SPS AMONCIO VS BENEDICTO part, petitioners counter that the parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because
rs counter that the parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because they
GR NO. 171707
JULY 28, 2008
FACTS: Wilfredo and Angela Amoncio entered into a contract of lease with a certain Ernesto
Garcia over a 120 sq. m. portion of their property in Quezon City. The spouses then entered
into another contract of lease, this time with Aaron Go Benedicto over a 240 sq. m. portion
of the same property. The Amoncio spouses allege that Benedicto stopped paying his
monthly rentals and shortly thereafter, discovered that Benedicto was putting up
improvements on another 120 sq. m. portion of the property that is not being leased to
either him or Garcia. It was also alleged that after Garcia vacated his portion, Benedicto
occupied it as well. After repeated demands asking him to vacate, pay arrears and desist
from the construction, the spouses rescinded the contract and filed with the RTC of Quezon
City a case for recovery of possession of real property against Benedicto. In his answer,
Benedicto denied the accusation of the spouses and alleged that it was the them who owed
him as there was allegedly an agreement between them to construct five commercial
buildings on the property wherein Garcia with occupy one building and the spouses and
Benedicto would occupy 2 buildings each. The RTC gave credence on Benedicto’s version and
dismissed the case for lack of factual and legal basis. One of the arguments of the Amoncio
spouses is that the RTC disregarded the parol evidence rule which disallowed the court from
looking into any other evidence relating to the agreement of the parties outside the written
contract between them.The CA, in affirming the RTC decision, stated that the rule on parol
evidence could no longer apply after they failed to object to Benedicto’s testimony about
their agreement regarding the construction of the buildings.
ISSUE: Can the PER be applied in this case?
HELD: NO. The so-called “parol evidence” forbids any addition to or contradiction of the
terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing
of the document, other terms were orally agreed on by the parties. Under such rule, the
terms of the written contract are conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is
inadmissible to vary an enforceable agreement embodied in the document. However, where
a party entitled to the benefit of the parol evidence rule allows such evidence to be received
without objection, he cannot, after the trial has closed and the case has been decided against
him, invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal of the judgment.Petitioners failed to make a
timely objection and to dispute the fact that Aaron undertook the construction of the
buildings. Evidence further disclosed that the building permit issued by the Building Official
bore the signature of petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio. Hence, by failing to object to
respondent’s testimony in the trial court, petitioners waived the protection of the parol
evidence rule.
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. CAMERON GRANVILLE
G.R. NO. 204700
NOVEMBER 24, 2014
FACTS: For resolution is respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.'s motion
for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision, which reversed and set aside the Court
of Appeals' resolutions and ordered respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase
Agreement (LSPA), including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in order that petitioners
may inspect or photocopy the same. Respondent contends that the production of the LSPA
will violate the parol evidence rule under Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court. For their
were not parties to the deed of assignment, and "they cannot be prevented from seeking
evidence to determine the complete terms of the Deed of Assignment." Besides, the deed of
assignment made express reference to the LSPA, hence, the latter cannot be considered as
extrinsic to it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule.
RULING: The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the
deed of assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from
seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment. Even
assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second
paragraph is when the party puts in issue the validity of the written agreement, as in the case
a quo. Besides, what is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or
extrinsic evidence, not those expressly referred to in the written agreement. "Documents can
be read together when one refers to the other." By the express terms of the deed of
assignment, it is clear that the deed of assignment was meant to be read in conjunction with
the LSPA.
PILIPINAS BANK VS. COURT OF APPEAL
G.R. NO. 141060
SEPTEMBER 29, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner obtained a money securities and payroll comprehensive insurance policy
with private respondent Meridian Assurance Corporation. While the policy was in full force
and effect, petitioner's armored vehicle which was on its way to deliver the payroll
withdrawal of its client was robbed. It filed a formal notice of claim with the insurer, but it
was denied on the ground that it did not cover the deliveries of the withdrawals to
petitioner's client. Thus, the filing of a complaint before the RTC against the insurer with
petitioner claiming that under the provisions of the policy it was entitled to recover the
amount it lost during the robbery. The complaint did not allege that the terms were
ambiguous or failed to express the true agreement between them. Petitioner, at the pre-
trial, stated that it would present Cesar Tubianosa to testify on the negotiations that were
held prior to the execution of the insurance contract and those that led to the attachment
warranties to prove that the subject loss is covered by the policy. The private respondent
objected when petitioner was about to present the witness on the ground that it would
violate the best evidence rule. The objection was overruled and the witness was allowed to
testify only on the terms and conditions of the policy. Petitioner moved to recall the witness
for him to testify on the intentions of the parties prior to the issuance of the policy. The trial
court denied the motion on ground that it would violate the parol evidence rule. This was
affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals which found that there was no ambiguity in the
policy. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tubianosa should be recalled to testify on the negotiations pertaining
to the terms and conditions of the policy before its issuance.
RULING: Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly requires that for parol
evidence to be admissible to vary the terms of the written agreement, the mistake or
imperfection thereof or its failure to express the true agreement of the parties should be put
in issue by the pleadings. As correctly noted by the appellate court, petitioner failed to raise
the issue of an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the terms of the Policy, or of
the failure of said contract to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto in
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its Complaint. There was therefore no error on the part of the appellate court when it
affirmed the RTCs Order disallowing the recall of Tubianosa to the witness stand, for such
disallowance is in accord with the rule that when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such other terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 204700
November 24, 2014
FACTS: For resolution is respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.'s motion
for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision, which reversed and set aside the Court
of Appeals' resolutions and ordered respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase
Agreement (LSPA), including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in order that petitioners
may inspect or photocopy the same. Respondent contends that the LSPA is a
privileged/confidential bank document. For their part, petitioners counter that "it has not
been shown that the parties fall under . . . or, at the very least . . . analogous to [any of the
relationships enumerated in Rule 130, Section 124] that would exempt [respondent] from
disclosing information as to their transaction."
ISSUE: Whether or not the LSPA is a privileged/confidential bank document.
RULING: No, the LSPA is not privileged and confidential in nature.
Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged communication. These are
communication between or involving the following: (a) between husband and wife; (b)
between attorney and client; (c) between physician and patient; (d) between priest and
penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. Privileged communications under the
rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to protect a trust relationship. It has not
been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any of the foregoing
categories. This court has previously cited other privileged matters such as the following: "(a)
editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not
be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in
tax census returns; . . . (d) bank deposits" (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act); (e)
national security matters and intelligence information; and (f) criminal matters. Nonetheless,
the LSPA does not fall within any of these classes of information. Moreover, the privilege is
not absolute, and the court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice.
At any rate, respondent failed to discharge the burden of showing that the LSPA is a
privileged document. Respondent did not present any law or regulation that considers bank
documents such as the LSPA as classified information. Its contention that the Special Purpose
Vehicle Act only requires the creditor-bank to give notice to the debtor of the transfer of his
or her account to a special purpose vehicle, and that the assignee-special purpose vehicle has
no obligation to disclose other financial documents related to the sale, is untenable. The
Special Purpose Vehicle Act does not explicitly declare these financial documents as
privileged matters. Further, as discussed, petitioners are not precluded from inquiring as to
the true consideration of the assignment, precisely because the same law in relation to
Article 1634 allows the debtor to extinguish its debt by reimbursing the assignee-special
purpose vehicle of the actual price the latter paid for the assignment. An assignment of a
credit "produce[s] no effect as against third persons, unless it appears in a public
instrument[.]" It strains reason why the LSPA, which by law must be a public instrument to be
binding against third persons such as petitioners-debtors, is privileged and confidential.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIONISIO DELOY
G.R. NO. 192893
JUNE 5, 2013
FACTS: Respondents are the owners, by way of succession, of a parcel of land located in
Trece Martires City. On November 12, 1965, Dionisio, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest,
donated a 680-square meter portion of the 8,550 square meter property to the
Communications and Electricity Development Authority (CEDA). Sometime in 1985, CEDA
offered for sale to MERALCO, its electric distribution system, consisting of transformers and
accessories, poles and hardware, wires, service drops, and customer meters and all rights
and privileges necessary for providing electrical service in Cavite. This was embodied in a
memorandum of agreement (MOA). After the approval of the MOA, CEDA and MERALCO
executed the Deed of Absolute Sale. MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice President and Head
of the Legal Department wrote a letter to Dionisio requesting the latter’s permission for the
continued use of the subject land as a substation site. The parties were not able to reach any
agreement. In an internal memorandum, it was stated that the death of Dionisio, the lack of
agreement yet among the heirs, and a request that a member of the Deloy family be
employed by MERALCO were some of the reasons. Respondents offered to sell the subject
land to MERALCO, but their offer was rejected. For said reason, in their letter, respondents
demanded that MERALCO vacate the subject land. Despite the written demand, MERALCO
did not move out of the subject land. Thus, respondents were constrained to file the
complaint for unlawful detainer.
ISSUE: Whether or not evidence aliunde, such as the letters of petitioner’s assistant vice
president and head of legal department and the internal memorandum can prevail over the
deed of absolute sale.
RULING: It is undisputed that on October 11, 1985 or four (4) months after the approval of
the MOA and the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale, MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice
President and Head of the Legal Department, Atty. Torres , sent a letter to Dionisio seeking
his permission for the continued use of the subject land. Relative thereto, L.G. De La Paz of
the Trece Martires Substation of MERALCO sent the Internal Memorandum, addressed to
Atty. G.R. Gonzales and Atty. Torres, informing them of some obstacles in reaching a lease
agreement with the Deloys. Evidently, by these two documents, MERALCO acknowledged
that the owners of the subject land were the Deloys. MERALCO never disputed the
declarations contained in these letters which were even marked as its own exhibits. The
Court held that the letter and the internal memorandum presented, offered and properly
admitted as part of the evidence on record by MERALCO itself, constitute an admission
against its own interest. Hence, MERALCO should appropriately be bound by the contents of
the documents. Nevertheless, in this petition, MERALCO insists that extrinsic evidence, such
as the two documents, even if these were their own, cannot contradict the terms of the deed
of sale between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The Court has read the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale but found nothing that clearly
stated that the subject land was included therein. What were sold, transferred and conveyed
were "its electric distribution facilities, service drops, and customers' electric meters except
those owned by the VENDOR'S customers, x x x, and all the rights and privileges necessary for
the operation of the electric service x x x." No mention was made of any land. Rights and
2
privileges could only refer to franchises, permits and authorizations necessary for the
operation of the electric service. The land on which the substation was erected was not
included, otherwise, it would have been so stated in the two documents. Otherwise, also,
MERALCO would not have written Dionisio to ask permission for the continued use of the
subject land.
SPS PARAS VS KIMWA CONSTRUCTION
GR NO. 171601
FACTS: Petitioner is Lucia Paras who was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit. On
the other hand, Respondent Kimwa is a construction firm that sells concrete aggregates to
contractors and haulers in Cebu. Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract as evidenced by
their "Agreement for Supply of Aggregates" where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were
allotted by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000
cubic meters of aggregates; then Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates. Claiming that in failing
to haul the remaining 30,000 aggregates Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia filed a
Complaint for breach of contract with damages. To prove the intent of such arrangement,
Lucia presented her Special Permit which expires on May 15, 1995. Thus, she emphasized
that she would be willing to enter into a contract with Kimwa provided the 40,000 cubic
meters would be completely extracted before May 15, 1995. In its Answer, Kimwa asserted
that the Agreement articulated the parties' true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a
maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. RTC rendered the
Decision in favor of Spouses Paras. It reasoned that it was contrary to human experience for
Kimwa to have entered into an Agreement with Lucia without verifying the latter's authority
as a concessionaire. The Special Permit granted to Lucia clearly indicated that her authority
was good for only six months. The trial court noted that Kimwa must have been aware that
the 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates must necessarily be hauled by May 15, 1995. CA
reversed the Regional Trial Court's Decision. It declared that the findings of the trial court
were based on evidence which were in violation of the Parol Evidence It noted that the
Agreement was clear that Kimwa was under no obligation to haul 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates by May 15, 1995.
ISSUE: Did the RTC rule in violation of the PER?
HELD: NO. The RTC was correct in considering such evidence. CA was erroneous to rule there
was a violation of the PER. Two things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted:
first, that the existence of any of the four exceptions has been put in issue in a party's
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol
evidence serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal's conclusion, petitioners pleaded in the Complaint they filed
before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement's
failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through its
Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras' pleading of these issues. This is, thus,
an exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence. It is true that petitioners Spouses
Paras' Complaint does not specifically state words and phrases such as "mistake,"
"imperfection," or "failure to express the true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is
evident that the crux of petitioners Spouses Paras' Complaint is their assertion that the
Agreement "entered into on 6 December 1994 or thereabouts" was founded on the parties'
supposed understanding that the quantity of aggregates allotted in favor of respondent
Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995, lest such hauling be rendered impossible by the
rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras' permitted area. This assertion is the very foundation
of petitioners' having come to court for relief. Therefore, this case falls under the exceptions
provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Accordingly, the
testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by petitioners Spouses
Paras may be admitted and considered.The Special Permit was then admitted to prove the
awareness of respondent as to the expiration of petitioner’s authority of rechanneling the
aggregates. The SC ruled that there was no violation of PER in admitting such evidence. Thus,
SC reversed the CA, and reinstated the order of RTC.
AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 188956
20 MARCH 2013
FACTS: Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over 3 parcels of land located in
West Bicutan, Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City. These 3 parcels of land constitute a
land grant by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, issued by former President Fidel
V. Ramos on 8 May1998. After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, and since
no oppositor registered any oppositions after the petitioner met the jurisdictional
requirements, the RTC issued an order of general default against the whole world, and the
petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. The petitioner then presented as its
witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President and Head of its Asset Enhancement
Office. She testified that prior to Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of the Philippines
owned the 3 parcels of land at issue. After the Republic transferred ownership to it through
the said proclamation, petitioner has been occupying the lands and assumed the obligations
of an owner. The RTC granted the application.In response, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the petitioner failed to prove that it
has personality to own property in its name and the petitioner failed to show that the
witness it presented was duly authorized to appear for and in its behalf. The RTC granted the
OSG’s Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Should a witness be authorized by the petitioner to appear for and in its behalf?
HELD: NO. There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to
present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or
her. No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such omission can be
considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. All that
the Rules of Court require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided therein. Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a witness for
the petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able to perceive and being able
to make her perceptions known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the
disqualifications under the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS. HAMTO
G.R. NO. 128137
AUGUST 2, 2001
FACTS: Accused was charged of rape of Mary Grace, a mentally retarded woman. During
arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty. According to the prosecution, Mary Grace
testified that Fernan, Mario and Ronald raped her in the fifteen-seater double-tire jeepney.
They all smelled of liquor at that time, according to her. It was Mario who raped her first, she
said. Mario boxed her on the chest, covered her mouth and held her hands. Mario then
removed her panty. Ronald prevented her from going out of the jeepney. Mario removed his
pants and raped her. Afterwards, Mary Grace said Ayaw ko nang magpaiyot. The three
3
refused to let her go and raped her again one after another. She felt pain. She did not tell her
Ate Lina about the incident because she forgot to do so. Appellant contends that the
testimony of the private complainant, who is medically diagnosed to be suffering from
moderate mental retardation, is not worthy of any credence or belief. The trial court found
the testimony of the victim was straightforward and worthy of belief, despite her mental
weakness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a mental retardate can be given probative weight
RULING: Although Mary Grace was mentally retarded, her testimony cannot be discredited.
All persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses. Mere intellectual weakness of a witness is not a ground to disqualify, or at
the very least discredit, a witness. The intellectual weakness of Mary Grace does not make
her incompetent as a witness if, at the time she testified, she had the mental capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong, understand the nature and obligation of an oath, and
give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matters about which she testifies. The
psychiatrist who examined her testified that Mary Grace was capable of being receptive and
perceptive. She could tell what happened but found difficulty in interpreting things. Hence,
we agree with the trial courts finding that Mary Graces credibility commands great weight
and respect. Also, considering the statutory rule that sexual intercourse with a victim under
twelve years of age is rape, then it should follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose
mental age is that of a child below twelve years would also constitute rape.
PEOPLE VS. GLORIA UMALI
G.R. NO. 84450
FACTS: Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug dependency
and for an alleged crime of robbery. In the course of the investigation, the policemen
discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable of committing crime against property, only if
under the influence of marijuana. To determine the source of marijuana being sold to the
minors in Tiaong, Quezon, the police sought the help of the detained accused Francisco
Manalo. He charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts, concealment of deadly
weapon, and other crimes against property. The police gave Manalo some marked money to
buy marijuana from sources known to him. The instruction was for Manalo to act as a
poseur-buyer and bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to the police
headquarters. After the purchase, Manalo returned with 2 foils of dried marijuana which he
allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali. In the criminal trial of Umali, the
prosecution presented Manalo as its witness. He testified on the circumstances regarding his
purchase of marijuana from Umali. Based on Manalo’s testimony, among others, the trial
court found Umali guilty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, i.e. sale of illegal drugs. On
appeal, Umali alleges that Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his
words should not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, she stressed that said witness has
several charges in court and because of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he
was likely to tell falsehood.
ISSUE: Is a witness facing several criminal charges disqualified from testifying in court?
HELD: NO. The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" under Sec. 20
of Rule 130 takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons
"convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from
being witnesses to a will.” Manalo has not been convicted of any of the above-mentioned
crimes to disqualify him as a witness. The fact that Manalo is facing several criminal charges
when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. The testimony of a witness
should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was actuated by
improper motive. Hence, in the absence of any evidence that Manalo was actuated by
improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDWIN ALEMAN
G.R. NO. 181539
FACTS: Accused-appellant Edwin Aleman appeals from the Decision which found him guilty of
the crime of robbery with homicide.
The prosecution’s case against accused-appellant hinges on the following eyewitness account
of Mark Almodovar: Mark went out of his house to play ball in the basketball court. He
walked to the basketball court, played and at about 9:00 o’clock, he stopped playing as he
then felt like urinating. He went to a place near the basketball court where there were five
cars parked. While urinating, he saw a fat man walking towards a car. The fat man was talking
on his cellular phone. He then noticed two men following the fat man, who entered a parked
car. The two male persons who were then following the fat man then separated: one went to
the left side of the fat man’s car and stood by the door at the driver’s side of the vehicle.
While the other positioned himself by the door at the opposite side of the car. Mark made a
diagram, rectangular shape and two circles on both sides, depicting the car and the positions
of the two men. The man who stood by the door at the driver’s side had a knife while his
companion was armed with a gun. He then witnessed the man with the knife in his hand
stabbing the fat man repeatedly on different parts of his body, while the man with the gun
fired once. After taking the fat man’s personal belongings, including his ring, watch, wallet
and cellular phone, the two men left. He followed them to a place which he described as far
and there, he saw them buried the knife and covered it with soil. He made a drawing
representing the place where he followed them. After burying the knife in the ground, the
men left and he followed them again to a place which he described as near. While thereat, he
saw one of the culprits uncovered his face. He recognized him as the person who went to the
left side of the car and stabbed the victim who was later on identified as the accused Edwin
Aleman. After which, the two men left. He decided not to follow them and went home
instead. It was about 11:00 o’clock in the evening when he arrived home. After waking up at
8:00 o’clock the following morning, he returned to the scene of the incident. There were
many people gathered in the area, including policemen. He saw a chubby girl and requested
her to call the policemen. He rode in a car with the police officers and the chubby girl. They
went to a house in a far place, but no one was there. He recognized and identified the face of
the fat man depicted in the picture shown to him. Mark was 14 years old when he testified.
He is a deaf-mute. He was assisted in his testimony by Daniel Catinguil, a licensed sign
language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been
teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990. Catinguil had also completed a five-
year course at the Philippine Normal University with a degree in teaching special education
children. Accused-appellant interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He claimed that, at
the time the incident happened on February 10, 2003, he was at the billiards hall which was a
15-minute walk from his residence. The trial court rejected the defenses of accused-
appellant for their inherent weakness and implausibility. Accused-appellant appealed his
case to the Court of Appeals. His claim was four-pronged, all aimed at discrediting the
eyewitness, Mark. Accused-appellant questioned the qualification of Mark to be a witness.
4
Accused-appellant argued that, being a deaf-mute who cannot make known his perception to
others as he has no formal education on sign language. Court of Appeals held that the
contentions of accused-appellant lacked merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mark, being deaf-mute, can be a credible witness.
RULING. Yes. The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a
witness. The rule is that “all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.” A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but
his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to
make observations about his/her environment and experiences. The inability to hear and
speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with others but he/she may still
communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in this case,
sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to
make observations and he/she can make those observations known to others.
Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they
1. Can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath;
2. Can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and
3. Can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter.
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and
appreciated the sanctity of an oath and that he comprehended the facts he testified on.
Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter
from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the
Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990 and possessed special education and training for
interpreting sign language. The trial and the appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to act
as interpreter for Mark. No ground to disturb that finding exists.
PEOPLE VS. BUSTOS AND MACASPAC
G.R. NO. L-27200
FACTS: In the afternoon of October 24, 1925, while trying to determine the boundaries of the
lands they respectively occupy, accused Francisco Bustos and Angel del Castillo (del Castillo)
engaged in a dispute, due to which Bustos grabbed del Castillo by the neck. A certain
Mariano Montemayor and accused Mariano Macaspac hurried to the scene to separate the
two. Bustos then left the scene accompanied by Macaspac. Lareana Yumul, wife of del
Castillo and who was also present when the incident happened, went home ahead of her
husband. Upon approaching their house, she heard the desperate cries of her deaf-mute
daughter, Soledad Encarnacion. Going in the direction pointed out by her daughter, Laureana
came upon her son Felipe del Castillo (Felipe) stretched out on the ground and wounded.
Felipe told Laureana that it was Bustos and Macaspac who attacked him. Felipe died
moments later. The autopsy disclosed that Felipe incurred sharp wounds on the left arm and
a penetrating wound on the abdomen. Bustos and Macaspac was charged with the crime of
homicide. At the trial, Laureana and Soledad testified for the prosecution. Laureana testified
that when she arrived at the place pointed out by Soledad, she found Felipe on the ground
and wounded, that at that moment Felipe told her that Bustos and Macaspac attacked and
stabbed him, that a few moments later Felipe died, and that the authorities arrived later on
but by that time Felipe was already dead. The defense impeached the veracity of the
testimony of Laureana by the testimony of the municipal president, Nicanor Garcia, and
Cristino Basay, who testified that they were first to arrive at the scene and that Laureana
then approached them and then asked them what had happened and who had killed Felipe.
Laureana Yumul denied asking such questions. Soledad’s testimony was made with the help
of an interpreter. The trial court covicted the two accused of the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of Bustos and Macaspac has been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING: YES. The Court held that the trial court correctly found Laureana’s testimony more
credible. However, Soledad’s testimony should not have been admitted. Her testimony was
interpreted by a teacher from a deaf and dumb school who had never taught the witness,
nor had Soledad ever been to such a school. While it is true that modern pedagogy has made
tremendous strides in the instruction and education of persons so afflicted, even to the
extent of enabling the blind to read by means of the sense of touch and deaf- mutes to
receive instruction through conventional signs and objects, nevertheless, with respect to
deaf-mutes, it is necessary that he who is to communicate with them know the meaning of
their signs, either from having had them taught to him, or from having acquired a knowledge
of them through frequent contact with the same. Without these circumstances, although it is
possible to guess part of what deaf-mutes mean by their signs even without having had much
to do with them, still much of what they wish to say escapes us, and in our eagerness to
understand them, we resort to enjecture. It will be seen how dangerous then in such a
procedure to arrive at the truth, and above all when the life and liberty of an accused man
are at stake. This was shown in the present case, in which during the course of
interpretation, there were times when the interpreter could not make out what the witness
meant by such signs as she uses, and this is due to the fact that the deaf-mute had never
been a pupil of the interpreter, nor had the latter previously had anything to do with the
former, such as would have given her an opportunity to acquire some knowledge of the
meaning of the signs the deaf-mute used. In view of this, it would not be prudent to admit
the deaf-mute's testimony as interpreted by the teacher. Nonetheless, the Court affirmed
the trial Court’s conviction of the two accused of the crime of homicide only with a
modification of the penalty imposed.
PEOPLE V DEAUNA
G.R. NOS. 143200-01
FACTS: Accused Deauna was charged with two counts of rape of his daughter. During
arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty. Version of prosecution: Josephine Deauna who was
19 years old at that time, was at their house. While Josephine was lying on her stomach, her
legitimate father raped her. In another incident, one evening in July 1997, Josephine was
already sleeping when appellant approached her again. Appellant proceeded to touch her
vagina and succeeded in having intercourse with her. Thereafter, Josephine went to the NBI
and gave her sworn statements. Version of the Defense: On the other hand, appellant
advances the theory that complainant was insane when she testified in court, and that the
alleged rape incidents did not actually happen. The defense for its part, offered the
testimony of five (5) witnesses consisting of 3 doctors and parents of Josephine. Such doctors
testified that Josephine was emotionally maladjusted and that her emotion appears to be
less stable, which means that when confronted with a situation that is threatening to herself,
private complainant becomes overwhelmed by the situation. Josefa Deauna, wife of the
accused testified that her daughter never complained to her about the alleged sexual abuses
committed by her father and she went directly to the NBI. The reason why private
complainant lodge[d] her complaint before the NBI, is that she harbored a grudge against her
father as she was being disciplined and whipped by her father prior to the complaint. Lastly,
5
Richard Deauna testified and raised several defenses. The defense is primarily anchored on
the alleged mental insanity or pyschosis on the part of the private complainant so as to
concoct a story of rape against her own father. The defense is primarily anchored on the
alleged mental insanity or pyschosis on the part of the private complainant so as to concoct a
story of rape against her own father. Also, the victim submitted an affidavit of desistance
stating that she was insane when she testified in Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant's testimony credible
RULING: Yes. It appears that she manifested in her demeanor, some form of insanity or
mental derailment thereafter or during the course of the proceedings, when she again
testified in court, this time as a defense witness. Even assuming that the victim was already
insane during her earlier testimony, this will not negate her testimony incredible and
inadmissible. Her mental imbalance would not automatically affect her mental credibility. All
persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to others, may
be witnesses. One may be insane but may be capable in law giving credible testimony. In this
case, it is quite evident that the victim was not only competent to testify, but turned out to
be a credible and convincing witness for the prosecution. Verily, sufficient in itself to
establish appellants criminal liability were her detailed accounts of the two (2) rape incidents
establishing the fact of rape and identifying her father as her ravisher, as indicated in the
transcripts of stenographic notes. The longstanding rule is that when a woman says that she
has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed. If her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted
solely on that basis. As confirmed by the evidence on record, Josephines insanity was
diagnosed on December 28, 1998, and a Report released by the National Mental Hospital
dated March 2, 1999 verified this finding. Her unsound mental condition is, therefore,
presumed to continue up to the present until a contrary finding can be established, or a
report to the effect that she is no longer insane can be produced. Considering that appellant
has not presented any substantial proof that his daughter has regained her sanity and is now
capable of expressing her thoughts freely, conscientiously and intelligently, we cannot
ascribe much value or credence to her declarations after December 28, 1998. Moreover, it is
not impossible that he or his family may have been taken advantage of her lack of mental
fortitude to persuade her to write those letters.
PEOPLE VS. ACBANGIN
G.R. NO. 117216
FACTS: Accused was charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Sweet.
According to the prosecution, Sweet's father testified that he last saw Sweet at the house of
the accused. When Jocelyn arrived without Sweet, when asked where the child was, Jocelyn
denied knowing the child's whereabouts. Pat. Manuel testified that when he asked Niu how
she came have possession of the child, she said that a certaik Helen brought the child
however on witness stand, Niu told that that it was Jocelyn who brought to him Sweet.
Jocelyn testified that Niu is the business of selling children. One day, Sweet wa s brought to
the house of Niu. Upon seeing Sweet, she accompanied Sweet's father to Niu's house.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of Sweet, a minor is credible
RULING: Jocelyn knew for two days where Sweet was. In fact, it was she who brought Sweet
to Niu's house. At that point, the crime was consummated. Jocelyn 's repentance and
deisistance came too late. Also, Sweet's testimony that it was Jocelyn who brought her to
Niu's house should not be disregarded. A witness' young age will not deter him from being
competent and credible witness. To be a competent's child witness, the following must be
regarded, a. Capacity of observation b. Capacity of recollection c. Capacity of communication.
All these were met by Sweet. Hence, Sweet's testimony should be upheld sice its testimony is
not tainted with arbitrariness.
MAXIMO ALVAREZ VS. SUSAN RAMIREZ #VIP#
G.R. NO. 143439
FACTS: The petitioner went to the house of his sister-in-law, Susan Ramirez, poured gasoline,
and set the house ablaze. His wife, Esperanza Alvarez was inside the house during the
incident and saw him pour the gasoline. Susan Ramirez filed a criminal case in RTC Branch 72,
Malabon City against the petitioner for Arson. The private prosecutor called Esperanza to the
witness stand as a witness against her husband, to which she testified that petitioner
committed the acts of Arson. The petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying pursuant to Sec. 22, Rule 130. The trial court issued an order disqualifying her and
deleting her testimony from the records. Thus, Susan Ramirez filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals with application for preliminary injunction and TRO. The CA
granted the petition.
ISSUE: May Esperanza testify against her husband?
HELD: Yes. Sec. 22 provides:
The Court ruled that while the circumstances do not expressly fall under the exceptions,
since the crime of arson was committed against the sister of Esperanza, notice must be given
to the reasons behind the rule: Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants."
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.
‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow;
and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes
within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or
directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute
that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committee (by) one against the other.’" Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to
petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act,
as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects
of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal
relationship survives and flourishes. "The act of private respondent in setting fire to the
house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in
fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and
confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The
6
criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the
accused- husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or
tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-
existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims to
protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home. It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission
of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact,
they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence
and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims
to protect.
PEOPLE VS. QUIDATO
G.R. NO. 117401
FACTS: Quidato, Jr., along with the brothers Reynaldo and Eddie Malita, was charged for
parricide for the murder of Bernardo Quidato, Sr. The accused-appellant, and the brothes as
hired hands, accompanied Bernardo to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling the
copra and being paid, the three retreated back to the brother’s house and drank tuba. Gina
Quidato then overheard that the three planned to go to her father-in-law’s house to get
money from the latter. This was presented in direct testimony against Quidato, Jr. and the
brothers. Ultimately, Bernardo was hacked to death by the three. Nevertheless, Quidato Jr.
averred that he had no participation in the crime, and was merely coerced by the brothers to
accompany the two to his father’s house. During trial, the accused-appellant objected to his
wife’s testimony pursuant to Section 22 of Rule 130. The trial court acknowledge the
applicability of the ruled, yet allowing the testimony as against the brothers as co-accused.
ISSUE: May the testimony be admitted as against the co-accused?
HELD: Yes. As correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband
and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or
accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie,
which was jointly tried with accused-appellant's case. This testimony cannot, however, be
used against accused- appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the
proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule. "What
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly" is a rule familiar even to law students.
Thus, with regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-
appellant having timely objected thereto under
the marital disqualification rule.
PEOPLE VS. ROBERTO PANSENSOY
G.R. NO. 140634
FACTS: Roberto Pasensoy is charged with the crime of murder for the death of Hilario Reyes.
As witness for the prosecution, Analie Pasensoy – Roberto’s wife – testified that he went to
the house of Hilario in Antipolo Rizal where she was currently living in. Upon opening the
door, Analie saw that Roberto was carrying a gun, and thus embraced him in a failed attempt
to wrest the gun away from him. Afterwards, Hilario went outside the house and confronted
Roberto. Appellant approached Hilario and asked him if he really loves his wife. Hilario
answered in the affirmative. Appellant next asked Hilario if he was still single.Hilario
answered yes. Appellant counted one to three and at the count of three shot Hilario. Hilario
was hit on the forehead and sprawled on the ground. However, Roberto Pasensyo averred
that his killing Hilario was an act of self-defense. The appellant kicked the door of the room
and there he found his wife and Tisoy lying beside each other. They were only clad in their
underwear. He dragged his wife out of the room by her hair and while doing so, he saw Tisoy
pull a gun from the table which was covered with clothes. He let go of his wife and jumped
on Tisoy to grab the gun. While they struggled for possession of the gun he hit the testicles of
Tisoy with his knees. Tisoy fell on his knees but was still holding the gun. Still grappling for
possession of the gun, appellant held on to the back portion of the gun and part of the
trigger, while his other hand held Hilarios hand which was holding the butt of the gun. When
Hilario knelt down, appellant was able to twist Hilarios hand and to point the barrel of the
gun towards the latter, eventually killing him. Roberto was convicted on the strength of
Analie’s testimony.
ISSUE: May Roberto be convicted on Analie’s testimony?
HELD: Yes. The Court held that Analie’s testimony would have been disregarded had
appellant timely objected to her competency to testify under the marital disqualification
rule. Under this rule, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or
in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct
descendants or ascendants. However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife
to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other
witnesses generally. The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he
or she is first offered as a witness. In his case, the incompetency was waived by appellants
failure to make a timely objection to the admission of Analies testimony.
GONI VS. CA
GR. L-27434
FACTS: TABACALERA owned three haciendas in Bais, Negros Oriental. The petitioner's
predecessors-in-interest, Villanueva bought the haciendas and because he did not have
sufficient funds he offered to sell one hacienda to Villegas with consent of TABACALERA. In
the said transaction, TABACALERA required a guaranty, and the private respondent Vicente
stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. The amount realized from the
transaction still fell short, thereby Villanueva sold portion of one hacienda. The agreement
was in writing and was signed by Goni as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. As a guarantor,
Vicente advised TABACLERA to debit from his account amount of P13,807 as payment for
balance of purchase price. However, the amount debited from private respondent's account
was only P12,460 as it was the actual amount needed to complete the purchase price. The
difference was supposedly paid by private respondent to Villanueva, but as no receipt
evidencing such payment was presented in court, this fact was disputed by petitioners.
Petitioner alleged that Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling a property, thus he went
to Vicente to rescind the contract however, as the amount of P12,460.24 was already
debited from Vicente's account it was agreed that the lots would merely be leased for 5 years
to Vicente, and the rental to be deducted from the money advanced by Vicente. In 1949 a
formal deed of sale covering three Haciendas was executed by TABACLERA, and was
registered in the name of Villanueva. Subsequently, property was mortgaged by Villanueva to
7
Rehabilation Finance Corporation. In 1950, portions of properties were delivered to Vicente.
On the same year, Villanueva executed a document of definite sale in favor of Villegas. Then
in 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted, and the lot of Vicente was
included in the inventory and was delivered to the heirs of Villanueva. Thus, an action for
recovery of property was filed by Villanueva against Goni in his capacity as administrator of
the estate of Villanueva on the basis of contract/ promise to sell executed by Villanueva in
favor of Vicente. Trial court ordered the delivery of the property to Vicente. On appeal, CA
affirmed the RTC's decision with modification.
ISSUE: WON Vicente's testimony on matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva
which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate is admissible.
HELD: Yes, Vicente's testimony is admissible. Under ordinary circumstance, Vicente's
testimony would be disqualified by reason of interest from testifying to any matter of fact
occuring before the death of Villanueva, such being anchored on Section 20 (a) Rule 130
known as Dead Man Statute or Survivorship disqualification. Section 20 (a) provides that “The
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or
indirectly, as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against
a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind.
In the case, although institued against the heirs of Villanueva after the estate has been
distributed remains within the ambit of protection for the very reason that defendants-heirs
are the “representatives” of the deceased, because they are placed in the litigation that they
are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense
which the deceased might have made if he is still living. The purpose of the rule is to guard
against temptation to give false testimony on part of surviving party, however in this case the
protection has been effectively waived when the counsel for petitioners cross-examined
Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the
estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
occurring during deceased's lifetime.” Vicente took the witness stand as defendant in the
counterclaim that was filed by petitioner. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim he was
not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva
because the said action was not brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the
estate or deceased person. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a)
of Rule 130 where one of the parties no longer has opportunity to either confirm or rebut the
testimony of the other because of death does not actually exists in the case since GONI as
attorney- in-fact of Villanueva who signed the promise to sell has the opportunity to either
confirm or deny any allegations made by Vicente with respect to the contract.
HKO AH PAO, ET AL., VS. LAURENCE CHUA TING
GR NO. 153476
FACTS:The spouses Aristeo Mayo and Salud Masangkay sold for P70,000 the property subject
of this case which is located at Malate, Manila to Arsenio Ting. A TCT was subsequently
issued in the name of Arsenio Ting. Arsenio died in 1972, predeceasing his father, Teng Ching
Lay, and leaving as compulsory heirs, the surviving spouse, Germana, and respondents who
were all minors at that time. In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Arsenios
estate before the Court of First Instance, the court issued an Order approving the project of
partition which included, among others, the property in question which was adjudicated in
favor of respondents. Petitioners, heirs of Teng Ching Lay, claim that the property was
bought by their patriarch, who allegedly entrusted the same to his son from a previous
marriage, Arsenio Ting, the deceased father of herein respondents. Petitioners, who have
been residing in the property since 1961, demanded the reconveyance of its title in their
favor on the ground that Arsenio merely held the property in trust for Teng Ching Lay.
According to petitioners, Teng Ching Lay purchased the property from the spouses Aristeo
Mayo and Salud Masangkay but it was made to appear in the contract of sale that Arsenio
was the vendee because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning land in the
Philippines. Petitioners’ principal witness was Angel Sembrano, corporate accountant of
Triumph Timber, Inc., and Teng Ching Lay’s personal accountant. According to Sembrano, he
met Arsenio when he was hired as an accountant of Triumph Timber, Inc. in 1959. As Teng
Ching Lay’s personal accountant from 1960 to 1989, he prepared the latter’s income tax
returns and purchases. In June of 1961, Arsenio allegedly told him that his father was going
to buy a house in Manila, and directed him to prepare a voucher and a check of the
corporation for P200,000 payable to Teng Ching Lay. Said voucher and check, however, along
with the other records of the corporation, were allegedly lost during the flood that hit
Butuan City in 1981. Sembrano likewise stated that when he went to Manila in November of
1961, Teng Ching Lay brought him to the house that he purportedly bought but since he was
a Chinese national at that time, the title to the property was placed in the name of Arsenio
The RTC rendered its decision dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners on the ground
that petitioners failed to prove that Arsenio was merely holding the subject property in trust
for his father. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Is the property owned by the estate of Arsenio or Teng Ching Lay? [Should Angel
Sembrano’s testimony be admitted?]
HELD:Property is owned by Arsenio. Angel Sembrano’s testimony is inadmissible. Petitioners
failed to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence. Time and again, the Court has
held that it will not interfere with the trial courts assessment regarding the credibility of
witnesses, absent any showing that it overlooked, misapplied or misunderstood some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance or that it gravely abused its discretion. Here, both
the RTC and the CA were not convinced of the truthfulness of Sembranos bare testimony. He
did not present any documentary proof to support his statements, particularly with regard to
the P200,000 check that he supposedly gave to Arsenio for the payment of the property in
question. Furthermore, Sembranos testimony on behalf of petitioners is about an alleged
declaration against an interest of a person who is dead in an action that is in effect a claim
against his estate. Such a testimony if coming from a party would be barred by the surviving
parties rule, or the dead mans statute, in the Rules of Court: Section 23, Rule 130.
Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or assignors of parties
to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such
person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. While Sembrano is
not a party, he is practically a surrogate of petitioners since he was the personal accountant
of their predecessor-in-interest and the corporate accountant of the corporation he
8
controlled.
SANSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 127745
FACTS: Petitioner Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon
Fing Sy (the deceased) who died Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in
the amount of P603,000.00 and to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the
amount of P360,000.00. Petitioners Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles
Montinola (Angeles) later filed separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased
owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively. Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the
deceased, was declared as administratrix of his estate, after the raffle of the case. During the
hearing petitioners testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the objection of
the Sy who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court otherwise known as
the Dead Man’s Statute. Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that
she had a transaction with the deceased which is evidenced by six checks. Celedonia, in
support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the deceased issued
five checks. Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and
motherin-law Angeles, testified that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000
and P150,000 from her husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks
issued by the deceased Sy denied having any knowledge about these obligations by her
husband. She objected to the admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered
in evidence by the claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are
disqualified under the Dead Man’s Statute. Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits
identified by Jade, she asserted that she is the daughter-in-law of Montinola Jr, hence
covered by the prohibition under Sec. 23 Rule 130. After the claimants rested their case, Sy
filed four separate manifestations informing the trial court that she was dispensing with the
presentation of evidence against their claims. The trial court rendered a decision in favor or
the petitioners and held that the Dead Man’s Statute is inapplicable, and ordered for the
payment of the obligations stated in the complaint from the assets in the estate of the
deceased. Sy appealed to the CA which set aside the decision of the trial court wherein the
claims of the petitioners were dismissed. Petitioners filed an MR however it was denied,
hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statements of the petitioners and Jade are prohibited under Sec
23 of Rule 130.
RULING: No. The rule renders incompetent, the parties to a case, their assignors, persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted. The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend
its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Jade is not a party
to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being
prosecuted. The testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other’s claim
against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute Since the law disqualifies
parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in his own
behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-
parties. The law speaks of parties or assignors of parties to a case. Sanson’s and Celedonia’s
claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with
respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson’s claim.
One is not thus disqualified to testify on the others transaction. In any event, what the Dead
Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose
before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony.
Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary
evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks. In fine, as the
claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims against the
estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who,
however, expressly opted not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was
dispensing with the presentation of evidence against the claims. Hence the petition was
granted.
Sunga-Chan v Chua
G.R. No. 143340
Facts: Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners Lilibeth and Cecilia daughter and
wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga for Winding Up of Partnership Affairs,
Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages.Respondent alleged that he
verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila and agreed to register the business name of their partnership,
SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER, under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship.
Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while
the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention
that the profits would be equally divided between them.Upon Jacinto’s death in the later
part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter, petitioner
Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite
without respondents consent. Despite respondents repeated demands upon petitioners for
accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net shares in the
partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Respondent claimed that petitioner Lilibeth
disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000.00 and partially paid the
same to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed respondent that the P200,000.00
represented partial payment of the latter’s share in the partnership, with a promise that the
former would make the complete inventory and winding up of the properties of the business
establishment. The trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent.In her appeal, in
the absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, petitioners argue that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of
respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after
Jacinto’s death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the Dead Man’s Statute or
Survivorship Rule under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Dead Man’s Statute applies to this case so as to render
inadmissible respondents testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
Held: No. The Dead Man’s Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party
is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction.But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the
introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: 1. The witness is a party or assignor
of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.2. The action is against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of
unsound mind;3. The subject matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person or against person of unsound mind;4. His testimony refers to any
9
matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such
person became of unsound mind. Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Man’s
Statute to this case.First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in
their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners
themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the Dead Man’s Statute.Well
entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the
estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to
occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as
defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of
fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against
but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.Second, the testimony of Josephine is
not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple reason that she is not a party or
assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Records show
that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the
partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners insistence that Josephine is the
alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term assignor of a party
means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned
before any cause of action has arisen. Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of
respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff. Josephine merely declared in court that she
was requested by respondent to testify and that if she were not requested to do so she
would not have testified. Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent
does not diminish the value of her testimony since relationship per se, without more, does
not affect the credibility of witnesses Petitioners reliance alone on the Dead Man’s Statute to
defeat respondents claim cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto. Based
not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the
formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.
Bordalba v CA
G.R. No. 112443
Facts: Lot No. 1242 located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City was originally owned by the late
spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme.An extrajudicial partition was
executed which disposed of the property as follows:1) 1/3 in favor of (a) their grandchild
Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent Candida Flores and the father of
private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their
grandchild Asuncion JaymeBaclay, whose heirs are private respondents Agelio Baclay, Elnora
Baclay and Carmen JaymeDaclan; 2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother
of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and 3) 1/3 to an unidentified party. Built on the land
adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house.Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez,
petitioner’s mother, filed with the Regional Trial Court an amended application for the
registration of the lot described. She further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is
applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission. The case was, however,
dismissed.Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands an application seeking the
issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted application of her mother,
Elena.Petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over
said lot.Thereafter, petitioner caused the subdivision and titling of Lot into 6 lots, as well as
the disposition of two parcels thereof. Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court, the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U.
Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands
and prayed that Free Patent No. (VIII) 11421 and OCT No. 0571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos.
2277122776 be declared void and ordered cancelled. Petitioner admitted that the properties
of the late Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in
1947, but claimed that she was not aware of the existence of said Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature
of her mother.The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner and declared
said patent and title void.Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for
private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother
should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s
statute.
Issue: Whether the Dead Man’s Statute applies in the case.
Held: No. As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, suffice it to state that said
rule finds no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to
close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledgeSince the claim
of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, on
the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and
communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by
the trial court.
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION vs. PENNSWELL, INC.
G.R. No. 172835
FACTS: On various dates, respondent Pennswell, Inc. delivered and sold to petitioner Air
Philippines Corporation sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, petitioner’s total
outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the
amount would be fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under
said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money with the RTC. In its Answer,
petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. In
particular, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by
respondent for its previous sale of four items. Said items were misrepresented by respondent
as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner
had previously purchased from respondent. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by
respondent which merely altered the names and labels of such goods. During the pendency
of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the
ingredients and chemical components of its certain products. The RTC rendered an Order
granting the petitioner’s motion. Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order,
contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components sought because
the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire upon
constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge.
The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. Alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which denied the Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the chemical components or ingredients of respondent’s products are
trade secrets or industrial secrets that are not subject to compulsory disclosure.
RULING: Yes. A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound
10
known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants
are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. The ingredients constitute the very
fabric of respondent’s production and business. To compel its disclosure is to cripple
respondent’s business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage. Section24 of Rule 130 draws
the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a)
communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client;
(c) communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and
penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged
matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may
not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled
to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census
returns; and (d) bank deposits. That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond
quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade secrets is evident in our laws
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the
chemical formulation of respondent’s products is not known to the general public and is
unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients are not within the
knowledge of the public. Since such factual findings are generally not reviewable by this
Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below. Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court
may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice. We do not, however, find
reason to except respondent’s trade secrets from the application of the rule on privilege. The
revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the
main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money.
ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107383
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. Petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought this action below for
recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila which after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin. Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the documents and papers, so forcibly/illegally taken or seized by the wife
from and without the consent of her husband as the capital owner of the same, are
admissible in evidence in a case of legal separation to which they are parties
RULING: No, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful
order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose
in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them
in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence
by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.
UNITED STATES VS ANTIPOLO;
GR NO. L-13109;
FACTS: Respondent Dalmaceo is charged for the murder of one Fortunato Dinal. The trial
court convicted him of homicide. The decision was appealed, and one of the errors assigned
is the refusal of the trial to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of Dinal, to testify as a witness
on behalf of the defense concerning certain dying allegations. Accoding to the testimony of
Ezpeleta, it was the dying declaration of her husband that his injury that caused his death
was from a fall, and not respondent. The fiscal objected to the testimony of Ezpeleta.
According to the fiscal, Ezpeleta, as the widow of the deceased, is incompetent to testify
under the rules and procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent
of her husband. Since the husband is dead, he cannot grant permission. Therefore, the
witness is disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured party.
The trial court sustained the object. The defense now argues that the witness is competent.
According to the defense, disqualification related only to cases where a husband/wife of one
of the parties to proceeding is called to testify. According to them, the parties in this case are
the government and the accused.
ISSUE: Is Ezpeleta disqualified from being a witness for the defense?
HELD: NO.Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
"Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the
other, neither husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a
criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties." This case does not fall
with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section 58 is
to protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the
marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential
communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the
prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of
injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received those
injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a
communication is made for the express purpose that it may be communicated after the
death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
PEOPLE VS CARLOS;
GR NO. 22948;
FACTS: The case is regarding the murder of Dr. Sityar. The accused, Carlos, is the husband of
one the doctor’s patients. In one of their consultations asked the defendant, he was met by
11
his outraged wife due to an argument with the doctor. Despite what happened, Carlos still
went to the doctor for consultation. Several days after, he received a letter from the doctor
asking him for immediate settlement of his wife’s account. According to the prosecution, the
defendant went to the office of the doctor. Without any preliminary quarrel, Carlos willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked the doctor with a fan-knife and stabbed him causing the
doctor’s immediate death. Defendant admitted he killed the deceased but maintained in
court that it was a mere act of self-defense. The trial court decided that there was no self-
defense. Therefore, what was left to determine is whether defendant was guilty of
committing murder or simple homicide. In proving that there was murder, the prosecution
presented a hand-penned letter written to the defendant by his wife. The tenor of the letter
shows that the writer (his wife) feared what could be the consequences of what the
defendant was contemplating which is resorting to physical violence in dealing with the
doctor. Due to this found element, premeditation was established which completely
constitutes the crime of murder.
ISSUE: Does the letter between the husband and the wife constitute privileged
communication as was contemplated in the Rules of Evidence?
HELD: YES. The letter was held to be inadmissible. The Supreme Court held that generally
where a privileged communication of spouse- to-spouse comes either legally or not into the
hands of a third party, if without collusion and there is voluntary foreclosure on either
spouse, then the privilege is extinguished and the communication becomes admissible.
But in this case however, the letter in question was obtained through search and seizure
where no warrant was issued. And documents obtained by illegal searches are not admissible
in a criminal case. Furthermore, the letter was held to be hearsay evidence. The letter was
written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have
been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the
letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or
otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also
have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his
possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore
nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the
defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and
have the opportunity to cross-examine them.
HILADO VS DAVID;
GR NO. L-961;
FACTS: In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled
against Selim Assad. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick. In January 1946, Atty.
Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he entered his appearance
in court. In May 1946 or four months later, counsel of Hilado filed a motion to have Atty.
Francisco be disqualified because Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional
legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion
letter. Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said
that no material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s
story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado
returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado
returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain
Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving
behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was
stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign
the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a
letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case. Atty. Francisco also pointed out
that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was relayed because all
Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any,
Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already
representing Assad in court for four months in the said case. Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled
in favor of Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE: Should Atty. Francisco be disqualified in this case?
HELD: YES. There is already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty.
Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s
consent. As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded as established. An attorney is
employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he
is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice
thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s
cause in open court.
Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not
matter if the information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client
relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other representations against
the client. Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco
but was only signed by him: It still binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the
real author, was part of the same law firm. An information obtained from a client by a
member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm, his associates or his
employers.
REGALA VS SANDIGANBAYAN;
GR NO. 105938, 108113;
FACTS: The matters raised in the present case are an offshoot of the institution of the PCGG
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the several corporations.
Petitioners in this case are all the partners in ACCRA law firm. The complaint in PCGG Case
No. 33 alleged that the ACCRA LAWYERS and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each
other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate
framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others. Also,
that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly- owned investment
arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million
shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The
PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and
it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, ACCRA
LAWYERS acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others,
12
to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth. On August 20, 1991, PCGG filed a
“Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint” which EXCLUDED private respondent ROCO
from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, whereas ACCRA LAWYERS still
were included still as defendants. ACCRA LAWYERS subsequently filed their
Comment/Opposition with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same
treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent ROCO.
PCGG in its comment agreed to exclude the ACCRA LAWYERS on the ff conditions: (a) the
disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments ACCRA
LAWYERS executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.
SANDIGANBAYAN RULING: DENIED the exclusion of ACCRA LAWYERS in PCGG Case No. 33 for
their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG.
ISSUE: Should petitioners be compelled to reveal their clients?
HELD: NO. The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their
clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of
the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is
not privileged information. Sandiganbayan resolution annulled and set-aside. Petitioners
excluded from complaint. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of this client. Reasons: 1. Court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.; 2. Privilege begins to
exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client; 3. Privilege generally pertains to the subject
matter of the relationship.; 4. Due process considerations require that the opposing party
should, as a general rule, know his adversary. BUT when the client's name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences: 1. A
strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.; 2. Disclosure would open the client to
civil liability. (case at bar); 3. Government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client
unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (case at bar); 4.
Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance
(case at bar); 5. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and
it is the identity which is intended to be confidential
SAURA, JR. VS. AGDEPPA
A.C. NO. 4426
FACTS: Petitioners filed two (2) administrative complaints against respondent, Atty. Lilibeth
Agdeppa, regarding her handling of a settlement case involving a piece of property owned in
common by the petitioners with their other siblings, Macrina, Romeo and Amelita, all
surnamed Saura, who were then the administrators of the said property of the late Ramon E.
Saura who died intestate on 15 May 1992. On 27 April 1995, petitioners learned that the
administrators of the property, Macrina, Romeo and Amelita, had, with the assistance of the
respondent as their counsel, who in fact notarized the Deed of Sale, sold the property to
Sandalwood Real Estate and Development Corporation without the knowledge and
participation of petitioners. To compound matters, petitioners alleged that despite repeated
demands, the vendors or their counsel, Atty. Agdeppa, have refused to disclose the amount
of the sale or account for the proceeds. The petitioners have thus been constrained to
institute criminal and civil actions to enforce and protect their rights. When ordered to
respond to the complaints, Atty. Agdeppa proffered that she canno answer the
administrative charges against her without divulging certain pieces of information in violation
of the attorney-client privilege.
ISSUE: Is the request to provide information regarding the sale of the property and to
account for the proceeds a violation of the attorney- client privilege?
HELD: NO. The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The petitioners are
only asking for the disclosure of the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds.
Petitioners certainly have the right to ask for such information since they own the property
as co-heirs of the late Ramon E. Saura and as co-administrators of the property. Hence,
respondent cannot refuse to divulge such information to them and hide behind the cloak of
the attorney-client relationship.
SANVICENTE VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 132081
FACTS: Petitioner, Joel Sanvicente, was charged with homicide for the killing of Dennis Wong.
On 11 June 1995, at around 5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally shot the victim outside the Far East
Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly
attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the
automatic teller machine. Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, wrote a letter
addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz, Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, Anonas
Road, Quezon City. In said letter, Atty. Valmonte narrated his client’s version of the incident
to P/Major Diaz. This letter was marked by the prosecution as its “Exhibit LL.” The trial court
eventually acquitted petitioner when it granted the latter’s demurrer to evidence. On appeal,
the prosecution averred that the trial court rejected its motion to have the Exhibit LL further
identified through the proposed testimony of Atty. Valmonte, the author of said letter. As
petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Valmonte refused to testify on any matter regarding the letter
since its covered subject is falls squarely within the scope of privileged communication.
ISSUE: Can Atty. Valmonte be compelled to testify on contents of the letter?
HELD: NO. It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the
details of the shooting communicated by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it
is connected with the business for which petitioner retained the services of the latter. More
specifically, said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to seek
his professional advice or assistance in relation to the subject matter of the employment, or
to explain something in connection with it, so as to enable him to better advice his client or
manage the litigation.
GONZALES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 117740
FACTS: This is a case involving the settlement and partition of the estate of Ricardo de Mesa
Abad. On 18 April 1972, petitioners sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their
brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad. They claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de
Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. On 17 July 1972, private respondents filed a motion to set
aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition. They alleged that Honoria Empaynado had
been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for 27 years before his death, and that during
these period, their union had produced 2 children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad
13
Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child
allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. Petitioners
presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abad’s physician, declaring that in 1935,
he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the
latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
Private respondents objected to it for being privileged communication
ISSUE:
. Is the affidavit of Dr. Perdo Arenas admissible?
. Does the privilege communication rule apply even if the patient is already dead?
HELD:
1. NO. Ricardo Abad’s "sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which
most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a
premium, sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a
sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any
patient. Hence, it is inadmissible.
2. YES. The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in
established precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would
be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if
death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures
which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the
living are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to
light communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.
LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 91114
FACTS: Petitioner, Nelly Lim and private respondent, Juan Sim, are lawfully married to each
other. Private respondent filed petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that
petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia Private
respondent's counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the Chief of the
Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine
who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify. Petitioner's counsel opposed
the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Private respondent’s counsel contended
that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any
information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity.
ISSUE: Is Dr. Lydia Acampado barred by the privilege communication rule from testifying as
an expert witness?
HELD: NO. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation
and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the
subject communicated is not stated. She did not disclose anything obtained in the course of
her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and
conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on
whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. It is
quite clear from Dr. Acampado's testimony that the petitioner was never interviewed alone.
Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party. There is authority to
the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence of
third parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege:
CHAN VS. CHAN
G.R. NO. 179786
FACTS: This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production
and submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration
of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband. Petitioner
Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before RTC of Makati Cit a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny). Josielene filed with the RTC a
request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering
Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a
motion to “be allowed to submit in evidence” the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-
patient privilege.
ISSUE: Can the court order the production of Johnny’s hospital records?
HELD: NO. Josielene claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged
since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged.
Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent
of the patient, be examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says
Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at
the trial. To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness,
and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow access to evidence that is
inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in
the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to
testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s
prior consent.
KROHN VS. CA
G.R. No. 108854
FACTS: Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married. However, the relationship
between the couple developed into a stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing
purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile. They
finally separated in fact. Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report
on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. Edgar filed a
petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court. In his petition,
he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. Edgar took the witness stand and
tried to testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was
objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication between
physician and patient. Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the
contents of the psychiatric report. She argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which he may have acquired in
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attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "with more reason should be third person
(like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report,
findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his
confidential and privileged relation with a patient." Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr.,
however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to a
physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar where
the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the
husband and not the physician of the petitioner."
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the husband with regard to the confidential
evaluation report is prohibited.
RULING:No. The requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the
privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the
information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was
confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the
patient. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband
who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly,
this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a
circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of
the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed
the report.
Pentagon Steel Corporation vs. CA, NLRC, and Balogo
G.R. No. 174141.
FACTS: Perfecto Balogo was an employee of Pentagon in its wire drawing department.
Pentagon alleged that Balogo was absent for several days without just cause. On the other
hand, Balogo stated that he had contracted a flu associated with diarrhea and suffered loose
bowel movement due to infection. Despite presenting medical certificate, Pentagon refuses
to accept Balogo back to work. Balogo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. During the
conciliation proceedings the respondent presented the medical certificate covering his
period of absence. The petitioner required him, however, to submit himself to the company
physician to determine if he was fit to return to work. Balogo complied with the same but
according to Pentagon, Balogo refused to return to work and insisted that he be paid his
separation pay. The case proceeded and later on, the LA dismissed the same ruling that there
was no dismissal. The NLRC reversed LA’s ruling, which was affirmed by the CA. The CA in
ruling for Balogo, considered among other factual circumstances the parties’ actions during
the conciliation proceedings. The CA held that the respondent was constructively dismissed
when the petitioner repeatedly refused to accept the respondent back to work despite the
valid medical reason that justified his absence from work. The CA concluded that the
respondent complied with the petitioner's directive to submit a written explanation when the
former presented the medical certificate to explain his absences. In this petition, Pentagon
argues that CA cannot use the parties' actions and/or agreements during the negotiation for
a compromise agreement as basis for the conclusion that the respondent was illegally
dismissed.
ISSUE:Whether or not the parties’ actions in the conciliation proceedings are privileged
communication.
HELD:YES. Article 233 of the Labor Code states that "[i]nformation and statements made at
conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communication and shall not be used
as evidence in the Commission. Conciliators and similar of cials shall not testify in any court
or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them." This
was the provision we cited in Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor when we
pointedly disallowed the award made by the public respondent Secretary; the award was
based on the information NCMB Administrator Olalia secured from the confidential position
given him by the company during conciliation. In the present case, SC finds that the CA did
indeed consider the statements the parties made during conciliation; thus, the CA erred by
considering excluded materials in arriving at its conclusion. The reasons behind the exclusion
are two-fold: First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person
is entitled to "buy his or her peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her
efforts fail; hence, any communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged.
Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against a person who presents
it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no
prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise
position could be exploited as a confession of weakness. Second, offers for compromise are
irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the parties making them. A true
offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a
defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is
groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the
expense of litigation. It is the distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made
tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual concessions. (Ultimately
however, the SC ruled that the petition is without merit. It ruled that the CA also based its
decision on other facts and not only those in the conciliation proceedings. The SC noted that
Balogo had a valid reason of his absence but the same was still refused from work. Also,
Balogo did not abandon his employment and did not intend to severe the EER because he
returned to work after his illness and presented a medical certificate.)
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