PS20107 Essay

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DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

Moderated

UNIT COURSEWORK (MARKING GRID WITH FEEDBACK)

Note to students: Fill in your candidate number, essay title and exact word count. Your candidate
number changes every year. Please be sure to check your 5-digit candidate number for 2020-1 in
SAMIS.

Candidate Number 14830


Unit Code and Title PS20107: Developmental Psychology
Marker Initials

Essay Title Critically evaluate how perceptual experiences are important for
children’s development of cognitive skills
Word Count
1999

Provisional Mark
(Note: All marks in the current year are provisional until the Faculty Board of Studies in June)
0 5 15 25 35 42 45 48 52 55 58 62 65 68 72 75 80 85 95

For information on the marking criteria see section 9 of the Undergraduate Programme Handbook -
online version available on the BSc Psychology - (including Induction and SSLC) Moodle page.

Feedback will generally cover the following areas: (i) knowledge and understanding of relevant
ideas and methods; (ii) argument and ability to answer the question; (iii) depth and development of
a critical stance; (iv) use of original sources and breadth of reading; (v) clarity of expression,
presentation of material and organisation and (vi) referencing.

General Comments and Areas for Improvement


Beginning at birth, an infant construct their thought process through their interaction with the environment in

order to learn about their surroundings and gradually achieve cognitive milestones (Lorina, 2015). To

achieve a better understanding of the physical world, infants use their perceptual abilities to educate

themselves and expand their cognitive abilities. One critical cognitive milestone is object permanence, which

can be defined as the understanding that an object continues to exist when they are no longer visible or

detectable through other senses (Shaffer & Kipp, 2014). While the age in which object permanence emerges

within an infant is widely debated, it is widely considered a foundational cognitive skill by numerous

psychological academic authors. It is considered a major achievement in interpreting the physical world

(Morss, 1984) and it is integral to symbolic reasoning which, in turn, allows for the development of

language, math’s and emotional development (Blackwell, 2019). One of the key perceptual experiences that

continuously informs this cognitive process is visual perception. Therefore, this essay will critically evaluate

how visual perception is important for a child’s development of object permanence. More specifically, this

essay will explore Piaget’s theory of cognitive development by evaluating the underlying mechanism of the

A-not-B task and its numerous variations. Moreover, this essay will also explore the neo-nativist perspective

by analyzing time looking studies.

Prior to Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, cognitive research believed that babies were simple and

passive (Cherry, 2019). However, Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development suggests that children are

active participants in their own cognitive development and develop their cognitive abilities through a

combination of biological maturation and exposure to the physical world (McLeod, 2020). More specifically,

Piaget believed that children pass through a series of stages. During the first stage, the sensorimotor stage

(birth to 2 years old), infants are seen to coordinate their sensory inputs and motor capabilities in order to

form cognitive structures to interact and understand their environment (Shaffer & Kipp, 2014). What marks

the end of this stage is the ability to successfully develop the concept of object knowledge. Once they have

done this, they move away from the idea that the world exists separate from their point of view and start

understanding how the world functions. However, this theory has been heavily criticized for underestimating

children’s ability as well as for overlooking how cultural and social factors can influence a child’s cognitive

growth rate (Shaffer & Kipp, 2014). Nevertheless, Piaget’s findings created the foundation for the study of
cognitive development and played a central role in constituting the constructivist viewpoint that children are

active explorers of their own cognitive development through their perceptual experience (Brainerd, 1996).

As explained by Thomas Politzer (2008), the main aim of the visual process is to arrive at an appropriate

motor and cognitive response. Therefore, in order to attain a healthy cognitive functioning, there needs to be

adequate visual development within a child. This development is notably seen in the first year of life after

birth and allows for a substantial and rapid development of perceptual abilities, such as object permanence

(Emberson, 2019). Continuously, Aslin and Smith (1988) explicitly state that the development of visual

perception is formed through bottom-up, in which the first phase of development is limited to sensory

primitives, and can only achieve perceptual representation once the sensory primitives are sufficiently

developed. In other words, low perception develops which then allows for a higher-level perception, which,

in turn, permits for more cognitive abilities. This bottom up model of perceptual development fits Piaget’s

theory of stage-like progression towards a more sophisticated mental representational capacity. While there

are several other models that have different focuses, such as the importance of a child’s environment in the

development of perceptual and cognitive abilities, (Kelly et al., 2007; Pascalis et al., 2005), the predominant

models employed to analyze perceptual abilities have been bottom-up and emphasize the importance of

visual experiences to achieve cognitive growth, and object permanence more specifically (Emberson, 2019).

Additionally, a recent study by Brenmer, Slater and Johnson (2015) have argued that young infants (4

months old) have a number of constraints when it comes to detecting trajectory continuities. This suggest

that they do not fully grasp the concept of object persistence and require multiple cues to perceive object

persistence across occlusion (Bremner, Slater, and Johnson, 2015). However, as they develop, they gradually

require less cues and can perceive object persistence across longer spatial and temporal gaps (Bremner,

Slater, and Johnson, 2015). This investigation supports Piaget’s bottom up approach of cognitive

development.

Most famously, Jean Piaget uncovered the A-not-B error. This phenomenon is described as the tendency for

children between the ages of 8 to 12 months to search for a hidden object where they previously found it

rather than where they last observed it (Markovitch & Zelazo, 1999). Piaget believed that the A-not-B error

occurred due to a lack of object permanence and, thus, succeeding this task would signify the ability to form
abstract mental representation, and, in turn, allow an infant to enter the preoperational stage (Piaget, 1956,

Shaffer & Kipp, 2014). However, numerous authors have rejected this theory and claim that this error does

not entail that the infant does not understand the concept of object permanence. Instead they argue that there

is a disassociation between visual perception and the act of reaching (Diamond, 1988). Diamond (1988)

noted that during the A-not-B task, the infant’s eyes would stare in the right direction while simultaneously

reaching for the wrong location. Mareschal and Johnson (2002) furthers this argument by stating that infants

can detect visual information relevant to object permanence tasks before they are able to utilize the

information and act upon it. Continuously, Berthenthal (1996) proposes that the A-not-B error resides in the

“perception-action” system rather than in the lack of object permanence, which he believes develops much

earlier than Piaget’s assumptions. Overall, these interpretations argue that the A-not-B error occurs due to a

lack of maturation within the brain and that infants will overcome this task once visual perception and action

are associated and integrated (Mareschal and Johnson, 2002). This would suggest that infants are constrained

due to the lack of integration between visual input and the action capabilities rather than due to a lack of

object permanence.

Furthermore, several variations of the A-not-B task have highlighted the importance of vision in reducing the

likelihood of error. For example, Butterworth, Jarrett ad Hicks (1982), demonstrated that visual

distinctiveness between the location A and the location B would result in lower rates of error. While the task

is typically done in the context of two confusable location, this research had two distinct locations, each

being represented by a different color. This suggests that visual discrimination between two dissimilar

location can aid an infant in successfully completing this task (Smith et al., 1999). Additionally, visual

attention is also seen as a factor that influences the success rate of this task. Horobin & Acredolo (1986) have

noted that infants, between the ages of 8 to 10 months, who look more intently at the hiding location would

be more likely to reach for the right location. This demonstrates a link between visual attentiveness and the

ability to retain and process information: key aspects of object permanence. Furthermore, this study’s sample

age is consistent with Piaget’s account of the age in which object permanence emerges. However, as

mentioned earlier, visual perception and search behavior are not always associated during the first year after

birth (Diamond, 1988). Nevertheless, these studies illustrate that visual distinctiveness of the hiding location
and the direction of visual attention can have an influence on the likelihood of failing the A-not B error

(Smith et al., 1999). This would suggest that infants have a developed visual perceptual ability which can

guide their action. However, there needs to be several cues (such as color or attentiveness) to aid them in

completing this task and to integrate sight with action. This shows that these infants have not fully developed

object permanence.

While Piaget believed that object permanence was gradually developed during the sensory stages, numerous

researchers (e.g., Spelke,1985; Bower, 1974) have taken a neo-nativist stance which suggests that infants are

born with substantial innate knowledge (Bremner, Slater & Johnson, 2014). This line of thinking posits that

perceptual functions vary in degree and are ready to be employed once the certain aspects of the brain have

matured (Hood & Santos, 2009). Such line of thinking stem from numerous studies documenting that object

permanence can be observed as soon as 2 months (e.g. Bower & Wishart, 1972), thus, contradicting Piaget’s

cognitive development theory which suggests that such cognitive skill only appears between the age of 9 to

12 months (Piaget, 1954). Notably, Baillargeon (1987) argues that infants are unable to accomplish Piaget’s

search task due to the lack of ability to perform coordinated actions rather than the fact that they do not

possess the notion of object permanence. Instead she claims that object permanence can be observed in

infants as young as 3 ½ months old and believes that object permanence cannot depend on perceptual

abilities more sophisticated than those acquired after the age of 3 months (Baillargeon, 1987). She used a

technique that has come to be known as the violation of expectation (VOE) paradigm. It exploits the fact that

infants tend to habituate when looking at a repeated stimulus and look for longer at things they have not

encountered before (Oakes, 2011). Numerous studies have supported this idea and have emphasized the fact

that novel (Fagan, 1970) and more complex stimulus (Caron & Caron, 1969) lead to further looking time.

These findings would appear to show that object permanence is present much earlier than Piaget accounted

for. This implies an innate nature as such concept emerges too quickly to derive from gradual post-natal

learning. However, this study can be seen as not meeting Piaget’s criteria for full object permanence as

Piaget argues that an accurate search for a hidden object is a vital factor in demonstrating knowledge of

object permanence (Haith, 1998). Continuously, Hood (2004) explains that infants may be aware that a law

has been violated, however that does not suggest that they would know the nature of said violation.
Nonetheless, the nativist viewpoint that infants are born with innate fast learning abilities or with innate

object knowledge has gained popularity around the discourse in cognitive development studies (Spelke &

Newport, 1998).

To summarize, this essay evaluates how visual perception is an important factor for the development of

cognitive skills, notably object permanence, which has been cited by a substantial body of evidence (Piaget,

1954; Brainerd, 1996; Haith, 1998). Object permanence has its origins in Piaget’s constructionist accounts

(Piaget, 1954), according to which infants construct an understanding of the physical world at the age of 8 to

9 months of age, once they are able to search for a hidden object. However, recent studies have taken a more

nativist perspective, in which infants possess innate core knowledge of object permanence (Baillargeon,

1987). By looking at the A-not-B error and its variations, this essay looked at both perspectives, providing

evidence to support both a nativist and constructionist viewpoints on how object permanence emerges.

Overall, this essay showed that visual perception plays a more important role in Piaget’s theory as visual

attention and distinctiveness can influence an infant’s cognitive ability, notably in the A-not-B task. It also

showed the importance of the development of visual perception and how it is linked to Piaget’s bottom up

approach. On the other hand, the nativist approach showed a belief that the tools to obtain object knowledge

was already rooted in the biological mechanism of the infant and, subsequently, visual perception played a

less vital role in acquiring this cognitive skill. Future research could take a more detailed investigation by

examining which perspective and method has a higher development rate of object permanence. This would

have implication on child development and object permanence which is considered a pivotal milestone in

achieving a healthy cognitive ability.


Reference

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