Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology

ISSN: 0022-3131 (Print) 1881-1248 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tnst20

Using Risk-Informed Asset Management for

Feedwater System Preventative Maintenance
Optimization

Ernest KEE , Alice SUN , Andrew RICHARDS , James LIMING , James SALTER &
Rick GRANTOM

To cite this article: Ernest KEE , Alice SUN , Andrew RICHARDS , James LIMING , James
SALTER & Rick GRANTOM (2004) Using Risk-Informed Asset Management for Feedwater System
Preventative Maintenance Optimization, Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, 41:3, 347-353

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/18811248.2004.9715494

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 Journal of NUCLEAR SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 41, No. 3, p. 347–353 (March 2004)

TECHNICAL REPORT

Using Risk-Informed Asset Management for Feedwater System Preventative

Maintenance Optimization
Ernest KEE1;
, Alice SUN1 , Andrew RICHARDS1 , James LIMING2 , James SALTER2 and Rick GRANTOM1
1
South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company, Risk Management,
8 mi. West of Wadsworth on FM-521 Wadsworth, TX 77483, USA
2
ABSG Consulting Inc. (ABS Consulting), 300 Commerce Dr. #200, Irvine, CA 92602, USA
(Received July 18, 2003 and accepted in revised form December 8, 2003)

The initial development of a South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company process for supporting preventative
maintenance optimization by applying the Balance-Of-Plant model and Risk-Informed Asset Management alpha-level
software applications is presented. Preventative maintenance activities are evaluated in the South Texas Project Risk-
Informed Asset Management software while the plant maintains or improves upon high levels of nuclear safety. In the
Balance-Of-Plant availability application, the level of detail in the feedwater system is enhanced to support plant de-
cision-making at the component failure mode and human error mode level of indenture by elaborating on the current
model at the super-component level of indenture. The enhanced model and modeling techniques are presented. Results
of case studies in feedwater system preventative maintenance optimization using plant-specific data are also presented.
KEYWORDS: risk-informed, preventative maintenance, preventive maintenance, availability modeling, risk,
asset management, life cycle management, work management system

I. Introduction and Background

Primary South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company
(STPNOC) management focus areas are safety and plant val-
ue supported in part by a comprehensive risk management
program (CRMP). The CRMP is used to help manage plant
risk in nuclear safety and plant valuation. Elements of the
CRMP are the probabilistic risk model,1) balance of plant
performance predictor program (BOPPP) model2) and
Risk-Informed Asset Management (RIAM)3,4) model. These
elements are used in plant operating maintenance risk man-
agement (called ‘‘on-line maintenance’’)5) and in strategic
programs that would reduce cost of major maintenance
and spares. Conceptually, using the CRMP input would help
management move the plant operating point on the ‘‘safety/
profitability’’ plane in the direction shown in Fig. 1 (that is, Fig. 1 Safety and profitability plane
increased profitability would increase owner value).
An important component of RIAM is the plant preventa-
tive maintenance (PM) program that uses reliability-centered FW heater) and ends at the steam generator FW inlet noz-
maintenance (RCM) techniques to manage STPNOC equip- zles. The FW system further includes the piping and valves
ment reliability.6) BOPPP is the availability modeling soft- associated with level measurement in the steam generators
ware used for estimating the impact of changes to the and some of the deaerator level instrumentation and control
RCM on plant availability and capacity factor within RIAM. equipment. Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of the FW
The focus of the Feedwater (FW) system project is to quan- system. The FW system is defined by 3,768 different plant
titatively identify the optimal change in frequency and type components each identified with a unique alpha-numeric
of PM for each component. The FW system was studied first designator known as a total plant numbering system (TPNS)
because equipment in FW contributes to roughly 40% of designator. There are about 16,300 unique TPNS/failure
plant production interruption events at STPNOC plants. mode combinations. Support equipment (electrical power,
seal water, instrument air, etc.) represents an additional
II. Feedwater System Overview 3,015 TPNS items.

For the purpose of equipment designation, the FW system

III. Availability Model
is defined as starting at the outlet of the deaerator (fifth stage
Clearly, the plant availability model detail must be suffi-
cient to support the end use. In the case of the STPNOC


Corresponding author, Tel. +1-361-972-8907, Fax. +1-361-972- BOP availability model, plant programs, maintenance activ-
7073, E-mail: keeej@stpegs.com

347
348
Fig. 2 Super-components in the feedwater system
ities and database keys are centered around the TPNS. In
particular, the STPNOC PM program uses the TPNS as the
equipment identifier for all PM activities. Because a major
objective of STPNOC RIAM analysis is PM optimization
within the context of the STPNOC RIAM process, it is clear
that the STPNOC availability model detail must be at the
TPNS level of indenture.
On the other hand, previous development of the STPNOC
BOP availability model development used reliability data for
high level components (super-components), such as pumps,
heat exchangers, control valves and so forth to simulate plant
level performance. An initial development approach based
on super-components allows use of data from industry relia-
bility databases (EPIX, NERC-GADS, etc.). In the context
of the STPNOC computerized work management system
(CWMS), many of these super-components actually consist
of several support equipment (sub-components) represented
by TPNS items. Additionally, industry practice is to collect
reliability data at the super-component level (exceptions are,
for example, where data are collected for a prime mover and
the driven equipment such as the turbine and pump of a tur-
bine-driven FW pump). Finally, a ‘‘sub-component’’ associ-
ated with almost all TPNS items is the human being operat-
ing the equipment unreliably.
IV. FW Preventative Maintenance Methodology
The methodology applied in the preventive maintenance
optimization (PMO) process by STPNOC was taken largely
from Perla,7) with updates based on recently-developed
RIAM technology at STPNOC. The PMO process involves
evaluation of equipment failures, both historical and predict-
ed, and associated generation loss costs and corrective main-
tenance costs, including all related labor and material costs
as summarized below:
. Build Availability Block Diagram (ABD),
. Gather list of affected equipment or TPNS items,
. Perform Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA),
. Perform Fault Tree Analysis,
. Gather Financial Data,
. Create Critical Items Lists (CILs),
. Evaluate and implement PM changes, and
. Gather, analyze, and implement PM program feedback.
E. KEE et al.
Fig. 3 Feedwater system availability block diagram
1. Availability Block Diagram
All super-components can be grouped schematically into
blocks that represent series logic for availability. For exam-
ple, Figure 3 is an ABD schematic for the STPNOC FW
system reflecting the requirements to support 100% power
operation. ABDs display a critical overview of system suc-
cess criteria critical to the accurate modeling of plant avail-
ability. Also, using the ABD for a reference is a convenient
way to break down the modeling task into logical blocks.
2. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Each TPNS item represents a sub-component that, in gen-
eral, will have several failure modes (FMs). For a large num-
ber of components the task of determining all possible fail-
ure modes is quite intimidating. But the STPNOC master
equipment database is populated with equipment type iden-
tifiers (i.e. valves and pumps) that can be mapped to an FM
database (for example DOE databases.8,9) Once the mapping
is accomplished, the two tables are linked and a report show-
ing each TPNS (component) with its associated generated
FM. In this way, all potential FMs can be reviewed for ap-
plicability to production loss or interruptions. When linking
was complete, the total number of preliminary failure modes
identified for the STPNOC FW system was approximately
25,000.
3. Fault Tree Analysis
Several blocks in the ABD contain super-components. In
the simplest cases, super-components can be modeled as a
collection of ‘‘OR’’ logic gates made up of TPNS/FM com-
binations modeled as the basic events using Saphire soft-
ware. However, several super-components in the STPNOC
FW systems require more complex modeling. In particular,
the FW pumps, booster pumps, and FWIVs require
‘‘AND’’ logic to properly model all failure modes. In this
case, the existing fault tree model must be augmented. The
JOURNAL OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Using Risk-Informed Asset Management for Feedwater System Preventative Maintenance Optimization
Fig. 4 Fault tree augmentation
minimal cut sets, sets of basic events that lead to a top event
where all basic events in the set are essential, were computed
in Saphire and exported to BOPPP where reliability data are
assigned to the basic events. The process of incorporating
new events in the existing BOPPP fault tree model is illus-
trated in Figs. 4 and 5. Figure 5 shows how the failure dis-
tribution for one super-component is parsed out into differ-
ent sub-components with different failure distributions.
The BOPPP application includes modules to solve for
plant availability as well as a data module to maintain FM
reliability data. As reliability data are obtained during plant
operation, the BOPPP data module is updated with the new
information. The BOPPP data module uses an ‘‘update by
exception’’ method making the data update process more ef-
ficient by only requiring failure data. The equipment that op-
erates without failure is updated as well, but in those cases,
they are updated automatically with success over default ex-
posure duration. The default exposure duration is part of the
plant model data. Using the BOPPP data module, STPNOC
plant-specific distributions were created using DOE distribu-
tions for priors by updating them with plant-specific failure
histories and repair times.
Table 1 Reliability data for each activity
Source
Data assigned from CWMS (query results)
Data assigned from plant process computer
Data assigned by analyst (by hand)
VOL. 41, NO. 3, MARCH 2004
349
Fig. 5 Mapping process from TPNS data distribution to super-
component distribution
4. Gather Plant-specific Data
In general, we consider two types of reliability data, cur-
tailing (generation impacting) events and non-curtailing
events. Non-curtailing event data come primarily from the
CWMS, and curtailing event data primarily come from the
plant process computer. Historical non-curtailing reliability
data for each TPNS is obtained by querying the CWMS da-
tabase. For each query result, the data are reviewed ‘‘by
hand’’ to assign the failure mode and other data related to
the maintenance activity. The types of data retrieved from
the query are summarized in Table 1.
Curtailing event data are taken from review of the plant
electrical generator output data recorded on the plant process
computer. These data are downloaded into a spreadsheet that
is set up to find events where the power drops more than 2%
below the rated generator output for gross generator output.
Each unit data element is screened individually. When a cur-
tailing event is detected, the event data are brought into a
Name
STPNOC unit number
TPNS
System
ECO number
Maintenance type
Start date/time
Finish date/time
Activity description
Downtime
Megawatt hour loss
Failure mode
NERC/GADS code
EPIX code
350
separate worksheet and the total production loss is found by
integrating the power history over the time of the event.
Data assignment by the analyst is the most time-consum-
ing part of the data analysis and is a ‘‘hole’’ in the STPNOC
CWMS record keeping process. Although it would be much
more efficient to store the failure mode data with work his-
tories in the CWMS database, comprehensive FMEA (as is
being done in the work described here) has not been accom-
plished for all systems (including FW) at STPNOC. The re-
pair time, also from CWMS, for each activity is set based on
the ‘‘tag-out’’ time (equipment clearance order (ECO) time)
for the activity.
Financial data needed for the evaluation include station
costs for each work activity, operation and maintenance
costs, and capital costs. The station costs are readily availa-
ble from STPNOC’s financial department. The price of elec-
tricity is gathered from the ERCOT website showing the
day-to-day electricity spot prices for STPNOC customers.
The time-weighted yearly average of ERCOT spot prices
is used in the evaluation.
5. Create Critical Items Lists
Primary results of this evaluation process are ranked crit-
ical items lists (CILs) of plant structures, systems, and com-
ponents (SSCs). The CILs are developed first at the TPNS/
FM level of indenture, then ‘‘rolled up’’ into TPNS item
CILs. The relationship between TPNS items and preventive
maintenance activities (PMs) is then applied to develop PM
activity CILs, based on their relationship to predicted plant
profitability, equivalent annual percentage rate return-on-in-
vestment (ROI), and net present value (NPV) decision sup-
port metrics.
Using all (curtailing and non-curtailing) event data, a CIL
showing component reliability is created. To calculate the
mean time to failure (MTTF) and the probability of failure
in 18 months, the DOE database is used as a prior, as men-
tioned before, which is then Bayesian updated with
STPNOC plant failure data. All TPNS and FM combinations
are separated into demand or time based failures. The gener-
ic data includes the mean (Mn1) and error factor (EF1) for a
lognormal distribution.
The number of demands for demand based failure compo-
nents need to be defined manually[JKL2] for a specific
amount of time. To perform Bayesian updating for demand
based failures, based on the lognormal prior distributions
from the DOE database, the following equations are used
to solve for the predicted failures per demand as well as error
factor:
Mn3 or
(predicted failures per demand) ¼ N3/D3 ð1Þ
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
 ffi
1þð1Mn3Þ
1:645
ln Mn3
(D1+D2+1)
EF3 ( final error factor) ¼ e : ð2Þ
where D3=D1+D2,
N3=N1+N2,
D1 (pseudo-denominator)
1Mn1
¼ 1þ 2 ,
Mn1*ðeðlnðEF1Þ=1:645Þ 1Þ
E. KEE et al.
N1 (pseudo-failures)=Mn1*D1,
D2=Given site specific # demands in x amount of
time,
N2=Given site specific # failures in x amount of
time,
Mn1=Given industry data for failures per demand,
EF1=Given industry data for error factor of fail-
ure, and
Mn2=N2/D2.
For time based failures, the equations are as follows:
Mn3 or
(predicted failures per hour) ¼ N3/T3 ð3Þ
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
 ffi
1:645
ln N3þ1
EF3 ( final error factor) ¼ e N3
: ð4Þ
where N3=N1+N2,
T3=T1+T2,
1
N1 (pseudo-failures)= 2 ,
eðlnðEFlÞ=1:645Þ 1
T1 (pseudo-denominator)=N1/Mn1,
N2=Given site specific # failures per hour,
T2=Given site specific # hours of operation per
hour,
Mn1=Given industry data for failure per hour,
EF1=Given industry data for error factor of fail-
ure, and
Mn2=N2/T2.
Also included in the CIL for both demand and time based
failures are:
Predicted failure rate for 18 months ¼ Mn3
#
of demand or operating hours in 18 months ð5Þ
MTTF ¼ 1=
ð6Þ

t
Reliability ¼ e ; ð7Þ
where t=time.
For curtailing events, EPRI NP-3416 methodology applies
equipment categorization techniques to aid the PMO proc-
ess.10) First, a list of equipment within the scope of the anal-
ysis that requires specific PM actions, largely based on reg-
ulatory and major equipment warranty requirements, is de-
veloped. Next, a list of system equipment that actually con-
tributed to historical generation loss at the plant is compiled
and ranked based on generation loss contribution (that is,
MWH loss). This list is called the ‘‘failed critical items list’’
or FCIL. Last, results of a predictive logic model (that is,
fault tree) analysis for the target system are analyzed to de-
velop a critical items list of key system equipment, called a
KCIL, based on future predicted MWH loss at the power sta-
tion.
Additionally, the EPRI NP-3416 methodology has been
enhanced to include developing CILs for FW system compo-
nent failure modes based on additional metrics, such as event
frequency, revenue loss, and two additional metrics currently
called profitability achievement worth (PAW) and profitabil-
ity reduction worth (PRW). PAW for a specific TPNS failure
mode is defined as the factor by which baseline predicted
station profitability would be multiplied if the TPNS failure
mode were assumed never to occur (that is, to be perfect, rel-
JOURNAL OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Using Risk-Informed Asset Management for Feedwater System Preventative Maintenance Optimization 351

Table 2 List of CILs

PMO critical items

list (CIL) title CIL Description

Mandatory maintenance List of equipment with required PM

list (MML) activities based on regulatory and major
equipment warranty requirements.
Failed critical items list List TPNS items that have caused actual
(FCIL) historical generation loss at STPNOC
over the previous five years ranked by
decreasing level of MWH loss
contribution.
Failure mode predicted List of FW system TPNS failure modes
frequency critical items that are predicted to contribute to future
list generation loss risk at STPNOC, ranked
based on decreasing value of predicted
frequency.
Failure mode predicted List of FW system TPNS failure modes
generation loss critical that are predicted to contribute to future
items list generation loss risk at STPNOC, ranked
based on decreasing value of predicted
MWH loss. Note: this list also includes
expected profitability achievement
estimates based on generation risk.
Failure mode predicted List of FW system TPNS failure modes
profitability reduction with estimates of associated station
critical items list profitability reduction if the failure
mode is considered continuously
effective (i.e., the failure is always in
effect).
Tag/TPNS item List of FW system TPNS items that are
predicted frequency predicted to contribute to future
critical items list generation loss risk at STPNOC, ranked
based on decreasing value of predicted
frequency.
Tag/TPNS item List of FW system TPNS items that are
predicted generation predicted to contribute to future
loss critical items list generation loss risk at STPNOC, ranked
based on decreasing value of predicted
MWH loss. Note: this list also includes
expected profitability reduction
estimates based on generation risk.
Tag/TPNS item List of FW system TPNS items with
predicted profitability estimates of associated station
reduction critical items profitability reduction if the linked
list TPNS item failure modes are considered
continuously effective (i.e., the failure is
always in effect).
PM activity predicted List of FW system PM activities with
profitability reduction estimates of associated station
critical items list profitability reduction if the linked
TPNS item failure modes are considered
continuously effective (i.e., the failure is
always in effect).
TPNS reliability List of TPNS in FW system with
respective reliability for 18 months that
may or may not have an impact on
generation
PM reduction List of FW system PM activities that are
candidates not currently linked to the system
generation risk model (i.e., are predicted
to have no impact on future station
generation risk).

VOL. 41, NO. 3, MARCH 2004

352
ative to that failure mode) or,
PAW ¼ Pðq ¼ 0Þ=PðqÞ: ð8Þ
where Pðq¼0Þ=profit if the event is always successful,
and
PðqÞ=actual profit.
PRW for a specific TPNS failure mode is defined as the
factor by which baseline predicted station profitability would
be multiplied if the TPNS failure mode were assumed to be
continuously effective (that is, the associated component is
always failed via the specified failure mode) or,
PRW ¼ Pðq ¼ 1Þ=PðqÞ; ð9Þ
where Pðq¼1Þ=profit if the event is always failed.
The concept of PRW is particularly valuable in evaluating
PM effectiveness or the need for additional PM activity. It is
important to note that values of PRW can be negative when
predicted generation losses associated with the continuous
failure of specified equipment causes the station to no longer
be profitable (i.e., when predicted costs are greater than pre-
dicted revenue). The FW system FM and TPNS CILs also
include links to information on future maintenance costs,
for both corrective maintenance (CM) and PM, as well as
previously evaluated predicted future safety impacts. A com-
plete list of CILs is shown in Table 2.
V. PMO Results
Using the CILs, an identification and preliminary develop-
ment of potential PM improvement options, including both
preventive and predictive (or condition-based) maintenance
options, is performed. Next, the process involves an evalua-
tion of the projected net benefits (or return-on-investment
(ROI)) of the PM improvement options identified in phase
two. Then, taking into account plant budget constraints, safe-
ty constraints, PM improvement option ‘‘packaging’’ evalu-
ations, and PM package ROI and NPV improvement predic-
tions, a PM improvement optimization analysis will be per-
formed.
Some of the results from the TPNS Reliability CIL are
shown in Table 3. A computer program was written so the
individual user can set the high/low parameters for PAW,
PRW, and preventative maintenance ratio (PMR), which
would form the basis for the recommendations. PMR is de-
fined as the ratio of preventive maintenance to total mainte-
Table 3 Excerpt of FW PMO recommendations CIL (component names deleted)
Probability
of failure/
18 months PAW PMR
0.02275532 1E10 0.79
0.03086359 1E10 N/A
0.2885826 1.000014 0.36
E. KEE et al.
nance. Table 3 provides general direction to the responsible
engineer to decide what kinds of changes should be consid-
ered in order to maximize PM performance. For example,
the first entry in Table 3 is an item that has a high preventive
maintenance ratio (PMR would normally be in the 0.60
range for most equipment) but has small effect on production
interruption (PAW is 1010 ) and would have small effect on
production loss if more failures were experienced (PRW is
0.86).
Shown in Table 3 as well is an entry for an equipment that
has a PMR designated ‘‘N/A’’. These are examples of equip-
ment that have not had either preventive or corrective costs
found in the CWMS. In these cases the responsible engineer
would determine if costs, failures and preventive data are be-
ing assigned correctly.
The last entry in Table 3 is an example of an equipment
that has caused, or may cause, production loss (PAW is
1.000014) but has low preventive maintenance performed
(PMR is 0.362) and, if allowed to have high unavailability,
would not cause a significant production loss (PRW is
0.904). The responsible engineer would use this information
to investigate ensuring preventive maintenance has been
properly considered and assigned for the equipment. In par-
ticular, even though the equipment has a low contribution to
production loss (high PRW), the consequence of production
interruption is high (high PAW).
After the responsible engineer develops proposed changes
to the PM program following the guidelines described above,
the cost effectiveness of the changes is determined. The cost
effectiveness would be determined under the RIAM process
using as input changes to maintenance frequency and cost of
the recommended PM option(s). PM options determined to
be profitable would be recommend for implementation.
VI. Conclusion
This project was performed primarily to develop and dem-
onstrate a STPNOC process for supporting effective, effi-
cient, and prudent PMO decision-making at the plant. Perla’s
PMO process was enhanced via application of the concept of
PRW to critical items list development and associated deci-
sion support.7) While this process was developed and demon-
strated via the plant FW system, it is important to note that
optimizing PM only within the FW, or any subset of plant
generation-supporting systems, could result in sub-optimiz-
PRW Recommendation
0.863 Reduce PM without
severely compromising reliability
0.863 Requires additional
evaluation
0.904 Add or redesign PM
to better address
failures
JOURNAL OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Using Risk-Informed Asset Management for Feedwater System Preventative Maintenance Optimization
ing total plant asset return and net present value. In the fu-
ture, the PMO analysis team will expand and apply to all
plant systems at STPNOC, particularly those that could im-
pact future generation risk.
The project team recommends that PM activities for the
TPNS items identified on the FCIL be retained and reviewed
by STPNOC maintenance improvement efforts or expert
panel to identify potential enhancements of associated criti-
cal failure mode detection and prevention/mitigation. Addi-
tionally, the project team recommends the TPNS Reliability
CIL be evaluated based on potential cost-benefit via the
plant’s risk-informed asset management (RIAM) process.
Currently, the PMs identified in the PM Reduction Candi-
dates CIL and TPNS Reliability CIL are being reviewed
by the maintenance improvement teams to determine if these
actions can feasibly accomplished, thus providing potential
savings to STPNOC.
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