EMMA LEE VS. CA
Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness
FACTS: Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) were immigrants from China
and had 11 children (collectively, the Lee-Keh children). Lee brought from China a young
woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu) and allegedly had 8 children (collectively, Lee’s other children)
with her, one of which is petitioner Emma Lee. When Keh died, Lee’s other children claimed
too that they are Keh’s daughters. The Lee-Keh children learned from an NBI investigation
that Lee’s other children were born out of a younger woman which possibly be Tiu. The Lee-
Keh children filed a complaint for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of Emma Lee,
the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother's name.
They filed a request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu to testify
in the case. Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma
Lee's stepmother.
ISSUE:Whether or not Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner.
HELD: YES. Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence states: SECTION 25. Parental and lial
privilege. — No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants. The above is an adaptation from a similar
provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who
revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or
descendants. But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother
of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to
"direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
PEOPLE VS. INVENCION
FACTS: For sexually violating his 16-year old daughter Cynthia P. Invencion, accused Artemio
Invencion was charged, tried and subsequently found guilty of the crime of qualified rape and
was sentenced to the penalty of death thus this automatic review. One of the witnesses of
the prosecution is Elven Invencion. Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang
Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and
son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. Sometime before the end of the school
year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two
other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthia's loud cries. Looking towards her, he
saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his
father put on his short pants. Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel
father and a drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. The
defense tried to refute the witnesses’ testimonies. They argue, among others, that Elven, as
accused’s son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:Whether or not Elven is disqualified as a witness because of the “filial privilege”. HELD:
NO. The Court ruled that the competency of Elven to testify is not affected by Section 25,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is
not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified
to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be
invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was
not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he
voluntarily testified against Artemio.
against his father of his own accord and only "to tell the truth." Also, neither can Artemio
challenge the prosecution's act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child
of tender years like Elven.
JOEL M. SANVICENTE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
Facts: Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua. On
June 11, 1995, petitioner fatally shot the victim outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan
Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly attempted to rob him of a large
amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller machine. Petitioner,
by counsel, wrote a letter to P/Major Antonio Diaz, Station Commander of PNP Station 9,
CPDC, Anonas Road, Quezon City admitting of the fact of shooting but interposing self-
defence (Exhibit LL). RTC granted petitioner’s MTD on Demurrer to Evidence. CA reversed the
RTC holding that it erred in preventing the prosecution to prove the authenticity and due
execution of Exhibit LL.
Issue: Whether or not Exhibit LL constitutes an admission.
Held: Yes. But not admitted in evidence due to the failure of prosecution to prove
authenticity and due execution. - Admission v confession. An admission is defined under Rule
130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court as the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is the declaration
of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or any offense necessarily
included therein.
More particularly, a confession “is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily
and without compulsion or inducement stating or acknowledging that he had committed or
participated in the commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand, is usually
applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve
an acknowledgment of the guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense
with which he is charged.” In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while
there is no such acknowledgment of guilt in an admission. With the foregoing distinctions in
mind, the trial court correctly rejected the prosecution’s motion to have Exhibit LL further
identified “in the manner that it wanted,” i.e., through the proposed testimony of
petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who incidentally refused to testify. Aside from covering
a subject which squarely falls within the scope of “privileged communication”, it would, more
importantly, be tantamount to converting the admission into a confession. What was
objectionable was the prosecution’s sole reliance on the document without proof of other
facts to establish its case against petitioner because of its mistaken assumption that the
same was a confession. It had failed to adduce evidence to prove the genuineness and due
execution of the document. Exhibit LL is considered as hearsay.
PEOPLE v OMICTIN
FACTS: Four private complainants: Guevarra, Caponpon, Mago and Ambrosio filed against
Omictin complaint for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa before the NBI. NBI prepared an
entrapment operation where Omictin was arrested. Omictin was charged with and adjudged
guilty of Illegal recruitment in large scale and three (3) counts of Estafa by RTC. On appeal,
Omictin assailed that Primo Guevarra was not the one who paid the accused, but Elisa
Dotenes, who issued a check in favor of accused-appellant in behalf of Guevarra. Thus,
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without the supporting testimony of Dotenes who was not presented by the prosecution,
Guevarras testimony is unsubstantiated and hearsay; As to private complainant Ambrosio,
there was no receipt presented to show payment to accused-appellant, rendering his
testimony uncorroborated and self-serving. CA affirmed RTC Decision in toto. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not testimonies of Guevarra and Ambrosio are unsubstantiated and self-
serving.
HELD:NO. The common objection known as self-serving is not correct because almost all
testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is hearsay. Petitioner fails to take
into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court.
Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest;
they do not include a partys testimony as a witness in court. Self-serving statements are
inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination,
and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a
partys testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing
party for cross-examination. Even assuming hypothetically that their testimonies are
unsubstantiated and self-serving, Omictin admitted, during trial, the substance of their
testimonies. Omictin testified thus before the RTC: Q So how much did each of the four
complainants paid (sic) you for the processing of their visa? A Arvin [Guevarra] and Roy
[Mago], P40,000.00 each.Q How about this Anthony Ambrosio?A P16,000.00. Through her
testimony, Omictin admitted and established the fact that she was paid by Guevarra the
amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP 16,000.
HEIRS OF CLEMEA v HEIRS OF BIEN
FACTS: The only question presented in this petition for review on certiorari is whether
petitioners, the heirs of Pedro Clemea y Zurbano, should be made to pay respondents, the
heirs of Irene B. Bien, compensatory damages for depriving them of the owners share of the
harvest from a tract of riceland in Bolo, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. Petitioners no longer
dispute respondents ownership of the property covered by TD 5299. They insist, however,
that they cannot be held liable to respondents for the harvest because (1) they never took
possession of the property declared in TD 5299 and (2) the evidence the CA relied on to
determine the amount of damages, proceeding as it did from one of the plaintiffs, was self-
serving and therefore could not have been a proper basis for such an award.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for compensatory damages.
HELD: YES, petitioners contention that the land was never in their possession should be
dismissed outright for two reasons. First, petitioners predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano
alleged in his answer that the land declared in TD 5299 was in his exclusive possession.
That statement took on the character of a judicial admission contemplated in Section 4, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court: An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter
contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the
exercise of its discretion and because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a
party from the consequences of his admission. The rule was more forcibly stated by Mr.
Justice Street in the 1918 decision Ramirez v. Orientalist Co.: An admission made in a
pleading can not be controverted by the party making such admission; and all proof
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should simply be ignored by the
court, whether objection is interposed by the opposite party or not. And in Cunanan v.
Amparo, the Court declared that: the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings. Second, the issue of whether petitioners ever
had possession of the land is undeniably a question of fact. Questions of this nature cannot
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari as the remedy is confined to pure questions of
law. Petitioners next proposition, that Gregorio Clemeas testimony was self-serving and
therefore an improper basis for the damages awarded to respondents, is unworthy of
favorable consideration. Self-serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any
evidence that serves its proponents interest. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers
only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of
court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court. Evidence of this
sort is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for
cross- examination by the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would
open the door to fraud and fabrication. In contrast, a partys testimony in court is sworn and
subject to cross-examination by the other party, and therefore, not susceptible to an
objection on the ground that it is self-serving. Therefore, the award of damages must stand.
PEOPLE V MAGDADARO Y GERONA
FACTS: On three separate occasions, accused-appellant Paulino Magdadaro (Magdadaro), 54-
year old farmer, allegedly raped complainant Beverlinda Abrasado, 16 years old, and the
daughter of Magdadaro’s tenant Leonardo. On the third rape incident, Beverlinda had the
chance to shout, which was heard by her father who proceeded towards the direction where
it came from. When Leonardo saw his landlord abusing his daughter, he called “Gaw” and
unsheathed his bolo. Appellant immediately ran away naked from waist down, and became
lost in the bushes. Magdadaro was found about two hours later by the Bantay Bayan and the
military, still hiding in the bushes. The witness asked him if he was Paulino Magdadato and
“Why did you do it?” but the latter did not answer. He was then taken to the checkpoint of
the PC detachment. At the scene of the incident, the search party found a pair of long pants,
a pair of briefs, a hat and a woman’s underwear. Beverlinda was also still there, seated and
crying.
In his defense, Magdadaro admitted having carnal knowledge of Beverlinda but maintained
that the acts were consummated upon mutual agreement, and that, by implication, he and
Beverlinda were sweethearts. The RTC Cagayan De Oro found Magdadaro guilty in all three
criminal cases, and sentenced him to three penalties of reclusion perpetua, plus
indemnification and moral damages. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Did the RTC err in holding that the failure of accused-appellant Magdadaro to answer
whether he was the one who committed the crime is an admission of guilt?
RULING: NO, it did not err. Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and
specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-
confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and empathically repel an accusation of
crime, as a matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a precaution of against
prejudicing himself. A person’s silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify
an inference that he is not innocent. In this case, Magdadaro’s silence when asked by the
Barangay Captain why he had done it, is significant. His claim that there was no admission by
silence on his part since he was not given the opportunity to make a reply besides the fact
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that whoever asked the question was not known to him therefore hardly deserves
consideration.
SMITH BELL AND CO. (PHILS) INC v COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: This involves a collision of two vessels M/V Don Carlos and M/S Yotai Maru, the
former ramming the portside (left side) of the latter. The consignees of the damaged cargo
were paid by their insurance companies. The insurance companies in turn, having been
subrogated to the interests of the consignees of the damaged cargo, commenced actions
against private respondent Go Thong for damages sustained by the various shipments in the
then Court of First Instance of Manila. Two (2) cases were filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila. Civil Cases Nos. 82567 (Judge Fernandez) and 82556 (Judge Cuevas) held that the
officers and crew of the "Don Carlos" had been negligent that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision and accordingly held respondent Go Thong liable for
damages to the plaintiff insurance companies. Fernandez Case: On appeal, Court of Appeals
through Reyes, L.B., J., rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of Judge Fernandez.
Subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Go Thong went to Supreme Court which
denied petition for review for lack of merit. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Cuevas Case: In the Cuevas case Court of Appeals (almost two [2] years after the Decision of
Reyes, L.B., J., in C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R, had been affirmed by the Supreme Court on Petition
for Review) through Sison, P.V., J., reversed the Cuevas Decision and held the officers of the
"Yotai Maru" at fault in the collision with the "Don Carlos," and dismissed the insurance
companies' complaint. Herein petitioners asked for reconsideration, to no avail. The
insurance companies filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Decision of
Sison, P.V., J. contending among others, that Sison P.V., J., was in serious and reversible error
in accepting Go Thong's defense that the question of fault on the part of the "Yotai Maru"
had been settled by the compromise agreement between the owner of the "Yotai Maru"
and Go Thong as owner of the "Don Carlos;"
ISSUE: Whether or not offer of compromise is an admission of liability and admissible in
evidence against the person making the offer.
HELD: NO. Private respondent Go Thong argues that a compromise agreement entered into
between Sanyo Shipping Company as owner of the "Yotai Maru" and Go Thong as owner of
the "Don Carlos," under which the former paid P268,000.00 to the latter, effectively settled
that the "Yotai Maru" had been at fault. This argument is wanting in both factual basis and
legal substance. True it is that by virtue of the compromise agreement, the owner of the
"Yotai Maru" paid a sum of money to the owner of the "Don Carlos." Nowhere, however, in
the compromise agreement did the owner of the "Yotai Maru " admit or concede that the
"Yotai Maru" had been at fault in the collision. The familiar rule is that "an offer of
compromise is not an admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence
against the person making the offer." A compromise is an agreement between two (2) or
more persons who, in order to forestall or put an end to a law suit, adjust their differences by
mutual consent, an adjustment which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining more,
balanced by the danger of losing more. An offer to compromise does not, in legal
contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant that he is legally liable, nor
on the part of a plaintiff that his claim or demand is groundless or even doubtful, since the
compromise is arrived at precisely with a view to avoiding further controversy and saving the
expenses of litigation. It is of the very nature of an offer of compromise that it is made
tentatively, hypothetically and in contemplation of mutual concessions. The above rule on
compromises is anchored on public policy of the most insistent and basic kind; that the
incidence of litigation should be reduced and its duration shortened to the maximum extent
feasible.
TAN vs. RODIL ENTERPRISES
FACTS: Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the subject premises, the Ides ORacca Building since
1959, which is owned by Manila, is owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On May1992,
Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, through the DENR, entered into a Renewal of a Contract
of Lease over the Ides ORacca Building. A subsequent Supplementary Contract dated later
that year was similarly entered into, thus, extending the lease agreement until 1 September
1997. The validity of these contracts were placed in question in several actions involving
Rodil Enterprises, the Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc., and other tenants. This
Court upheld the validity of the aforesaid contracts in a Decision rendered on 29 November
2001. Prior thereto, the Office of the President in OP Case No. 4968 declared the Renewal of
Contract of Lease and the Supplementary Contract, of no force and effect. Meanwhile during
the pendency of these cases, respondent subleased a space to herein petitioner, Luciano Tan.
However, Luciano Tan unjustifiably and unreasonably refused to pay the rentals from
September 1997 up to the time of the filing hence defendant file for a case of Unlawful
Detainer. In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government
who owns the Ides ORacca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. He, thus, prayed for the
dismissal of the Complaint, and for the return of whatever amount Rodil Enterprises had
collected from 1987 to 1997, or during such time when he was still paying rentals to the
latter. MeTC recognized the validity of the sublease contract between the parties and
ordered the petitioner to pay the rentals amounting to P440,000.00. On 14 August 2000,
Luciano Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring therein that he
had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the subject premises and to pay the subsequent
monthly rentals as they fall due. According to the MeTC the foregoing gestures, as
appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to an admission of a fact, like the existence of a debt
which can serve as proof of the loan, and was thus, admissible. The court pronounced that
Luciano Tan had explicitly acknowledged his liability for the periodic consideration for the use
of the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from disavowing the fact of lease
implied from the tender of payment for the rentals in arrears. Tan appealed to the RTC which
reversed the decision of the MeTC being contrary to Section 27, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Subsequently, Rodil Enterprises filed a Petition for Review with the
appellate court, which reinstated the decision of the MeTC, hence this petition.
ISSUE:W/N Tan made a judicial admission of his liability under the sublease contract
between him and the petitioner.
RULING: YES. Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then,
reiterated in his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an
admission of his liability, citing Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which states, that
an offer of compromise in a civil case is not a tacit admission of liability. However this rule
admits exceptions. In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly
appreciated petitioners admission as an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The
MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the existence of the sublease, and his counsel
made frank representations anent the formers liability in the form of rentals. This expressed
admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant to
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Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioner’s
liability on the subleased premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC. Indeed, the
existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner.
Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as to his liability,
but also, as to the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. Petition is denied.
SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS, INC v CA, SPOUSES TOLOSA, BINAN MOTOR SALES
CORPORATION, and EDUARDO GARCIA,
FACTS: Servicewide filed a complaint for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against
Tolosa spouses alleging that spouses Tolosa failed to pay the installments due on the
purchase price of jeepney despite several demands. Later on, Servicewide amended its
complaint and included Garcia as defendant alleging that the Tolosa spouses, without
Servicewide's knowledge and consent, executed and delivered to Eduardo Garcia a "Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage" over the jeepney sought to be recovered. Bartina filed a
compliant-in-intervention claiming that the vehicle subject of the complaint was sold to her
by Binan Motors owned by Eduardo Garcia and that the vehicle was in her possession when
it was seized by the sheriff and thereafter turned over to Servicewide. Later, Bartina and
Garcia and Binan Motors, with the assistance of their respective counsels, moved to dismiss
the complaint-in-intervention. They alleged that they had "arrived at an amicable settlement
of their claims. The decision was rendered by the trial court and included Garcia liable to
Servicewide.
ISSUE:W/N Garcia’s subsequent compromise with Bartina proves his liability for the
obligation.
RULING: NO. The compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors cannot be
taken as an admission of Garcia's liability. In the "Answer to the Complaint in Intervention,"
Garcia and Bian Motors admitted that they acquired from the Tolosas the "vehicle subject of
the complaint in consideration of one Celeste jeepney valued at P56,000.00." The vehicle
subject of the complaint was the one found in the possession of Bartina. Under the two
pleadings, however, what Garcia and Bian Motors sold to the Tolosa spouses was a different
vehicle from the one they acquired from said spouses and which they allegedly sold to
Bartina. A double sale of the same jeepney could not rise because there appears to be two
different jeepneys in the pleadings. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission
of any liability. With more reason, a compromise agreement should not be treated as an
admission of liability on the part of the parties visa-vis a third person. The compromise
settlement of a claim or cause of action is not an admission that the claim is valid, but merely
admits that there is a dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of the controversy, nor is
a compromise with one person an admission of any liability to someone else. The policy of
the law should be, and is, to encourage compromises. When they are made, the rights of
third parties are not in any way affected thereby.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., vs. PAL EMPLOYEES SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.
Facts:PESALA filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with prayer for TRO
and injunction against PAL. Upon filing of the complaint, PESALA, among others, sought to
prohibit PAL from implementing the 40% limitation on their salary deductions pertaining to
the loan repayments, capital contributions and deposits authorized by the PESALA members
which will be remitted to PESALA and to order defendants to maintain status quo ante litem
and to strictly enforce the aforesaid payroll deductions in favor of PESALA. PAL, through its
then counsel Atty. Pena and then Labor Affairs OIC Atty. Blanco, acknowledged its liability to
PESALA in the amount of P44 million plus. In open court, during the hearing of the case, Atty.
Pena and Atty. Blanco assured that PAL will settle its obligations to PESALA concerning the
undeducted loan remittances.This assurance was transcribed in the Order of the RTC. PAL
contends that its right to due process was violated when the Court of Appeals sustained the
RTC ruling for it to remit to PESALA the amount of P44 million plus which amount was not
specically prayed for in the Complaint.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in making an award not specifically prayed for in the
complaint.
Held: No. PESALA's claim of P44 million is a necessary consequence of the action it filed
against PAL. As said claim was duly heard and proven during trial, with PAL being afforded
the opportunity to contest it, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in granting such
claim.
Even if viewed as an offer of compromise, which is generally inadmissible in evidence against
the offeror in civil cases, PAL's acknowledgment of its liability to PESALA, through the
assurance made by Atty. Pena and Atty Blanco, falls under one of the exceptions to the rule
of exclusion of compromise negotiations. If there is neither an expressed nor implied denial
of liability, but during the course of negotiations the defendant expressed a willingness to
pay the plaintiff, then such offer of the defendant can be taken in evidence against him. PAL
admitted the amount of P44 million without an expressed nor implied denial of liability. This
admission, coupled with an assurance of payment, binds PAL.
PEOPLE VS. DE JOYA
Facts: Defendant was charged before the RTC-Bulacan with the crime of robbery with
homicide. Arnedo, the son-in-law of the victim, testified that he had a conversation with the
accused’s lawyer regarding a possible negotiation of the case. The accused was one or two
meters away from him and the lawyer when they were discussing the lawyer’s offer of
compromise. The accused also did not mention anything during the discussion. In the
Solicitor-General's brief, it is casually contended that the circumstantial evidence against
appellant included: "the attempt on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya through his
counsel to settle the case amicably”.
Issue: Whether the lawyer’s offer of compromise in behalf of the accused is tantamount to
admission of guilt.
Held: No. The court refused to apply the last sentence of Section 24, Rule 130
The Court does not feel justified in concluding from the testimony of a member of the
extended family of the victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the accused"
nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may be reasonably
inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself made no mention of any attempt on the part
of appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we must
assume that the trial court either did not believe that appellant had tried to compromise the
criminal case or considered that appellant could not fairly be deemed to have impliedly
admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed the victim. A much higher level of
explicitness and specific detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused had
impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with homicide.
PEOPLE VS. MEJIA, ET. AL
Facts:One evening, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan,
several persons on board a passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter
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and a passenger, Vergilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds.
Landingin died while Catugas survived. 9 persons were held to account for the crime but only
4 (Mejia, et. al) were taken into police custody 3 separate criminal complaints for murder,
frustrated murder and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of 1992, as amended)
were filed against the accused. At the arraignment, the four accused entered a plea of
innocence in each case. Catugas testified that the parents of the accused offered to pay him,
but he refused because such an offer could not be accepted by his conscience. The trial court
gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even took the incident as offer of
compromise, which may be considered an implied admission of guilt.
Issue: Whether there is an implied admission of guilt.
Held: None. There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants authorized his
parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one
were to believe the explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the
expenses he incurred for his hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is
not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last paragraph of
Section 27 of Rule 130. Catugas had ulterior motive in implicating the appellants. He
demanded P80,000.00 from the parents of the appellants in consideration of his exculpatory
testimony. But the parents could not deliver the money as they cannot afford it.
SAN MIGUEL CORP VS. KALALO
Facts: Respondent Kalalo ad been a dealer of beer products of petitioner SMC. SMC failed to
send a detailed statement of account to respondent despite several requests made by the
latter. In order to protect her rights and to compel SMC to update her account, she ordered
her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks she had issued to petitioner. Instead of
updating the account of respondent , SMC sent her a demand letter for the value of the
seven dishonored checks. In the face of constant threats made by the agents of SMC,
respondent's counsel wrote a letter (the "Offer of Compromise") wherein Kalalo
"acknowledged the receipt of the statement of account demanding the payment of the sum
of P816,689.00" and "submitted a proposal by way of 'Compromise Agreement' to settle the
said obligation." It appears, however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. Subsequently,
SMC filed a Complaint against respondent for violating the Bouncing Checks Law. In the
meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her account. During trial,
and after the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner finally complied. After tallying all
cash payments and funded checks and crediting all returned empty bottles and cases, the
Statement of Account showed that the net balance of the amount owed to petitioner was
P71,009. Respondent thereafter recanted her Offer of Compromise and stated that, at the
time she had the letter prepared, she was being threatened by SMC agents with
imprisonment, and that she did not know how much she actually owed petitioner. The MeTC
acquitted Kalalo of the BP 22 cases. SMC appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC but
its appeal was dismissed. In its present petition before the SC, petitioner argues that, in her
Letter of Offer of Compromise, respondent unequivocally admitted her liability to private
complainant-appellant duly assisted by her counsel."
Issue: Whether the Offer of Compromise may be considered as evidence against Kalalo.
Held: No. The letter does not contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what
respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of account, not the existence of
her liability to petitioner. The fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner
SMC cannot be considered as an admission of liability. The reasons why compromise offers
must not be considered as evidence against the offeror are as follows: Since the law favors
the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to "buy his or her peace"
without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication
made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace
could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements would be
prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no prudent person would dare offer
or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a
confession of weakness. Offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended
as admissions by the parties making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal
contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally
liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it
is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the
distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically, and
in contemplation of mutual concessions. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by
respondent, the Offer of Compromise was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint
against her for a violation of BP 22. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in the
context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied
admission of guilt.
PEOPLE vs. ERGUIZA
FACTS: Appellant Erguiza was charged with the rape of AAA, a 13-year-old girl. The trial court
convicted Erguiza of the crime charged stating, among others, that the act of Erguiza’s father
and mother of offering to compromise with AAA’s parents by offering P5,000 was an implied
admission of guilt on the part of the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: NO. Aside from the fact that the defense successfully presented evidence to
corroborate the alibi of appellant, the prosecution failed to established appellant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the
case cannot be used as evidence of his guilt. Appellant testified that he did not ask his
parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant was not present when the offer was allegedly
made. An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an
admission of the party himself. Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt
of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt, the better
rule is that for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused
should have been present or at least authorized the proposed compromise. Moreover, it
has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not constitute an implied
admission of guilt.
PEOPLE vs. RAQUEL
FACTS: Appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel, together with accused Amado Ponce, were
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide for allegedly killing Agapito Gambalan and
thereafter taking the latter’s revolver. According to Gambalan’s wife who witnessed the
crime, three armed men entered their house and killed her husband then stole his revolver.
When the authorities arrived at the scene of the crime, they apprehended Ponce while the
two other perpetrators escaped . At the police station, Ponce confessed to the authorities
5
that his co-perpetrators were the appellants. Thus, appellants were arrested. During trial,
Ponce escaped from jail. Appellants and Ponce were convicted of the crime of robbery with
homicide by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the identity of the appellants as Ponce’s co-perpetrators was
established beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: NO. In this case, the identification of appellants as culprits was based chiefly on the
extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of
the crime. However, Ponce escaped from jail before he could testify in court and has been at
large since then. The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not
be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never
had the opportunity to cross examine his co-accused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements,
it is elementary that the same are hearsay against the accused. That is exactly the situation in
this case. Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of
an accused which implicates his co- accused. A distinction should be made between judicial
and extrajudicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to
cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for
cross-examination and rebuttal. The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. An extrajudicial
confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused.
The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s
own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conducts and
declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly be inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust ,
that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought
not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.
TAMARGO VS. AWINGAN
FACTS: On the affidavit executed by Reynaldo Geron, Lucio Columna and 3 John were Does
indicted for the murder of Atty. Tamargo and his 8 year-old daughter. Columna was, then,
arrested and he executed an affidavit dated March 8, 2004 admitting his participation as a
“look out” and implicating herein respondents, Awingan as the gunman and Licerio Antiporda
and Lloyd Antiporda as Masterminds. Hence, Harold Tamargo, Atty. Tamargo’s brother, filed
a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor Manila. The respondents denied
involvement in the killings and averred that such complaint is politically motivated. During
the PI, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten May 3 letter disowning the contents of the
March 8 affidavit, narrating how he was tortured until he signed the extrajudicial cofessions,
and clearing the respondent’s name. Subsequently, Columna executed an affidavit dated
May 25, 2004 repeating the contents of his May 3 letter. In the clarificaroty hearning,
Columna admitted that the May 3 letter and May 25 affidavit are his and voluntarily made.
Hence, the charge was dismissed. On appeal with the DOJ, probable cause was found.
Informations were filed and consolidated. However, on MR, the DOJ directed the withdrawal
of the charges decalring that Columna’s extrajudicial admission was inadmissible against
respondents, even if admissible, was not corroborated by evidence. RTC Judge Mindaro-
Grulla hence granted the motions to withdraw the Informations and inhibited herself without
resolving an MR filed. Re-raffed to Judge Daguna who granted the MR ruling that there was
probable cause based on Columna’s March 8 affidavit. CA, on certiorari reversed.
ISSUE: Should the Informations be withdrawn?
HELD: Yes. Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his
March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the
rule on res inter alios acta. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter
alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co- accused and is considered as hearsay
against them. The reason for this rule is that: on a principle of good faith and mutual
convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So
are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers;
and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (see
rules). This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators
provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or
her co- conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot
be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them. Here, aside from
the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was
presented to prove the alleged conspiracy.There was no other prosecution evidence, direct
or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the
recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no
probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.
FGU INURANCE CORPORATION VS. G.P. SARMIENTO TRACKING CORP.
FACTS: G.P. Sarmiento Tracking Corp (GPS) undertook the delivery of 30 Condura
refrigerators onboard a truck driven by Lamber Eroles from Concepcion Industries in Alabang
to Dagupan City. While on its way, it collided with a truck, feel into a deep canal, damaging
the cargoes. FGU Insurance paid Concepcion P 204K for value of covered cargoes and sought
reimbursement from GPS. FGU rather failed, hence, this case for damages and breach of
contract of carriage aganst GPS and Lambert Eroles. GPS, in its answer, denied being a
common carrier and alleged accident. Trial Court found for GPD and dismissed the case
holding that GPS is not a common carrier. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Is GPS liable?
HELD: Yes. The Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to be
amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a
common carrier. Nevertheless, GPS cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, upon
which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the
mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief. Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the
existence of a contract of carriage between it and petitioner’s assured, and admits that the
cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its custody. In such a
6
situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation – in this case, the delivery
of the goods in its custody to the place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of
care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on
him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so. Respondent driver, on the other hand,
without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may not himself be ordered to pay
petitioner. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioner’s
principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can only
bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their
personality or their juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis
neque nocet prodest, such contract
REYES V. OMBUDSMAN
FACTS: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the
anomalous PDAF scam. In G.R. Nos. 213542-43, the Napoles siblings assert that the
Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause against them for
violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, mainly arguing that there is no evidence to show that
they conspired with any public officer to commit the aforesaid crime. Likewise, the Napoles
siblings asseverate that the whistleblowers' testimonies
were bereft of probative value and are, in fact, inadmissible against them
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed any grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions ultimately finding probable cause
against petitioners for the charges against them.
HELD: In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding
of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused]
are required, not absolute certainty. Luy and Suñas, being mere employees of Janet
Napoles, only acted upon the latter's orders. Thus, the Ombudsman simply saw the higher
value of utilizing them as witnesses instead of prosecuting them in order to fully establish
and strengthen her case against those mainly responsible for the scam. In fact, whistleblower
testimonies - especially in corruption cases, such as this - should not be condemned, but
rather, be welcomed as these whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves in order to
expose the
perpetrators and bring them to justice. As regards the finding of probable cause against the
Napoles siblings and De Asis, it must be first highlighted that they are placed in the same
situation as Janet Napoles in that they are being charged with crime/s principally performed
by public officers. Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the
whistleblowers based on their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a
conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing
rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course
of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's
appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical
rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay. This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and does
not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Applying the same logic, and with the
similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the
whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the
evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he
technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over
the conduct of a preliminary investigation, as in this case. Therefore, on account of the
above-mentioned acts which seemingly evince the Napoles siblings' participation in the
conspiracy involving Senator Enrile's PDAF, no grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed
against the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against them for fifteen (15) counts of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 as charged.
NAGUIAT V. CA
Facts:Queao applied with Naguiat for a loan in the amount of P200,000.00, which Naguiat
granted. On 11 August 1980, Naguiat indorsed to Queao Associated Bank Check No. 090990
dated 11 August 1980 for the amount of P95,000.00, which was earlier issued to Naguiat by
the Corporate Resources Financing Corporation. She also issued her own Filmanbank Check
No. 065314, to the order of Queao, also dated 11 August 1980 and for the amount of
P95,000.00. The proceeds of these checks were to constitute the loan granted by Naguiat to
Queao.To secure the loan, Queao executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated 11 August
1980 in favor of Naguiat, and surrendered to the latter the owners duplicates of the titles
covering the mortgaged properties. On the same day, the mortgage deed was notarized, and
Queao issued to Naguiat a promissory note for the amount of P200,000.00, with interest at
12% per annum, payable on 11 September 1980. Queao also issued a Security Bank and Trust
Company check, postdated 11 September 1980, for the amount of P200,000.00 and payable
to the order of Naguiat. Upon presentment on its maturity date, the Security Bank check was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. On the following day, 12 September 1980, Queao
requested Security Bank to stop payment of her postdated check, but the bank rejected the
request pursuant to its policy not to honor such requests if the check is drawn against
insufficient funds. On 16 October 1980, Queao received a letter from Naguiats lawyer,
demanding settlement of the loan. Shortly thereafter, Queao and Ruebenfeldt met with
Naguiat. At the meeting, Queao told Naguiat that she did not receive the proceeds of the
loan, adding that the checks were retained by Ruebenfeldt, who purportedly was Naguiats
agent. Naguiat applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage with the Sheriff of
Rizal Province, who then scheduled the foreclosure sale on 14 August 1981.Three days
before the scheduled sale, Queao filed the case before the Pasay City RTC, seeking the
annulment of the mortgage deed. The trial court eventually stopped the auction sale. On 8
March 1991, the RTC rendered judgment, declaring the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage null
and void, and ordering Naguiat to return to Queao the owners duplicates of her titles to the
mortgaged lots. Naguiat appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals, making no less
than eleven assignments of error. CA promulgated the decision now assailed before us that
affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Issues:
I. Whether or not Queao had actually received the loan proceeds which were supposed to be
covered by the two checks Naguiat had issued or indorsed
II. Whether or not there is the admissibility of various representations and pronouncements
of Ruebenfeldt, invoking the rule on the non-binding effect of the admissions of third
persons.
Held:  The Court held that the presumption of truthfulness engendered by notarized
documents is rebuttable, yielding as it does to clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
as in this case. On the other hand, absolutely no evidence was submitted by Naguiat that the
7
checks she issued or endorsed were actually encashed or deposited. The mere issuance of
the checks did not result in the perfection of the contract of loan. For the Civil Code provides
that the delivery of bills of exchange and mercantile documents such as checks shall produce
the effect of payment only when they have been cashed. It is only after the checks have
produced the effect of payment that the contract of loan may be deemed perfected. Art.
1934 of the Civil Code provides: An accepted promise to deliver something by way of
commodatum or simple loan is binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple
loan itself shall not be perfected until the delivery of the object of the contract. A loan
contract is a real contract, not consensual, and, as such, is perfected only upon the delivery
of the object of the contract. The objects of the contract are the loan proceeds which Queao
would enjoy only upon the encashment of the checks signed or indorsed by Naguiat. If
indeed the checks were encashed or deposited, Naguiat would have certainly presented the
corresponding documentary evidence, such as the returned checks and the pertinent bank
records. Since Naguiat presented no such proof, it follows that the checks were not encashed
or credited to Queaos account. On the second issue, CA rejected the argument, holding that
since Ruebenfeldt was an authorized representative or agent of Naguiat the situation falls
under a recognized exception to the rule.  his will not to resign has wilted.
The existence of an agency relationship between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt is supported by
ample evidence. Naguiat instructed Ruebenfeldt to withhold from Queao the checks she
issued or indorsed to Queao, pending delivery by the latter of additional collateral.
Ruebenfeldt served as agent of Naguiat on the loan application of Queaos friend, Marilou
Farralese, and it was in connection with that transaction that Queao came to know Naguiat.
It was also Ruebenfeldt who accompanied Queao in her meeting with Naguiat and on that
occasion, on her own and without Queao asking for it, Reubenfeldt actually drew a check for
the sum of P220,000.00 payable to Naguiat, to cover for Queaos alleged liability to Naguiat
under the loan agreement. The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of an agency by
estoppel citing Article 1873 of the Civil Code. Apparently, it considered that at the very least,
as a consequence of the interaction between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt, Queao got the
impression that Ruebenfeldt was the agent of Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to correct
Queaos impression. In that situation, the rule is clear. One who clothes another with
apparent authority as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such, cannot be permitted
to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third
parties dealing with such person in good faith, and in the honest belief that he is what he
appears to be. CA is correct in invoking the said rule on agency by estoppel. More
fundamentally, whatever was the true relationship between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt is
irrelevant in the face of the fact that the checks issued or indorsed to Queao were never
encashed or deposited to her account of Naguiat.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, PETITIONER, VS. ANIANO DESIERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION,
GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG AND ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., RESPONDENTS.
Facts: Estrada v Desierto MR Case. Angara Diary. Petitioner devotes a large part of his
arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the
use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his
resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the Angara Diary contains an admission.
Held: Yes. A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine
whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more
circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover
admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130
provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him." It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if
they are hearsay. Admissions are not covered by the hearsay rule. The Angara Diary
contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party:
his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his
statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes;
his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by
Monday and "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this - it's too painful. I'm
tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will
go." We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign
despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - -
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC., and MCARTHUR MINING, INC. vs. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP.
FACTS: Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a domestic corporation organized and
existing under Philippine laws, took interest in mining and exploring certain areas of the
province of Palawan. After inquiring with the DENR, it learned that the areas where it wanted
to undertake exploration and mining activities where already covered by Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. Redmont
filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three (3) separate petitions for the
denial of petitioners’ applications for MPSA . In the petitions, Redmont alleged that at least
60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI
Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is
a considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force behind petitioners’ filing of
the MPSAs over the areas covered by applications since it knows that it can only participate
in mining activities through corporations which are deemed Filipino citizens. Redmont argued
that given that petitioners’ capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise
disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for
Filipino citizens. Additionally, they stated that their nationality as applicants is immaterial
because they also applied for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA) Tesoro
and Narra, which are granted to foreign-owned corporations. Nevertheless, they claimed
that the issue on nationality should not be raised since McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are in
fact Philippine Nationals as 60% of their capital is owned by citizens of the Philippines.
POA: considered petitioners as foreign corporations being "effectively controlled" by MBMI,
a 100% Canadian company and declared their MPSAs null and void.
RTC: granted Redmont’s application for a TRO and setting the case for hearing the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
CA: partially granted; held that respondents McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are indeed foreign
corporations. CA found that there was doubt as to the nationality of petitioners when it
realized that petitioners had a common major investor, MBMI, a corporation composed of
100% Canadians. Using the grandfather rule, the CA discovered that MBMI in effect owned
8
majority of the common stocks of the petitioners as well as at least 60% equity interest of
other majority shareholders of petitioners through joint venture agreements. It concluded
that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are also in partnership with, or privies-in-
interest of, MBMI.
ISSUES:The Court of Appeals erred when it applied the exceptions to the res inter alios acta
rule.
RULING: No. Petitioners question the CA’s use of the exception of the res inter alios acta or
the "admission by co-partner or agent" rule and "admission by privies" under the Rules of
Court in the instant case, by pointing out that statements made by MBMI should not be
admitted in this case since it is not a party to the case and that it is not a "partner" of
petitioners. Secs. 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide: Sec. 29.
Admission by co-partner or agent.- The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party
within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may
be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration itself. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a
joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party. Sec. 31.
Admission by privies.- Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration,
or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence
against the former. Petitioners claim that before the above-mentioned Rule can be applied to
a case, "the partnership relation must be shown, and that proof of the fact must be made by
evidence other than the admission itself." Thus, petitioners assert that the CA erred in finding
that a partnership relationship exists between them and MBMI because, in fact, no such
partnership exists. Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this case, it can be
assumed that the relationships entered between and among petitioners and MBMI are no
simple "joint venture agreements." As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering into
partnership agreements; consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements
with other corporations or partnerships for certain transactions in order to form "pseudo
partnerships."
Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by and among petitioners and
MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering into
partnerships, then the relationship created should be deemed as "partnerships," and the
laws on partnership should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among
corporations may be seen as similar to partnerships since the elements of partnership are
present. Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are
considered to be partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the
Rules by stating that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with
Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
THE LEARNING CHILD, INC. and SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO vs.
AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA, MARIA
LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC.
FACTS: At bar are three consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari all concerning the
operation of a preparatory and grade school located in Ayala Alabang Village. Sometime in
1984, subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the spouses Jose
and Cristina Yuson. In 1987, the spouses Yuson sold the same to the spouses Felipe and Mary
Anne Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was annotated and issued to the spouses Alfonso, as
had been required by ALI. The Deed of Restrictions indicated that: 2.2 USE AND OCCUPANCY
- The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a
preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may include such installations as an
office for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles. ALI turned over
the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the Ayala Alabang Village,
including the above restrictions, to the association of homeowners therein, the Ayala
Alabang Village Association (AAVA). Then the spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The
Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a preparatory school which initially consisted of
nursery and kindergarten classes. TLC was expanded to include a grade school program, the
School of the Holy Cross, which provided additional grade levels as the pupils who initially
enrolled advanced. AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso, essentially (1)
protesting the TLC’s and the spouses Alfonso’s violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2)
requesting them to comply with the same, and (3) ordering them to desist from operating
the grade school and from operating the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of the
two classrooms allowed by the ordinance. AAVA filed with the RTC an action for injunction
against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract by the defendant spouses,
particularly of the Deed of Restrictions, the contents of which likewise appear in the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
ISSUE:
1. WON AAVA abrogated the Deed of Restrictions and is deemed estopped from seeking the
enforcement of said restrictions
2. WON ALI’s acts bind AVAA
RULING:
1. No. TLC and the spouses Alfonso proceeded to enumerate acts allegedly constituting a
setting aside of said restrictions: AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial
court that AAVA had previously approved the proposed construction of a school building with
24 classrooms, which approval is further evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on the Site
Development Plan with the signature of Frank Roa himself.While the case was submitted for
resolution with the CA, AAVA, through its president Jesus M. Tañedo, authorized through a
letter the construction of a new "school building extension." ALI itself requested the
reclassification of the subject property as institutional, as allegedly proven by the testimony
of then Municipal Planning and Development Officer Engineer Hector S. Baltazar. TLC and the
spouses Alfonso point out that the subject property was considered institutional in the
Official Zoning Map, thereby implying that the submission of the latter constitutes an intent
to have the subject property reclassified as institutional. ALI assented to the reclassification
of the subject property to institutional. TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the gravity of AAVA’s acts so as to bar the latter from insisting
compliance with the Deed of Restrictions. The two-classroom restriction is not imposed in
the Deed of Restrictions but rather in MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. The alleged assent of AAVA
to the construction of additional classrooms is not at all inconsistent with the provisions of
the Deed of Restrictions, which merely limit the use of the subject property exclusively for
the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten)
school.
The circumstances around the enumerated acts of AAVA also show that there was no
intention on the part of AAVA to abrogate the Deed of Restrictions nor to waive its right to
have said restrictions enforced.
2. Yes. AAVA claims that the act of reclassification cannot be considered in the case at bar
9
under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the case. Section 28, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court embodies said rule: Sec. 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided. ALI’s statements, if damaging to AAVA, would be binding on the latter.
The general Ayala Alabang Village "Deed Restrictions," which was attached to the Deed of
Restrictions on the title of the subject property, expressly state that: "2. Compliance with the
said restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by
Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their
respective successors and assigns, or by any member of the Ayala Alabang Village
Association."
As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is jointly interested with AAVA in an action to
enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following exception to
the res inter alios acta rule: Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. — The act or
declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule
applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly
interested with the party. However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of
AAVA. The act complained of concerns the alleged assent of ALI to the reclassification of the
subject property as institutional which, as we have already ruled, does not amount to a
nullification of the Deed of Restrictions. From the foregoing, it cannot be said that AAVA
abrogated the Deed of Restrictions. Neither could it be deemed estopped from seeking the
enforcement of said restrictions.
PEOPLE VS PALIJON
Facts: Trial then proceeded against the remaining co-accused Rodelo Palijon and Myra Pria.
The prosecution’s case was propelled in the main by the testimony of Mercene, who gave
evidence against said co-accused. The trial court synthesized the testimony of Mercene as
follows: "...Jim Mercene points to the herein accused Palijon and Pria as co-conspirators in
the commission of the crime, not to mention Decena who like him (Mercene) already
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Homicide. The accused Mercene and Decena
participated in the commission and consummation of the offense with Myra Pria as having
initiated the plan, knowing as she does that the victims are balikbayans and moneyed. The
plan was completely hatched in the house of Palijon which is near the house of the victims. In
the evening of August 26, [1993], the live- in partners Decena and Pria and the latter’s child
slept in the house of Palijon. At 2:00 o’clock in the morning of August 27, 1993, Decena,
Palijon and Mercene executed the act, with Palijon climbing the concrete fence and Decena
climbing a post to open a jalousy window. After Decena had opened the jalousy window
Mercene was able to enter the house and he (Mercene) entered through the door with
Decena opening the same. Palijon meanwhile stayed outside the house near the door. Pria
stayed in the house of Palijon. He and Decena executed the acts with Decena hitting Mrs.
Reyes causing her physical injuries, as well as Mr. Reyes, the latter having died due to the
injuries sustained by him. Shouts were heard from outside saying "Ate, Ate, what happened
(?)" which caused Mercene to run away going towards the direction of his cousin’s house and
proceeded to the BLTB Station. He did not return to the house of Palijon. Before the
commission of the crime, Mercene knew already that Decena and Pria are live-in partners.
Mercene had been Decena’s co- inmate at the City Jail of Lucena (City). Later, Mercene saw
Palijon in the CIS-Headquarters, Camp Nakar, Lucena City. They were not able to carry away
the articles mentioned in the Information. It was Palijon who pointed to Mercene which led
to the latter’s investigation by the CIS- Investigator leading to his arrest and detention. The
investigation on Mercene was not in writing. Mercene also saw Decena and Pria in the City
Jail of San Pablo but was not able to talk to them. "Mercene went to Brgy. Sta. Monica for
three times with Decena and they went to the house of Pria on August 24, 1993. At that time
Decena was staying in the house of Palijon and Decena could not stay in the house of Myra
because the latter’s parents were very angry with Decena. It was Myra who mentioned to
Mercene that the victims are already in the Philippines from the United States and upon
knowing this matter, the four of them, namely, Palijon, Decena, Pria and Mercene planned
the robbery. Decena was arrested in Carmona, Cavite at the instance of Pria. From August 24
to 26, 1993, Mercene stayed in the house of Palijon, with Decena and Pria. Palijon was the
one who pointed to Mercene and Decena."
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT CONVICTION (especially Mercene’s testimony)
HELD: In seeking an acquittal, appellant Palijon contends that the trial court erred when it
convicted him on the basis of the confession of his co-accused. Palijon argues that in
determining the weight and sufficiency of the admissions of a self-confessed co-conspirator,
the trial court should have exercised the greatest caution and held that such confession
should have been corroborated by other evidence to establish his participation in the
conspiracy or in the commission of the crime. Human experience teaches that a malefactor
who admits the commission of a crime is likely to put the blame as much as possible on
others other than himself alone. In ruling upon Palijon’s arguments, we must make a
distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be
given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived
of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the
declarant’s co- accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or
admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused
was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon.
Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a
co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter. Nor can we
give credence to Palijon’s defense of alibi. Mercene’s identification of Palijon as one of the
conspirators and participants in the crime was positive and categorical. His alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution’s eyewitness.
PEOPLE vs. MICHAEL BOKINGO alias "MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE COL
FACTS: The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, owned a pawnshop, which formed
part of his house. He also maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the back of his
house. The first row had six (6) units, one of which is Apartment No. 5 and was being leased
to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasion’s brother-in-law, while the other row was still under
construction at the time of his death. Appellants, who were staying in Apartment No. 3, were
among the 13 construction workers employed by Pasion. Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes
inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and went out of
the back door. A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed
to said unit to check. He peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something
10
on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and
attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several
times. Vitalicio bit Bokingco’s neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase
Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and
was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio
went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor. Pasion
and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later while Vitalicio
was treated for his injuries. On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded
not guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged. Evelyn Gan, the
stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted down notes during the
preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to
kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because they got "fed up"
with Pasion. Esla was one of the witnesses and attested that she was in the second floor of
their house when the incident happened but saw the two accused fled after her husband
died. Appellants testified on their own behalf. During the cross-examination, Bokingco
admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion. RTC: appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder. CA: affirmed the findings of the trial court but reduced the
penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of Republic Act No. 7659.
ISSUE:WON appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator under Sec.
30 of Rule 130?
RULING: In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco
because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession was taken
before a judge. A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco
for failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances. The
finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants fled together after
killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco. In as much as Bokingco’s
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col,
specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission
of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused,
and is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than by such act or declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator
may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the
common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out
the conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no
probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col. Bokingco’s judicial admission
exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter hit
him in the head. All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was
adduced to implicate him.
PEOPLE VS CACHUELA
FACTS: The prosecution’s evidence revealed that, Ibañez went to Weapons System
Corporation (WSC) on board an old car, and told Henessy Auron, WSC’s Secretary and Sales
Representative, that he was the one who bought a gun barrel at the company’s gun show in
SM Megamall. At around 9:00 a.m. of July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the
doorbell, but no one opened the door. She went to the back of the office where the firing
range was located, and called Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC. Zaldy answered from
inside the store but Henessy did not understand what he said. Henessy returned to the front
door and called again. Zaldy replied that he could not open the door because his hands were
tied. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the company’s operations manager, and informed him
that Zaldy’s hands had been tied. After one hour, the police arrived; they opened the gate at
the back using acetylene. When Henessy and the police entered the premises, they saw that
Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the police that the company’s
gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered the firing range, and
saw the lifeless body of Rex. NBI received an information from an asset that the group of
Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and
that Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an
entrapment team and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their
arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela
and Ibañez to look for buyers of firearms. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas
that they were conducting an entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at
WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the other persons involved
in the crime. Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had
already talked to the buyers, and that they would like to see the firearms being sold.
Cachuela set up a meeting with the buyers at a gasoline station in Naic, Cavite. NBI Special
Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising Agent Jerry Abiera and the asset went to the agreed
place. Cachuela came and talked to them, and brought them inside his house where
Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents inquired from Cachuela whether
the firearms had legal documentation, the latter sensed that the meeting was a set-up. The
NBI agents arrested Cachuela before he could make any move. The NBI conducted a follow-
up operation on Ibañez whom the asset also contacted. The agents asked whether the guns
had legal documentation; they then arrested Ibañez when they sensed that he was already
becoming suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibañez, viz.: a .45 Glock 30 with
serial number FML 245 and a .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z. At the NBI Main Office,
Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the
robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession
implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime. The prosecution filed an Information for
robbery with homicide. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. During trial, Zaldy died.
ISSUE:Whether or not the out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial confession are
admissible as evidence
HELD: After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas’
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an
extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the
confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it
must be in writing.” We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by
the authorities when he executed the alleged written confession. "A custodial investigation is
understood x x x as x x x any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
11
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
the investigation has started to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the
police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense. At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This
rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as
hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the
act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be
received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission
relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy. This exception, however, does not apply in the present case
since there was no other piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial
confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime
charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as
the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency of
evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
PEOPLE VS CONSTANCIO
FACTS: "AAA" went to Alabang Town Center with her friends Dacanay and Golez. After
parting ways with them, "AAA" was about to board her car when she found herself
confronted by Berry then armed with a knife, who was then in the company of Constancio,
Pagkalinawan, Darden and alias "Burog." They forcibly seized "AAA's" car and drove her to
Constancio' house where she was raped and killed. In the course of an interview with ABS-
CBN Reporter Amparo, Berry revealed that while "AAA's" car was parked in Constancio'
garage, the said car was moving and shaking with "AAA" inside. This led him to suspect that
something was already happening; that when the door of the car was opened, he (Berry) saw
that "AAA" was without her underwear; and that Constancio then uttered the words, "wala
na," indicating that "AAA" was already dead. "AAA's" body was then placed inside the trunk
of her car. Adarna, a tricycle driver, saw Berry, Constancio, and their other companions,
throw something over a bridge which turned out to be "AAA's" body upon investigation by
the authorities.
Bales almost became the next victim when Berry and his companions who were still using
"AAA's" car, attempted to abduct her. Fortunately for Bales, a barangay tanod was present at
the scene and was able to foil the abduction when he shouted at the malefactors and
startled them. Nonetheless, Bales' bag was taken during this incident. Eventually, Berry and
Constancio were arrested after an informant surfaced and identified them as "AAA's"
assailants. The informant came out after Mayor Marquez offered a reward for information
leading to the identity of persons responsible for "AAA's" rape-slay. During the custodial
investigation, where Atty. Suarez advised him of his constitutional rights and the
consequences of his statements, Berry executed an extrajudicial confession which was
embodied in a Sinumpaang Salaysay. Berry also confessed to Amparo during an interview
that he did take part in the execution of the crime. At the trial, however, Berry denounced
the Sinumpaang Salaysay as false, and claimed that he was coerced into signing the same.For
his part, Constancio contended that he was in Baguio at the time of the commission of the
crime. Both appellants denied the charges against them. These two also asserted that Berry's
extrajudicial confession was inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in declaring Berry's extrajudicial confession admissible in
evidence and in considering it against his co-accused Constancio.
HELD: Admissibility of Berry's Extrajudicial Confession After a close reading of the records,
this Court believes that Berry's confession is admissible because it was voluntarily executed
with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel in the person of Atty. Suarez. In
point of fact Atty. Suarez testified that he thoroughly explained to Berry his constitutional
rights and the consequences of any statements he would give. Berry's confession is
admissible in evidence because it was voluntarily made to a news reporter and not to the
police authority or to an investigating officer. Amparo testified that he requested Berry for an
interview in connection with his confession, and that the latter freely acceded. Hence, Berry's
confession to Amparo, a news reporter, was made freely and voluntarily and is admissible in
evidence. The general rule is that an extra-judicial confession is binding only on the
confessant and is inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused since it is considered
hearsay against them. However, as an exception to this rule, the Court has held that an extra-
judicial confession is admissible against a co-accused when it is used as circumstantial
evidence to show the probability of participation of said co- accused in the crime.
PEOPLE VS COMILING
Facts: Respondents including Joe, Rey and Paul, armed with firearms and hand grenade, with
intent to gain and with the use of violence against or intimidations upon persons, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the Masterline Grocery pretending to be customers and once inside, poked
their guns and intimidated the owner of said grocery, Inciong, and his worker to open the
drawers of the tables and when opened, took and carried away Php 81,000 and 3 Chinese
gold necklaces. Afterwhich, the accused shot and hit PO3 Pastor, which led to his death.
Conching was also shot, resulting injuries to her. Except for Eddie and Balot, the accused
pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Prosecution witness Panimbaan decided to reveal
to police authorities what she knew about the case. During the trial, she testified that she
was present in all the four meetings in which the plan to rob the grocery was hatched. RTC
rendered a judgment of acquittal in favor of Salagubang and Clotario but rendered a
judgment of guilt against Comiling, Galingan and Mendoza for the crime of robbery with
homicide. CA affirmed RTC decision
Issue: WON Panimbaan’s testimony is admissible.
Held: Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that any declaration made by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is
admissible against him alone but not against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first
shown by other independent evidence. According to Comiling, Natys testimony showed that
she was also a conspirator, thus, the existence of conspiracy must be shown by evidence
other than Natys admission. As there was no independent proof of conspiracy except the
testimony of Naty, the latters testimony concerning appellants participation in the conspiracy
12
was inadmissible against him. This contention is misplaced. The res inter alios acta rule refers
only to extrajudicial declarations or admissions and not to testimony given on the witness
stand where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. In the present case, Natys admission implicating appellant Comiling was made in
open court and therefore may be taken in evidence against him.

PEOPLE V BAHARAN
FACTS: On Valentine’s Day 2005, an RRCG bus travelling southbound EDSA was involved in a
bombing incident allegedly conducted by accused-appellants Gamal B. Baharan (Baharan),
and Angelo Trinidad (Trinidad). The bomb attack was part of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf’s
“Valentine’s Day gift” to former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, as per the
announcement made by the group’s spokesperson over the radio. During pretrial, it was
stipulated that accused Trinidad gave an exclusive interview with ABS-CBN News sometime
after the incident, confessing his participation in the said bombing incident. In another
exclusive interview with the same network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
incident. Finally, accused Gappal Bannah Asali (Asali) confessed that he had supplied the
explosive devices for the bombing, in another television interview. After arraignment,
accused Asali was discharged as state witness. He testified that while under training with the
Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Asali was taught how to make bombs and explosives by accused Rohmat
Abdurrohim (Rohmat) and two others. Asali also testified that on separate occasions,
accused Trinidad and Baharan got TNT from him, some of which were used in the RRCG Bus
bombing. The RTC Makati convicted the three accused-appellants Baharan, Trinidad, and
Rohmat of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and
sentenced them to suffer death penalty by lethal injection. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision,
with modification of the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by RA 9346. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: Is the testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali admissible?
RULING: YES, it is admissible. Although under Section 30 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made
during the existence of the conspiracy, jurisprudence states that if the declarant repeats the
statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the
testimony admissible as to both conspirators. In People v Palijon, the Supreme Court made a
distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions, and held that Section 30 Rule 130
of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions, and not to testimony at
trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the defendant. REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN
The appeal was denied, and the decisions affirmed. FACTS: Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition
for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, seeking the declaration of the aggregate amount of
USD 356 million deposited in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as ill-gotten
wealth. The petition likewise seeks the forfeiture of USD 25 million and USD 5 million in
treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful income and income
from legitimately acquired property. On 18 October 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings, as opposed by respondent Marcoses.
This motion was denied on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise
agreement took precedence over the motion for summary judgment.
On 10 March 2000, after several resettings of trial, petitioner filed another motion for
summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the USD 356 million, again opposed by the

13
Marcos children. Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were
established, warranting a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited. After
hearing on the motion, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for summary
judgment on 19 September 2000. The respondents filed their respective motion for
reconsideration, to which the petitioner filed its opposition. On 31 January 2002, a resolution
of the Sandiganbayan reversed its 19 September 2000 decision, thus denying petitioner’s
motion for summary judgment. Hence the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUES: Did petitioner fail to prove that private respondents Marcoses acquired or own the
Swiss funds, by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by the Marcoses out
of context, and then treating them as judicial admissions? Do the individual and separate
admissions of each respondent bind all of them?
RULING:
1. NO, it did not fail. Under Section 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 4. Judicial
admissions. ─ An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made. An admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and becomes conclusive on him,
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith
shall be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or not. In
this case, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in
their various pleadings and documents were valid. It is of record that respondents
judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to
them. In the Answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds,
respondents likewise admitted ownership thereof.
2. YES, they do. Under Sections 29 and 31 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 29. Admission
by co-partner or agent. ─ The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party
within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or
agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or
agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule
applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person
jointly interested with the party.
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. ─ Where one derives title to property from another, the
act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the
property, is evidence against the former.
The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a privity of estate
exists between the declarant and the party, the term privity of estate generally denoting
a succession in rights. Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the
record is competent. Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case.
And where several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter of
the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all. Hence, in the absence of
a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents’ judicial admission of ownership of the
Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them.
BORDALBA V CA
Facts: Lot No. 1242 located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City was originally owned by the late
spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme.An extrajudicial partition was
executed which disposed of the property as follows:1) 1/3 in favor of (a) their grandchild
Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent Candida Flores and the father of
private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their
grandchild Asuncion JaymeBaclay, whose heirs are private respondents Agelio Baclay, Elnora
Baclay and Carmen JaymeDaclan; 2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother
of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and 3) 1/3 to an unidentified party. Built on the land
adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house.Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez,
petitioner’s mother, filed with the Regional Trial Court an amended application for the
registration of the lot described. She further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is
applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission. The case was, however,
dismissed.Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands an application seeking the
issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted application of her mother,
Elena.Petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over
said lot.Thereafter, petitioner caused the subdivision and titling of Lot into 6 lots, as well as
the disposition of two parcels thereof. Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court, the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U.
Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands
and prayed that Free Patent No. (VIII) 11421 and OCT No. 0571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos.
2277122776 be declared void and ordered cancelled. Petitioner admitted that the properties
of the late Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in
1947, but claimed that she was not aware of the existence of said Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature
of her mother.The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner and declared
said patent and title void.Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for
private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother
should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s
statute.
Issue: Whether the Dead Man’s Statute applies in the case.
Held: No. As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, suffice it to state that said
rule finds no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to
close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledgeSince the claim
of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, on
the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and
communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by
the trial court.
BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all
surnamed, GEVERO, Petitioner, -versus- INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent
It is however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a property must have been
made while he was the owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the
present owner.
FACTS: The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365
containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said
lot was acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed
14
of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the
same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo
Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title
No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica
Babangha — 1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and
Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing
48,122 square meters. Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived
by her six children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha,
consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement
and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I,
inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration
Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then
alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private
respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title
and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same
prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476. Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title
and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same
prejudices the land which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that before
purchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked the title of Luis Lancero and found the
same to be intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same with
the subdivision plan (Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the
Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero — all of which were found to be unquestionable.
By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought the land in good faith and for value,
occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's possession until May 1969,
when the defendants Abadas forcibly entered the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not admission of the former owner of a property must have been made
while he was the owner thereof binding upon the present owner? (YES)
RULING: As to petitioners’ contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the
1952 deed when he signed the document in 1968 entitled “Settlement to Avoid Litigation”
(Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court). This particular
rule is embodied in the maxim ‘res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.’Under Section 31,
Rule 130, Rules of Court “where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is
evidence against the former.” It is however stressed that the admission of the former owner
of a property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order that such
admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227
[1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465 [1910]). Hence, Lanceros’ declaration or acts of
executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land
having passed to DELCOR in 1964. Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the
petitioners which allegedly invalidated the 1952 deed of sale have not been raised before the
trial court nor before the appellate court. It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was
neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process. (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140
SCRA 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434
[1987]; Dulos Realty and Development Corporation v. C.A., 157 SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC,
G.R. No. 78282, July 5, 1989). Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica
(mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it
was intended to limit solely to Ricardos’ proportionate share out of the undivided 1/2 of the
area pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and that the Deed did not
include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite
that she was deceased at the time it was executed.
PEOPLE V ROA
FACTS: Two separate Information were filed against accused-appellant Nicanor Roa, charging
him with two counts of rape committed against Ma. Nina Dela Cruz, 14 years old, on two
separate occasions. Upon arraignment, Roa pleaded not guilty to both cases. After the joint
trial, RTC Valenzuela found accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape, and sentenced
him to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Does the appeal have merit?
RULING: NO, it does not. Section 32 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “an act or
declaration made in the presence and within the hearing observation of a party who does or
says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if
not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against
him.” In this case, Roa’s admitted silence when Nina’s mother confronted and even cursed
him by his claim, betrays his guilt just as his passivity does when he was allegedly maltreated
and haled into jail by Nina’s father on account of the incidents. For an innocent man would
certainly strongly protest and deny a false accusation and do something positive to spare
himself of punishment, but he did not. Following Section 32 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
Roa is, by his silence, deemed to have admitted the charges. The prosecution having by its
evidence prima facie established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of
evidence shifted on Roa. His evidence, however, is weak and fails to controvert the positive
declaration of Nina who was not shown to have any reason to falsely charge him.
THE UNITED STATES vs.SERVANDO BAY, 
The information in this case charges the appellant, Servando Bay, with the crime of rape,
committed as follows:On the night of June 7 of the present year, 1913, in the barrio of San
Teodoro of the township of Calapan, Mindoro, in the jurisdiction of this Court of First
Instance, the above- named accused accidentally met Florentina Alcones walking along the
beach, and, on finding that she was alone, did maliciously and criminally drag her toward a
place covered with underbrush, and there by means of force and intimidation did lie with her
against her will. The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is substantially as
follows: That the complaining witness and the accused are neighbors: that about 7 o'clock in
the evening of June 7, 1913, when turning from her rice field she was joined by the accused,
and that a short distance from the mouth of Subaan River he caught hold of her, picked her
up, and carried her to the edge of some thickets, where he threw her on the ground and
attempted to have carnal intercourse with her; that angered by her resistance he drew his
dagger, and force her under threat of her life to accede to his desires; that a party who were
passing near the place where the crime was committed heard her cries, and put into shore;
that one of the party stepped ashore, and seeing the accused get up from the place where
the woman claims the crime was committed, asked "What's this?;" that the accused made no
15
explanation of his conduct or his presence there, and left the place forthwith; that
immediately thereafter the woman, accompanied by some of the party from the boat, went
to the councilman of the barrio and made complaint; that the accused, having been brought
before the councilman and asked had he committed the crime of which he was charged,
admitted that he had; that thereafter the accused was sent to the justice of the peace, who
held him for trial. Upon his evidence the accused was convicted in the court below of the
crime with which is charged in the information and sentenced to seventeen years four
months and one day of reclusion temporal, together with the accessory penalties.Counsel for
appellant lays great stress upon certain apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the
testimony of some of the witnesses for the prosecution, and vigorously contends that the
trial court erred in accepting as true the testimony of the complaining witness and of the
witnesses called by the prosecution to corroborate her. He emphasizes what he calls the
inherent improbability of the story told by the offended woman, and points to the facts that
she appears to be much more than twice the age of the accused, and anything but attractive
in her personal appearance . His contention is that the charge of rape is a pure fabrication,
and that it was brought by the woman for the sole purpose of wreaking her vengeance and
spite upon the accused, with whom she had a quarrel over the trespass of one of his
carabaos on her land.It is true that there are some apparent contradictions and
inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the ignorant witnesses called for the prosecution,
and that it is somewhat difficult to understand how the accused, a young married man, could
have been so lost to all sense of right and decency as to assault a woman so much older than
himself, a neighbor, and an old friend of his family. But her evidence, supported by that of
other witnesses for the prosecution, is so convincing and conclusive that we are forced to
believe that he did it in fact commit the atrocious crime with which he is charged.We are not
forgetful of the fact that convictious for this crime should not be sustained without clear and
convincing proof of the guilt of the accused; or that experience has shown that unfounded
charges of rape or attempted rape have not frequently bee preferred by women, actuated by
some sinister or ulterior and undisclosed motive. We recognize that in cases of this nature it
is the duty of the courts to scrutinized with the utmost care the story told by the complaining
witness and the witnesses called to corroborate her, especially when it appears either that
the offended party did not make immediate outcry or that there was any unexplained delay
in instituting criminal proceedings. But in the case at bar it conclusively appear that the
offended woman sought assistance and made formal and official complaint immediately after
the commission of crime under such conditions as practically to prelude the possibility of a
conspiracy between herself and the other prosecuting witnesses to press a false charge
against the accused.There can be no possible doubt that the party passing in a boat the
deserted place where the crime was committed was attracted by her cries and complaints,
and that the arrival of those aboard was a fortunate coincidence which she could not well
have anticipated, had she planned the filing of false charges against the accused. There can
be no question also that she went immediately to the councilman of her barrio to make
complaint against the accused, accompanied by some of the passengers on the boat. And
there can be no question also that as a result, these proceedings were instituted forthwith in
the court of the justice of the peace.There is a direct conflict in the testimony as to whether
the accused, when the complaint was made to the councilman of the barrio, did or did not
admit his guilt, and this evidence is so contradictory that it would be difficult if not possible
to make an express finding on this point. But whatever be the truth as to these alleged
admissions of his guilt, the evidence leaves no room for doubt that neither at the moment
when the party in the boat came upon him in company with his victim nor when he appeared
before the councilman upon her complaint did he claim, as he does now, that her charge that
he had assaulted her was a pure fabrication, invented for the purpose of wreaking vengeance
upon him.There can be no possible doubt that he was present when the party on board the
boat were attracted to the place where she raised her outcry charging him with the assault,
and that he was present later or when he presented her complaint to the councilman of the
barrio. Under such circumstances, we are convinced that an innocent man would instantly
and indignantly repudiate such a charge, and attempt there and then to establish his
innocence, explaining how he came to be there present with the woman, and the conditions
under which she had made the false charge.The witnesses called both for the prosecution
and the defense go into considerable detail as to all that occurred at the time when the party
on board the boat responded to the calls of the woman and immediately thereafter, and yet
there is not the slightest indication in the evidence that there was on the part of the accused
any such indignant denials and protests as would be expected from an innocent man
suddenly confronted with such a charge under such circumstances. Indeed his conduct at
that time was, to our minds, wholly at variance with that which might fairly be expected from
him, granting the truth of his testimony and that of the other witnesses for the
defense.Having in mind the fact that the trial judge saw and heard the witness testify, and
upon a full review of all the evidence, we are of opinion that there is nothing in the record
which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the court below as to the degree of credit
which should be accorded the various witnesses, or as to the guilt of the accused of the crime
of which he was convicted.We find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the substantials
rights of the accused, and the judgment entered in the court below convicting and
sentencing him should, therefore, be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.
PEOPLE v MAGDADARO
FACTS: Paulino Magdadaro was convicted by RTC Cagayan de Oro of three (3) counts of Rape,
committed on three (3) different occasions, and sentenced to three (3) penalties of reclusion
perpetua for having carnal knowledge without consent of 16-year old country girl Beverlinda
Abrasado, daughter of Leonardo Abrasado, tenant of Magdadaro. On the 3rd instance of
rape, Leonardo heard shouts and proceeded towards the direction where they came from.
Leonardo testified that upon reaching there, he could hardly believe his eyes when he saw
Appellant, his own landlord, abusing his own daughter. Magdadaro tried to run, leaving his
leaving his pants, his underwear and his hat in his haste. The father chased Appellant but lost
the latter lost in the bushes. He was later found in 300 meters away from the place of the
incident, still hiding in the bushes. Beverlinda's father declared Magdadaro asked for
forgiveness twice and offered to pay damages but that he refused because the matter was
already before the authorities. Again, during the investigation at the Fiscal's Office, Appellant
asked for settlement of the case but he gave the same answer. Accused-appellant, now
seeks a reversal by claiming among others, that the trial court erred in holding that the
alleged repeated request for settlement of the case by the accused is an implied admission of
guilt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged repeated request for settlement of the case by the
accused is an implied admission of guilt.
HELD: YES. Appellant's offers to settle the case in exchange for money or land, which were all
rejected by Beverlinda's father, were correctly appreciated by the Trial Court as evidential of
16
his culpability. An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt (Rule 130, Sec. 24, now Section 27 of Rules of Court).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PARAGSA
FACTS: Bienvenido Paragsa was convicted of the crime of rape against Mirasol Magallanes.
Mirasol was alone in her parents' house when the alleged rape was committed. After the
incident, Mirasol went to Barrio Codia later in the afternoon of the same day and joined her
brother and sister and grandmother. She did not reveal to any of them what transpired
between her and the accused. When Mirasol's mother returned, Mrs. Parochel had a
conversation with her regarding the person of the accused and thereafter Mirasol's mother
filed the corresponding complaint against the accused. Appellant admits having sexual
intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he stoutly denied that he did so by
employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and Mirasol were sweethearts;
that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol who invited him to the latter's house where
they had sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that the intercourse they had that
afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their third sexual intercourse . The foregoing testimony of
the accused was substantially corroborated by two witnesses for the defense.
ISSUE: Is the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be
safely construed as an admission
of the truth of such assertion?
HELD: Yes. Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime
charged and point to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant and
the complaining witness was voluntary. Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did
not offer any resistance or vocal protestation against the alleged sexual assault. She could
have easily made an outcry or resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life.
But she did not. She was allegedly raped in her own home, not far from her neighbors and
during the daytime. If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she
could have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who
asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the
intercourse took place and when the accused ran from the bed to a storeroom of the house
to hide upon seeing and/or hearing the voice of her aunt Lita. or, she could have grabbed the
hunting knife by her side when the copulation was going on, and with it she could have
possibly prevented the accused from consummating the sexual act. But she did not. Another
circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was raped.
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony
of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually
sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications.The rule allowing
silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements
uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can
be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and understood
the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in
respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling,
naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact
admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue (IV
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316). These requisites of
admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the
facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of
the truth of such assertion.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TIA FONG alias AH SAM
This is an appeal by Tia Fong alias Ah Sam against a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental finding the said Ah Sam, Maximo Alcantar, Florencio Bahala and Rufino
Palarca guilty of homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Lian Kaw in the
amount of P3,000 and to pay the costs. Only the said Ah Sam has appealed.It appears that
early in the morning of February 21, 1950 the Municipal Mayor of Mambaiao, Misamis
Oriental, was informed that a dead body was lying in the coconut plantation of one by the
name of Juan Neri in said municipality. The Mayor and some of his policemen and the
President of the Sanitary Division went to the place indicated, and there they found the dead
body of a Chinaman named Lian Kao, 28 years of age, son of Chinaman Wong Kiat. The
President of the Sanitary Division found the body in a state of rigidity and calculated that
death must have occurred from 9 to 12 hours before the discovery. He found an incised
wound one inch in length on the right brow, a depressed wound 1/2 inch in depth at the
vertex of the head, ecchymosis with slight tumefaction of the head and the upper part of the
neck above a line which appeared to be the line of strangulation. The body was found with a
belt tied around the neck, and the president of the sanitary division was of the opinion that
death was caused by suffocation or by strangulation after the victim had become
unconscious.The authors of the crime could not be immediately determined until a
lieutenant of the Constabulary by the name of Alberto N. Chavez was detailed to conduct the
investigation. He began making inquiries in and about the place. He suspected Florencio
Bahala, who was living in the neighborhood, and subjected him to a rigid questioning. He
noticed that his statements did not agree with those of his common-law wife. After some
time Chavez succeeded in convincing him, through the help of the wife, to own his part in the
crime. Bahala made a confession on March 9, 1950. The confession of Maximo Alcantar and
Rufino Palarca were also secured. So an information was filed on March 9, 1950. This was
amended on March 10, 1950. The persons accused were the three above-mentioned who
has confessed, and Heracleo Limbaco and the Appellant Tia Fong alias Ah Sam. Both Limbaco
and Ah Sam denied complicity in the crime. At the trial, the other Defendants repudiated the
confessions they had made. This notwithstanding, the court found four of them guilty.
Heracleo Limbaco was acquitted of the charge. As only Ah Sam has appealed the decision,
only such facts as are relevant to the charge against him will be considered.Sometime before
the incident, Ah Sam was in partnership with Wong Kiat and other Chinamen. Ah Sam
separated from Wong Kiat and the others and established a store of his own. A compadre of
his by the name of Hermogenes Tago testified that at eight o’clock in the evening of February
20, 1950, after he had closed the store and while he was outside, he saw Tia Fong pass by
and had occasion to converse with the latter. Ah Sam complained that his business was dying
because Wong Kiat, the father of the deceased, and his companions would not sell him bread
to sell in his store. Ah Sam after a while said it is better that Wong Kiat and Lian Kaw be
whipped.The evidence mainly relied upon for the conviction of Ah Sam is his silent
participation in the reenactment of the crime by his co- accused Florencio Bahala, Maximo
Alcantar and Rufino Palarca. With the confessions of these three accused on hand, Lt. Chavez
and a subordinate of his, Sgt. Fernandez, asked the accused to reenact the crime and
photography of the acts reenacted were caused to be taken. In all the most important
17
incidents and details of the commission of the crime. Ah Sam took part, although silently,
under the direction of the Constabulary and his three co-accused.
In Exhibit “Q” Tia Fong reenacted his position while waiting for his co-accused. In Exhibit “R”
he reenacted his own position when he and his co-accused were talking together planning
the commission of the crime. In Exhibit “S” Ah Sam also reenacted his own position or
participation while he and his co-accused were waiting for Erak (Heracleo Limbaco), who had
gone out to look for the intended victim and present him to them. In Exhibit “K” Ah Sam also
reenacted his own position in relation to the other accused when Erak accompanied the
victim and the other accused followed them - Erak and the victim.Exhibit “M” represents the
positions of all the accused, Ah Sam included, as the victim fell unconscious after he had been
assaulted. In this same exhibit, Ah Sam reenacted the part he took in untying the belt of the
victim. In Exhibit “N” Ah Sam played his own part, showing the method in which he strangled
the victim. Exhibit “U” is the photograph of the manner in which Appellant tied the belt
which he took from the victim’s waist and with which the latter was strangled, while Exhibit
“W” reenacts the distribution of the money by him to his co-accused.The witnesses for the
prosecution especially Lt. Chavez, testified that Ah Sam took part in the reenactment of the
crime and without any opposition on his (Ah Sam’s) part. He (Ah Sam) neither opposed nor
denied to take part. On one occasion Ah Sam himself, according to Lt. Chavez, corrected his
co-accused as they were reenacting their respective positions as Exhibit “K” was being taken,
as witness the following testimony —
“x x x                    x x x                    x x x
A.  Tia Fong did not object neither did he show signs of complaint when his co-accused
indicated their relative positions in the picture.
Q.  In what pictures or scenes which were photographed, was it in all occasions in which Tia
Fong ever made any correction or complaint regarding their relative positions?
A.  As a matter of fact, in one of those picture, Tia Fong after his co-accused indicated his
relative position in the picture, complained to the fact that his position was not right, and
consequently, he said that he was not supposed to be on the right side of the picture but on
the extreme left of the road or street.
x x x                    x x x                    x x x”
Ah Sam testified that before the reenactment of the crime he was told before hand to obey
whatever instructions Sgt. Fernandez would give, and that he (Ah Sam) tried his best to obey
said instructions. According to him, Sgt. Fernandez would first read the paper (confession of
his co-accused), then direct the accused to assume the positions, and lastly ordered pictures
to be taken. Ah Sam further declared that he just followed the directions given by Sgt.
Fernandez because he had already been maltreated. The supposed maltreatment consisted
in having been boxed in the solar plexus as a result of which he involuntarily urinated. The
trial judge held that the guilt of Ah Sam was proved by his participation in the reenactment of
the crime. His counsel, on this appeal, argues that it was error for the trial court to consider
said participation as an evidence against him, because all that the Appellant did during the
entire period of the reenactment was to remain silent and do what he was told and directed
to do. Against this contention the Solicitor General argues that the Appellant himself
voluntarily took part in the reenactment and in one instance corrected the position which he
was directed to take.We have carefully reviewed the evidence, especially the testimony of
the Appellant on the circumstances leading to his participation in the reenactment, and we
find no evidence to sustain the claim that he was forced against his will to participate therein.
It is true that Ah Sam stated that he was boxed on the solar plexus, and was later brought to
a toilet where he was compelled to put his face in the bowl, but these supposed instances of
maltreatment relate to attempts to extract a confession from him, not to compel him to take
part in the reenactment of the crime. He stated that Sgt. Fernandez had warned him to obey
his orders in the reenactment otherwise he would again be subject to maltreatment, but we
find nothing to corroborate the making of the supposed threat and Appellant’s willing
conduct throughout the reenactment does not evince the supposed threat. We have
searched the record in vain for any act or word of protest from Appellant, either before the
reenactment or during the entire period thereof, against his taking part therein. Appellant’s
counsel himself admits that the Appellant was silent, doing what he was told to do. But
counsel for the Appellant contends that as the Appellant was under arrest at the time of the
reenactment, his taking part therein should not be considered as evidence against him. The
principle that may govern the relevancy and admissibility of Appellant’s participation in the
reenactment is stated in section 8 of Rule 123 of the Rules, which provides: “SEC.
8.  Admission by silence. — Any act or declaration made in the presence and within the
observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him.” In
one case decided by us, U. S. vs. Bay, 27 Phil., 495, the Defendant was accused before the
councilman of a barrio with having criminally assaulted the offended party.
The Defendant kept silent as the latter explained the assault, neither admitting nor denying
the imputation. At the trial he allege that the imputation was false, but we held that if it were
so, he would have instantly and indignantly denied the imputation when made before the
councilman. But in another case, we also said that if a Defendant remains silent during an
official investigation by a Fiscal, such silence is no evidence of his guilt, as said official
investigation was no occasion for denying the imputation then being made against him (U. S.
vs. De la Cruz, 12 Phil., 87). There are other related principles, in connection with the silence
of an accused in criminal cases, namely, that his failure or refusal to testify may not be taken
as evidence against him (Rule 111, section 1 [c], and that he may refuse to answer an
incriminating question E Rule 123, section 79]. It has also been held that while an accused is
under custody his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to
remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him,
otherwise his right of silence would be illusory. “Section 1259 (d) Silence under Arrest. Some
of the courts have held that the fact that one is under arrest and in the custody of an officer,
when he is silent under accusation, prevents his silence or the statements themselves from
being admissible against him, on the ground that under such circumstances he is not called
upon to speak. Other courts have held that this circumstance alone does not render the
evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of crime calls for reply even from a person
under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the circumstances surrounding him
indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses so to do.”, (16 C.J.633.) “SEC. 574.  Accused
under Arrest or in custody. — The authorities are divided as to the effect on the admissibility
of an incriminating statement made in the presence of an accused, and not denied by him, of
the fact that he was under arrest or in custody under a criminal charge at the time the
statement was made. According to some decisions, the mere fact of arrest, alone, is not
sufficient to render the testimony inadmissible, but such fact deserves consideration only as
one of the circumstances under which the accusation was made, in determining whether the
accused was afforded an opportunity to deny and whether he was naturally called to do so.
Another view supported by many authorities is that the mere fact that an accused was under
arrest is sufficient to render inadmissible the fact of the failure of the accused to deny
18
accusatory statements made in his presence and bearing. According to this view, it is
common knowledge and belief of men in general that silence while under arrest is most
conducive to the welfare of an accused, whether he is guilty or innocent.” (20 Am. Jur. 486.)
But the better rule is to consider the circumstances in each case and decide the admissibility
of the silence accordingly. “(4)  Certain situations in particular may furnish a positive motive
for silence without regard to the truth or falsity of the statement. Whether the fact that the
party is at the time under arrest creates such a situation has been the subject of opposing
opinions; a few Courts (for the most part in acceptance of an early Massachusetts
precedent), by a rule of thumb exclude the statement invariably; but the better rule is t o
allow some flexibility according to circumstances:(IV Wigmore, pp. 80-81.)
Let us now examine the facts and circumstances of the reenactment in view of the above
principles.The reenactment of the crime was not a part of a formal official investigation like
one conducted by a justice of the peace or a provincial fiscal. The reenactment was a police
contrivance, designed to test the truthfulness of the statements of the witnesses who had
confessed the commission of the offense. If the Appellant herein had not really taken part in
the commission of the crime, his immediate reaction when he became aware that the crime
was to be reenacted, should have been to protest against the implication of the reenactment
or to refuse his indicated participation therein. One of the accused, Heracleo Limbaco, did
not admit participation in the crime. Like the Appellant, he did not confess yet he was not
asked to participate in the reenactment. On the other hand the Appellant readily took part
therein. If he did own participation in the offense he should have refused, at least in the
beginning, to participate in the reenactment or to follow the directions indicated. Far from
doing so, he acquiesced and willingly took part in the reenactment as directed. If
the Appellant had the courage to refuse to own his guilt when he was boxed on the solar
plexus, or when he was forced to put his face in the toilet bowl, why did he not have the
courage to protest his participation in the reenactment before or while it was being
conducted? It is to be noted that the implication of guilt in the case at bar is not derived from
mere silence; it is inferred from Appellant’s silent acquiescence in participating in the
reenactment of the crime. More than mere silence, Appellant committed positive acts
without protest or denial when he was free to refuse. Had he not actually participated in the
commission of the offense for which he is charged, he would have protested being made to
take part in the reenactment thereof; he would have informed the public officials at the time
of the reenactment, or immediately prior thereto, that he did not actually take part in the
commission of the offense. We, therefore, find that the trial court committed no error in
taking into account Appellant’s participation in the reenactment as voluntary and in
considering it as evidence against him. The circumstances or evidence submitted against
the Appellant in this case are as follows:c he was the only one among the accused who had a
motive for causing the death of Lian Kaw; had he not actually participated in the commission
of the offense he would have been able to introduced positive evidence that he was either
not present or was somewhere else and, therefore, could not have taken part in the said
crime; the confession of his co-accused as to the reason for the killing and as to the manner
in which the offense was committed corroborates or indicates the probability of
the Appellant having participated therein; and his silent acquiescence in taking part in the
reenactment and his voluntary and ready participation therein produce conviction as to his
actual participation in the commission of the offense. The above circumstances convince us
that the Appellant Ah Sam participated in the commission of the crime, inducing his co-
accused to help him perpetrate it, he himself actually taking direct part therein. We find,
therefore, that the trial court committed no error in finding him guilty as charged. The
Solicitor General calls attention to the fact that the crime committed is not mere homicide,
but murder. The information charges murder, and the facts found show that the killing of the
deceased is attended by one qualifying circumstance, that of evident premeditation. The
other aggravating circumstances possibly attending the commission of the crime cannot be
imputed to the Appellant herein, so the offense with which he may be convicted is that of
simple murder qualified by the circumstance of evident premeditation. The judgment
appealed from is hereby modified and instead of homicide the Appellant Tia Fong alias Ah
Sam is found guilty of murder, without any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The
sentence imposed upon him by the trial court is therefore raised to that of reclusion
perpetua. In all other respects, the sentence imposed is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DE LOS SANTOS
FACTS: Appellant Leonardo de los Santos and Alfredo Lacastesantos were charged with the
crime of Murder of Gregorio Dotado on November 29, 1971. Gregorio Dotado, was found
dead by his sister at the junction of a trail leading to his house. There was no eyewitness to
the commission of the crime. Prior to his death, the victim was courting a certain Herminia
Garcia and he had a rival by the name of Leonardo de los Santos, appellant herein. Appellant
was picked up for questioning by the police authority and voluntarily executed an affidavit
wherein he confessed his participation in the killing of the deceased. The said affidavit was
sworn to and was marked as Exhibit "D". The trial court dismissed the case against
Lacastesantos for the reason that although appellant Leonardo de los Santos was convicted,
his conviction was due to his extrajudicial confession and that Lacastesantos was merely
implicated by the appellant as one of the participants of the crime. Subsequently, Delos
Santos executed an affidavit repudiating his extrajudicial confession. He maintains that his
confession Exhibit "D" is inadmissible for having been obtained thru violence, threat and
intimidation. The lower court, however, ruled that the extrajudicial confession of appellant
was freely and voluntarily executed and appellant was found guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE: Is the lower court correct in convicting the defendant-appellant solely on the strength
of Exhibit 'D,' the alleged confession?
HELD: No. The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, may be given in evidence against him (See. 29, Rule 130). It has been held that a
confession constitutes evidence of high order and the presumption is that no sane person
would deliberately confess the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and
conscience. (U.S. vs. De los Santos, 24 Phil. 329). Another factor that militates against the
claim of appellant of involuntariness in the execution of Exhibit "D" is the fact that the
confession is replete with details that only the confessant could have known. The post-
mortem examination of the body of the deceased showed that the wounds sustained by the
victim were located exactly in the places where appellant in his affidavit stated that he
inflicted them upon the victim, thus: Indeed, the confession at bar being complete with
details that only the appellant could have known, therefore, show that the confession was
executed voluntarily (People vs. Jimenez, 105 SCRA 721). Considering the foregoing
circumstances, this Court is of the view that appellant's admission voluntarily made and
confirmed by him in open court during his trial, renders worthless the challenge now
interposed by him to the admissibility of his sworn statement, Exhibit "D." It is significant to
note that the extrajudicial confession, Exhibit "D," was obtained and offered in evidence
19
before the 1973 Constitution took effect. In fact, the decision appealed from was rendered
by the trial court on May 24, 1972. Consequently, appellant's extrajudicial confession, Exhibit
"D," is admissible in evidence although the requisites in Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which declares inadmissible a confession obtained from a person under
investigation for an offense who has not been informed of his right to remain silent and to
counsel were not observed, since that portion of the 1973 constitutional mandate should be
given prospective and not retrospective effect and no law gave the accused the right to be so
informed before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution (Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4).
PEOPLE vs. SATORRE
FACTS: Appellant Satorre Romero was charged with murder on account of Pantilgan’s death
who was shot at the head. On trial, among the witnesses presented by the prosecution was
Castaares, Barangay Captain of Can-asuhan, Carcar, Cebu who testified that the father of the
accussed together with F. Gelle brought appellant to her residence where he confessed
having killed Pantilgan. Appellant allegedly informed her that he killed Pantilgan because the
latter struck him with a piece of wood. That same evening, she went to the Carcar Police
Station with appellant where she executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant
voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun which he wrestled
from his possession.NBI Ballistician, testified that the deformed bullet taken from Pantilgans
head wound was fired from the gun surrendered by appellants brothers to the Carcar Police.
Appellant denied the allegations. Appellants father denied having accompanied appellant to
Castaares house to surrender him. Appellants brother testified that he never surrendered
any firearm to anybody.
ISSUE: Is the bare allegation that Satorre confessed or admitted killing Romero Pantilgan is a
sufficient proof of guilt?
HELD: No. There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants alleged oral extrajudicial
confession. Indeed, as far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of
Court makes no distinction whether the confession is judicial or extrajudicial. The rationale
for the admissibility of a confession is that if it is made freely and voluntarily, a confession
constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no
sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. Accordingly, the basic test
for the validity of a confession is was it voluntarily and freely made. The voluntariness of a
confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession
exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete
with details which could only be supplied by the accused reflecting spontaneity and
coherence, it may be considered voluntary. The problem with appraising voluntariness occurs
when the confession is an oral extrajudicial confession because the proof of voluntariness
cannot be inferred from the testimony of a witness who allegedly heard the confessant since
there is no written proof that such confession was voluntarily made. Neither can the
confessant be appraised by the court since, precisely, it was made outside the judicial
proceeding. The problem posed therefore by an oral extrajudicial confession is not only the
admissibility of the testimony asserting or certifying that such confession was indeed made,
but more significantly whether it was made voluntarily. On the question of whether a
confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and circumstances prevailing at the time it
was made must be considered. In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did
not even finish first grade. Granting that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay
Captain Castaares, he may not have realized the full import of his confession and its
consequences. This is not to say that he is not capable of making the confession out of a
desire to tell the truth if prompted by his conscience. What we are saying is that due to the
aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral
confession may not be definitively appraised and evaluated.At any rate, an extrajudicial
confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by whom it is made. Such
confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they
were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded
as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when
uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest. At the police station, appellant
allegedly admitted before policemen that he killed Pantilgan. His statement was not taken
nor was his confession reduced into writing. This circumstance alone casts some doubt on
the prosecutions account that appellant freely and voluntarily confessed killing Pantilgan.
It raises questions not only as to the voluntariness of the alleged confession, but also on
whether appellant indeed made an oral confession. A confession is not required to be in
any particular form. It may be oral or written, formal or informal in character. It may be
recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or tape. However, while not required to be
in writing to be admissible in evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video
tape or other means, to reduce the confession to writing. This adds weight to the confession
and helps convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily made. If possible the
confession, after being reduced to writing, should be read to the defendant, have it read by
defendant, have him sign it, and have it attested by witnesses. The trial court gave credence
to appellants oral extrajudicial confession relying on jurisprudence which we find are not
applicable. In the cases cited by the trial court, the convictions were based on circumstantial
evidence in addition to the appellants confessions, or the extrajudicial confessions were
reduced to writing and were replete with details which only appellants could have supplied.
In the case at bar, however, there was no circumstantial evidence to corroborate the
extrajudicial confession of appellant. More importantly, the said confession does not contain
details which could have only been known to appellant. The events alleged in the confession
are inconsistent with the physical evidence.Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not
support a conviction where it is uncorroborated. There must be such corroboration that,
when considered in connection with confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a
reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a confession. It
is not necessary that the supplementary evidence be entirely free from variance with the
extrajudicial confession, or that it show the place of offense or the defendants identity or
criminal agency. All facts and circumstances attending the particular offense charged are
admissible to corroborate extrajudicial confession. The fatal gun and the slug extracted from
Pantilgans brain cannot be considered as corroborative evidence. While the slug embedded
in Pantilgans brain came from the fatal gun, the prosecution was not able to conclusively
establish the ownership of the gun other than the bare testimony of prosecution witnesses
that appellants brothers surrendered the gun to them. This was denied by appellant and
his brothers and there was no other proof linking the gun to him.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRENEO URRO, GUILLERMO DE LA CERNA, ELADIO
DIANA and MEDRICO ARINASA, *
Facts: Cornelio Reconalla left the conjugal home at Sitio Bual, Barrio Abongabong, Tabina,
this province, in order to catch fish. Unfortunately, he was found dead at the coast.
20
Thereafter, the four accused allegedly executed an extrajudicial confession of the crime of
murder, with Urro acting as the mastermind, gathering the other accused, and proceeding to
the site of Reconalla’s death wherein the latter was hacked to death after a supposed
argument. The alleged confessions were all subscribed and sworn to before the two mayor,
Antonio Adaptar on January 30, 1962 (except those of the accused De la Cerna and Arinasa
which bore the date of January 29, 19629). Mayor Adaptar as such conducted the
investigation of the alleged crime (the deceased being a brother of his son-in-law, besides10)
and at the same time received and acted on the complaint against the accused (as filed by his
chief of police) for and in the absence of the justice of the peace. Mayor Adaptar as ex oficio
justice of the peace thus issued
the warrant on January 30, 1962 for the arrest of the four accused and Canuta (Exhibit 3).
The complaint against all five accused (including Canuta) and the amended complaint
(excluding Canuta) as filed by the chief of police were all dated January 30, 1962. No sooner
was the warrant of arrest against Canuta, Et. Al. issued on January 30, 1962 by Mayor
Adaptar when he issued on the same date, January 30, 1962, the order for the release of
Canuta
Issue:Are the confessions admissible against the accused?
Held: No. The double role of Mayor Adaptar as both investigator and judge (for and in the
absence of the justice of the peace) was totally inconsistent and a deplorable denial of due
process to the accused, prescinding from the inherent improbability that five conspirators
would simultaneously and in one day execute written confessions readily admitting their
conspiracy and commission of the crime. Mayor Adaptar’s pretensions that he asked and
made sure that the tour herein accused understood the contents of their alleged confessions
which were written in a language not known to them were completely shattered by his own
admission that he himself "could not fully comprehend or understand the contents (of the
alleged confessions)" and had to "call (his) secretary who translated (the) affidavits from
English to Visayan" and thus "would not be able to know (or) to inform the court whether the
translation was made faithfully or not because (he) could not fully comprehend the English
language." It is established doctrine that the confession or "declaration of an accused
expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged" may be given in evidence against
him, where it is voluntary. Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by force or
intimidation are null and void and are abhorred by the law, which proscribes the use of such
cruel and inhuman methods to secure a confession. A coerced confession "stands discredited
in the eyes of the law and is as a thing that never existed."While there is convincing evidence
of violence, the validity and admissibility of the confession are destroyed. The issue generally
focuses on the voluntariness of the confession which in turn depends upon the credibility of
the witnesses. In any case, the most painstaking scrutiny must be restored to by the trial
courts in weighing evidence relating to alleged voluntary confessions of the accused and the
courts should be slow to accept such confessions unless they are corroborated by other
testimony. The case at bar is replete with numerous clear warning signals for the rejection of
the alleged confessions, which had they been but heeded by the lower court, would have
prevented it from the grave error it incurred in rendering its judgment of conviction
PEOPLE V OMILIG
FACTS: Estur, a COA Auditor, discovered in July 1993 rice stocks unaccounted for in the
bodega of the NFA. The stocks were under the account of Matas. Upon the recommendation
of Estur, COA State Auditor IV, Betonio, who was the Provincial Manager of NFA, suspended
accused Matas. On 21 August 1993, at about 8:00 p.m., Betonio, upon disembarking from the
Ford Fiera driven by Fajardo, was stabbed and shot in front of his rented apartment. Before
Betonio was brought to the Dr. Uy Hospital, where he was later pronounced dead on arrival,
he whispered to his wife the names, Delfin and Matas. During the investigation, SPO4 Lubang
initially identified the following as suspects: Edgar Matas, Anacleto Matas, Jr., and Oscar
Ondo. However, in the course of the investigation, after publishing a sketch of the knife
which was found embedded in Betonio’s chest, they were informed that a certain Ramil
Peñaflor was the actual killer. During the investigation, accused-appellant Peñaflor admitted
killing Betonio and that he was hired by accused Ondo, the brother-in-law of Matas. At 3:00
p.m. of that same day, the police brought accused-appellant Peñaflor to the Office of the City
Prosecutor to obtain his admission, which was conducted by Assistant City Prosecutor
Albulario, with the assistance of Atty. Cristobal, as counsel de officio. Three days after
accused-appellant Peñaflor’s first extrajudicial confession/admission, accused-appellant
Peñaflor discharged the Padilla Law Office as counsel and entered a second extrajudicial
confession.13 This time, however, the second extrajudicial confession was conducted by City
Prosecutor Lagcao, with the assistance of Atty. Cavales, as counsel de officio. The RTC
acquitted accused Matas, Omilig, and Ondo, while it convicted accused-appellant Peñaflor for
the crime of murder for killing Betonio. The RTC admitted accused-appellant Peñaflor’s
extrajudicial confessions because they were not taken under duress or intimidation as the
extrajudicial confessions were conducted at the Prosecutor’s Office and not in a police
station, and in the presence of his relatives. On appeal, the defense claimed that the two
extrajudicial confessions accused-appellant Peñaflor executed were inadmissible in evidence
for having been obtained in violation of his right to a competent and independent counsel.
The Court of Appeals affirmed accused-appellant Peñaflor’s conviction.
ISSUE:W/N the two extrajudicial confessions accused-appellant Peñaflor executed were
admissible in evidence.
RULING: YES. As correctly found by the lower courts, accused-appellant Peñaflor executed
his extrajudicial confession not during custodial investigation, but during the preliminary
investigation. Custodial Investigation “is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way”; on the other hand, Preliminary Investigation “is an inquiry or a
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial.” The import of the distinction between custodial interrogation
and preliminary investigation relates to the inherently coercive nature of a custodial
interrogation which is conducted by the police authorities. Due to the interrogatory
procedures employed by police authorities, which are conducive to physical and
psychological coercion, the law affords arrested persons constitutional rights to guarantee
the voluntariness of their confessions and admissions, and to act as deterrent from coercion
by police authorities. The claim by the accused of inadmissibility of his extrajudicial
confession is unavailing because his confessions were obtained during a preliminary
investigation. And even if accused-appellant Peñaflor’s extrajudicial confessions were
obtained under custodial investigation, these are admissible. To be admissible, a confession
must comply with the following requirements: it “must be (a) voluntary; b) made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.”31 In the
case at bar, the prosecution did not present proof of the absence of any of these
requirements. Also in the case at bar, there was no evidence, not even an allegation, that the
21
counsel who assisted accused-appellant Peñaflor when his extrajudicial confessions were
obtained were absent at any stage of the duration of the proceedings. Based on his
admission, Atty. Cavales was the last person to arrive for the conduct of preliminary
investigation. However, the preliminary investigation commenced only after he arrived. Only
then were questions propounded to accused-appellant Peñaflor.
PEOPLE v DENIEGA
FACTS: The naked body of Marlyn Canoy was found on a heap of garbage in an ill-frequented
back corner on the left side of the Mt. Carmel Church in New Manila, Quezon City. body bore
thirty nine (39) stab wounds. There was evidence that she had been brutally assaulted,
physically and sexually, before she was murdered. Police arrested Rey Daniega y Macoy on
information that the victim was last seen with Daniega, a waiter at the Gathering Disco
where Canoy used to work. Following the latter's arrest, and on the basis of a confession
obtained by police authorities from him during custodial investigation (where he allegedly
admitted raping and killing Canoy), a second sworn statement, substantially similar and
corroborating many of the details of Daniega's sworn affidavit, was later extracted from Diaz.
In the said statement, Diaz admitted his participation in the rape of Canoy, but denied that he
had something to do with the victim's death. Armed with the said extra-judicial confessions,
an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, charging petitioners
with the crime of Rape with Homicide. In their defense, appellants, during the course of the
trial, vehemently denied the claim that they had voluntarily executed the said confessions.
Both testified that they were subjected to electrocution and water treatment. They
contended that they were arrested without warrants of arrest and that the confessions
obtained from them immediately thereafter were made without the assistance of counsel. In
a demurrer submitted to the trial court on, appellants moved for the dismissal of the
information for Rape with Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence due to
involuntariness and lack of assistance of competent counsel. The RTC denied the motion for
Demurrer to Evidence and held both of them guilty of the crime of rape with homicide.
ISSUE: W/N the extrajudicial admissions of the accused were voluntary and was made in
the presence of independent and competent counsel.
RULING: NO. Under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the
confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express and 4) the
confession must be in writing. Certain irregularities violate these requirements for the
admission to be admitted in court. First, there is convincing proof that, while Attys. Sansano
and Rous may have been present at the signing of the documents, they were not present at
all during the actual custodial investigation of the accused in the police headquarters.
Second, no details of the actual assistance rendered during the interrogation process were
furnished or alleged during the entire testimony of the lawyers in open court. Taken together
cast a serious doubt on their due execution, and support the contention that the sworn
statements executed by the appellants were already prepared and signed at the police
headquarters before the statements were brought to the QC-IBP office for signing. During
the trial, Daniega testified that the statement was signed by him at the police station and
then we brought it to the IBP office. Together with all the legal deficiencies pointed out so
far, it would not be difficult for us to give credence to appellants' testimonies to the effect
that the investigation was actually conducted in the absence of counsel in one place (the QC
SID headquarters) and signed in the presence of counsel in another (the QC IBP office). These
facts lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the confessions of both defendants were
obtained in the absence of independent and competent counsel as mandated by the 1987
Constitution and that the same may have been acquired under conditions negating
voluntariness, as alleged by the accused. Both of the accused were acquitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO FELIXMINIA Y CAMACHO
FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of a 6 year old
girl (Maria Lourdes Galinato). After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision finding accused
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In his brief, accused-
appellant contends that the lower court erred in not applying the doctrine of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" and in not rejecting as inadmissible the evidence derived therefrom. In the
instant case, the admission made by accused-appellant was not in the form of a written
extra-judicial confession; the admission was made verbally to the PO3 Roberto Reyes, a
member of the PNP
ISSUE: W/N the extrajudicial confession by the accused should be struck down as
inadmissible.
RULING: YES. The accused was taken into custody for investigation of his possible
participation in the commission of the crime. Hence, the constitutional mantle of protection
clearly covers the instant situation. While said officer testified that he apprised the accused-
appellant of his right to remain silent and to have a counsel of his own choice, accused
appellant’s alleged admission was made without the presence of a counsel. It does not
appear either that accused-appellant manifested that he could not afford the services of a
counsel nor waived his right to one in writing and in the presence of a counsel as no such
written and counseled waiver of these rights was presented in evidence. Therefore, the Court
finds the extra-judicial confession of accused appellant invalid since he was deprived of his
right to counsel during said custodial investigation. Consequently, the exclusionary rule
applies and the extra-judicial confession should be struck down as inadmissible.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confession executed by the accused-
appellant, he was properly convicted by the trial court because (a) compromising
circumstances were duly proven which were consistent with each other and which lead with
moral certainty to the conclusion that he was guilty of the crime charged and (b) the totality
of such circumstances eliminated beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of his innocence.
There were sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the accused of the crime charged.
CRUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Upon the death of Delfin I. Cruz, his surviving spouse and children executed a
notarized Deed of Partial Partition by which each one of them was given a share of several
parcels of registered lands. The said heirs executed a Memorandum Agreement which
provides that they are common co-owners pro- indiviso in equal shares and they agreed to
share alike and received equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted
to and adjudicated in their individual names. The MOA was annotated in the titles of the
lands covered by the Deed of Partial Partition. The spouses Malolos filed a case against the
spouses Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo for a sum of money, wherein a writ of
execution was issued and the properties in question were sold in an execution sale to the
spouses Malolos. Nerissa Cruz Tamayo failed to exercise her right of redemption.
Subsequently, Adoracion, Thelma, Gerry and Arnel Cruz filed a case Partition of Real Estate
22
against spouses Malolos over the lands in question alleging that they were co-owners of
Nerissa Cruz Tamayo over the lands in question. The court a quo rendered a decision in favor
of the plaintiffs. The CA found that several deeds of sale and real estate mortgage, which
petitioners executed when they sold or mortgaged some parcels adjudicated to them under
the DPP, contained the statement that the vendor/mortgagor was the absolute owner of the
parcel of residential land and that he or she represented it as free from liens and
encumbrances. Hence, the CA held that petitioners were estopped from claiming that there
was a co-ownership over the disputed parcels of land which were also covered by the DPP.
Petitioners contend that CA in so ruling violated the res inter alios acta rule.
ISSUE: Whether the CA violated the res inter alios acta rule.
HELD: No. Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the admission of evidence that
tends to show that what a person has done at one time is probative of the contention that he
has done a similar as act at another time. Evidence of similar acts or occurrences compels the
defendant to meet allegations that are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his
defense, raises a variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts the attention of the court from the
issues immediately before it. Hence, this evidentiary rule guards against the practical
inconvenience of trying collateral issues and protracting the trial and prevents surprise or
other mischief prejudicial to litigants.The rule, however, is not without exception. While
inadmissible in general, collateral facts may be received as evidence under exceptional
circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions
giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be
proved. Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially in actions based
on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person’s; it
provides insight into such persons motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or
it reveals a mistake.In this case, petitioners argue that transactions relating to the other
parcels of land they entered into, in the concept of absolute owners, are inadmissible as
evidence to show that the parcels in issue are not co-owned. The court is not persuaded.
Evidence of such transactions falls under the exception to the rule on the res inter alios acta.
Such evidence is admissible because it is relevant to an issue in the case and corroborative of
evidence already received. The relevancy of such transactions is readily apparent. The nature
of ownership of said property should be the same as that of the lots on question since they
are all subject to the MOA. If the parcels of land were held and disposed by petitioners in fee
simple, in the concept of absolute owners, then the lots in question should similarly be
treated as absolutely owned in fee simple by the Tamayo spouses. Unmistakably, the
evidence in dispute manifests petitioner’s common purpose and design to treat all the
parcels of land covered by the DPP as absolutely owned and not subject to co-ownership.
PEOPLE V ACOSTA
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch 127, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Arson. A few hours before the fire,
Montesclaros, in the belief that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in
partner from him, stormed the house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and
appliances. Montesclaros lived in the house owned by said complainant. It was this house
allegedly set on fire by appellant. As summarized by the SolGen, the nephew of prosecution
witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant Raul Acosta,
their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She went out of her house and
approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that
he would burn the house of complainant. When she peeped through her kitchen door, she
saw appellant inside complainant's house, which was unoccupied at that time. Thereafter,
appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with cigarette lighter. The fire
was easily put off by appellant's wife who arrived at the place. At around 1:00 o'clock in the
morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videña, likewise a resident of
Mountain Heights Subdivision, was roused from her sleep by the barking of their dogs at the
back portion of her house. When she went out of her house, she saw complainant's house
situated at the adjacent lot near the back portion of her garage burning. When she peeped
through the holes of the GI sheets separating her lot from the adjacent lot, she noticed the
presence of appellant standing alone in front of the burning house. Appellant was just
watching the blaze and not doing anything to contain it. Appellant was charged with the
crime of Arson. During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses (1) Mrs. Lina
Videña, (2) Mrs. Mona Aquino, both neighbors of appellant; and (3) Fire Investigator
Raymundo Savare. The trial court held the accused guilty of the crime of Arson, hence this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty based on circumstantial
evidence.
RULING: NO. In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination
of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal
responsibility of the accused. In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the
following circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to
one fair and logical conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of
private complainant. Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we
agree with the trial court holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following
circumstances duly proved and on record. Also the intent to commit the arson was
established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house
(private complainant's) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution witness Mona
Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant
carrying a gas stove and knife. When she asked him what he was going to do with the stove,
he answered that he was going to burn the house of private complainant. When she peeped
in the kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house of private complainant and started
pouring gas on a bed ("papag") and then lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's
wife rushed in and extinguished the fire with a broomstick. While it is true that "evidence
that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did
or did not do the same or similar thing at another time," it may be received "to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and
the like. While nobody actually saw appellant light the match which set the house on fire, the
facts and circumstances proved make a complete chain strongly leading, to the conclusion
that it was the appellant who perpetrated the crime.
PEOPLE VS. MAGPAYO
FACTS: Appellant Benjamin C. Magpayo was charged with Rape, Robbery, Robbery with Hold-
up and Forcible Abduction with Rape before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon in four (4)
separate complaints Criminal Cases 6436 (RAPE) and 6437-MN (ROBBERY) Lilibeth Bobis,
went to the Malabon market to get money from her parents to buy milk for her younger
sister. She proceeded to the store near their house but before reaching it, she paused in
front of Betsy's Restaurant. There she was approached by appellant, who accused her of
23
involvement in a theft of coffee. Lilibeth denied the accusation. Appellant then demanded
threateningly that she go with him. They proceeded to the San Bartolome Church and then
entered the cemetery beside the church. For fear of her life, Lilibeth pleaded with appellant
not to kill her. Then appellant removed his shorts and inserted his organ into her mouth
while she was seated on the ground. He removed Lilibeth's shorts and panty and she was
made to sit on a bench. Appellant parted her legs and inserted his organ into hers while he
was in a standing position. After his coitus with her, appellant took P26.00 from Lilibeth.
Criminal Case No. 6438 (For Robbery Hold-Up)
Jacquiline Yutuc Jaime, then 8 years old, was walking alone on Rivera Street in Malabon,
Metro Manila, when she was accosted by appellant who accused her of stealing a cart.
Despite her denials, appellant insisted that they go to the police station, and Jacquiline
consented. Instead, she was brought to the cemetery beside San Bartolome Church where
she was divested of her gold earrings and a ring with red stone, valued at P1,000.00, given by
her father as a birthday gift. Thereafter, appellant told her to go home.
Criminal Case No. 6443-MN (For Forcible Abduction with Rape)
At 10:30 in the morning, then 11-year old Mara N. Chico, was with her younger brother
Daniel in front of King's Store at the Malabon Central Market, upon instruction of their
mother to buy "sago". At the said place, they were approached by appellant, who asked her
if she was involved in a theft of Nescafe coffee, and to which she answered in the negative.
Appellant thereafter asked her if she knew someone by the name of Neneng, and when she
answered in the affirmative, appellant suddenly poked a sharp instrument at her neck and
forced her and Daniel to go with him. The three then boarded a pedicab and alighted
somewhere in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila. They walked to a grassy portion
where Daniel was told by appellant to stay at a corner, while appellant brought Mara to
another portion with "talahib" growth, about four meters away. Appellant then laid her on
the ground and removed her shorts and panty, after which he removed his shorts and brief,
placed himself on top of Mara, and inserted his organ into hers. Mara cried out because of
the pain. Thereafter, appellant left the place Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of
not guilty to all the charges. After trial, he was found guilty of all the offenses charged in a
joint decision rendered by the trial court. Appellant assails, among others, the application of
the doctrine of res inter alios acta (Sec. 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence)
allegedly because the similarity of the acts involved was not sufficiently established.
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in applying Section 34 Rule 130 in convicting the appellant?
HELD: No.
The trial court committed no error in applying the exception to the above doctrine. The Rules
provide: Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did or did not a certain thing
at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. As a rule, evidence is not admissible
which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime
wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that
he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he committed
the crime charged in the complaint or information. An exception to this rule is when such
evidence tends directly to establish the particular crime, and it is usually competent to prove
the motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one
tends to establish the other, or the identity of the person charged with the commission of
the crime on trial. In the case at bar, evidence was introduced in Criminal Case No. 6443
(Forcible Abduction with Rape) committed by appellant against 11-year old Mara N. Chico on
November 20, 1987, not as evidence of similar acts to prove that on April 10, 1988, the said
appellant also committed a similar act of rape (and robbery) against the person of 10-year
old Lilibeth Bobis (Criminal Case No. 6436). These offenses are separate crimes and are the
subject of separate complaints and proofs though jointly tried. Hence, the evidence in one
was not offered and admitted to prove the other but only to show the plan, scheme or
modus operandi of the offender.
As aptly noted by the trial court: It is to be observed that in all the above-entitled cases, the
modus operandi of the offender is that of approaching young girls of not more than twelve
years of age, and taking advantage of their innocence, imputed to them the commission of a
crime and brought them to an isolated place where the offenses charged were committed.
These young girls narrated in detail in a clear and convincing manner what the offender did
to them and likewise positively identified said offender as herein accused during the
investigation at the Malabon Police Station on May 22, 1988 immediately after the arrest of
the accused, as well as during the trial. Thus, Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence provides that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage and the like.
PEOPLE V DADLES
FACTS: This case involves the alleged kidnapping of two farmers, Alipio Tehidor and Salvador
Alipan and their respective sons, Dionisio and Antonio from their homes in Barangay
Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. Appellant Narito alias Naring Dadles was charged in
two separate informations. Appellant denied the charges against him and interposed an alibi.
The defense attempted to prove that on the said date and time of the alleged kidnapping of
the victims, the appellant was in the house of defense witness Rogelio Ariola sleeping
soundly after a round of beer with the latter and his other guests. Regional Trial Court (RTC)
rendered a decision convicting the appellant of two (2) counts of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal intent of the accused was clearly established.
HELD: Yes. Appelants argued that the prosecution was unable to indubitably prove that the
purpose of the appellant and his companions in taking the victims was to deprive them of
their liberty. Such argument is incorrect. In this case we find that there is such a relation
between both incidents of kidnapping charged in the two informations that proof of one
tends to prove the other, and evidence of similar acts committed about the same time
establishes the criminal intent of the appellant to deprive Salvador and Alipan of their liberty.
First of all, both incidents happened almost simultaneously. The kidnapping of Alipio and
Dionisio occurred only some thirty (30) minutes before Salvador and Antonio were taken
from their home. Secondly, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), circumstances existto further warrant the conclusion that it was the appellants
criminal intent to deprive the victims of liberty, to wit: First. If appellants group merely
wanted to talk to Salvador Alipan, they could just have talked to him then and there at the
house of the latter without necessarily taking him together with his son. Second. Appellants
group could have elicited the required information from Salvador in just a matter of hours.
Hence, they should have returned Salvador and his son the following day as promised. To this
date, however, no trace of the two (2) can be found. Third. If they did not have any ill motive
24
against the duo, why did they warn the family of the victims not to report the incident to
anybody or they will be killed? Clearly, this behavior betrays the falsity of their alleged
intention
TANZO VS DRILON
FACTS: Manuel and Mario Salazar were engaged in the business of forwarding and
transporting “balikbayan” boxes from California, U.S. to the Philippines. Manuel managed the
Philippine side under “MANSAL Forwarders”, whereas Mario managed the forwarding
business from California under “M.J.S. International.” Thereafter, the two on different
occasions persuaded the petitioner, Harry Tanzo, to invest $34,000.00 in the business, for a
return on investment of 10% per month. The petitioner recognized the agreement as a ‘trust
agreement’ than a simple loan contract. The loan was transacted by several checks through
his aunt, Liwayway Dee Tanzo in the U.S. However, ultimately, the business did not take off
since the Bureau of Customs seized some of the goods as smuggled. Thus, they were unable
to pay the petitioner. After several failed attempts at claiming his money, the petitioner filed
a case for estafa against the brothers before the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor. The
Quezon City Prosecutor dismissed the charges seeing as the case was beyond its jurisdiction
as the estafa was alleged to have been committed in the U.S. Upon petition for review, then
Acting Secretary of Justice also dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction, and for petitioner’s
insufficiency of evidence to support the charge of estafa seeing as the agreement between
the parties was not a trust agreement (where estafa will prosper) but a simple loan (where
estafa will not prosper).
The petitioner for his part testified that the contract was a trust agreement.
ISSUE: Is the contract a trust agreement?
HELD: No. The Court maintained that the contract was a simple loan, applying the rule of res
inter alios acta wherein evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time, but it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like. The series of transactions between MJS International
and Liwayway Dee Tanzo were entered into under similar circumstances as those
surrounding the contract between petitioner and Mario. Just like the alleged trust agreement
between petitioner and Mario, the loan contracts between M.J.S International and Liwayway
Dee Tanzo provide that the creditor shall lend to the debtor a specific amount for use by the
latter in its business operations. Petitioner also admits that he entrusted the checks to
Liwayway Dee Tanzo for investment in private respondents' business. This shows that private
respondents were transacting directly with Liwayway Dee Tanzo in the usual manner that
they conduct business, that is the loan of money for stipulated interest. Hence, private
respondents' modus operandi, if there ever was one, in raising additional capital for M.J.S.
International was to borrow money from willing investors. It is thus unlikely, considering the
scheme of things, that private respondents would all of a sudden deviate from an established
business practice to enter into a trust agreement with the petitioner.
MCLAUGHLIN VS CA AND RAMON FLORES
FACTS: Luisa F. McLaughlin and Ramon Flores entered into a contract of conditional sale of
real property. Due to Flore’s failure to pay some balance due, Petitioner filed a complaint for
rescission of the deed of conditional sale. Thereafter, a compromise agreement was executed
whereby respondent acknowledged his indebtedness for P119,050.71 and both agreeing
such to be due and payable as follows: a) P50,000.00 upon signing of the agreement; and b)
the balance of P69,059.71 in two equal installments on June 30, 1980 and December 31,
1980. Respondent again failed to pay the July installment. Hence, petitioner on October 15,
1980 demanded such balance plus the December installment amount. Private respondent
sent a letter to petitioner signifying his willingness and intention to pay the full balance of
P69,059.71. Moreover, he stated that he tendered payment to petitioner but this was
refused acceptance by petitioner. However, this does not appear in the decision of the Court
of Appeals. On November 7, 1980, petitioner filed a Motion for Writ of Execution for
respondent’s failure to pay the July installment and rents accruing. Also petitioner asked for
rescission and a court order for respondent to pay 1k back rentals from June 1980, among
others. The trial court granted the motion for writ of execution. MR was filed with
respondent tendering a certified manager's check in the amount of P76,059.71, payable to
the order of petitioner and covering the entire obligation including the installment due on
December 31, 1980. However, the same were denied. CA reversed. Hence, this appeal
ISSUE: Is it inequitable to rescind the deed of conditional sale?
HELD: Private respondent's tender of payment of the amount of P76,059.71 together with his
motion for reconsideration on November 17, 1980 was, well within the thirty-day period
granted by law. The tender made by private respondent of a certified bank manager's check
payable to petitioner was a valid tender of payment. The certified check covered not only the
balance of the purchase price in the amount of P69,059.71, but also the arrears in the rental
payments from June to December, 1980 in the amount of P7,000.00, or a total of P76,059.71.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that: "An offer in
writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or specific
property is, if rejected, equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money,
instrument, or property." However, although private respondent had made a valid tender of
payment which preserved his rights as a vendee in the contract of conditional sale of real
property, he did not follow it with a consignation or deposit of the sum due with the court.
Both parties submitted their respective manifestations which confirm that the Manager's
Check in question was subsequently withdrawn and replaced by cash, but the cash was not
deposited with the court.
According to Article 1256 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, if the creditor to whom tender
of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be
released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due, and that
consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the five cases enumerated therein;
Article 1257 provides that in order that the consignation of the thing (or sum) due may
release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of
the obligation; and Article 1258 provides that consignation shall be made by depositing the
thing (or sum) due at the disposal of the judicial authority and that the interested parties
shall also be notified thereof. To distinguish consignation from tender of payment Tender is
the antecedent of consignation, that is, an act preparatory to the consignation, which is the
principal, and from which are derived the immediate consequences which the debtor desires
or seeks to obtain. Tender of payment may be extrajudicial, while consignation is necessarily
judicial, and the priority of the first is the attempt to make a private settlement before
proceeding to the solemnities of consignation. In the case at bar, he remains liable for the
payment of his obligation because of his failure to deposit the amount due with the Court.
However, inasmuch as petitioner did not accept the aforesaid amount, it was incumbent on
private respondent to deposit the same
25
with the court in order to be released from responsibility. Since private respondent did not
deposit said amount with the court, his obligation was not paid and he is liable in addition for
the payment of the monthly rental of P1,000.00 from January 1, 1981 until said obligation is
duly paid, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Compromise Agreement.
ESPINELI VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: This case concerns the conviction of Jose Espineli, a.k.a. Danilo Espineli, for the crime
of homicide committed against DZMM Senior Desk Coordinator Alberto Berbon. On 15
December 1996, Espineli and some other malefactors shot Berbon in the head and different
parts of his body in front of the latter’s house in Imus, Cavite. Meanwhile, the group of Atty.
Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the NBI arrested one Romeo Reyes for illegal possession of deadly
weapon. Reyes confided to the NBI that he was willing to give vital information regarding the
Berbon case. On 10 February 1997, NBI Agent Segunial interviewed Reyes and reduced his
statement into writing whereby Reyes claimed he saw Espineli and Sotero Paredes board a
red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite, respectively; and Espineli told
Paredes that “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon.” Subsequently, Reyes posted
bail and was released on 14 February 1997. He jumped bail and was never heard of again. On
24 June 1997, an Information was filed before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging Espineli with
the crime of murder. The prosecution offered the sworn statement of Reyes as its evidence.
Since Reyes jumped bail and cannot be found, NBI Agent Segunila testified on said sworn
statement. After the prosecution rested its case, Espineli did not adduce evidence for his
defense. Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. As no action
whatsoever was taken thereon by the trial court, petitioner just moved that the case be
deemed submitted for decision. On 31 August 1991, the RTC found Espineli guilty of murder.
On appeal, the CA modified the lower court’s ruling and found Espineli guilty of homicide
instead since none of the witnesses actually saw how Berbon was killed. Hence, the alleged
qualifying circumstances cannot be appreciated.
ISSUE: Is the sworn statement of Reyes considered as hearsay?
HELD: NO, this case falls under the doctrine of independently relevant statements. What the
prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his
sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI
Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement where what is
relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is
immaterial. Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized document having been
duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As
such, it may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due execution of this instrument or
document involved pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It enjoys a prima facie
presumption of authenticity and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence.
GULAM VS. SPS. SANTOS
FACTS: On 19 January 1994, Jallaludin Abdulrahman Gulam and Sps. Santos entered into a
Contract to Sell regarding a 72- square meter parcel of land located in Sampaloc, Manila, for
the price of Php 1.7 million, including a 2-story townhouse to be constructed by Sps. Santos
on the property. The terms of payment were as follows: Php 500 thousand to be paid on the
1st month of construction, another Php 500 thousand to be paid on the 2nd month of
construction, the remaining balance to be added on the full payment of the contract price;
and a reservation fee of Php 50 thousand shall be paid by Gulam. A final deed of sale shall be
executed by Sps. Santos upon full payment of the contract price, with Gulam bearing the
costs of the taxes. Written on the contract is the note: "Received the amount of Php 500
thousand representing Partial Payment of Full Downpayment.” Two years after the execution
of the Contract to Sell, Gulam filed an action for Specific Performance against Sps. Santos,
asking the RTC of Manila, Branch 50, to order Sps. Santos to execute a final deed of sale, plus
damages and costs. Gulam contended that he already fulfilled his end of the bargain by
paying the stipulated amount, including the taxes, or a total of P2,050,000.00. Gulam offered
as his evidence a private receipt dated 9 March 1994 for the amount of Php 500 thousand.
Sps. Santos denied Gulam's allegations, claiming that Gulam is yet to fully pay the agreed
price, having paid only Php 1 million, exclusive of the Php 50 thousand reservation fee.
According to Sps. Santos, Gulam paid Php 500 thousand upon the execution of the Contract
to Sell, as acknowledged in the Contract to Sell, and another Php 500 thousand in two
separate payments made in March 1994. Thus, Sps. Santos set up a counter-claim by asking
for the rescission of the contract due to Gulam's refusal to abide by its terms. On 17
September 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint and ordering the
rescission of the Contract to Sell. It ruled that Gulam is incompetent to testify on the due
execution of the receipt in the subject contract since he was not present when during the
time it was made; and it was his wife, Norhaya, who allegedly made the payment. In
addition, the private receipt allegedly issued by Sps. Santos on 9 March 1994 was found to be
a forgery. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: Can Gulam testify regarding the alleged payments made by his wife?
HELD: YES. Gulam's statements may be considered as independently relevant statements and
may be admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus
uttered. However, the admissibility of his testimony to such effect should not be equated
with its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade. In this case, both the RTC and the CA refused to give
credence to Gulam's testimony, and the Court finds no reason to doubt the assessments
made by both courts. Even assuming that his wife told him that payments were made on
these dates, still, it does not follow that it is sufficient proof to establish his claim of
overpayment. These should be weighed vis-à-vis the other evidence on record, which, as
appraised by the RTC and the CA, do not support Gulam's claim. The RTC and the CA chose to
ignore her testimony, and instead gave weight to the testimony of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Document Examiner that the signature appearing on the receipt was not made by Santos
based on her standard signature.
LEODEGARIO BAYANI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
FACTS: Petitioner Leodegario Bayani was charged with Violation of B.P. 22. It was alleged in
the Information that on August 20, 1992, he issued Check No. 054924 dated August 26, 1992,
in the amount of ₱10,000.00, drawn against the PS Bank, payable to "Cash" and gave the said
check to one Dolores Evangelista in exchange for cash although the said accused knew fully
well at the time of issuance of said check that he did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for payment, the same was dishonored and refused payment for the
reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, had no sufficient funds therein, and that
despite due notice said accused failed to deposit the necessary amount to cover said check,
26
or to pay in full the amount of said check, to the damage and prejudice of said Dolores
Evangelista in the aforesaid amount. After trial, petitioner was convicted by the RTC of
Lucena City.On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. Thus,
herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioner denies having issued the
check subject of this case. He argues that the evidence pinpointing him as the signatory on
the check is merely hearsay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to acquit the accused despite the conviction
of the trial court is utterly based on hearsay evidence.
HELD: The Court sustains the CA in affirming petitioner’s conviction by the RTC. In the
present case, complainant Evangelista testified that she was approached by Alicia Rubia who
told her that she was requested by petitioner to have the check exchanged for cash, as he
needed money badly. Obviously, Evangelista’s testimony is hearsay since she had no personal
knowledge of the fact that petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the check exchanged
for cash, as she was not personally present when petitioner supposedly made this request.
What she testified to, therefore, was a matter that was not derived from her own perception
but from Rubia’s. However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of
Evangelista’s testimony even if the same is hearsay. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court requires that the trial court shall not consider any evidence which has not been finally
offered. Section 35 of the same Rule provides that as regards the testimony of a witness, the
offer must be made at the time the witness is asked to testify. And under Section 36 of the
same Rule, objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a
witness shall be made as soon as the ground therefor becomes reasonably apparent. Thus, it
has been held that "in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay,
the evidence offered may be admitted." Since no objection to the admissibility of
Evangelista’s testimony was timely made – from the time her testimony was offered and up
to the time her direct examination was conducted – then petitioner has effectively waived
any objection to the admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to have her testimony
excluded for being hearsay has no ground to stand on. While Evangelista’s statement may be
admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily follow that the same should be given
evidentiary weight. In this regard, it has been held that although hearsay evidence may be
admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party’s counsel, it is nonetheless
without probative value, unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
exception to the hearsay evidence rule. In this case, Evangelista’s testimony may be
considered as an independently relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the
purpose of which is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of
such statement. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has
been made is relevant. When Evangelista said that Rubia told her that it was petitioner who
requested that the check be exchanged for cash, Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia
told her of such request. It does not establish the truth or veracity of Rubia’s statement since
it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court to attest to such utterance. On this
score, evidence regarding the making of such independently relevant statement is not
secondary but primary, because the statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (2)
be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of that fact. Indeed, independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelista’s statement
is relevant to the issues of petitioner’s falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and
consequently, his culpability of the offense charged. In any event, petitioner’s conviction did
not rest solely on Evangelista’s testimony. There are other pieces of evidence on record that
established his guilt, to wit: the subject check was included in the booklet of checks issued by
the PSBank to petitioner; the subject check was made to apply to the account of petitioner
whose name appears on the upper portion of the said check; and most telling is that
petitioner never categorically denied that the signature appearing on the check was his.
What petitioner claimed was that the signature on the check was similar to his signature,
although there were "differences.”
LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.
FACTS: Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer Industries, Inc., for
the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand valued at P565,000. Consigned to Vulcan
Industrial and Mining Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from Palawan to Manila.
The silica sand was placed on board Judy VII, a barge leased by Lea Mer. During the voyage,
the vessel sank, resulting in the loss of the cargo. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid
Vulcan the value of the lost cargo. To recover the amount paid and in the exercise of its right
of subrogation, Malayan demanded reimbursement from Lea Mer, which refused to comply.
Consequently, Malayan instituted a Complaint with the RTC of Manila, for the collection of
P565,000 representing the amount that respondent had paid Vulcan. The trial court
dismissed the Complaint, upon finding that the cause of the loss was a fortuitous event. The
RTC noted that the vessel had sunk because of the bad weather condition brought about by
Typhoon Trining. The court ruled that petitioner had no advance knowledge of the incoming
typhoon, and that the vessel had been cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard to travel from
Palawan to Manila. Reversing the trial court, the CA held that the vessel was not seaworthy
when it sailed for Manila. Thus, the loss of the cargo was occasioned by petitioner’s fault, not
by a fortuitous event. Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the survey report of the cargo surveyor, Jesus Cortez, who had not
been presented as a witness of the said report during the trial of this case before the lower
court can be admitted in evidence to prove the alleged facts cited in the said report.
HELD: Petitioner claims that the Survey Report prepared by Jesus Cortez, the cargo surveyor,
should not have been admitted in evidence. The Court partly agrees. Because he did not
testify during the trial, then the Report that he had prepared was hearsay and therefore
inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of its contents. The Survey Report Not the
Sole Evidence The facts reveal that Cortez’s Survey Report was used in the testimonies of
respondent’s witnesses -- Charlie Soriano; and Federico Manlapig, a cargo marine surveyor
and the vice-president of Toplis and Harding Company. Soriano testified that the Survey
Report had been used in preparing the final Adjustment Report conducted by their company.
The final Report showed that the barge was not seaworthy because of the existence of the
holes. Manlapig testified that he had prepared that Report after taking into account the
findings of the surveyor, as well as the pictures and the sketches of the place where the
sinking occurred. Evidently, the existence of the holes was proved by the testimonies of the
witnesses, not merely by Cortez’ Survey Report. Rule on Independently Relevant Statement
That witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial, and that their testimonies
must be confined to personal knowledge is required by the rules on evidence. On this basis,
the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus Cortez’s Affidavit, which respondent had
offered as evidence. Well- settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is presented as a witness,
an affidavit is considered hearsay. An exception to the foregoing rule is that on
"independently relevant statements." A report made by a person is admissible if it is
intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements. Independent of the truth or
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the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has been made is relevant.
Here, the hearsay rule does not apply. In the instant case, the challenged Survey Report
prepared by Cortez was admitted only as part of the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses.
The referral to Cortez’s Report was in relation to Manlapig’s final Adjustment Report.
Evidently, it was the existence of the Survey Report that was testified to. The admissibility of
that Report as part of the testimonies of the witnesses was correctly ruled upon by the trial
court. At any rate, even without the Survey Report, petitioner has already failed to overcome
the presumption of fault that applies to common

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