➠ Redesign SH/RH so that the DMW is in a
lower temperature regime.
➠ Implement a damage assessment code,
such as PODIS, to optimize a program of con-
trol and prevention of DMW failures. Actions
may include predicting remaining life, relocat-
ing welds, upgrading to higher grade materials.
➠ Determine what effects changes in operation
will have on DMWs.
➠ Implement a periodic inspection program
for hangers, supports and spacers, and a tem-
perature monitoring program.
➠ Monitor for outbreaks of similar problems
in other locations; a damage assessment
method such as PODIS may provide guidance
about general DMW life, although it cannot
specifically pinpoint initial fabrication defects.
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of DMW
damage or its precursors.
DMW Aspect Alert for Other Cycle
Components
Tubes are being sub- • Possibility of additional
jected to temperatures tube failures by mecha-
in excess of those that nisms such as long-term
were expected by the overheating/creep (Chapter
design. 32) or fireside corrosion
(Chapter 33 or 34).
Redesign of SH/RH has • Potential for overheating
changed absorption in other sections which
pattern within convec- might include a DMW.
tive pass.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes
➠ Actions Indicated
➠ Evaluate sources of overheating and
determine what control measures are
possible to prevent future failures.
➠ Consider installation of additional
thermocouples, or instituting periodic
oxide scale surveys via UT to monitor
tube temperature progression.
➠ Ensure that the locations of DMWs
are known and that the ramifications to
them by any redesign of an adjacent
SH/RH section are known.
35-25
35-26 Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
Chapter 36 • Volume 3
Short-Term
Overheating in
SH/RH Tubing
Introduction
Short-term overheating in super-
heater/reheater (SH/RH) tubing
occurs when the normal flow of cool-
ing steam is blocked. Excessive
temperatures and subsequent tube
failures can occur in a very short
period of time. This is distinct from
long-term overheating/creep,
described in Chapter 32, which is
gradual and long-term damage that
occurs primarily as a result of the
insulating characteristics of steam-
side oxide scale and/or prematurely
because of poor initial design.
Short-term overheating of water-
walls, also caused by the blockage
of cooling fluid flow to a tube, is cov-
ered in Chapter 23, Volume 2.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 36-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure
Damage by short-term overheating
will display distinctive characteristics
including: (i) a considerable
increase in the diameter of affected
tubes (swelling) without ovalization,
(ii) a ductile final failure showing a
thin-edged fracture surface, and (iii)
“fish-mouth” appearance (Figure 36-
1). Failures are generally oriented
longitudinally.
Microstructural examination will dis-
play evidence of severe overheating
of the tube metal. Depending on the
composition of the material and the
time over which the excessive tem-
peratures occurred there may be
microstructural changes similar to
those described for short-term over-
heating of waterwall materials (the
presence of ferritic transformation
Figure 36-1. "Fish-mouth" appearance typical of failures by short-term overheating.
Source: Austa Electric, Australia
36-2 Short-Term Overheating in SH/RH Tubing
products), similar to those for long-
term overheating (such as the pres-
ence of sigma phase in austenitic
stainless steels), or very often, for
the most rapid overheating failures,
relatively little microstructural
change.
There is likely to be evidence of
localized hardening near the rupture.
The key factors that distinguish long-
term and short-term overheating are
listed in Table 36-1. Primary among
these factors are: short-term over-
heating is a ductile, thin-edged fail-
ure with generally increased hard-
ness near the rupture; in contrast,
long-term overheating is manifested
as brittle, thick-edged failures, with
evidence of microstructural creep
damage, and decreased metal hard-
ness profiles near the rupture.
Table 36-1
Characteristics of Long-Term Overheating/Creep Compared to Short-Term Overheating
In SH/RH Tubing
Characteristic Long-Term Overheating
Fracture Surface and • Generally thick-edged, brittle
Appearance of Failure final failure.
• Generally accompanied by
external tube wastage at the 10
o'clock and 2 o'clock positions.
Internal Scale? Yes, generally extensive, multi-
laminated and exfoliating.
External Scaling? • Yes, thick, laminated and often
longitudinally cracked.
• Usually two layers - (i) a hard,
porous outer layer with com-
position typically that of flyash,
and (ii) a black glossy inner
layer.
Outside surface Characteristic longitudinal groov-
appearance after removal ing and pitting ("alligator hide").
of scale/deposits
Wall Thinning? Typically wastage flats at 10
o'clock and 2 o'clock positions
caused by accelerated oxidation.
There is always a layer of oxide
adjacent to the tube.
Tube Material Yes, generally extensive signs of
Degradation overheating and/or of creep dam-
age, particularly near to the crack
tip. Creep voids will not be found
removed from crack tip.
Change in material Localized softening near the rup-
hardness ture is typical.
Short-Term Overheating
• Usually thin-edged, ductile
final failures.
• Swelling of tubes without
ovalization.
• "Fish-mouth" appearance of
tube rupture.
Not necessarily thick. Depends
on age of tube at failure.
Not necessarily thick.
Swelling, stretch marks on tube
metal.
Only because of bulging of tube
material.
Depends on the material and the
maximum temperature reached.
Localized hardening near the
rupture is likely.
Examination of debris contained in
removed sections of tubing may pro-
vide clues about the cause of the
problem. For example, bottom
bends may be blocked by exfoliated
oxide or chemical cleaning debris,
an example is shown in Figure 36-2.
Analysis of the exfoliated oxide for
example can indicate whether its
primary origin is austenitic or ferritic
tubing materials.
1.2 Locations of failure
The most common location of failure
is near the bottom bends in vertical
loops of the SH/RH (Figure 36-3).
Failures have also occurred in outlet
tube legs.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 36-3
 Outlet
header

A C

Austenitic Ferritic
alloy alloy

Figure 36-2. Bottom bend and debris causing blockage.

Source: Austa Electric, Australia
Figure 36-3. Typical locations of failures by short-term
overheating in the superheater/reheater. Exfoliating oxide
in the austenitic leg AB drops to bend B during shut-
downs and causes blockage. Failure typically occurs at
"X" in the ferritic material.

2. Mechanism of Failure
Short-term overheating occurs when
the normal cooling effects of the
steam in the superheater/reheater
are no longer operating. As a result,
the tube metal temperature rises
rapidly. Failure can occur within a
matter of minutes if the blockage is
significant. Pronounced local
bulging occurs because of the
increased ductility of the material.
The eventual rupture, as it occurs at
very high temperatures without any
cooling, is ductile with the concur-
rent characteristics.

36-4 Short-Term Overheating in SH/RH Tubing

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
3.1 Introduction
There are three groups of root
causes of short-term overheating:
blockage-induced, maintenance-
induced, and operation-induced.
Table 36-2 summarizes the potential
root causes, actions to confirm, and
corrective actions.
3.2 Tube blockage-induced
short-term overheating
3.2.1 Blockage caused by exfoliated
oxide. This is the most common
cause of tube failures by short-term
overheating in the SH/RH. The
growth and exfoliation of oxide in
SH/RH circuits is a normal event of
operating the materials of construc-
tion at high temperatures. As is
noted in the general discussion of its
growth in Chapter 2, Volume 1,
changing the unit to oxygenated
treatment (OT) has no effect on
either the growth of the oxide or its
exfoliation.
The rate of scale growth and rate of
exfoliation depends on the material
of construction. Under normal oper-
ating conditions, as shown in Table
36-3, the scale which grows on fer-
ritic materials in the SH/RH is the
greatest concern. This data is from a
reheater with 63,430 hours of ser-
vice and 450 startups.1,2 The exfolia-
tion of ferritic material oxide is the
most significant contributor to the
problem of solid particle erosion
(SPE) of the turbine. A ranking of
severity of exfoliation has been
developed and is shown in Table 36-
4. Additional detail about the mech-
anism and its development can be
found in Chapter 2, Volume 1.
However, for short-term overheating
the more relevant scale is that pro-
duced in austenitic SH/RH tube
materials. Unlike the multilayer
scales that form on ferritic materials
which are somewhat resistant to
thermal changes, a two layer scale
forms on the steamside of austenitic
tubes. The scale is very susceptible
to exfoliation when subjected to
severe thermal transients such as
occur during rapid shutdown and
cooling events. This is because of
the marked difference in the coeffi-
cient of thermal expansion between
the scale and the austenitic stainless
steel base metal.
Once exfoliation of oxide flakes has
occurred, the propensity for tube
blockages is a function of4: flake
size and shape, strength and stiff-
ness of the flakes, tube internal
radius, constrictions and imperfec-
tions in the tube, flow rates in the
tube, friction coefficients, and total
quantity of spalled oxide in the tube.
The size of the exfoliated particles
can be large in comparison to scale
exfoliated from ferritic materials, up
to 2.5 cm (~ 1 in.) in diameter. As a
result, the accumulation of these
large particles, particularly at bends
in smaller diameter tubing, can more
readily result in tube blockage. On
startup, steam flow is limited through
the blocked tube(s).
The ability of a blockage to with-
stand boiler pressures depends on
the orientation of the flakes. At low
flows, flakes tumble until they
become oriented in a hydrodynami-
cally stable position; once these
positions are reached, subsequent
high flows do not always disturb
them. As a result tube blockages
can occur when these stable posi-
tions are reached during the low
steam flow associated with boiler
startup. Flake transport studies4
found that an overlapping wedge of
flakes formed at low speeds in an
arch formation. The most important
parameter in blockage formation
was the ratio of flake dimension to
tube radius. The ability of the arches
to withstand subsequent fluid forces
was a function of flake thickness;
100 mm flakes were likely to with-
stand breakage, 20 mm thick flakes
were likely to break.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 36-5
Table 36-2
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause
Influences
3.2 Tube blockage-induced short-term overheating
3.2.1 Blockage caused by
exfoliated oxide.
3.3 Maintenance-induced short-term overheating
3.3.1 Improper chemical clean-
ing.
- of SH/RH: poor flushing pro-
cedures leave deposits in bends.
- of waterwalls: volatility of
chemicals getting into SH
circuits or poor backfilling of SH
3.3.2 Improper repairs,
miscellaneous maintenance
shortcomings
3.4 Operation-induced short-term overheating
3.4.1 Improper shutdown and
startup of unit (condensate
collection in SH/RH bends)
3.4.2 Overfiring when a top
feedwater heater is out of ser-
vice.
36-6 Short-Term Overheating in SH/RH Tubing
Actions to Confirm
(a). Removal of damaged tube to
confirm source of blockage.
Metallurgical examination may be
required. See Chapter 6, Volume 1
for an overview of such techniques.
(b). Examination for signs of exfolia-
tion in unit such as outbreaks of SPE
in the turbine.
(c). NDE, such as radiography, for
other locations of similar blockage.
(d). For austenitic materials, a hand
held magnet will detect spalled oxide
in bends.
(e). As in item (a) above.
(f). Review chemical cleaning proce-
dures. See Chapter 4, Volume 1 for
additional discussion.
(g). Review repair records and cor-
relate to locations of failures.
(h). Check thermocouples in outlet; • Replace tubing.
determine whether tubes are running
cold because of no flow.
(i). Review shutdown procedures;
determine whether proper procedures
have been employed to boil out any
condensate.
(j). Review of operating logs of feed- • Replace tubing and perform
water heater operation and service.
Immediate Actions and
Solutions
• NDE to determine blocked
tubes.
• Removal of bends with
blockages.
• Blow out debris and replace
tubes or if solid remove
bends and replace tubing.
• As above, plus,
• An interim solution can be to
change operating procedures
to limit temperature
transients if the problem is
exfoliation in austenitic
material; especially important
is to minimize forced or
rapid cooldowns.
• Chemical cleaning of SH/RH
is the primary option. See
Chapter 4, Volume 1 for
additional discussion.
• As above for tube blockages,
plus
• Clean out tubes and remove
source of blockages.
• Replace tubing.
NDE of adjacent areas.
Long-Term Actions and Prevention of
Repeat Failures
• Establish a long-term program of moni-
toring and preventing the excessive buildup
of steamside oxide.
• Perform periodic evaluation of tube
metal temperatures via direct thermocouple
measurements, NDE measurements of
oxide scale thickness or tube sampling to
measure scale thickness.
• If tubing is being replaced, consider use
of chromizing to limit exfoliation.
• Change chemical cleaning procedures
and frequency.
• Ensure that utility has optimum weld-
ing/repair/maintenance procedures for tube
repair or for major SH/RH replacements.
See additional discussion of tube repairs
and replacements in Chapter 11, Volume 1.
• Review and optimize shutdown proce-
dures.
• Review and optimize operating proce-
dures when heaters are out of service and
carefully monitor steam/metal temperatures.
Table 36-3 an iron chromium spinel. Very often
Example of Reheater Tube Material Oxide Thickness and Percent Exfoliated the oxide from ferritics is multilami-
nated. Additional detail about scales
Material Average thickness, mm (mils) Percent Exfoliated formed on ferritic and austenitic
material can be found in Chapter 2,
T-11 70 ( 3) < 10 Volume 1.
(b). Examination for evidence of
T-22 270 ( 11) 80 exfoliation. If exfoliation is occurring,
confirmation can be obtained by
T-9 150 ( 6) <5 direct sampling of candidate tubing
or through the interpretation of other
304H 90 ( 4) <2 signals from the unit. For example,
has there been solid particle erosion
in the HP or IP turbine or valves?
Source: R.B. Dooley, et al.1; V.R.D. Miller and A.V. Manolescu2
(c). NDE examination, for example
by radiography, to confirm the exis-
tence of similar blockages that have
Table 36-4 not lead to failure. It may be possi-
Rating System for Steamside Oxide Scale Exfoliation ble to examine nondestructively sim-
ilar locations for evidence of tube
Exfoliation Rating Percent of Surface Approximate Weight of Magnetite blockage. Flow verification can be
Area Exfoliated Released (Exfoliated Per Unit done by running warm water
Length of Tube g/m (lbm/100 ft) through suspect sections and
checking by hand or by thermal
1 (Little to None) <1 < 3 (< 0.2) monitors to see if tubes are also
warm, indicating adequate flow.
2 (Mild) 1 - 10 3 - 30 (0.2 - 2) (d). For austenitic materials, a hand
held magnet will detect spalled
3 (Moderate) 11 - 20 30 - 60 (2 - 4) oxide in bends.

4 (Severe) 21 - 40 60 - 125 (4 - 8.4)

5 (Very Severe)
Note: Approximate weight estimate based on an assumed density of 5.18 g/cm3 for iron oxide, a steamside
scale thickness of 0.038 cm (0.015 in), and a tube inside diameter of 5.08 cm. (2.00 in.).
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.3
Failure will usually occur away from
the blockage, typically in locations
where there is a transition to a lower
grade (less creep resistant) material,
or in changes of wall thickness in
the same grade material.
Actions to confirm this root cause:
(a). Removal of the damaged tube
to confirm the source of blockage. It
is important to distinguish between
sources of blockage in order to
apply the proper corrective action.
For example, steamside oxide from
> 40 > 125 ( > 8.5)
austenitic or ferritic origin should be
distinguished from debris remaining
after chemical cleaning.
Metallurgical examination may be
required to confirm the source of the
blockage, including energy disper-
sive X-ray spectroscopy to charac-
terize the elemental composition of
the blockage material. Generally
exfoliated oxide from austenitic
materials consists only of Fe3O4,
whereas exfoliated oxide from ferritic
materials usually consists of at least
two layers, one of Fe3O4 and one of
3.3 Maintenance-induced
short-term overheating
3.3.1 Improper chemical cleaning.
Wall thinning caused by excessive
chemical cleaning has been cov-
ered as a separate boiler tube fail-
ure mechanism for SH/RH tubing in
Chapter 43. Here the concerns are
other aspects of the chemical clean-
ing operations that can directly
cause tube blockage and subse-
quent overheating.
Care must be taken to adequately
flush the SH/RH after cleaning. The
use of a final system purge by either
steam or air blows may remove any
loosened or dislodged scale. A pro-
cedure is required to ensure that any
scale laying at the bottom of pen-
dant loops has been removed; this
is not always accomplished by the
final system purge. The concern is

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 36-7

that the chemically removed oxide
and the chemical cleaning residue
may accumulate in the bends of the
SH/RH leading to flow restriction and
subsequent failure as discussed
above.
Flow verification such as by hand
checking as outlined above is a rec-
ommended part of chemical clean-
ing of SH/RH sections.
A second problem is inadequate
protection of the superheater during
the chemical cleaning of the water-
walls and economizer. If the super-
heater is not backfilled properly,
volatile or liquid cleaning fluid can
get into the SH circuits and lead to
its inadvertent, partial cleaning. As a
result, debris can accumulate at
tube bends and lead to failure by
short-term overheating.
Actions to confirm and evaluate this
root cause include:
(e). See item (a) above.
(f). Review of chemical cleaning
procedures. For example, if the
SH/RH was cleaned, was the flow to
36-8 Short-Term Overheating in SH/RH Tubing
each parallel circuit confirmed by
specific field test? Were tube sam-
ples removed and analyzed to con-
firm efficacy of the cleaning
process? If the cleaning procedure
took place in the waterwalls or econ-
omizer, were adequate safeguards
in place to protect the SH?
Additional detail about chemical
cleaning of the SH/RH can be found
in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
3.3.2 Improper repairs, miscella-
neous maintenance shortcomings.
Improper repairs or poor practice
such as excessive weld splatter,
leaving repair debris, tools, loose
pieces of hardware, or other materi-
als in the tubing can cause a block-
age that would lead to a failure by
short-term overheating. It is unlikely
that such a problem would be wide-
spread, but if good repair practices
are used they will avoid such obvi-
ous problems. Confirmation will be
found from:
(g). Review of repair records to
determine whether there is a corre-
spondence between failures
observed and recent repair locations.
3.4 Operation-induced short-
term overheating
3.4.1 Improper shutdown and
startup. If condensate collects in
SH/RH bends on unit shutdown, the
flow of steam to that tube can be
prevented on startup and lead to
overheating, especially with rapid
boiler starts.
(h). Check thermocouples in outlet
region to determine whether there
are tubes that are running cold,
indicative of a no-flow condition.
(i). Review shutdown procedures to
determine whether they have been
sufficient to boil out any conden-
sate.
3.4.2 Overfiring when a top feedwa-
ter heater is out of service.
(j). Review operating logs of feed-
water heater operation and service
and records of steam/metal temper-
atures to determine whether over-
heating has occurred.
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
Inspection for additional blockage
locations generally requires 100%
coverage, although it may be possi-
ble to identify patterns of damage,
or isolated affected tubes if, for
example, maintenance errors are at
fault. Inspection for signs of block-
age in austenitic loops can be per-
formed using (i) magnets on the
tube, (ii) radiography, (iii) tube
removal, or (iv) measurement of tube
outside diameters for signs of
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
It is important for this mechanism
that immediate identification of the
problem be made. A typical field
experience is a repetitive cycle of (i)
a tube failure, (ii) repair/replace the
affected tube bend, (iii) unit on line,
(iv) additional tube failures. Both the
specific root cause and the extent of
the problem should be addressed
before the unit goes back on line in
order to avoid the predictable forced
outage that will occur otherwise.
One means which has been used to
evaluate whether all damaged mate-
rial has been removed is to measure
the outside diameter of the tubing in
which clear evidence of swelling has
occurred and replace those tubes
where the original diameter has
increased by more than 1%.5
swelling. In ferritic tubes, only the
last three methods will be usable. A
recommended procedure used to
determine whether blocked tubes
are present after a chemical clean-
ing is to circulate water of changing
temperature. A “hand check” or
measurement of tube temperatures
using a thermal meter can detect
tubes for which there is no flow.
Removal of all tube blockages and
repair/replacement of all affected
tube bends should be performed
prior to the unit being returned to
service.
If the problem is exfoliation from
austenitic stainless steel material,
an interim procedure that limits large
temperature differentials such as
occur during forced cool downs can
be imposed, but only until a longer
term approach is defined. This can
be helpful since such scales are
more sensitive to thermal transients
than those for the ferritic tube
materials.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 36-9
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
7. Case study
Superheater/Reheater Short Term Overheating Case Study:
Analysis of Field Failures and Chemical Cleaning of the SH
Background. Three supercritical
units, rated at 600 MW and with
about 25,000 operating hours
began to manifest tube failures in
the secondary superheaters. A
total of fifteen tubes burst, failure
always occurred during cold
startup of the units. The failures
were located in SA213-T12 mater-
ial. Blockages were eventually
traced to Type 304 which makes
up about 45% of the secondary
superheater material. Minimum
tube inside diameter in tubes of
Type 304 was 22.8 mm (0.90 in.);
minimum bend radius was 28.5
mm (1.12 in.).
Appearance of Failures. Failures
showed classic signs of short-term
overheating including fish-mouth
openings with thin edges and con-
siderable increases in tube diame-
ters (up to 40%) with no sign of
ovalization. Microstructural exami-
nation of the T12 showed transfor-
mation indicating that its critical
temperature, Ac1, which is 740°C
(1364°F), had been exceeded.
36-10 Short-Term Overheating in SH/RH Tubing
If the failure was caused by the
exfoliation of built-up steamside
oxide, a long-term program to moni-
tor and prevent recurrence of the
problem is required. See the pro-
gram described in the case study
for a view of an integrated approach
to solving the problem. For severe
oxide buildup a chemical clean of
the SH/RH is indicated. An overview
of the process is provided in
Chapter 4, Volume 1. A detailed
manual of practice is available.6
Hardness had increased from 160 to
260 Vickers. An oxide scale had
formed rapidly. It was estimated from
morphology and thickness to have
occurred in less than 15 minutes.
Inspection Results. A 100%
gamma-ray examination of the lower
bends was used to identify blocked
tubes. Some 50% of tube bends
indicated partial or total blockage
with 27 bends totally blocked.
Measurement of the outside diame-
ter of T12 and T22 tubes showed
sixteen swelled tubes. Selective
sampling was performed on both
Type 304 and ferritic tubes.
Analysis of Internal Scale. The for-
mation of a duplex oxide layer was
found on Type 304 samples, with
only the external layer (nearest to
the steam) showing signs of exfolia-
tion. Tube blockage was caused by
this exfoliated scale as determined
by analysis of the chemical compo-
sition of the blockage material which
was essentially only Fe3O4. Some of
the scale was up to 10 mm (0.39 in.)
in width.
Once the situation has been con-
trolled, a monitoring scheme should
be developed to determine the
severity of oxide buildup in affected
tubing. Such monitoring may consist
of ultrasonic inspection for direct
measurement of scale thickness,
tube sampling to confirm type and
extent of scale, and temperature
determination such as by direct ther-
mocouple measurement or analysis
of oxide scale buildup.
Resolution: Air blowing was used
to clear all tubes where inspection
had indicated a blockage of 40%
or greater. An interim operating
procedure was used to limit tem-
perature excursions until the
corrective actions were finalized.
Emphasis was on NDE to deter-
mine the extent of damage and
periodical chemical cleaning of
the secondary superheater. A
chemical cleaning procedure was
developed. Hydroxyacetic formic
acid (6%) was used without
ammonium bifluoride. Extensive
monitoring was performed during
and after the cleaning process
including: temperature, pH, total
acidity measurements, analysis of
Fe, Cr and Ni ions, flow-rate mea-
surements, continuous corrosion
rate monitoring, thermal monitor-
ing of tube, and post-test sam-
pling. The results indicated
excellent cleaning of T12, T22,
and Type 304 materials.
8. References
1Dooley, R.B., F.M Somerset, A.C. Davidson, V.R.D. Miller
and A.V. Manolescu, “Ontario Hydro’s Experience with
Solid Particle Erosion of Steam Turbines”, in 1980
EPRI/ASME Workshop on Solid Particle Erosion of Steam
Turbine Components, Report CS-4683, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1980, p. 3-36.
2Miller, V.R.D and A.V. Manolescu, “Maintenance
Strategies and Specific Design Changes to Ontario
Hydro’s Lambton TGS Coal-Fired Generating Units to
Mitigate the Effects of Solid Particle Erosion”, Solid
Particle Erosion of Steam Turbine Components: 1985
Workshop, Report CS-4683, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1985, p. 2-21.
3Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.
4Armitt,J, R. Holmes, M.I. Manning, D.B. Meadowcroft,
and E. Metcalfe, The Spalling of Steam-Grown Oxide
from Superheater and Reheater Tube Steels, Technical
Planning Study 76-655, Final Report FP-686, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February, 1978.
5Personal Communication D. Barnett (Pacific Power,
Australia) to R.B. Dooley, February, 1995.
6Bartholomew, R.D, W.E. Chesney, R.D. Hopkins, J.S.
Poole, J.W. Siegmund, J.P. Williams, and S. Yorgiadis,
Guidelines for Chemical Cleaning of Fossil-Fueled
Steam-Generating Equipment, Research Project 2712-
06, Final Report TR-102401, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, June, 1993.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 36-11
ACTIONS for Short-Term Overheating In SH/RH Tubing
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of short-
term overheating in the SH/RH
begin here. The goal of these
actions is to see if further investi-
gation of short-term overheating
is warranted or whether another
BTF mechanism should be
investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a SH/RH
BTF has occurred and short-
term overheating is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by short-term overheating.
36-12 Short-Term Overheating in SH/RH Tubing
Action 1a: If a SH/RH BTF has
occurred and short-term overheat-
ing is the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of short-term overheating:
• Most prominent locations near
the bottom bends of vertical
loops
• Review main text, section 1.2
and Figure 36-3 for susceptible
locations.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Considerable increase in ID or
OD of tube (“swelling”)
• Ductile, thin-edged fracture sur-
face or final failure with “fish-
mouth” appearance.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by short-term
overheating.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Evidence of severe exfoliation in
the unit (see Table 36-4), or
SPE in the turbine.
• Any indication of blocked
tubes.
• A problem experienced during
chemical cleaning of SH/RH
sections such as the discovery
that inadequate rinsing was
used or that flow verification
was improper.
• Evidence that condensate may
be forming in SH bends during
unit shutdown.
• Furnace slagging that could
lead to overheating in convec-
tive passes.
• Overfiring such as when the top
feedwater heater is out of ser-
vice.
➠ These precursors can signal the
potential for SH/RH tube failures
by a short-term overheating
mechanism. If one or more has
occurred, go to Action 3 which
reviews root causes and outlines
the steps to confirm the influence
of each.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is short-term
overheating.
A SH/RH tube failure has
occurred which the BTF team
has tentatively identified as
being short-term overheating
(Action 1a). Action 2 should
clearly identify short-term over-
heating as the primary mecha-
nism or point to another cause.
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by removing representa-
tive tube sample(s), followed by
visual examination and detailed
metallographic analysis. Note
that if a blockage is at the root,
the blockage may be occurring
remote from the point of failure;
very typically the blockage is in
austenitic material and the failure
occurs at the transition to a lower
grade material.
➠ Analyze fracture surface. Does
it display characteristic ductile
features: “fish-mouthed” open-
ing, thin-edges, excessive
bulging or swelling?
➠ Analyze internal scale. Is there
evidence of a buildup and/or
exfoliation of internal oxide
scale?
➠ Analyze tube blockages. If tube
blockages underlie the problem,
an examination of the composi-
tion of the material will help pin-
point the material exfoliating or
provide evidence of improper
chemical cleaning.
Brittle, thick-edged failures are
more typical of another mecha-
nism such as long-term overheat-
ing. Review alternatives that have
brittle failure characteristics.
Remember that exfoliation may be
occurring remote from the actual
tube rupture. Or there may be
another root cause for the
overheating, continue through
flowchart.

Probable mechanism is short-

term overheating. An additional
step to confirm is to review Table
36-1 to contrast with long-term
overheating if there is doubt of the
mechanism.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

References to other sources of detailed information:

• Chapter 2, Volume 1 discusses the formation and exfoliation of internal
oxide scale.
• Summary of the steps and methods of metallurgical investigation of boiler
tube failures can be found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
• The separate mechanism writeup on long-term overheating should be
reviewed if there is doubt as to the identification of the failure mechanism.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 36-13

Action 3: Determine root cause of the short-term overheating
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as short-term overheating
(Action 2) or a precursor to short-
term overheating has occurred
(Action 1b). The goal of this
Action 3 is for the BTF Team to
review the potential root causes
of short-term overheating, iden-
tify probable ones, and take
those actions that are needed to
confirm which are operative in
the unit. This step must be taken
so that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
36-14 Short-Term Overheating in SH/RH Tubing
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
3.2 Tube blockage-induced short-term
overheating
3.2.1 Blockage caused by exfoliated oxide.
3.3 Maintenance-induced short-term
overheating
3.3.1 Improper chemical cleaning.
• of SH/RH: poor flushing procedures leave
deposits in bends.
• of waterwalls: volatility of chemicals getting
into SH circuits or poor backfilling of SH.
3.3.2 Improper repairs, miscellaneous
maintenance shortcomings.
3.4 Operation-induced short-term
overheating
3.4.1 Improper shutdown and startup of unit
(condensate collection in SH/RH bends).
3.4.2 Overfiring when a top feedwater heater is
out of service.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Removal of damaged tube to confirm
source of blockage. Metallurgical examination
may be required. See Chapter 6, Volume 1 for
an overview of such techniques.
➠ (b). Examination for signs of exfoliation in
unit such as outbreaks of SPE in the turbine.
➠ (c). NDE, such as radiography, for other
locations of similar blockage.
➠ (d). For austenitic materials, a hand held
magnet will detect spalled oxide in bends.
➠ (e). As in item (a) above.
➠ (f). Review chemical cleaning procedures.
See Chapter 4, Volume 1 for additional discus-
sion.
➠ (g). Review repair records and correlate to
locations of failures.
➠ (h). Check thermocouples in outlet; deter-
mine whether tubes are running cold because
of no flow.
➠ (i). Review shutdown procedures; deter-
mine whether proper procedures have been
employed to boil out any condensate.
➠ (j). Review of operating logs of feedwater
heater operation and service.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

It is particularly important in the ➠ Use appropriate NDE

case of suspected short-term ➠ Use appropriate NDE
method to detect tube method to detect tube
overheating that the BTF Team swelling. Tube measure- blockage. Methods
should determine the extent of ments may indicate include:
damage as quickly as possible, damage accumulation.
perhaps even before the root • Magnets on the tube (for
cause has been confirmed. austenitic tubing only)
100% coverage is required • Radiography
unless it is clear that the failure • Warm-water flow verifica-
was an isolated event such as a tion tests.
blockage caused by a tool left in
a tube.
➠ Take selective samples
to confirm NDE result
and to determine extent
and nature of any block-
ages that are occurring.
Missed locations are
sites for immediate future
failures (next startup).

➠ Go to Action 5:
Implement Repairs,
Immediate Solutions and
Actions.

References to other sources of detailed information:

• Chapters 9 and 10, Volume 1 provide information about
methods to determine macroscopic and microscopic dam-
age, respectively, in boiler tubes.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

➠ Actions from Survey for Extent of
The BTF Team must ensure that Damage (Action 4).
repairs and immediate solutions
are directly tied to the underlying ➠Identify and remove all tube
cause. Of most immediate con- blockages.
cern are clearing major block- ➠Chemical clean if it is indicated
ages and all other sources of that excessive scale has
overheating before the unit goes formed and exfoliation is indi-
back on line. cated as an immediate source
for additional blockages.
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
of affected tubes.
➠See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
➠ Interim measure if exfoliation from
stainless steel is the root cause:
• A temporary operating measure
can be imposed to limit large
temperature transients, for
example, forced cooling of the
unit, that are causing the exfoli-
ation of the stainless steel tub-
ing. This should only be consid-
ered an interim measure until
longer term corrective actions
can be developed. Further, the
above steps to remove existing
blockages and replace affected
tubes must have already been
completed.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 36-15

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on clear identification of
underlying root cause.
Major Root Cause Influences
Tube blockage-induced short-term overheating
Blockage caused by exfoliated oxide.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Establish a long-term program of monitor-
ing and preventing the excessive buildup of
steamside oxide.
➠ Perform periodic evaluation of tube metal
temperatures via direct thermocouple measure,
NDE measurements of oxide scale thickness or
tube sampling to measure scale thickness.
➠ If tubing is being replaced, consider use of
chromizing to limit exfoliation.

Maintenance-induced short-term overheating

Improper chemical cleaning. ➠ Change chemical cleaning procedures and

• of SH/RH: poor flushing procedures leave frequency to correct.
deposits in bends.
• of waterwalls: volatility of chemicals getting
into SH circuits or poor backfilling of SH.

Improper repairs, miscellaneous maintenance ➠ Ensure that utility has optimum

shortcomings. welding/repair/maintenance procedures for
tube repair or for major SH/RH replacements.
See additional discussion of tube repairs and
replacements in Chapter 11, Volume 1.

Operation-induced short-term overheating

Improper shutdown and startup of unit ➠ Review and optimize shutdown procedures.
(condensate collection in SH/RH bends).

Overfiring when a top feedwater heater is out of ➠ Review and optimize operating procedures
service. when heaters are out of service and carefully
monitor steam/metal temperatures.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of
short-term overheating, or its
precursors.
Short-Term Alert for Other Cycle
Overheating Aspect Components
Presence of thick and • Potential for solid particle
exfoliating oxide. erosion damage to begin in
turbine components.
• Potential for overheating of
SH/RH tubes and loss of life.
➠ Actions Indicated
➠ Chemical cleaning of boiler. See
Chapter 4, Volume 1.
➠ Remnant life assessment using
oxide technique.

36-16 Short-Term Overheating in SH/RH Tubing

Chapter 37 • Volume 3
Stress Corrosion
Cracking (SCC)
Introduction
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is
the initiation and growth of cracks
in a susceptible material by simulta-
neous exposure to stress and an
adverse chemical environment.
SCC is a damage mechanism that
is common in a number of power
plant components, e.g., generator
rotor retaining rings, LP turbine
rotors, etc. and remains, because of
its complexity, one of the most
widely researched topics in corro-
sion science.
Stress corrosion cracking, along
with corrosion fatigue (Chapter 13,
Volume 2), are forms of environmen-
tally-assisted cracking, falling in the
spectrum of failure mechanisms
between fatigue (no effects of envi-
ronment) and generalized corrosion
(no effects of stress). Failures by
SCC can occur at stress levels that
are significantly below those
required for overload failures.
This chapter focuses on SCC, both
intergranular and transgranular in
superheater/reheater tubing, primar-
ily tubes constructed of austenitic
stainless steel.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 37-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of
boiler tubes occurs primarily in
austenitic materials, but may also
occur in ferritics. Macroscopically,
final failures are evidenced as thick-
edged, brittle failures, and may often
involve the blow out of small “win-
dow-type” pieces. Damage may
also be manifested as a pin-hole
leak. There is generally little plastic
deformation associated with failure
by SCC, and there is also little or no
loss of wall thickness because of the
SCC damage.
Cracks can be oriented circumferen-
tially or longitudinally as they will
form perpendicular to the dominant
stress, and may have significant
branching. Failures can initiate at
either inside or outside surfaces of
tubes, although ID initiation is the
most prevalent.
Microscopically, crack propagation
can be either transgranular (across
the crystal grains) or intergranular
(along grain boundaries). An exam-
ple of transgranular cracking, also
sometimes referred to as “branched
SCC”, is shown in Figure 37-1. This
can be contrasted with intergranular
SCC, also termed IGA as shown in
Figure 37-2. Either mode of propa-
gation can be observed in boiler
tube materials, depending upon the
conditions, and in some cases both
can occur simultaneously or in
sequence.
Boiler tube failures caused by inter-
granular SCC may be confused with
those caused by an intergranular
creep mechanism. Intergranular
creep will show the presence of
grain boundary creep cavitation
under high magnification whereas
intergranular SCC will not. During
polishing of material for metallurgical
37-2 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
examination, SCC damage will typi-
cally result in grains that fall out (See
Figure 37-2 for an example),
whereas the cracking tends to be
more discontinuous for intergranular
creep cracking.1 A final complica-
tion is that cracking may proceed
part way through-wall by intergranu-
lar SCC then propagate by inter-
granular creep.
Failures caused by intergranular cor-
rosion can also be confused with
intergranular SCC. Intergranular cor-
rosion has occurred extensively in
the superheater and reheater tubing
of several boilers.2 The attack origi-
nated on the OD of the tubes due to
the effects of sulfates and chlorides
in the deposited fly ash during wash
down of the tubing while the boiler
was out of service. The propensity to
the corrosion is enhanced when the
tubing surface is exposed to the
high temperature effects of the ash
which causes depassivation during
the off-load periods when the sur-
face is wet.2 IGSCC and intergranu-
lar corrosion have the same mor-
phology, that is, in austenitic stain-
less steels they both require sensiti-
zation. The two will be distinguished
primarily by damage location.
IGSCC is usually located at stress
concentrations and can be either ID-
or OD-initiated. Intergranular corro-
sion occurs in such locations as (i)
on the tube OD as caused by wash
down or (ii) on the tube ID at low
spots where liquids will accumulate.
Historically, the main cause of stress
corrosion cracking in ferritic materi-
als was caustic contamination and
buildup found in crevices of riveted
or welded joints. It was observed in
T1A reheater tubes, manifesting as
axial cracks, originating on the out-
side surface of the tube and was
entirely intergranular in nature.
Figure 37-1. Cracking of SA-213 Type 304H base material near the edge of a weld backing bar in a dissimilar metal weld joint.
This tube contained through-wall cracks after a few weeks of service. The corrodant causing the cracking was suspected to be a
petroleum-based preservative which was not effectively flushed from the weld backing rings prior to service.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

1.2 Locations of failure

The typical failure locations are in
bends and straight tubing with low
spots; these locations are exposed
to the highest concentrations of con-
taminants when water solutions are
left in, and boiled out of, the super-
heater. Lower bends in vertical pen-
dants which are entirely austenitic
and in which condensate can form
during shutdown are a typical loca-
tion for the occurrence of SCC.
High stress locations are also partic-
ularly susceptible: Such locations
include: bends, welds, tube attach-
ments, supports or spacers, and
locations near welds, especially
where a change in thickness occurs.
Higher stresses, either residual from
the fabrication process or as a result
of operating conditions, are more
Figure 37-2. Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of a SA-213 Type 304H typical of these types of locations
reheater tube. Away from the rupture, the IGSCC was limited to the tube's inside sur-
face. Carryover of chlorides was believed to have been the corrodant responsible for rather than straight tubing.
the cracking. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 37-3

2. Mechanism of Failure
Stress Corrosion Cracking:
Mechanism
1. Stress corrosion cracking
occurs by the interaction of
environment, stress and a sus-
ceptible material. The precise
mechanisms are a matter of
continued widespread and
detailed research.
2. In general, an initiating defect
such as a pit, surface scratch,
or weakness in protective
oxide allows for an initial cor-
rosive attack. Stress concen-
tration effects at the root of the
defect lead to the repeated
rupture of protective films that
form, and to the formation of a
crack. Crack growth occurs
as a result of the subsequent
interaction between stresses
at the crack tip and a concen-
trating environment.
37-4 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
2.1 Introduction
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC)
occurs as a result of the combined
action of a susceptible material, a
corrosive environment and a tensile
stress. The available information
about SCC is extensive and over-
whelming (see, for example, refer-
ences 3-6). After a review of the
basic mechanism, the next two por-
tions of this section briefly review
susceptible materials as they pertain
to boiler tubing and environmental
effects. Stresses may be present in
the form of applied or residual
stresses and, as noted above, loca-
tions where damage by SCC accu-
mulates are often associated with a
stress riser or concentration.
2.2 Basic overview of the
mechanism of SCC
The mechanism(s) of stress corro-
sion cracking is not fully determined
and continues to be one of the most
researched topics in corrosion; a
basic review of some aspects of the
mechanism follows.
The development of stress corrosion
cracking requires that a susceptible
material be subjected to both stress
and environmental effects. SCC is an
electrochemical phenomenon, an
aqueous solution is required, how-
ever local, for its occurrence. Stress
only will result in fatigue (cyclic
stresses) or overload failures; envi-
ronmental attack only will result in
pitting or generalized corrosion. SCC
often occurs in ductile materials that
form a passivation layer on the sur-
face and therefore are resistant to
general corrosion.4
For purposes of introducing the influ-
ences on SCC, the discussion of
mechanism is here divided into
transgranular attack and crack
growth, and intergranular growth,
although it should be kept in mind
that they can occur together either
sequentially or simultaneously, and
there is evidence that the two propa-
gation modes can be represented as
a continuum.7
For transgranular SCC, initiation
occurs at the surface, from pits, dis-
continuities, scratches, or, from local
modification of the protective oxide.
A rupture of the protective surface
film allows an initial corrosive attack.
Film rupture is determined by a vari-
ety of local factors, including local
stress, strain rate, film thickness, film
rupture strength, substructure of
moving dislocations, and microstruc-
ture.4 A further influence on the rate
of damage accumulation is the
repassivation rate of the crack walls
controlled by the material and such
environmental parameters as poten-
tial, pH, solution, and composition.4
Subsequently, the geometric effects
of stress concentration at the root of
the initial surface defect lead to crack
formation and advance. Successive
rupture and reformation of the pas-
sive film occurs at the crack tip as a
result of tensile stresses.
In the case of intergranular SCC,
preferential attack occurs at the
grain boundaries of “sensitized”
material.
2.3 Boiler tubing materials
and SCC
2.3.1 Austenitic stainless steels
When austenitic stainless steels are
exposed to temperatures in the
range 425 to 815°C (~ 800 to
1500°F) chromium will diffuse to
grain boundaries to form chromium
carbides. The depletion of chromium
from the matrix nearby the grain
boundary reduces the local corro-
sion resistance of the material.
Stainless steel in this condition is
termed “sensitized”. Sensitized
stainless steel is particularly suscep-
tible to attack by chlorides.
Since stainless steel used in SH/RH
sections is routinely exposed to
these temperature levels, the mater-
ial will develop a susceptibility to
SCC. Two approaches to limit the
degree of sensitization are (i) the
use of low carbon grades and (ii)
the use of stabilized grades of stain-
less steels. In the low carbon
grades, the objective is to have
insufficient carbon to form carbides.
Unfortunately, as they generally have
low creep strengths, these materials
are generally not suitable for SH/RH
tubing applications. The second
approach is to utilize grades, such
as Type 321H and 347H that contain
elements (titanium and niobium
respectively) which are stronger car-
bide formers than chromium; thus
the material maintains its corrosion
resistance in these “stabilized”
grades. However, both Types 321H
and 347H will sensitize in SH/RH
applications.
2.3.2 Ferritic materials Attack of
ferritic materials by SCC is very
uncommon. It was a significant
problem in power plants in the early
1900s because of caustic contami-
nation and buildup associated with
crevices of riveted or welded joints.
SCC has also been observed in
rolled tubes in drums and headers.
There have been some occurrences
in T1A reheater tubes, manifested as
axial cracks, originating on the out-
side surface of tubes and intergran-
ular in nature. Most typically the
caustic was introduced in the desu-
perheating or attemperator spray.
The attack of ferritic materials by
caustic in tubing and turbine materi-
als is one of the most important fea-
tures to consider for any units that
are considering change over to
NaOH treatment, or indeed that
operate with phosphate treatment in
the free hydroxide zone. It is one The second source of contaminants
reason that the amount of free NaOH that can foster SCC is the carryover
is usually limited to 1 ppm in the of volatile chemicals from the boiler.
boiler water. For example, Na2SO4 can be
mechanically carried over in steam
and will subsequently combine with
2.4 Sources of corrosive moisture from condensate to cause
environments in boiler tubes pitting, usually in the RH (see
that can lead to SCC Chapter 41). As mentioned above,
there can also be a problem if there
2.4.1 Steamside sources
is carryover of NaOH in those units
Steamside contributors to SCC are
under either caustic treatment or
usually chlorides or hydroxides; fer-
phosphate treatment and operating
ritic materials are susceptible to
with excessive levels of NaOH.
NaOH, stainless steels to either
There is also some emerging infor-
NaOH or chlorides. There are two
mation that high levels of organics
primary sources for these contribut-
(hundreds of ppm) can result in SCC
ing species: (i) contamination from
especially when they are oxidized
chemical cleaning, and (ii) carryover
by high dissolved oxygen levels.8
of volatile chemicals from the boiler.
SCC caused by chloride or caustic
The sources of chemical cleaning
ingress is invariably transgranular
contaminants are described in
with extensive crack branching.
Chapter 4, Volume 1 which
overviews cleaning procedures and
2.4.2 Fireside sources Fireside cor-
considerations, and in the two chap-
rosives are either polythionic acids,
ters addressing specific BTF mecha-
or less commonly, nitrates and sul-
nisms in waterwalls (Chapter 25,
fates. Polythonic acids are H2SXO6
Volume 2) and in SH/RH tubing
compounds where X is equal to 3, 4,
(Chapter 43). Briefly the major prob-
or 5. They form in oil-fired units from
lems are:
reactions between sulfur corrosion
• Poor back-fill procedures that fail products, SO2, moisture and air.
to protect SH circuits from the
carryover of solvents, such as HCl,
during cleaning of waterwalls.
• Problems that develop during
cleaning of SH/RH circuits such
as a breakdown of inhibitors
caused by excessive tempera-
tures, or leaving acids in circuits
because of improper flushing of
chemicals. Furthermore, the
inhibitors used sometimes contain
sulfur, which, if it deposits, can
lead to a problem with intergranu-
lar attack.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 37-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Stress Corrosion Cracking:
Root Causes
Stress corrosion cracking
requires all three influences:
environmental effects, tensile
stresses and a susceptible
material. Therefore, the goal of
root cause analysis is not to pick
a single cause but to evaluate
the relative contribution of the
causes and point toward
solutions most likely to be
successful.
37-6 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
3.1 Introduction
Failure by SCC requires all three
aspects: environmental, stress and a
susceptible material. Part of the chal-
lenge in developing solutions will be
the clear identification of the influ-
ence of the various contributors.
However, the reader should be fore-
warned that preventing BTF by SCC,
except for some of the effects of the
environmental contribution, is difficult.
The root cause influences of envi-
ronment, stress, and a susceptible
material are discussed in the next
three sections. Table 37-1 summa-
rizes the major root cause influ-
ences, their confirmation, and cor-
rective actions.
3.2 Influence of environment
Sources of contamination can occur
on either the steamside or fireside
and include: (i) carryover of chlo-
rides from the chemical cleaning of
waterwalls, (ii) introduction of high
levels of caustic by carryover from
the boiler, (iii) condenser cooling
water constituents in attemperator
spray water as a result of a con-
denser leak, (iv) boiler water carry-
over, especially during drum level
surges produced by rapid load
changes, or by operating at too high
a drum level, (v) sulfur compounds
that form polythionic acid during
shutdown and attack the fireside,
(vi) ingress of flue gas environment
into tubes through a primary failure,
especially in the RH when a vacuum
is drawn, or (vii) desuperheating or
attemperator water.
Actions to confirm:
(a). Analyze steamside fracture sur-
faces and oxide deposits for the
presence of chemical species that
would indicate a source of contami-
nation. For example, the presence of
chlorides has been detected on
fracture surfaces by EDX spec-
troscopy.
(b). Analyze fireside deposits, in the
case of fireside attack, for indica-
tions of aggressive corrodants. For
example, in the case of SCC of fer-
ritic materials, analysis of fireside
deposits typically show significant
amounts of chloride and sulfate, and
sometimes nitrate.
(c). Review of chemistry records
may indicate the source of contami-
nation. For drum units a mechanical
carryover test should be performed
to determine if any of the drum inter-
nals are cracked or by-passing
moisture. This involves measuring
the ratio of the contaminant in the
saturated steam to that in the boiler
drum (CBD) and comparing that
ratio to prior measurements or to the
manufacturer’s specified limit.
(d). Review of recent chemical
cleaning operations either in the
waterwalls or in SH/RH circuits may
indicate whether a potential source
of contamination was introduced in
the SH/RH circuits.
Table 37-1
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failure

3.2 Influence of environment, mainly contamination from:

• carryover of chlorides from (a). Analyze steamside fracture surfaces and • Institute repair and • Develop chemical control and
the chemical cleaning of oxide deposits for presence of contami- replacement as required. monitoring procedures to maintain
waterwalls. nant species such as chlorides. • Clean up sources of and verify appropriate chemistry. See
• boiler water carryover. (b). Analyze fireside deposits for indications contamination, if possi- Chapter 3, Volume 1 for more
• introduction of high levels of of aggressive corrodants. ble. For example, information.
caustic from desuperheating (c). Review chemistry records, monitoring re-clean SH/RH circuits • Develop optimized chemical cleaning
or attemperator spray. records, etc. for indication of source of if improper flushing of procedures and safeguards. See
• condenser cooling water contamination. Perform carryover test. solvents is underlying Chapter 4, Volume 1 and chemical
constituents from a condenser See main text for additional discussion cause. cleaning damage mechanisms (Chapter
leak. on this point. 43 and Chapter 25, Volume 2).
• fireside contaminants such as (d). Review recent chemical cleaning
polythionic acid. operations, either waterwalls or SH/RH
• ingress of flue gas environ- circuits, for potential sources of
ment into tube through primary contamination.
failure, especially in RH when
vacuum is drawn.

3.3 Influence of excessive stresses

(e). Visual examination for signs of obvious
distress such as broken or missing
attachments or supports, etc.
(f). Review field welding procedures for
details of post-weld heat treatment.
• Repair any obvious • Ensure that any redesign of supports,
contributors to excess etc. will actually lower the imposed
stress levels. stress.
• See long-term actions.

3.4 Influence of sensitized material.

(g). Perform a metallurgical examination to • See long-term actions. • Consider replacement of material with
determine whether sensitization devel- a stabilized grade of stainless steel.
oped in service or was present as a
result of the fabrication process used.
(h). Test the material for baseline suscepti-
bility using ASTM Standard Practice
A262.
(i). Analyze the chemical composition of
the failed material to see if the proper
material was used.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 37-7

3.3 Influence of stresses
Since residual stresses from fabrica-
tion or welding alone, and/or in con-
junction with normal service
stresses, can be sufficient to con-
tribute to a problem with SCC in
boiler tubes, it may be difficult to
provide significant mitigation of this
individual contributor. Generally, an
outbreak of SCC occurs as a result
of a contaminant getting into the
SH/RH with the affected areas being
those at the highest imposed
stresses. As a result, although
stresses may be a contributor, con-
trol of SCC in boiler tubes will more
often be found in identification and
correction of the occurrence of
contamination and/or environmental
effects. There may be, however,
obvious sources of excessive
stresses such as improperly
designed or constructed attach-
4. Determine the Extent of Damage
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
37-8 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
ments, missing supports, improper
field welding or heat treating
procedures etc.
Actions to confirm:
(e). Visual examination for obvious
signs of stress distress such as
missing or broken attachments, sup-
ports, etc.
(f). Review field welding procedures
for details of post-weld heat-treat-
ment.
3.4 Influence of a susceptible
material
The third contributor to SCC in boiler
tubes is a susceptible material. As
noted above, the operating temper-
ature in SH/RH tubes corresponds
to the range of typical sensitization
of Type 300 stainless steels.
Therefore, without changing to a
less susceptible material, sensitiza-
If the cracking is surface-connected,
fluorescent dye penetrant or eddy-
current testing can be used carefully
to detect it. Fluorescent magnetic
particle is used for ferritic materials.
Because of the tightness of the
cracks, methods such as radiogra-
phy, and ultrasonics for detecting
subsurface damage are of limited
value.
Seldom is there an occurrence of
SCC in SH/RH circuits where only a
single tube location is affected.
Outbreaks of SCC tend to be wide-
spread and there have been
instances of where whole sections of
the SH have been replaced after
corrosive chemicals were carried
over during a waterwall chemical
cleaning.
The primary immediate actions are
to (i) determine the extent of dam-
age, especially critical may be
bends, weld, attachments, etc. and
other locations of highest stresses
although, as discussed above, this
tion is essentially a given. There are
three actions that can be taken to
evaluate the extent of sensitization
and characterize the boiler tube
material:
(g). A metallurgical examination
can help determine the degree of
susceptibility. French9 points out
that if the degree of sensitization is
different on hot and cold sides of
the tube, then the sensitization has
occurred during service and not as
a result of the fabrication process,
which would result in uniform sensi-
tization.
(h). Test the material for baseline
susceptibility using the ASTM
Standard Practice (A262).10
(i). Analyze the chemical composi-
tion of the failed material to see if
proper material was used.
is not a simple step, (ii) make appro-
priate repairs or tube replacements,
and (iii) clean up any sources of
contamination that may have
triggered the outbreak. The last is
par-ticularly apt when a single,
obvious event is at the root of the
problem, e.g., improper chemical
cleaning, breakdown of inhibitors,
unit startup after an improper shut-
down procedure has introduced
significant contamination, or similar
event.
The balance of the actions are prob-
ably more appropriately considered
under long-term actions.
6. Background to Long Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Long-term actions can be reviewed
for each of the three contributing
influences on SCC: environment,
stress, and material susceptibility.
6.1 Control of environment
Control of environmental influences,
primarily keeping contaminants out
of the SH/RH, is perhaps the most
direct means to preventing SCC. A
variety of steps can be taken; all are
good practices that have consider-
able value beyond the prevention of
SCC. They include control of steam
composition during normal opera-
tion, proper execution of chemical
cleaning operations, and proper
shutdown/layup procedures. The
first two are discussed in detail in
Chapter 3, Volume 1, and the last in
Chapter 4, Volume 1. Some exam-
ples are:
• Monitor SH and RH steam for
composition, including key para-
meters such as Na and cation
conductivity levels as described
in the appropriate cycle chemistry
guidelines. More detail in this
regard is presented in Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
• A check for mechanical carryover
can provide assurance in a drum
unit that impurities and concen-
trated boiler chemicals do not
enter the steam.
• Ensure proper backfilling of the
SH during chemical cleaning of
waterwalls, and proper conduct of
chemical cleaning of SH/RH
including complete rinsing follow-
ing the clean.
• Control the SH/RH atmosphere
during shutdown.
6.2 Control of stresses
Executing effective strategies for the
control of the influence of stress on
SCC in boiler tubes is difficult. Some
actions to reduce obvious stresses,
either applied (such as where
attachments are poorly designed,
missing, or broken) or residual (such
as by the heat treatment of bends
and control of installation welding)
may be performed. Heat treatment
of austenitic stainless steels is not
recommended because of the likeli-
hood that the temperatures used will
result in fully sensitized microstruc-
tures.
6.3 Control of sensitized
material
Because the normal operating tem-
peratures for SH/RH tubes are suffi-
cient to cause sensitization of the
austenitic stainless steels, it is diffi-
cult to prevent sensitization from
occurring. It may be possible to
change materials to stabilized
grades of austenitic steels that can
reduce sensitization. However, this is
not a “magic bullet”. There have
been a number of cases of SCC in
Types 321 and 347.
One such example cited by French9
was of SCC in Type 347H which is
normally resistant to SCC unless ele-
vated temperatures of at least 590 to
705°C (~ 1100 to 1300°F) have
been experienced. It was concluded
that the tube had been exposed to
higher than expected temperatures
as had nearby tubing that had not
failed, but contained extensive SCC
damage. The tubes in question had
seen 20 years life and a replace-
ment in-kind was made with a rec-
ommendation to minimize overfiring
at low flows during startups.9
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 37-9
7. Case studies

Stress Corrosion Cracking Case Studies: Field Experience

Table 37-2 shows a summary of
five examples of field conditions
which each led to a problem with
stress corrosion cracking. The first
four (# 1-4) were initiated by prob-
lems/deficiencies during chemical
cleaning. In 3 of the 4 cases, the
chemical cleaning medium entered
the steam circuits because of poor
protection of the SH during the
clean.
In case #2 the EDTA temperature
in the boiler was elevated in error
and some of the chemical vola-
tized. It subsequently entered the
SH circuits and started to “chemi-
cally clean” the SH tubes; it thus
remained in place and obviously
was not “rinsed” until the unit
returned to service. As a result, the
Type 304H at the bottom of the
loops was severely attacked inter-
granularly.
In case #3, during a preoperational
RH clean, the chemical (HAF) with
a sulfur-bearing inhibitor remained
in the RH tubes for an excessive
time because of a lack of rinsing
water. Almost every location adja-
cent to a weld and to an attach-
ment suffered IGA as a result.
Case #5 is a special case not
related to a chemical cleaning
operation where a major condenser
leak occurred in a once-through
supercritical unit. The cation con-
ductivity went to >> 0.3 mS/cm.
The unit, which lacked control room
alarms, was kept running in this
condition for more than 6 hours,
and as a result the entire unit was
affected. In addition to SCC of all
austenitic material in the SH and
RH, major deposition and damage
also occurred in the turbine.

Table 37-2
Case Studies of SCC

Case Boiler Area Solvent* Damage Cause

Study Being Type
No. Cleaned Area/Material

1 Drum WW/ HCl SCC Poor backfill during

Econ. SH/321H cleaning.

2 Drum WW/ EDTA IGA Poor backfill and over-

Econ. SH/304H heated EDTA which vola-
tized and entered the SH.

3 Drum RH HAF IGA Breakdown of sulfur-

RH/304H containing chemical
cleaning inhibitor which
remained after rinsing.

4 Once-through WW/ HCl SCC Poor protection of SH

Econ. SH/321H during cleaning.

5 Once-through n/a n/a SCC Major condenser leak.

SH/RH/321 & Unit kept running for six
304 hours.

Note: IGA - intergranular attack

* See Table 4-3 in Volume 1 of SH/RH Solvents.

37-10 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)

8. References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.
2Personal Communications from K. Woolhouse (FCA,
Australia) and D. French (David N. French, Inc.) to R.B.
Dooley, February, 1995.
3Logan,H.L., The Stress Corrosion of Metals, Wiley,
New York, 1966.
4Macdonald, D.D. and G.A. Cragnolino, “Corrosion of
Steam Cycle Materials”, Chapter 9 in The ASME
Handbook on Water Technology For Thermal Power
Systems, American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
New York, 1989.
5Staehle, R.W., A.J. Forty, and D. Van Rooyen, eds.,
Fundamental Aspects of Stress Corrosion Cracking,
National Association of Corrosion Engineers, Houston,
TX, 1969.
6Staehle, R.W., J. Hockmann, R.D. McCright, J.E. Slater,
eds. Stress Corrosion Cracking and Hydrogen
Embrittlement of Iron Base Alloys, National Association
of Corrosion Engineers, Houston, TX, 1977.
7Capener, E.L. and R.H. Richman, “A Re-Analysis of
Results from Constant Extension Rate Tests on Sensitized
AISI 304 Stainless Steel”, NACE Corrosion, Vol. 42, No.
8, 1986, pp. 482-489.
8Martynova,O.I. and A.B. Vainman, “Some Problems
of Oxygenated Treatment Use in Supercritical Units”,
Thermal Engineering, Volume 41, No. 7, 1994, pp.
497-503.
9French, S.M., “Intergranular Failure of Tube 347H
Stainless Steel Superheater Tubes”, in B. Dooley, ed.,
Proceedings: International Conference on Boiler Tube
Failures in Fossil Plants, held in San Diego, California
November 5-7, 1991, Proceedings TR-100493, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1992, pp.
4-17 through 4-27.
10American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard
A262-93a (1993), “Standard Practices for Detecting
Susceptibility to Intergranular Attack in Austenitic
Stainless Steels”, 1994 Annual Book of ASTM Standards,
American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia,
PA, 1994.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 37-11
ACTIONS for Stress Corrosion Cracking
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of stress
corrosion cracking begin here.
The goal of these actions is to
see if further investigation of this
mechanism is warranted or
whether another BTF mechanism
should be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and stress corrosion
cracking is the likely mecha-
nism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by stress corrosion cracking.
37-12 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred
and stress corrosion cracking is
the likely mechanism.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure indi-
cates such features as:
• Thick-edged, brittle final frac-
ture or pin-hole leak.
➠ Confirm that damage has been
found in a location typical of SCC,
such as adjacent to attachments,
bends, welds, etc.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by stress corro-
sion cracking.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• A condenser leak leading to
condenser cooling water con-
stituents in attemperator spray
water.
➠ Determine if there has been cont-
amination particularly by chlo-
rides during chemical cleaning of
either (i) waterwalls because of
poor back-fill procedures that
failed to protect SH circuits during
cleaning operations or (ii) SH/RH
circuits such as caused by a
breakdown in inhibitors or
improper flushing of solvents.
➠ Determine whether there has been
carryover of volatile chemicals
from the boiler, such as NaOH for
units on caustic treatment.
➠ These precursors can be indica-
tive of attack by a stress corro-
sion cracking mechanism. If one
or more has occurred, go to
Action 3 which outlines the steps
to confirm the root cause.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is stress
corrosion cracking.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being stress corrosion
cracking damage (Action 1a).
Action 2 should clearly identify
stress corrosion cracking as the
primary mechanism or point to
another cause. The actions listed
will be executed by removing rep-
resentative tube sample(s), fol-
lowed by visual examination and
detailed metallographic analysis.
➠ Analyze in detail the failure Thin-edged or ductile failures are
surface. Is the failure surface a not typical of SCC damage. See
thick-edged fracture, and/or wastage mechanisms such as fire-
brittle in appearance? side corrosion (Chapters 33 or 34).
➠ Determine extent of wall thinning. Damage has at least a component
Is there significant wall thinning of fireside corrosion (Chapters 33
associated with the damage? or 34) associated with it. May not
be stress corrosion cracking.
➠ Analyze nature of cracking. Does
it have the appearance of either
transgranular or intergranular
attack? For example, a source of
chloride or caustic will generally
lead to transgranular attack; sul-
fur-containing compounds will
usually lead to IGA.
➠ Determine whether cracking is Extensive signs of creep damage
intergranular creep cracking and may indicate mechanism is
not SCC. Are there obvious grain intergranular creep cracking (see
boundary creep cavities? Chapter 24, Volume 2 on low-
temperature creep cracking), not
stress corrosion cracking. See also
main text for other distinguishing
features.
Probable mechanism is stress
corrosion cracking.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 37-13
Action 3: Determine root cause of stress corrosion cracking
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as stress corrosion crack-
ing (Action 2) or a precursor to
stress corrosion cracking has
occurred (Action 1b). The goal of
this Action 3 is for the BTF Team
to review the potential root
causes, identify probable ones,
and take those actions that are
needed to confirm which are
operative in the unit. This step
must be taken so that the proper
actions can be taken to prevent
future BTF from occurring by this
mechanism. Execute, in parallel,
Action 4 to determine the extent
of damage.
37-14 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
3.2 Influence of environment, mainly
contamination from:
• carryover of chlorides from the chemical
cleaning of waterwalls.
• boiler water carryover.
• introduction of high levels of caustic from
desuperheating or attemperator spray.
• condenser cooling water constituents from a
condenser leak.
• fireside contaminants such as polythionic
acid.
• ingress of flue gas environment into tube
through primary failure, especially in RH
when vacuum is drawn.
3.3 Influence of excessive stresses.
3.4 Influence of sensitized material.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Analyze steamside fracture surfaces
and oxide deposits for presence of contaminant
species such as chlorides.
➠ (b). Analyze fireside deposits for indica-
tions of aggressive corrodants.
➠ (c). Review chemistry records, monitoring
records, etc. for indication of source of conta-
mination. Perform carryover test. See main text
for additional discussion on this point.
➠ (d). Review recent chemical cleaning oper-
ations, either waterwalls or SH/RH circuits, for
potential sources of contamination.
➠ (e). Visual examination for signs of obvi-
ous distress such as broken or missing attach-
ments or supports, etc.
➠ (f). Review field welding procedures for
details of post-weld heat treatment.
➠ (g). Perform a metallurgical examination to
determine whether sensitization developed in
service or was present as a result of the fabri-
cation process used.
➠ (h). Test the material for baseline suscepti-
bility using ASTM Standard Practice A262.
➠ (i). Analyze the chemical composition of
the failed material to see if the proper material
was used.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root

cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Because of the tight
cracks associated with SCC,
even surface-connected crack-
ing may be difficult to detect.
Fluorescent dye penetrant can
be used to detect surface-con-
nected cracks; fluorescent mag-
netic particle for ferritic materi-
als. Eddy current testing may
also be used.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Immediate actions (Action 5) will
be primarily to repair and
replace damaged tubes as
required. Most actions can be
considered for the longer-term
(Action 6) but several underlying
problems can be dealt with in
the short-term.
➠ Remove a sufficient number of
tube samples ( ~ 10) from typical
areas and evaluate using metal-
lurgical analysis.
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
of affected tubes based on NDE
survey (Action 4)
➠See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
➠ Clean up any obvious sources of
contamination that may have trig-
gered the outbreak of SCC.
➠ Correct any obvious contributors
to excessive stress levels such as
broken, missing, and incorrectly
designed attachments, supports,
etc.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 37-15

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

The correction of the underlying
problem(s), if possible, and the
prevention of repeat failures are
priorities for the BTF Team. The
proper choice of long-term
actions will be based on clear
identification of the underlying
root causes. For SCC long-term
actions will be based primarily
on controlling contamination to
the SH/RH circuits.
Major Root Cause Influences
Influence of environment, mainly
contamination from:
• carryover of chlorides from the chemical
cleaning of waterwalls.
• boiler water carryover.
• introduction of high levels of caustic from
desuperheating or attemperator spray.
• condenser cooling water constituents from a
condenser leak.
• fireside contaminants such as polythionic
acid.
• ingress of flue gas environment into tube
through primary failure, especially in RH
when vacuum is drawn.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Develop chemical control and monitoring
procedures to maintain and verify appropriate
chemistry. See Chapter 3, Volume 1 for more
information.
➠ Develop optimized chemical cleaning pro-
cedures and safeguards. See Chapter 4,
Volume 1 and chemical cleaning damage
mechanisms (Chapter 43 and Chapter 25,
Volume 2) for more information.

Influence of excessive stresses. ➠ Ensure that any redesign of supports, etc.

will actually lower the imposed stress.

Influence of sensitized material. ➠ Consider replacement of material with a sta-

bilized grade of stainless steel.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

The final step is for the BTF team

to review the possible ramifica-
tions implied by the presence of
stress corrosion cracking. The
main warning is about secondary
effects of contamination espe-
cially in the turbine.

37-16 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)

Chapter 38 • Volume 3
SH/RH Sootblower
Erosion
Introduction
This chapter discusses sootblower
erosion as it occurs in SH/RH sec-
tions. Another chapter addresses
some separate aspects of soot-
blower erosion in water-touched tub-
ing (Chapter 22, Volume 2).
Sootblower erosion is one of five fire-
side erosion mechanisms discussed
in this book. The others are flyash
erosion, erosion caused by falling
slag, coal particle erosion, and the
erosion of in-bed tubes of bubbling
fluidized bed units. Tube failures
caused by sootblower erosion are
completely preventable by the
proper maintenance and operation
of sootblowers, along with a periodic
quality assurance program.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 38-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
Sootblower Erosion:
Identification Keys
1. The presence of symmetric
wastage flats on the tube sur-
face located approximately
45° around the tube circum-
ference from the direction of
sootblowing.
2. Wastage that is less severe as
the distance from the soot-
blower increases.
38-2 SH/RH Sootblower Erosion
1.1 Features of failure
Macroscopic features of failure from
sootblower-induced erosion will be
those common to other erosive
processes: (i) wall thinning caused
by external tube surface wastage,
and (ii) little or no ash deposits on
the tube.
A distinguishing feature of soot-
blower erosion is the evidence of
two wastage flats at approximately
45° around the tube circumference
from the direction of impact from the
sootblower as shown in Figure 38-1.
These wastage flats will decrease in
severity with increasing distance
from the sootblower itself. Figure 38-
1 also shows that tubes subjected to
sootblower erosion will have little or
no ash on the tube surface. Similar
to other erosive processes, a distin-
guishing feature is the formation of
fresh rust on tubes only a few hours
after boiler washing which indicates
Figure 38-1. Superheater tube which failed because of sootblower erosion. Note
wastage flats and absence of ash deposits. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1
an advanced erosion problem in
which the protective scale has been
removed.
In the case of SH/RH tubing, where
sootblower erosion is the dominant
mechanism of failure, the amount of
wall thinning to the amount of steam-
side scale buildup will be large,
often a ratio greater than 5:1 as
shown in Figure 38-2.
As erosion becomes more severe,
tubes begin to thin, flattened areas
develop, and eventually internal
pressure leads to tube rupture. If the
erosion is rapid, the failure may be
thin-edged, a pin-hole shape or a
long, “thin” blowout. If the failure
was gradual, then creep effects
could dominate, resulting in a thick-
edged failure. This latter case is
however less likely for sootblower-
induced erosion than, for example,
in the case of flyash erosion.
 There are some superficial similari-
0.2 ties among the boiler tube failures
Gas flow caused by erosion. In particular it is
Y = 5X
A important to distinguish between
F B tube damage caused by sootblower
0.15
Wall Loss (Inches)

erosion and that caused by flyash

erosion. Table 38-1 provides some of
Y = 3X the basic differences, which are also
F E C
0.1
D
discussed in Chapter 7, Volume 1.
B

A 1.2. Locations of failure

0.05 Typical failure locations for soot-
DC blower erosion in the SH/RH include
those that
0 E
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 • Are the first tubes in from the
wall entrance of the retractable
Steamside Oxide Scale Thickness (Inches)
blowers.
• Are in the direct path of the
Figure 38-2 Tube with sootblower erosion. Note that the tube wastage is well above retractable blowers.
that expected from in-service oxidation. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Table 38-1
Comparison of Characteristics of Sootblower and Flyash Erosion

Feature Sootblower Erosion Flyash Erosion

Correlation of damage to Obvious correspondence between None

distance from a soot- (i) the severity of the erosion and
blower. (ii) the distance to sootblower
and the track of the sootblower.

Nature of wastage flats Generally two, located at 45° Flats form in direction facing into
around tube circumference from gas flow.
direction of sootblowing.

Severity of erosive process
Can be very severe with short
times to tube failure in the case
of a deficiency in the sootblowing
operation.
Tends to occur over somewhat
longer periods, although it can
also be rapid in the case of
extreme local velocity profiles or
ash loadings.

Principal underlying cause Excessive use, malfunction, Excessive local flue gas veloci-
improper operation, or poor ties exacerbated by high ash
maintenance of sootblowers. loadings.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 38-3

2. Mechanism of Failure
Sootblower-induced erosion causes
accelerated tube wastage by direct
material removal; removal of the fire-
side oxide also increases the fireside
oxidation rate. The rate and extent of
all the erosive processes are
affected by impacting particle or
fluid velocity, angle of impact, parti-
cle composition and shape, and ero-
sive resistance of the tube surface
including compositional and temper-
ature variations. There are an extra-
ordinary number of papers on all
aspects of solid particle, liquid
droplet and cavitation erosion effects
on materials; only a brief review of
key aspects is provided here, spe-
cific to sootblower erosion. See also
the general comments on erosion in
Chapter 14, Volume 2 on flyash ero-
sion.
Sootblower erosion generally results
from ash particles that are incorpo-
rated into the sootblowing medium.
This problem is exacerbated if the
medium is “wet” from: (i) insufficient
superheat in the steam, (ii) because
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Primarily, sootblower erosion is
caused by improper operation and
maintenance, such as incorrectly
setting the blowing temperature,
excessive use of the sootblowers,
malfunction or improper location of
sootblowers. It can also result from
drooping or misalignment of the
sootblower, such as at the end of its
traverse, because of the effects of
operating temperature or poor main-
tenance.
Condensation in steam or air supply
lines can result from a variety of
causes including3: (i) improper
drainage, (ii) temperature changes,
(iii) insufficient steam superheat
38-4 SH/RH Sootblower Erosion
the temperature sensor is incorrectly
set, or (iii) because the control valve
has not been properly set. Failures
caused by condensate forming in
the blowing media will generally
originate at the sootblower valve and
continue along the blower path until
the moisture is cleared from the
blower.
There can also be the appearance
of gouges on the external tube sur-
face where eddying of the steam
occurs between adjacent tubes.2
Final failure generally occurs as a
result of stress rupture when the
thinned tube wall can no longer sup-
port the internal pressure. The final
failure appearance will be ductile
and thin walled. In rare cases where
only partial thinning takes place,
such as on an intermittent basis,
final failure may be by creep, which
will manifest thick-edged final fail-
ures. In this case, there will typically
be other signs of long-term over-
heating of the tube such as the
build-up of steamside oxide.
temperature, or (iv) inadequate
aftercooling of sootblower air com-
pressors.
Actions to pinpoint the particular
shortcoming that is causing the
boiler tube wear include:
(a). Visual examination can, for
example, detect a sootblower stuck
in one position, misalignment, etc.
(b). Calibration and testing to
measure key parameters such as
blowing temperature and pressure,
operation of moisture traps, or
checking travel and sequence
times.
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
As with other erosion processes,
visual examination may identify a
serious sootblower erosion problem
where significant wastage has
occurred, or it may uncover indirect
signs of a problem, such as rusted
tube locations within a few hours of
a boiler wash, indicating the removal
of protective surface oxides. In the
case of sootblower erosion, damage
should be localized to the area
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Where the loss of wall thickness is
not significant, the damaged tubes
should be evaluated as to whether
they can remain in service, or
whether they will require repair or
replacement. Chapter 8, Volume 1,
addresses remaining life calcula-
tions; procedures for the repair and
replacement of tubes are discussed
in Chapter 11, Volume 1.
Palliative solutions such as the use
of pad welds, spray coatings to
increase the wear resistance of the
tube, or shielding to protect local
eroded areas, should only be used
as emergency repairs to get the unit
back on-line. They should be
replaced at the next scheduled out-
age as these weld measures can
themselves introduce further prob-
lems. The pitfalls of these repair
methods are covered in Chapter 11,
Volume 1. It is also important to rec-
ognize that if the underlying soot-
blower problem is not addressed,
the result will be on-going repeat
failures.
Tube failures by sootblower erosion
are preventable through improved
maintenance or operation of soot-
around the defective blower or in the
track of the blower, and the survey
for the extent of damage should be
straightforward. An ultrasonic testing
(UT) survey to detect wall thinning
can determine the degree of dam-
age that has occurred, a necessary
precursor to rational repair/replace
decisions. Chapter 9, Volume 1 pro-
vides an overview of the use of UT
to detect wall thinning.
blowers, and setting of optimized
sootblowing parameters and fre-
quency. Since a modern boiler can
have over 100 sootblowers and they
are subject to a harsh environment,
they present a constant mainte-
nance chore, to the point where
some utilities keep dedicated crews
to perform sootblower maintenance
on a regular basis.2 This is consid-
ered to be the optimum approach.
Recommended practices for general
sootblower maintenance, not neces-
sarily specific to preventing boiler
tube failures include3:
• Use of thermocouples in steam
trap lines to detect and alarm on
the presence of water to prevent
nozzle failures.
• Use of stainless steel in the last 2
to 3 feet of long sootblower noz-
zles.
• Correcting sootblower misalign-
ment due to cold sprung piping
installation.
• Use of complete spare part kits
for sootblower maintenance.
• Use of sealed proximity switches.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 38-5
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures (Continued)
• Use of dedicated sootblower
repair crews and a regularly
scheduled preventive mainte-
nance program.
• Use of a slide gate to isolate the
sootblower opening when doing
on-line repairs.
• Use of severe duty sootblowers
for critical locations.
• Use of thermocouples in tube
walls and computers to optimize
the sootblowing program.
Periodic checking of steam traps
and drains are essential to keep
water out of the system as is regular
blowdown of the sootblowing air
lines for compressed air systems.
As noted above, thermocouples
have been used in steam trap lines
to detect the presence of water. If
condensate is forming in the blow-
ing media then appropriate actions
may include4: (i) allowing for steam
warmup, (ii) completely draining the
supply piping through thermal drain
valves or impulse condensate drain
valves, or (iii) the use of air dryers.
Excessive blowing pressures will
increase the likelihood for erosion to
occur since the rate of erosion is a
function of velocity to an exponent
that ranges from 2 to 4 depending
upon a number of factors.
The long-term prevention of failures
will also be found in a program that
confirms, by visual inspection and
calibration of the sootblowers and
components, that the optimum oper-
ation is continuing. Fireside testing
with probes in the area to determine
the rate of ash buildup on tubes will
allow the optimum intervals between
sootblowing to be set. Sootblowing
should not be simply performed
once/shift or once/day, but on an as-
needed basis.
Alignment problems, which can
develop as a result of inadvertent
forces during operation, can be
found by inspection of tubes adja-
cent to sootblowers during planned
maintenance outages.

7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.

8. References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.
2Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec,
November, 1983.
3Pack, R.W. and P.J. Resetar, State-of-the-Art
Maintenance and Repair Technology for Fossil Boilers
and Related Auxiliaries, Research Project 2504-1, Final
Report CS-4840, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, March, 1987.
4Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.

38-6 SH/RH Sootblower Erosion

ACTIONS for Sootblower Erosion (SH/RH)
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of soot-
blower erosion begin here. The
goal of these actions is to see if
further investigation of soot-
blower erosion is warranted or
whether another BTF mechanism
should be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and sootblower ero-
sion is the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by sootblower erosion.
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred
and sootblower erosion is the
likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred near to a sootblower in
a steam-touched circuit, particu-
larly in locations that:
• Are the first tubes in from the
wall entrance of the retractable
blowers.
• Are in the direct path of the
retractable blowers.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Symmetric wastage flats on the
tube surface, located approxi-
mately 45° around the tube cir-
cumference from the direction
of sootblowing.
• Thin-edged, pin-hole, or a long
“thin” blowout typical of exten-
sive wall thinning and rapid
erosion.
• Thick-edged fracture showing
creep effects of slow erosion
rates.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by sootblower
erosion.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found or is likely to have occurred
in the unit:
• Burnishing or polishing of the
tube in the blower path. This is
typical of the early stages of an
erosion problem.
• Flat spots, ovality and formation
of edges on straight tube sec-
tions typical of advanced
stages of an erosion problem.
• Fresh rust found on tubes fol-
lowing a boiler washing.
➠ Determine whether inspection or
testing of sootblowers indicates
such problems as:
• Misalignment of sootblowers,
sootblower stuck in one position.
• Incorrect blowing temperature.
• Presence of condensed water in
blowing medium.
• Improper drainage.
• Improper travel and sequence
times.
➠ If one or more of these indicators
have been found, go to Action 3
which outlines the steps needed
to confirm the influence of each.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 38-7
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is sootblower
erosion.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being sootblower erosion
damage (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify sootblower
erosion as the primary mecha-
nism or point to another cause.
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by visual examination of
affected areas and removal of
representative tube sample(s) for
analysis.
38-8 SH/RH Sootblower Erosion
➠ Evaluate the extent of damage.
Is damage localized?
➠ Eliminate other erosive
processes as candidates. Is the
damage found in the blower
path and/or obviously associ-
ated with sootblowing?
➠ Evaluate appearance of
damage. Is wear manifested as
wastage of the tube in two sym-
metric flats located approxi-
mately 45° around the tube from
the sootblowing direction?
➠ Examine microstructure. Is there
distinct microstructural damage?
Probable failure mechanism is
sootblower erosion.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
If spread over a large area, prob-
lem may be generalized corrosion
or generalized erosion; however
continue with balance of flowchart
to eliminate sootblower erosion as
the cause.
Possibility that another erosive
mechanism such as flyash erosion
(Chapter 14, Volume 2) is respon-
sible for the damage. Should be
able to distinguish by tube loca-
tion; see discussion of alternative
erosion mechanisms if there is
uncertainty in diagnosis
Damage may be flyash erosion if
evidenced by smooth, polished
wastage of the tube, particularly
on the side facing into the gas
flow.
Mechanism is probably not soot-
blower erosion. Review fireside
corrosion and long-term overheat-
ing mechanisms to see if they are
the root causes of damage
detected. Note that in rare cases,
long-term overheating could be
exacerbated by the wall thinning
associated with incidences of
sootblower erosion. Some care is
required to separate causes in this
case.
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of sootblower erosion
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as sootblower erosion
(Action 2) or a precursor has
been identified (Action 1b) that
might lead to sootblower erosion.
The goal of this Action 3 is for
the BTF Team to review the
potential root causes of soot-
blower erosion, identify probable
ones, and take those actions that
are needed to confirm. This step
must be taken so that the proper
actions can be taken to prevent
future BTF from occurring by this
mechanism. Execute, in parallel,
Action 4 to determine the extent
of damage.
Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas
In parallel with Action 3 (root
cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Evaluation will be
based on detecting obvious
signs of erosion and for wall thin-
ning.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
Improper maintenance or operation of ➠ (a). Visual examination to determine
sootblowers such as: location and mal-operations, such as a stuck
• Incorrect setting of blowing temperature sootblower.
(insufficient superheat) ➠ (b). Calibration and testing to measure key
• Condensate in blowing media parameters such as:
• Improper operation of moisture traps. • blowing temperature and pressure
• Excessive sootblowing pressures • operation of moisture traps
• Improper location of sootblower • checking travel and sequence times
• Misalignment of sootblower
• Malfunction of sootblower
• Excessive sootblowing
• Improper travel or sequence time of soot
blowers.
➠ Identify all locations to be examined. Missed locations
are sites for future failures.
➠ Perform visual examination to detect obvious signs of
erosion.
➠ Perform UT survey to measure extent of damage via
wall thinning. A review of UT methods is provided in
Chapter 9, Volume 1
➠ Use results interactively with Action 3.
➠ Go to Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate
Solutions and Actions.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 38-9
Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
The most important actions for
the BTF team are to (i) make the
tube repairs necessary to get the
unit on-line and (ii) fix the under-
lying sootblower problem.
Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures
The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF Team. Long-term actions
will include periodic inspection
and calibration of the sootblower
and its components. Modifica-
tions to prevent the development
of condensate in the blower
media may be indicated. As
always, the required steps will be
based on the clear identification
of the underlying root cause
(from Action 3).
Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems
38-10 SH/RH Sootblower Erosion
➠ Implement repairs or replacement
of affected tubes as identified
from the NDE Survey (Action 4).
➠See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.
➠Temporary pad welds, spray
coating, or shielding may be
used, but are not long-term
solutions, as they will most likely
lead to continual repairs. Plan
to remove at the next outage.
➠ Perform sootblower maintenance
as required.
Major Root Cause Influences
Improper maintenance or operation of
sootblowers such as:
• Incorrect setting of blowing temperature
(insufficient superheat)
• Condensate in blowing media
• Improper operation of moisture traps.
• Excessive sootblowing pressures
• Improper location of sootblower
• Misalignment of sootblower
• Malfunction of sootblower
• Excessive sootblowing
• Improper travel or sequence time of soot
blowers.
None for this mechanism.
➠ Modify sootblower operation as
required. Most important is to
develop an understanding of
when sootblowing is needed and
thus moving away from an auto-
matic sootblowing cycle. Other
modifications to sootblowing
operating may include: changing
sootblowing parameters, regular
blowdown of sootblowing air lines
to avoid condensation, and instal-
lation of thermocouples in steam
trap lines to detect water.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Determine the optimal period between soot-
blowing. It should not be simply a matter
of once/shift or once/day. Fireside testing
with probes to determine the rate of buildup of
ash on tubes is useful.
➠ Success has been achieved by having a
sootblower maintenance team so that mainte-
nance is performed on a regular basis and not
on an as-needed basis.
➠ Institute periodic visual examination and
program of calibration and testing of soot-
blower operation to prevent future failures.
➠ Make needed modifications to hardware or
operating procedures to prevent condensate
from forming in blowing media.
Chapter 39 • Volume 3
Fatigue in
Steam-Touched
Tubes
Introduction
This chapter discusses boiler tube
failures caused by fatigue, without
regard to the source of the cyclic
stresses (thermal, mechanical, vibra-
tion, etc.). The common elements of
failures in this category are that they
are manifested by cracking that is
OD-initiated, are predominantly
transgranular, and not primarily
attributable to the effect of either the
fireside or fluid environment. That is,
for the failures described here, the
effect of environment is small
enough that even if all environmental
effects were removed, the failure
would still occur. Cyclic stresses are
obviously also an important contrib-
utor to cracking mechanisms that do
have a major contribution from the
environment such as corrosion
fatigue (Chapter 13, Volume 2) and
stress corrosion cracking (Chapter
37), and in failures by creep-fatigue.
This Chapter provides some means
to distinguish among these effects;
however, it concentrates on fatigue
as the dominant failure mechanism.
The generic BTF caused by fatigue,
reviewed in this Chapter, are divided
into two general classifications: tub-
ing (attachment)-related and header
related.
A separate chapter discusses
fatigue failures in water-touched tub-
ing (Chapter 26, Volume 2).
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 39-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure
Fatigue failures, either tubing- or
header-related, generally result in
thick-edged failures (Figure 39-1).
Cracking is predominantly straight
and transgranular, although it may
also be intergranular particularly at
higher temperatures in the SH/RH
sections. Cracks may be filled with
oxide depending upon the service
conditions.
Fatigue cracks can also occur in
material that has been damaged by
creep that is primarily stress-driven
(low-temperature creep) in which the
cracking will be intergranular and
will occur in conjunction with void
formation. Low temperature creep is
covered in Chapter 24, Volume 2.
The appearance of beach marks
and ratchet marks is typical,
although they may be totally obliter-
ated by oxidation.
Fatigue failures originate on the out-
side surfaces of tubes.

Figure 39-1. Thermo-mechanical failure of an SA-213 Type 304H superheater tube.

The portion of the rupture which is missing was believed to have contained a welded
attachment clip. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

39-2 Fatigue in Steam-Touched Tubes

1.2 Typical locations
Tubing-related failures are generally
found in locations associated with
(i) attachments, particularly solid
attachments or jammed sliding
attachments, or (ii) bends in tubing.
At attachments, failures by fatigue
are often associated with weld-
ments, particularly in cases where
the weld or condition of the attach-
ment does not allow for thermal
expansion, such as shown in Figure
39-2.
At bends in the tubing, particularly
“U”-bends, failures can be initiated
at the intrados, extrados or neutral
axis as shown in Figure 39-3. If fail-
ures occur in U-bends, they are

a
usually those in the cooler (below
creep temperature) regions of the
primary SH or RH.
Header-related fatigue failures in
tubes occur most frequently at the
ends of the header and are related
to restricted flexibility of the header
and/or thermal expansion stresses.
The problem of header-related
fatigue failures is more prevalent in
SH/RH than in economizers. Two
common locations have been expe-
rienced. The first is in nipple or stub
welds, as illustrated in Figure 39-4.
As tube temperatures increase, the
tubes try to lengthen. Temperature
differentials lead to constraint from
expansion of the hotter tubes and
stretching of the cooler tubes and a
resulting strain with each thermal
cycle. The cyclic strain leads to fail-
ures at locations such as at the toe
of header-to-tube welds, shown in
Figure 39-4.
Tubes

a
a) Large Spacer or Beamer

Welds

Typical
cracks
Large
spacer
b) C and T ÒSlidingÓ Spacer

Cracks

Figure 39-2. Schematic showing typical locations of fatigue failures in steam-touched

tubing. Source: R.B. Dooley and H.J. Westwood.2

Extrados
Neutral axis

Intrados

Figure 39-3. Three possible locations for tubing-related fatigue fail-

ures in tight 180° bends.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 39-3

 A second form of cracking is
Outlet caused by the lateral expansion of
the header as shown in Figure 39-5.
Here connecting tubes that pene-
trate through the waterwall or roof
Superheater or
reheater outlet tubes will be subjected to bending
header moments when the header expands
more than the tubes; the effect is
Failure location worst at the ends of the header.
During normal operation the strains
are modest since temperatures are
steady; however the problem is
Header nipples exacerbated by two-shifting or
Field welds cycling operation. Cracking is OD-
initiated, oriented circumferentially,
and generally found at the toe of
welds.
Element Vibration fatigue failures induced by
terminal tubes gas-flow usually occur in vertical
screen tubes and horizontal rear
pass tubes and rarely in pendant
sections. They are also more com-
mon in SH/RH sections than in
Roof tubes economizers.
Poor weld geometry or execution
(overfill, poor fillet weld profile,
undercut) may also lie at the root of
Figure 39-4. Fatigue tube failures caused by differential thermal a fatigue problem.
expansion of element transfer tubes on a header. Source: W.R.
Sylvester, et al.3

a) Cold b) Hot

Outlet
header

Outlet tubes Cracks

at weld
...Water wall...

Figure 39-5. Schematic illustrating failures due to inflexibility of movement between

header and waterwall.

39-4 Fatigue in Steam-Touched Tubes

2. Mechanism of Failure
Fatigue is the phenomenon of dam-
age accumulation caused by cyclic
or fluctuating stresses. It is mani-
fested as the initiation and stable
propagation of a crack. Final failure
in a component subjected to fatigue
ensues when a critical crack size is
reached and failure occurs by frac-
ture or overload. Fatigue is depen-
dent upon the frequency and magni-
tude of the stress cycles and is gen-
erally independent of stress dura-
tion. Obviously, at high temperatures
where creep fatigue becomes the
dominant mechanism, there is
dependence on stress duration.
Stress cycling may be induced
mechanically or thermally.
Fatigue in boiler tubes is generally
driven by excessive local stress lev-
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
3.1 Introduction
Unanticipated or excessive cyclic
stresses (strains) are the primary
cause of fatigue failures in boiler
tubes. Three basic sources of
excessive strains are those caused
by (i) constraint of thermal expan-
sion, (ii) excess mechanical loads,
or (iii) flow-induced vibration. The
first of these is responsible for the
bulk of tube failures occurring by
this mechanism. Excessive stresses
can also arise in welded connec-
tions if the expansion of the welded
joint is inadequate. These four
causes are discussed below. A sum-
mary of the appropriate actions to
confirm, immediate actions and
longer term measures to prevent
future failures are summarized in
Table 39-1.
els, typically at welded connections.
Such connections may be tube
attachments and supports, or at
header nipples and stub welds, as
described above. Stresses may be
induced by excessive (unantici-
pated) mechanical loads, restrained
thermal expansion, vibration such as
produced by the flow of combustion
gases, or as a result of poor weld
geometry in which the global
stresses are within the design, but
strains are locally excessive
because of the geometry of the joint.
In many cases, the excessive
stresses, particularly thermally-
induced, are produced by unit
cycling or two-shift operation lead-
ing to conditions that did not arise
during baseload operation.
3.2 Excessive strains caused
by constraint of thermal
expansion
The typical locations for the occur-
rence of this problem were dis-
cussed above. Actions to confirm
this root cause include:
(a). Visual examination to detect
distortion or bending of adjacent
tubes. Tubes at headers may also
be physically distorted or even
pulled away.
(b). Strain gauging of susceptible
locations can indicate the level of
strains experienced during thermal
excursions of the unit such as
cycling operation.
(c). LVDT measurements to monitor
the relative movement of the header/
tube during transients, particularly to
ensure that the header support
allows for expansion.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 39-5
Table 39-1
Major Root Cause Influence, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.2 Excessive strains caused
by constraint of thermal
expansion.
(a). Visual examination for distortion or • Identify similar dam- • Evaluate modifications to attachment
bending in adjacent tubes. aged locations. design or to header/tube connection to
(b). Strain gauging of suspect locations to • Repair/replace affected reduce stress levels.
evaluate strains during unit starts and tubes. See Chapter 11, • Institute periodic inspection program,
cycling operation. Volume 1 for an particularly of susceptible header
(c). LVDT measurements to monitor the overview of methods. locations in units that are now, or will
relative movement of the header/tube during be cycled.
transients; particularly whether header • Improve header/tube flexibility and
support allows for expansion. confirm with LVDT.

3.3 Poor design and/or
manufacture giving rise to
excessive mechanical stresses.
(d.) Strain gauging to measure actual
strains experienced at the local area during
operation.
(e). As in (c) above.
(f). For tight, hair-pin bends, determine
whether residual stresses are high.
• As above. • Evaluate modifications to attachment
design or to header/tube connection to
reduce stress levels.
• Institute periodic inspection program,
particularly of susceptible header
locations in units that are now, or will
be cycled.

3.4 Vibration (flue gas- (g). Metallurgical examination to determine • As above. • Evaluate and install modifications such
induced) by direct flow or high cycle fatigue. as snubbers or vibration restraints to
vortex shedding. (h). Estimate natural and forcing frequen- reduce stresses induced by vibration.
cies and confirm by test.

3.5 Poor welding, particularly (i). Visual and microscopic examination of • As above. • Institute program of weld quality control
poor geometry of final joint. weld quality. based on guidelines such as provided
in reference 4.

3.3 Poor design and/or manu-
facture giving rise to excessive
mechanical stresses
Actions to confirm this root cause
include:
(d). Strain gauging of susceptible
locations for indication of unex-
pected mechanical loads in excess
of design assumptions.
(e). as in (c) above.
(f). Tight hair-pin bends may contain
high residual stresses. This can be
determined qualitatively by observ-
ing the extent of “spring-apart” that
occurs when the tube is cut.
Quantitatively, rosette strain gauges
can be used to measure strains.
Typically such gauges are placed on
the location of interest and the center
drilled so that the strain thus relieved
can be evaluated.
3.4 Vibration (flue gas-
induced) by direct flow or
vortex shedding
Actions to confirm this root cause
include:
(g). Metallurgical examination and
location usually provide confirmation.
Also if vibration is occurring, it is
often extremely noisy and thus obvi-
ous.
(h). Analytic estimate of natural fre-
quency and forcing frequency fol-
lowed by confirmation by cold or hot
flow testing with strain gages and
accelerometers.
3.5 Poor welding, particularly
poor geometry of final joint
Actions to confirm this root cause
include:
(i). Analysis of weld profile and
quality to determine whether poor
welding was a likely contributor to
the failure.

39-6 Fatigue in Steam-Touched Tubes

4. Determining the Extent of Damage
Detection of fatigue damage once a
crack has initiated is well estab-
lished by a number of methods
including, liquid penetrant, magnetic
particle, eddy current, ultrasonic
testing, and radiography. Since
fatigue cracks in boiler tubes are
OD-initiated identification of cracked
locations is possible within the con-
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Cracks can usually be ground out
and rewelded as a temporary mea-
sure. Tight “U”-bends should be
replaced. Most of the rest of the
actions can be taken over the longer
term.
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Longer-term actions will consist of
modifications to prevent a recur-
rence of the problem. For example,
if the failure was at an attachment
and strains were caused by differen-
tial thermal expansion, the attach-
ment design should be modified to
reduce the stress level, e.g. replace-
ment of large C and T sliding spac-
ers can be by a “ladder”-type sup-
port or one that allows free expan-
sion.2 It is important to establish
clearly that the stresses in the new
design are in fact lower than those
of the original design.
In the case of vibration-induced
strains, solutions are typically found
in the installation of vibration baffles
to break up the critical vibration
modes for gas flow, or by using
snubbers and vibration restraints.
straints of access. The analysis of
fatigue is likewise well established
and sufficient materials data exist for
all common constructional materials
to allow complete analysis of the
expected life of components subject
to fatigue.
A periodic inspection program is
indicated for susceptible locations,
particularly in the header-related
locations, and if the unit is cycled.
If the unit has recently been or is to
be changed to cycling or to two-shift
operation, it may be advisable to
perform an analysis of the stresses
induced by constraint in the water-
wall penetration and header such as
indicated in the schematic of the
detail and failure locations in Figure
39-4. Monitoring the relative move-
ment of header/tube during tran-
sients with LVDTs is typical.
Improvements to waterwall sliding
seals may be needed or a change
to the tube configuration required.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 39-7
7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.

8. References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H. 3Sylvester,
W.R., et al., “Locate Problems in Radiant and
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide, Convective Sections Early to Improve Availability”, Power,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices, March, 1978.
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433, 4Stephenson, G.G. and J.W. Prince, Guidelines on Fossil
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
Boiler Field Welding, Research Project 2504-02, Final
October, 1993.
Report TR-101699, Electric Power Research Institute,
2Dooley, R.B. and H.J. Westwood, Analysis and Palo Alto, CA, January, 1993.
Prevention of Boiler Tube Failures, Report 83/237G-31,
Canadian Electrical Association, Montreal, Quebec,
November, 1983.

39-8 Fatigue in Steam-Touched Tubes

ACTIONS for Fatigue in Steam-touched Tubes
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of
fatigue begin here. The goal of
these actions is to see if further
investigation of fatigue is war-
ranted or whether another BTF
mechanism should be investi-
gated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and fatigue is the
likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
which indicates that there
could be a future BTF by
fatigue.
Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and fatigue is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in typical locations, e.g.,
does it appear to be associated
with a weld, tight hair-pin bend,
and either tubing-related or
header-related?
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• OD-initiated
• Thick-edged failure
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by fatigue:
➠ Routine inspection and/or tube
sampling finds indication of
cracking, broken or bent tubing or
other macroscopic evidence of
fatigue.
➠ If unit has recently been con-
verted to cycling or two-shifting
duty, the potential for fatigue-
related tube failures will increase.
Check the flexibility of steam-
touched headers and connecting
tubes.
➠ If these indicators have been
found, go to Action 3 which out-
lines the steps to confirm the
influence of each.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 39-9
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is fatigue.

A failure has occurred which the

BTF team has tentatively identi-
➠ Analyze the macroscopic dam- Damage may not be fatigue. If
age. Does damage have features final failure is thin-edged suspect:
fied as being fatigue (Action 1a). (i) fireside corrosion (Chapter 33)
that include: thick-edged failure
Action 2 should clearly identify for coal-fired units or (Chapter 34)
surface, obvious OD-initiation,
fatigue as the primary mecha- for oil-fired units, or (ii) an erosion
association with a weld?
nism or point to another cause. process such as flyash erosion
The actions listed will be exe- (Chapter 14, Volume 2) or soot-
cuted by removing representative blower erosion (Chapter 38).
tube sample(s), followed by
visual examination and detailed
metallographic analysis.
➠ Analyze microscopic appearance Intergranular cracking may still be
of cracking. Is cracking trans- primarily fatigue-related; however it
granular? may also indicate a corrosion-
assisted mechanism, such as
stress corrosion cracking (Chapter
37) or a combination of creep and
fatigue. Confirm the latter with a
determination of whether creep
damage is seen such as void for-
mation, etc. (see Chapter 24,
Volume 2 on low-temperature
creep cracking).

➠ Probable mechanism is fatigue.

If creep damage is present such
as creep cavitation and/or voids,
etc., are present, see Chapter
24, Volume 2 on low-temperature
creep.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

39-10 Fatigue in Steam-Touched Tubes

Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the fatigue
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as fatigue (Action 2) or a
precursor has occurred (Action
1b). The goal of this Action 3 is
for the BTF Team to review the
potential root causes of fatigue,
identify probable ones, and take
those actions that are needed to
confirm which are operative in
the unit. This step must be taken
so that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
3.2 Excessive strains caused by constraint of ➠ (a). Visual examination for distortion or
thermal expansion. bending in adjacent tubes.
➠ (b). Strain gauging of suspect locations to
evaluate strains during unit starts and cycling
operation.
➠ (c). LVDT measurements to monitor the rel-
ative movement of the header/tube during tran-
sients, particularly whether header support
allows for expansion.

3.3 Poor design and/or manufacture giving
rise to excessive mechanical stresses.
➠ (d). Strain gauging to measure actual
strains experienced at the local area during
operation.
➠ (e). As for (c) above.
➠ (f). For tight, hair-pin bends, determine
whether residual stresses are high.

3.4 Vibration (flue gas-induced) by direct flow ➠ (g). Metallurgical examination to determine
or vortex shedding. high cycle fatigue.
➠ (h). Estimate of natural and forcing fre-
quencies followed by confirmation testing.

3.5 Poor welding, particularly poor geometry ➠ (i). Visual and microscopic examination of
of final joint. weld quality.

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root

cause analysis), the BTF Team
should determine the extent of
damage. Subject to access con-
straints, detection of fatigue is
possible through a variety of rou-
tine NDE methods. Chapter 9,
Volume 1 provides additional
information.
Results of the survey for damage
will be used interactively with
Action 3 to determine root cause
and with Actions 5 and 6 to
develop a rational prevention
strategy.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 39-11

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Routine weld repairs are gener-

ally sufficient to deal with the
immediate attachment or header
related failures. Tube replace-
ment is needed for failures asso-
ciated with bends. Pad weld-
ing/grinding is not satisfactory as
a permanent solution for either
area. Thereafter, most actions
should be considered for the
longer-term (Action 6).

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on the clear identification
of the underlying root cause
(Action 3) and an economic eval-
uation to ensure that the opti-
mum strategy has been chosen.
Major Root Cause Influences
Excessive strains caused by constraint of ther-
mal expansion.
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Evaluate modifications to attachment design
or to header/tube connection to reduce stress
levels.
➠ Institute periodic inspection program, par-
ticularly of susceptible header locations in
units that are now, or will be cycled.
➠ Improve header/tube flexibility and confirm
with LVDT.

Poor design and/or manufacture giving rise to
excessive mechanical stresses.
➠ Evaluate modifications to attachment design
or to header/tube connection to reduce stress
levels.
➠ Institute periodic inspection program, par-
ticularly of susceptible header locations in
units that are now, or will be cycled.

Vibration (flue gas-induced) by direct flow or ➠ Evaluate and install modifications such as
vortex shedding. snubbers or vibration restraints to reduce
stresses induced by vibration.

Poor welding, particularly poor geometry of ➠ Institute program of weld quality control
final joint. based on guidelines such as provided in refer-
ence 4.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

None for this mechanism.

39-12 Fatigue in Steam-Touched Tubes

Chapter 40 • Volume 3

Rubbing/Fretting
Steam-Touched Tubes

Description of Boiler Tube cave shape that matches the profile

Failure and its Manifestation
If adjacent tubes come into direct
metal-to-metal contact (impact, rub-
bing, etc.) tube wear will occur by
both rubbing/fretting and by accel-
erated oxidation of the tube surface
as a result of the removal of the pro-
tective iron oxide.
Features of this boiler tube failure
mechanism include: (i) smooth
wastage flats on the fireside of the
tube, perhaps missing ash and fire-
side oxide scale (Figure 40-1), and
(ii) the rubbed area may have a con-
of the adjacent tube (Figure 40-2).
Several easily correctable conditions
may be at the root of this problem
including: (i) missing, nonfunctioning,
broken, or inadequate tube supports,
or (ii) misaligned tubing. A visual
inspection of the nearby area should
be sufficient to detect the underlying
mechanical problem. Repair of the
faulty tube support and/or correction
of the tube alignment, along with
replacement or repair of the dam-
aged tube will be indicated. Repair
techniques are summarized in
Chapter 11, Volume 1.

Figure 40-1. Region of a tube surface where rubbing occurred (arrow).

Note the smooth appearance and the absence of a fireside scale in
this region (MAG:1.3X). Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 40-1

Figure 40-2. Side view of the rubbed area. Note the concave surface
formed as a result of the rubbing (MAG:1.3X).
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H. Vaillancourt,
Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide, Volume 1: Technical
Report, Volume 2: Appendices, Research Project 1890-09, Final
Report TR-102433, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto,
CA, October, 1993.

40-2 Rubbing/Fretting Steam-Touched Tubes

ACTIONS for Rubbing/Fretting Failures in Steam-touched Tubes
The detection and correction of
this boiler tube failure mecha-
nism should be straightforward.
As with other, more involved fail-
ure types, the two paths for the
BTF team to take for its resolu-
tion begin here.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and rubbing is the
likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
which indicates that there
could be a future BTF by rub-
bing.
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred Action 1b: If a precursor has
and rubbing is the likely mecha- occurred in the unit that could
nism. lead to future BTF by rubbing:
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic • Routine inspection finds indica-
appearance of the failure includes tion of nonfunctioning, missing
such features as: or inadequate tube supports or
of severely misaligned tubes.
• “Rubbed”, smooth appearance
of fireside surface ➠ If these indicators have been
found, go to Action 3 which out-
• Little or no ash and/or external
lines the steps needed to confirm
scale in damaged location.
the influence of each.
• Concave surface at location of
damage, similar in size to out-
side surface of adjacent tube.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 40-3
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is rubbing.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as having been caused by
rubbing (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify rubbing as
the primary mechanism or point
to another cause. The actions
listed will be executed by deter-
mining the extent of the damage
(number of affected locations)
and by removing the damaged
tube(s) followed by visual exami-
nation.
40-4 Rubbing/Fretting Steam-Touched Tubes
➠ Determine the extent of the dam-
age (number of tubes involved).
Is damage limited to one or only
a few tubes that interact?
➠ Analyze the macroscopic dam-
age. Does damage have features
including: “rubbed” appearance,
concave damage, little or no fire-
side ash and/or oxide?
➠ Damage is probably caused by
rubbing.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
Widespread damage is likely to be
caused by another mechanism
such as (i) one of the erosive
processes, see flyash erosion
(Chapter 14, Volume 2) or soot-
blower erosion (Chapter 38) for
example, or (ii) fireside corrosion
(see Chapters 33 and 34).
Concave appearance of the dam-
age is a key. If the damage is man-
ifested as flat wastage spots, sus-
pect an erosive process, particu-
larly flyash erosion (Chapter 14,
Volume 2) or sootblower erosion
(Chapter 38).
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the rubbing

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In the case of rubbing damage, the root cause should be obvious from a
visual examination of nearby tubes and tube supports. Missing, nonfunc-
tioning, broken, or inadequate tube supports, or misaligned tubes are the
principal problems.
The isolated nature of the failure points to a local problem with a single
support. Some care in interpretation may be needed if a rubbing failure
has led to a tube rupture with subsequent secondary damage from steam
impingement.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

Routine repairs or tube replacements are generally sufficient to deal with

the immediate failure/damage. Correction of the underlying cause (tube
supports or tube alignments) is indicated.
In order to avoid similar failures, the underlying cause of any tube support
inadequacies should be determined. The BTF Team should be confident
that other supports of a similar design are not at risk of future failure.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

None for this damage type.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 40-5

40-6 Rubbing/Fretting Steam-Touched Tubes
Chapter 41 • Volume 3
Pitting in
Steam-Touched
Tubes
Introduction
Pitting is a form of damage that can
occur throughout the boiler. One
cause of pitting in steam-touched
tubes is the result of poor shutdown
practices which allow stagnant, oxy-
gen-saturated condensate to form in
the pendant loops of superheater
and reheater tubing. Another form,
affecting especially reheaters, is
caused by the mechanical carryover
of Na2SO4 in steam during operation
which then combines with moisture
from condensation during shutdown
to cause pitting in ferritic tubing.
Chemical cleaning damage in
SH/RH sections, which can also
cause pitting is a third manifestation
of pitting; it is discussed separately
in Chapter 43. Pitting in water-
touched tubes is discussed in
Chapter 27, Volume 2.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 41-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Features of failure
Pitting is localized part- or through-
wall dissolution of tube metal. Pits
associated with low pH conditions
tend to be numerous and closely
spaced. The affected metal is usu-
ally clean and free of deposits (if
found soon after the acid attack);
the surface is jagged and rough.
Pits are generally sharp-walled and
free of oxide or corrosion products if
fresh. Damage from excessively
aggressive chemical cleaning in
SH/RH sections is of this type and is
covered separately in Chapter 43,
which can be consulted for addi-
tional detail about appearance.
A second form of pitting attack that
occurs in reheaters is caused by the
mechanical carryover of Na2SO4 in
steam during operation and its
deposition in the reheater tubes.
This then combines with the mois-
ture of condensed steam during
shutdown and creates an acidic
attack leading to pit formation.
Corrosion products that fill the pits
will generally contain sulfate in and
around the pits.
41-2 Pitting in Steam-Touched Tubes
A third type of pitting that occurs in
SH/RH sections is a result of stag-
nant oxygen-saturated water formed
during shutdown. The typical
appearance is shown in Figure 41-1.
Pits thus formed can be either
numerous and closely spaced, or
isolated. They are often covered with
caps of corrosion products, and
generally found to be filled with cor-
rosion products, particularly red
hematite iron oxide (Fe2O3) which is
the thermodynamically favored reac-
tion of iron with oxygen under condi-
tions of high oxygen (see Figure 2-3,
Volume 1).
1.2 Locations of failure
Typical locations are those where
condensate can form and remain as
liquid during shutdown periods if
improper venting or draining proce-
dures are utilized. Typically affected
areas for both superheaters and
reheaters are (i) the bottoms of pen-
dant loops and (ii) low points in sag-
ging horizontal tubes.
Figure 41-1a. Superheater inlet header drain with a failure at the neutral
axis. The tube was resting flat on a horizontal support at this location
resulting in oxygen-saturated water remaining in the tube during shut-
down periods of the unit. Source: J. Hickey, Irish Electricity Supply
Board

Figure 41-1b. Typical pitting on the I.D. surface of the tube shown in
Figure 41-1a. Source: J. Hickey, Irish Electricity Supply Board

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 41-3

2. Mechanism of Failure
2.1 Development of pitting
corrosion
Pitting is a form of corrosion that is
distinguished by the aspect ratio of
the damage: it tends to be deep
through-wall relative to the defect
length. It is an insidious form of
damage because (i) a relatively
small amount of metal loss can lead
to through-wall failure with cata-
strophic results, (ii) the small size
coupled with the fact that pits are
often filled with corrosion products
makes them hard to detect, (iii) pits
often undercut the surface, which
can complicate their detection, (iv)
laboratory simulation of field pitting
is difficult, and, perhaps most inter-
esting, (v) pitting is autocatalytic;
that is, conditions within the pit stim-
ulate the continued activity of the
corrodant.1
A breakdown in the passivity of a
metal surface initiates the pitting
process. An electrolytic cell is
formed, the anode is a small area of
active metal, the cathode a large
area of passive metal.2 A large
potential difference exists (about 0.5
V for 300-series stainless steels)
which results in considerable current
flow and rapid corrosion. Figure 27-
3 in Volume 2 shows the process for
the growth of a pit in a metal M
caused by a concentrated solution
of aerated NaCl. Dissolution of metal
in the pit forms metal ions (M+)
which results in the inward migration
of Cl- from solution to maintain
charge neutrality. The metal chloride
(M+Cl-) formed combines with water
to form hydroxide and free acid:
(M+Cl-) + H2O ® MOH + H+Cl-
(41-1)
Although the pH of the bulk solution
remains neutral, the concentration of
acid in the pit lowers the pH values
(to the range 1.5 to 1.0).2 This accel-
erates the dissolution of the metal.
At the same time, a cathodic reac-
tion such as oxygen reduction, is
41-4 Pitting in Steam-Touched Tubes
occurring on nearby surfaces which
suppresses corrosion on these adja-
cent areas. The suppression of cor-
rosion around the edges of the pit
and the acceleration of corrosion
within the pit result in increasing
rates of damage accumulation.
This model for pitting initiation and
growth provides an explanation for
other observations about pitting. For
example, pitting generally displays
long initiation periods followed by
what can be quite rapid propaga-
tion. Why? Initiation is thought to
require a momentarily high concen-
tration of metal dissolution to start
the process.3 Such an initial concen-
tration might be caused by a sur-
face scratch, dislodged defect or
random solution variation.1 However,
just as it forms, the initial concentra-
tion could be swept away by the
flow along the surface. Thus initia-
tion might nearly start and stop
many times before a “permanent’
concentration forms that is sufficient
to initiate a pit. In tubing, other pos-
sible initiators are deposits of feed-
water corrosion products, which
might contain a number of different
cations (such as Fe, Cu, Ni, Zn, etc.)
and anions (Cl, SO4, etc.). A number
of theories have been proposed to
explain pitting initiation. Two general
classifications are: (i) kinetic theories
that explain breakdown of passivity
based on competitive absorption
between chloride ions in solution
and oxygen on the metal surface,
and (ii) thermodynamic theories that
consider that the critical pitting
potential to be the potential where
chloride ions are in equilibrium with
the oxide film.2,4,5,6
Pit growth is influenced by gravity, a
fact that is also explained by the
mechanistic process described
above. The formation of a dense,
concentrated solution and its reten-
tion favors the propagation of the pit,
a process that is facilitated if the pit
is oriented to the pull of gravity.
Similarly, it is now clear why pitting
is most prominent in stagnant condi-
tions. The fact that the fluid is static
allows the initiation of pitting to
occur unimpeded and stagnant
conditions allow for the concentra-
tions needed to accelerate the
attack. Once initiation has begun,
such as during shutdown of the unit,
the continued growth of the pit
under the more turbulent conditions
of operation can continue unabated.
Pitting remains a topic of active
research interest. Additional infor-
mation about pitting mechanisms
and activities can be found in refer-
ences 4, 7 and 8.
2.2 Development of pitting
from oxygen-saturated,
stagnant condensate
The most common cause of pitting in
steam-touched tubing is the pres-
ence of oxygen-saturated, stagnant
condensate formed as a result of
unit shutdown. Forced cooling
and/or improper draining and vent-
ing procedures can result in excess
moisture throughout the boiler.
Oxygen is present if improper blan-
keting and/or protection procedures
are used during the shutdown. The
problem is particularly acute in local
areas where collected liquid is
exposed to the air (the interface line).
2.3 Carryover of Na2SO4
The pitting process can be
markedly accelerated if unit condi-
tions allow for the deposit of chemi-
cals on susceptible surfaces. As an
example, reheater tube failures have
been caused by pitting attack in fer-
ritic materials that results when
deposits of sodium sulfate (Na2SO4)
combine with the moisture that
forms from steam condensate on
shutdown. The resulting combina-
tion in the presence of oxygen is
acidic and results in corrosion dam-
age accumulation.
An investigation by Ball and
Jenkins9 found that (i) sodium levels
in drum boilers increase consider-
ably during starts, load changes
and changes in firing patterns for a
variety of unit sizes and for both AVT
and sodium hydroxide treatment, (ii)
some carryover seems to be
inevitable, (iii) mechanical carryover
of droplets results from imperfect
steam separation in the drum and
may be on the order of 0.1%, (iv)
because they are soluble in super-
heated steam, sodium chloride and
sodium hydroxide carried over do
not deposit, and (v) sodium sulfate
is the least soluble species in steam
and, as a result, does not re-entrain
and therefore tends to accumulate
or deposit, particularly in the
reheaters.
Conditions that increase the likeli-
hood of mechanical carryover such
as operating with the drum level too
high or with holes in the drum sepa-
rators, will increase the deposition of
Na2SO4 and the likelihood of pitting.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 41-5
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
3.1 Introduction
Table 41-1 summarizes the major
root causes, actions to confirm,
immediate solutions, and the long-
term actions for each root cause.
Pitting will result in SH/RH sections
as a result of improper chemical
cleaning (covered in Chapter 43),
poor shutdown practices, or carry-
over of Na2SO4.
3.2 Influence of poor shut-
down practice (presence of
stagnant, oxygen-saturated
water)
As discussed above, pitting can
form if shutdown procedures allow
accumulations of stagnant, oxy-
genated water. Actions to confirm
this root cause include:
(a). Analysis of corrosion products
present in and around the pitting will
help to pinpoint the source of the
problem. In the case of oxygenated
attack, hematite (Fe2O3) is generally
present.
(b). Selective tube sampling can be
used to evaluate whether localized
corrosion cells have been formed.
(c). A critical evaluation of shut-
down procedures and unit condi-
tions during shutdown should be
performed to ensure that they are
optimal for the unit. Such proce-
dures are provided in Chapter 4 of
Volume 1. A review of the chemistry
logs of analyses performed during
the shutdown will provide clues. A
partial list of questions to be
assessed might include the follow-
ing: (i) Was the boiler pH increased
41-6 Pitting in Steam-Touched Tubes
to around 10 with ammonia and
around 200 ppm of hydrazine and
were these monitored during shut-
down/layup periods? (ii) Were nitro-
gen blanketing and caps properly
applied and checked? (iii) Was suffi-
cient N2H4 added?, (iv) Have
sources of air inleakage been
detected?
3.3 Na2SO4 carryover
The potential for carryover and
deposition of Na2SO4 in the reheater
was noted above. Actions to confirm
that this is a root cause of pitting
include:
(d). Analysis of corrosion products
present in and around the pitting will
help to pinpoint the source of the
problem. In the case of Na2SO4 car-
ryover, there should be evidence of
sulfate that can be detected by
sampling and analysis.
(e). Review of drum operation and
condition. Typical questions to be
addressed include: (i) Has the drum
been operated with a level high
enough to have interfered with the
separating process? (ii) Are there
any holes in the drum separation
devices? (iii) Are welds or weld
attachments broken? A carryover
test should also be conducted as a
function of load and drum level.
(f). Review steam composition, par-
ticularly for evidence of excessive
levels of Na, SO4, and Cl. Evaluation
of whether monitoring equipment
has detected a problem with exces-
sive carryover should also be con-
ducted.
Table 41-1
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions
Major Root Cause Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
Influences Actions to Confirm and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures

3.2 Influence of poor (a). Analyze corrosion products in and
shutdown practice around pitting; specifically looking for
(presence of stagnant, presence of hematite. Methods of
oxygenated water) metallurgical examination are reviewed
in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
(b).Selective tube sampling to evaluate for
localized corrosion cells.
(c). Perform critical evaluation of shutdown
procedures and of unit condition during
shutdown. Check logs of chemistry
monitoring during shutdown.
• Identify damaged • Confirm or establish unit shutdown and
locations. layup procedures that will prevent
• Replace affected tubes. pitting precursors. See additional
See Chapter 11, Volume discussion in main text this chapter
1 for an overview of and Chapter 4, Volume 1.
methods.
• Initiate implementation
of long-term options.

3.3 Carryover of Na2SO4 (d). Analysis of corrosion products, as in

item (a) above; in this case specifically • As above, plus • As above, plus:
looking for a confirmation of Na2SO4. • Effect any obvious • Establish steam composition
See Chapter 6, Volume 1 for methods of mechanical repairs such monitoring instrumentation and action
metallurgical examination. as damage to drum levels to prevent excessive carryover.
(e). Review drum condition and operation. furniture, sources of air See discussion of additional detail in
(f). Review steam composition, particularly inleakage, etc. Chapter 3, Volume 1.
evaluating for excesses of Na, SO4,
and Cl.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 41-7

4. Determining the Extent of Damage
Pitting can be difficult to detect
unless it is extensive. If there has
been significant loss of wall thick-
ness, the standard method of NDE is
ultrasonic testing. Typical problems
with access and with surface prepa-
ration will be present. Chapter 9,
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
The primary immediate actions are
to: (i) identify damaged locations, (ii)
replace the affected tubes, and (iii)
repair obvious contributing conditions
such as drum furniture damage,
sources of air in-leakage, etc.
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Longer term actions will consist of
establishing procedures to prevent
precursor conditions from occurring
and monitoring of steam chemistry
to ensure that carryover is not
excessive.
6.1 Instituting proper unit
shutdown and layup proce-
dures
A detailed discussion of appropriate
shutdown and layup procedures is
presented in Chapter 4, Volume 1.
Briefly for SH/RH circuits the main
objectives are to ensure that good
dry-out practices and nitrogen blan-
keting is used during shutdown.
41-8 Pitting in Steam-Touched Tubes
Volume 1 provides an overview of
UT methods as applied to wall thick-
ness measurement.
Selective tube sampling and metal-
lographic analysis can be used to
detect localized corrosion cells.
Procedures for tube replacement are
summarized in Chapter 11, Volume 1.
The balance of actions can be con-
ducted as a part of long-term
actions.
6.2 Steam chemistry
monitoring
A means of monitoring steam com-
position, particularly for evidence of
excessive levels of Na, SO4, and Cl
should be in place for the unit. All
representative regimes of operation
should be included, with particular
emphasis on those periods of tran-
sient operations. Suggested action
levels of steam contaminants and
recommended levels of instrumenta-
tion are provided in Chapter 3,
Volume 1.
7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.
8. References
1Fontana,
M.G. and N.D. Greene, Corrosion Engineering,
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967.
2Asphahani, A.I. and W.L. Silence, “Pitting Corrosion” in
Metals Handbook Volume 13: Corrosion, ASM
International, Metals Park, OH, 1987.
3Evans, U.R., Corrosion, Volume 7, Number 238, 1951.
4Shreir, L.L, R.A. Jarman, and G.T. Burstein, eds.,
Corrosion Volume 1: Metal/Environment Reactions, 3rd
Edition, Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 1994.
5Uhlig, H.H. and J. Gilman, Corrosion, Volume 19, 1963,
p. 261t.
6Vermilyea,
D., Journal of the Electrochemistry Society,
Volume 118, 1971, p. 529.
7Isaacs, H., U. Bertocci, J. Kruger, S. Smialowska,
Advances in Localized Corrosion, NACE-9, National
Association of Corrosion Engineers, p. 221.
8Evans, U.R., The Corrosion and Oxidation of Metals,
Arnold, London, 1961.
9Ball, M. and M.A. Jenkins, “Steam Chemical Purity from
CEGB Drum Boilers”, in Proceedings of EPRI Conference
on Cycle Chemistry, held in Seattle, Washington, August
30-September 1, 1988, Research Project 2712, GS-6166,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, January,
1989, pp. 4-55 through 4-68.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 41-9
ACTIONS for Pitting in SH/RH Tubes
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of pitting
begin here. The goal of these
actions is to see if further investi-
gation of pitting is warranted or
whether another BTF mechanism
should be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a SH/RH
BTF has occurred and pitting
is the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by pitting.
41-10 Pitting in Steam-Touched Tubes
Action 1a: If a SH/RH BTF has
occurred and pitting is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of pitting:
• Bottom of pendant loops of
either superheaters or
reheaters.
• Low points in sagging horizon-
tal tubes susceptible to pooling
of condensate.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as:
• Obvious corrosion pits on tube
ID.
• Corrosion product “caps”.
• Pits are deep, relative to their
length.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future SH/RH BTF by
pitting:
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors are nor-
mal practice:
• No preservation procedures are
applied to the SH/RH during
shutdown.
• No nitrogen blanketing is used
during shutdown.
➠ Determine (if the information is
available such as from the con-
duct of a chemical monitoring
campaign) whether there is evi-
dence of:
• A potential carryover problem,
particularly of excesses of Na,
SO4, and/or Cl.
• Operating problems with the
drum such as indications of
high water levels.
• Drum furniture problems such
as holes in separators, etc.
➠ Determine whether one or more of
the following precursors has been
found:
• A BTF by short-term overheat-
ing occurred which was caused
by condensate accumulation in
SH/RH pendant loops.
• Excessive deposits in reheater
tubing, particularly of sulfate.
• Routine inspection and/or tube
sampling finds indication of
localized corrosion cells, mea-
surable wall thinning or evi-
dence of pitting.
➠ If one or more is likely to have
occurred, go to Action 3 which
outlines the steps needed to con-
firm the influence of each.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is pitting.

A failure has occurred which the ➠ Analyze the macroscopic dam-

BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being pitting (Action 1a).
Action 2 should clearly identify
pitting as the primary mecha-
nism or point to another cause.
If the cause is pitting, the source
of the problem (low pH, Na2SO4,
or stagnant oxygenated water)
should be identified through
reliance on analysis of any
deposits found in and around
the pits.
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by removing representa-
tive tube sample(s), followed by
visual examination and detailed
metallographic analysis.
age. Does damage consist of
pits that are deep relative to their
length, with corrosion “caps”,
and evidence of deposits?
Probable mechanism is pitting.
➠ Analyze deposits in and around
pits to help determine root cause.
• Deposits that contain sulfate will
provide evidence of a carryover.
• Deposits primarily of hematite,
provide evidence that pitting
most likely is a result of oxy-
genated, stagnant condensate
during shutdown.
• If deposits are missing, as is
surface oxide, suspect chemical
cleaning damage. See Chapter
43.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

References to other sources of detailed information:

• Main text (this chapter) provides the background to mechanism and the
development of pitting.
• Summary of the steps and methods of metallurgical investigation of boiler
tube failures can be found in Chapter 6, Volume 1.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 41-11

Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the pitting
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as pitting (Action 2) or a
precursor has occurred (Action
1b). The goal of this Action 3 is
for the BTF Team to review the
potential root causes of pitting,
identify probable ones, and take
those actions that are needed to
confirm which are operative in
the unit. This step must be taken
so that the proper actions can be
taken to prevent future BTF from
occurring by this mechanism.
Execute, in parallel, Action 4 to
determine the extent of damage.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences ➠ Actions to Confirm
3.2 Influence of poor shutdown practice ➠ (a). Analyze corrosion products in and around
(presence of stagnant, oxygen-saturated water) pitting; specifically looking for presence of
hematite. Methods of metallurgical examination
are reviewed in Chapter 6, Volume 1.
➠ (b). Selective tube sampling to evaluate for
localized corrosion cells.
➠ (c). Perform critical evaluation of shutdown
procedures and of unit condition during shut-
down. Check records or logs of chemistry during
shutdown.

3.3 Carryover of Na2SO4 ➠ (d). Analysis of corrosion products, as in item

(a) above; in this case specifically looking for a
confirmation of Na2SO4. See Chapter 6, Volume 1
for methods of metallurgical examination.
➠ (e). Review drum condition and operation.
➠ (f). Review steam composition, particularly
evaluating for excesses of Na, SO4, and Cl.

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

In parallel with Action 3 (root cause analysis), the BTF Team should deter-
mine the extent of damage. Detection of extensive pitting may be possible
with ultrasonic testing (UT), otherwise sampling for localized damage in
suspect locations (see main text) will be required. Sampling may also be
required to confirm the root cause.
Results of the survey for damage will thus be used interactively with Action
3 to determine root cause and with Actions 5 and 6 to develop a strategy
to prevent repeat failures.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

➠ Implement repairs or replacement
The BTF Team must ensure that
repairs and immediate solutions
are directly tied to the underlying
cause. Most actions can be con-
sidered for the longer-term
(Action 6) but several underlying
problems can be dealt with in
the short-term.
➠Repair any obvious mechanical
of affected tubes. problems such as that lead to
excess carryover of contami-
➠Develop a plan based on results
nants in steam or to the ingress
of NDE survey (Action 4) to
of oxygen during shutdown.
replace affected tubing includ-
ing an assessment of the antici-
pated rate of future failures.
➠See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
summary of applicable tube
repair techniques.

41-12 Pitting in Steam-Touched Tubes

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

The correction of the underlying
problem(s) and the prevention of
repeat failures are priorities for
the BTF team. The proper choice
of long-term actions will be
based on the clear identification
of the underlying root cause
(Action 3) and an economic eval-
uation to ensure that the opti-
mum strategy has been chosen.
Major Root Cause Influences
Influence of poor shutdown practice (presence
of stagnant, oxygenated water)
Carryover of Na2SO4
➠ Long-Term Actions
➠ Confirm or establish unit shutdown and
layup procedures that will prevent pitting pre-
cursors. See additional discussion in main text
this chapter and Chapter 4, Volume 1.
➠ Establish steam composition monitoring
instrumentation and action levels to prevent
excessive carryover. See discussion of addi-
tional detail in Chapter 3, Volume 1.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

The final step for the BTF team is
to review the possible ramifica-
tions to other cycle components
implied by the presence of pit-
ting damage or its precursors.
Pitting Aspect Alert for Other Cycle
Components
Carryover of Na2SO4 • Potential for carryover
in steam of other corrosive chemi-
cals, of particular concern
if potential for carryover to
the turbine.
➠ Actions Indicated
➠ Check turbine deposits for evidence
of excessive carryover.
➠ Implement stricter cycle chemistry
control program, and instrumentation.
See Chapter 3, Volume 1.

Carryover of • Potential for damage ➠ Check drum control and equipment.

contaminants throughout the cycle
caused by improper drum
operation.

Improper unit shutdown • Possibility for damage ➠ Check for economizer tubing damage
or layup procedures throughout cycle. by pitting (Chapter 27, Volume 2).
➠ Implement appropriate procedures.
See overview of the issues provided in
Chapter 4, Volume 1.

Excessive formation of • Potential for SH/RH ➠ Revise shutdown and startup proce-
condensate boiler tube failures by dures to eliminate or minimize formation
short-term overheating if of condensate.
condensate is present at
bottom loops during
startup. See separate dis-
cussion of short-term over-
heating in Chapter 36.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 41-13

41-14 Pitting in Steam-Touched Tubes
Chapter 42 • Volume 3
Graphitization
Introduction
Graphitization of carbon and car-
bon-molybdenum steels is a form of
microstructural degradation that
occurs after prolonged exposure at
temperatures of 450-700°C (~ 840-
1290°F). The damage mechanism
can affect steels in many compo-
nents of the power plant and,
because it causes embrittlement in
the material, can lead to cata-
strophic failure. Although fairly com-
mon in boiler tubes in the 1940s and
1950s, it is not now a major cause
of boiler tube failures.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 42-1
1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
Graphitization: Identification Keys
1. Graphitization is manifested
macroscopically as brittle
fractures in carbon and car-
bon-molybdenum boiler tubes,
usually oriented circumferen-
tially and associated with the
heat affected zone (HAZ) of
welds.
2. Microscopically, graphitization
can be seen as the formation
of nodules or “chains” of
graphite particles.
1.1 Features of failure
Graphitization occurs most com-
monly in the heat affected zones
(HAZ) of welds in carbon or carbon
molybdenum low-alloy steel such as
SA209-T1A. Macroscopically such
damage is manifested by brittle frac-
ture that occurs along a line of
graphite nodules which forms along
the HAZ. Figure 42-1 shows the
appearance of the microstructure.
The black spots represent graphite
particles or nodules which embrittle
the material in that location, leading
eventually to brittle fracture, usually
oriented circumferentially.
A second form of graphitization can
be found in material remote from the
effects of a weld. In these locations,
the graphite nodules are generally
uniformly dispersed, Figure 42-2, not
aligned as in chain graphite.
1.2 Locations of failure
Graphitization is most prevalent in
the low temperature portions of the
superheater and reheater. There are
only a few boiler tube failures by this
mechanism annually and of those
the overwhelming majority are asso-
ciated with the HAZ of weld joints.
Graphitization has been frequently
confused with creep damage.
Although less commonly, because of
a similarity in location, graphitization
may also be confused with failures
in dissimilar metal welds. Table 42-1
compares the key characteristics of
these three failure mechanisms.

Figure 42-1. Photomicrograph illustrating graphitization (black nodules)

in a weld heat affected zone. Graphitization took place in the carbon
steel after approximately 15 years of service at 455°C (850°F).
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

42-2 Graphitization
Figure 42-2. Remote from weld effects graphitization can be found with
graphite modules that are more uniformly dispersed (etched). Source:
S.R. Paterson, et al.1

Table 42-1
Comparison of Characteristics of Graphitization, Long-Term Overheating, and Dissimilar Metal Weld Failures
Characteristic Graphitization Dissimilar Metal Weld Long-Term Overheating

Location in tube Edge of HAZ or in the tube. Along weld line. Not necessarily at weld or HAZ.

Location and Usually circumferential; parallel Always parallel to weld line. Usually final failure is longitudinal.
Orientation of Failure to weld.

Fracture Surface Thick-edged, brittle Thick-edged, brittle. Thick-edged in middle of wall loss with
some bulging.

Wall Thinning? No No, unless wastage occurs in Yes, wastage flats typical at 10 and
ferritic material. 2 o'clock positions.

Material Degradation? Only along graphitization lines. Only locally along weld lines. Extensive signs of overheating and
spheroidization.

Material(s) Involved T1A Any ferritic joined to any Any ferritic.

austenitic.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 42-3

2. Mechanism of Failure
Graphitization: Mechanism
Graphitization is a form of
microstructural deterioration in
carbon and carbon-molybdenum
steels caused by the decompo-
sition of iron carbide to ferrite +
graphite.
42-4 Graphitization
2.1 Introduction
Graphitization is one of the changes
that can occur to the microstructure
of carbon and low-alloy steels when
they are exposed over a long period
to temperatures in the range of 450-
700°C (~ 840-1290°F). Two other
effects, creep cavitation and carbide
spheroidization are discussed in
detail in Chapter 10, Volume 1.
Graphitization occurs when iron
carbide decomposes into ferrite +
graphite, its true equilibrium struc-
ture. The formation of graphite
particles or nodules, if dispersed
throughout the metal are not consid-
ered a problem, however, if they
form a continuous zone the resulting
embrittled material can fail cata-
strophically by brittle fracture.
Carbide spheroidization is also a
mechanism of pearlite decomposi-
tion. Of the two, graphitization is less
common, but because it results in
embrittled material, it is more serious
when it does occur. Because of the
difference in activation energies of
the two processes, it has generally
been considered that graphitization
is preferred at temperatures below
about 550°C (~ 1020°F). However,
recently it has been observed from
field experience with degraded
materials that the graphitization-to-
spheroidization temperature may
differ somewhat from the accepted
value, be dependent on steel com-
position and microstructure, and in a
manner which to date, is not com-
pletely predictable.2
Pearlite decomposition tends to
become unstable when the steel has
been heated briefly above the A1
temperature, approximately 725°C
(~ 1340°F). Such a temperature
regime occurs during the welding
process which is why traditionally
graphitization damage is mostly
associated with the heat affected
zones of welds, usually at a charac-
teristic distance from the weld.
Recent field investigations have
identified graphitization that has
occurred in base metal removed
from the influence of welds.2 This
phenomenon referred to as “non-
weld-related graphitization” seems
to be associated with locations that
have been subjected to large plastic
deformations. A complete explana-
tion of this second type of graphiti-
zation is not yet in hand. Boiler
tubes are among the power plant
components in which this recently
recognized form of graphitization
has led to failure.
The propensity to graphitization
damage has also been considered
to be dependent on the steel-mak-
ing practice used. Aluminum-killed
steels, once in common usage have
been shown to be more susceptible
than those deoxidized with silicon or
titanium, unless the aluminum con-
tent is restricted to < 0.025%.
If the nodules are pulled out during
metallurgical examination, they can
leave voids that can be mistaken for
creep cavities.
2.2 Analysis of the growth
kinetics of graphitization
Foulds and Viswanathan2 have
described the kinetics of graphite
growth through consideration of an
incubation period, and a growth
period that is approximated by an
equation of the form:
y = A exp (-QÕ/RT) tgm (42-1)
where
y = fraction of transformation
(0 to 1.0)
A = constant
Q’ is approximately equal to Q
the activation energy for the
controlling process
T = exposure temperature in
absolute units
R = Universal Gas Constant
tg = exposure time following
incubation
m = time dependence power
 Figure 42-3 shows the two regimes
Fraction Transformation, y of interest; incubation and growth.
1 An analysis of available data led to a
best-fit determination for predicting
Sigmoidal growth fractional transformation in weld
Power law approximation HAZ graphitization of:
y = 2.07 x 108 exp
(-20,000/T) tg0.53 (42-2)

where
T = exposure temperature in °K
tg = growth period following
incubation.

Incubation period was also derived

from available data and found to be:
"Incubation" "Growth" ti = 226.25 exp (3693/T) (42-3)

Best estimate time-temperature-

transformation curves were devel-
oped as shown in Figure 42-4 which
were recommended as “first-cut”
0 predictors of weld HAZ graphitiza-
0 ti tion of C, C-Si and C-Mo steels.2
Service Time, T (logarithmic) Although, because of a lack of data,
“non-weld-related graphitization”
curves were not developed, it would
Figure 42-3. Schematic of graphite growth kinetics. be conservative to use these results
Source: J.R. Foulds and R. Viswanathan2 for the weld HAZ as a first cut.

Service Time (years)

2 4 6 8 10 20 40 60 80 100
1000
Heavy graphitization
(G = 4)
950 Moderate
graphitization
Service Temperature (°F)

(G = 3) 500
Service Temperature (°C)

900
Slight
graphitization
(G = 2)
850
Very slight
450
graphitization
(G = 1)
800
Start of
graphitization
750 (G = 0) 400

700
104 2 4 6 8 105 2 4 6 8 106
Service Time (hours)

Figure 42-4. Graphical summary of the best-fit time-temperature-transformation curves

for various weld heat affected zone graphitization levels developed from equation 42-3.
Source: J.R. Foulds and R. Viswanathan2

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 42-5

3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
Graphitization: Root Cause
The root cause of graphitization
is prolonged exposure of sus-
ceptible boiler tube materials to
temperatures in the range 450-
700°C (~ 840-1290°F).
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
42-6 Graphitization
3.1 Prolonged exposure of
susceptible materials
Traditionally, graphitization has been
identified by metallographic exami-
nation following tube failures. This
has been followed by a determina-
tion of the extent of the problem and
replacement of affected tubes.
There are now several alternatives
available for confirming that graphiti-
zation has been a problem and
determining to what extent. The
options include:
(a). Metallurgical examination on
samples removed from service to
characterize the appearance of
graphitization.
There are several methods available
to identify or confirm locations at-risk
if tube failures have occurred with
graphitization as the primary dam-
age mode, or in an anticipatory
sense.
A method to screen for susceptible
locations is implicit in the work of
Foulds and Viswanathan.2
Specifically Figure 42-4 can be used
to identify potential locations for
HAZ-related graphitization. Note that
as this is meant to be a first cut,
there may be some non-conserva-
tive aspects to the figure, but it does
provide a starting point. It could also
be used for screening for potentially
(b). Bend testing of removed sam-
ples. Since graphitization results in
embrittled material, a bend speci-
men can be used to determine qual-
itatively whether significant damage
has accumulated. A 45° bend at fail-
ure is taken as indicative of severe
graphitization damage and a 90°
bend of mild damage.
(c). Fracture toughness testing on
miniature specimens removed from
suspect locations. A method to
remove small samples from compo-
nents for fracture testing using
miniature specimens has been
developed.3 These tests are harder
to apply and interpret than bend
testing but provide a more quantita-
tive approach to flaw tolerance.
susceptible non-weld related loca-
tions, although there it will probably
be conservative.
Removal of material, either punch
testing for small scale sampling for
use in miniature fracture mechanics
tests, or tube samples for metallo-
graphic analysis can also be
performed. The former has the
advantage of being nearly non-
destructive. Samples removed for
metallographic analysis could also,
of course be used in mechanical
tests. As previously noted, bend
tests have long been used as a
qualitative measure of the amount
of graphitization damage.
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Graphitization:
Immediate Solutions and Actions
1. Replace or repair damaged
locations.
2. Determine the extent of the
problem through methods
such as: screening evalua-
tions of susceptible service,
selective sampling and testing
of material pulled from ser-
vice.
5.1 Repairs
Immediate actions will involve
replacing or repairing damaged
tubes and identifying those similar
locations or welds which may also
be at risk given the failures experi-
enced.
Repairs can either replace whole
tubes or only affected areas.
Chapter 11, Volume 1 discusses
repair and replacement of boiler
tubes. Depending upon the
expected and required lifetime of
replacement tubes, they can be
replaced with material of the same
grade or by using a higher grade of
material, for example T-1A can be
replaced with T11, etc. As a general
rule, steels with chromium levels
greater than about 0.5% are immune
to graphitization.1 Historically, a rule-
of-thumb on replacement materials
was to avoid any with aluminum
content above 0.025% in suscepti-
ble steels. Since this is not a bur-
densome requirement, it is still pru-
dent even though a recent analysis2
has indicted that aluminum levels
may not have significant influence
on long-term graphitization of car-
bon steel.
Mild graphitization has been rehabil-
itated by solution heat treatment, but
the method is usually impractical
because of tight tube spacing. If
such a process were to be applied,
a recommendation has been made
to use a heat treatment of 720-
730°C (~1325-1350°F) for a mini-
mum of four hours.1
5.2 Remaining life assessment
Some guidelines have been pro-
posed for the remaining life analyses
of the two types of graphitization. In
the case of HAZ-related or planar
base metal graphitization, some
determination of the subcritical and
critical crack growth properties of
the material are required from sam-
pling testing.2 In the case of random
nodule formation removed from weld
HAZ, it has been suggested that the
graphitization be treated as if it were
spheroidization, for which stress rup-
ture data are readily available.2
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 42-7
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
Graphitization:
Long-Term Actions
If graphitization becomes a key
concern, a program to identify
susceptible locations and take
periodic samples for confirma-
tion of the degree of damage
may be warranted. As graphitiza-
tion of boiler tubes is a relatively
infrequent problem, a formal pro-
gram of prediction and monitor-
ing is probably not warranted.

7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.

8. References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, S.R. Moser, and H. 3McMinn, A. and D. Mercaldi, “Material Sampling for
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide, Equipment Evaluation”, in I.A. Diaz-Tous, ed., Steam tur-
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices, bines in Power Generation, ASME PWR, Volume 3,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October, 1988.
1993.
2Foulds, J.R. and R. Viswanathan, “Graphitization of
Steels in Elevated-Temperature Service”, in P.K. Liaw, et
al., eds., Microstructure and Mechanical Properties of
Aging Material, The Minerals, Metals and Materials
Society, 1993.

42-8 Graphitization
ACTIONS for Graphitization
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of
graphitization begin here. The
goal of these actions is to see if
further investigation of graphiti-
zation is warranted or whether
another BTF mechanism should
be investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and graphitization is
the likely mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
by graphitization.
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred
and graphitization is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Determine whether the failure has
occurred in a location that is typi-
cal of graphitization: most typi-
cally associated with a weld heat-
affected zone, but may also be
remote from a weld (see Section
1.2 of text).
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
such features as: a brittle fracture
in either carbon or carbon molyb-
denum tubes, usually oriented cir-
cumferentially.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by graphitiza-
tion.
Unlike most of the other BTF mecha-
nisms, for graphitization there are
few, if any, indicators that might sig-
nal a potential problem with graphiti-
zation. About the only sign might be
evidence of graphitization that is
uncovered during the investigation
of a boiler tube failure caused by
another mechanism.
➠ If this occurs, go to Action 3
which reviews root causes and
outlines the steps needed to con-
firm the influence of each.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 42-9
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is graphitization.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being caused by graphiti-
zation (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify graphitiza-
tion as the primary mechanism
or point to another cause. The
actions listed will be executed by
removing representative tube
sample(s), followed by visual
examination and detailed metal-
lographic analysis. Because of
the similarity in location, a pri-
mary objective of this Action is to
determine that the failure was not
because of dissimilar metal
welds.
42-10 Graphitization
➠ Confirm that failure location is
typical of graphitization. Is failure
located near a weld, specifically
in a weld HAZ?
➠ Distinguish failure from that of
dissimilar metal weld cracking.
Is the affected weld between
dissimilar metals? See Table 42-1
for distinguishing characteristics.
➠ Evaluate microstructure of failed
tube. Does metallographic analy-
sis show the distinctive forma-
tions of graphite particles such
as in Figure 42-1 for weld HAZ
and Figure 42-2 for metal remote
from welds?
Probable mechanism is
graphitization.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
Problem may not be graphitization,
however, continue with flowchart
as there have been a few boiler
tube graphitization failures remote
from welds.
Suspect dissimilar metal weld fail-
ures, go to the discussion of that
mechanism for actions to confirm.
If graphite nodules are not found,
but cavities are, the problem may
be long-term overheating. Under
this damage mechanism, cavities
may also be less oriented than
graphite nodules. See Table 42-1
for additional means of distinguish-
ing between the two.
Action 3: Determine root cause of graphitization

Action 4: Determine extent of damage

A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as graphitization (Action
2) or a precursor to graphitiza-
tion has occurred (Action 1b).
Since there is really only one root
cause, the primary goal for
Actions 3 and 4 is for the BTF
Team to take the actions needed
to confirm graphitization in the
unit and determine the extent of
damage.
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
3.1 Prolonged exposure of a susceptible
material at the specific temperature range.
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Metallurgical analysis on samples for
characteristic appearance of graphite nodule
or chains-like arrays. See for example Figures
42-1 and 42-2.
➠ (b). Bend testing of removed samples to
determine qualitative amount of damage.
➠ (c). Fracture toughness testing on full-
sized or miniature samples removed from
service.

In parallel, perform a screening analysis as outlined in text and shown in

Figure 42-4 that plots service hours against service temperatures to deter-
mine probable extent of the problem.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

➠ Repair damaged areas and
replace tubes.
➠ Anticipate other locations which
may be susceptible. See screen-
ing method outlined in main text.
➠ If graphitization is likely to be an
on-going concern, implement a
program of periodic sampling to
monitor damage accumulation.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

None implied by this mechanism.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 42-11

42-12 Graphitization
a)
Temperature °F
Chapter 43 • Volume 3
1100

1080

1060

1040

1020
Estimated
end of life
Chemical Cleaning
1000

980

b)
0 120,000
Time (hours)
237,601 Damage: SH/RH
Temperature °F
1060

1040

1020
Estimated
end of life
1000

980
0 120,000 300,818
Time (hours)

Introduction and by the difficulties inherent in

Chemical cleaning of boilers has
traditionally focused on waterside
deposits in waterwall and econo-
mizer tubing. However, chemical
cleaning of superheater/reheater
(SH/RH) tubing can also provide sig-
nificant advantages. The buildup of
internal steamside oxide is a primary
cause of tube overheating and a
secondary contributor to a variety of
other boiler tube failure mecha-
nisms. Further, the exfoliation of
internal scale with carryover into the
turbine causes solid particle erosion
(SPE) of nozzles and blades, a sig-
nificant industry problem.
As is the case for waterwalls (see
Chapter 25, Volume 2), either insuffi-
cient or partial cleaning, as well as
errors in the cleaning process itself
can lead to significant problems in
the superheater/reheater. In the
SH/RH the situation is complicated
by the use of a variety of materials
ensuring an adequate post-cleaning
rinse, particularly of the pendant
platens.
An overview of the establishment of
an optimized chemical cleaning pro-
gram for superheaters and
reheaters is included in Chapter 4,
Volume 1. Here the focus is on
chemical cleaning damage to
SH/RH tubes. There are two related
SH/RH boiler tube failure mecha-
nisms; each the subject of a sepa-
rate chapter. Short term overheating
in SH/RH tubes (Chapter 36) is prin-
cipally caused when tubes are
plugged by exfoliated oxide or
chemical cleaning waste material
which has been improperly flushed
out of the tubes. Stress corrosion
cracking (Chapter 37) is a failure
mechanism which can be triggered
by improper chemical cleaning.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 43-1

1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
The primary problem is chemical
attack, manifested as generalized
corrosion of affected tube surfaces.
Depending upon the severity of the
problem, the appearance of the
affected tubes will be as jagged,
rough, straight-sided or undercut
pits or as generalized wall thinning
2. Mechanism of Failure
Chemical cleaning of SH/RH tubing
is performed to achieve one or more
of three primary objectives. The first
is to remove excessive oxide that
might exfoliate and carry over into
the turbine causing solid particle
erosion of turbine parts. The second
is to prevent short-term overheating
of SH/RH tubing that results from
tube blockage caused by exfoliated
oxide (Chapter 36). The third is to
remove excessive oxide scale
buildup which acts to insulate
SH/RH tubes from the cooling
effects of steam and thus lead to
premature tube failure by creep, see
long-term overheating of SH/RH
tubes described in Chapter 32.
The failure mechanism is corrosion
of the base tube metal by the sol-
vent used in, or remaining after, the
chemical cleaning process. For
SH/RH chemical cleans it is even
more important than for waterwalls
to carefully perform the solvent and
inhibitor selection process. This con-
sists of extracting a tube or tubes
from the locations to be cleaned and
subjecting them, in the laboratory, to
possible chemical cleaning environ-
ments. Although there may not be a
direct correlation between these
smaller scale tests and the cleaning
process in the boiler itself, it does
provide a means to optimize the
process variables chosen. It is
43-2 Chemical Cleaning Damage: SH/RH
that can occur around the entire
tube circumference. If the damage
is found relatively soon after chemi-
cal cleaning then pitting will be
found to be relatively free of oxides
and deposits.1
important to look at the full range of
materials including ferritics such as
T11 and T22, and austenitics such
as 304 and 321.
The evaluation should include as a
minimum2: the evaluation of the
optimal solvents and inhibitors, char-
acterizing the length of exposure,
and the velocity of the solvent to be
used. Table 4-3, Volume 1 provides
a list of chemical cleaning solvent
options and their temperature
ranges.
For SH/RH chemical cleans, addi-
tional agents such as ammonium
bifluoride are often added. It is
important that the process develop-
ment includes tests with and without
these agents especially as they
could cause damage on the
austenitic materials. It may be possi-
ble that these agents are not
required; for example, ammonium
bi-fluoride is often found to not be
required.
After the cleaning procedure is com-
plete, care must be taken to remove
any loosened or dislodged scale
through a final system purge using
either steam or air blows. Scale may
also be lying in the bottoms of pen-
dant loops which may not be
removed by steam or air blows; it
should be confirmed that this mater-
ial is removed by checking that
there is flow in each tube circuit.
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
The root causes of this form of dam-
age are one or more improper oper-
ations in the chemical cleaning
process including:
• Use of an inappropriate clean-
ing agent, inhibitor, or other
chemical
• Excessively strong acid con-
centration
• Excessively long cleaning times
• Too high a temperature
• Failure to neutralize, drain and
rinse properly after cleaning
• Breakdown of inhibitors as a
result of temperature excur-
sions. Inhibitors are used to
prevent corrosion of the base
tube material after the scale
and deposits are removed.
Most inhibitors have a maximum
temperature above which they
will decompose or lose effec-
tiveness.
Monitoring of the chemical cleaning
process by means of a side loop,
particularly for Fe in the cleaning
solution, can prevent failure by this
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
The primary means for assessing
the extent of damage will be mea-
surements at suspect locations for
either wall thinning or tube block-
ages. Wall thinning can be mea-
sured by ultrasonic surveys as out-
lined in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
Tube blockages in loops, caused by
improper rinsing are generally
detected by: (i) magnets on the tube
if the loop is of austenitic material,
(ii) radiography, (iii) tube removal, or
mechanism. If, at some later date,
tube failures are suspected to have
been caused by this mechanism,
actions to confirm consist of:
(a). Review of chemical cleaning
procedures, chemical pumping sys-
tems, chemical control logs. Items of
particular concern are those listed
above which would lead to signifi-
cant damage.
(b). Review cycle chemistry moni-
toring records to detect a pH
depression on start-up of the unit
after cleaning, indicating a hideout
and return of acid.
(c). Sampling of affected tubes to
allow examination of the inside sur-
face for evidence of generalized
corrosion. Part of an optimized pro-
cedure for chemical cleaning will be
sampling of selected tubes for the
efficacy of the cleaning process.
These samples can be used to
determine whether excessive dam-
age has accumulated. Wall thick-
ness measurements provide a quick
screening of whether excessive con-
ditions have occurred.
(iv) measurement of the outside
diameter of tubes to detect swelling
caused by overheating of the
blocked tube. For ferritic materials,
only the last three methods will be
usable. Circulating water of chang-
ing temperature in conjunction with
“hand-checking”, usually done as
part of the chemical cleaning opera-
tion, can detect tubes that are
blocked.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 43-3
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
Immediate solutions will consist of
repairing or replacing the damaged
tubes (see Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
a discussion of these methods) and
immediate chemical clean with par-
ticular emphasis on proper neutraliz-
ing and rinsing.

6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat

Failures
If procedures were inadequate to
control the chemical cleaning
process, including sampling for
deposit extent and composition, sol-
vent choice, planning, cleaning pro-
cedures, post-cleaning inspection,
etc., then such procedures must be
established as a means to prevent
recurrence of the problem.

7. Case Study
None for this mechanism.

8. References
1Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.
2Bartholomew, R.D., W.E. Chesney, R.D. Hopkins, J.S.
Poole, J.W. Siegmund, J.P. Williams, and S. Yorgiadis,
Guidelines for Chemical Cleaning of Fossil-Fueled Steam-
Generating Equipment, Research Project 2712-06, Final
Report TR-102401, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, June, 1993.

43-4 Chemical Cleaning Damage: SH/RH

ACTIONS for SH/RH Chemical Cleaning Damage
Two paths for the BTF team to
take in the investigation of chem-
ical cleaning damage begin
here. The goal of these actions is
to see if further investigation is
warranted or whether another
BTF mechanism should be
investigated.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and chemical clean-
ing damage is the likely
mechanism.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
that could lead to future BTF
because of chemical cleaning
damage.
Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and chemical cleaning
damage is the likely mechanism.
➠ Determine whether damage
appears to be generalized corro-
sion over a large number of
affected surfaces.
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes
extensive pitting (jagged, rough,
straight-sided or undercut) or is
manifested as generalized wall
thinning. If found relatively soon
after chemical cleaning, pits
might be relatively free of
deposits of oxides.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for steam-
touched tubing (Table 31-1) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF by chemical
cleaning damage.
➠ Determine whether there may
have been one or more of the fol-
lowing during a recent chemical
cleaning operation:
• Use of an inappropriate clean-
ing agent
• Excessively strong acid con-
centration
• Excessively long cleaning times
• Too high a temperature was
used
• There was a failure to monitor
Fe levels during the cleaning
• Fe levels were monitored but
did not level out during the
clean
• Failure to neutralize, drain and
rinse after cleaning
• Breakdown of inhibitors as a
result of temperature excur-
sions during the chemical
clean.
➠ Determine whether one or more
of the following precursors has
been found or is likely to have
occurred in the unit:
• Wall thinning found during a
routine inspection
• Excessive steamside oxide or a
continuing problem with exfolia-
tion found relatively soon after a
chemical clean.
➠ These precursors can signal the
potential for BTF because of an
improper chemical clean. If one
or more has occurred, go to
Action 3 which reviews root
causes and outlines the steps to
confirm the influence of each.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 43-5
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is chemical
cleaning damage.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as caused by chemical
cleaning (Action 1a). Action 2
should clearly identify this as the
primary mechanism or point to
another cause. Note that this
mechanism covers mostly gener-
alized or localized corrosion
caused by chemical cleaning
such as indicated by pitting,
roughness, or wall loss. Tube
failures by stress corrosion
cracking may also result from
improper chemical cleaning (see
Chapter 37).
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by removing representa-
tive tube sample(s), followed by
visual examination and detailed
metallographic analysis.
43-6 Chemical Cleaning Damage: SH/RH
➠ Review extent of damage (in
conjunction with Action 4). Is
damage manifested as general-
ized attack over affected tube
surfaces?
➠ Analyze locations of damage. Is
damage localized at stress points
such as attachments, etc.?
➠ Characterize nature of damage.
Does damage have the appear-
ance of jagged, rough, straight-
edged or undercut pits?
Probable mechanism is chemical
cleaning damage.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
Very localized attack may be via
a pitting mechanism. See Chapter
41.
Failure mechanism may be stress
corrosion cracking (SCC) instead
of corrosion although it could have
been triggered by a problem with
the chemical cleaning process.
Confirmation of SCC will include
evaluation of the nature of the
damage, e.g., cracking instead of
pitting or surface roughness, etc.
See separate chapter on SCC
(Chapter 37).
Compare to pitting damage
(Chapter 41).
Action 3: Determine root cause of chemical cleaning damage
A BTF failure has occurred and
the mechanism has been con-
firmed as chemical cleaning
damage (Action 2) or a precur-
sor has occurred (Action 1b).
The goal for this Action 3 is to
pinpoint the particular source of
damage and in conjunction with
Action 4, to determine the extent
of the affected area so that
appropriate repairs can be
implemented.
➠ Review list of major root cause influences in first column, below.
➠ Take indicated actions to confirm the applicability of that influence in the
unit.
Major Root Cause Influences
3.1 One or more improper operations during
the chemical cleaning process
➠ Actions to Confirm
➠ (a). Review chemical cleaning procedures,
chemical pumping systems, chemical control
logs for evidence of (i) inappropriate cleaning
agent, (ii) excessively strong solvent concen-
tration, (iii) excessively long cleaning times,
(iv) failure to properly neutralize, drain and
rinse after cleaning, (v) levels of Fe that con-
tinue to increase in cleaning solution, (vi)
breakdown of inhibitors, (vii) too high a tem-
perature.
➠ (b). Review cycle chemistry monitoring
records for pH depression on startup indicating
a hideout and return of acid.
➠ (c). Sample affected tubes for evidence of
generalized corrosion.

In parallel, determine the extent of affected area, Action 4.

Action 4: Determine the Extent of Damage or Affected Areas

In parallel with Action 3, the BTF
team should determine the extent
of the affected area. Note that if
damage is consistent with stress
corrosion cracking, the steps of
Action 4 presented in Chapter 37
should be followed.
➠ Determine the areas and extent to be inspected from a
review of the chemical cleaning operation and likely
problems.
➠ Perform NDE. Ultrasonic examination of suspect
locations to detect wall thinning extent. See Chapter
9, Volume 1 for additional background on methods.

➠ Selective tube sampling to confirm results of NDE

survey.

➠ See Action 5: Implement Repairs, Immediate Solutions

and Actions.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 43-7

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions
The primary immediate objective
for the BTF team is to ensure that
a proper cleaning occurs and
that damaged tubes are repaired
or replaced.
➠ Immediate chemical clean is indi- ➠ See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for
cated followed by proper neutral- summary of applicable tube
izing and rinsing. repair techniques.
➠ Implement repairs or replacement ➠ Ensure that the full extent of dam-
of affected tubes as identified age is removed as indicated by
from the NDE survey (Action 4). wall thinning. Failure to do so will
result in immediate repeat fail-
• Perform minimum wall analysis
ures.
in accordance with applicable
ASME requirements. More detail
about such requirements is pro-
vided in Chapter 2, Volume 1.
Remaining life methodologies
are described in Chapter 8 of
Volume 1.

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

If inadequate procedures or controls
were in place for the chemical
cleaning processes they should be
implemented to include: sampling
for deposit extent and composition,
solvent choice, planning, cleaning
procedures, post-cleaning inspec-
tion. See the summary provided in
Chapter 4, Volume 1 or review
detailed guidance2.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

If steamside oxide scale was not
loosened and removed by the chem-
ical cleaning process then exfoliation
leading to SPE in the turbine is likely.
If scale was loosened and not
removed then either SPE or tube
blockage by the scale is likely.
Potential exists for either short-term
overheating of SH/RH tubes caused
by blockage, or long-term overheat-
ing (creep) if scales were not
removed. Ultrasonic testing can be
used to determine the extent of oxide
scale remaining as described in
Chapter 9, Volume 1.

43-8 Chemical Cleaning Damage: SH/RH

Chapter 44 • Volume 3
Maintenance
Damage
Description of Boiler Tube
Failure and its Manifestation
A number of boiler tube failure
mechanisms occur as a direct or
indirect result of improper or poorly-
executed maintenance practice.
Chapter 4, Volume 1 is devoted to
the topic of boiler tube failures and
operating/maintenance practice.
The subject of this brief chapter is
damage that can be introduced
during the maintenance activity,
mostly as a result of the mainte-
nance cleaning of the fireside of tub-
ing. Note that this general class of
damage can include either water-
touched or steam-touched tubing.
Typical of the damage that can be
done to tubing during maintenance
operations are:
• Impacts from explosives or power
tools used in cleaning flyash from
between tube rows or fireside
deposits from tube surfaces.
• Wall thinning by excessive appli-
cation of high pressure steam,
water, abrasive slurries used in
the cleaning process.
• Impacts to tubes from projectiles.
• Damage to tubes by mishandled
or improperly applied tools.
• Damage incurred during a repair.
• Oil-fired boilers are often water
washed every three months or so.
Severe fireside pitting will develop
when the acid salts in the ash are
not neutralized with a washing
soda solution.
A related topic, the subject of
Chapter 46, is welding (repair) flaws
such as leaving weld or cutting torch
spatter in tubes, poor weld prepara-
tion that can result in lack-of-pene-
tration or lack-of-fusion welds, or
improper heat treating leading to
graphitization (Chapter 42).
Features of the failure will depend to
an extent on the exact type of main-
tenance error that was made. Dents,
gouges and other mechanical dam-
age can often be significant in
extent as shown in Figure 44-1. This
degree of plastic deformation of the
tube wall will display microstructural
as well as macrostructural evidence
of the mechanical straining that has
occurred.
Excessive wall thinning such as
caused by the excessive application
of steam, water or abrasive slurries
during the cleaning process is a
second form of damage. It can be
detected by standard ultrasonic test-
ing or by analysis of removed tube
samples.
If damage is found immediately fol-
lowing the suspect maintenance,
then the confirmation of root cause
is straightforward; it is done by com-
paring the tube damage to type of
equipment or process used in the
recently completed maintenance.
Damage found some time later may
take somewhat more analysis to tie it
back to a prior operation.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 44-1
 Repair and replacement decisions
will depend on the severity of the
damage. Cracks and punctures will
require immediate repair. Chapter
11, Volume 1 provides an overview
of repair procedures. Gouges, dents
or thinned tubes should be sub-
jected to a fitness-for-service evalua-
tion on a case-by-case basis.1
Quality control measures such as: (i)
preparation of cleaning procedures,
and (ii) training of personnel, can
minimize the possibility of damage
occurring during the maintenance
procedure. Inspection of tubing fol-
lowing cleaning, and testing for
integrity such as with hydrostatic
testing are recommended.

Figure 44-1. Cross section of tube near a rupture; deformation caused

by the impact of an explosive charge. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.1

References
1Paterson, S.R. T.A. Kuntz, S.R. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
October, 1993.

44-2 Maintenance Damage

ACTIONS for Maintenance Damage Tube Failures
The detection and correction of
this boiler tube failure mecha-
nism should be straightforward.
As with other, more involved fail-
ure types, the two paths for the
BTF team to take for its resolu-
tion begin here.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and damage done
during the maintenance
process is the likely cause.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
which indicates that there
could be a future BTF
because of damage done
during maintenance activities.
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred Action 1b: If a precursor has
and damage from a maintenance occurred in the unit that could
activity is the likely cause. lead to future BTF because of
maintenance damage:
➠ Confirm that the macroscopic
appearance of the failure includes • Routine inspection, or mandatory
such features as: post-cleaning inspection, finds
indication of physical tube
• Tube gouging, dents, or
damage.
other signs of external tube
deformation • Tubes have failed during a hydro-
static test following a unit (fire-
• Wall thinning
side) clean.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent • If these indicators have been
with these features of failure, go found, go to Action 3 which out-
to Action 2 for further steps to lines the steps to confirm the
confirm the mechanism. influence of each.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the appropriate screening Table
for water-touched tubing (Table
12-1, Volume 2) or steam-touched
tubing (Table 31-1, this Volume) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 44-3
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is
maintenance-induced.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as having been caused by
damage done during a mainte-
nance procedure (Action 1a).
Action 2 should clearly identify
this as the primary mechanism or
point to another cause.
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by determining the extent
of the damage (number of
affected locations), and by
removing the damaged tube(s)
followed by visual examination.
➠ Determine the extent and type of
the damage. Is damage limited
to one or only a few tubes?
Is damage external surface
gouging, or denting?
➠ Correlate damaged locations to
locations of maintenance actions.
Is damage correlated with loca-
tions of prior actions, particularly
hammering, chipping, dynamit-
ing, shotgun blasting, high pres-
sure grit or water blasting?
Widespread damage particularly
wall thinning may be caused by
another mechanism such as (i)
one of the erosive processes, pri-
marily flyash erosion (Chapter 14)
or sootblower erosion (Chapter 38)
or (ii) fireside corrosion (Chapters
33 or 34). However, continue the
flow chart as it could also be
induced by aggressive cleaning.
Damage is probably not due to a
maintenance related activity.

Damage is probably induced by a

maintenance activity.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the damage

Root cause determination is sim-

plified if the damage is found
immediately after the suspect
maintenance procedure. If dam-
age is found at some later time,
it may be necessary to take met-
allographic samples to confirm
that there is a mechanical source
(impact, erosive wear, etc.) to the
damage.

44-4 Maintenance Damage

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

Extent of damage can usually be

determined by visual examina-
tion. If the damage manifestation
is wall thinning, ultrasonic testing
survey of thickness can be used,
metallographic sampling can be
taken to analyze the nature and
extent of the problem.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Routine repairs or tube replace-

ments are generally sufficient to
deal with the immediate
failure/damage. See Chapter 11,
Volume 1 for a summary of prac-
tices. Cracks and punctures
require immediate repair while
dents, gouges, or thinned tubes
should be evaluated for fitness-
to-serve. An overview of remain-
ing life assessment can be found
in Chapter 8, Volume 1.

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

In order to avoid similar failures,

quality control measures such as
cleaning procedures and opera-
tor training should be imple-
mented. A routine inspection and
testing practice, such as hydro-
static testing, following cleans
should be adopted.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

Check for incidence of the same

damage in other locations that
have been subjected to the
same procedures in prior out-
ages.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 44-5

44-6 Maintenance Damage
Chapter 45 • Volume 3
Material Flaws
Description of Boiler Tube
Failure and its Manifestation
Boiler tube failures from material
flaws can occur in either water-
touched or steam-touched tubing.
Examples of material flaws include
such possibilities as:
• Defects introduced into the tube
during its manufacture, fabrica-
tion, storage and/or installation.
Such defects might include1:
• Forging laps, see for example,
Figures 45-1 and 45-2.
• Inclusions or laminations in the
metal.
• Lack of fusion of the welded
seams.
• Deep tool marks or scores from
tube piercing, extrusion or
rolling operations.
• Gouges, punctures, corrosion,
impact dents.
• Use of the wrong tube material
caused by errors in design, sup-
ply, storage, and stockroom
exchange or issue.
Failures are rarely caused by the
use of the wrong material, a pre-
existing defect from the manufactur-
ing process, particularly a forging
lap in the construction of the tube is
more common. As shown in Figures
45-1 and 45-2, such laps may
include such features as2: orienta-
tion in the tube’s forming direction
rather than perpendicular to the
tube service stress, decarburization
and/or inclusions along the lap sur-
face, branching, and secondary
laps along the tube length.
Failures from these defects will gen-
erally be manifested in the interme-
diate stages with crack growth by
fatigue, corrosion, or some combi-
nation; final failure will occur by
fatigue or by stress rupture. Failures
tend to be more predominant in high
temperature sections because of the
interaction of flaws with the higher
stress in these locations.
Another failure mechanism, strain-
age embrittlement, can occur with
replacement tube bends for water-
touched service. This is caused pri-
marily as a result of not hot forming
tubes or not heat treating them after
cold bending.3 One way of detecting
this type of damage is to conduct a
simple hardness test on the bend.
A failure mechanism that has
affected membrane wall panels was
initiated by an electric resistance
flash weld process which joins the
membrane fins to the tube wall.4
The problem results during manu-
facture if the process leaves
unfused material between the fin
and tube surface as shown in Figure
45-3. Small initial cracks are intro-
duced by the lack-of-fusion, or intro-
duced into the martensitic heat
affected zone during lifting of the
panels during manufacture. These
cracks propagate in service and
result in a “window pane” failure
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 45-1
 where the failure occurs along the
membrane line. The affected tube
areas are large and can result in a
significant release of water or steam
on final rupture. The problem is
overcome by using full penetration
fusion welds.
For all of these material failures,
metallurgical examination in con-
junction with material testing, as
needed, will generally be able to
highlight the root cause as an origi-
nal construction defect, as opposed
to a service-induced root cause.
Review of procurement and inspec-
tion records may also provide an
indication of root cause.
Detection of these types of flaws
after installation is difficult, therefore
the primary strategy is prevention
through appropriate quality control
procedures which include1:
• Design review of material selec-
tion and specifications.
• Nondestructive examination of
tube material and tubing stock.
• Documentation of purchase spec-
ifications, shipping, receiving,
storage, and stock issuance
requirements.
• Visual inspection of tubing during
fabrication and installation.
• Documentation of tubing loca-
tions, condition, and date of
installation.

Figure 45-1. Forging lap in a rifled tube. The lap produced a flow dis-
ruption and local steam blanketing. This in turn lead to deposit accu-
mulation and severe underdeposit corrosion. The final tube rupture
occurred by creep cracking. Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.2

45-2 Material Flaws

a
Figure 45-2. A fabrication lap in an SA-210-A1 waterwall tube.
Note the decarburization at the tip of the lap, the branching of
the lap, and the angle of the tip of the lap with respect to the
tube surface. This lap was present in the tube throughout its
service life and was not responsible for the failure of the tube.
Source: S.R. Paterson, et al.2

References
1Lamping, G.A. and R. M Arrowood, Jr., Manual for
Investigation and Correction of Boiler Tube Failures,
Research Project 1890-1, Final Report CS-3945, Electric
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, April, 1985.
2Paterson, S.R., T.A. Kuntz, R.S. Moser, and H.
Vaillancourt, Boiler Tube Failure Metallurgical Guide,
Volume 1: Technical Report, Volume 2: Appendices,
Research Project 1890-09, Final Report TR-102433,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, October,
1993.
Tube wall

3Personal

4Personal
a
Membrane applied by
electrical flash weld

HAZ

Martensitic zone
Unfused area

Small
crack
initiated

Figure 45-3. Materials flaws can be introduced by the original

fabrication process. Here an electric resistance weld used to
join a tube to a membrane results in a lack of fusion region.
Subsequent handling during manufacture can introduce cracks
in the weld heat affected zone (HAZ) which has a martensitic
zone. Source: T. Flatley4

Communication from D. Barnett (Pacific Power,

Australia) to R.B. Dooley, February, 1995.
Communication from T. Flatley (PowerGen) to
R.B. Dooley, March, 1995.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 45-3

ACTIONS for Tube Failures Caused by Material Flaws
The detection and correction of
this boiler tube failure mecha-
nism should be straightforward.
As with other, more involved fail-
ure types, the two paths for the
BTF team to take for its resolu-
tion begin here.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and damage caused
by material flaws is the likely
cause.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
which indicates that there
could be a future BTF
because of material flaws.
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is related to
material flaws.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as being caused by material
flaws (Action 1a). Action 2 should
clearly identify this as the pri-
mary mechanism or point to
another cause.
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by determining the extent
of the damage (number of
affected locations) and by
removing the damaged tube(s)
followed by a metallurgical
examination and materials test-
ing, as needed.
45-4 Material Flaws
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred
and damage from a material flaw
is the likely cause.
➠ Go to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ Determine the extent and type of
the damage. Is damage limited
to one or only a few tubes?
➠ Remove a sample and examine
metallographically. Is there evi-
dence of a defect of material
construction? Is material the
proper alloy expected for this
location?
Damage is probably induced by a
material flaw.
➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause
Determination
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF because of
material flaws:
• Improper materials or tubes with
inadequate fabrication character-
istics have been found in a sec-
tion of the boiler and the potential
for other locations to be similarly
affected is indicated.
➠ If these indicators have been
found, go to Action 3 which out-
lines the steps to confirm the
influence of each.
Widespread damage may be
caused by another mechanism,
return to screening Table 12-1,
Volume 2 for water-touched tubing,
or Table 31-1, this Volume for
steam-touched tubing, to pick a
more likely candidate.
If there is no obvious material flaw
and if the material is the correct
alloy, problem is more likely
caused by a different mechanism,
return to screening Table 12-1,
Volume 2 for water-touched tubing
or Table 31-1, this Volume for
steam-touched tubing, to pick a
more likely candidate.
Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the damage

Root causes should be obvious from Action 2. A manufacturing defect

should have been identified or the material should have been identified as
improper for the installed application, such as possessing inadequate
properties.

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

Detecting material flaws prior to tube failures is not usually possible. Post-
failure, the extent of immediate damage can usually be determined by
visual examination. The ability to locate additional, similarly affected loca-
tions that have not failed will depend upon the nature and progress of the
flaw. Review available NDE methods list in Chapter 9, Volume 1 for
options available.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Routine repairs or tube replacements are generally sufficient to deal with

the immediate failure/damage. See Chapter 11, Volume 1 for a summary
of practices.

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

In order to avoid similar failures, control measures such as listed in the

main text to ensure the quality of incoming materials should be imple-
mented if not already a part of standard procedures.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

If the problem is likely to be widespread, such as caused by the installa-

tion of large numbers of tubes with inadequate properties, then a system-
atic review and check for the incidence of the same damage is indicated.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 45-5

45-6 Material Flaws
Chapter 46 • Volume 3
Welding/Repair
Defects
Description of Boiler Tube
Failures Caused by
Welding/Repair Defects and
Their Manifestation
This chapter covers BTF incurred
when flaws are introduced as part of
a welding process, particularly dur-
ing repairs. Such failures can occur
in steam- or water-touched tubes.
Note that poor welding practices in
general are contributors to many
BTF mechanisms as shown in Table
46-1. The damage described in this
chapter is limited to that directly tied
to specific defects introduced during
the welding process such as: poros-
ity, slag inclusions, undercut, lack-
of-fusion, lack-of penetration, as well
as improper weld processes or pro-
cedures such as: improper joint
preparation, poor cleaning of the
joint, inadequate preheat, inade-
quate stress relief, improper choice
of filler metals, etc.
Despite the short length of this
chapter, be forewarned that
improper repair and welding proce-
dures can be the bane of availability
in many units such as indicated by
the list of the associated damage
mechanisms in Table 46-1.
A full list of weld discontinuities is
presented in Table 46-2.1 Not all
weld defects or process shortcom-
ings will evolve into a BTF. Generally,
planar or “sharp” defects such as
cracks, lamellar tears, lack-of-fusion,
and lack-of-penetration are the most
likely to grow into cracks and propa-
gate to final failure, particularly in
the high residual stress fields that
remain after the welding process.
NDE methods which can be used
for detecting in-service flaws are
summarized in Table 46-3. A more
complete discussion of inspection
techniques for use with welds is pro-
vided in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
Generally, metallurgical analysis is
needed to determine whether a
welding problem has been at the
root cause of a BTF. A review of the
welding process, welder qualifica-
tion records, inspection records and
weld material control reports may
also provide an indication about
whether a weld process error is
responsible for an observed failure.
Some care is needed to determine
whether the failure is the result of a
problem weld or merely located at
the weld. For example, the toe
region of fillet welds present both a
stress riser (stress concentration)
and a location with high residual
stresses. It is therefore a favored
location for several types of failure
to occur, even if the weld is “per-
fect”. When confronted with a “weld”
failure it is necessary to confirm the
underlying root cause; merely to
place another weld into the same
failure environment is likely to only
result in a repeat failure.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 46-1
Table 46-1
Welding Practices as Contributors to Various Boiler Tube Failures
Welding/Repair Practice/Problem
Weld spatter or cutting debris left in tubes,
improperly executed weld repairs that leave
material in tubes.
Use of pad welds can cause flow disruption
and tube failures because of copper embrittle-
ment.
Excessive weld material protruding into tube
inside surface; also the use of backing rings in
welding of waterwall tubing.
Welding temperature excursions causing met-
allurgical changes in susceptible materials.
Stress riser caused by the toe of a fillet weld or
improper geometry to a weld repair.
Weld and attachment design can lead to con-
straint of thermal stresses and is a contributor
to BTF.
Improperly executed induction pressure welds
between dissimilar metals in SH/RH.
Welding procedures can lead to sensitization of
material or weld defects act as an initiation site
for stress corrosion cracking.
46-2 Welding/Repair Defects
Potential Boiler Tube Failure
Tube blockage leading to short-term overheat-
ing failures in either waterwalls (Chapter 23,
Volume 2) or in SH/RH tubes (Chapter 36).
Flow disruption can lead to underdeposit cor-
rosion mechanisms in waterwalls. In Volume 2
see Chapter 15 on hydrogen damage, Chapter
16 on acid phosphate corrosion and Chapter
17 on caustic gouging.
Flow disruption can lead to underdeposit cor-
rosion mechanisms in waterwalls. See
Chapters 15-17, Volume 2.
Graphitization (Chapter 42) in materials such
as T1A.
Mechanical fatigue failures near tubing attach-
ments in either water-touched tubes (Chapter
26, Volume 2) or SH/RH tubes (Chapter 39).
Contributor to excessive stresses that can
cause: corrosion fatigue (Chapter 13, Volume
2), mechanical fatigue (Chapter 26, Volume 2;
Chapter 39), and dissimilar metal weld failures
(Chapter 35).
Direct cause of dissimilar metal weld failures
(Chapter 35).
Stress corrosion cracking (Chapter 37).
Detection of a weld shortcoming,
once the joint has been placed in
service is difficult. Avoiding weld
failures is therefore mostly preven-
tive. Quality control measures
include2: (i) qualification of welding
procedures, welders and welding
operators, (ii) certification of welding
inspectors and nondestructive test
examiners, (iii) calibration of welding
equipment and testing devices, (iv)
documentation of welding and test
methods, materials and equipment,
and (v) proof tests.
Solution of welding-defect induced
boiler tube failures will consist of
removing the problem areas, and re-
welding with proper techniques. A
complete reference for fossil unit
field welding has been developed.2
A summary of the recommended
practices from that work is included
in Chapter 11, Volume 1.
A temporary repair such as pad
welding or window welding may be
performed to return the unit to ser-
vice in the shortest possible time,
but only in exceptional circum-
stances if absolutely necessary to
reduce the time of a forced outage.
Under such circumstances a pad
weld must be replaced with a per-
manent repair at the next available
outage; as a result, careful docu-
mentation of pad weld locations is
indicated.
Pad welding sometimes involves
mechanically restoring the tube to
its original shape by bending the
edges of the rupture back together,
followed by sealing the root and fill-
ing the vee with a weld. Differences
in the thickness in the weld area are
possible so that care is required not
to burn through the thin sections.
Table 46-2 Pad welding of thinned tubes has
Characterization of Weld Discontinuities been used as a temporary measure
until a scheduled outage. It is not,
Weld Process and Procedure Related however, recommended as a regular
A. Geometric or permanent repair procedure, nor
as a long-term “fix” of the problem
Misalignment Backing ring - lack of penetration
for the following reasons:
Undercut Insert ring - lack of penetration
Concavity or convexity Backing - left on • Heat input of pad welding can
Excessive reinforcement Incomplete penetration affect internal deposits.
Poor reinforcement Lack of fusion Particularly bad is the presence
of Cu in the internal deposits on
Poor reinforcement angle Shrinkage
water wall tubes. These can, dur-
Overlap Surface irregularity - ripples ing the welding process, become
Burn through molten and embrittle the grain
B. Other boundaries of the tube wall. If Cu
Arc strikes is likely to be present some orga-
Slag inclusions nizations have adopted a rule
that pad welds should not be
Tungsten inclusions
applied where the tube thickness
Oxide films is less than 3 mm.3
Weld dressing
Spatter • There is no critical determination
Arc crater of the minimum wall to which the
process can be applied. If
applied to a wall which is too thin,
Metallurgical then the weld beads can pene-
A. Cracks or fissures trate the wall or make the internal
Hot surface protrude into the water
Cold or delayed flow. This will cause a disruption
Reheat, stress relief or strain age of the flow and lead to deposition,
with the associated and concomi-
Lamellar tearing
tant events eventually leading to
B. Porosity an underdeposit corrosion mech-
Spherical anism: hydrogen damage, caus-
Worm-hole tic gouging, or acid phosphate
corrosion.
C. Heat-affected zone, microstructure alteration
• There is no indication of whether
D. Weld metal and heat-affected zone segregation a crack is present on the internal
E. Base plate delamination surface, such as is caused by
corrosion fatigue. The pad weld-
ing will not seal the crack, which
Design can then act as an initiating cen-
A. Changes in section, stress concentration ter or exacerbate the cracking
process. Figure 13-22 in Volume
B. Weld joint type 2 shows an example of an
attempt to place a pad weld over
Source: C. Lundin1 a region of corrosion fatigue
attack.

Similar considerations occur in the

repair of superheater/reheater tub-
ing, where there is uncertainty about
the tube condition such as the exis-
tence of creep cracks and their
depths, and of the conditions of the
internal tube surface.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 46-3

Table 46-3
NDE Selection Guide for Different Weld Types
Inspection Radiographic Ultrasonic Penetrant Magnetic Visual
Need Testing Testing Testing Particle Examination
Testing
Discontinuity
Crack O A A A A
Inadequate joint A A X X X
preparation
Incomplete fusion O A X X X
Laminations X A A A A
Overlap X O A A O
Porosity A O A O A
Slag inclusions A A X O X
Undercut A O O O A

Joints
Butt A A A A A
Corner O A A A A
T O A A A A
Lap X O A A A

Notes:
A - applicable; O - marginal; X - generally inapplicable
Other considerations include: material type and geometry, welding processes, criticality of weld and unaccept-
able discontinuity types.

Source: C. Lundin1

References
1Lundin, C., “Fundamentals of Weld Discontinuities and 3Personal Communication from D. Barnett (Pacific Power,
their Significance”, Bulletin 295, Welding Research Australia) to R.B. Dooley, February, 1995.
Council, New York, June, 1984.
2Stephenson, G.G. and J.W. Prince, Guidelines on Fossil
Boiler Field Welding, Research Project 2504-02, Final
Report TR-101699, Electric Power Research Institute,
Palo Alto, CA, January, 1993.

46-4 Welding/Repair Defects

ACTIONS for Welding Defect Tube Failures
The detection and correction of
this boiler tube failure mecha-
nism should be straightforward.
The two paths for the BTF team
to take for its resolution begin
here.
➠ Follow Action 1a: If a BTF has
occurred and weld defects are
the likely cause.
➠ Follow Action 1b: If a precur-
sor has occurred in the unit
which indicates that there
could be a future BTF
because of damage done dur-
ing welding activities.
Action 1a: If a BTF has occurred
and weld ÒdefectsÓ are the likely
cause.
➠ Confirm that the failure is associ-
ated with a weld.
➠ If the BTF seems to be consistent
with these features of failure, go
to Action 2 for further steps to
confirm the mechanism.
➠ If the BTF does not seem to have
features like those listed, return to
the screening Table for water-
touched tubing (Table 12-1,
Volume 2) or for steam-touched
tubing (Table 31-1, this Volume) to
pick a more likely candidate.
Action 1b: If a precursor has
occurred in the unit that could
lead to future BTF because of
welding Defects:
• Routine inspection or manda-
tory post-repair welding inspec-
tion finds indication of welding
defects.
• Pad welding or window welding
repairs have been used in the
unit.
• Tubes have failed during a
hydrostatic test following a unit
welding repair sequence.
➠ If these indicators have been
found, go to Action 3 which out-
lines the steps needed to confirm
the influence of each.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 46-5
Action 2: Determine (confirm) that the mechanism is
welding-induced.
A failure has occurred which the
BTF team has tentatively identi-
fied as having been caused by
welding defects (Action 1a). A
primary function of Action 2 is to
eliminate other potential causes
and clearly identify weld defects
as the primary cause.
The actions listed will be exe-
cuted by determining the extent
of the damage (number of
affected locations) and by
removing the damaged tube(s)
followed by visual examination.
➠ Examine the microstructural
details of the failure. Are weld
defects such as cracks, lack-of-
fusion, lack-of-penetration, lamel-
lar tears, porosity, slag inclusion,
undercut, etc. evident? See
Table 46-2 for a complete list.
Does the boiler tube failure
appear to be directly related to
these flaws (such as cracks orig-
inated at the defect, etc.)
➠ Correlate damaged locations to
weld locations. Is damage corre-
lated with locations of field
welds, particularly temporary
repairs such as pad welding
and/or window welding?
Several mechanisms, notably cor-
rosion fatigue (Chapter 13, Volume
2) are found in conjunction with a
weld because of the stress con-
centration and residual stresses at
that location. A key step is to
ensure that the failure is truly
related to a weld defect and not
merely located near a weld.
Tube damage could still be weld-
ing induced, for example, at a
shop weld, however, other possi-
ble causes should be investigated.
For example, see more complete
discussion on dissimilar metal
welds in SH/RH (Chapter 35) and
corrosion fatigue of waterwalls in
(Chapter 13, Volume 2).

➠ Damage is probably induced by

a welding activity.

➠ Go to Action 3: Root Cause

Determination

Action 3: Determine root cause(s) of the damage

Root cause determination is sim-

plified if the damage is found
immediately after the suspect
welding procedure. If damage is
found at some later time, it may
be necessary to take metallo-
graphic samples to confirm a
weld-defect induced cause.

46-6 Welding/Repair Defects

Action 4: Determine the extent of damage or affected areas

Extent of damage can usually be

determined by a variety of NDE
techniques. See Table 46-3.

Action 5: Implement repairs, immediate solutions and actions

Removal of the damaged area

and re-welding with the proper
techniques are generally suffi-
cient to deal with the immediate
failure/damage. See Chapter 11,
Volume 1 for a summary of prac-
tices.

Action 6: Implement long-term actions to prevent repeat failures

In order to avoid similar failures,

quality control measures may
need to be implemented to
improve weld practices. Routine
inspection and adequate testing
such as hydrostatic testing fol-
lowing extensive repair welding
should be adopted.

Action 7: Determine possible ramifications/ancillary problems

Check for incidence of the same

damage in other locations that
have been subjected to the
same procedures in prior out-
ages. Be aware that the
improper welding process may
also be a precursor to a number
of other boiler tube failures.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 46-7

46-8 Welding/Repair Defects
 Chapter 47 • Volume 3
Vapor space
Fuel feed
tube
Vapor tubes
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
Overfire-air
nozzles
BTF Issues in
Fluidizing
nozzles
Distribution
In-bed
tubes
Bubbling Bed FBCs
manifolds
Slide gate
Bed-drawdown
cones
Introduction
This is the first of two chapters that
discuss some of the boiler tube fail-
ure issues pertaining to fluidized-
bed combustion (FBC) units. There
are two basic types: bubbling flu-
idized bed (BFB) and circulating flu-
idized bed (CFB) units, there are
also some hybrid designs.
Configurations include atmospheric
(AFBC) or pressurized (PFBC)
designs, drum and once-through
designs. This chapter reviews
issues relevant to bubbling-bed
units; circulating-bed designs are
discussed in the next chapter.
To date there have been only a
handful of BTF mechanisms that are
specific to FBC units, notably the
wastage of in-bed tubes in BFB
units, and wastage at the interface
between the refractory lining on the
lower portion of the bed and water-
wall tubes in CFBs.
There have also been isolated inci-
dences of failures caused by the
same mechanisms that affect con-
ventional plant such as underde-
posit corrosion in horizontal tubing
and fretting/rubbing of tubes. Based
on certain similarities between FBC
units and conventional units, it
seems likely that as the number of
operating hours increases on FBC
units, that more of the time-depen-
dent mechanisms which affect con-
ventional plant will be seen. As
stated in recent guidelines for cycle
chemistry of FBC units: “Because of
the variety of fluidized-bed designs,
shapes, and orientations of the in-
bed boiler tubes, and because of
the relatively high heat transfer coef-
ficients, steam blanketing, hideout,
corrosion, deposit buildup, overheat-
ing, and erosion-corrosion could be
a problem”.1
In this chapter, the focus is on two
topics: (i) the wastage of in-bed
tubes, a mechanism that appears to
be unique to BFB units, and (ii) the
propensity for waterside, underde-
posit corrosion to develop in in-bed
tubes as a result of poor water
chemistry control and the horizontal
geometry of the tubes.
A basic understanding of fluidized
bed combustion (FBC) plant
designs will aid the discussion of
boiler tube failures in these units.
More complete discussions are
available in references 1 and 2. FBC
units are so-named because the fuel
is fluidized by combustion air travel-
ing upward through the bed.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 47-1
Reputed advantages of fluidized
bed units are as follows1:
• Increased efficiency.
• Reduced levels of SO2 emissions Vapor space
which are captured by limestone Fuel feed
or dolomite introduced into the tube
fuel.
• Minimal production of NOx ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
because combustion tempera- Vapor tubes ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ Overfire-air
tures are relatively low, on the nozzles
order of 815 to 870°C (~ 1500 to ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
1600°F).
• No need for add-on FGD systems
or special burners to control NOx.
• Ability to burn a wide range of Fluidizing In-bed
fuels, including municipal refuse, nozzles tubes
lignite, sewage sludge, wood, etc. Distribution
• Lower levels of corrosion and manifolds
fouling of boiler surfaces as the
operating temperatures are below Slide gate
normal ash softening levels Bed-drawdown
cones
• Operating flexibility that accom-
modates a range of turndown and
load following needs

A schematic of a bubbling bed FBC

is shown in Figure 47-1.
Figure 47-1. Schematic of a bubbling-bed boiler. From: J. Makansi, “Special Report:
Fluidized-Bed Boilers,” Power, March, 1991. Reproduced with permission.

47-2 BTF Issues in Bubbling Bed FBCs

1. Features of Failure and Typical Locations
1.1 Typical damage mecha-
nisms and features of failure
Table 47-1 provides an overview of
BTF mechanisms experienced in
bubbling bed FBC units, an estimate
of their prevalence to date, and the
source within this book for a discus-
sion of each as most are covered in
other chapters. In-bed tube
wastage, which has affected a
range of units to varying degrees, is
the subject of much of this chapter.
Wastage rates are extremely vari-
able, with maximum reported rates
as high as 3.8 mm/1000 hr (150
mils/1000 hr).4,5 Although wastage
occurs for all wetted tubes, the
effects on the in-bed tubes are of
most concern.
Top surfaces of tubes exhibit dam-
age that is manifested as light, ran-
domly-oriented scratches; bottom
tube surfaces often have much more
extensive damage in the form of
gouging and with evidence of direct
impact.
Maximum wastage is observed in
two different patterns, as classified
by Stringer and Wright.6 In “Class A”
conditions, the maximum wear is at
20 to 30 degrees on either side of
the bottom of the tube; in “Class B”
wear, the maximum wastage is at
the tube bottom and located at the
midspan of tubes. Tubes located
near recycle feed locations have
also been found to have increased
wastage.
Wastage rates tend to be higher on
tubes with metal temperatures below
400°C (~ 750°F); tubes with higher
metal temperatures form relatively
thick scales or deposits and do not
appear to develop accelerated
wastage. External tube scales or
deposits vary in color and in
appearance from rough to polished.
Deposit colors are a function of
many variables, including the local
temperature, the oxidation state of
the iron in the deposit, and proximity
to coal feed ports. They are typically
composed of iron oxides and inter-
mingled bed materials.
The use of horizontal tubes for the
evaporative surface within the bub-
bling bed (and in external heat
exchangers in circulating bed
designs) can result in “steam blan-
keting” and the resulting underde-
posit corrosion. There have been
reports of several failures in such
tubes caused by water chemistry
and corrosion1, although experience
from only one unit has been
reported in the literature.7 In this
unit, there was a single tube failure
by caustic corrosion and a second
tube failure by fretting from tube-to-
tube contact. In both cases the ini-
tial tube leaks resulted in secondary
tube leaks by erosion.
In three other instances, damage
known to have been caused by
internal corrosion of horizontal tub-
ing was assessed as part of the
FBC cycle chemistry guidelines
development.1 Figure 47-2 illustrates
a case of underdeposit corrosion in
a horizontal tube. In this case, tube
leaks occurred after only 500 hours
of operation. Temporary mitigation
was achieved by the installation of
swirl vanes to increase turbulence in
the flow.
Features of underdeposit corrosion
are detailed in Chapters 16 and 17,
Volume 2. The macroscopic features
of damage are (i) thin-edged, ductile
final failures or pin-hole leaks, (ii)
material removal (wall thinning) on
the waterside, (iii) tube gouging in
smooth undulating surfaces, and (iv)
distinct hemispherical or elliptical
depressions usually filled with thick,
layered deposits. In the case of
caustic gouging, the deposits will
contain distinctive crystals of sodium
ferroate and/or sodium ferroite; for
acid phosphate corrosion the major
constituent of the inner layer will be
maricite (NaFePO4).
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 47-3
Table 47-1
Overview of Boiler Tube Failure Mechanisms in Bubbling Bed Fluidized Bed Combustors
Mechanism Prevalence to Date
Wastage of in-bed tubes Major industry concern; severity
highly variable between units;
mitigation options established.
Underdeposit corrosion Several incidences known,
(internal) particularly caus- including tube leaks in as short a
tic corrosion period as 500 hours of opera-
tion.
Fretting Few incidences reported to date.
Corrosion in austenitic tub- None known to date; potential
ing of superheaters and ramification to consider if caustic
reheaters is used.
Corrosion fatigue None known to date; a concern
based only on knowledge of con-
ventional plant and similarities
with aspects of FBC designs.
For More Information Refer to:
This chapter
Discussed in this chapter see also
primary discussions in caustic
gouging (Chapter 17, Volume 2)
and acid phosphate corrosion
(Chapter 16, Volume 2).
Tube rubbing/fretting (Chapter 40).
See chapter on corrosion fatigue
(Chapter 13, Volume 2).
1.2 Typical locations
The locations of concern depend on
which mechanism is operative. High
wastage rates have occurred on (i)
in-bed evaporator and waterwall
tubes immersed in bubbling beds of
fluidized-bed boilers, and (ii) on
waterwall tubes at the interface
between the refractory lining on the
lower portion of the bed and the
waterwall tube panels in circulating,
fluidized bed combustors. This prob-
lem has occurred in a number of
operating industrial FBC units, and
in atmospheric and pressurized FBC
utility boilers.
In the case of underdeposit corro-
sion, all horizontal tubing tends to
be susceptible because of the
potential for steam blanketing; tube
bends and kinks are somewhat
more susceptible because liquid
separates from steam-water mix-
tures assisted by gravitational forces
at those locations.

Flyash erosion of convec- A few incidences known in non- Flyash erosion (Chapter 14,
tive steam sections coal-fired (agricultural waste) Volume 2).
units.

Figure 47-2. A horizontal bottom tube from an atmospheric fluidized

bed. The tube experienced caustic corrosion at the 12 o'clock position
due to steam blanketing and additional heat transfer through the top
rib. Tube leaks occurred after only 500 hours of operation.

47-4 BTF Issues in Bubbling Bed FBCs

2. Mechanism of Failure
2.1 A note about underdeposit
corrosion
The mechanism that leads to under-
deposit corrosion in horizontal tubes
is covered in detail in Chapters 15-
17 of Volume 2 that address hydro-
gen damage, acid phosphate corro-
sion, and caustic gouging. The latter
two are particularly recommended to
the reader interested in this underly-
ing cause of FBC corrosion. The bal-
ance of this section reviews briefly
the in-bed wastage of tubes, which
is a process that is not covered
elsewhere in this book.
2.2 Current thoughts on the
mechanism of in-bed wastage
Regions of low particle density
occur when excess air is present in
a fluidized bed; they resemble bub-
bles in a liquid.5 The bubbles rise
through the bed, increasing in size
as they move upward, and collapse
on the surface. A wake of dense
(unfluidized) particles forms behind
each bubble and moves with the
bubble as it rises. The balance of
the bed remains at the minimum flu-
idized conditions which is called the
emulsion phase.5 In addition to the
obvious wastage possibilities pre-
sented by the nominal flow condi-
tions of particles against tube sur-
face, accelerated wear conditions
seem likely to result from the move-
ment and collapse of the bubbles
that form in the bed.
Stringer5 has recently reviewed the
current thinking about the mecha-
nism of wastage in bubbling flu-
idized beds. It seems clear that the
process is not a simple erosion
process, but a combination of sev-
eral wear and abrasion processes.
Among those processes that have
been proposed are the following5:
• General particle flow past the
tube.
• In-bed jets cased by design
defects or component failures.
• Induced long-range flow patterns.
• Local flow regimes.
• Fast-moving particles immediately
above the bed in the splash zone.
• Fast-moving particles in bubble
wakes.
• Bubbles tracking along vertical or
inclined tubes.
• Intrinsic fast particles in the bed.
• The impact of “blocks” of parti-
cles on the tubes, particularly as
a result of the collapse of bubbles
in a “cavitation-like” process.
The evidence from AFBC units and
cold models supports the view that
a primary mechanism of accelerated
wear of in-bed tubes is when blocks
of particles are thrown onto tube sur-
faces by bubble collapse in a “cavi-
tation-like” event. It is suspected that
there is an equivalent mechanism
working in PFBC, although the evi-
dence is more indirect.5
A major effort has been conducted
during the past several years to
determine (i) the relative effective-
ness of available options to minimize
wastage of in-bed evaporator tubes,
and (ii) the key coal quality parame-
ters that influence wear potential of
bed materials.8
A quantitative predictor of the wear
potential of a bed cannot yet be
deduced from the wear potential of
individual components. Some of the
effects of feedstock properties, bed
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 47-5
design, and operation on wastage
potential have been extensively
explored. Coal factors that have
been shown to lead to increased
rates are8:
• Higher content of quartz particles
in the larger size ranges because
of their high hardness and likeli-
hood to retain properties of an
effective erodent.
• Harder particles.
• The presence of more angular
(sharp-edged) particles.
• Larger average particle sizes as in
run-of-mine coal instead of
washed coal; or in bubbling beds
with overbed coal feed rather
than under-bed feed systems;
coals that produce agglomerates.
• Inherent calcium and magnesium
content, which affects the amount
of sorbent added and therefore
the amount of Ca (Mg)-based
particles available for deposit for-
mation.
47-6 BTF Issues in Bubbling Bed FBCs
These additional factors are thought Other factors identified as important
to lead to increased wastage rates, are8: (i) whether or not the particle
although their role is somewhat has a surface coating of material
more speculative: different from the base particle, (ii)
the extent of the surface coverage
• Chlorine content, possibly
of the coating, and its thickness,
through detrimental effects on
and (iii) possibly the composition of
oxide scale retention.
the coating.
• Alkali content, through its corro-
In summary, although work contin-
sive effects in deposits.
ues, only general trends in wastage
• Ash fusion temperature. potential can be made for the in-
bed tubes of FBC units. Fortunately,
Factors of bed design and operation the use of armoring or of surface
that seem to lead to higher wastage treatments, seems to offer consider-
rates are the following8: able improvement in tube lifetimes.
• Particle size, as fixed by the FBC
operating characteristics, since
they affect the fluidization perfor-
mance of the unit.
• Particle attrition characteristics,
which determine the residence
time of the particles in the bed.
• Conditions that cause local sub-
stoichiometric combustion.
• The Ca/S ratio.
• Steam conditions that affect
chemical interactions.
3. Possible Root Causes and Actions to Confirm
3.1 Introduction
Table 47-2 summarizes the potential
root causes, actions to confirm,
immediate and long-term actions for
damage caused by wastage of in-
bed tubes. Table 47-3 presents simi-
lar information for underdeposit cor-
rosion of those tubes.
3.2 In-bed wastage: influence
of a susceptible material
Plain carbon steel tubes, typical of
in-bed construction are more sus-
ceptible to in-bed wastage than
either armored designs or tubes with
surface treatments such as
chromized or nitrided finishes.
Actions to confirm that a susceptible
material is contributing to a problem
with in-bed wastage are:
(a). Visual examination and UT
inspection to determine the extent of
damage and its correspondence
with unprotected carbon steel sur-
faces.
3.3 In-bed wastage: influence
of fuel factors
The composition of fuel and of bed
additives will impact the occurrence
and severity of the wastage prob-
lem. This may occur through either
mechanical (particle size, shape,
etc.) or chemical (chlorine, alkali
content) considerations. There is not
a quantitative index yet developed
to predict wastage rates directly;
however, the following actions may
help to confirm the influence of fuel
factors on a wastage problem:
(b). Evaluate ash and erosive/abra-
sive content of fuel.
(c). Metallographic analysis of fire-
side tube deposits and bed materi-
als may provide an indication that
key contaminants (chlorine or low-
melting point alkalis) in the fuel are
contributing to corrosion-accelerated
wastage.
3.4 Underdeposit corrosion:
influence of excessive deposits
due to steam blanketing.
The formation of excessive internal
tube deposits in horizontal tubing of
FBC units is a primary influence on
the development of underdeposit
corrosion. Actions to confirm this
problem include:
(d). Analysis of the results of water
chemistry monitors, primarily for lev-
els of Fe and Cu, indicating the
presence of excessive feedwater
corrosion products that are likely to
“deposit-out” on tube inside sur-
faces.
(e). NDE inspection (primarily by
UT) and selective sampling of tubes
for direct measurement of the extent
of deposits. Tube sampling prac-
tices and test methods are briefly
summarized in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
(f). Checking the efficacy of prior
chemical cleaning operations to
determine whether appropriate fre-
quencies are being used or whether
the unit has been allowed to exceed
acceptable limits on deposits.
(g). Check circulation ratio and con-
firm that tube flows, particularly in
horizontal tubing, are outside the
regime of departure from nucleate
boiling.
(h). Metallurgical analysis of tube
samples can confirm the nature and
extent of internal deposits.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 47-7
Table 47-2
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions for In-Bed Wastage of FBC Tubes
Major Root Cause
Influences Actions to Confirm
3.2 Susceptible material
(a). Visual and UT inspection to determine
extent of problem.
3.3 Fuel factors
- excessively hard particles (b). Evaluate ash and erosive/abrasive
- excessively angular or content of fuel. Compare to design coal.
sharp-edged particles (c). Metallographic analysis of tube
- high chlorine content deposits and bed materials may provide
- high alkali contents indicators of key contaminants.
Table 47-3
Major Root Cause Influences, Confirmation and Corrective Actions for Under-Deposit Corrosion in the In-Bed Tubes of FBC Units
Major Root Cause
Influences Actions to Confirm
3.4 Excessive deposits due to steam blanketing
(d). Analysis of results from chemistry
monitors, mainly for levels of Fe and
Cu entering boiler.
(e). NDE examination and selective
sampling of tubes for deposit
measurements.
(f). Check efficacy of chemical cleaning.
(g). Check circulation ratio and confirm that
tube flows are outside regime of DNB.
(h). Metallurgical analysis of tube samples
to determine nature and extent of tube
deposits.
3.5 Underdeposit corrosion: influence of poor water chemistry
(i). Perform metallurgical examination of
damaged tubes, particularly to
determine composition of deposits.
(j). Analyze cycle chemistry data: plant
chemistry control logs, on-line cycle
chemistry records, chemical additions
to boiler, and instrumentation alarms.
47-8 BTF Issues in Bubbling Bed FBCs
Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures
• See long-term actions. • Upgrade material by armoring.
• Upgrade material through chromizing,
nitriding, or other surface protection,
alone or in conjunction with armoring.
• See long-term actions. • Determine quartz content and assess
fuel's erosive/abrasive potential.
Immediate Actions Long-Term Actions and
and Solutions Prevention of Repeat Failures
• Chemically clean to • Keep deposits to an acceptable level.
remove excessive levels At this time, the recommendation is to
of deposits. See guid- follow guidance for conventional units.
ance in reference 9 and See guidance in Chapter 4, Volume 1,
summary in Chapter 4, particularly Figure 4-1.
Volume 1. • Minimize feedwater corrosion products
through control of chemistry. FBC
cycle chemistry guidance is provided
in reference 1 and summarized in
Chapter 3, Volume 1.
• Monitor for the effectiveness of
chemistry control.
• Ensure that optimized chemical
cleaning procedures are developed.
• Confirm design and circulation ratio.
• As above, plus • As above, plus
• Move to optimum cycle • Optimize feedwater to keep low levels
chemistry as detailed in of Fe ( < 5 ppb) and Cu ( < 2 ppb).
reference 1.
3.5 Underdeposit corrosion:
influence of poor water
chemistry
Most of the BTF in this category are
related to improper chemistry, i.e.,
units operated with a high level of
additives. As with conventional units,
an excess of a control chemical
(either caustic or phosphate) in con-
junction with a source of excessive
deposits leads directly to tube corro-
sion. For caustic, this can be (i) an
excess in units under caustic treat-
ment, (ii) excessive amounts added
to AVT units, or (iii) excessive
amounts added as a control chemi-
cal for units operating under phos-
phate treatments. See the discus-
sion of caustic gouging in Chapter
17, Volume 2. In the case of phos-
phate, the condition is also caused
by improper cycle chemistry control,
4. Determining the Extent of Damage
5. Background to Repairs, Immediate Solutions and Actions
particularly chasing phosphate hide-
out. See Chapter 16, Volume 2 for
additional detail.
Actions to confirm:
(i). Perform metallurgical examina-
tion of damaged tubes, with particu-
lar attention to the composition of
any deposits present. Because the
smooth corrosion surface and thick
deposits typical of acid phosphate
corrosion are similar in visual
appearance to those for caustic
gouging, it is important to perform a
thorough metallurgical evaluation to
identify the mechanism properly.
This will include the use of x-ray dif-
fraction to identify the presence of
maricite (in the case of acid phos-
phate corrosion) or sodium
ferroate/ferroite (in the case of caus-
tic gouging).
Either external surface wastage or
internal corrosion are manifested as
wall thinning. Therefore, NDE meth-
ods, particularly ultrasonic testing,
can be used to determine the extent
of damage. UT has also been
applied, in conventional units, to
determine the extent of waterside
deposits, a precursor to underde-
Most of the options to address in-
bed wastage are longer term strate-
gies as discussed in the next sec-
tion. Most of the options for dealing
with an excessive buildup of internal
deposits in horizontal tubing are also
long-term, although chemical clean-
ing to deal with an immediate prob-
lem can be undertaken together with
a review of, and a move toward,
optimum cycle chemistry.
Unfortunately, chemical cleaning
guidance for FBC units is not as well
established as for conventional units,
(j). Look for high levels of PO4
and/or OH reflected in plant chem-
istry control logs, on-line cycle
chemistry records, chemical addi-
tions to the boiler, and/or instrumen-
tation alarms. Of particular perti-
nence is a pervasive problem with
phosphate hideout and compensa-
tion with low Na:PO4 molar ratio
additions such as mono-sodium
phosphate or an excess of di-
sodium phosphate or pre-mixed
mixtures. Monitoring boiler water
pH, phosphate level and specific
conductivity as a function of load
will indicate whether phosphate
hideout is occurring. Typically dur-
ing a shutdown or reduction in load,
the phosphate, which hid out during
load increase, will come back into
the boiler water. The problem can
be detected by the associated pH
decrease and a conductivity
increase.
posit corrosion. Underdeposit corro-
sion will usually occur on the tops of
horizontal tubes. Reviews of the
standard methods of NDE for wall
thinning and recent developments
for deposit measurement are pro-
vided in Chapter 9, Volume 1.
and there is a degree of concern that
somewhat stricter requirements may
be needed because of the higher
heat fluxes and horizontal tubing.1 It
has been recommended that the
guidance developed for conventional
units, detailed in reference 9 and
summarized in Chapter 4, Volume 1
of this book, be used for decisions
about chemical cleaning of FBC
units until such time as a data base
of experience with FBC units can be
compiled and evaluated.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 47-9
6. Background to Long-Term Actions and Prevention of Repeat
Failures
6.1 Overview of options for in-
bed wastage
Options for solution of in-bed
wastage, developed mostly by trial
and error, and from the results of
cold model studies, include8:
changes in fluidization conditions,
changes in combustor design,
armored tubing, changes in tube
surface temperature, use of alterna-
tive alloys, surface treatments such
as chromizing or nitriding and use of
coatings or overlays.
6.2 Upgraded materials to
resist in-bed wastage
A number of materials options,
armoring, and protection schemes
are available for in-bed tubes.
Figure 47-3 shows the geometry of
four types of armoring available:
Tube
Rod
Rods
Fins
Fins Flow
interrupters
Fins and Flow Interrupters
Figure 47-3. Schematic of the various types of armor used to protect tubes within the
bubbling bed. Source: V.K. Sethi and I.G. Wright8
47-10 BTF Issues in Bubbling Bed FBCs
rods, fins and pin studs, fins and
flow interruptors, and pin-studded
tubes; each can be in a chromized
or an unchromized version. The
plain tubes can also be in either
chromized and unchromized ver-
sions. Chromized plain tubes, all of
the chromized armoring schemes,
and all but the rods variation in the
unchromized version, show signifi-
cant improvements in wear resis-
tance.8
6.3 Operating options to coun-
teract in-bed wastage
Several alternative operating strate-
gies have been proposed8:
• Use washed coals to reduce wear
potential in bubbling bed FBC.
This reduces amount of over-
sized, adventitious material in the
bed.
Fin
Pin studs
Fins and Pin Studs
Pin Studs
• Add excess limestone to the bed
to reduce its wear potential.
• Determine and control the overall
quartz content of the coal. Some
coals may be better suited for
CFBs and some for bubbling bed
FBCs. Other fuel properties that
can affect wear are chlorine
content, alkali content, inherent
calcium content and ash fusion
temperature.
• Avoid those design and operating
variables that might give rise to
substoichiometric combustion
areas.
6.4 Overview of options for
underdeposit corrosion
Options for avoiding the develop-
ment of waterside, underdeposit cor-
rosion include (i) control or changes
in cycle chemistry to prevent
buildup of deposits, (ii) prevent the
excursions of caustic or phosphates
that can concentrate to cause a
problem with corrosion, and (iii) flow
modification to prevent deposit
buildup.
6.5 Control of cycle chemistry
to prevent deposit buildup and
failure
Prevention of feedwater corrosion
product deposit and buildup begins
with implementation of the appropri-
ate controls. In FBC tube failures
caused by corrosion, local deposit
densities of iron and copper oxides
have been found as high as 50 to
100 g/ft2, indicating the need for
immediate chemical cleaning and
for better control over corrosion
products.
Guidance is available for cycle
chemistry control and monitoring
specifically for fluidized bed units.1
It prescribes target values and
action levels for critical sample
points through the water and steam
cycle for: (i) drum-type units with
phosphate treatment, (ii) drum-type
units on all-volatile treatment, and
(iii) for once-through FBC units.
Corrective actions and layup proce-
dures are also included.
Cycle chemistry commissioning, with
all associated equipment and tests,
is critical to determine1: (i) boiler car-
ryover of sodium, chloride, sulfate,
and silica, (ii) a mass balance of
boiler sodium and phosphate, (iii) the
iron and copper pickup in the pre-
boiler cycle during operation and
startup and (iv) the hydrogen in
feedwater and saturated steam
caused by cycle corrosion.
Chapter 3, Volume 1 discusses
some of the cycle chemistry control
options that are available to get
feedwater corrosion under control
and to deal in a preventive way with
the potential for boiler tube failures.
6.6 Flow modifications to
increase turbulence
As noted above, swirl vanes inside
horizontal tubes have been used as
a means to increase turbulence and
decrease the likelihood for deposit
formation (Figure 47-2). Because of
the benefits of cycle chemistry con-
trol throughout the unit, cycle chem-
istry changes are considered as pri-
mary action, with flow controls to be
used only when chemistry controls
have been insufficient. The insertion
of such flow control devices act as
deposition initiators at the locations
where they touch the inside surfaces
of the tubes.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 47-11
7. Case Study
None for these mechanisms.
8. References
1Aschoff, A.F. and O. Jonas, Guidelines on Cycle
Chemistry for Fluidized-Bed Combustion Plants,
Research Project 979-29, Final Report TR-102976,
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
September, 1993.
2Proceedings of the 1991 International Conference on
Fluidized Bed Combustion, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, New York, 1991.
3Makansi,J., “Special Report: Fluidized-Bed Boilers”,
Power, March, 1991, p. 32.
4Stringer,J., “Current Information on Metal Wastage in
Fluidized Bed Combustors”, in J.P. Mustonen, ed.,
Proceedings of the 1987 International Conference on
Fluidized Bed Combustors, pp. 685-696.
5Stringer,J., “Practical Experience with Wastage at
Elevated Temperatures in Coal Combustion Systems”,
Eighth International Conference on Erosion by Liquid and
Solid Impact, Cambridge, U.K., 1994.
6Stringer, J. and I.G. Wright, “Erosion/Corrosion in FBC
Boilers”, EPRI Workshop on Wastage of In-Bed Surfaces
in Fluidized Bed Combustors, Argonne National
Laboratory, Illinois, November, 1987.
47-12 BTF Issues in Bubbling Bed FBCs
7Thimsen, D.P. and J.W. Stallings, “EPRI Perspective on
the Northern States Power Company Black Dog Unit #2
AFBC Retrofit Experience to Date”, Proceedings ASME
Fluidized Bed Conference, 1991.
8Sethi, V.K., and I.G. Wright, Materials Support for EPRI
Fluidized-Bed Combustion Program, Volume 1: Relative
Performance of Wear Control Strategies for Evaporator
Tube Wastage in AFBCs (May, 1993), Volume 2: Effect of
Fuel Variables on the Wear Potential of FBC Bed
Particles (November, 1993), Project 979-20, Final Report
TR-101804 Vols. 1 and 2, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1993.
9Bartholomew,
R.D., W.E. Chesney, R.D. Hopkins, J.S.
Poole, J.W. Siegmund, J.P. Williams, and S. Yorgiadis,
Guidelines for Chemical Cleaning of Fossil-Fueled
Steam-Generating Equipment, Research Project 2712-
06, Final Report TR-102401, Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, CA, June, 1993.
 Chapter 48 • Volume 3

Gas

BTF Issues in
Convection
pass

Limestone Combustor

Coal

Solids

Hot
cycle

Recycle
Flue gas
Circulating Bed FBCs
Refractory
lining

Secondary
air Heat exchanger
Primary
air

BTF Issues in Circulating Bed provides an overview of such prob-

FBCs
A simplified schematic of a CFB unit
is shown in Figure 48-1. The primary
difference from the bubbling bed
design is, as implied in the name,
the combustion bed circulates to a
cyclone separator and back to the
boiler. There are no in-bed tubes as
in the bubbling bed units; however,
in some designs there are horizontal
tubes in either external heat
exchangers or in the cyclone
separator.
The majority of potential boiler tube
failures that may affect circulating
fluidized (CFB) units are similar to
those which have been confronted
in conventional plant. Table 48-1
lems and the applicable chapters of
this book where they are discussed.
Two problems which have been
found in CFB units that are some-
what different from those in conven-
tional plant are the (i) erosion/abra-
sion on waterwall tubes, particularly
at the interface between the refrac-
tory lining on the lower portions of
the bed and the waterwall tube pan-
els, and (ii) the potential for damage
to external heat exchangers or in
the cyclone separator by mecha-
nisms such as wastage, fretting,
and fatigue; a particular concern is
waterside corrosion in CFB units
with horizontal tubes in these areas.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 48-1

 Erosion/Abrasion of Waterwall
Tubes
Wastage of the waterwalls at the
refractory lining/wall interface is the
most significant of several wastage
Gas mechanisms in CFB units.2 The
Convection location typically affected is shown
pass in Figure 48-2. Wear has, in some
cases, been extremely rapid, e.g.,
Limestone Combustor maximum loss rates up to 1800 mils
per year (5200 nm/hr).1 Two modes
Coal of local flow that may be responsible
for the wastage are illustrated in
Solids Figures 48-3 a and b.
Because the problem is not uniform
around the walls, inspections to
Hot determine the extent of damage must
cycle
Flue gas be as comprehensive as possible.1
Refractory Recycle
lining
Two solutions to this problem have
been applied. Proprietary coatings
have been applied to the affected
areas, in later units as part of the
original construction, with good suc-
Secondary cess. The second option has been
air Heat exchanger
to modify the geometry of the
Primary affected area either by (i) installing
air
shelves above the refractory inter-
face or (ii) by reducing the angle of
the tapered region (these options
Figure 48-1. General schematic of a circulating fluidized bed. are shown schematically in Figure
Adapted from: E. Bretz, Power, 133, No. 3, 1989, p. W-8. Reproduced with permission. 48-4) or (iii) routing the affected
tubes outside of the bed as shown
in Figure 48-5.
Table 48-1
Overview of Boiler Tube Failure Mechanisms in Circulating Bed Fluidized Bed Combustors There have been a few reports of
wastage at three other locations in
Mechanism Prevalence to Date For More Information Refer to: CFB units1: (i) at combustor wall cor-
ners or between wing panels and
Underdeposit corrosion Some occurrences in external Same mechanism in BFB units; the walls, (ii) general wastage on
in horizontal tubes of heat exchangers. also chapters on underdeposit straight walls, and (iii) at geometric
external heat exchangers or corrosion in conventional plant, irregularities introduced by instru-
cyclone separators in some particularly caustic gouging mentation penetrations, weld beads,
designs. (Chapter 17, Volume 2) and acid and tubes bent around openings.
phosphate corrosion (Chapter 16,
Volume 2).

Wastage on waterwall tubes Most prevalent material loss Main text this chapter.
at the refractory lining. mechanism.

Flyash erosion of tubes in Has occurred with agricultural See discussion of flyash erosion
convection steam sections. waste-fired units. in Chapter 14, Volume 2.

Corrosion fatigue.
None known to date; a concern See Chapter 13, Volume 2 on
based on knowledge of conven- corrosion fatigue.
tional plant and similarities with
aspects of FBC designs, espe-
cially if pH depressions occur in
units on phosphate treatment
with hideout and return.

48-2 BTF Issues in Circulating Bed FBCs

a
a Wastage
aa Membrane
Water wall
tube

Wastage

Refractory
lining

Water wall
tubes

Refractory
lining

Figure 48-2. Typical wear pattern on the waterwall above the

refractory lining in circulating fluidized-bed units.
Source: J. Stringer1
Downward
flow at wall

Vortex

Effective load
on stream
Upward flow
in combustor

a) Local Vortex Formation at the

Section Change

Downward-flowing
dense stream at wall

b) An Effective Load Towards the Metal

Surface as a Result of the Change
in Direction of Flow of the Dense Layer

Figure 48-3a/b. Two possible modes of local flow which could

give rise to the observed wastage at the refractory termination.
(a) Local vortex formation at the section change. (b) An effec-
tive load towards the metal surface as a result of the change in
direction of flow of the dense layer. Source: J. Stringer1

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 48-3

a a
a Shelves

Refractory
lining

Figure 48-4. Two methods of ameliorat-

ing wear on the wall. The first uses a
series of shelves to break up the down-
ward flow; the second changes the
angle of the refractory lining.
Source: J. Stringer1

References
1Stringer,
Water wall
tube

Refractory
lining

Figure 48-5. Bending out the waterwall

tubes to produce a coplanar surface
between the refractory lining and the
unlined waterwall.

J. and J. Stallings, “Material Issues in

Circulating Fluidized-Bed Combustors”, in Proceedings
of the 1991 International Conference on Fluidized Bed
Combustion, American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
New York, 1991.

48-4 BTF Issues in Circulating Bed FBCs

Potential for Waterside
Corrosion in Horizontal Tubing
The potential for horizontal tubing
to develop excessive deposits, and
for concentration of control chemi-
cals (caustic or phosphates) within
the deposits, has been extensively
discussed in the previous chapter
on BFB. The mechanism, root
causes and actions for preventing
the development of underdeposit
corrosion in susceptible CFB loca-
tions is identical.

2See issues of Materials & Components in Fossil Energy

Applications, jointly published by U.S. Department of
Energy and the Electric Power Research Institute for
experiences with CFB wastage including, for example:
No. 86, June, 1990, pp. 1-2; and No. 101, December
1992, pp. 1-5.
3Bretz, E., Power, Volume 133, No.. 3, 1989, p. W-8.
Chapter 49 • Volume 3
Issues in BTF
of Waste-to-Energy
Units
Introduction
As of 1993, there were approxi-
mately 250 combustors in the United
States firing over 200 tons per day
of municipal solid waste (MSW),
refuse-derived fuel (RDF), or co-fir-
ing coal and waste. Total generation
capacity represented by such units
was about 2,000 MWe. About 5% of
these are owned or operated by
U.S. utilities. These waste-to-energy
(WTE) units have a number of active
boiler tube failure mechanisms in
common with conventionally-fueled
boilers.1 This chapter provides an
overview of four BTF mechanisms
that are specific to WTE units.
Types of Boilers Combusting
MSW
Four major boiler types firing MSW
include1:
• Mass-burn systems in which
waste is burned without pre-pro-
cessing except to remove large
items. Refuse is typically placed
on a grate that moves the waste
through the combustor.
Combustion air is fed from above
and below the grate in amounts in
excess of the stoichiometric mix.
These units vary in size from 50 to
1,000 tons/day with the average
around 500 tons/day.
• Modular combustors, in which
waste is also burned without pre-
processing, here however, com-
bustion is staged with a primary
(substoichiometric) chamber and
a secondary combustion cham-
ber firing with excess air. These
units tend to be smaller, in the
range 5 to 100 tons/day.
• Rotary, mass-burn combustors in
which the grate is replaced with a
refractory-lined rotary. The aim of
this design is to allow sufficient
mixing and residence time for
complete burnout of the fuel.
These units range in capacity
from 250 to 400 tons/day.
• Refuse-derived fuel (RDF) sys-
tems which burn processed
waste and include both
stoker/grate-fired units and flu-
idized bed combustors. The for-
mer range in size from 300 to
1,333 tons/day; the latter from
200 to 600 tons/day.
Main steam conditions vary among
the various designs and with the vin-
tage of unit. In general, in the U.S.,
waste-fired boilers operate with a
final steam temperature not greater
than 454°C (850°F) compared to
537 - 565°C (1000 - 1050°F) for con-
ventional plant. This results in corre-
spondingly lower tube metal temper-
atures in both waterwalls and super-
heater tubes and is specifically to
control the rate of corrosion from
molten salt attack.
Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 49-1
Overview of the Demands
Placed on Boiler Tubes in WTE
Units
The composition of the fuel in WTE
units has a major impact on the
nature and extent of boiler tube fail-
ures. There are a variety of con-
stituents in MSW, most troublesome
is the presence of high levels of
chlorine, which result from plastics
such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC),
and NaCl, as well as other species
(such as alkalies, sulfur, Pb, Zn, and
Sn) that can lead to the formation of
aggressively corrosive, low melting
point compounds. For comparison,
U.S. coals tend to have sulfur con-
tent of 0.5 to 4.5 wt% and chlorine
content of 0.1 to 0.35% wt%. MSW
sulfur content is lower, typically
ranging from 0.1 to 0.4 wt%; but
chlorine content is significantly
higher ranging from 0.3 to 2.0 wt%.
The resulting concentration of chlo-
rine, sulfur and alkali species in the
flue gas varies as a function of boiler
location.
Another concern is the occurrence
of areas of non-optimal (either oxi-
dizing or substoichiometric) com-
bustion conditions caused by the
diverse nature of the fuel and which
exacerbates the fireside corrosion
problems of boiler tubes.
As a result of these particular condi-
tions, typical boiler tube concerns in
WTE units are: increased fireside
corrosion, slagging and fouling
problems, and erosion/corrosion
due, in part, to the increased carry-
over of unburned products and to
the higher local velocities that result
from blockage of flue gas passages.
Table 49-1 provides a more com-
a
plete list of the boiler tube problems
in MSW/RDF-fired boilers.
The balance of this chapter looks
briefly at four BTF: (i) waterwall thin-
ning along the grate line, (ii) corro-
sion by deposits containing low-
melting-point chlorides and sulfates,
(iii) corrosion by combustion gases,
and (iv) erosion-assisted corrosion.
Figure 49-1 provides an illustration
of a typical WTE unit and the loca-
tions in which these failure mecha-
nisms can occur.

49-2
Table 49-1

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Water wall

Refractory
lining

Overfire

Waterwall
thinning along
grate line

Fuel
feed

Underfire
air
air
a
BTF Problems Specific to WTE Units
Water-Touched Tubes
Waterwall thinning along grate line from mechanical wear/corrosion*
Mechanical wear from molten aluminum
Wastage from direct flame impingement on waterwalls
Fireside corrosion caused by low-melting point chlorides and sulfates*
Fireside corrosion by combustion gases*
Erosion caused by high local velocities and carryover of particles (economizer)*

Steam-Touched tubes
Fireside corrosion caused by low-melting point chlorides and sulfates*
Fireside corrosion by combustion gases*
Erosion from excessive sootblowing required by slagging of superheater tubes*
Fouling which results in flow-channeling, high local velocities and subsequently to excessive
erosion rates*
• Flame impingement from furnace in older units with short furnace zones
• Pitting (external) from aqueous corrosion during unit downtime

Notes 1. * Indicates mechanisms that are specifically discussed in this chapter.

2. Not all designs have all these problems; some of the problems are also specific to older designs
and prevention has been achieved by various approaches.

Corrosion by

Corrosion
by
deposits
Steam
drum

combustion gases

Ash
Corrosion by
Superheater

combustion gases

Corrosion by
deposits

Fuel bed
Evaporator

Ash
Economizer

Erosion assisted corrosion

Figure 49-1. Schematic of a waste-to-energy combustor illustrating the typical areas

that experience boiler tube failures. Source: I.G. Wright, et al.2

Issues in BTF of Waste-to-Energy Units

Flue gas to
clean up
Mechanism: Waterwall
Thinning Along the Grate Line
1.1 Features of Failure. Wastage
features as a result of mechanically-
assisted high temperature corrosion.
1.2 Typical Locations. Wastage is
typically found in a band on each
sidewall at an elevation extending
from the top of the grate to the maxi-
mum height of the bed.
2. Mechanism of Failure. The
mechanism is wastage, caused by
mechanical damage which removes
the protective oxides and corrosion
products. As this is a very corrosive
area (notably with locally substoi-
chiometric conditions, perhaps also
containing corrosive species such
as HCl, H2S, and condensable
salts), attack of the now unprotected
tubes by high temperature corrosion
can then proceed rapidly. The het-
erogeneous nature of the fuel pro-
vides both the objects needed to
cause the removal of protective lay-
ers, as well as causing the local
aggressive combustion conditions.
Mechanism: Corrosion by
Deposits Containing Low-
Melting Point Chlorides and
Sulfates
1.1 Features of Failure.
• Fireside wastage is a maximum at
the fireside crown, the location of
highest metal temperature. Figure
49-2 illustrates the typical appear-
ance of thinning in waterwall
tubes. Figure 49-3 shows a duc-
tile final failure in a furnace wall
tube, which will often show the
typical “fish-mouth” ruptures. The
manifestation of damage in a
superheater tube is shown in
Figures 49-4a and b.
• Final failure is by ductile overload
with thin-edged or “fish-mouth”
fracture surface.
• Usually there are no signs of
overheating of the microstructure.
• Presence of external tube
deposits. The outer layer gener-
ally is soft, friable and contains
carbon, sulfates, and chlorides.
The inner layer is dark or black
and contains much higher levels
of carbon and chlorides as well
as Na, K, Zn, and Pb.
• Presence of chlorine, Na, K, Sn,
Zn or Pb in the deposits, particu-
larly at the metal scale/deposit
interface. For example the super-
heater tube shown in Figure 49-4
had deposits with 10-30% chlo-
ride, 33 to 47% Pb, 3 to 13 per-
cent Zn, 3 to 14% Na, and 2 to
11% K. Chloride may still be the
principal corrodent, even when
the chloride concentration in the
bulk deposit is as low as 1%.3
• After the easy removal of
deposits, the tubes can be either
dimpled or smooth.
• Can affect a large number of
tubes or be isolated to one.

3. Root Cause(s). Large, hard

objects found in the fuel are
dragged along the wall by the
motion of the grate causing the
mechanical damage. Combustion
products are also aggressive which
accelerates the rate of wastage.

6. Prevention Options.
• In units where fuel is moved on a
grate, sliding contact cannot be
avoided; mitigation will be found
in lining the waterwalls with wear-
resistant refractory such as SiC
tiles.
• Sorting fuel to remove large, solid
objectives is a possibility, but
would require economic justifica-
tion.
• It may be possible to redesign the
fuel feed system to avoid pro-
longed contact of the fuel with the
lower waterwall.

Figure 49-2. Waterwall tubes from a waste-fired boiler showing thinning

from fireside corrosion. Source: I.G. Wright, et al.1

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 49-3

 1.2 Typical Locations. Failures can
occur in lower and upper water-
walls, and sometimes on the leading
tubes of superheaters (Figure 49-1).
In general, attack will occur where
tube metal temperatures are in
excess of the melting temperature of
the corrosive species that is pre-
sent.
2. Mechanism of Failure. Damage
by this mechanism occurs when
aggressive species “flux” away the
normally protective scale. Attack of
Figure 49-3. Failure in a 21/4 inch O.D. furnace wall tube from an RDF- the tube is by chloride mixtures (of
fired boiler showing localized thinning caused by fireside corrosion. Zn, Pb, Na and K) and other
Source: I.G. Wright, et al.1 aggressive species such as those
listed in Table 49-2. These com-
pounds form during the combustion
of PVC, bleached paper, and NaCl
which react with the oxides of met-
als volatilized from the refuse. They
can come into contact with the
tubes via condensation or direct
impingement.
As illustrated in Table 49-2, a num-
ber of compounds normally resulting
from the combustion of municipal
waste have sufficiently low melting
points to form molten salts on tube
surfaces at operating temperatures.
Figure 49-4a. Thinned T22 superheater tube from an RDF boiler. Deposits contained For example, the SnCl2 and ZnCl2
Cl, Pb, Zn, Na, and K. Source: I.G. Wright, et al.1 eutectic mixtures will be molten at
wall temperatures. The PbCl2 eutec-
tics will be molten at superheater
temperatures. The buildup of water-
side deposits in waterwalls can
increase their susceptibility to the
higher melting point compounds
listed in the table.

3. Root Cause(s). The root cause

is burning fuels containing species
which flux the normally protective
external tube scale, form aggressive
low-melting point compounds, and
lead to accelerated tube wastage.
Because of the heterogeneity of the
fuel, the problem is significantly
worse than for conventionally-fueled
units.
6. Prevention Options
• Lower temperatures. Waste-fired
boilers operate at lower tempera-
tures than conventional fuel units
to minimize the problem of fire-

Figure 49-4b. Cross section of the T22 superheater tube shown in

Figure 49-4a. Source: I.G. Wright, et al.1

49-4 Issues in BTF of Waste-to-Energy Units

Table 49-2 • In superheater tubes, replace-
Eutectic Compositions with Low Melting Points ment of low alloy steels with Alloy
825 up to steam temperatures of
Eutectic Mixture, mole % Melting Point, °C Melting Point, °F
454°C (850°F) has been shown to
be cost-effective.1 Under some
25 NaCl - 75 FeCl3 156 313 conditions, less expensive materi-
37 PbCl2 - 63 FeCl3 175 347 als such as Alloy 800H, Sanicro
28 or Types 304 and 310 stain-
60 SnCl2 - 40 KCl 176 349 less steel may be adequate.1 For
70 SnCl2 - 30 NaCl 183 361 uncooled components, 309, 310,
HR160, 825 and other alloys have
70 ZnCl2 - 30 FeCl3 200 392 shown promise in testing.
20 ZnCl2 - 80 SnCl2 204 400 • Keeping excessive deposits from
forming on superheater tubes.
55 ZnCl2 - 45 KCl 230 446
Mechanical rapping has been
70 ZnCl2 - 30 NaCl 262 504 shown to be more effective than
sootblowing for this purpose
60 KCl - 40 FeCl2 355 671 because excessive sootblowing
58 NaCl - 42 FeCl2 370 698 can accelerate corrosion.1
70 PbCl2 - 30 NaCl 410 770 • Sorting of fuel, particularly remov-
ing PVC which represents about
52 PbCl2 - 48 KCl 411 772 one-half of the chlorine present
72 PbCl2 - 28 FeCl2 421 790 would clearly be advantageous.
However, other sources of chlo-
90 PbCl2 - 10 MgCl2 460 860 rine, and of Pb, Zn, and Sn still
80 PbCl2 - 20 CaCl2 475 887 would remain and this option is
not generally within the control of
49 NaCl - 51 CaCl2 500 932 the operator.
• Additives. The addition of sulfur,
Source: H.H. Krause4 to at least a sulfur/chlorine ratio of
4, has been shown to lower the
corrosion rate. Sulfur promotes
side corrosion. Typical operating Applications of such coatings are the conversion of alkali metal
conditions might be final steam subject to quality variations, and chlorides to sulfates which then
temperatures of 454° (850°F) or thus vary in expected life. An form non-corrosive deposits.
lower; some units have operating alternative where the reduction of However, addition of sulfur or sul-
temperatures as low as 242° heat flux caused by the use of fur-rich fuels is counter to current
(467°F) and appear to have suc- refractories is not possible is the environmental goals and not gen-
cessfully avoided problems with use of a weld overlay of a high erally practiced.
corrosion.1 nickel, high chromium alloy such
as Alloy 625. Any program of alloy
• Use a more resistance material to
substitution requires an analysis of
protect susceptible areas of
not only the expected increased
waterwalls.1 In lower waterwalls, a
life of the substitute but the eco-
protective coating of a refractory
nomics of its use. Sprayed metal
such as Ca-bonded SiC is the
coatings have also been used
most common mitigation means.
with mixed results, generally poor.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 49-5

Mechanism: Corrosion by
Combustion Gases
This mechanism is similar to that for
coal-fired boilers except that the
proportion of chlorine to sulfur con-
taining species is significantly
higher, which means a significantly
higher amount of HCl in the com-
bustion gas.
1.1 Features of Failure.
• Tube thinning.
• External scales that are porous
and/or laminated, poorly adher-
ent, and voluminous. Only a small
percent of the corrosion products
remain on the tube.
• In waterwalls, the metal/scale
interface will contain FeCl2 but no
evidence of alkali metals or of Pb,
Zn, or Sn.
• In superheater tubes, the inter-
face will contain FeCl2 and alkali
sulfates. Typical microstructure
appearance of a superheater
tube following attack is shown in
Figure 49-5.
2. Mechanism of Failure. The
mechanism is thought to be essen-
tially a gas phase attack in which
HCl penetrates to the metal-oxide
interface, forms FeCl3 at about
400°C (752°F), and when it evapo-
rates, leaves the surface susceptible
to further attack by HCl. When this
occurs, FeCl2, a typical key feature
for this mechanism, can form
although it would otherwise not be
favored thermodynamically. The
presence of a substoichiometric
atmosphere allows sulfur to form
H2S. The sulfide scales are inher-
ently more porous than oxide scale
and thus less protective; reducing
conditions are essential for them to
form. The Cl can thus penetrate the
scale and form the iron chlorides.
49-6 Issues in BTF of Waste-to-Energy Units
Figure 49-5. Microstructure of a superheater tube corroded as a result
of gas-phase attach by HCl/Cl. The wastage rate was approximately
270 mil/yr. No heavy metals were present on the surface.
Source: I.G. Wright, et al.1
The threshold for HCl-induced gas- • Reduce superheater tube/flue gas
phase corrosion is 232°C (450°F).5 temperature. This has been done
Since waterwall tubes operate in a two ways1: (i) increasing the heat
metal temperature range from absorption of the furnace walls by
around 260 to 315°C (~ 500 to minimizing slagging and the use
600°F), this form of corrosion is pos- of refractory linings, (ii) by
sible at any location with a reducing designing a large heat absorption
environment. areas ahead of the superheater
such as one or two empty
The problem is further exacerbated
upstream convection passes or
by the higher temperatures in the
installing water-cooled screen
superheater when a solid tube
tubes.
deposit containing an alkali metal, in
the presence of SO2, increases the • Reduce superheater tube temper-
attack when chloride species are atures by using parallel flow
present. design.
• Change materials. More resistant
3. Root Cause(s). The presence of
materials can be substituted for
chlorine in the fuel in combination
either waterwalls or superheaters.
with substoichiometric conditions at
the furnace walls and high gas tem- • Derate the unit and take the asso-
peratures in the superheater sec- ciated economic penalty.
tions are at the root of the problem.
6. Prevention Options.
• Air distribution modifications so
that substoichiometric conditions
are minimized.
Mechanism: Erosion-Assisted
Corrosion
1.1 Features of Failure. Typical
appearance of eroded tubing: pol-
ished appearance, flat spots on
tubes, rust appearance after water-
washing.
1.2 Typical Locations. Superheater
and steam generator tube banks
adjacent to ducting walls; near the
rear wall of the rear pass; next to
gas flow path openings; and close
to sootblower lanes.1
2. Mechanism of Failure. Excessive
erosion of regions in the superheater
can develop from excessively high
velocity flows that result from block-
ing of flow passages by deposits, or
from the operation of sootblowers.
The former problem is similar to
conditions that develop for flyash
erosion in coal-fired units (see
Chapter 14, Volume 2), however, the
problem is exacerbated by soot- 6. Prevention Options.
blower operation mandated by
extensive carryover, particularly of
• Shielding with Type 309 stainless
steel, used to protect the affected
unburnt and/or sticky particles; this
tubes, has been the most com-
problem is similar to sootblower ero-
monly applied mitigation.
sion described in (Chapter 38).
• Use of mechanical rapping
3. Root Cause(s). Buildup of
instead of sootblowing to remove
deposits can cause flow restrictions
deposits has also been imple-
and result in excessive local veloci-
mented. It has the additional
ties. In WTE units the buildup of
advantage of not removing pro-
deposits can be caused1: (i) when
tective tube oxides.
the moisture content of the fuel is
too high and burning is delayed, (ii) • The use of flow modification
by extensive use of refractory or screens, similar to those
slagging of furnace walls, (iii) when described for flyash erosion are
the furnace volume is too small to probably not applicable because
allow for complete combustion, or the heavy entrained ash in WTE
(iv) when there is insufficient overfire boiler may lead to fouling and/or
air to achieve complete combustion. corrosion of the screens.
In the case of WTE units, the primary
sootblower problem is excessive use
as mandated by an excessive foul-
ing problem. Other problems that
can lead to sootblower erosion can
be reviewed in Chapter 38.

References
1Wright, I.G., H.H. Krause, and V. Nagarajan, Boiler Tube
Failures in MSW/RDF Incineration/Co-Firing, Research
Project 3295-07, Final Report TR-103658, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, January, 1994.
2Wright,
I.G., H.H. Krause, and R.B. Dooley, NACE Paper
95-562T, NACE 1995 Meeting.
3Personal
Communication from P. Daniel (Babcock &
Wilcox) to R.B. Dooley, February 15, 1995.
4Krause, H.H., “High-Temperature Corrosion and Fouling
in Oil-Fired Power Plants”, in Workshop Proceedings:
Applications of Fireside Additives to Utility Boilers, WS-
80-127, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,
May, 1981, Section 2, p. 4.
5Stanko, G.J., J.L. Bough, E.D. Montrone, and P. Adkin,
“MSW Corrosion: Materials and Design Solution”, R.W.
Bryers, ed., Incinerating Municipal and Industrial Waste:
Fireside Problems and Prospects for Improvement,
Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1991, pp. 261-278.

Volume 3: Steam-Touched Tubes 49-7

49-8 Issues in BTF of Waste-to-Energy Units
Index
Acid contamination, 15-10 through
15-12
Acid deposition, 30-2, 30-3
Acid dewpoint corrosion (economizer),
30-1 through 30-12
actions, 30-8 through 30-12
determining the extent of
damage, 30-6, 30-11
features of failure, 30-2, 30-8
locations of failure, 30-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
30-6, 30-12
mechanism, 30-3, 30-4, 30-9
precursors, 30-8
ramifications/ancillary problems,
30-12
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 30-6, 30-12
root causes and actions to
confirm, 30-5, 30-10
Acid phosphate corrosion, 16-1
through 16-28
actions, 16-22 through 16-28
case study, 16-16 through 16-20
deposit characteristics, 7-1
through 7-4, 16-2, 16-4, 16-6,
16-19, 16-20
determining the extent of
damage, 16-13, 16-25
distinguishing from hydrogen
damage or caustic gouging,
7-1, 7-2, 16-3
features of failure, 7-1, 7-2, 16-2
through 16-4, 16-18 through
16-20, 16-22
locations of failure, 16-4, 16-5
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
16-14, 16-15, 16-27
mechanism, 16-6 through 16-8,
16-23
precursors, 16-22
ramifications/ancillary problems,
16-28
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 16-13, 16-26
root causes and actions to confirm,
7-4, 16-9 through 16-12, 16-24
Additives, oil-fired units, 34-10, 34-11,
34-18, 34-19
Air inleakage, 13-24, 27-6, 27-7, 27-9,
30-4, 30-5, 41-6
Alkali iron trisulfates, 33-2, 33-7, 33-8
Alkali salts, 33-2, 33-7, 33-8
All-volatile treatment (see also
Feedwater treatment), 1-18, 3-9,
3-13
“Alligator hide”, 32-2, 33-3, 33-4, 34-5
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) Codes
design, 2-2 through 2-6
non-destructive examination, 11-3
welding 11-3, 11-4
Ammonia, 3-8, 3-9
Ash analysis, 33-12
Austenitic welds (in dissimilar metal
welds), 11-7, 35-2 through 35-9,
35-15
Availability losses and improvement,
1-20
Backing rings, 2-14, 11-4
Baffles (erosion), 14-12
Bell-shaped corrosion curve, 33-7,
33-8
Black boiler water samples, 16-11
Boiler pressure drop losses, 19-5,
19-6
Boiler Tube Failure (BTF) Reduction
Program, 1-20, 5-1 through 5-3
corporate directives for BTF
reduction, 5-2
goals, 1-20, 1-21, 5-2
multidisciplinary teams for BTF
reduction, 5-2
Boiler tube failures
formalizing programs for
reduction of, 1-20, 5-1 through
5-6
historical developments in
identification, correction and
prevention, 1-16, 1-18
importance, 1-1
importance of operation and
maintenance procedures in
preventing, 4-1
influence of cycle chemistry, 1-18,
3-1 through 3-2
influence of fuel options, 1-18
influence of operating conditions,
1-18
influence of unit lay-up, 4-9
influence of unit transients, 4-8, 4-9
influencing or influenced by
chemical cleaning, 4-2
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
largest availability losses, 1-1, 1-2
precursors to, 1-4, 1-10 through
1-15, 1-16, 12-7 through 12-12,
31-7 through 31-13
repeat failures, 1-20, 1-21
reporting and report form, 5-3
through 5-5
resulting from breakdown of
protective magnetite in
water-touched tubing, 2-11
resulting from breakdown of
protective oxide in steam-
touched tubing, 2-15
resulting from fireside conditions,
2-21
screening table, steam-touched
tubes, 1-8, 1-9, 31-4, 31-5
screening table, water-touched
tubes, 1-6, 1-7, 12-4, 12-5
steps in generic investigation 1-4,
1-5, 1-16, 12-2, 12-3, 31-2, 31-3
with significant microstructural
changes, 10-2
worldwide statistics, 1-1
Boiler tubes (see also Superheater/
reheater tubes and Waterwalls
and economizer tubes)
design considerations, 2-2
through 2-6
materials and alloys, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6
maximum design and oxidation
temperatures, 2-4, 23-2, 23-3
Boiler water treatment, 3-1 through
3-8
all-volatile treatment (see also
Feedwater treatment), 1-18,
3-9, 3-13
caustic treatment,
and caustic gouging, 17-5, 17-6,
17-10
guidelines for, 3-5, 3-6, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18,
3-5, 17-5
success factors for use of, 3-5
comparison of options, 3-6
effect on boiler tube failures
3-1, 3-2
factors during unit transients, 4-8
optimization of, 3-6 through 3-8
I-1
 phosphate treatments, 3-3 through
3-5, 16-6
and acid phosphate corrosion,
16-6 through 16-8, 16-11,
16-12,16-16, 16-17
effect of chemical additions on
operating regimes, 3-4
guidelines for, 3-5, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18,
3-3
Borio index, 33-9
Bubbling-bed FBC units, 47-1
through 47-12
chromized tubes, 47-10
plasma coatings, 47-10
tube armoring, 47-10
Burner misalignment, 15-10, 16-11,
17-10
Carbides, 10-5, 10-6
Carryover, 37-5, 37-6
of Na2SO4, 41-2, 41-5, 41-6
Caustic gouging, 17-1 through 17-22
actions, 17-16 through 17-22
case study, 17-14
deposit characteristics, 7-1
through 7-3, 17-2, 17-3, 17-6,
17-7
determining the extent of
damage, 17-11, 17-19
distinguishing from hydrogen
damage or acid phosphate
corrosion, 7-1, 7-2, 17-2
electrochemical corrosion cell,
17-6, 17-7
features of failure, 7-1, 7-2, 17-2,
17-3, 17-16
locations of failure, 17-2 through
17-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
17-12, 17-13, 17-21
mechanism, 2-11, 2-14, 17-5
through 17-7, 17-17
precursors, 17-16
ramifications/ancillary problems,
17-22
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 17-11, 17-20
root causes and actions to
confirm, 7-4, 17-8 through 17-10,
17-18
Caustic treatment (see also Boiler
water treatment),1-18, 3-5, 3-6,
3-13, 17-5,17-6, 17-10
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-2
Chemical cleaning (see also Chemical
cleaning damage in super
heater/reheater tubes and
Chemical cleaning damage:
waterwalls)
as indicator of non-optimized
feedwater chemistry, 3-2
boiler tube failures influenced by,
4-2, 36-6, 36-8
effect of changing to oxygenated
treatment, 3-11, 3-12
FBC units, 4-8
superheaters/reheaters, 4-5
through 4-7, 32-21, 33-21,
34-19, 37-5 through 37-10
importance of sampling, 4-6
locations to clean, 4-6
monitoring, 4-7
process optimization, 4-6, 4-7
reasons to perform, 4-5
solvent choice, 4-6
typical operations for, 4-7
when to clean, 4-6
waterwalls, 4-1 through 4-5
assessing cleanliness and
deposit levels, 4-2, 4-3
guidelines for, 4-1
importance, 4-1
inhibitor breakdown, 25-4
monitoring Fe levels to
determine finish, 4-5
possible problems that could
lead to damage, 25-4
solvent choice, 4-3, 4-4
typical operations for, 4-5
when to clean, 4-2
Chemical cleaning damage in
superheater/reheater tubes,
43-1 through 43-8
actions, 43-5 through 43-8
determining the extent of
damage, 43-3, 43-7
features of failure, 43-2, 43-5
locations of failure, 43-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
43-4, 43-8
mechanism, 43-2, 43-6
precursors, 43-5
ramifications/ancillary problems,
43-8
repairs and immediate
solutions/actions, 43-4, 43-8
root causes and actions to
confirm, 43-3, 43-7
Chemical cleaning damage: water
walls, 25-1 through 25-9
actions, 25-6 through 25-9
determining the extent of
damage, 25-4, 25-8
features of failure, 25-2, 25-3, 25-6
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
25-5, 25-9
mechanism, 25-4, 25-7
precursors, 25-6
ramification/ancillary problems,
25-9
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 25-5, 25-9
root causes and actions to
confirm, 25-4, 25-7
Chlorine in coal, 18-5, 18-6, 33-10,
33-11, 47-6
Chordal thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
Chromizing waterwalls, 19-15, 19-16
Circulating-bed FBC units, 48-1
through 48-4
coatings, 48-2
erosion/abrasion, 48-2 through
48-4
underdeposit corrosion, 48-2
Coal composition (see also
Combustion process and/or
Fireside scale/ash)
and corrosiveness, 18-4 through
18-6, 33-8 through 33-11
and erosiveness, 14-5 through
14-7
effect of chlorine content on fire
side corrosion in steam-
touched tubes, 33-10, 33-11
effect of chlorine content on
fireside corrosion in water-
touched tubes 18-5, 18-6
effect of sulfur level on fireside
corrosion in water-touched
tubes, 18-4
Coal particle erosion, 28-1 through
28-5
actions, 28-3 through 28-5
description and manifestation, 28-1
Coal Quality Impact Model (CQIM)
2-22, 33-14, 33-20
Coatings, 22-4, 48-2
for fireside corrosion in steam-
touched tubing, 33-18, 34-16,
34-17
for fireside corrosion in water-
touched tubing, 18-12 through
18-14
for sootblower erosion, 38-5
Cold air velocity test (CAVT) (see also
Flyash erosion), 14-12 through
14-18
Co-extruded tubing
for fireside corrosion in steam-
touched tubes, 33-20, 34-17
for fireside corrosion in water-
touched tubes, 18-14
welding, 11-7
Cold bent tubes and low-
temperature creep, 24-4
Cold end corrosion, 30-1
Combustion process,
ash formation, erosiveness, and
deposition, 2-22 through 2-24
formation of gaseous species, 2-22,
18-4
Commissioning of units,
activities to prevent future boiler
tube failures, 4-9, 4-11
Concentration in deposits, 2-13, 2-14,
15-4 through 15-6, 15-8, 15-10,
16-5 through 16-7, 17-4, 17-6, 17-7
Condenser leaks, 15-10, 15-11, 37-6
Congruent phosphate treatment
(see also Boiler water treatment),
3-4, 16-6
Coordinated phosphate treatment
(see also Boiler water treatment),
3-3, 3-4
Core monitoring parameters for
cycle chemistry, 3-14
Corporate commitment needed to
solve boiler tube failures, 5-1, 5-2
Corporate directives for BTF
reduction, 5-2
Corrosion
indices, 18-5, 18-6, 33-8 through
33-11
rates as a determinant of repair
choices, 18-11
Corrosion fatigue, 13-1 through
13-41
actions, 13-35 through 13-41
analysis of field experience, 13-13
through 13-15
breakdown of magnetite, 13-10
through 13-12
case study, 13-30 through 13-32
determining the extent of
damage, 13-26, 13-38
distinguishing from OD-initiated
fatigue, 7-6, 7-7
environmental effects on initiation
and propagation, 13-16
through 13-20
features of failure, 13-2 through
13-5, 13-35
Influence Diagram for the analysis
of corrosion fatigue, 13-24
through 13-26, 13-30 through
13-32
locations of failure, 13-6 through
13-9
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
13-28, 13-29, 13-40
mechanism, 2-11, 13-10 through
13-20, 13-36
oxygenated treatment, effect on
corrosion fatigue, 13-20
phosphate treatment, effect on
corrosion fatigue, 13-18, 13-20
precursors, 13-35
ramifications/ancillary problems,
13-41
repairs and immediate
solutions/actions, 13-27, 13-39
root causes and actions to con
firm, 13-21 through 13-26, 13-37,
13-38
stress effects on initiation and
propagation, 13-15, 13-16
Corrosion products, 1-17, 3-1, 3-2
Creep (see also Long-term overheat-
ing and Low-temperature creep
cracking), 6-8, 7-6, 7-8, 24-1
through 24-11, 32-1 through 32-32
Creep cavitation, 10-6
Creep damage
assessment techniques, 10-5
through 10-8
Larson-Miller Parameter (LMP),
10-2 through 10-6
Cycle chemistry (see also Boiler
water treatment and Feedwater
treatment),
core monitoring parameters, 3-14
developing unit-specific
guidelines, 3-12 through 3-13
diagnostic parameters, 3-14
goals for improvement program,
3-1, 3-2
guidelines documents for, 3-13
instrumentation and monitoring,
3-14
setting action levels, 3-12, 3-13
Cycling of units, 4-8, 4-9, 13-24, 20-4,
26-5, 35-12, 39-5
effect on boiler tube failures, 4-8,
4-9
effect on thermal fatigue in
economizer inlet header tubes,
20-2
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Departure from nucleate boiling
(DNB), 2-12, 2-13
Deposit density, 4-2
Deposit weight, 4-2, 4-3
Deposits (see Waterside deposits,
Feedwater corrosion products,
Concentration in deposits, Oxides
internal in steam-touched tubes,
Oxides internal in water-touched
tubes, Fireside scale/ash), 15-2,
15-4, 16-2 through 16-5, 17-2
through 17-4, 19-5
Diffusion screens (erosion), 14-14,
14-16 through 14-18
Dissolved oxygen, 13-11, 13-12,
13-16 through 13-20, 21-3, 21-4
Dissimilar metal welds, 35-1 through
35-25
actions, 35-19 through 35-25
case study, 35-17
determining the extent of
damage, 35-12, 35-13, 35-22
features of failure, 35-2 through
35-5, 35-19
influence of welding variables,
35-7 through 35-9
locations of failure, 35-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
35-15, 35-16, 35-24
mechanism, 35-6 through 35-9,
35-20
microstructural changes in
service, 35-6, 35-7
precursors, 35-19
ramifications/ancillary problems,
35-25
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 35-14, 35-23
root causes and actions to
confirm, 35-10 through 35-12,
35-21
Distorted or misaligned tubes, 14-3,
14-4, 14-11, 33-6, 33-15, 33-21,
34-5, 34-15, 34-19, 35-10, 39-5,
40-1, 40-3
Distribution screens (erosion), 14-14,
14-16 through 14-18
DMW LIFE code, 35-16
Drum boiler water treatment, 3-3
through 3-8
Drum level control, 23-6, 37-6, 41-6
“Dutchman” repair, 11-7, 35-23
Economizer inlet header tube
failures (see Erosion-corrosion of
economizer inlet header tubes
and/or Thermal fatigue in econo-
mizer inlet header tubes)
I-3
Electric resistance flash welding, 45-1
through 45-3
Equilibrium phosphate treatment (see
also Boiler water treatment), 3-3,
3-5, 16-14
Erosion (see also Flyash erosion, Coal
particle erosion, Falling
slag damage, Sootblower
erosion in superheater/reheater
tubes, Sootblower erosion in
water-touched tubing,
Fluidized-bed combustion
(FBC) units)
abrasion index, 14-6, 14-7
basics of damage mechanism,
14-5
erosiveness of ash constituents,
2-23, 2-24, 14-5, 14-6
wear propensity calculation, 14-6,
14-7
Erosion-corrosion,
general 3-9, 21-3, 21-4
Erosion-corrosion of economizer
inlet header tubes, 21-1 through
21-9
actions, 21-7 through 21-9
determining the extent of
damage, 21-5, 21-8
distinguishing from thermal
fatigue and flexibility-induced
cracking, 7-6, 7-7
features of failure, 21-1, 21-2,
21-7
locations of failure, 21-2, 21-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
21-5, 21-9
mechanism, 21-3, 21-8
precursors, 21-7
ramifications/ancillary problems,
21-9
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 21-5, 21-9
root causes and actions to
confirm, 21-4, 21-8
Excess oxygen,
high excess air in oil-fired units,
34-14, 34-19
low excess air, 18-1, 18-7, 34-14
Exfoliation of SH/RH steamside oxide,
2-17 through 2-21, 36-5, 36-7
effect of unit chemistry on, 2-21
effects, 2-17, 2-18, 2-21
failure criterion, 2-18, 2-20
rating severity of, 2-18, 2-19
susceptible materials, 2-18, 2-20,
2-21
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-4
Failure mechanisms
fluidized-bed units, Chapters 47
and 48
list, 1-3
steam-touched tubes, Volume 3
waste-to-energy units, Chapter
49, Volume 3
water-touched tubes, Volume 2
Falling slag damage, 29-1 through
29-6
actions, 29-3 through 29-6
description and manifestation,
29-1, 29-2
Fatigue in superheater/reheater
tubes, 39-1 through 39-12
actions, 39-9 through 39-12
determining the extent of
damage, 39-7, 39-11
features of failure, 39-2, 39-9
locations of failure, 39-3, 39-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
39-7, 39-12
mechanism, 39-5, 39-10
precursors, 39-9
repairs and immediate
solutions/actions, 39-7, 39-12
root causes and actions to
confirm, 39-5, 39-6, 39-11
Fatigue in water-touched tubes, 26-1
through 26-12
actions, 26-9 through 26-12
determining the extent of
damage, 26-7, 26-11
distinguishing from corrosion
fatigue, 7-6, 7-7, 26-3
features of failure, 26-2, 26-9
locations of failure, 26-3, 26-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
26-8, 26-12
mechanism, 26-5, 26-10
precursors, 26-9
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 26-8, 26-11
root causes and actions to
confirm, 26-6, 26-7, 26-11
Feedwater corrosion products,
1-17, 3-1, 3-2, 15-4, 15-14, 16-4,
16-5, 16-14, 17-2 through 17-4,
17-12, 23-5
Feedwater treatment, 3-8 through
3-12
all-volatile treatment (AVT), 3-9
guidelines for, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18
comparing AVT and oxygenated
treatment, 3-9, 3-11, 3-12
factors during unit transients, 4-8,
4-9
importance of proper choice of,
3-8
optimizing for all-ferrous
feedwater trains, 3-9 through
3-11, 21-5, 21-6
optimizing for mixed metallurgy
feedwater trains, 3-11, 21-5,
21-6
oxygen scavenger use, 3-8 through
3-10, 21-3, 21-6
oxygenated treatment (OT), 3-9
through 3-11
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-20
effect on oxide growth and
exfoliation, 2-21
guidelines for in once-through
and drum units, 3-13
historical development of, 1-18
to reduce deposition in
waterwalls, 19-5, 19-6, 19-11,
19-13, 19-15
problems with erosion-corrosion
throughout unit, 3-9
Fe-Fe carbide equilibrium diagram,
7-5, 23-2
FeO, 2-7, 32-9
Fe2O3, 2-7, 2-16, 2-17, 2-20, 32-9
Fe3O4, 2-7, 2-16, 2-17, 2-20, 32-9
Ferric oxide hydrate (FeOOH), 3-10
Film boiling, 2-12, 2-13
Finite element analysis for analyzing
corrosion fatigue, 13-29
Fireside corrosion in SH/RH tubes
(coal-fired units), 33-1 through
33-30
actions, 33-24 through 33-30
case study, 33-22
determining the extent of
damage, 33-15, 33-27
distinguishing from long-term
overheating, 6-8, 7-6 through
7-8, 33-4, 33-5
features of failure, 7-6, 7-8, 33-2
through 33-5, 33-24
locations of failure, 33-6
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
33-17 through 33-21, 33-28,
33-29
mechanism, 33-7 through 33-11,
33-25
precursors, 33-24
ramifications/ancillary problems,
33-30
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 33-16, 33-28
 root causes and actions to
confirm, 33-12 through 33-15,
33-26, 33-27
use of indices to predict
likelihood of, 33-8 through
33-10, 33-15
Fireside corrosion in SH/RH tubes
(oil-fired units), 34-1 through
34-26
actions, 34-21 through 34-26
determining the extent of
damage, 34-14, 34-24
distinguishing from long-term
overheating, 6-8, 7-6 through
7-8, 7-9, 34-5, 34-6
features of failure, 7-6, 7-8, 34-2
through 34-5, 34-21
locations of failure, 34-5
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
34-16 through 34-19, 34-25
mechanism, 34-7 through 34-10,
34-22
precursors, 34-21
ramifications/ancillary problems,
34-26
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 34-15, 34-24
root causes and actions to
confirm, 34-11 through 34-14,
34-23
Fireside corrosion in water-touched
tubes, 18-1 through 18-24
actions, 18-18 through 18-24
case study, 18-16
determining the extent of
damage, 18-11, 18-21
effect of coal chlorine content on,
18-5, 18-6
features of failure, 18-2, 18-3, 18-18
locations of failure, 18-2, 18-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
18-12 through 18-15, 18-23
mechanism, 18-4 through 18-6,
18-19
precursors, 18-18
ramifications/ancillary problems,
18-24
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 18-11, 18-22
root causes and actions to
confirm, 18-7 through 18-10
summary of field experience, 18-16
Fireside scale/ash,
compositional analysis of, 33-12,
33-15
development on SH/RH tubing,
32-10
metallurgical analysis of, 6-9
Flame impingement, 15-10, 16-11,
17-10
Fluidized-bed combustion (FBC) units
boiler tube failures in bubbling-
bed units, 47-1 through 47-12
boiler tube failures in circulating-
bed units, 48-1 through 48-4
chemical cleaning of, 4-8
Fluxdome, 9-9
Flux meter, 9-9
Flyash erosion, 14-1 through 14-29
actions, 14-23 through 14-29
case studies, 14-19 through
14-21
cold air velocity test (CAVT),
14-12 through 14-18
determining the extent of
damage, 14-11, 14-26
distinguishing from sootblower
erosion in SH/RH tubes, 7-9
estimating solids loading, 14-16
features of failure, 14-2, 14-3,
14-23
locations of failure, 14-3, 14-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
14-12 through 14-18, 14-28,
14-29
mechanism, 14-5 through 14-7,
14-24
precursors, 14-23
protection options, 14-16 through
14-18
ramifications/ancillary problems,
14-29
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 14-11, 14-27
root causes and actions to
confirm, 14-8 through 14-10,
14-25
Forging laps, 45-1, 45-2, 45-3
Fossil-fuel power plants, primary com-
ponents, 1-16
Fretting, 40-1 through 40-5
Fuel changing, blending, washing,
14-10, 18-10, 18-14, 30-3, 30-5,
30-6, 33-15, 33-20, 34-7
Gas-touched length (GTL), 32-8, 34-5
plotting as a diagnostic tool,
32-15, 33-12, 33-15
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW),
11-4, 11-6, 11-7
Gouging of tubes, 15-2, 15-3, 16-2,
16-3, 17-2, 17-3
Graphitization, 42-1 through 42-11
actions, 42-9 through 42-11
determining the extent of damage,
42-6, 42-11
distinguishing from dissimilar metal
weld failures, 42-3
distinguishing from long-term
overheating (creep), 7-9, 42-3
features of failure, 42-2, 42-3, 42-9
kinetics of growth, 42-4, 42-5
locations of failure, 42-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
42-8, 42-11
mechanism, 42-4, 42-5, 42-10
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 42-7, 42-11
root causes and actions to
confirm, 42-6, 42-11
Hardness
assessing changes in, 10-4, 10-5
metallurgical analysis, 6-7
Header flexibility, 39-4
Heat flux
effects of high levels, 15-10,
16-11, 17-10, 18-9
measuring with Fluxdome, 9-9
measuring with a flux meter, 9-9
monitoring, 9-9
Heat recovery steam generators
(HRSG), 30-1
Hideout of phosphate, 3-4, 3-8,
16-6, 16-11, 16-12
Hydrazine, 3-8, 3-9, 21-4, 27-7
Hydrogen damage, 15-1 through
15-30
actions, 15-21 through 15-30
case studies, 15-16 through
15-19
deposit characteristics, 7-1
through 7-4, 15-3
determining the extent of
damage, 9-1, 9-6, 9-7, 15-13,
15-25
distinguishing from caustic
gouging or acid phosphate
corrosion, 7-1, 7-2, 15-3
electrochemical corrosion cell, 17-6
features of failure, 7-1, 7-2, 15-2,
15-3, 15-7, 15-21
locations of failure, 15-4
I-5
 long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
15-14, 15-15, 15-27
mechanism, 2-11, 2-14, 15-5
through 15-7, 15-22, 15-23, 17-6
microstructural changes, 7-3, 15-2,
15-3, 15-7
precursors, 15-21
ramifications/ancillary problems,
15-29
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 15-14, 15-26
root causes and actions to
confirm, 7-4, 15-8 through 15-12,
15-24
Hydrogen sulfide, 18-4
Hydrostatic testing, 9-10
In-bed wastage (in bubbling-bed FBC
units), 47-5 through 47-8, 47-11,
47-12
Induction pressure welds (in dissimilar
metal welds), 35-2, 46-2
Influence diagram, 13-24 through
13-26, 13-30 through 13-32
Inhibitor breakdown during chemical
cleaning, 25-4
Inspection, 9-1 through 9-12
acoustic monitoring, 9-8
codes and standards, 9-3
eddy current testing, 9-1, 9-2, 9-7,
9-8
importance, 9-1
liquid penetrant testing, 9-1, 9-2,
9-7
magnetic particle testing, 9-1, 9-2,
9-7
NDE for different weld types, 46-4
radiographic testing, 9-1, 9-2, 9-7
ultrasonic testing, 9-1 through 9-7
detecting microstructural
changes, 9-6, 9-7, 15-13
measuring steamside oxide
thickness, 9-4 through 9-6
measuring wall thickness, 9-4
measuring waterside deposits,
9-6
Union Electric technique for
dissimilar metal welds, 35-12,
35-13
visual examination, 9-7
Instrumentation for cycle chemistry
monitoring, 3-14
Intergranular stress corrosion
cracking (see also Stress corrosion
cracking), 37-1 through 37-3
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-6
Lack of fusion weld defect (see also
Welding/repair defects), 45-1
through 45-3
Laning of gas passages, 14-8,
32-16, 33-15, 34-14
Larson-Miller Parameter (LMP), 10-2
through 10-5
Lay-up, 4-9 through 4-11, 27-7,
41-5, 41-6, 41-8
Lifetime, tubes (see also Remaining
life of tubes and Boiler tubes,
design considerations), 2-2 through
2-6, 4-5, 8-1 through 8-8, 18-12,
23-2, 23-3, 32-18, 32-19
Long-term overheating (creep), 32-1
through 32-32
actions, 32-24 through 32-32
case study, 32-22
determining the extent of
damage, 32-16, 32-29
distinguishing from fireside
corrosion, 6-8, 7-6, 7-8, 7-9, 32-2
through 32-6
distinguishing from graphitization,
7-9
distinguishing from short-term
overheating, 32-5
features of failure, 7-6, 7-8, 32-2
through 32-6, 32-24
locations of failure, 32-6 through
32-7
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
32-18 through 32-21, 32-31,
32-32
mechanism, 32-8 through 32-10,
32-25, 32-26
precursors, 32-24
ramifications/ancillary problems,
32-32
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 32-17, 32-30
root causes and actions to
confirm, 7-6, 7-8, 32-11
through 32-16, 32-27, 32-28
Low excess air for Nox control, 18-1,
18-7
Low melting point ashes (see Melting
points of fireside ashes)
Low-temperature corrosion, 30-1
Low-temperature creep cracking,
24-1 through 24-11
actions, 24-8 through 24-11
determining the extent of
damage, 24-6, 24-10
features of failure, 24-1, 24-2, 24-5,
24-8
locations of failure, 24-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
24-7, 24-11
mechanism, 24-4, 24-5, 24-9
precursors, 24-8
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 24-6, 24-11
root causes and actions to
confirm, 24-6, 24-10
Magnetite, strain tolerance, 1-18, 2-18,
2-20, 13-10
Maintenance, effects on boiler tube
failures, 4-1 through 4-12
Maintenance damage, 44-1 through
44-6
actions, 44-3 through 44-6
as a possible cause of short-term
overheating in waterwall
tubing, 23-5
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 44-1, 44-2
Maricite, 16-2 through 16-4, 16-7, 16-8
Material flaws, 45-1 through 45-6
actions, 45-4 through 45-6
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 45-1 through
45-3
Melting points of fireside ashes
coal-fired, 33-7, 33-8
oil-fired, 34-2, 34-3, 34-7 through
34-10
waste-to-energy units, 49-3
through 49-5
Membrane fins, failures associated
with, 45-1 through 45-3
Metallurgical analysis, 6-1 through
6-10
fireside scale/ash analysis, 6-9
flowchart of steps for, 6-2
importance of, 6-1
metallographic samples, 6-6, 6-7
oxide scale thickness and
morphology, 6-7, 6-8
required background information,
6-4
ring sampling for dimensional
checks, 6-6
sample evaluation form, 6-5
sample removal and shipping, 6-4
waterside deposits/scale analysis,
6-8, 6-9
MgO - V2O5 phase diagram, 34-10
Microstructure
assessing changes in austenitic
stainless steels, 10-4 through
10-5
assessing changes in ferritic
steels, 10-1 through 10-4
Microvoids, 10-6 through 10-8
Misaligned or distorted tubes, 14-3,
14-4, 14-11, 33-6, 33-15, 33-21,
34-5, 34-15, 34-19, 35-10, 39-5,
40-1, 40-3
Molten deposits, 2-22 through 2-24
Molten salt attack, 32-10, 33-7
Monitoring
displacements and strains, 9-10
heat flux, 9-9
temperatures, 8-6, 9-8, 9-9
Multidisciplinary teams for BTF reduc-
tion, 5-2
Multilaminated oxides, 2-16, 2-17
Municipal solid waste (MSW) units,
BTF issues in, 49-1 through 49-7
Nickel-based welds (in dissimilar
metal welds), 11-7, 35-2, 35-3, 35-5
through 35-9, 35-15
Nitrogen blanketing (see Layup)
Nucleate boiling, 2-12, 2-13
Oil composition
and corrosiveness, 34-7, 34-8
effect of additives on corrosive-
ness, 34-9, 34-10, 34-15, 34-18,
34-19
Oil-fired boilers
fireside corrosion in, 34-1 through
34-26
maintenance damage while
washing, 44-1
Operation and maintenance, effects
on boiler tube failures, 4-1 through
4-12
Orifice plugging, 23-5
Ovality of tubes, 24-4, 24-5
Over-fire air, 18-1, 18-7
Oxide notch, 35-3, 35-4, 35-6
Oxide thickness (see also Oxides,
internal in steam-touched tubes),
2-14 through 2-21, 4-5, 4-6, 6-7,
6-8, 8-2 through 8-6, 9-4 through
9-6, 10-2, 32-9
Oxides internal in steam-touched
tubes,
development and breakdown, 2-14
through 2-21, 10-2, 32-2, 32-9
exfoliation, 2-17 through 2-21,
36-5 through 36-7
failure criterion, 2-18, 2-20
growth on austenitic materials,
2-17, 8-4, 8-5
growth on ferritic materials, 2-16,
2-17, 8-4, 8-5, 10-2
influence on tube metal tempera-
tures, 4-6, 8-4, 8-5, 9-4, 9-5, 32-2
life assessment analysis of, 8-2
through 8-4
life improvement by chemical
cleaning of, 4-5
measuring by ultrasonic testing,
9-4 through 9-6
metallurgical analysis of, 6-7, 6-8
spalling, 2-17 through 2-21, 36-5,
36-6
Oxides, internal in water-touched
tubes,
comparing most common forms,
2-7
formation, 2-6 through 2-12, 19-7
general nature of, 1-18
model explaining regular array of
cracking, 13-10, 13-11
Pourbaix diagram, 13-11, 13-12
protective magnetite breakdown
and resulting boiler tube
failures, 1-18, 2-10, 2-11, 13-10
through 13-13
protective magnetite growth, 2-8
strain tolerance of magnetite, 2-11,
13-10
Oxygen (see also Dissolved oxygen)
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-16
through 13-20
Oxygen scavengers 3-8, 3-9, 3-10,
21-3 through 21-6
Oxygenated treatment (see also
Feedwater treatment), 1-18, 3-9
through 3-11, 3-13, 19-5, 19-6,
19-11, 19-13, 19-15
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-20
effect on growth and exfoliation,
2-21, 19-5, 19-6, 19-11, 19-13,
19-15
Pad-type thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
Pad welding (see also Repair and
replacement of boiler tubes), 11-5,
11-6, 13-27, 15-15, 16-13, 16-14,
17-11, 17-12, 22-4, 38-6, 46-2, 46-3
Personnel, importance of training,
5-2
pH depression, 13-16 through
13-20, 13-23, 13-24, 15-10 through
15-12, 15-14, 15-15
pH elevation, 17-5
Phosphate control, 3-3, 3-4, 16-6
through 16-8
Phosphate control diagrams, 3-3,
3-4, 16-7
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Phosphate hideout, 3-4, 3-8, 16-6,
16-11, 16-12
Phosphate treatment (see also Boiler
water treatment), 1-18, 3-3
through 3-5, 3-13, 16-6 through
16-8, 16-12, 16-14, 16-16, 16-17
effect on corrosion fatigue, 13-18,
13-20
Pitting in superheater/reheater
tubes, 41-1 through 41-14
actions, 41-10 through 41-14
determining the extent of
damage, 41-8, 41-12
features of failure, 41-2, 41-3, 41-10
locations of failure, 41-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
41-8, 41-13
mechanism, 41-4, 41-11
precursors, 41-10
ramifications/ancillary problems,
41-13
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 41-8, 41-12
root causes and actions to
confirm, 41-6, 41-7, 41-12
Pitting in water-touched tubes (see
also Chemical cleaning damage:
waterwalls), 27-1 through 27-13
actions, 27-9 through 27-13
determining the extent of
damage, 27-7, 27-12
features of failure, 27-2, 27-3, 27-9
initiation, 27-4
locations of failure, 27-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
27-7, 27-13
mechanism, 27-4, 27-5, 27-10
precursors, 27-9
ramifications/ancillary problems,
27-13
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 27-7, 27-12
root causes and actions to con
firm, 27-6, 27-11
Plasma coating (see Coatings)
PODIS (Prediction of Damage in
Service) code, 35-15, 35-16
Polythionic acid, 37-5, 37-6
Post-exposure testing of tubes 10-6,
10-8
Pourbaix diagram, iron, high tempera-
ture, 13-11, 13-12
Pressure drop across circulation
pumps (orifices plugging), 23-4,
23-5
I-7
Pressure drop losses in boiler, 19-5,
19-6
Protective oxide, 1-18, 2-6 through
2-21
Pyrites (effect on erosion), 2-23, 2-24,
14-5 through 14-7
Quartz (effect on erosion), 2-23, 2-24,
14-5 through 14-7, 47-6
Reducing fireside conditions, 18-1
through 18-5, 18-7
Reducing feedwater conditions, 21-3,
21-4
Refuse-derived fuel (RDF) units (see
also Waste-to-energy units) 49-1
through 49-7
Remaining life computer codes, 8-3
through 8-6
NOTIS, 8-3
TUBECALC, 8-3
TUBELIFE, 8-3 through 8-6, 10-8
TUBEPRO, 8-3
Remaining life of tubes,
accelerated creep rupture testing,
8-5, 8-6
assessment, 8-1 through 8-8,
32-18, 32-19
assessment methods for SH/RH
tubes, 8-1 through 8-7, 32-18,
32-19, 33-17, 33-18, 34-16
assessment methods for water-
walls and economizer tubes, 8-7
assessment to optimize actions
for fireside corrosion, 18-12
computer codes, 8-3 through 8-6
for graphitization in SH/RH tubes,
42-4, 42-5
improvement by chemical
cleaning of SH/RH tubes, 4-5
roadmap for analysis of, 8-3
statistical analysis, 8-6, 8-7
Repair and replacement of boiler
tubes (see also Welding/repair
defects), 11-1 through 11-8
boiler tube buildup, 11-6
codes for weld repair, 11-3
dissimilar metal welds 11-7
general requirements, 11-4
pad welding, 11-5, 11-6, 13-27,
15-15, 16-13, 16-14, 17-11,
17-12, 22-4, 38-5, 46-2, 46-3
repair strategies, 11-1, 11-2
roadmap for weld repair, 11-2
tube section replacement, 11-4,
11-5
welding co-extruded tubes, 11-7
welding problems that can lead to
boiler tube failures, 46-2
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-8
window welding (canoe piece
repairs), 11-6, 11-7, 15-15,
16-13, 17-11
Residual oils, 34-7
high vanadium, 34-7
low vanadium, 34-8
Mexican, 34-8
Rifled tubes, 2-13, 15-15, 16-14, 17-12
“Ripple” magnetite, 2-10, 19-3
Root passes in welding repairs, 11-4,
11-5
Rubbing/fretting failures, 40-1 through
40-5
actions, 40-3 through 40-5
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 40-1, 40-2
Rupture times, 23-2, 23-3
Rust on tubes following washing,
14-2, 22-1, 38-2
Sampling, 9-10
Secondary tube failures, identifying,
7-10, 7-11
Shielded metal arc welding (SMAW),
11-4, 11-6, 11-7
Shields
for corrosion resistance, 33-18,
33-19, 34-16
for erosion resistance, 14-12, 22-4
Short-term overheating in super-
heater/reheater tubes, 36-1
through 36-16
actions, 36-12 through 36-16
case study, 36-10
determining the extent of
damage, 36-9, 36-15
distinguishing from long-term
overheating, 36-2, 36-3
features of failure, 36-2 through
36-4, 36-12
locations of failure, 36-3, 36-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
36-10, 36-16
mechanism, 36-4, 36-13
precursors, 36-12
ramifications/ancillary problems,
36-16
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 36-9, 36-15
root causes and actions to
confirm, 36-5 through 36-8,
36-14
Short-term overheating in waterwall
tubing, 23-1 through 23-14
actions, 23-9 through 23-14
determining the extent of
damage, 23-7, 23-12
distinguishing among the three
levels of, 7-5, 7-6, 23-2 through
23-4
features of failure, 23-2 through
23-4, 23-9
locations of failure, 23-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
23-8, 23-13
mechanism, 23-5, 23-10
precursors, 23-9
ramifications/ancillary problems,
23-14
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 23-7, 23-13
root causes and actions to
confirm, 23-5, 23-6, 23-11
Shutdown of units, 4-8, 4-9, 27-6,
37-10, 41-4 through 41-6
Sigma phase of austenitic stainless
steels, 10-4, 10-5, 32-3
Slagging, 2-22, 2-23, 19-6 through
19-8, 29-2, 36-12
Slagging propensity, 29-2
Solid particle erosion in the turbine,
32-32, 36-5, 36-12, 36-16
Solvent choice for chemical cleaning,
4-3, 4-4, 4-6
Sootblower erosion in superheater/
reheater tubes, 38-1 through
38-10
actions, 38-7 through 38-10
determining the extent of
damage, 38-5, 38-9
distinguishing from flyash erosion,
7-9, 38-3
features of failure, 38-2, 38-3,
38-7
locations of failure, 38-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
38-5, 38-6, 38-10
mechanism, 38-4, 38-8
precursors, 38-7
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 38-5, 38-10
root causes and actions to
confirm, 38-4, 38-9
Sootblower erosion in water-touched
tubing, 22-1 through 22-9
actions, 22-6 through 22-9
determining the extent of damage,
22-3, 22-8
features of failure, 22-1, 22-6
locations of failure, 22-1
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
22-4, 22-9
 mechanism, 22-2, 22-7
precursors, 22-6
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 22-4, 22-8
root causes and actions to
confirm, 22-2, 22-3, 22-8
Sootblower operation and mainte-
nance practices (see also
Sootblower erosion in
superheater/reheater tubes and
Sootblower erosion in water-
touched tubes), 22-2
Spacers, 26-3
Spalling of SH/RH steamside oxide,
2-17 through 2-21, 36-5, 36-6
Spray coatings (see Coatings)
Spheroidization, 10-3, 32-3, 42-4
Stagnant water, 27-1, 27-4, 27-5, 41-2,
41-4, 41-5
Startup of units, 4-8, 4-9, 27-6
Steam blanketing, 2-12, 2-13, 15-5,
15-6, 16-6 through 16-8, 17-5
through 17-7
Steam flow redistribution, 32-19
through 32-21, 33-21, 34-19
Steam impingement, importance of
identifying, 7-10, 7-11
Steam monitoring, 3-14, 41-8
Steamside oxide (see Oxides, internal
in steam-touched tubes)
Strain age embrittlement, 45-1
Strains, monitoring, 9-10
Stress analysis for analyzing corrosion
fatigue, 13-29
Stress corrosion cracking, 37-1
through 37-16
actions, 37-12 through 37-16
case study, 37-10
determining the extent of
damage, 37-8, 37-15
distinguishing from stress
corrosion cracking and inter-
granular corrosion, 7-10
features of failure, 37-2, 37-3, 37-12
locations of failure, 37-3
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
37-9, 37-16
mechanism, 37-4, 37-5, 37-13
precursors, 37-12
ramifications/ancillary problems,
37-16
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 37-8, 37-15
root causes and actions to
confirm, 37-6 through 37-8,
37-14
Substoichiometric fireside conditions,
18-1 through 18-5, 18-7
Sulfidation, 18-4, 33-7, 33-8
Supercritical steam properties, 19-6
Supercritical waterwall cracking, 19-1
through 19-22
actions, 19-19 through 19-22
case study, 19-16
chromizing waterwalls, 19-15, 19-16
determining the extent of
damage, 19-14, 19-21
features of failure, 19-2, 19-3, 19-18
in oil-/gas-fired units, 19-10
international experience base, 19-5,
19-6, 19-16
locations of failure, 19-4
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
19-15, 19-16, 19-22
mechanism, 19-5 through 19-10,
19-19
precursors, 19-18
ramifications/ancillary problems,
19-22
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 19-14, 19-21
root causes and actions to
confirm, 19-11 through 19-13,
19-20
Superheater/reheater chemical clean-
ing (see also Chemical clean-
ing), 4-5 through 4-7
solvent choice, 4-6
Superheater/reheater tubes,
basics, 2-5, 2-6, 32-8
failure mechanisms screening
table, 1-8, 1-9, 31-4, 31-5
maximum metal temperatures,
32-8, 32-9
temperature distribution in, 32-11,
32-14, 32-15
Supports, 26-3, 35-10, 35-11, 39-3,
39-4
Temperature measurements,
in economizer inlet headers, 20-6,
20-7, 20-10
in SH/RH tubes, 32-11, 32-14
10 o’clock - 2 o’clock flats, 32-2,
32-10, 33-2, 33-3,
Thermal-hydraulic regimes in boiler
tubes, 2-12 through 2-14
conditions that lead to deposit
formation, 2-13, 2-14
global, 2-12, 2-13
local, 2-13, 2-14
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
Thermal fatigue in economizer inlet
header tubes, 20-1 through
20-19
actions, 20-14 through 20-19
assessment methodology, 20-9
case study, 20-12, 20-13
determining the extent of
damage, 20-8, 20-17
distinguishing from erosion-
corrosion and flexibility-
induced cracking, 7-6, 7-7, 20-4
features of failure, 20-2, 20-3, 20-14
locations of failure, 20-2
long-term actions and the
prevention of repeat failures,
20-11, 20-19
mechanism, 20-4, 20-5, 20-15
precursors, 20-14
ramifications/ancillary problems,
20-19
repairs and immediate solutions/
actions, 20-9 through 20-11,
20-18
root causes and actions to
confirm, 20-6, 20-7, 20-16
Thermocouples, 8-6, 9-8, 9-9
chordal thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
pad-type thermocouples, 9-8, 9-9
Thermogravimetry analysis, 33-12,
33-15
Transgranular stress corrosion crack-
ing (see also Stress corrosion
cracking), 37-1 through 37-3
TUBELIFE, 8-3 through 8-6, 10-8
Tube blockage, 23-5, 36-5
Tube build-up, 11-6
Tube manufacturing laps, 45-1, 45-2,
45-3
Tube ovality, 24-4, 24-5
Tube temperatures
increased by increasing oxide
thickness, 4-5, 8-3, 8-4, 9-4
measuring via thermocouples, 8-6,
9-8, 9-9
predicted by oxide growth laws
compared to thermocouple
measurements, 8-4 through 8-6
Two phase flow, 2-12, 2-13
U-bends in tubes as fatigue site, 26-3,
26-4, 39-3
Ultrasonic measurement of oxide
thickness, 4-6, 9-4 through 9-6,
32-11
I-9
Underdeposit corrosion,
acid phosphate corrosion, 16-1
through 16-28
caustic gouging, 17-1 through
17-22
distinguishing among the types,
7-1 through 7-5
hydrogen damage, 15-1 through
15-30
in bubbling-bed FBC units, 47-3,
through 47-5, 47-9
in circulating-bed FBC units, 48-2
Unit lay-up,
as a cause of boiler tube failures,
4-9, 27-7, 41-1, 41-6, 41-8
options, 4-9 through 4-11, 27-7,
41-8
Unit startup and shutdown,
effect on boiler tube failures, 4-8,
4-9
effect on pitting in water-touched
tubes, 27-6
effect on pitting in SH/RH tubes,
41-6
effect on stress corrosion
cracking in SH/RH tubes,
37-10
Chapters 1-11 can be found in Volume 1; 12-30 in Volume 2; 31-49 in Volume 3
I-10
V2O5 - MgO phase diagram, 34-10
V2O5 - Na2O phase diagram, 34-3
Vanadates, 32-2, 32-3
Vibration in tubes as cause of fatigue,
26-6, 39-6, 39-11
Vortex shedding, 26-6, 39-6, 39-11
Waste-to-energy units, BTF issues
in, 49-1 through 49-7
additives, 49-5
erosion, 49-2, 49-3, 49-7
fireside corrosion of SH/RH, 49-3
through 49-6
fireside corrosion of waterwalls,
49-3 through 49-6
high chlorides, 49-2
Water chemistry (see Boiler water
treatment and/or Feedwater treat-
ment)
Waterside fireside corrosion (see
Fireside corrosion in water-touched
tubes)
Water-steam cycle
ingress, corrosion and deposition
in drum units, 1-17
ingress, corrosion and deposition
in once-through units, 1-17
introduction to 1-16
Waterwall deposits,
effect on tube metal temperatures,
19-7, 19-8
local tube conditions that can
cause, 2-13, 2-14, 15-4, 15-5,
15-6, 15-8, 15-10, 16-5, 17-4
measuring by ultrasonic testing, 9-6
metallurgical analysis of, 6-8, 15-2,
15-3, 16-2, 16-3, 16-18 through
16-20, 17-2, 17-3
rate of accumulation, 2-9
Waterwalls and economizer tubes,
basics, 2-4, 2-5
failure mechanisms screening
table, 1-6, 1-7, 12-4, 12-5
Weld build-up, 11-6
Welding/repair defects, 45-1, 46-1
through 46-7
actions, 46-5 through 46-7
description of the mechanism and
its manifestation, 46-1 through
46-4
Welding repairs (see also Repair and
replacement of boiler tubes), 11-1
through 11-8
Wick boiling, 2-13, 2-14
Window welds (canoe piece repairs),
11-6, 11-7, 15-15, 16-13, 17-11