TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

QUALIFICATION TO BE A WITNESS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA UMALI AND SUZETH UMALI

G.R. No. 84450; February 4, 1991
MEDIALDEA, J.

DOCTRINE: The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence
that he was actuated by improper motive.

FACTS: (Criminal Case No. 85-473 of RTC-Lucena City) Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged
for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. On 22 April 1985, at Recto
Street, Poblacion, Municipality of Tiaong, Province of Quezon, the abovenamed accused, conspiring
and confederating together, sold and delivered marijuana or Indian Hemp, a prohibited drug to one
Francisco Manalo (which was alleged to be used by Pierre Pangan – a minor – resulting to his drug
dependency). Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali
remained at large. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision finding accused Gloria Umali guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Hence, this
appeal from the lower court's decision.

This case stemmed from an investigation on the drug dependency of Pangan. Manalo agreed to help
in the identification of the source of the marijuana. With his consent, the policeman gave him 4 marked
P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him. He was instructed to bring back the prohibited
drug purchased by him to the police headquarters. Manalo returned with 2 foils of dried marijuana which
he alleged to have been bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police
investigators to give a statement on the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase 2
marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of Manalo, supported by the said
marijuana, the Chief of the Investigation Division petitioned the Court for the issuance of a search
warrant as a justification for them to search Gloria’s house at Tiaong, Quezon. After securing such, the
police operatives went to her house and served the search warrant on her. Confiscated from her person
were the four P5.00 bills Likewise, present were the letters “T” which were placed by the police
investigators to further identify the marked bills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the biased
testimony of Francisco Manalo.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that “in the absence of any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain
substantial facts, said factual findings are entitled to great weight, and indeed are binding even on this
Court.”

Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving
can make known their perception to others may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Art. 821 of the
Civil Code which states that persons convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony"
are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify
him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, the SC ruled that the fact that said
witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a
witness. The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that
he was actuated by improper motive (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268, 29 January 1988) Hence, in
the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his
testimony must be accorded full credence.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification
that a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be imposed, as it is hereby imposed, on the accused-
appellant.
_________________________________________________________________________________

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN ALEMAN

 G.R. No. 181539; July 24, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

DOCTRINE: A deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make
observations and he/she can make those observations known to others.

FACTS: On the 10th day of February 2003, in Quezon City, Edwin Aleman, conspiring and
confederating with another person – whose identity was not ascertained – and mutually helping each
other, rob one Ramon Jaime Birosel. While the said victim was inside his car having a conversation
over his cellphone, the said accused suddenly appeared and by means of violence approached the said
vehicle and ordered said victim to open it and once opened thereafter stabbed the said victim with a
bladed weapon hitting him on the thorax thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, and thereupon took and stole 2 NOKIA
cellular phones, 1 brown leather wallet, cash money, 1 necklace, and 1 men’s ring. Accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned.

The prosecution’s case against accused-appellant hinges on the following eyewitness account of Mark
Almodovar (14 years old when he testified; deaf-mute; and he was assisted in his testimony by Daniel
Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf)

On the said date, at 7PM, Mark went out of his house to play ball in the basketball court. At about
9PM, he stopped playing as he then felt like urinating. He went to a place near the basketball
court where there were 5 cars parked. While urinating, he saw a fat man walking towards a car.
The fat man was talking on his cellular phone. He then noticed 2 men following the fat man, who
entered a parked car. The 2 men who were then following the fat man then separated: one went
to the left side of the fat man’s car and stood by the door at the driver’s side of the vehicle. While
the other positioned himself by the door at the opposite side of the car.

The man who stood by the door at the driver’s side had a knife while his companion was armed
with a gun. He then witnessed the man with the knife in his hand stabbing the fat man repeatedly
on different parts of his body, while the man with the gun fired once. After taking the fat man’s
personal belongings, the two men left. He followed them to a place which he described as far and
there, he saw them buried the knife and covered it with soil.

After burying the knife in the ground, the men left and he followed them again to a place which he
described as near. While thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncovered his face. He recognized
him as the person who went to the left side of the car and stabbed the victim who was later on
identified as the accused Aleman. After which, the two men left.

RTC: Found Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. Aleman
appealed to the CA.

CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

HELD: No. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that accused-appellant stabbed the victim
several times, causing the latter’s death, for the purpose of depriving the victim of his personal
properties, which personalties accused-appellant took away with him before leaving the scene of the
crime. The killing of the victim was by reason of the robbery. It therefore constitutes the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.

The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness. The rule is that
"all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses." A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses – such as his/her
sense of sight – remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment
and experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally
with others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and,
as in this case, sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the
faculty to make observations and he/she can make those observations known to others.

A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they
(1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to
testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter. (People v. Tuangco)
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and appreciated the
sanctity of an oath and that he comprehended the facts he testified on. This Court sees no reason in
ruling otherwise. Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed sign language
interpreter. The trial and the CA found Catinguil qualified to act as interpreter for Mark.

Moreover, the CA correctly observed that Mark’s testimony was corroborated by the findings of the
medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim’s corpse that the cause of death was "hemorrhagic shock
secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax."

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02100 affirming the Decision dated November 16, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 which found
accused-appellant Edwin Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in so far as legal interest at the rate of 6%
per annum is imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages and actual damages awarded to the heirs
of the victim, which shall commence from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
_________________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. FRANCISCO BUSTOS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-27200; January 20, 1928
VILLA-REAL, J.

DOCTRINE: With respect to deaf-mutes, it is necessary that he who is to communicate with them know
the meaning of their signs, either from having had them taught to him, or from having acquired a
knowledge of them through frequent contact with the same.

FACTS: On the afternoon of October 24, 1925, while trying to determine the boundaries of the lands
which they respectively occupied on the Gadalupe Estate, Francisco Bustos and Angel del Castillo
became engaged in a dispute finally resulting in the former catching the latter by the neck.

Attracted by the cries of the people, Mariano Montemayor and his ward, Antonio Macaspac, ran to the
place of the fight, Antonio Macaspac catching hold of Francisco Bustos, and Mariano Montemayor of
Angel del Castillo, thus separating the combatants.

Mariano Montemayor entertained Angel del Castillo on the street by conversing with him. Antonio
Macaspac took Francisco Bustos to the latter's house. Laureana Yumul, Angel del Castillo's wife, who
was also there went to her house, leaving her husband. On nearing her home, she heard the desperate
cries of her deaf-mute daughter, Soledad Encarnacion, who was under a mango tree gesticulating and
making signs, failing upon her knees and getting up again, without knowing what to do. Going in the
direction pointed out by her daughter, Laureana Yumul came upon her son Felipe del Castillo stretched
out on the ground wounded, expiring a few moments later.

That same night Francisco Bustos presented himself to the municipal president with a wound on his
forehead, stating that he had been stoned by someone. He was taken to the General Hospital where
he was examined and found to have a wound on his forehead and several bruises on his nose and lips,
caused by a blunt instrument which might have been a stone.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the testimony of Soledad Encarnacion was admissible in evidence.
2) Whether or not the trial court erred in finding each of them guilty, beyond any doubt, of the
crime of homicide.

HELD:
1) No. While the testimony of Laureana was found by the trial court to be credible, her daughter
Soledad’s testimony is not admissible in evidence. This is so because during the course of
interpretation, there were times when the interpreter could not make out what the witness meant
by such signs as she uses, and this is due to the fact that the deaf-mute had never been a pupil
of the interpreter, nor had the latter previously had anything to do with the former, such as would
have given her an opportunity to acquire some knowledge of the meaning of the signs the deaf-
mute used. In view of this, it would not be prudent to admit the deaf-mute's testimony as
interpreted by the teacher.

x x x With respect to deaf-mutes, it is necessary that he who is to communicate with them know
the meaning of their signs, either from having had them taught to him, or from having acquired
a knowledge of them through frequent contact with the same. Without these circumstances,
 although it is possible to guess part of what deaf-mutes mean by their signs even without having
had much to do with them, still much of what they wish to say escapes us, and in our eagerness
to understand them, we resort to conjecture.

2) No. The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively establishes the fact that on the afternoon in
question the accused Francisco Bustos and Antonio Macaspac, on meeting Felipe del Castillo,
son of Angel del Castillo, with whom Francisco Bustos had just had a quarrel, and in which
Antonio Macaspac had intervened, the said accused pursued him; that Felipe del Castillo threw
a stone at his pursuers which struck Francisco Bustos wounding him on the forehead; that the
accused continued to pursue their victim until they overtook him, inflicting several wounds upon
him as a result of which he died a few minutes later.

These acts constitute the crime of homicide as defined and penalized in article 404 of the Penal Code,
the herein accused being criminally liable as principals by direct participation, and the penalty provided
by the law being reclusion temporal to its full extent.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: The virtue of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is modified, as
recommended by the Attorney-General sentencing the accused Francisco Bustos to fourteen years,
eight months and one day reclusion temporal, and confirmed in all other respects, with one-half of the
costs against each of the appellants.
_________________________________________________________________________________

MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE

MAXIMO ALVAREZ v. SUSAN RAMIREZ

G.R. No. 143439; October 14, 2005
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

DOCTRINE: All other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other.

FACTS: Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-
MN for arson pending before the RTC-Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner.
He is the husband of Esperanza, sister of respondent.

On 21 June 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza (estranged wife of the accused) to the
witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no
objection. Esperanza testified as follows: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the
gasoline in the house of my sister (and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court
room). During the course of Esperanza’s direct testimony, the petitioner showed "uncontrolled
emotions," prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant
to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification. Respondent filed an opposition.
Pending resolution of the motion, the RTC directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of
the other witnesses.

RTC: issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza from further testifying and deleting her
testimony from the records. The prosecution’S MR was denied.

CA: respondent Susan Ramirez, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with application for preliminary
injunction and TRO. CA rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders by RTC.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in the said criminal case.

HELD: Yes. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband nor
the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in
a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a
case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law
aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home.

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between
him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him,
eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect, and love by which
virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes. Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply
the Marital Disqualification Rule."

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto
almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the
preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims
to protect.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so
that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct
testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because "it was the latter himself
who gave rise to its necessity."

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial
court, RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner,
her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
_________________________________________________________________________________

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR.

G.R. No. 117401; October 1, 1998
ROMERO, J.

DOCTRINE: Marital disqualification rule: The disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not
precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused.

FACTS: Accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide before the
RTC of Davao. Bernardo conspiring and mutually helping with Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, did
then and there wilfully, and unlawfully – with the use of a bolo and an iron bar – assaulted, hacked, and
stabbed his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
wounds which caused his death. Bernardo Jr.’s case was tried jointly with the murder case filed against
his co-accused Malita brothers who, however, withdrew their "not guilty" plea during the trial and were
accordingly sentenced. Thus, only accused-appellant's case was tried on the merits.

The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its witnesses accused-appellant's
brother Leo, appellant's wife Gina, as well as Patrolman Lucrecio Mara.

Being a widower, Bernardo, Sr. lived alone in his house. He owned 16 hectares of coconut land in the
area. On 16 September 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by his son, and 2 hired hands, Reynaldo Malita
and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. On the evening of the next day -
according to Gina - the accused and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their house. She
overheard the trio planning to go to her father-in-law's house to get money from the latter. She
had no idea, however, as to what later transpired because she had fallen asleep before 10:00 p.m.
Accused objected to Gina’s testimony on the ground that the same was prohibited by the marital
disqualification rule found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The judge, acknowledging
the applicability of the so-called rule, allowed said testimony only against Reynaldo and Eddie.

RTC: Found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused must be acquitted.

HELD: Yes. In indicting accused Bernardo, Jr., the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed
by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify
on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of
hearsay.

It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments
in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible
hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence
against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-
examine him.

Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same inadmissible
in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of
counsel — is inadmissible in evidence.

WITH REGARD TO GINA’S TESTIMONY: the same must also be disregarded, accused-appellant
having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. The disqualification is between
husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or
accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie. This
testimony cannot, however, be used against herein accused directly as it would violate the marital
disqualification rule.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Criminal Case No. 89-9 dated March 2, 1994, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable
doubt. Consequently, let the accused be immediately released from his place of confinement unless
there is reason to detain him further for any other legal or valid cause.
_________________________________________________________________________________

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO PANSENSOY

G. R. No. 140634; September 12, 2002
CARPIO, J.

DOCTRINE: Objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in a criminal prosecution
against the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses generally. The objection to the
competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first offered as a witness.

FACTS: On 08 May 1994, in Antipolo, Rizal, Pansensoy - armed with a handgun, killed Hilario Reyes,
hitting him on his forehead, thereby inflicting upon him a mortal gunshot wound, which directly caused
his death. The accused, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.

Analie Pansensoy is the legitimate wife of appellant. She testified that she had been living-in with the
victim, Hilario. She and the latter were in the house they were renting at Lumang Bayan, Antipolo. Hilario
was lying down inside the house. She stood up when she heard a knocking on the door. As she opened
the door, she saw appellant holding a gun. She embraced appellant and tried to wrest the gun away
from him but she failed. Hilario went out of the house and sat on a bench. Roberto approached Hilario
and asked him if he really loves his wife. Hilario answered in the affirmative. Roberto next asked Hilario
if he was still single. Hilario answered yes. Roberto counted one to three and at the count of three shot
Hilario. Hilario was hit on the forehead and sprawled on the ground.

RTC: Found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: No. According to Roberto, Analie’s testimony is flawed as she insisted that she and appellant
had been separated for more than three years but this is belied by the fact that their youngest daughter
is barely a year old. He also points out that his version that he dragged his wife outside by pulling her
hair was more believable and in accord with human behavior rather than Analie’s version that he took
time to interrogate the victim regarding how much the latter loved his (Roberto) wife and other personal
circumstances before shooting him.

Analie’s testimony that she had been separated from appellant for three years which, as pointed out by
Roberto, was belied by the age of their youngest daughter, does not necessarily impair her credibility.
As to Analies' version that appellant interrogated Hilario before shooting him, suffice it to say that it is a
matter of common observation that the reaction of a person when confronted with a shocking or unusual
incident varies. In any event, a thorough evaluation of the transcript of stenographic notes indicates that
Analie, as observed by the trial court, testified in a candid and straightforward manner.

From Analie’s testimony, it is all too apparent that the first requisite of self-defense is absent. The
unlawful aggression did not come from the victim but from Roberto himself.

AS TO THE MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE

As the legitimate wife of appellant, Analie’s testimony would have been disregarded had appellant timely
objected to her competency to testify under the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants. However, objections to the competency of a
husband and wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of
other witnesses generally. The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or
she is first offered as a witness. In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellant Roberto’s
failure to make a timely objection to the admission of Analie’s testimony.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City in Criminal Case No. 94-11527 is MODIFIED. Appellant ROBERTO PANSENSOY is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code, instead of murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking
into account the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to
Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. The award of
actual damages of P40,000.00 is DELETED, but appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and loss of earning capacity in the amount of P3,379,200.00.
_________________________________________________________________________________

DISQUALIFICATION - PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

As to Husband and Wife

CECILIA ZULUETA v. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

G.R. No. 107383; February 20, 1996
MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE: The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other
as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions.

FACTS: Petitioner Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Martin. On 26 March 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband - a doctor of medicine - and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and
took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which the petitioner had filed against her husband. Dr.
Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner.

RTC: rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin.

CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.
In appealing from the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s decision, petitioner's only ground is that in
Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr. the SC ruled that the documents and papers were admissible in
evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice
or gross misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision instead of dismissing private
respondent's complaint.

HELD: No. Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Dr. Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix,
Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct. The complaint was however dismissed. Atty. Felix, Jr.
was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC because,
at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the RTC’s order was temporarily
restrained by the SC. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in her
action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice. HOWEVER, when the TRO was eventually
lifted, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is
no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order from a court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
_________________________________________________________________________________

As to a Dying Declaration; Widow as witness

THE UNITED STATES v. DALMACEO ANTIPOLO

G.R. No. L-13109; March 6, 1918
FISHER, J.

DOCTRINE: When a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a
statement regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the communication so made is in
no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the express purpose that it
may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the
cause of his death.

FACTS: The appellant was prosecuted in the CFI of Batangas, charged with the murder of one
Fortunato Dinal. The RTC convicted him of homicide and from that decision he appealed. One of the
errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the
man whom the appellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense
concerning certain alleged dying declarations (concerning the cause of his death, the general purport
being that his injuries were due to fall and not to the acts imputed to the accused).

The witness was called to the stand and having stated that she is the widow of Fortunato Dinal was
asked: "On what occasion did your husband die?" To this question the fiscal objected upon the ground
that since she is the widow of the deceased, she is not competent to testify under the rules and
procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is
dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified from testifying in this
case in which her husband is the injured party.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial judge erred in NOT permitting Susana Ezpeleta (widow of the victim) to
testify as a witness.

HELD: Yes. Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows: Except with the consent of
both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be
a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both
shall be parties. Reason: If either were recognized as a competent witness against the other who was
accused of crime, a very serious injury would be done to the harmony and happiness of husband and
wife and the confidence which should exist between them. (Underhill's work on Criminal Evidence)

This case does not fall within the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose
of section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by
the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might
have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse.

Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a
statement regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the communication so
made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the express
purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities
concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.

The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending death, concerning the
circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a prosecution of the person charged with killing
the declarant. (U. S. vs. Gil) Such dying declarations are admissible in favor of the defendant as well
as against him. (Mattox vs. U. S.) It has been expressly held in several jurisdictions in the United States
that the widow of the deceased may testify regarding his dying declarations.

The SC is therefore of the opinion that the court below erred in excluding the testimony of the witness
Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such exclusion, the accused was deprived of one of his
essential rights. That being the case, a new trial must be granted.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: For the reason stated, the judgment of the court below is hereby set aside and
a new trial is granted at which the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta will be admitted, together
with any additional evidence which may be offered on the part of the prosecution or the defense. At the
new trial granted the accused, the testimony taken at the former hearing shall be considered. The costs
of this appeal shall be de officio. So ordered.
_________________________________________________________________________________

As to privileged communications of spouses in the hands of third persons

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. FAUSTO CARLOS

G.R. No. L-22948; March 17, 1925
OSTRAND, J.

DOCTRINE: Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a
third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the
spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent,
becomes admissible

FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision of the CFI-Manila finding the defendant Fausto Carlos guilty
of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment.

It appears from the evidence that the victim of the alleged murder - Dr. Pablo Sityar - in Mary Chiles
Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon the defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain other
ailments. After her release therefrom she was required to go several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar
at Escolta, for the purpose of dressing the wounds caused by the operation.

The defendant, suffering from some stomach trouble, entered the PGH. While in the hospital he
received a letter from Dr. Sityar asking the immediate settlement of the account for the professional
services rendered to his wife. Defendant told Dr. Sityar - on one of his visits to the latter’s clinic - that
he does not owe the doctor anything.

Days later, defendant again went to the office of the deceased and found him there alone. According to
the evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then, without any preliminary quarrel between the two,
attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice. The deceased made an effort to escape
but the defendant pursued him and overtaking him in the hall outside the office, inflicted another wound
upon him and as a consequence of the three wounds he died within a few minutes.

Defendant, on his part, invoked self-defense.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant is guilty of murder or of simple homicide.

HELD: The defendant is guilty of simple homicide, without aggravating circumstances.

The court below found that the crime was committed with premeditation and therefore constituted
murder. This finding can only be sustained by taking into consideration Exhibit L, a letter written to the
defendant by his wife and siezed by the police in searching his effects (without a warrant) on the day
of his arrest. It is dated 25 May 1924, two days before the commission of the crime and shows that the
writer feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the
deceased.

Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged communication and
therefore not admissible in evidence. The numerical weight of authority is, however, to the effect
that where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a
third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of
either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise
competent, becomes admissible.

The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for the following reasons:
● The wife of the defendant was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not
offered for that purpose.
● The fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on
his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates
the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses
for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect there can
be no difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged.
● Where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter, such a statement is not admissible
in evidence.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: For the reasons stated we find the defendant guilty of simple homicide, without
aggravating or extenuating circumstances. The sentence appealed from is therefore modified by
reducing the penalty to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the
corresponding accessory penalties and with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
_________________________________________________________________________________

As to Lawyer-Client Privilege

BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO v. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, ET. AL.

G.R. No. L-961; September 21, 1949
TUASON, J.

DOCTRINE: The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from
his first client.

FACTS: On 23 April 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad (a
Syrian national) to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation
by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased husband.

On May 14, Attys. Ohnick, Velilla, and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant; and on
June 15, Attys. Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for the
plaintiff. On October 5, these attys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as party
defendant.

On 28 January 1946, Atty. Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the defendant in
substitution for the previous lawyers who had withdrawn from the case.

On May 29, Atty. Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Atty. Francisco urging him to discontinue
representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him about her case, on
which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Atty. Francisco, and the latter sent her
a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion, counsels for plaintiff filed a formal motion
with the court to disqualify Atty. Francisco.

The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the CA, dismissed the
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for disqualification should be allowed.

HELD: Yes. Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers to Atty. Francisco was to secure the
latter’s professional services. Hence, the relation of attorney and client between Atty. Francisco and
Mrs. Hilado ensued.

To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client should have employed
the attorney professionally on any previous occasion; it is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had.

Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract may be express
or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in
matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney
from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter.

Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
in the course of professional employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney
the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of
his client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from
acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such
prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted.

Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and client ought to
preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of
what information was received by him from his first client.

Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly represented the
adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire as to
how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former during that relationship, before refusing to
permit the attorney to represent the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller)

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client
as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests.

It behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

The defense that Atty. Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A would not take the case out of the interdiction.
The fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which emerged the
relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estops him in the same manner and to the same
degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant
of a law firm is information imparted to the firm.

The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date Atty. Francisco
first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for his disqualification.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed.
It is so ordered, without costs.
_________________________________________________________________________________

As to Lawyer-Client Privilege

TEODORO R. REGALA, ET. AL. v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 105938; September 20, 1996.
KAPUNAN, J.
DOCTRINE:
➢ General rule: As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery.
Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction (as well as in the United States) is that a
lawyer may NOT invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
➢ Exceptions: Client identity is privileged 1) where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice; 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged; and
3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless – by
revealing the client’s name – the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain
of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is privileged.

FACTS: The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint before the
Sandiganbayan, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth.

Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, ET AL - who all were
then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law
Firm). The latter performed legal services for its clients, which included the organization and acquisition
of business associations and/or organizations, where its members acted as stockholders.

More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its
client documents which substantiate the client’s equity holdings. In the course of their dealings with
their clients, the members of ACCRA acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their
personal and business circumstances. ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.

Respondent PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint"
which excluded private respondent Raul Roco from the complaint in the PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant. Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on
his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.

Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint because the PCGG wanted to establish
through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all
the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents
by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth
through government concessions, which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and authority,
flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that –
under the facts of this case – the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from
revealing the identity of their clients and the other information requested by the PCGG.

HELD: Yes. It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force
them to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the
"bigger fish" as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG’s willingness to cut
a deal with petitioners — the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion form the complaint. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun
to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client. This is what
appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course
of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners’ inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is
merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the
PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as
against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.

NATURE OF LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP: In modern day perception of the lawyer-client

relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers
of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of
the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent.
Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in
fact an officer of the Court and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken
favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very
delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,
that is required by reason of necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from
seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.

(See Sec. 24(b), Rule 130; Sec. 20(e), Rule 138; Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics)

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens many legal options which
would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An
effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists
between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful
exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation,
the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional
responsibility.

The question now arises whether or not this (fiduciary) duty may be asserted in refusing to
disclose the name of petitioners’ clients in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.

General rule: As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under
this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction (as well as in the United States) is that a lawyer may
NOT invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
➢ First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
➢ Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client,
➢ Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
➢ Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." He cannot
be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.

The general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.

Principal exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless – by
revealing the client’s name – the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain
of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is privileged.

Other exceptions:
4) The content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to
the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.
5) Where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the
identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be
privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.

Summary: information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when
the client’s name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal
that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
➢ First, disclosure of the alleged client’s name would lead to establish said client’s connection
with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information – because the privilege
protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client
relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners’ ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering
their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted
the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework
and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form
of the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client’s shareholdings.

➢ Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client’s name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.

In fine, the crux of petitioner’s objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution
has a case against their clients, the latter’s case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered
by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name
of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which
may or may not be illegal. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to
charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.

The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege and lawyer’s loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which
exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship.

The SC held, thus: We have no choice but to uphold petitioners’ right not to reveal the identity of their
clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant
case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client’s name is not privileged
information.”

By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the
PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from
petitioners a link, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of
a crime."

The condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion
as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situation litigant from
prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG’s demand x x x
not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of
such rights.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of

respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to execute
petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Conception, Victor P.
Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033
entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Et. Al.
_________________________________________________________________________________

As to Physician-Patient Privilege; waiver

NELLY LIM v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91114; September 25, 1992.
DAVIDE, JR., J.
DOCTRINE: The object of the physician-patient privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no
timely objection is made to the physician’s testimony.

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent (Juan Sim) are lawfully married to each other. On 25
November 1987, private respondent filed with the RTC-Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such
marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the present."

During the trial, respondent presented 3 witnesses. Juan’s counsel announced that he would present
as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia
Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied
for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify. Petitioner’s counsel
opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged
and that Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-
patient relationship since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued.
Petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and suspend the
proceedings pending resolution of the motion.

Counsel for private respondent contended that: Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness
and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional
capacity.

RTC: denied the motion and allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. However, the Court advised counsel for
respondent to interpose his objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited
is covered by the privileged communication rule.
CA: upheld RTC’s decision; MR was denied. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that all the essential elements of the rule on physician-
patient privileged communication under Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence exist in
the case at bar.

HELD: No. The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent CA committed no reversible error in its
challenged resolution. The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential
disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the
end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his
patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community.

Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made
to the physician’s testimony.

In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly
character) of the patient." Note: ‘Character’ is what a man is, and ‘reputation’ is what he is
supposed to be in what people say he is.

These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a
privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of
the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites. The
petitioner failed to discharge that burden.

➢ In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. She did not
disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner.
➢ There is no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating
to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. As
an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded.
➢ Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the petitioner was never
interviewed alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party.
There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in
the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege. "Some
courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the confidential nature of
the communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that under
such circumstances the doctor may testify.”
➢ Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim — that the information given by Dr.
Acampado brings disgrace and invites reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in the
eyes of the trial court and the public that the latter was suffering from schizophrenia, nothing
specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the information obtained from Dr.
Acampado would blacken the former’s "character" (or "reputation").
➢ Lastly, The petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to
any question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate
the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the
testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the
testimony of Dr. Acampado do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even
granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the
failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.

SUMMARY ON THE RULE: The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the
statutory physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to
give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the
physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based
strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional
knowledge he may have concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient
privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts
hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient
acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from
consideration his personal professional knowledge of the patient’s condition he should not be permitted
to testify as to his expert opinion.

SCOPE: The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to
the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by
the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The
mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not
stated."

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
_________________________________________________________________________________

As to Physician-Patient Privilege; Hospital Records

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN v. JOHNNY CHAN

G.R. No. 179786; July 24, 2013
ABAD, J.

DOCTRINE: To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of
tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he
gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent.

FACTS: Petitioner Josielene filed before the RTC-Makati City, a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage to respondent Johnny, the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award
of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family
and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use
of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification
and rehabilitation. Johnny’s contention: he claimed that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached
to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form
carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol
abuse."

Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces
tecum. The request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records
of Johnny’s confinement will be presented in court as evidence in support of her action to have
their marriage declared a nullity. Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were
covered by physician-patient privilege.

RTC: denied Josielene’s motion. MR denied.

CA: upheld RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the
privileged character of the physician-patient communication.

HELD: No.The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who
gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to
encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him
access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure.

The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence,
such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part
of the physician’s testimony OR as independent evidence that he had made entries in those
records that concern the patient’s health problems.

Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence
for admission in court. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after
notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court. In any case, the grounds for the
objections must be specified.

Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum
is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for
examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more
so to their disclosure.

It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a
litigant prior to trial. (Sec.1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure)

BUT THE ABOVE RIGHT TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS HAS A LIMITATION:
THE DOCUMENTS TO BE DISCLOSED ARE "NOT PRIVILEGED."

To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests
that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he
gave him — would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s
consent. Physician memorializes all this information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be
the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with
the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

Josielene’s argument: since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had
been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form
covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records.
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already
presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify
Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet
bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his
hospital records would again be premature.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying
Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records. ACCORDINGLY, the
Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913
dated September 17, 2007.
_________________________________________________________________________________

As to Physician-Patient Privilege; psychiatric evaluation report

MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN v. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR.
G.R. No. 108854; June 14, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J.

DOCTRINE: In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes
to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within
the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined
the patient and executed the report.

FACTS: Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were legally married and out of such union produced
three children. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a
stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain.
The effort however proved futile. Hence, they finally separated in fact.

Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed
by Drs. Banaag, Jr., and Reyes. Presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree
("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage
with Ma. Paz on the ground of “incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia” due to lack of due discretion
existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." Such decree was confirmed and pronounced final.

Meanwhile, the then CFI of Pasig issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership. Subsequently, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before
the trial court. In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz
merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant."

At the hearing, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated
the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed
a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, “that would
thwart the physician-patient privileged communication rule.”

CFI: issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in evidence; MR denied
CA: dismissed the petition for certiorari. MR was likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report be
enjoined.

HELD: No. The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication between
physician and patient is not doubted. Statutes making communications between physician and patient
privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure
to his physician of his symptoms and condition. Consequently, this prevents the physician from making
public information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. Thus, it has
been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the notion that certain forms
of antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in need of treatment for emotional
problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist. Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is
however misplaced.

Lim v. CA clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked:
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics;
(c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;
(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character)
of the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized
to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to
testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall
within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the
physician who examined the patient and executed the report.

Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground
that it was privileged x x x but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. In
failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make
such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.
_________________________________________________________________________________

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL. v. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT

G.R. No. 204700; November 24, 2014
LEONEN, J.

DOCTRINE:
➢ What is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or extrinsic evidence, not
those expressly referred to in the written agreement. "Documents can be read together when one
refers to the other."
➢ Privileged communications under the rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to protect
a trust relationship. It has not been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any
of the foregoing categories. The LSPA does not fall within any of these classes of information.
Moreover, the privilege is not absolute, and the court may compel disclosure where it is
indispensable for doing justice.

FACTS: For resolution is respondent Cameron’s MR of the SC’s decision which reversed and set aside the
CA’s resolutions and ordered respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA),
including its annexes and/or attachments, in order that petitioners may inspect or photocopy the same.

Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation, Marcelo Naval, and Crispin Oben filed their motion to admit
attached opposition. Subsequently, respondent filed its reply and petitioners filed their motion to admit
attached rejoinder.

The MR raises the following points:

(1) The motion for production was filed out of time;
(2) The production of the LSPA would violate the parol evidence rule; and
(3) The LSPA is a privileged and confidential document.

For their part, petitioners counter that their motion for production was not filed out of time, and "there is no
proscription, under Rule 27 or any provision of the Rules of Court, from filing motions for production, beyond
the pre-trial." Petitioners next argue that the parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because they were
not parties to the deed of assignment, and "they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine
the complete terms of the Deed of Assignment." Besides, the deed of assignment made express reference
to the LSPA, hence, the latter cannot be considered as extrinsic to it.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the production of LSPA would violate the parol evidence rule.
2) Whether or not the LSPA is privileged and confidential in nature.

HELD:
1) No. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IS NOT APPLICABLE. The parol evidence rule does not apply to
petitioners who are not parties to the deed of assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they
cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of
assignment. Besides, what is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or
 extrinsic evidence, not those expressly referred to in the written agreement. "Documents can be
read together when one refers to the other." By the express terms of the deed of assignment, it is
clear that the deed of assignment was meant to be read in conjunction with the LSPA. Since the
deed of assignment was produced in court by respondent and marked as one of its documentary
exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for
its understanding may also be inquired into by petitioners.

2) The LSPA is not privileged and confidential in nature. Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types
of privileged communication. These are communication between or involving the following: (a)
between husband and wife; (b) between attorney and client; (c) between physician and patient; (d)
between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest.

Privileged communications under the rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to protect
a trust relationship. It has not been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any
of the foregoing categories. The LSPA does not fall within any of these classes of information.
Moreover, the privilege is not absolute, and the court may compel disclosure where it is
indispensable for doing justice. At any rate, respondent failed to discharge the burden of showing
that the LSPA is a privileged document.

Further, as discussed, petitioners are not precluded from inquiring as to the true consideration of the
assignment, precisely because the same law in relation to Article 1634 allows the debtor to
extinguish its debt by reimbursing the assignee-special purpose vehicle of the actual price the latter
paid for the assignment. The LSPA must be a public instrument to be binding against third persons.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
_____________________________________________________________________________________

As to Trade Secrets

AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. PENNSWELL, INC.

G.R. No. 172835; December 13, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

DOCTRINE: The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights
therein which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the
disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or through a
"confidential relationship.

FACTS: Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air
transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the
business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.

On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade, covered by several
sales invoices which correspond to their respective purchase orders. Under the contracts, petitioner’s
total outstanding obligation amounted to ₱449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the amount
would be fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts,
respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.

Petitioner’s contention:
➢ it was defrauded in the amount of ₱592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of 4 items
which were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in
fact, identical with products petitioner had previously purchased from respondent.
➢ respondent’s products, namely Excellent Rust Corrosion, Connector Grease, Electric Strength
Protective Coating, and Anti-Seize Compound, are identical with its Anti-Friction Fluid, Contact
Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, and Dry Lubricant, respectively.

During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list
of the ingredients and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease
and Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c)
Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound. It appears that petitioner had earlier requested the Philippine
Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry (PIPAC) for the latter to conduct a comparison of respondent’s
goods.

RTC: granted the order; Respondent sought reconsideration contending that what petitioner
endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge.
Subsequently, RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. It held that the
chemical components are respondent’s trade secrets and are privileged in character. Petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC with the CA.
CA: denied the Petition; MR was denied. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC that the chemical components or ingredients
of respondent’s products are trade secrets or industrial secrets that are not subject to compulsory
disclosure.

HELD: No. The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special
lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law.

➢ It is unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production of respondent’s products
proceed from a formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation of its lubricants,
respondent expended efforts, skills, research, and resources. What it had achieved by virtue of
its investments may not be wrested from respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary
for petitioner’s defense against a collection for a sum of money.
➢ The ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondent’s production and business. No doubt,
the information is also valuable to respondent’s competitors. To compel its disclosure is to
cripple respondent’s business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical
composition of respondent’s lubricants are opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the
backbone on which its business is founded. This would result in nothing less than the probable
demise of respondent’s business.
➢ The detailed ingredients sought to be revealed have a commercial value to respondent.

A TRADE SECRET is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its
owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to
a secret formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding
some article of trade having a commercial value. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device, or compilation of information that:
(1) is used in one's business; and
(2) gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess the
information.

Generally, a trade secret is a process or device intended for continuous use in the operation of the
business, for example, a machine or formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized customer
list. It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or
possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property,
and ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by one who
obtained the information "in confidence" or through a "confidential relationship."

Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to
wit:
(a) communication between husband and wife;
(b) communication between attorney and client;
(c) communication between physician and patient;
(d) communication between priest and penitent; and
(e) public officers and public interest.

There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the
following:
(a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news;
(b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted;
(c) trade secrets;
(d) information contained in tax census returns; and
(d) bank deposits.

Clearly, in accordance with our statutory laws, this Court has declared that intellectual and industrial
property rights cases are not simple property cases. Without limiting such industrial property rights to
trademarks and trade names, this Court has ruled that all agreements concerning intellectual property
are intimately connected with economic development. Verily, the protection of industrial secrets is
inextricably linked to the advancement of our economy and fosters healthy competition in trade.

Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for
doing justice. The SC do not, however, find reason to except respondent’s trade secrets from the
application of the rule on privilege. The petitioner was not able to show a compelling reason for the
Court to lift the veil of confidentiality which shields respondent’s trade secrets.
DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 16 February 2006,
and the Resolution dated 25 May 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329 are
AFFIRMED.
_________________________________________________________________________________

As to Executive Privilege

ROMULO NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEES

G.R. No. 180643; March 25, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

DOCTRINE: Elements of Presidential Communication Privilege

FACTS: In April 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S.$329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the People's Republic of China.

In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate. The
investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of 3 pending bills in the Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and
cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was invited and was summoned to appear and
testify on different dates. In one hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project
by the NEDA.

On 26 September 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed
that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval
of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve.

Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear

and testify on 20 November 2007. However, in a letter by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive
privilege. Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita. The context in which executive privilege is being
invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the People's Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which this information
was conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

On 20 November 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. The latter issued the
show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. Petitioner replied to
respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that
he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.

Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari assailing the show cause letter.
Respondent Committees found petitioner's explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his
request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued an Order citing him in
contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. On the same date,
petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by
the executive privilege.

HELD: Yes. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a
valid claim of executive privilege.

In United States v. Nixon, the U.S. Court recognized a great public interest in preserving "the
confidentiality of conversations that take place in the President's performance of his official duties." It
thus considered presidential communications as "presumptively privileged." Apparently, the
presumption is founded on the "President's generalized interest in confidentiality." The privilege is said
to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide "the President and
those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately."

In In Re: Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of
executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the
deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to "communications, documents or other materials
that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should
remain confidential." The latter includes 'advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated."

Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the

deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the President's unique constitutional role; the second
on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications
privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well
as pre-deliberative ones.

Courts ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or
state secrets, identity of government informers in some circumstances, and information related to
pending investigations. An area where the privilege is highly revered is in foreign relations.

The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1. The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power."
2. The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational
proximity" with the President.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important
evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making
process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, the SC is convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
➢ First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President,
i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
➢ Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the
"operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo's cabinet.
➢ And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a
compelling or critical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead,
the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of
Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the "the oversight
function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation." It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of
legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will
depend on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds
of presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making process
and diplomatic secrets.

On the right to information: Not violated. Petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for 11 hours. He expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.

As to whether the claim is properly invoked by the President: Jurisprudence teaches that for the
claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter." A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires
a "precise and certain reason" for preserving their confidentiality.

The Letter of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement as it is the formal claim of privilege.
There, he expressly states that "this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive
privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly."

With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason," the SC finds the grounds relied upon by
Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not "to leave respondent Committees in the dark on
how the requested information could be classified as privileged.” The context in which executive
privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China.

As to grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order

Lastly, respondent committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order.
➢ First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order
suffers from constitutional infirmity.
➢ Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v.
Ermita that the invitations should contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need
for the inquiry," along with "the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof." This must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiry are respected as mandated. Unfortunately, despite
repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send him an advance list of questions.
➢ Third, only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during
the deliberation. The needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently,
members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt
Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order.
➢ Fourth, respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure."
➢ And fifth, respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate.
Respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege. Instead, they
curtly dismissed his explanation as "unsatisfactory" and simultaneously issued the Order citing
him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated
January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing
his arrest and detention, is hereby nullified.
_________________________________________________________________________________

PNB v. EMILIO A. GANCAYCO and FLORENTINO FLOR (Special Prosecutors, DOJ)

G.R. No. L-18343; September 30, 1965
REGALA, J.

DOCTRINE: Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no
reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential.

FACTS: Defendants Gancayco and Flor required the petitioner PNB to produce at a hearing the records
of the bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In declining to reveal its
records, the PNB invoked Republic Act No. 1405 or “An Act Prohibiting Disclosure of or Inquiry Into,
Deposits with Any Banking Institution and Providing Penalty Therefor.”
ISSUE: Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of a depositor who
is under investigation for unexplained wealth.

HELD: Yes. The defendants cited the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) in support
of their claim of authority and demanded anew that Eduardo Romualdez, as bank president, produce
the records or he would be prosecuted for contempt.

Congress clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. Without
such provision, the court added prosecutors would be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the
prosecution of those charged with having acquired unexplained wealth while in public office.

R.A. No 3019 and R.A. No. 1405 are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is possible.
Thus, while Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are "absolutely confidential and
therefore may not be examined, inquired or looked into," except in those cases enumerated therein, the
Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits "shall be taken into consideration in the
enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary." The only conclusion
possible is that Sec. 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1405 by providing
additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.

With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits
confidential, it is enough to point out that while Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1405 declares bank deposits to be
"absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances:
1. Upon written permission of the depositor;
2. In cases of impeachment;
3. Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;
4. In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation.

Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen
why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential.
The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the motion
that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full
knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs.
_________________________________________________________________________________

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK v. HON. FIDEL PURISIMA, etc.
G.R. No. L-56429; May 28, 1988
NARVASA, J.

DOCTRINE: The inquiry into illegally acquired property — or property NOT "legitimately acquired" —
extends to cases where such property is concealed by being held by or recorded in the name of other
persons.

FACTS: The Customs special agent involved is Manuel Caturla, and the accusation against him was
filed by the BIR. In the course of the preliminary investigation thereof, the Tanodbayan issued a
subpoena duces tecum to the petitioner commanding its representative to appear at the Office of the
Tanodbayan and furnish the latter with duly certified copies of the records in all its branches and
extension offices, of the loans, savings and time deposits and other banking transactions, dating back
to 1969, appearing in the names of Caturla, his wife, their children, and Pedro Escuyos.

Caturla moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum arguing that compliance therewith would result in
a violation of Sec. 2 and 3 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits. Then Tanodbayan Vicente Ericta
not only denied the motion for lack of merit, and directed compliance with the subpoena, but also
expanded its scope through a second subpoena duces tecum, this time requiring production by
petitioner Pedro Escuyos or his wife, and etc.

Petitioner filed a complaint for declaratory relief with the CFI-Manila, which was assigned by raffle to
the sala of respondent Judge Purisima. Petitioner prayed for a judicial declaration as to whether its
compliance with the subpoenae duces tecum would constitute an infringement of the provisions of the
abovementioned law provisions. Respondent Judge Purisima denied such application by petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the "Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits" precludes production by subpoena
duces tecum of bank records of transactions by or in the names of the wife, children, and friends of a
special agent of the BOC for having allegedly acquired property manifestly out of proportion to his salary
and other lawful income.

HELD: No. The inquiry into illegally acquired property — or property NOT "legitimately acquired" —
extends to cases where such property is concealed by being held by or recorded in the name of other
persons. This proposition is made clear by R.A. No. 3019 which quite categorically states that the term,
“legitimately acquired property of a public officer or employee shall not include property unlawfully
acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held
by, respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives or any other persons.”

To sustain the petitioner's theory, and restrict the inquiry only to property held by or in the name of the
government official or employee, or his spouse and unmarried children is unwarranted in the light of the
provisions of the statutes in question, and would make available to persons in government who illegally
acquire property an easy and fool-proof means of evading investigation and prosecution; all they would
have to do would be to simply place the property in the possession or name of persons other than their
spouse and unmarried children. This is an absurdity that the Court will not ascribe to the lawmakers.

DISPOSITIVE RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, with costs against
petitioner.