IPP Cancelation

Bode/Chambers

A Policy for Disaster: The Case to Cancel the IPP

Katie Bode & Drew Chambers – Vector/ViDA

Nobel Peace-Prize winner Joseph Rotblat once said that “The present nuclear policy
is a recipe for proliferation. It is a policy for disaster.”

With this in mind, Drew and I today stand resolved: that the United States
Federal Government should significantly reform its policy towards Russia.

Let’s dive right on in with some background information so you can further
understand our position.

Background point one is IPP Explained

Dr. Sharon Weiner, professor at American University, explained the IPP in 2010
when she said,

“In the early 1990s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to concerns about
proliferation, including fears about the spread of nuclear weapons expertise. The
splintering of the Soviet nuclear complex, poor security protocols in the newly
independent states, and pending layoffs of nuclear weapons workers combined with
dismal economic conditions to reinforce fears that former Soviet nuclear weapons
experts would sell their skills for money. In the United States, the response was the
creation of several programs to fight proliferation by providing income to former Soviet
nuclear weapons workers. Two such efforts [the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
and Nuclear Cities Initiative] were located in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Both
focused on a two-pronged response: improve experts' living standards in the short
term and redirect them to non-weapons jobs in the future.”1

Our second background point is Funding WMD Work.

The Government Accountability Office said in 2007 that,

“DOE misstates the number of institutes that we included in our fieldwork in Russia and Ukraine. The
correct number is 22. Regarding DOE’s comment, our draft report clearly stated that DOE policy does
not require IPP project participants reemployed in peaceful activities to cut ties to their home
institute. However, more than one [IPP] institute we visited stated that they are still
involved in some weapons-related work, and many institutes remain involved in
research and technology development that could be applied to WMD or delivery
systems for WMD. We do not believe it is possible for DOE to verify the full extent and intended
purpose of all activities at the institutes where the IPP program is engaged. Moreover, we believe that

1
Sharon K. Weiner [B.A., Northeast Missouri State University; B.S., Northeast Missouri State University;
M.A., University of Lancaster (UK); Ph.D. Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Security Studies Program; assistant professor in the School of International Service at American
University], “Organizational Interest, Nuclear Weapons Scientists, and Nonproliferation,” published in
the Journal: Political Science Quarterly, 2009-2010, (Vol. 124, No. 4; pp. 655-679)

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DOE misrepresents the IPP program’s accomplishments by counting individuals who have been
reemployed in private sector jobs but also are employed by their institutes and, therefore, may still
be involved in weapons-related activities. In our view, the reemployment of former weapons
scientists into new long-term, private sector jobs—one of the primary metrics DOE uses to measure
progress of the IPP program—implies that these individuals have terminated their previous
employment at the institutes and are dedicated solely to peaceful commercial activities outside of
their institutes.”2

Our first justification, or warrant for why we should change policy, is Russian
Rearmament.

Our “a.” point here is “IPP Rearming Russia.”

The Law Journal Political Science Quarterly said in 2010 that,

“This shift toward transparency and away from nonproliferation can be seen in two ways. First, IPP
and many lab participants increasingly reference the goal of engagement and its value, even without
job creation. For example, the Department of Energy used this logic in responding to criticism that re-
sulted from the GAO's 2007 investigation. Second, IPP has used transparency as an argument for
program expansion beyond the former Soviet Union. Regardless of the value of transparency, it
requires more long-term engagement with current Russian defense institutes. Therefore, if the
United States works with scientists inside the weapons complex then U.S. programs,
by definition, will pay the salaries of defense workers, [and] help supply equipment
that can be diverted to military uses, and contribute to the production of weapons-relevant
knowledge. For these reasons, a shift from nonproliferation to transparency contradicts the
assumptions on which cooperative threat reduction is premised and threatens to destabilize the
fragile domestic political balance in the United States that enables cooperative work with Russia.” 3

The article goes on to say that the most significant issues were security concerns,
accountability, coordination, and,
“These problems got their start in one piece of good news: despite concerns about the spread of
weapons knowledge, there was no evidence of significant proliferation from the former Soviet Union.
Few weapons workers emigrated and most of those went to the United States, Europe, or Israel.
However, as the urgency and danger of proliferation diminished, domestic political concerns in both
Russia and the United States increasingly sought to question and limit cooperation. In this
environment, the self-interested behavior of the U.S. labs acted to reinforce rather than assuage these
concerns. The most significant issues were security concerns in Russia, accountability in the United

2
Gene Aloise [Gene is the Director of the Natural Resources and Environment branch at the Government
Accountability Office], “Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives — Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and
Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed,” published by the Government Accountability Office, December
2007, (GAO-08-189)
3
Sharon K. Weiner [B.A., Northeast Missouri State University; B.S., Northeast Missouri State University;
M.A., University of Lancaster (UK); Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; assistant professor in
the School of International Service at American University], “Organizational Interest, Nuclear Weapons
Scientists, and Nonproliferation,” published in the Journal: Political Science Quarterly, 2009-2010, (Vol.
124, No. 4; pp. 655-679) [Brackets added for clarification]

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States, coordination between U.S. programs, and U.S. fears that money aimed at
nonproliferation was actually helping Russia rejuvenate its own weapons complex.
As explained below, the organizational interests of the U.S. labs amplified each of these
issues, causing them to become stumbling blocks to further U.S.-Russian cooperation.” 4

The next point is “b. Russia Exports Arms.”

The Dow Jones Newswire said in March 2011 that,

“Rosoboronexport [Russia’s government-controlled arms dealer] plans to export

between $9.4 billion and $9.5 billion-worth of weapons in 2011. Its 2010 foreign sales
totaled $8.6 billion and its current arms sales portfolio is $38.5 billion. Rosoboronexport exports
80% of the arms Russia sells abroad.”5 Brackets added by Drew Chambers to clarify

Past sales from Russia have included deals with nations such as Iran, Syria, Libya,
and Venezuela.

And finally the “c.” point is “Proliferation Potential.”

“One of the greatest risks associated with nuclear rearmament is the potential for
proliferation. There is no long-term guarantee that nuclear weapons materials will
not end up in the wrong hands. The challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation from the
former Soviet nuclear weapons complex has cost the US some US$ 5 billion to date.” 6

The United States should not be funding another nation’s nuclear modernization at
the cost of potential proliferation.

This brings us to our second justification of Iran Nuclearized.

The first point is “a. IPP Aids Iran.”

4
Ibid
5
Dow Jones Newswire, “Russia’s State Arms Exporter Sees Minimal Effect from Middle East,” March 9 th
2011, http://www.dowjones.de/site/2011/03/russias-state-arms-exporter-sees-minimal-effect-from-
m-east-.html
6
Susan Willett [Director of the Cost of Disarmament Programme at the United Nations Institute of
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva], “Costs of Disarmament—Disarming the Costs: Nuclear
Arms Control and Nuclear Rearmament,” 2003, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [an
intergovernmental organization within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and
security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament
and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. Works with
researchers, diplomats, Government officials, NGOs and other institutions], Publisher United Nations,
Sales No. GV.E.03.0.25, ISBN 92-9045-154-8

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Sharon Weiner, professor at the School of International Service, said in 2010 that
the most recent concerns are that,

“Additionally, IPP was unable to force the labs to keep accurate or detailed records of their projects
or the former Soviet experts involved. This lead to a series of problems, including discoveries that
more U.S. funding was going to U.S. labs than to Russian ones, and most recently, to concerns that the
U.S. labs have funded project teams in Russia that are also involved in nuclear
energy and possibly weapons activities in Iran.” 7

Our next point is “b. Iran Tipping Point.”

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, PhD in Political Science, said in March 2009
that,

“So Iran could well be a tipping point on the proliferation issue. Anything that allows
Iran to enrich uranium is a deadly peril to the goal of containing proliferation
capabilities in the world.”8

The “c.” point is “Arms Race Sparked.”

In February 2010 Dr. Graham Allison, professor at the JFK School of Government,
quoted U.S. National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft saying,

“As former U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft testified to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in March 2009, "We're on the cusp of an explosion of proliferation, and Iran is
now the poster child. If Iran is allowed to go forward [in attaining weapons] , in self-
defense or for a variety of reasons, we could have half a dozen countries in the region and
20 or 30 more around the world doing the same thing just in case." As Mohamed El-
Baradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has noted, nuclear
terrorism is "the most serious danger the world is facing." 9

7
Sharon K. Weiner [B.A., Northeast Missouri State University; B.S., Northeast Missouri State University;
M.A., University of Lancaster (UK); Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; assistant professor in
the School of International Service at American University], “Organizational Interest, Nuclear Weapons
Scientists, and Nonproliferation,” published in the Journal: Political Science Quarterly, 2009-2010, (Vol.
124, No. 4; pp. 655-679)
8
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Ret. [PhD, Political Science, Columbia University; National Security
Advisor, Administrations of Gerald Ford and George H W Bush; Vice Chairman, Kissinger Associates, Inc,
International Consulting Firm, 1982-89; Expert, International Policy; Lt. Gen., United States Air Force
(Ret.); Former Professor, Russian History, West Point; Former Head, Political Science Department, Air
Force Academy; Former Member, Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Assistance;
Former Special Assistant, Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Former Member, Commission on Strategic
Forces; Former Member, President's Special Review Board] Testimony Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, “US Strategy Regarding Iran” March 5, 2009, S. Hrg. 111-39
9
Dr. Graham Allison [professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, Ph.D. In
Political Science from Harvard University, former special advisor to the Secretary of Defense, with an
emphasis on policy towards the Soviet Union, over forty years of experience], “Nuclear Disorder:

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Our fourth point is “d. Potential Disaster.”

The Harvard International Review wrote in 2009 that,

“It is often said that the world is at a nuclear tipping point. By this, analysts mean
that the policy choices we make over the next few years may determine if we tip
over into nuclear catastrophe or pull back from the various brinks on which we now teeter.
Those who thought talk of nuclear disasters was a thing of the past, that the end of
the Cold War ended nuclear threats, might want to pay attention to this debate.”10

Our final point is “e. International Politics.”

Michael Horowitz, Post-Doctoral Fellow at Harvard University, said in 2009 that,

“Given that nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945, that modern
biological weapons have arguably never been used in warfare, and that the risk of chemical weapons
is often considered exaggerated, one might think preventing the proliferation of WMDs is
not a critical policy issue. However, the proliferation of new weapons systems can
have a profound impact on international politics even at levels short of war. The
impact on the coercive power of states and the potential for actual use make nuclear
weapons potentially destabilizing in the international security environment. ”11

The unintentional funding of Iran’s civilian and weapons nuclear sector is clearly
something the U.S. should avoid for domestic and global interests.

Our next justification is Scientist Education.

Surveying Atomic Threats”, Published by Foreign Affairs Vol. 89 No. 1, January/February 2010,
Retrieved via LexisNexis
10
Joseph Cirincione [Expert Advisor, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States; Member, Advisory Committee, Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation; Expert, US
Nuclear Policy, Nuclear Terrorism, Proliferation, and US Foreign Policy; Member, Council on Foreign
Relations; President, Ploughshares Fund; Former Senior Vice President, National Security and
International Policy, Center for American Progress; Former Director, Nonproliferation, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace; ] “US Nuclear Policy” Harvard International Review, Vol. 31, No. 1,
p. 42-46, Spring 2009
11
Michael Horowitz [Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Assistant Professor, Political
Science, University of Pennsylvania; Associate Fellow, International Centre for the Study of
Radicalization and Political Violence; Former Research Assistant, International Security Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies; Non-Resident Fellow, Center for a New American
Security, 2007-09; Analysts, Long Term Strategy Project, 2004-07; Researcher, Office of Net Assessment,
Department of Defense; Sidney R Knafel Fellow, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 2005-06;
Post-Doctoral Fellow, Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 2004-05] “The Spread of
Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2, p. 234-257,
April 2009

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The important “a.” point here is “Inexperienced Hires,” and this point says that the
IPP is hiring scientists without experience in weapons or with the Soviet Union.

Gene Aloise, with the GAO, said in 2007 that,

“DOE has overstated the number of WMD scientists receiving DOE support and the number of long-
term, private sector jobs created. First, according to our analysis of 97 IPP projects involving
about 6,450 scientists for whom we had complete payment information , more than
half of the scientists paid by the program never claimed to have WMD experience .
Furthermore, according to officials at 10 nuclear and biological institutes in Russia, IPP program
funds help them attract, recruit, and retain younger scientists and contribute to the continued
operation of their facilities. This is contrary to the original intent of the program , which
was to reduce the proliferation risk posed by Soviet-era weapons scientists. For example, about 972
of the scientists paid for work on these 97 projects were born in 1970 or later, making them too
young to have contributed to Soviet-era WMD efforts. Second, although DOE asserts that through
April 2007, the IPP program had helped create 2,790 long-term, private sector jobs in Russia and
other countries, we were unable to substantiate the existence of many of these jobs in our review of
the projects DOE considers to be commercial successes. DOE relies on “good- faith” reporting and
does not independently verify employment data it receives. Finally, DOE officials stated that the IPP
program metrics are not sufficient to judge the program’s progress in reducing proliferation risks.
However, DOE has not updated its metrics or set priorities for the program on the basis of a country-
by-country and institute-by-institute evaluation of proliferation risks.” 12

The “b.” point is “Unathorized Funding Use.”

The Government Accountability Office said in 2008 that,

“Our analysis of the program’s operations provide further support, we believe, for the need for fundamental
program reassessment. Over half of the scientists being funded at the 97 projects we reviewed did not claim any
weapon-related experience in the documentation we reviewed . Instead of being used to support
former Soviet-era weapons scientists, the authorized design of the program, funding
is now being used to attract, recruit and retain younger scientists that were too
young to have had this experience. In this way, we may actually be helping sustain the
continued operation of institute activities or, at a minimum, help the institutes develop technical
capabilities that we ultimately may have to compete against. Ultimately, and importantly, DOE has
not updated its metrics to judge the extent to which the program is actually reducing proliferation
risk, and this is where we want to make sure the energy is concentrated here today, or adjust
priorities so that funds can be targeted to the areas of highest need.” 13
12
Gene Aloise [Gene is the Director of the Natural Resources and Environment branch at the
Government Accountability Office], “Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House
of Representatives — Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia
and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed,” published by the Government Accountability Office,
December 2007, (GAO-08-189)
13
Robert A. Robinson [Robert is the Government Accountability Office Managing Director of Natural
Resources and Environment; in this hearing, Mr Robinson was substituting for Gene Aloise, who was
being treated for medical problems], “COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM
— HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED TENTH

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Not only is hiring inexperienced scientists unauthorized, it also increases the

proliferation threat by educating previously uneducated scientists about weapons,
as seen in “c. Risk Raised.”

Sharon Weiner said in 2010,

“Regardless of the value of transparency, it requires more long-term engagement with current
Russian defense institutes. Therefore, if the United States works with scientists inside the
weapons complex, then U.S. programs, by definition, will pay the salaries of defense
workers, help supply equipment that can be diverted to military uses, and
contribute to the production of weapons-relevant knowledge. For these reasons, a shift
from nonproliferation to transparency contradicts the assumptions on which cooperative threat
reduction is premised and threatens to destabilize the fragile domestic political balance in the United
States that enables cooperative work with Russia.” 14

The IPP is exacerbating proliferation and political risks in three specific ways:
Russia rearmament, Iran nuclearization, and WMD scientist production.

The IPP must be addressed, we offer the solution in our plan of action.

Our only mandate is to: “cancel the Russian leg of the IPP program.”

It’s time to finish a program that shoud have been finished long ago. It’s time to
finish the IPP.

CONGRESS: FIRST SESSION,” published by the United States Government Printing Office, January 23,
2008, (Serial No. 110–82)
14
Sharon K. Weiner [B.A., Northeast Missouri State University; B.S., Northeast Missouri State University;
M.A., University of Lancaster (UK); Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; assistant professor in
the School of International Service at American University], “Organizational Interest, Nuclear Weapons
Scientists, and Nonproliferation,” published in the Journal: Political Science Quarterly, 2009-2010, (Vol.
124, No. 4; pp. 655-679) [Emphasis added]