(International Political Economy Series) Gopinath Pillai (Eds.) - The Political Economy of South Asian Diaspora - Patterns of Socio-Economic Influence-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2013)

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Gopinath Pillai (editor)

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH ASIAN DIASPORA
Patterns of Socio-Economic Influence
Rachel K. Brickner (editor)
MIGRATION, GLOBALIZATION AND THE STATE
Juanita Elias and Samanthi Gunawardana (editors)
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DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
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Jeffrey D. Wilson
GOVERNING GLOBAL PRODUCTION
Resource Networks in the Asia-Pacific Steel Industry
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The Political Economy of
South Asian Diaspora
Patterns of Socio-Economic Influence
Edited by
Gopinath Pillai
Chairman, Institute of South Asian Studies,
National University of Singapore
Editorial matter, selection, introduction and conclusion © Gopinath Pillai 2013
Remaining chapters © Respective authors 2013
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Contents
List of Figures vii
List of Tables viii
Acknowledgements ix
List of Contributors x
List of Acronyms xi
Introduction: South Asian Diaspora: Patterns of

Socio-Economic Development 1
Gopinath Pillai and Hema Kiruppalini
Part I Economics
1 Looking East and Beyond: Indian IT Diaspora in Japan 9
Anthony P. D’Costa
2 Bangladeshi Diaspora Entrepreneurs in Japan 33

Md Mizanur Rahman and Lian Kwen Fee
3 From Sentries to Skilled Migrants: The Transitory Residence

of the Nepali Community in Singapore 59
Hema Kiruppalini
4 Migrant Remittance Supported Micro-Enterprises in South Asia 81

Shahadat Khan
5 A Diaspora Route to Professional Success in

the Indian Context: A Perspective 109
Ravi Mantha and Meng Weng Wong
Part II Religion
6 Religion, Politics and Islam in the South Asian Diaspora 125
Pnina Werbner
7 Social Movements in the Diasporic Context:

The Sathya Sai Baba Movement 143
Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Melissa Kelly
v
vi Contents
Part III Media

8 Transnational Subject/Transnational Audience: The NRI Trope
and Diasporic Aesthetic in Diasporic Romance Films 167
Sarah A. Joshi
9 Transnational Collaboration and Media Industry in

South India: Case of the Malaysian–Indian Diaspora 187
Shanthini Pillai
Editor’s Postscript 204

Gopinath Pillai
Index 209
List of Figures
1.1 Changing permanent residents in Japan, 2006–11 19

1.2 Changing concentration of Indian residents in
the Great Tokyo area 22
1.3 Software engineering curriculum deficiencies 27
3.1 Nepali restaurants in Singapore 62
3.2 An example of the numerous posters that encourage
Nepali students to go abroad to study in Singapore 70
4.1 Value diminishing flow of migrant remittance 83
4.2 Stages of small/micro business life cycle 87
4.3 Scope of study 89
8.1 The consumable hero of Kabhi Khushi Kabhie Gham 177
vii
List of Tables
1.1 Foreigners registered in Japan by country in

descending order 16
1.2 India’s share of technical talent in Japan, 1998–2004 17
1.3 Inflows and shares of technical talent by select sending
countries, 2006–11 20
1.4 Student’s enrolments at the undergraduates, masters and
PhD levels by fields 26
2.1 Profiles of Bangladeshi entrepreneurs in Japan 39
3.1 Source regions of population absent in Nepal and
countries of destination 63
3.2 Distribution of the population absent from Nepal by
countries of destination and by reasons for absence, 2001 64
4.1 Respondents’ age 90
4.2 Respondents’ educational background 91
4.3 Types of business, location and position in supply chain 95
4.4 Years of operation of MRSMEs and ownership pattern 96
4.5 Reasons for choosing business 96
4.6 Amount of initial capital and percentage for MR 101
4.7 Gaps identified in MRSMEs 103
viii
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to the following people who have

in one way or the other have helped to shape this publication. They
have contributed their time and energy in many ways through vision,
support, encouragement, expertise, writing and book coordination.
Special thanks goes to

Prof Tan Tai Yong, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)
Mr Johnson Paul, Senior Associate Director, Institute of South Asian
Studies (ISAS)
Prof Riaz Hassan, Visiting Research Professor, Institute of South Asian
Studies (ISAS)
Dr Md Mizanur Rahman, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of South
Asian Studies(ISAS)
Ms Ambika Raghavan, Publications Coordinator, Institute of South
Asian Studies (ISAS)
ix
List of Contributors
Ajaya Kumar Sahoo, Assistant Professor, University of Hyderabad,

India.
Anthony P. D’Costa, Chair and Professor of Contemporary Indian
Studies, Australia India Institute and the School of Social and Political
Sciences, University of Melbourne.
Gopinath Pillai, Editor and Ambassador-at-Large.
Hema Kiruppalini, Research Associate, Institute of South Asian Studies
(ISAS).
Lian Kwen Fee, Professor of Sociology, Institute of Asian Studies,
Universiti Brunei DarussalamAssociate Professor, Department of
Sociology, National University of Singapore.
Md Mizanur Rahman, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian
Studies (ISAS).
Ms Melissa Kelly, Doctoral Student, Uppsala University, Sweden.
Pnina Werbner, Professor of Social Anthropology, Keele University.
Ravi Mantha, Director, Sagelock Investments.
Sarah A. Joshi, Honorary Research Fellow, University of London-
Birbeck.
Shahadat Khan, Senior Lecturer, School of Business Information
Technology and Logistics, RMIT.
Shanthini Pillai, Associate Professor in Literary Studies in English,
National University of Malaysia.
Meng Weng Wong, Co-Founder and Social Engineer, JFDI Asia.
x
List of Acronyms
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BMET Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training
CAG capital gap
CBI continue business inherited
CBS Central Bureau of Statistics
CDs compact discs
CND Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
COG commitment gap
DIF desire to be independent and flexible
DCJ difficulties in job
DDLJ Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge
DVD digital video disc
EBHR European Bulletin of Himalayan Research
ESCWA Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia
FA foreign aid
FDI foreign direct investment
GDP gross domestic product
GIIS Global Indian International School
HRS had relevant skills
HSC Higher School Certificate
HTA home town associations
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICT information and communications technologies
ING information gap
IOM International Organization for Migration
ISAS Institute of South Asian Studies
ISG institutional capacity gap and service delivery gap
ISIJ International School in Japan
IT information technology
JISA Japan Information Technology Services Industry Association
KKHH Kuch Kuch Hota Hai
LPG looking prestigious
MBA Master of Business Administration
MEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and
Technology (Japan)
MF micro-finance
xi
xii List of Acronyms
MP Member of Parliament
MR migrant remittance
MRSMEs migrant remittance supported micro-enterprises
NATHM Nepal Academy of Tourism & Hotel Management
n.d. no date
NGO non-governmental organisation
NRI non-resident Indian
OCI Overseas Citizenship of India
PGI peer group influence
PR permanent resident
RA regional associations
RMIT Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
SADC South Asian Diaspora Convention
SKG skill gap
SLC School Leaving Certificate
SME small and medium enterprise
SSB Sathya Sai Baba
TiE The Indus Entrepreneurs
Tk taka
UK United Kingdom
UKIM UK Islamic Mission
UN United Nations
URG unwritten ground rules
US United States
VCDs video compact discs
WSH wanted something home-based
Introduction: South Asian
Diaspora: Patterns of Socio-
Economic Development
Gopinath Pillai and Hema Kiruppalini
The suggestion that the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) should
consider the South Asian diaspora as an important area of focus was
mooted by the former President of Singapore, Mr S. R. Nathan. He saw
the diaspora as a successful group of entrepreneurs who could make a
significant contribution to the economic integration of the South Asian
region. ISAS took up the challenge of not only studying the diaspora but
also providing a platform for the diaspora to meet and interact.
The first South Asian Diaspora Convention (SADC) was organised by
ISAS in July 2011. This initiative helped to connect the global South
Asian diaspora. Attended by over 600 delegates from different parts
of the world, the SADC was a success. The Institute was overwhelmed
with positive responses from South Asian diaspora communities around
the world. The success of the SADC boosted ISAS’s credentials and led
the way to more serious and regular involvement with the South Asian
diaspora across the world. In response to growing interest, ISAS decided
to organise the SADC biennially to bring prominent members of the
South Asian diaspora to share their experiences with home countries
in South Asia and to promote regional integration in South Asia and
beyond. The next Convention will be held in November 2013.
While we realise the importance of the SADC as a platform for the
South Asian diaspora to interact, we are also aware of the gaps in the
existing scholarship on this community. In a bid to address such gaps,
we embarked on this academic publication. Initially drawing from some
of the presentations at the SADC 2011, we later reached out to selected
scholars around the world, who are already working on South Asian
diaspora studies, to contribute to this initiative.
1
2 Gopinath Pillai and Hema Kiruppalini
This book’s approach is multidisciplinary and covers a broad range of

subjects involving selected home countries in South Asia and host coun-
tries in Europe, North America, and East and Southeast Asia. Chapters
from scholars located in different countries present different approaches
as well as different context-specific experiences. From a theoretical stand-
point, this volume does not propose a grand new theory of diaspora and
migration nor challenges any existing theories. Instead, it is an attempt
to encourage more scholarly research on South Asian diaspora.
Specifically, this book offers insights into the emerging trends that
have developed within the domain of the contemporary South Asian
diaspora. Scholarly works on the South Asian diaspora are often bifur-
cated along the lines of the ‘old diaspora’ and the ‘new diaspora’. The
‘old diaspora’ is associated with the wave of migration that took place
in the nineteenth century and is situated in the context of labour and
imperial diasporas; indentured Indians, etc. On the other hand, the ‘new
diaspora’ that is linked to the contemporary movement of migrants
encompasses a wide spectrum of people (entrepreneurs, professionals,
unskilled labour, semi-skilled labourers, students, etc.) and patterns of
migration (temporary migrants, circulatory migrants, returnees, refugees,
etc.), therefore embodying a different variant from the earlier period. In
effect, the new pattern of migration necessitates an expanded concept
of diaspora to better understand the increasingly complex movements
of people from South Asia.
Within the realm of the ‘new diaspora’, developments continue to
unfold thus requiring traditional conceptual theories to be revisited and
also new conceptual approaches to be mapped out to better compre-
hend the changing patterns of migration and how it impacts the socio-
economic development of the ‘homeland’. It is within the parameters
of the ‘new diaspora’, and to a lesser extent the ‘old diaspora’, that this
book offers fresh case studies to demonstrate the changing patterns
of international migration from South Asia. It deals with the complex
transnational identities that have emerged as a result of both local and
global pressures; and the jostling relations between nation and diaspora
where the notion of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ is beginning to undergo
more layers of transformations. In general, these emerging trends
have received little attention in scholarly literature on the South Asian
diaspora.
Conventional historiography on diasporas depicts migration as a
one-way flow where migrants moved from one destination to another.
In recent years, the relationship between the homeland and diaspora
has received greater attention. In the current context there are,
Introduction 3
arguably, two types of engagement with the homeland that has become
increasingly significant. Firstly, there is an engagement that is taking
place with the homeland from the host country; a trend that has been
examined in several scholarly works with the phrase ‘diasporic engage-
ment’ gaining currency in academic literature. Secondly, another type
of engagement has taken root within the context of the ‘homeland’ – a
migration flow that has been understood in terms of a ‘reverse migra-
tion’ as former migrants are beginning to return to their country of
origin. This growing pattern of reverse migration deserves greater
research investigation.
In this regard, Ravi Mantha and Meng Weng Wong’s chapter on
‘A Diaspora Route to Professional Success in the Indian Context: A
Perspective’, and Shahadat Khan’s ‘Migrant Remittance Supported
Micro Enterprises in South Asia’ are respectively useful in understanding
the changing dynamics of migration and how this reverse flow has
altered socio-economic development. The chapter by the former exam-
ines Indian ‘diaspora repatriates’ who have succeeded upon return as
a result of leveraging on their professional expertise in information
technology and their experience in the Silicon Valley. Analysing remit-
tance flows to Bangladesh, Shahadat Khan studies the behaviours of
migrant remittances supported micro-enterprises (MRSMEs) and makes
the case that there is a need for specific institutional services to cater to
returnees who would like to invest their overseas earnings on produc-
tive activities.
In both chapters, a question that arises is how ‘repatriates’, ‘return-
eess’ or ‘sojourners’ figure into the wider discourse of diaspora studies.
Generally, migrants from South Asia who sojourn in the Gulf as low
skilled workers are labelled as ‘not disperse’. However, in the case study
highlighted by Ravi Mantha and Meng Weng Wong, Indian profes-
sionals who return to their home country after spending several years
abroad are understood in terms of ‘diaspora repatriates’ – a phrase that
in itself is a paradox given the prototypical notions of the diasporic
condition. In any case, both chapters reflect the gap in the current liter-
ature towards the understanding of the differentiated migration trends
from South Asia and how these trends shape socio-economic influence.
Furthermore, a trend that is evident from the aforementioned chapters
is the shifts that have developed in the homeland–diaspora nexus and
how this change has contributed to a renegotiation of identity among
these migrants. The ideas of ‘homeland’ and ‘home’ are intrinsic to the
diasporic condition and these concepts have entered a more nebulous
field in view of the renewed ties to their place of origin.
As migrants move, they bring along with them their cultural and reli-
gious practices, music, food, etc. Sarah A. Joshi’s chapter on ‘Transnational
Subject/Transnational Audience: The NRI Trope and Diasporic Aesthetic in
Diasporic Romance Films’ and Shantini Pillai’s chapter on ‘Transnational
Collaboration and Media Industry in South India: Case of the Malaysian–
Indian Diaspora’ offer unique insights into the realm of the popular
media industry adopting film and music respectively as tropes to explore
the diasporic engagement with the homeland and the implications this
has on nationhood and identity. Sarah A. Joshi, through the medium of
popular Hindi films, discusses the development of the NRI as both subject
and targeted audience as part of recent economic and political develop-
ments and highlights how filmic engagement with the diaspora tests
nationhood, Indianness and cultural citizenship. Pillai studies the impact
that the Malaysian Tamil hip-hop artistes have had on India, shedding
light on the influence of the Malay language in Tamil songs, and how
these songs fluidly move between hip-hop and Tamil poetics. She makes
a significant point that for these Malaysian Tamil artistes, the ‘homeland
is undeniably Malaysia ... and hails their identity as Malaysians’. Here,
it is fair to suggest that albeit the attachment to India as a source of
cultural pride and linguistic affinity, there is, arguably, a further distinc-
tion between the ‘ancestral homeland’ and ‘homeland’. Among the more
established diasporas such as those in Malaysia, conceptions of ‘home’
as their place of settlement are engendered in historical experiences that
depart from the more contemporary case studies that perceive ‘home’ as
their place of origin.
The book also draws on hitherto unexplored case studies to better
understand migrant entrepreneurship and talent mobility, and alludes
to the need for further interrogation into the relatively new idea of
‘diaspora in the making’. Focusing on Japan, Md Mizanur Rahman
and Lian Kwen Fee’s co-authored chapter on ‘Bangladeshi Diaspora
Entrepreneurs in Japan’ and Anthony P. D’Costa’s chapter on ‘Looking
East and Beyond: India’s IT Diaspora in Japan’ together point towards
the growing presence of South Asians in Japan. While the former studies
Bangladeshi migrant entrepreneurship in Japan and casts new light on
the ways in which such entrepreneurship emerges under conditions
of temporary migration, the latter examines the presence of Indian IT
professionals in Japan and their contribution to both the Japanese and
Indian economy. Both these chapters serve to shed light on how South
Asians, notwithstanding their socio-economic status and skills, have
formed a niche for themselves in the Japanese markets be it as entrepre-
neurs or professionals.
Introduction 5
Anthony D’Costa makes a further point to illustrate that the more

recent presence of Indians especially in Tokyo has become more visible
and argues that the Indian professionals in Japan are a ‘diaspora in the
making’. In a similar vein, Hema Kiruppalini’s chapter on ‘From Sentries
to Skilled Migrants: The Transitory Residence of the Nepali Community
in Singapore’ in the course of examining the complex migratory motiva-
tions of new lāhures (professionals, students and entrepreneurs), argues
that the recent phase of Nepali migration to Singapore underscores why
they are a ‘community in the making’. She distinguishes the new lāhures
from the lāhures (Gurkhas who serve in the Singapore Police Force) and
considers them to be a quasi-diaspora in the context of Singapore. Both
these case studies reflect contemporary movements from South Asia and
how there is a theoretical lacuna in the concept of a ‘diaspora in the
making’. Although recent movements from South Asia point towards
the formation of incipient diasporas, these community formations have
not reached the kind of maturity that we see in the other chapters that
deal with more established diasporas (for example, Shantini Pillai, Pnina
Werbner, and to a lesser extent Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Melissa Kelly).
As such, there is a need for future research to study whether new migrant
communities under similar circumstances will develop into diasporas
and sustain themselves. Marienstras argues that ‘time has to pass’ before
we can know that any community that has migrated ‘is really a diaspora’.
Both these case studies showcase South Asian communities that are in
the formative stages of development or perhaps have not evolved into a
more established community.
Pnina Werbner’s chapter on ‘Religion, Politics and Islam in the South
Asian Diaspora’ and Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Melissa Kelly’s chapter
on ‘Social Movements in the Diasporic Context: The Sathya Sai Baba
Movement’ both explore the construction and reconstruction of reli-
gious identities in the South Asian diaspora. In an attempt to demon-
strate how religious movements strengthen the diasporas’ relation with
the homeland, Sahoo and Kelly study the transnational Sathya Sai Baba
movement and explain the impact that the new media has had on
strengthening their religious and cultural ties to the India. Focusing on
the South Asian Muslim diaspora in Britain, in particular the established
Pakistani Muslim community, Pnina Werbner analyses the impact that
international conflicts have had on the politicisation of Islam in Britain
and how this has led to the alienation of the community from other
South Asians. She explains the increased isolation of Muslim South
Asians in the United Kingdom, and argues that British Muslims are ‘pious
and emotional about their transnational loyalties’, thus demonstrating
the impact of global religious change in shaping transnational religious

identities.
Broadly speaking, the nine chapters bring to fore the varying experi-
ences of the South Asian diaspora and makes an attempt to understand
the changing dynamics of transnational networks, nationhood and iden-
tity vis-à-vis entrepreneurship, remittances, religion, popular culture and
the movement of professionals. One key aspect that has been alluded to
in most chapters is the issue of citizenship. While references are made to
concepts such as ‘transnationalizing citizenship’, ‘cultural citizenship’,
etc., the chapters in the book raise scope for further research to study the
interface between citizenship and diaspora and the implications that the
changing patterns of migration, as seen from these chapters, will have
on citizenship linkages, nationhood, belonging and identity. In any
case, the various chapters make an effort to provide fresh case studies. It
serves to direct future research on diaspora to draw new conceptual maps
to better understand the nuances that have developed in the diaspora–
homeland nexus. The chapters also serve to provide both commonalities
and contrasts in the patterns of settlement between incipient commu-
nities and more established diasporas. By means of a multidisciplinary
approach, the chapters showcase the versatility of understanding South
Asia from the vantage point of both the host country and from the
subcontinent itself that has witnessed unprecedented interactions with
their citizens who have ventured abroad.
Reference
Richard Marienstras, R. (1989) ‘On the Notion of Diaspora’, in Gérard Chaliand
(ed.), Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-states (London: Pluto Press).
Part I
Economics
1
Looking East and Beyond: Indian
IT Diaspora in Japan
Anthony P. D’Costa
Introduction
Since the 1980s there has been considerable global economic and polit-
ical realignment, with Asia as a significant centre. Japan’s dramatic rise in
the post-World War II era, the rise of poverty-stricken East and Southeast
Asian economies based on multinational-driven manufacturing growth,
and more recently China and India’s wider and deeper engagement with
the world economy have cumulatively created a dynamic Asian region.
The character of the global economy has undergone fundamental shifts
with rapid development of technology and innovations, dispersion of
industrial investments worldwide and emphasis on exports. Asia’s place
in this tumultuous process is not in doubt. However, there is another
development accompanying this geo-economic shift, namely, the move-
ment of people across national boundaries. The deployment of informa-
tion and communications technologies (ICT), and the corresponding
services revolution, leading to tradability of services, has redrawn the
boundaries of firms. Companies increasingly rely on the mobility of
highly skilled professionals to run their operations globally and they
obtain services from providers located outside of the company and
possibly outside the country. The increasing reliance on international
outsourcing (or offshoring) has contributed to a new layer of globali-
sation with the international movement of high-skilled professionals,
with significant national policy implications (Bhagwati, 2009; Menz,
2011). The flow of professionals from one country to another has led to
the formation of a diaspora, generating a bank of professionals overseas.
Governments have been anxious to generate the science and technology
professionals at home that are so critical to contemporary economic
activities driven by innovations, but they are also increasingly interested
9
10 Anthony P. D’Costa
in tapping the technical and commercial knowledge and wealth of their

country’s professionals living abroad.
India has been a major country for diasporic studies from a wide range
of academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. However,
much of the work has focused on India’s relationship with the West,
with scant attention paid to India’s relationships with its neighbours in
East Asia. In one otherwise excellent study of the Indian diaspora and the
IT industry, there is no mention of Japan, although it still is the second
largest IT market in the world (see Kapur, 2010). There are some excep-
tions in the literature, where the movement of people and diasporic
developments are specifically located in Asia (Amrith, 2011). However,
these tend to be historical accounts of the movements of people and
not about professional diasporas that are contributing to international
economic and social integration today. There are obvious reasons for
this neglect. It reflects the small size of the Indian diaspora in Asia (with
the exceptions of Singapore, Malaysia and Australia) and India’s ideolog-
ical, intellectual, economic and political biases towards the West. In fact,
it is precisely the large size of the Indian diaspora in the US, comprising
a significant number of well-connected professionals in various sectors,
which draws attention to India’s relationship with the West.
Yet, it would be a gross omission from a practical as well as an intel-
lectual point of view to ignore India’s relations with the East, particu-
larly, the large economies of Japan and China. While China offers both
opportunities and challenges, Japan offers little competition for India’s
IT industry, at least in those segments where India has been globally
successful. Rather than dismiss the small number of Indian professionals
in Japan as insignificant, I would argue that a closer look at the empir-
ical reality is necessary because of emerging patterns of Indians resident
in Japan. This does not reveal a fundamentally different picture from
the mainstream view but does hint at the formation of a professional
Indian diaspora, whose impact through ‘reputational intermediaries’
could be felt later in Japan, India and elsewhere (Kapur and McHale,
2006: 236–7). Furthermore, there are developments in the bilateral rela-
tionship between Japan and India, which if followed through, portend
critical forms of engagement that could boost both the scale and lever-
aging of the small yet growing IT diaspora in Japan. Aside from the
diversification on international economic relations, especially in the IT
industry, such a partnership would also deflect American pressure on
India to limit offshoring arrangements and minimise job losses in the
US. At the same time, an engagement with the Japanese market could
indirectly foster multilateral relationships with countries in Asia, where
Indian IT Diaspora in Japan 11
Indian companies operate out of Singapore and China for the Japanese
market, and create alternative avenues for commercial and technolog-
ical learning for Indian firms.
In the next section, I present a brief discussion of the relevance of a
diaspora to economic development, especially in skill-intensive sectors.
In the following section, I use Japanese immigration data to show that
Japan, despite its limited engagement with foreigners, is accepting more
immigration. I will also discuss the presence of Indians, especially IT
professionals, in Japan. Why this might be the case is addressed in the
section on Japan’s current predicament. I will specifically present Japan’s
predicament, which includes a rapidly ageing population (demographic
crisis), shortage of skilled workers, and acute Japanese business and
government anxiety to cope with these challenges. In the section on
India’s diaspora and looking East, I present some of the benefits to both
India and Japan in forging strong bilateral and multilateral relation-
ships, to demonstrate the importance for India of looking eastward.
Diaspora, demography and the innovation ecosystem
The literature on diaspora is squarely anchored in immigration and to a

lesser extent, in emigration, though both are critical for the formation of
a diaspora. Kapur (2010) emphasises Indian emigration and its relation-
ship to the US-based diaspora. Emigration suggests simply an outflow of
citizens to various countries, which could result in diasporas, with immi-
grants concentrated in a few countries, or the scattering of nationals in
different countries. It is a given that a critical mass of nationals is needed
to form a diaspora, but how many are needed to form a diaspora is an
open question. The composition of the diaspora is also crucial. While
the US-based Indian diaspora is large, it is also socially and economically
very successful and thus able to offer economic and technical knowl-
edge to the home country (Kapur and McHale, 2006: 240–4). Due to the
large flow of Indian students to US universities, many graduates stay in
the US, contributing to the formation and expansion of the diaspora.
I raise two questions that are relevant to the understanding of diaspora
development and dynamics. First, what drives the formation of diasporas
in specific receiving countries composed largely of technical profes-
sionals? Second, what are the expected benefits of such diasporas to
sending countries such as India? Regarding the formation of diasporas,
it is obvious that the receiving country must be receptive to foreign
professionals, since governments manage immigration. However, the
demand for workers, both skilled and unskilled, has increased under
global capitalism for a variety of economic and social reasons, including

labour shortages due to demographic shifts, reduced enrolments in
science and technology education and increasing tradability of serv-
ices. A small number of globally oriented centres are able to specialise in
specific types of high-skill activities leading to the spatial congregation
of professionals. Silicon Valley and Bangalore are joined at the hip, each
attracting professionals internally and externally (D’Costa, 2011). Japan
has not been perceived as a foreigner-friendly destination compared to
the US or the UK. However, when it comes to skilled professionals, there
is no a priori reason that nationals of any one country should concen-
trate in the receiving country, since the demand could be met by any
country that generates the acceptable quantity and quality of technical
professionals. Countries with good technical educational systems tend
be major providers of high-skilled professionals. Large countries such
as China and India can generate large absolute numbers of science and
engineering graduates, albeit of uneven quality.
To be effective as a diaspora, the concentration of technical profes-
sionals of a particular national background (or ethnicity for heteroge-
neous sending countries) must be spatially concentrated in urban areas,
with tightly knit professional communities. Cities and regions rather
than countries as a whole tend to be innovation hubs today (Moretti,
2012). Countries with high emigration of tertiary educated professionals
tend to concentrate in global innovation centres. Subsequent network
effects work to attract more such professionals from the same sending
country. A host of factors could trigger initial emigration, such as weak
employment opportunities or lack of professional challenges. Students
studying overseas, though deemed temporary migrants, often remain
in the receiving country if professional opportunities become avail-
able. As a result, students could become permanent residents and citi-
zens, adding to the stock of the diaspora. Thus, in this simple narrative
there is a demand and supply dimension to the formation of a diaspora,
although the precise mechanisms that determine why some cities and
regions become innovation hubs, such as Silicon Valley or Seattle, are
not always clear. Innovation hubs generate their own ecosystem in
which entrepreneurs, businesses, local governments and others work
collectively, formally and informally. This suggests that there is a certain
‘stickiness’ to innovation hubs, meaning these areas will attract talent
(domestic and foreign) under globalisation and thus could contribute to
the formation of a diaspora, in addition to sustaining the hub.
How could members of a professional diaspora contribute to their
home country in spite of the ‘stickiness’ that attaches them to an
innovation hub outside of their own country? Strong economic growth

and increasing professional opportunities in the home country can
attract members of the diaspora either through return migration or
through business opportunities, which lead to the transfer of capital
and knowledge. There appears to be a home country bias by diasporas
(Kapur, 2010: 28–30), although not remittance income, given that
such emigrant professionals tend to come from middle-class families
(Bhagwati, 2009: 9). For example, several Indian Americans in leader-
ship positions in US corporations have launched important India-based
IT operations (Kapur, 2010: 198). Related to the pull effect, which home
countries exercise in high-skill activities, the role of institutional actors,
including business and government in fostering an ecosystem commen-
surate with today’s innovation activities is necessary in reinforcing the
diaspora effect on investment, innovation and exports. This is an impor-
tant component to incrementally transforming, though not reversing,
brain drain and achieving a form of ‘brain gain’.
Since professionals are generally high-skilled workers enjoying a skill
premium, they are an economic resource to the receiving country in the
context of shortages. But the second question, what are the expected
benefits to sending countries, is really about the anticipated contribu-
tion of such a diaspora on sending-country development. While there
are many theoretical benefits of a professional diaspora to the home
country (for a summary, see D’Costa, 2008a), these are hard to docu-
ment empirically. Nevertheless, there is evidence of economic and tech-
nological benefits from diasporas, especially through the social and
professional links to their home country (Kapur, 2010). In the absence
of empirical data, the precise mechanisms are unclear. However, using
technical and commercial knowledge gained in the receiving country
to set up business in the sending country as part of the diaspora or as a
return migrant is a major contribution. Professional networks, not only
within the diaspora but also outside it, with professionals and institu-
tions in the sending country are platforms through which technical
and commercial knowledge are disseminated. Thus for a diaspora to be
effective, it must meet the following necessary conditions: (1) it must
contain a critical mass of expatriate professionals, technical and entre-
preneurial, concentrated in an innovation hub or region; (2) there must
be strong networks within the community in the innovation hub or
region; and (3) there must be strong economic and social links to the
home country.
Emigration from a sending country and receptivity of the receiving
country contribute to the formation of a critical mass under conditions
of economic/sectoral growth. However, the second and third condi-

tions listed above are significantly influenced by investment and
growth dynamics as well as by the formation of innovation ecosys-
tems. High growth of technology-intensive sectors, characterised by
innovations, are expected to contribute to cluster dynamics, whereby
the geographical proximity of many firms within an industrial sector
either as buyers or suppliers compels thick interactions. A favourable
policy environment as well as business links to research centres will
enhance the quality of these interactions. A diaspora of technical
professionals can find it easier to tap into such an ecosystem locally if
it is on the cutting edge of technology. Networks can be both formal
and informal, with the former working through business associations
and professional organisations and the latter through diaspora-based
alumni organisations and outreach activities such as social events,
lectures, seminars and cultural activities. It is more difficult for the
diaspora to tap into the innovation ecosystem of their home country
since much of the networking is more effective in face-to-face interac-
tions. Nevertheless, since most IT professionals come from the middle-
class, with well-connected backgrounds and substantial education, they
can leverage their professional, regional, ethnic and alumni connec-
tions back home, especially under changing geo-strategic favourable
bilateral partnerships.
It is evident that the formation and effectiveness of a technical
diaspora to interact with the home country hinges on a number of
variables. Most importantly, however, a critical mass of expatriates, of
indeterminate size, is a necessary precondition. Expatriates can arrive
directly as employees of foreign firms under special work permits and
visas or as students who stay after completion of their education.
Naturally, both contribute to the size of the professional diaspora. In
the absence of either one of these flows, diaspora formation is likely
to be underdeveloped unless sufficiently exceeded by one flow over
the other flow. Other factors can influence the critical mass, favour-
ably or unfavourably, and help or hinder the formation of an effective
diaspora. In the sections below, I first present the notion of a critical
mass by examining the presence of Indians in Japan. Although the
number of Indian expatriates in Japan is small compared to those
in English-speaking countries, there are certain bilateral agreements
between Japan and India, such as the Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement, that encourage a closer scrutiny of the Indian
diaspora in the making in Japan.
Indians and other foreigners in Japan
The number of foreigners in Japan is very low compared to the foreign

populations in Anglophone and other European countries. However,
that trend is changing, partly because of deepening global economic
integration, increased travel, Japan’s expansion abroad through foreign
direct investment, and its need for foreign workers due to demographic
shifts and lifestyle choices. Table 1.1 shows the number of foreigners
registered (staying over 90 days) in Japan by country of origin.
Several observations can be made from the data. First, the presence of
foreigners in Japan has increased by nearly 20 per cent between 1986 and
1990 and by 62 per cent between 1995 and 2000. If the Korean popula-
tion is removed from the statistics (since they are long-time Japanese
residents but without Japanese citizenship), the absolute number of
foreigners has increased even more.1 Since 2000, the relative increase in
foreigners has slowed down. The immigration reforms of 1990, which
brought in Japanese-Brazilians (nikkeijin) to work in the Japanese auto
supplier industry, changed the number of foreigners substantially.
However, the two-decade-long recession in Japan in the context of high
growth in China, India and elsewhere has slowed down foreign entry.
Second, the single largest contributor of immigrants to Japan is China.
From about 10 per cent of Korean residents, today the Chinese are the
most dominant among foreigners with nearly 700,000 registered. Brazil
has retained third place, but with a declining share relative to China.
From 79 per cent in 1995, the share of Brazilians to Chinese dropped to
only a third by 2010. Third, the presence of Indians is marginal when
compared even to that of the US. However, the number of Indians
doubled between 2000 and 2010 to about 22,500. Such a small number
is unlikely to form a diaspora unless the population can be shown to be
a relatively homogenous, highly skilled professional group.
To determine whether this small group of Indian residents in Japan
is composed mainly of high-skilled professionals, foreign registrations
were disaggregated by country and visa type. As Table 1.2 shows, China
dominates, not only in overall numbers in Japan, but also in terms of the
percentage of skilled workers such as professors, researchers, engineers
and intra-company transfers. Nearly 54 per cent of foreign, high-skilled
professionals comprising professors, journalists, investors/business
managers, lawyers, accountants, medical staff, researchers, humani-
tarian workers and international business personnel resident in Japan
between 1998 and 2004 were Chinese. Korea’s share was similar. What is
Table 1.1 Foreigners registered in Japan by country in descending order
1984 (Persons) 1986 (persons) 1995 (persons) 1995 (persons) 2000 (persons) 2005 (persons) 2010 (persons)
Total 840,885 Total 867,237 Total 1,075,317 Total 1,0391149 Total 1689,444 Total 2,011,555 Total 2,134,151
N&S Korea 687,135 N&S Korea 677,959 N&S Korea 687,940 N&S Korea 666,376 N&S Korea 635,269 N&S Korea 598,687 China 687,156
China 67,895 China 84,397 China 150,339 China 222,991 China 335,575 China 519,561 N&S Korea 565,989
USA 27,882 USA 30,695 Brazil 56,429 Brazil 176,440 Brazil 254,394 Brazil 302,080 Brazil 230,552
Philippines 9,618 Philippines 18,897 Philippines 49,092 Philippines 74,297 Philippines 144,871 Philippines 187,261 Philippines 210,181
UK 6,354 UK 7,426 USA 38,364 USA 43,198 Peru 46,171 Peru 57,728 Peru 54,636
Vietnam 3,911 Vietnam 4,388 Peru 10,279 Peru 36,269 USA 44,856 USA 49,390 USA 50,667
W.Germany 2,997 W.Germany 3,193 UK 10,206 Thailand 16,035 Thailand 29,289 Thailand 37,703 Vietnam 41,781
Thailand 2,536 Thailand 2,981 Thailand 6,724 UK 12,485 Indonesia 19,346 Vietnam 28,932 Thailand 41,279
India 2,434 Canada 2,685 Vietnam 6,233 Vietnam 9,099 Vietnam 16,908 Indonesia 25,097 Indonesia 24,895
France 2,250 India 2,601 Canada 4,909 Iran 8,645 UK 16,525 UK 17,494 India 22,497
Canada 2,149 France 2,494 Malaysia 4,683 Canada 7,226 Canada 10,088 India 16,988
Brazil 1,953 Malaysia 2182 Australia 3,975 Indonesia 6,956 India 10,064
Australia 1,686 Brazil 2,135 Indonesia 3,623 Australia 6,036
Malaysia 1,649 Australia 2,058 Inida 3,107 India 5,508
Indonesia 1,643 Indonesia 1,839 Iran 1,237 Malaysia 5,354
Iran 542 Iran 852 Germany 3606 Germany 3963
Peru 452 Peru 553 France 3166 France 3772
Source: Japan Immigration Association (various years).

noteworthy is that both India and the Philippines ranked much higher
than China or Korea in terms of the share of technical talent (defined as
professors, researchers, engineers and intra-company transfers) to total
professionals from that country. For example, India’s share of technical
talent as a share of all Indian professionals (by visa category) was nearly
83 per cent in 2004, followed by the Philippines with a share of 72 per
cent. China’s share stood at 68 per cent. Furthermore, between 1998 and
2004, the share of highly skilled Indian professionals among its total
professional pool had risen, suggesting India’s contribution to profes-
sionals of foreign nationalities in Japan, though small, is disproportion-
ately larger than those of other countries, including China.
Can this trend be sustained or will the absolute number of profes-
sionals continue to increase? In order to answer this question, it is neces-
sary to understand the extent to which Japan will increasingly depend
on foreign professionals and identify the conditions under which Indian
professionals will see Japan as an important market, from both an
employment and export point of view. There are a number of variables
that need to be examined before a reasonable assessment can be done.
First, Japan’s continued economic stagnation, made worse by the global
recession of 2008–09, is likely to discourage foreign professionals seeking
opportunities in Japan. A recent report indicated that the number of
foreign engineers declined from 2008 onwards (Ministry of Justice, Japan,
2010: 6). However, the continued shortfalls in particular skill areas could
be a countervailing force. Second, related to Japan’s demographic and
labour market dilemmas, the critical mass of foreign professionals could
Table 1.2 India’s share of technical talent in Japan, 1998–

2004 (%)
Year 1998 2001 2004
Asia 54.8 57.6 56.8

China 54.0 53.5 53.8
India 73.2 79.2 82.5
Koreas 51.4 54.0 54.9
Philippines 71.1 70.5 71.8
Notes: Technical talent = sum of professors, researchers, engineers, and

intra-company transfers. Total professionals = sum of non-technical
professionals, engineers, and intra-company transfers, where
non-technical professionals = sum of professors, journalists, investor/
business managers, lawyers, accountants, medical staff, researchers,
humanitarian workers, and international business personnel.
Source: Japan Immigration Association (various years).

be large enough to begin to act as a diaspora. Japanese companies, hard

pressed to compete with high costs, will have to adjust to the reality of
increasing numbers of foreign professionals. The unravelling of keiretsu
firms, with their relative inflexibility, may also mean greater opportu-
nities for agile entrepreneurial firms, with many launched by foreign
professionals.2 Third, while Japan has not been the destination of choice
for internationally mobile professionals, the continued economic crisis
in the US, together with anti-offshoring sentiments, could pave the way
for greater interest in Japan by Indian professionals.
Figure 1.1 presents the more recent data on permanent residents in
Japan. While the total number of permanent residents increased from
394,477 in 2006 to 598,440 by 2011, an increase of 51.7 per cent, visas
for long-term residency have fallen by 33.8 per cent over the same
period. Long-term visas are granted by the Ministry of Justice for special
circumstances. The decline is attributed to changing definitions of types
of visas and the availability of other types of visas. However, the ratio
of permanent residents to total inflows of foreigners is increasing, from
18.9 per cent in 2006 to 28.8 per cent in 2011. This indicates that more
foreigners are settling down in Japan on a permanent basis, although
foreign permanent residents are still less than half of one per cent of
Japan’s total population. India’s share of permanent residents in Japan is
small, numbering less than 4,000 in 2011 compared to China’s 184,216.
However, there are other indications that show that the presence of
Indians cannot be ignored when considering a future diaspora of tech-
nical and managerial professionals.
The disaggregated data on inflows of foreigners by visa type and
source country shows that the number of Indians who qualify as tech-
nical talent (professors, researchers, engineers and intra-company
transfers) continued to increase until the global recession of 2008–09
(see Table 1.3). Between 2008 and 2009, India’s share of such visas
increased more other countries (1.8% versus 1.4 for China, -4.6 for
Korea, and -5.1% for the Philippines), while the decline in such visas
was similar for China and India between 2010 and 2011. India’s pres-
ence in Japan, largely composed of technical talent, defined as the
sum of professors, researchers, engineers and intra-company transfer
employees, is different from the major sending countries of China,
Korea and the Philippines. This is consistent with Table 1.1 for earlier
years and with different definitions of professional visa catego-
ries. Table 1.3 indicates that India has the highest ratio of technical
talent as a share of its total registrations (staying in Japan for more
than 90 days). There are other indications that show that Indian
200000
China
180000
India
Koreas
160000
Philippines
140000
NUMBER OF RESIDENTS
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0 2122 2358 2720 3124 3383 3697

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Figure 1.1 Changing permanent residents in Japan, 2006–11

Source: Statistics on Legal Migrants, Ministry of Justice, Japan, various years.
professionals, despite their comparatively small numbers, are begin-

ning to make a diasporic community in Japan, especially in Tokyo.
There are three such indications: 1) the spatial agglomeration of Indian
residents in major urban areas such as greater Tokyo; 2) the establish-
ment of international schools, a reflection of a critical mass of workers
and their families as well as the desire to maintain a homeland identity
through a shared academic curriculum; and 3) the formation of organi-
sations, both professional and social, allowing for networking, which
is a critical dimension of diaspora dynamics as well as contributing to
an ecosystem for entrepreneurship and innovations.
Sawa and Minamino (2007: 13), based on 2005 immigration data,
show that many recent Indian arrivals have been dependents (24.2%)
followed by IT engineers (16.6%), with no other country (listed in their
study) falling under these two categories of residential status. What this
means is that the Indian engineers are bringing their families with them.
The Japanese government recently relaxed its visa regulations to allow
ageing parents to live as dependents. This is also evidenced by a high
Table 1.3 Inflows and shares of technical talent by select sending countries, 2006–11
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Numbers % Share Numbers % Share Numbers % Share Numbers % Share Numbers % Share Numbers % Share
Total 77,875 3.7 92.768 4.3 106,552 4.8 106,976 4.9 103,190 4.8 98,983 4.8
Inflows
Asia 64,235 4.2 78,985 4.9 92,392 5.5 93,939 5.6 90,974 5.4 87,701 5.3
China 35,046 6.2 44,079 7.3 51,744 7.9 52,444 7.7 50,926 7.4 48,745 7.2
India 7m032 37.2 8,080 39.2 9,177 41.1 9,342 40.9 9,050 40.2 8,638 40.2
Koreasb 11,142 1.9 12,768 2.2 13,763 2.3 13,132 2.3 11,880 2.1 10,310 1.9
Philippines 2,619 1.4 3,092 1.5 3,482 1.7 3,306 1.6 3,146 1.5 3,296 1.6
Notes: aShare of technical talent is the sum of professors, researchers, engineers, and intra-company transfers of a sending country divided by the total
registrations as foreigners (staying in Japan for more than 90 days) of that sending country.
b
Include both South and North Koreans who have been long-time residents of Japan but have not taken up Japanese citizenship.
c
Data are based on the figures as of the end of the year registered. China includes Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. The definitions of statuses are included
in the Immigration control and Refugee Recognition Act, http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/english/newimmiact/pdf/RefugeeRecognitionAct03.pdf
Source: Statistics on Legal Migrants, Ministry of Justice, Japan, various years.
ratio of Indian women to men (252.7 women to 1000 Indian men),

compared to China’s 70 and the US’ 184 (Sawa and Minamino, 2007:
13). As India captured the global offshoring of IT business and as Japan
introduced various immigration reforms, gradually moving towards
encouraging high-skilled professionals, the presence of Indians in Japan
and especially in selected areas of Tokyo has become visible. As with
other major innovation centres where technical talent tends to reside,
Tokyo has drawn many Indian technical and managerial professionals.
English-language capabilities have favoured Indian professionals in
multinational companies and banks, and Indian companies seeking a
slice of the Japanese IT market have made greater Tokyo their residential
and professional hub.
As documented by Sawa and Minamino (2007) and D’Costa and
Kobayashi (2009), most Indian IT professionals live in the Tokyo,
Kanagawa and Chiba areas. The Kasai (Nishikasai) area of Tokyo, popu-
lated by many Indians, has been dubbed ‘Indian Town’ by the Japanese
media. By mapping the changes of Indian residents in the Tokyo area,
we note not only the absolute increase in the population but also
geographical shifts through consolidation and concentration of Indian
residents in certain areas (wards) of Tokyo (Figure 1.2).3 Thus in 2003,
Ichikawa, Yokohama and Kawasaki cities, Saitama prefecture, and six
wards of Tokyo shared the Indian residents more or less equally, with
the three cities, Saitama prefecture, and Edogawa and Minato wards of
Tokyo having higher concentrations compared to the remaining four
wards of Tokyo. However, the 2011 data reveal some dramatic shifts, with
Yokohama and Kawasaki cities along with Koto and Edogawa wards in
Tokyo becoming the four principal concentrations of Indian residents.
The largest increase from 2003 to 2011 was in the Koto and Edogawa
wards with a four-fold increase in the number of residents; Yokohama
city doubled the number of its Indian residents. There are various reasons
for concentration, such as social, economic, housing and transportation
factors, but pure inertia, reduction of transactions costs and networks
could have been at work as well. Whatever the reason, it is evident that
a critical mass of Indian residents (largely professionals) is concentrating
in specific areas with close geographical proximity to each other, thereby
contributing to a diaspora in the making. The formation of a diaspora is
strengthened as community members begin living with their families on
a long-term basis in their new country of work. Consequently, children’s
education becomes a major priority for families, especially for Indians
who value education for social and economic mobility and whose own
international mobility has been influenced by their level of education. In
fact, the establishment of a preferred international school is a good sign
Figure 1.2 Changing concentration of Indian residents in the Great Tokyo area
Source: Figures created by Tomoko Nakamura based on data from local governments, 2012.
of a critical mass of community members with families. In 2004, the first

India International School in Japan (ISIJ) was opened in Tokyo. It was
designed to serve the Indian expatriate community living in the Tokyo
area with lower fees than the other international schools. In 2006, the
Global Indian International School (GIIS), headquartered in Singapore
and founded by Indians, was established in Edogawa. GIIS operates in
India, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the US and Japan. Both ISIJ and
GIIS follow India’s Central Board of Secondary Education curriculum and
exams. Both schools have expanded their operations into other locations,
including Yokohama, which is also host to many Indian IT companies
(Field Visits, Tokyo, 2011, 2010, 2006, 2005).
The third indication for diaspora development is networking, which
is not easy to quantify. For the diaspora to be effective, it must meet not
only the conditions of scale (membership) but also interaction among
the members and with their home country counterparts. A number of
organisations in and around Tokyo have been established to explicitly
facilitate networking among Indians as well as Japanese IT professionals.
One active organisation has been the India IT Club, Japan, established by
Indian IT professionals on a voluntary basis and supported by the Indian
Embassy in Tokyo. The club provides professional space for interactions
among Indian and Japanese IT professionals and allied service providers
such as Japanese language instructors, travel agents and consultants. It
organises IT-related events, including lectures and seminars throughout
Japan. The Club, established about 12 years ago, was renamed the India
IT Forum in 2012 and formalised with a constitution. There are other
social and religious organisations where informal networking among
Indians takes place. The geographical proximity of Indian residents in
the greater Tokyo area facilitates informal interactions.
There are avenues for international networking, whereby Japan-based
IT companies, mostly Japanese-owned but some with Indian profes-
sionals, can engage with the Indian IT diaspora elsewhere such as that
in the US or Singapore. Rather than deal directly with Indian companies
from India, due to perceived high transactions costs, Japanese companies
prefer to establish offshoring arrangements with Indian-led or Indian-
owned companies based elsewhere, who in turn have offshoring arrange-
ments with Indian-based companies. Softbridge, a Singapore-based IT
firm led by an Indian American, has offices in Tokyo and Pune, India.
The company ‘bridges’ Japanese and Indian companies by mobilising
bilingual engineers. Sun and Sands Advisors is a Tokyo-based company
founded by an Indian engineer with considerable experience in Japanese
and multinational banks in Tokyo. The company advises Japanese and
Indian companies for cross-border business and thus acts as a ‘reputa-

tional intermediary’. Similarly, a former Indian Ambassador, now a resi-
dent of Japan, is active in the Japan–India professional diaspora, helping
bridge businesses from both countries as well as generating goodwill
between the two. These developments are a roundabout way of forming a
technical community that transcends the immediate Japan-based Indian
diaspora. Thus, the 2011 acquisition of US-based Keane International
and Intelligroup by NTT Data and Sierra Atlantic by Hitachi illustrate
how Japanese IT companies are reaching out to India by way of third
countries. Over 75 per cent of the employees of these acquired compa-
nies are in India (Nambiar, 2011). There is also a Japanese benefit as they
can now enter Western software services markets through Indians and
Indian companies. The overall impact of tripartite arrangements – India,
Japan and third countries – is likely to be enhanced interaction and thus
greater familiarity with ‘cultural’ differences.
Extending this idea of international networks, it is likely that a
regional diaspora is in the making. Japan remains one of the largest
IT markets in the world, China is growing, and smaller Asian coun-
tries such as Singapore and Taiwan continue to find ways to enhance
their high technology sectors. Thus, the movement of professionals
from and within the Asian region, including Indians, is likely to inten-
sify. Indian IT companies such as Infosys, TCS and Wipro are already
present in China (and Japan), tapping local talent and markets, while
Chinese IT and telecommunications firms, such as Haier and Huawei,
undertake high-volume projects in India. Following China, which serves
the Japanese companies from Dalian in Eastern China, Indian compa-
nies following the near-shore delivery model could also use Dalian as
a platform to serve Japanese markets. Furthermore, the presence of an
Indian diaspora in Singapore and Australia can also add links to the
emerging East Asian professional networks. While this development is
likely to form a multinational technical community, the role of Indian
technical professionals in the region and their potential contribution
linking Indian professionals and companies in India should not be
underestimated.
Japan’s current predicament
From the patterns of inflows and stock of Indians, it is clear that the
relative number of Indians in Japan is small. However, there has been
an absolute increase in the numbers, made more significant by the
high share of technical professionals to total inflows. Furthermore, the
gradual formation of a community with more Indian dependents living
in the Tokyo area suggests increasing acceptance of as well as opportuni-

ties for Indian professionals in Japan. Why such a turning point might
be in the offing, despite conservative sentiments towards foreigners and
continuing depressed economic conditions, can be explained broadly
by Japan’s own economic predicaments and larger, outside develop-
ments. Japan’s contemporary challenges are many and here I will only
deal with one such challenge: changing demographics and the resulting
changes in Japan’s labour markets.
Demographers have projected that by 2050, Japan’s population will
decline to 93.5 million, from its current population of about 126 million
(Kaneko et al., 2008: 91).4 Given Japanese women’s responses to moder-
nity, labour markets, and employment and economic status, it is difficult
to accept the high variant fertility rate. Japan’s dependency ratio is esti-
mated at 52.6 per cent (31.8% of the elderly population of 65+ years),
which by 2050 is estimated to reach 95.2 per cent and 81.6 per cent (low
and high fertility variants respectively) (Kaneko et al., 2008: 87). There is
no historical precedent for such a high dependency ratio anywhere and
it is impossible to imagine how a socio-economic system with such high
dependency could function.
It could be argued that a declining population need not lead to labour
shortages in particular labour markets, such as IT, if labour productivity
continues to increase, more students pursue IT training and immigra-
tion is relaxed. For example, the total number of scientists and engi-
neers in Japanese manufacturing had already started to decline by
1995, but this was not due to lack of supply but rather the increased
productivity of all workers (Nakata and Miyazaki, 2011: 97–9). However,
it is evident that there are limits to productivity increases in services,
especially in services for the elderly as well as business and IT services
where labour input continues to be high and consumption of services
takes place at the point of production. Furthermore, in Japan, IT engi-
neers (by designation) tend to be graduates of two-year junior colleges
rather than four-year engineering programs, making them less competi-
tive in global markets. Another reason why increasing productivity may
not be possible is that Japan’s economy is structurally service-driven
with increasing dependency ratios. Japan’s high labour costs and busi-
ness practices are also undermining Japan’s competitiveness (D’Costa,
2008b). Hence, offshore manufacturing (which has already hollowed out
many Japanese firms) must also be accompanied by service providers to
Japanese manufacturers overseas. This process is already underway with
some foreign recruitment but cost containment at home under tight
labour markets (due to shortages) has also become a necessity since the
domestic market for services remains very large. This suggests that Japan
must absorb more foreign workers, which is already taking place overseas
with Japanese FDI and at home as reflected in the immigration statistics.
When it comes to IT services, the scarcity of labour is due to gradual
shifts in educational preferences as well as a deficient curriculum, when
benchmarked with global standards (see Figure 1.3).
Japanese labour markets have changed quite dramatically from the
earlier keiretsu-driven economy of life-long employment to increas-
ingly part-time, precarious employment. The preferences of youth are
also changing in favour of part-time, flexible work. Accompanying
these is a shift away from technical education. The continuing tradi-
tion of excluding women from technical education has exacerbated
the problem. In Table 1.4, I present shifting enrolments of Japanese
students at the Bachelor’s, Master’s and PhD levels. As can be seen at
the undergraduate level, the share of social sciences is the highest but
Table 1.4 Student’s enrolments at the undergraduates, masters and PhD levels by fields (%)
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Total 2,487,133 2,509,374 2,508,088 2,514,228 2,527,319 2,569,349

(undergraduates)
Humanities 16.6 16.3 16.2 15.8 15.4 15.0
Social Sciences 39.6 39.0 37.7 36.3 35.3 34.2
Sciences 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.2
Engineering 18.6 17.8 17.3 16.6 16.0 15.4
Agriculture 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9
Health 6.0 6.6 7.5 8.5 9.3 10.5
Education 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.3 6.7
Total (Master’s) 150,797 159,481 164,550 165,219 167,043 175,980
Humanities 8.5 8.1 8.2 7.8 7.5 7.3
Social Sciences 15.5 14.3 12.5 11.6 11.2 11.0
Sciences 8.6 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.3
Engineering 40.4 39.6 39.89 39.4 39.8 42.4
Agriculture 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.5
Health 5.0 6.1 6.9 7.5 8.3 6.3
Education 7.6 7.3 7.0 7.3 6.5 6.1
Total (PhDs) 65,525 71,363 74,907 74,811 73,565 74,779
Humaniteis 10.7 10.4 10.2 10.3 9.9 9.0
Social Sciences 10.1 10.4 10.1 10.0 9.7 9.2
Sciences 9.6 8.7 8.6 7.7 7.0 7.0
Engineering 18.6 18.5 18.6 18.6 18.4 18.6
Agriculture 6.7 6.1 5.8 6.0 5.4 5.2
Helath 32.0 32.0 31.9 31.9 33.0 34.1
Education 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.9
Note: As of 1 May every year.

Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Basic School Survey
(Gakkou Kihon Chousa).
clearly decreasing. What is troubling is the enrolment in natural science

and engineering. With engineering as the second highest category, its
share was 18.6 per cent of the total in 2001, which fell to 15.4 per cent
in 2011. The story of enrolment in the sciences is worse (Kamibayashi,
2005), with a share of a little over 3 per cent. Science and engineering
are two fields that are highly relevant for the IT industry, although some
of the students from the social sciences could also find jobs in IT. The
relatively high share of health education can be explained by Japan’s
rising elderly population.5
The data at the Master’s level provide a different picture for science
and engineering. The share of sciences is stable and more than double
than at the Bachelor’s level, while engineering has the highest share – at
or above 40 per cent of the total. Health-related education displays a
similar trend at the Bachelor’s level but to a lower extent. The share of
engineering at the PhD level is similar to the Bachelor’s level, while the
share of sciences at the Bachelor’s level is similar to the Master’s level.
However, at the PhD level, the share of sciences is declining faster, while
health education is not only roughly a third of the total but appears to
Gap in Education Content

JBF found sofware engineer is key factor, however it was missing both in
quantity and quality at that time on 2005.
Compared with other countries. JBF also found university’s education
program in computer technology placed a disproportionate emphasis on
the theory of computer science.
Gap between Needs and Seeds
Curriculum in other country
Needs of
En
ngineer
ngi
ngineering
in << Sccience
S Curriculum
Industry
in Japan
Practical Theoretical
Basic
B
Baasi
sic thttheo
he
h eo
eorryy of
of Digital circuit
Project Management
IInf
nfor
nforma mation
m atio
at ion Applied theory
Modeling
Programing
Pr
P rog
ogr
gram ng ng Special applicable
Design...etc..
Algolism...etc.
A lgoliissm etc etc.
e tc field...etc.
Figure 1.3 Software engineering curriculum deficiencies

Source: Obtained from Center for Future Information Technology Leaders (CeFIL), Keidanren
Tokyo, December 2011.
be expanding in recent years. The overall picture is either a stable or

declining share of students in social sciences, sciences and engineering
education enrolments, which clearly has implications for the future
domestic supply of technical professionals. In addition, the IT education
system has known curriculum deficiencies in software engineering in
both sciences and engineering fields, with sciences falling short of needs
more than engineering (see Figure 1.3). The Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) reported in its Basic
School Survey, that of the 14,431 new graduates entering universities
at the undergraduate level, only 12.7 per cent found employment in
2007, compared to 23.1 per cent in 2001. The total number of students
entering IT training was 23,271 in 2001 compared to 14,431 in 2011; the
corresponding number of engineers for the two years was 11,272 and
6,625 respectively. The employment decline might be due to a shrinking
IT industry. However, data from the Japan Information Technology
Services Industry Association (JISA) show that despite the slow-growing
economy, IT spending by Japanese firms in the last decade or so has
been increasing (JISA, 2011: 15).
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse in detail, the role foreign
students play in filling some of the gaps in science and engineering educa-
tion, although we know that students are the best source to create a
diaspora. The Japanese government and big businesses are keen to attract
foreign students in technical education, especially from Asia.6 Immigration
statistics show that the number of students has been increasing in the last
few years, albeit slowing down since the beginning of the 2008 financial
crisis. In 2005, the total number for the visa category ‘college students’
was 23,384, which increased to 37,871 in 2009, while ‘pre-college student’
visas followed a similar trend but at a slightly higher level (28,147 and
41,313 respectively) (Ministry of Justice, 2010: 8–9). When it comes to
Indian students, the numbers are negligible: 647 in 2006, 710 in 2009 and
685 in 2011, compared to China’s 109,755, 126,763 and 127,435 respec-
tively. At this time, it is not possible to obtain data on foreign students
enrolled by degree but it is likely that most Chinese students will not be
in science and engineering, although the absolute numbers of Chinese
in these fields will greatly exceed India’s. Furthermore, a small share of
foreign students remains in Japan to work, which was increasing until the
financial crisis. For example, there were 2,663 applications for employ-
ment in 1998, of which 89 per cent was granted. This increased substan-
tially to 11,789 in 2008 but declined to 8,467 in 2010. So the contribution
of Indian students to diaspora formation in Japan is limited. From this we
can conclude that the Indian diaspora will remain small in Japan and the
pattern of its formation, unlike in the US, will not be driven by students,
rather, it will be led by working IT professionals at junior and mid-levels.

As was indicated earlier, the increase in dependent visas for Indians reflects
the slow but steady diaspora formation.
India’s diaspora and looking East: some remarks
Asia is no doubt changing in some fundamental ways. There has been

massive economic transformation through economic growth, innova-
tions and technological progress and offshoring arrangements. In this
milieu, the mobility of talent globally has given a new twist to capitalist
competition and professional diasporas have become salient. The US
and other Western cases are well known for their immigration patterns
and formation of diasporas, particularly the Indian one in the US. This
chapter examines a less glamorous case of a small Indian professional
diaspora, which is in the making in Japan and explores how the diaspora
could contribute to the Japanese as well as Indian economies. Japan
remains the second largest IT market in the world, hence the case cannot
be considered insignificant. However, India’s engagement with Japan is
very low, just 2 to 3 per cent of its software exports, and the number
of Indian residents in Japan pales into insignificance when compared
to China. However, the composition of Indian residents suggests some-
thing different, that the majority of working Indians in Japan are profes-
sionals, most of whom are engineers. At one level, the high education
levels of Indian residents is similar to the US but perhaps more so due
to the density of technical professionals among a small number of resi-
dents. It was shown that Indian residents spatially are forming a commu-
nity in their own right in the greater Tokyo area and nearby cities. This
bodes well as it signals their gradual adjustment in Japan by establishing
community-oriented schools and social organisations while professionals
interact in occupation-specific associations such as the Indian IT Forum.
This development comes at an opportune moment as Japan continues
to reel under severe demographic and talent supply challenges, making
the Indian diaspora relevant not just for India but for Japan as well.
Japanese businesses and the government have been responding to these
challenges at multiple levels. However, the efforts have been ad hoc, such
as immigration reforms to bring in Brazilian workers and incremental
visa regime changes, thus the inability to secure technical talent on a
long-term basis. However, more recently, after many years of debates and
discussions, a points-based system has been proposed to attract foreign
high-skilled professionals to Japan. Japanese business associations are
also taking a variety of educational and training initiatives to generate
local talent and are working with Indian firms as well. In the meantime,
bilateral relations are better than ever with increasing Japanese infra-
structural investments and acquisitions in India and greater engagements
with US and other companies that have significant interests in India.
These two broad developments, the beginnings of an Indian diaspora
in Japan and Japanese responses to the talent shortage, in the context of
Asian dynamism suggest multilateral arrangements within Asia, particu-
larly India’s links to East Asia, including China. Under this scenario, for
India, looking east can only be a good thing: reducing India’s politically
sensitive, path-dependent relationship to the US (D’Costa, 2004) and
simultaneously engaging with a dynamic part of the world.
Appendix 1 Data Source for Figure 1.2
#Tokyo
Source Tokyo Metropolitan Government Website
URL http://www.toukei.metro.tokyo.ip/
gaikoku/ga-index.htm
Page Title – English Translation Population of Registered Foreigners in
Tokyo
Page Title – Japanese ೼ϰҀ໪೑Ҏⱏ䆄Ҏষ
Page Title – Japanese Pronunciation Tokyo-to no Gaikokujin Toroku Jinko
#Kanagawa
Source Kanagawa Prefectural Government
Website
URL http://www.pref.kanagawa.ip/cnt/f4695/
Page Title – English Translation Statistics of Registered Foreigners in
Kanagawa
Page Title – Japanese ೼⼲༜Ꮁ㏷ⱏ㿬ⱘ໪೟Ҏ㍅㿜
Page Title – Japanese Pronunciation Kennai Gaikokujin Tourokusha Tokei
#Chiba
Source Chiba Prefectural Government Website
URL http://www.pref.chiba.lg.ip/kokusai/
toukeidata/kokusai/index.html
Page Title – English Translation Population of Registered Foreigners in
Chiba
Page Title – Japanese ೼ग㨝㏷໪೟Ҏⱏ㿬Ҏষ
Page Title – Japanese Pronunciation Kennai no Gaikokujin Tourokushasu
#Saitama
Source Saitama Prefectural Government Website
URL http://www.pref.saitama.lg.ip/site/
keikakutoukei/gaikokujintoroku.html
Page Title – English Translation Population of Registered Foreigners by
Nationality in Saitama
Page Title – Japanese ೼ැ⥝㏷ⱘ೟㈡໪೟Ҏⱏ㿬Ҏষ
Page Title – Japanese Pronunciation Kokuseki Betsu Gaikokujin Tourokushasu
Acknowledgements
An Abe Fellowship from the Japan Foundation has made it possible for
my sustained engagement with talent mobility issues involving Japan.
Niels Mygind of CBS provided financial support for a Japanese research
assistant and Tomoko Nakamura assisted with Japanese statistical data
collection. Toshiya Ozaki of Rikkyo University graciously arranged
meetings with major Japanese IT companies, while the Keidanren facili-
tated meetings with member companies. Janette Rawlings, as always,
provided unstinting editorial support on short notice. I am grateful to
them all. The usual disclaimers apply.
Notes
1. Japanese immigration statistics do not distinguish between North and South
Koreans.
2. One sign of loosening of the lifetime employment system has been the gradual
externalisation of labour markets, which potentially opens up opportunities
for foreign professionals as well. See Nakata and Miyazaki (2011: 108).
3. For complete data sources for the maps see Appendix 2.1.
4. Its fertility rate was 1.26 in 2005 with a high variant projection of 1.54 and a
low variant of 1.26 by 2050 (Kaneko et al., 2008: 99).
5. The low share of agriculture education is understandable, given the small size
and relative inefficiency of its agricultural sector.
6. Keidanren, Japan’s largest business association, representing big business is
keen to accept foreigners, by proposing long-term policies rather than ad hoc
measures of increasing certain types of visas. For example, it has proposed
forming a special Ministry of State, a Basic Act to accept foreign workers, and a
Foreign Workers Employment Act (see Yamada, 2010: 15). My own discussions
with Keidanren officials and big IT firm representatives in Keidanren revealed
the urgency of ensuring adequate numbers and quality of IT professionals in
Japan (Field Visit, Tokyo, 2011).
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2
Bangladeshi Diaspora
Entrepreneurs in Japan
Md Mizanur Rahman and Lian Kwen Fee
Introduction
In recent decades, the emergence of migrant businesses has been a part

of the urban landscape in some relatively developed countries in East
and Southeast Asia. While the outcomes of international migration have
affected many aspects of the lives of immigrants and their receiving soci-
eties, one of the visible but often neglected outcomes of international
migration in Asia is the development of immigrant-run businesses.
Among the East and Southeast Asian countries, Japan is a case in point.
A diverse immigrant population, with significant numbers of migrants
from South, Southeast and East Asia, has evolved in Japan since the late
1970s (Tsuda, 2006; Goodman et al., 2003; Komai, 2000). In the early
1980s South Asian migrants, mainly Bangladeshis, entered Japan as tour-
ists and overstayed their visas. According to Mahmood (1994), 33,573
Bangladeshi entered Japan between 1985 and 1990. Other sources report
that the cumulative number of overstaying Bangladeshis between 1990
and 2000 was 73,016 (Watanabe, 1998: 246). Therefore, it is likely that
the number of Bangladeshi migrants in the 1980s and 1990s was more
than 100,000. These migrant workers encountered considerable prob-
lems settling in Japan. Halal food, ethnic goods and services were almost
unavailable. Realising the demand for halal food and other ethnic goods
and services, some Bangladeshi migrants started businesses in Japan to
serve mainly the South Asian migrant population including Muslim
migrants and many subsequently expanded into trading in Japanese
products internationally.
The literature on immigrant entrepreneurship has mainly devel-
oped in the North American context (for a review, see Portes, 1995;
Thornton, 1999). The questions traditionally investigated in migrant
33
34 Md Mizanur Rahman and Lian Kwen Fee
entrepreneurship research are: Why some immigrant groups are more

likely than others to engage in entrepreneurial activity, and what specific
outcomes entrepreneurship yield for immigrants and their countries of
origin (Zhou, 2004)? The making of an immigrant business is a central
but somewhat neglected aspect of entrepreneurship (Waldinger, 1994).
Most recently, there has been some attempt to address the development
of Asian migrant labour in the major cities of Europe (Spaan, Hillmann
and van Naerssen, 2005). However the development of migrant busi-
nesses under conditions of temporary labour migration, which is
a central feature of contemporary intra-Asian migration, remains a
neglected issue.
In this chapter, we draw on the experiences of Bangladeshi migrant
entrepreneurs in Japan to address the following questions: Who are these
migrant entrepreneurs? How do migrants, who are mostly irregular and
involved in low-skilled occupations, circumvent restrictions imposed
on them in operating businesses in Japan? What makes them entre-
preneurs and propels them to take risks either to start or expand their
enterprises? As will be discussed later, the migration of Bangladeshis
to Japan did not take place under any government-sponsored tempo-
rary migration scheme, unlike South Korea and many other low-skilled
migrant-receiving countries. It has been predominantly a clandestine
and single (male) migration with an overwhelming economic moti-
vation. Although the numbers involved in Bangladeshi migrant busi-
nesses are modest, their emergence provides an opportunity to explore
little known aspects of the development of migrant businesses under
conditions of temporary and irregular migration. Bangladeshi migrant
businesses also provide early insights into the unfolding processes of
settlement and community formation.
We argue that the repositioning of migrants, from workers to migrant
entrepreneurs, is a complex process and needs to be understood in
the light of several issues. In doing so, we highlight the significance
of cultural conditions, opportunity structure, innovative practices and
transnational linkages in the development of migrant businesses. Our
focus on Bangladeshi migrant worker businesses in Japan not only
provides an understanding of migrant entrepreneurship but also sheds
light on the way in which such entrepreneurship emerges under condi-
tions of temporary migration. After describing the data sources, trends
and patterns of Bangladeshi labour migration to Japan, we examine
the opportunity structure operating in Japan for the rise of such busi-
nesses, the path to entrepreneurship, innovative practices adopted to
reach ethnic and non-ethnic clienteles, and finally, the extra-territorial
Bangladeshi Diaspora Entrepreneurs in Japan 35
links that add a transnational and multinational dimension to migrant

businesses.
Theoretical issues
There are a number of theoretical contributions that help us understand

why immigrants participate in entrepreneurial activities as well as the
outcomes of such activities for migrants and their host countries (Light,
1972; Goldberg, 1985; Li, 1976; Bonacich and Modell, 1980; Wilson
and Portes, 1980; Portes and Zhou, 1992; Kloosterman, Van Der Leun
and Rath, 1999). In general, theories that explain the development of
migrant or ethnic entrepreneurship in advanced economies fall into
two schools: cultural and structural (Chan and Ong, 1995). The cultural
approach points to the supply side of entrepreneurship or class and
ethnic resources, while the structural approach stresses the socio-eco-
nomic contest and the demand side of the entrepreneurship (Light and
Rosenstein, 1995). A common objection to cultural analysis is its lack
of attention to the context in which entrepreneurship thrives, while a
common objection to structural analysis is its lack of attention to the
cultural conditions that propel entrepreneurship (Waldinger, Aldrich
and Ward, 1990).
In the 1990s, the theoretical development shifted to integrating the
cultural and structural determinants of immigrant entrepreneurship.
For instance, Waldinger, Aldrich and Ward (1990) introduced the ideas
of opportunity structure and group characteristic, thereby combining
structure and agency. In this approach, the demand for business and
the supply of skills and resources interact to produce ethnic entrepre-
neurship. Engelen (2001: 211) is critical of Waldinger, Aldrich and Ward
(1990) on two issues, namely the ‘economic assimilation thesis’ and
‘enclave spatial logic’. Engelen argues that the economic assimilation
thesis lacks insights on the process of innovation and that spatially
oriented strategies are relevant to some entrepreneurs but not to others.
For example, the latter may be applicable to retailers but not to whole-
salers and manufacturers as we will argue. Engelen (2001: 211–12)
suggests that the development of innovative marketing and distributing
strategies in tapping new markets can be viewed as a move away from
the ‘spatial logic’ argument, as we will highlight in this chapter.
Given the nature of some migrant businesses in East and Southeast
Asia, we have argued elsewhere that the analytic notion of ‘spatial logic
of the ethnic enclave’ does not fit well in the context of contemporary
migrant businesses in Asia (Lian and Rahman, forthcoming). Migrant
entrepreneurs employ different innovative strategies to access a wider

clientele and penetrate new and lucrative markets in Japan and beyond.
However, studies of ethnic business overlook the importance of innova-
tion in immigrant businesses (Aldrich and Roger, 1990: 112). Engelen
(2001) suggests that this is probably due to the marginal character of
most ethnic and migrant businesses. In our view, Engelen has overstated
the importance of innovation.
Schumpeter (1934: 66–9) argues that the essence of entrepreneurship
lies in ‘employing existing resources in a different way, in doing new
things with them, irrespective of whether those resources increase or
not’. Hence, one becomes an entrepreneur by doing any of the following:
introducing a new service or product, a new method of production,
opening a new market, discovering a new source of supply of raw mate-
rials and reorganising an industry. These may be described as innova-
tive strategies but no more than what an entrepreneur does in order to
expand his or her enterprise. Innovation, in Schumpeter’s view, is indis-
tinguishable from entrepreneurship. He further emphasises the ability to
re-combine and redeploy resources in order to initiate change depends
on the availability of credit. Notwithstanding their marginal character-
istic, the migrant enterprises in our study have prospered because of the
resourcefulness of individuals and their willingness to innovate in order
to tap larger markets, domestically and internationally.
The globalisation of technology in communication and transport
has had a considerable impact on the diversification of migrant entre-
preneurship in recent decades. As migrant entrepreneurship has so far
been examined in relation to the national and spatial limits of the host
country; transnational and even multinational dimensions now need to
be taken into consideration. Transnational entrepreneurship is primarily
explained from the immigrant (country) perspective (Portes, Guarnizo
and Haller, 2002; Faist and Özveren, 2004) as a way to maximise the
‘human capital returns of immigrants and to convert the meagre wages
earned in developed countries to material gains and social status recog-
nition in immigrants’ country of origin’ (Zhou, 2004: 1054–60).
However, we argue that migrant business activities are not only
confined to their home countries, but also extend to other countries with
high market returns, a trend that the current literature on transnational
entrepreneurship does not take into account. For instance, Bangladeshi
migrant entrepreneurs selling Japanese used cars in Bangladesh
and other countries in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, North
America and the former Soviet Union or Japanese herbal products in
Bangladesh, Europe and North America are more than just transnational
entrepreneurs. The international recognition of the quality of Japanese

products has resulted in lucrative global markets for these migrant
entrepreneurs.
We have argued elsewhere that the theoretical and conceptual tools
developed and hypotheses tested in connection with immigrant entre-
preneurship in North America and Europe have some limitations in
explaining recent developments in migrant businesses in Asia (Lian
and Rahman, forthcoming). It is not only because of varying levels of
economic development but also the absence of liberal immigration and
settlement policies, the nature of migration which is predominantly
individual (male or female) migration, and the transient nature of migra-
tion. We point to the fact that the making of migrant entrepreneur-
ship is a complex process and that it demands an appreciation of the
globalisation of markets and the migration experiences of the successful
Bangladeshi entrepreneurs. Hence, while we accept that cultural circum-
stances provide the necessary conditions to facilitate ethnic and migrant
businesses initially in the host country, the opportunity structure – a
confluence of the uncertainty of migration status and the globalisation
of migration – is critical to the development of Bangladeshi entrepreneur-
ship in Japan. What is striking about such entrepreneurship is its orien-
tation towards domestic, transnational and multinational markets.
Data sources
This study focuses on contemporary Bangladeshi migrant entrepreneurs

who are living in Tokyo but have businesses extending to different cities
in Japan and other parts of the world. There is no available and reliable
data on the number of Bangladeshi migrant entrepreneurs in Japan and
the corresponding areas of businesses. To understand the various types
of Bangladeshi migrant businesses and their development dynamics,
this study attempted, first, to locate major types of Bangladeshi migrant
businesses before proceeding to identify Bangladeshi migrant entrepre-
neurs in each type of businesses so that all major migrant businesses are
represented.
Information regarding major types of businesses was collected from
Bangladeshi residents who have been living in Japan for long as well
as their ethnic online portals and magazines (printed and online) that
regularly advertised different types of migrant businesses targeting this
community. Such portals and magazines provided valuable informa-
tion on the nature and extent of such businesses and the initiatives
and activities of the migrant community. From these, we identified the
respondents for the study. These respondents represented the major

businesses such as retail, service, wholesale, used cars, tyres, car parts,
phone cards and the export – import of other items.
In addition to interviewing migrant entrepreneurs, we also spoke to
members of the Bangladeshi community members to have a broader
idea about the development of Bangladeshi migrant businesses in Japan.
The data collection methods included questionnaire survey, participant
observations, in-depth interviews and informal focus group discussions.
The fieldwork was conducted between September and October, 2008. The
duration of the fieldwork was limited by financial and time constraints,
which precluded more in-depth fieldwork. We interviewed 25 migrant
entrepreneurs from all the major migrant businesses. Interviews were
conducted in the Bengali language, mother tongue of Bangladeshis, and
later translated into English.
The profiles of migrant entrepreneurs are provided in Table 2.1. Of
the 25 respondents, 20 were married to Japanese women, two were
single, two were married to Bangladeshi women, and one to a Burmese
woman Most respondents were aged between 40 and 45 years. Most of
them had 12 years of schooling including 11 cases who were graduates
from colleges in Bangladesh. Most have been in Japan for some time,
15 migrated in the 1980s while 8 in the 1990s. All respondents had
legal status in Japan holding long-term visas and permanent residence
while a few held Japanese citizenship. Fourteen respondents employed
Japanese nationals in their businesses along with Bangladesh and other
Asian nationals. The businesses of 13 respondents extended outside of
Japan and were internationalised. Most of the migrant entrepreneurs
were engaged in more than one business.
Bangladeshi migration to Japan
Japan, once known as an emigrant country in the early twentieth century,

became an immigrant country in the second half of the twentieth century
with the settlement of Korean immigrants after World War II (Iguchi,
2002; Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004). Japan first experienced labour short-
ages in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nevertheless, it was able to meet
its labour demand through increases in labour productivity and greater
use of untapped labour (for details, see Mori, 1997; Tsuda and Cornelius,
2004). Yoko Sellek (2001) maintains that the influx of foreign workers
since the late 1970s can be divided into three different stages. First, the
initial stage (late 1970s to mid-1980s) mainly involved irregular female
migration from East and Southeast Asia, especially the Philippines,
Table 2.1 Profiles of Bangladeshi entrepreneurs in Japan
National/ Nationality/
No of Business activities single/ Year of Nationality Status in Local/ No of Origins of
case multiple businesses) Age Education migration of wife Japan International employees employees
1 Calling card producer, 37 12 years of 1995 Japanese PR National/ 35 Japanese,

Japanese herbal exporter, schooling Multinational South,
used car, used laptop Southeast
and used scrap (Annual Asians,
turnover US$ 34 million Iranians
or ¥ 3300 million)
2 Retailer: entertainment 42 12 years of 1988 First Japanese; PR National 4 Japanese
products (music), clothes schooling later, B’Deshi B’Deshi
and leather products
3 Halal food and other 42 12 years of 1992 Japanese PR National 1 B’Deshi
ethnic products for schooling
daily use
4 Halal food shop and 43 Graduate 1986 First PR National 1 B’Deshi
other ethnic products Japanese;
for daily use later, B’Deshi
5 Jewellery shop with 40 12 years of 1987 Japanese PR Local and - -
music products schooling national
6 Travel agency, telecom 33 Masters 2002 Single Long-term National/ 8 Japanese and
(calling cards), visa International south Asian
halal food shop, it
service (software)
development
7 Used car (US$ 70 million 40 12 years of 1982 First Citizen International 45 Japanese and
yearly turnover); schooling Japanese; Bangladeshi
(around 1000 cars later, B’Deshi and others
export per month)
Continued
Table 2.1 Continued
National/ Nationality/
No of Business activities single/ Year of Nationality Status in Local/ No of Origins of
case multiple businesses) Age Education migration of wife Japan International employees employees
8 Restaurant (Indian food) 23 12 years of 2005 Single Working Local 3 Nepali and
schooling visa Bangladeshi
9 Restaurant (13 restaurants), 42 12 years of 1986 Japanese PR Local/National 75 Japanese and
budget hotel (2 hotels), schooling South Asian
stock exchange (first
business)
10 Halal food retailers 47 Graduate 1988 First Japanese PR National 4 B’Deshi
(including other ethnic later B’Deshi
products)
11 Car business 47 Graduate 1987 First Japanese PR Multinational 3 B’Deshi
Later B’Deshi
12 Calling card (producer), 39 Graduate 1996 B’Deshi Long-term National and 13 Japanese,
IP-Phone, used laptop, visa multinational B’Deshi
Bengali bi-monthly Vietnamese
magazine, Japan
13 Family store (Halal food, 40 10 years of 1997 Burmese Long-term National 5 B’Deshi,
music and other ethnic schooling visa Nepalese,
products) Indonesian,
Thai and Sri
Lankan
14 Restaurant (2 restaurants) 45 12 years of 1987 First Japanese; PR Local 6 B’Deshi,

schooling later, B’Deshi Nepalese and
Indian
15 Used car (around 2000 50 Graduate 1988 Japanese Japanese International 30 Japanese
car exports monthly on (citizen) B’Deshi Fiji
average), restaurants
16 Halal food 45 10 years of 1984 Japanese PR Local and 6 Japanese and
schooling national Bangladeshi
17 Car export, restaurant 43 Master 1986 Japanese PR Local and 3 Japanese and
international South Asian
18 Used car business but now, 44 Graduate 1988 Japanese Long-term International 3 Japanese and
mostly used tyre business visa B’Deshi
19 Calling card (producer), food 29 Graduate 1998 Japanese Long-term Local and 12 Japanese
staff, electronics visa national and B’Deshi Africa
international and South Asia
20 Used tyre, used car (50 to 39 10 years of 1992 Japanese PR Local\ 4 Japanese and
60 car exports on average schooling International B’Deshi
monthly)
21 Car businesses (local market 47 Graduate 1986 Japanese PR Local market - -
for foreigners such as
students, working visa
holders)
22 Travel agency (worked for 42 Graduate 1981 Japanese Japanese Local market 3 B’Deshi and
travel agency for long) Indian
23 Editor of Bengali bi-monthly 41 Graduate 1988 Japanese (wife PR Local, national, 3 B’Deshi
magazine (also works for a left and living online
restaurant full time) alone)
24 Car business 40 Graduate 1991 B’Deshi PR International 2 Japanese and
B’Deshi
25 Clothes (2 clothe shops 40 Master 1988 Japanese Citizen Local but 4 Japanese and
in Japan: clothes are based on South Asian
brought from South international
Korea and China) source
Source: Author’s survey.
Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and South Korea. They were brought in to

work in the entertainment industry. The second stage between mid-1980s
and 1990 is characterised by irregular male migration from South Asia,
Middle East (mainly Iran), Southeast Asia and other parts of the World
and female migration from East and Southeast Asia. The primary source
of cheap labour during this period was foreigners either working illegally
without work permits or those whose visas had expired (Komai, 2000).
The third stage, the implementation of the Revised Immigration Control
Act in 1990 facilitated the regular flow of skilled, semi-skilled and the
descendants of Japanese emigrants to South America (Sellek, 2001: 37–9;
Komai, 2000). Registered foreigners constitute 1.6 per cent of the popula-
tion (OECD, 2008: 254). Japan strictly controls unskilled migration from
the Asian countries. The official rationale for not accepting unskilled
labour stems from the fear that unskilled, foreign workers from ethnically
diverse societies may lower wages and worsen working conditions (Tsuda
and Cornelius, 2004: 452). Apart from these reasons, there is also a wide-
spread fear that the influx of low-skilled foreigners may increase the rate
of crimes and threaten public safety in Japan.
Japan has been a desirable destination for Bangladeshis since the
early 1980s.1 Due to the absence of any formal recruitment proce-
dures (such as trainee programmes), Bangladeshi migrants resorted to
unauthorised channels to live and work in Japan in the early phase of
migration in the 1980s. The influx of Bangladeshi migrants increased
after 1985 and reached a peak in 1988 but the number of entries then
suddenly dropped because the Japanese Government moved to stem
the flow by suspending the waiver of visa requirements for Bangladeshis
on 15 January 1989 (Higuchi, 2007: 2). After the suspension of visa-
waiving status, most Bangladeshis initially entered Japan legally using
tourist, student (language school) and other types of non-working
visas though their actual intent was to seek employment. Many of
them used Thailand or Singapore as springboards for their migration
to Japan in the early phase of Bangladeshi migration to Japan (Lian
and Rahman, 2006).
Bangladeshi official statistics suggest that between 1999 and 2008, 694
migrants went to Japan (BMET, 2009a).2 The Central Bank of Bangladesh
reports that Bangladeshis from Japan remitted US$384.91 million
between 1991 and 2003 (BMET, 2009b).3 This discrepancy in the total
number of recorded migrants and inflow of remittances to Bangladesh
suggests that a large number of Bangladeshi migrants are living in Japan
and, yet, are not reported in the official statistics in Bangladesh. In addi-
tion to migrants, around 10,000 Bangladeshi students studied in Japan
between 1991 and 2004 (Web Japan). In total, based on available data
and fieldwork in different parts of Japan, we estimate that there may be
as many as 40,000 Bangladeshi migrants including students, depend-
ents, regular and irregular migrants who are living in various parts of
Japan. They constitute a strong base for the development of Bangladeshi
migrant businesses.
Bangladeshi migrant businesses in Japan
The businesses of Bangladeshi migrants in Japan can be broadly cate-

gorised into two types: a typical calling card, used car, electronics and
ethnic magazines businesses and typical halal food enterprises, restau-
rants and travel agencies. In the following discussion, we will turn to
each of the businesses to explain their determinants and impact.
Halal food trade

The demand for halal food grew with the inflow of South Asian and
Iranian Muslim migrants in the early 1980s. Pakistanis first initiated
the halal food trade in the early 1980s, but with the increase in the
Bangladeshi migrant population in the mid-1980s, some enterprising
migrants came to supply halal food to the community mainly on an
informal and irregular basis. However by the late 1980s, two leading
halal food retailers and suppliers emerged to serve the Bangladeshi and
other Muslim population in Japan. Several other halal food retailers
came on to the scene in the 1990s, but the two established halal food
retailers continue to be the main suppliers and retailers of halal food in
Japan. Although they are known as halal food retailers by name, they
provide a variety of ethnic products, for instance food items (meats, fish,
spices and curry powder, rice, flour, sweets, pickles, dates, etc.), clothes
(male and female apparel from South Asia), print and music products
(Bangladeshi and Indian books, magazines, videos, CDs, VCDs), and
phone cards (different brands of prepaid calling cards). In addition to
Bangladeshi immigrants, migrants from other Asian countries are also
on their list of regular clienteles.
Started in 1989, Padma Halal Food was one of the pioneering
Bangladeshi halal food retailers and suppliers in Japan. It imported all
kinds of freshwater fish, halal meat, vegetables, spices, oils, rice, sweets
and other food products from Bangladesh, Thailand, India, Pakistan,
Malaysia and Australia. As an importer of halal food and ethnic prod-
ucts, it also supplied these imported products to other retailers. However,
these halal retailers do not rely on a single source of supply. They bank
on other Indian, Pakistani, Middle Eastern, and even African suppliers to

meet the demand from customers of different origins. The wholesalers
play a major role in supplying a variety of products to the market. Along
with the regular wholesale entrepreneurs, there are also some irregular
wholesale entrepreneurs who supply Indian products to the market. As
one unauthorised Indian wholesaler said,
I know the demand for Indian products in the local market; I tell
my friend in India to send a container of relevant products. I do not
invest money. Once the container reaches Japan, I contact my local
suppliers who take the responsibility to deliver the goods to local
retailers. Within a few weeks, I get cash. I take a commission and the
rest I remit to my friend in India.
Calling card trade

Of importance to migrants is their ability to maintain contact with
family members left behind. The quickest and most efficient means of
communication is the telephone. However, the cost of direct calling
is expensive and these migrants incur costly bills when they talk long
distance to their relatives. The early Bangladeshi migrant entrepre-
neurs seized this opportunity to establish calling card businesses in
Japan. It is the Bangladeshis who dominated the calling card trade
since its emergence in the late 1990s. We identified three major calling
card companies that control, as they claim, almost 70 per cent of the
market. However, this claim could not be verified through officially
published statistical data. Given the various types of calling cards and
market availability (in ethnic stores and online purchase), it is under-
standable that Bangladeshi manufactured cards are widely sold in the
market.
The educational background and business motivation of three leading
Bangladeshi calling card traders – Ryo International, ILP Japan and
Sadiatec revealed that they were exposed to information technology
before their move to Japan. One of the respondents disclosed that he
was involved in the IT business in Bangladesh, and when he moved to
Japan, he explored first the business niche in calling cards. This respond-
ent’s calling cards can be used to talk from computer to landlines and
mobile phones and his clients include even soldiers from South Asia
who are deployed in UN peace-keeping missions in African countries.
Another respondent who first entered Canada as a tourist and later
moved to Japan with his Japanese wife cited his involvement in the
calling card trade:
When I first came to Japan, I could not talk to family regularly.

Telephone call charge was very high. You know, all migrants are living
alone here, far away from their families and they all want to talk to
their loved ones back home. Whatever I earned from working in a
restaurant in Tokyo, I spent a good portion of it on telephone bill.
Later, when I decided to do business, I thought I should do a business
that would help other migrant workers. So, I decided to do calling
card business. (A Calling Card Trader, Tokyo, September 2008)
Bangladeshi calling card traders manufacture and market a few hundred

types of calling cards for local and international calls. Some of the
popular calling cards that they market have names like ‘for you’, ‘good
communications’, ‘my love’, ‘minar-e-Pakistan’, ‘new twin tower’, ‘the
best’, ‘Africa’, ‘you and me’, ‘original calling cards’, ‘sonar Bangla’, ‘Africa
Green card’ (ILP Japan; RYO International; Sadiatec International, 2009).
Some of these companies have also opened up branch offices outside of
Japan in countries such as Malaysia and run their calling card business
there. These companies are mainly producers and wholesalers of calling
cards. Retailers collect calling cards from them to sell to customers for a
fixed commission, in addition to maintaining online shopping facilities.
The customers of calling cards are both foreigners and locals.
Used car trade

Japanese cars are renowned for their reliability, efficiency and innova-
tive design, and they are available in most countries in the world. As
new models of Japanese cars are expensive, lower income groups cannot
afford them; hence the demand for used cars in both the developed
and developing countries. This demand for used cars is usually met
through the internal resale market in the developed countries. However,
customers in the developing world are forced to depend on imported
used cars if they wish to drive a Japanese model. To tap into the huge
market, many enterprising individuals have started businesses in Japan,
buying used cars and exporting them to the developing countries for
a fixed commission. In general, used car traders from the developing
countries contact the used car traders in Japan for wholesale purchase.
Some Bangladeshi migrant entrepreneurs became involved in the used
car businesses in the mid-1980s and expanded their businesses beyond
Asia. They export the cars to the Middle East, Africa, Latin America,
Russia, and South, Southeast and East Asia. One advantage of getting into
the used car business is that only minimum venture capital is required
so long as the right buyer from the other country is found. Furthermore,
the whole official procedure from buying to shipment in Japan can be

completed online. What is necessary to run this business is familiarity
with the formalities involved in the online transactions. Once one has
acquired the relevant technical knowhow, the business can be expanded
quickly. The commission for each used car ranges between US$200 and
US$800 and profitability depends on the volume transacted. Given the
profitability of the business and home-based operation procedures, many
migrants selling calling cards, ethnic groceries and halal food and even
those in salaried jobs also participate in the used car business by providing
information about potential buyers, auctions and shipment procedures.
Given the home-based nature of such business operations, it is not
possible to provide an exact figure on number of people involved
in the used car business. However, it is believed that a few hundred
Bangladeshis are currently involved in the used car business in Japan.
Bangladeshi entrepreneurs, who entered the business early, are currently
leading the used car trade in Japan with monthly exports of 1000 to
3000 cars to Latin America, North America, Africa, Middle East and
various countries in Asia. The two leading used car traders of Bangladeshi
origin are B. J. International and N. K. International. The latter exports
used cars to about 50 countries in the world. In addition, Bangladeshi
migrants export used tyres and car parts, while some trade used cars in
the local market, especially to professionals and students. However, the
increasing involvement of small migrant entrepreneurs in this business
has led to higher competition and profit margins have fallen sharply in
recent years, resulting in diversifications such as selling Japanese used
tyres in the international market. The sale of used tyres is now more
profitable than used cars.
Despite the substantial presence of Bangladeshi entrepreneurs in used
car trade, it is widely believed that it was the Pakistanis who first started
the used car business in Japan. Some Bangladeshi used car traders even
learnt the technical knowhow from the early Pakistani used car traders.
However, the leading Bangladeshi used car traders who migrated mostly in
the late 1980s had their own stories relating to taking up the business and
gaining success over time. Both Bangladeshi and Pakistani used car traders
would compete with each other in auctions and market penetration. Apart
from these South Asian communities, some Iranian immigrants are also
involved in this car trade though their presence is minimal.
Ethnic restaurants
Unlike halal food, used cars, and calling cards mainly catering to the
ethnic and migrant populations, ethnic restaurants have emerged to
meet the demand for South Asian food in general, and Indian food in
particular, among the local population. The taste for South Asian food
amongst the Japanese has created a lucrative market for ‘exotic’ goods.
Selling ethnic food offers a fruitful opportunity to migrants to invest
and expand a business. The immigration policy allowed the employ-
ment of foreign cooks which is so vital to the success of ethnic restau-
rants. Most business owners hire ethnic personnel to run the business
so that they can offer their services at relatively low prices. These restau-
rants serve mainly Indian dishes, at least by name, as it is not easy to
distinguish South Asian dishes from each other. The restaurants are
decorated Indian style, screen Bollywood movies, play Hindi music and
showcase cultural products and pictures of South Asian (Indian) polit-
ical and cultural personalities to present an ‘authentic’ Indian ambience.
All these suggest that migrants make every effort to convert both the
content and the symbols of ethnicity into profit-making commodities.
Other businesses
In addition to the various types of main businesses discussed, we
also identified various migrant businesses that serve both migrants
and locals, such as travel agency, jewellery shops, budget hotels, IT
services, used electronic products, entertainment products, apparel
shops and ethnic magazines. One key travel agency that served
mainly the Bangladeshi and other South Asian communities is located
at Akihabara in Tokyo, the largest electronics market in Japan. This
travel agency not only sells cheap air tickets but also provides various
immigration services and relevant information to the local immigrant
community. It doubles up as a multi-purpose shop offering their own
international calling cards, phone and software services. The owner, a
migrant entrepreneur who is 33 years old, also has a halal food outlet
next door. Close to the travel agency and halal food outlet, there are
other Bangladeshi shops selling gold jewellery, apparel and enter-
tainment products (music CDs and DVDs of Bollywood films). A few
hundred metres from these mini ethnic markets, there is a well-known
used electronic shop run by a Bangladeshi who came to Japan in the
late 1980s. His shop is next to the Akihabara railway line and sells
computer and computer accessories. Products like computer software,
cameras, DVD players and handycams are much sought after and tour-
ists are the main customers for this shop.
Two unusual types of businesses deserve mention: budget hotels and
ethnic magazines. One migrant entrepreneur came to Japan in 1986 and
made his fortune in the stock exchange. He later invested his earnings
in two budget hotels, equipped with natural hot spring, sauna and an
Indian restaurant. As budget hotels, they target both local and foreign
travellers. We also identified several ethnic magazines in Japan such as
the Shaptahik Isehara, the Bibekbarta, the Doshdick and the Porobash. They
are all available online and are important sources of both Bangladeshi
and Japanese news for the Bangladeshi migrant community. In addi-
tion to these magazines, there are also some online sites that link the
community to the homeland, for example Bangladesh Tigers Portal
and Deshbideshweb. These magazines and websites are owned and run
by Bangladeshi migrants. Advertisements and donations are the main
sources of earnings for these community magazines and websites.
Pathways to entrepreneurship
Business opportunities do not necessarily lead to the development of

immigrant businesses. The road to immigrant entrepreneurship, partic-
ularly in setting up small businesses in the course of temporary migra-
tion, should be understood in relation to the immigration policy of the
host country as well as the motivation for migration and the strategies
embedded in the migration process. As discussed earlier, Japan does not
have any temporary arrangements for allowing the entry of unskilled
migrants. Unlike many Asian countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia,
there were hardly any legal routes for Bangladeshi migrants who were
keen to work in Japan in the late 1980s, and a situation that encour-
aged overstaying and irregular immigration emerged. A migrant with
irregular status cannot start a business unless he has a business visa or
other long-term stay permits (permanent residency). This is because
legal procedures require business operators or owners of businesses
to have legal status, and failure to comply results in confiscation and
mandatory deportation. Hence, most irregular or overstaying migrants
typically seek paid jobs in 3‘D’ (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) occu-
pations. This was the major obstacle for Bangladeshi migrant workers
who aspired to be entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, although Japan is a culturally conservative society, it
does offer work and residence permits to foreigners who are married to
Japanese women on humanitarian grounds, a practice usually unavailable
in almost all labour-receiving countries in Asia except South Korea. Out
of the 25 cases in this study, 20 migrants were first married to Japanese
women. This high occurrence of mixed marriages suggests that migrants
made use of the only option open to them to regularise their status and
realise their business aspirations in Japan. Two migrant entrepreneurs
were single and were students before becoming entrepreneurs. Students

are eligible for residence status. However, this option is a recent develop-
ment. Most of the migrant entrepreneurs who arrived in Japan in the
1980s and early 1990s changed their status through marriage.
Why do some migrants who qualify for long-term residence or
permanent residence engage in businesses while others take up salaried
employment? We are not in position to elaborate on this in detail as
we did not interview those who are not involved in business activity.
However, we had an opportunity to speak to some migrants who were
engaged in businesses at first before turning to salaried employment
in the course of migration. These former migrant businesspersons
attributed their failures to a limited market (small ethnic population),
high start-up capital, excessive competition and meagre profits. Since
most migrants can converse in Japanese and are familiar with Japanese
culture, they had no difficulty in finding jobs in Japan. These conversa-
tions with unsuccessful migrant businesspersons gave us an insight to
why the successful entrepreneurs adopted innovative or break-out strat-
egies in order to survive.
Availability of credit is key to business development. Initially, most
respondents lacked resources to start new businesses. They had little
access to bank loans and their status as foreigners as well as newcomers
was the main obstacle to building business relationships with banks.
Hence, the bulk of the credit for business was obtained from other
sources like personal savings and contributions from Japanese wives.
Apart from these, loans from friends and Japanese colleagues also helped
solve some entrepreneurs’ initial credit needs.
With regard to why a transient migrant would want to change his
immigration status from a worker to an entrepreneur, we advance
three arguments here. First, migration to Japan is a risky venture due
to the lack of transparency in immigration policy and its strict regula-
tory regime. Japan has no transient migrant worker schemes. Although
Bangladeshis enter the country legally as tourists, students or trainees,
they become illegal once they overstay their visas. If these overstayers
leave voluntarily or involuntarily, they are banned from re-entering the
country because of their past immigration records. Whatever opportuni-
ties they may have contemplated in Japan are significantly lost.
Secondly, Bangladeshi migrants generally are motivated to break-out
of the ‘cycle of remigration’ embedded in the transient migrant worker
programmes. They are familiar with the experiences of fellow migrants
working as temporary workers in countries in East and Southeast Asia
and the Middle East. Temporary labour migration is a form of circular
migration in which a potential worker migrates for a limited period

to work abroad, but such migration has no certainty of success and is
often costly. Hence, many migrants attempted to break this ‘cycle of
remigration’ by becoming overstayers or irregular migrants. One might
well ask why migrate if it is likely to result in economic difficulties.
We have suggested elsewhere that international migration for work is
increasingly viewed as long-term and as an occupational choice between
working abroad and working at home. In Bangladeshi society, a refusal
to undertake migration for work is regarded as shameful and threatens
the masculinity of Bangladeshi males, while termination in the middle
of migration is often financially and socially costly for their families
(Lian and Rahman, 2006; Lian and Rahman, forthcoming).
Thirdly, regularising one’s immigration status is embedded in migra-
tion strategy – the very reason for migration is not only to start a career
for oneself but also to improve the position of the family and kin (bari –
collection of households related through kinship and spatial proximity)
in a society where socio-economic mobility is restricted to the very few.
Thus, the primary reason for migration is tied to the desire to uplift
the family and bari from socio-economic stagnation. As migrants from
traditional societies are obligated to meet cultural expectations of family
and kinship networks and demonstrate reciprocity, this puts pressure
on migrants to seek avenues for long-term stay and material success
overseas.
Innovative practices
Following Schumpeter, we do not regard innovation as a separate

activity from entrepreneurship. Migrant entrepreneurs are driven to
adopt various innovative practices in their businesses. Innovation is
the attempt to make one’s business as dissimilar as possible from one’s
competitors (Engelen, 2001: 212). Different groups of migrant entrepre-
neurs employ different innovative strategies to access a wider market,
both nationally and internationally. In general, innovation occurs in
product innovation, and in sales and distribution.
Product innovation
Migrant entrepreneurs engage in product innovation in at least three
ways: by bringing in regional products; by trading in local products;
and by hiring skilled ethnic personnel (for example, cooks). Migrant
retailers sell and distribute the products supplied by migrant wholesalers
but it is the latter that provides entrepreneurial leadership. Although
ethnic groceries are the mainstay in the category of ethnic products, it is

the entrepreneurial wholesalers who supply the products. However, the
origin of ethnic products varies. Most ethnic products were sourced from
Bangladesh, but this has changed over time and they are now imported
from different South Asian and Southeast Asian countries. The reason
behind this regionalisation lies in the demand for such products in
the market. Most people in South Asian and Southeast Asian countries
share many culinary preferences and products. Wholesalers supply these
products to retailers who, in turn, sell to wider clienteles of immigrants
from South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. On the dining
table of most migrants from these regions, one can easily identify prod-
ucts from different countries such as fish from Thailand, parata (Indian
bread) from Malaysia, curry powder from India and Pakistan, rice from
India and meat from Australia. Generally customers prefer to choose
from a wide range of products made in different countries. Thus, ethnic
groceries in Japan are multiethnic in both products and clienteles.
Migrant entrepreneurs usually deal only in ethnic products. The
Japanese case reveals a new dimension of migrant businesses. These
entrepreneurs are involved in a wide range of non-ethnic products such
as calling cards, used cars and tyres, Japanese silk and electronics. The
migrant entrepreneurs’ experiences and emotional attachments are asso-
ciated with their choices of businesses. Bangladeshi-owned companies
distribute calling cards all over Japan, offering the cheapest cards for
the African, Middle Eastern, South Asian and Southeast Asian migrant
markets. Many migrant entrepreneurs are also involved in selling used
cars. Some also trade in Japanese used tyres mainly to South Korea. One
migrant entrepreneur on a trip to South Korea discovered that there is a
huge market for Japanese used tyres. Upon return, he began exporting
them to South Korea.
Japanese silk is used to make sarees and women’s apparel. One migrant
entrepreneur came to know this on a visit to Dhaka’s New Market and
returned to export Japanese silk to Bangladesh. Japanese electronics
items are popular worldwide. Some Bangladeshi entrepreneurs consid-
ered exporting used electronics overseas. However, electronic products
in Japan are designed for the domestic market and all information is in
the Japanese language, hence they are not marketable overseas. A few
Bangladeshi entrepreneurs came up with a brilliant idea: They identi-
fied electronic items which could be reconfigured in terms of its soft-
ware; for example, the software in laptops can be easily replaced with
the English version of Windows. They then started buying used laptops
locally at a cheap price and downloaded the English software for overseas
markets. Some of these are sold in the local market, especially to foreign
tourists.
Indian food is becoming increasingly popular among the Japanese, and
Indian restaurants, many of which are owned and run by Bangladeshi
migrants, are opening throughout Japan. These entrepreneurs realised
that there was a demand for Indian cuisine but they were not cooks and
had no practical experience with Indian dishes. So they hired cooks from
India and opened restaurants with Indian names such as Indian Curry,
South Asian Restaurants, and Taj Mahal Restaurant. Indian restaurants
are also operated by Pakistani and Nepalese migrants.
Sales and distribution

Migrant entrepreneurs employ several strategies for sales and distribu-
tion: these are spatial, temporal and modal in nature. Spatial strate-
gies involve attempts to ‘relocate firms to more rewarding markets’
(Engelen, 2001) and these can be applied to restaurant businesses in
the case of internal markets and used car, calling cards, tyre, car parts,
Japanese silk and herbal products in the case of international markets.
Bangladeshi-owned Indian restaurants are located in convenient loca-
tions, usually next to the subway stations of business districts. The use
of the world ‘Indian’ is common to all these restaurants. Since Indian
food is more expensive than local food and restaurant owners rely on
non-ethnic customers, they advertise their menus and prices in various
ways including distributing leaflets, posters, handouts at subways, and
displaying prominent signboards in Japanese and English. Unlike tradi-
tional ethnic niches where businesses are usually confined to ethnic
markets as a spatial strategy, the Japanese case suggests that migrant
entrepreneurs have developed a new ethnic identity for their business
in predominantly non-ethnic locations. This has been made possible by
cultivating non-ethnic clienteles for their business.
The targeting of international markets by migrant entrepreneurs
is a radical departure from the conventional understanding of tradi-
tional immigrant business. As referred to earlier, entrepreneurs have
been able to identify opportunities for marketing Japanese products
outside of Japan. In the same way as Japanese multinational compa-
nies have promoted and distributed their products in the global market,
Bangladeshi entrepreneurs have alternative routes to sell used cars inter-
nationally. Used car entrepreneurs have targeted countries where the
demand is stable and returns are high. For instance, they chose to open
used car show rooms in several African countries because they know
that new Japanese cars are out of the reach of even the upper middle
classes, thereby developing a market for affordable second-hand cars.

While new cars manufactured in India have a good market in these
countries, Japanese cars are known for their quality even if they are
four or five years old and, together with their affordability, are highly
sought after in African markets. Such astute assessment of overseas
markets has transformed Bangladesh migrant business into thriving
entrepreneurship.
This is also true for Japanese herbal products marketed by one leading
calling card entrepreneur. While on a trip to the United States and
Europe, he discovered that Chinese herbal products were available in
Western markets but not Japanese ones. It was then that he immediately
decided to trade in the latter. He identified some well-known Japanese
herbs including beauty products and began marketing them over-
seas. The success of his venture even led him to acquire a well-known
Japanese herbal product company. Similarly, the sale of international
calling cards online outside Japan and the expansion of the calling card
business in Malaysia and Singapore suggest that Bangladesh migrants
are entrepreneurial in seeking out overseas markets.
Temporal strategies refer to modifying selling or production hours.
Retail entrepreneurs employ various temporal strategies for sale and
distribution. Halal food outlets and other ethnic groceries usually open
in the late morning and close late at night. However, due to changes
in the modality of sales and distribution, temporal strategies have a
minimal impact in the retail business. Bangladeshi retail entrepreneurs
have developed online shopping, telesales and pay-upon-delivery serv-
ices to expand their businesses. Retailers operate online shopping facili-
ties for customers who live in Tokyo and other parts of Japan, complete
with catalogues of prices and pictures of products.
Upon ordering online, goods are delivered by post within 24 hours
in any part of Japan. Customers pay cash upon delivery of goods. Few
customers now visit the physical retail stores for shopping. Online
shopping, a practice that few South Asian wives enjoy back home, has
made the lives of immigrant wives comfortable. Customers who do not
have the Internet at home can order by telephone and the goods will
be similarly delivered. Online shopping has made it possible to access
markets all over Japan. As one leading retailer from Tokyo said, 90 per
cent of orders were done online. However, there is also competition as
most retailers have online presence. To compete with one another, some
retailers offer special promotions and gift vouchers to customers, such
as free DVDs of newly released Bollywood films, Bengali dramas, ethnic
magazines and television programmes. Online shopping for groceries
and daily necessities has changed the traditional notion of ethnic/immi-

grant businesses.
Conclusion
Theoretical developments in migrant entrepreneurship have largely

been developed in the North American context, notably that migrant
entrepreneurship thrives in ethnic enclaves but is spatially restricted.
Ultimately, they are assimilated into the host economy by becoming
mainstream firms. The classic ethnic business pattern found in North
America and, indeed, many European societies are immigrant entre-
preneurs owning small and often vulnerable enterprises in neighbour-
hoods with strong immigrant populations, relying overwhelmingly
on co-ethnic networks (Light and Gold, cited in Fresnoza-Flot and
Antoine, 2007). We have argued (Lian and Rahman, forthcoming) that
Bangladeshi migrant entrepreneurship, though sharing some similar
characteristics, has largely taken a different trajectory under conditions
of temporary labour migration in East Asia. Because of the uncertainty
and cost of temporary migration, Bangladeshi migrants seek ways and
means to regularise their status in order to gain salaried employment or
engage in business activity.
Those who become entrepreneurs are forced to innovate and seek
overseas markets in order to survive. The incentive to do so can be traced
to the beginning of the migrant career of a Bangladeshi when he makes
the decision to migrate overseas. Once he migrates, there is no turning
back and he will continue in what we called the ‘cycle of re-migration’
until he can demonstrate some measure of success acceptable to his
bari. Migration is the only option for social and economic mobility for
Bangladeshis. Furthermore, in Japan, Bangladeshi migrants have had to
marry local women and regularise their status before they can go on to
develop their businesses.
Unlike traditional ethnic businesses that are greatly dependent
on co-ethnic networks for support (at least in the initial phase) and
rarely move beyond the domestic market, Bangladeshi entrepreneurs
in Japan are driven to adopt innovative strategies early on in both
product development and market expansion. Hence, innovation occurs
in developing regional sources of supply for food products required
by South Asians, adapting electronic equipment and exporting used
cars and tyres, exporting Japanese herbals to overseas markets, and
introducing online shopping facilities to cater to educated and mobile
clienteles. Along with product innovation, these entrepreneurs have

cultivated ethnic and non-ethnic customers in the domestic market
and targeted foreign markets. Thus, product and market innovation
feed on each other.
Technological advancements in communication (international calling
cards, mobile phones and the Internet) and transport (budget airlines)
accompanied by the globalisation of markets have opened up opportu-
nities unavailable to migrant businesses in the past. Such developments
have also led to hypercompetitive conditions. Potential Bangladeshi
migrant entrepreneurs can no longer rely on ethnic niche markets
because of size limitations and they are quickly saturated with competi-
tors. A culture of travel, networking and information-gathering creates
awareness of opportunities and markets in different parts of the world.
Consequently, migrant entrepreneurship has transcended national terri-
tory. This study highlights the development of migrant entrepreneurship
amongst recent Bangladeshi emigrants in Japan, which is transnational
and/or multinational in dimension. It is transnational in the transac-
tions of halal food, ethnic restaurants and apparel, and used tyres; and
multinational in the transactions of used cars, electronic accessories,
calling cards and Japanese herbal products.
Acknowledgement
The earlier draft was published in Journal of International Migration and

Integration, 12(3), 253–74.
Notes
1. In addition to Bangladeshis, other South Asian groups like Pakistanis and
Nepalese also migrated to Japan clandestinely for work in the 1980s.
2. Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET) is in charge of
monitoring the outflow of emigrants who leave the country for work in
other countries. The BMET is a government organisation and it does not
monitor or keep records for returning emigrants. Bangladeshi citizens who
went to Japan for study or tourism and overstayed their visas for work are
not reported here. It is important to note that most Bangladeshi immigrants
in Japan used other types of visas than trainee visas to enter the country.
Therefore, the BMET data do not capture the vast majority of Bangladeshi
immigrants in Japan.
3. The Central Bank of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Bank, monitors inflows of remit-
tances in Bangladesh. The remittance data presented here do not necessarily
represent workers’ remittances. The data basically represent individual trans-
fers of foreign currency from Japan to Bangladesh.
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3
From Sentries to Skilled Migrants:
The Transitory Residence of the
Nepali Community in Singapore
Hema Kiruppalini
Introduction
Following a special treaty which was signed in 1839 between the govern-
ment of Nepal and the Khalsa (Sikh) government, Nepali hill men began
travelling to Lahore to join the army of the Sikh King, Ranjit Singh
(Kansakar, 2003: 92–3). Therefore, from the early nineteenth century
onwards Nepali hill men who served in the Sikh Army at Lahore were
termed lāhure, which can be translated as ‘one who goes to Lahore’. A
soldier who has travelled abroad is still popularly known as a lāhure in
Nepal. A prefix is attached to the term lāhure, depending on the country
of the soldier’s service, for instance, Singapore lāhure, British lāhure,
Brunei lāhure and Hong Kong lāhure. It has been argued that what is
shared by the men who are called lāhures is their relationship with a
foreign place, an experience of a world beyond the familiar (Des Chene,
1991: 237).
The term lāhure is increasingly used to refer to all Nepalis who secure
foreign employment. In their study of international labour migration from
Nepal, Seddon, Adhikari and Gurung (2001) have characterised the new
category of Nepalis abroad as ‘New lāhures’. In 1991, des Chene postu-
lated that men who undertake civilian jobs in India or travel to Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states to work in the oil fields can be called lāhures,
regardless of whether they have first been soldiers (des Chene, 1991: 237).
As one Nepali (and research informant) in Singapore remarked,
Lāhures no longer refers to just the Gurkhas. It also refers to those

going to the Middle East or elsewhere. My father was a Singapore
59
60 Hema Kiruppalini
lāhure, but I am a new lāhure since I am doing a [medicine]-related

Ph.D in Singapore.1
The Gurkha Contingent was formed as a special paramilitary unit under

the Singapore Police Force on 9 April 1949. The timing of its creation was
significant as it coincided with a period of racial riots: the Contingent
was expected to function impartially as an anti-riot squad. The Gurkhas
are now famed as sentries who guard Singapore’s key installations, and
their key role continues to define the contingent’s purpose as a neutral
force. Over the last 63 years, Gurkha policemen have rendered inval-
uable service to Singapore and their gated living quarters at Mount
Vernon Camp, an entirely self-sufficient township, distinguishes them
as an independent and impartial unit. Gurkha families are politically
disenfranchised and are repatriated to Nepal after a Gurkhas service in
Singapore ends, usually after 20 or 25 years.
Apart from the Gurkhas (the original lāhures), there are growing numbers
of Nepalis (the new lāhures) who have taken up temporary or permanent
residence in Singapore. They include Nepalis who emigrate to Singapore
in search of job opportunities, primarily in the food and beverage sector;
students furthering their education, mainly in the field of hotel manage-
ment, tourism and hospitality; and a sizeable number of professionals
who work, for example, as engineers, doctors and educators.
Over a period of two years doing fieldwork in Singapore and Nepal
from 2008–10, I conducted detailed and semi-structured interviews
with 45 individuals: Nepali restaurateurs, professionals and students
in Singapore, ministry officials, ambassadors and academics from both
Singapore and Nepal, as well as a number of Singapore Gurkhas. An
examination of the Nepali community in Singapore must take into
account a variety of factors. Therefore, my research adopts an interdis-
ciplinary method as a framework of analysis and draws on diasporic
theory to study the dynamics of the migratory formation of this commu-
nity. Primary sources in the form of oral interviews and archival material
constitute the backbone of my methodology.
In order to obtain information about the Nepalis concentrated in the
food and beverage sector in Singapore, I met individuals from the Nepal
Academy of Tourism and Hotel Management (NATHM).2 I also visited
the Ministry of Education in Kathmandu to obtain statistical data on the
number of Nepali students studying in Singapore. In terms of archival
material, the National Archives of Singapore, newspaper articles from
the Singapore Press Holdings and online newspaper articles by Lexis
Nexis Academic have also been useful sources of information.
From Sentries to Skilled Migrants 61
Nepal continues to be a largely agrarian society. However, declining

crop productivity and a lack of employment prospects in other
sectors are some of the reasons for international migration. This has
been compounded by the Maoist insurgency which erupted in 1996.
Although the internal conflict has ended, continued political uncer-
tainty continues to hamper economic growth, pushing many Nepalis to
seek a livelihood in foreign lands.
Singapore is regarded as an economically viable and politically stable
country, and this has drawn Nepalis who have chosen to take up either
temporary or permanent residence. Ganesh Gurung, a sociologist at the
Nepal Institute of Development Studies, explains that Singapore is seen
as a ‘dream country’ because Nepali politicians frequently express an
aspiration to make Nepal like Singapore in the speeches they give at
political rallies.3 According to various Nepali informants, the affinity
with the island city-state is also based on Singapore’s multiracial compo-
sition and Asian culture. The image of Singapore as a safe and secure
country, coupled with its relative proximity to Nepal (compared to coun-
tries such as the USA and the United Kingdom) has attracted Nepalis to
Singapore.
The sudden influx of Nepali emigrants into Singapore during the
1990s and at the turn of the millennium begs the question of why this
particular period saw these particular trajectories. Changes in state poli-
cies towards foreign employment in Nepal and Singapore, the role of
social networks and the growth of private recruitment agencies are crit-
ical factors.
The profile of the new Lāhures
Foreign labour migration is highest in those regions of Nepal that have

a longstanding history of emigration. According to David Seddon, a
majority of the new lāhures come from the western and eastern hill
regions from which enlistment into the British army began in the early
nineteenth century (Seddon, 2002: 28). Seddon, Adhikari and Gurung
contend that a majority of the Nepali migrants working in East Asia
and Southeast Asia comprise Gurungs, Magars and Thakalis from the
Western hills and mountains, Rais, Limbus and Sherpas from the Eastern
hills and mountains, and Newars from the Kathmandu Valley and else-
where (Seddon, Adhikari and Gurung, 2001: 76–7). These findings are
mirrored in the case of Singapore. Figure 3.1 shows that the majority
of the Nepalis in Singapore hail from the eastern (38.3%) and western
(36.3%) regions of Nepal.
62 Hema Kiruppalini
Figure 3.1 Nepali restaurants in Singapore
In Singapore, most professionals are Newars hailing from the

Kathmandu Valley, alongside a small number of Bahuns, Chetris, Magars,
Rais and Gurungs. However, those working in restaurants usually have a
different regional and ethnic profile. Data drawn from 11 ethnic Nepali
restaurants suggests that a majority of the Nepali owners and employees
hail from Baglung and Gulmi districts in the western region and Jhapa
and Ilam districts in the eastern region. Those who work in restaurants
include several from the Kathmandu Valley and the Tarai. A substantial
number of English-speaking Nepalis work in other food and beverage
outlets in Singapore, in both managerial and non-managerial positions.
Tables 3.1 and Table 3.2 reproduce the official statistical data on the
number of Nepalis abroad in 2001. Table 3.2 shows the distribution
of the emigrant population from Nepal by country of destination and
reason for absence. In 2001, 3363 of the 762,181 Nepalis living abroad
were residing in Singapore. Of these 3363 Nepalis, 1249 were classi-
fied as having undertaken jobs in the personal service line, 1044 were
employed in institutional services, 347 had emigrated for educational
purposes and 145 had emigrated for marital reasons. The pursuit of busi-
ness opportunities is the least important reason given for emigration to
Singapore, with only 30 Nepalis recorded as having emigrated for this
purpose.
These figures are a gross underestimation of the large numbers of
Nepalis who have left Nepal since the figures were compiled almost
11 years ago. The figures are also lacking in accuracy, both in relation to
the number of Nepalis residing temporarily or permanently in Singapore,
Table 3.1 Source regions of population absent in Nepal and countries of destination
Nepal EDR CDR WDR MWDR FWDR
Countries Total % Total % Total % Total % Total % Total %
Total 762181 100.0 121911 16.0 107631 14.1 331890 43.54 94724 12.43 106035 13.91
India 589050 100.0 67388 11.4 63508 10.5 263150 44.63 90006 15.28 105018 17.83
Pakistan 558 100.0 107 19.2 232 41.6 138 24.73 36 6.45 45 5.06
Bangladesh 952 100.0 133 14.0 410 43.1 239 25.11 65 7.25 101 10.61
Sri Lanka 201 100.0 44 22.0 52 40.8 62 30.85 8 3.98 5 2.49
Maldives 370 100.0 130 35.1 56 23.2 129 34.9 17 4.59 8 2.2
China 1354 100.0 225 16.0 706 52.1 305 22.5 58 4.28 60 4.4
Korea 2679 100.0 484 18.1 567 21.2 1541 57.5 67 2.50 20 0.8
Russia and others 747 100.0 126 16.9 358 47.9 153 24.5 41 5.49 39 5.2
Japan 3726 100.0 358 9.0 1509 42.1 1752 46.3 47 1.26 27 0.7
Hong Kong 12001 100.0 4111 34.3 1821 15.2 5952 49.6 87 0.72 30 0.3
Singapore 3363 100.0 38.9 628 18.7 1221 36.3 213 6.33 13 0.4
Malaysia 6813 100.0 2562 37.0 1026 15.1 2983 43.8 153 2.65 59 0.9
Australia 2491 100.0 365 14.7 1476 59.3 556 22.3 53 2.13 41 1.7
South Africa 67460 100.0 23179 34.4 13873 20.6 27775 41.2 2475 3.67 158 0.2
Qatar 24397 100.0 9256 37.9 4547 15.6 10164 41.7 376 1.54 54 0.2
Kuwait 3688 100.0 1457 39.5 692 16.3 1450 39.3 69 1.87 20 0.5
United Arab Emirates 12544 100.0 4157 33.1 2590 20.7 5408 43.1 321 2.56 68 0.5
Bahrain 2737 100.0 1511 55.2 272 9.9 918 33.5 33 1.21 3 0.1
Other Asian Countries 3845 100.0 921 23.5 1334 34.7 1440 37.4 127 3.30 27 0.7
United Kingdon 7271 100.0 1645 22.0 2602 35.3 2811 38.7 160 2.20 52 0.7
Germany 1638 100.0 270 16.5 671 41.0 653 39.9 33 2.01 11 0.7
France 250 100.0 40 16.0 156 62.4 50 20.0 4 1.60 0 0.0
Other European 1958 100.0 210 10.5 931 45.6 818 40.9 22 1.10 17 0.9
Countries
USA, Canada and 9557 100.0 1147 12.0 6661 69.7 1566 16.4 116 1.21 67 0.7
Mexico
Other Countries 1877 100.0 534 28.5 617 32.9 568 30.3 86 4.58 72 3.8
Source: CBS (2001:113).

Tabel 3.2 Distribution of the population absent from Nepal by countries of destination and by reasons for absence, 2001
Reasons of Absence
Personal Institutional Study/

Country of Destination Total Agriculture Business service service Training Marriage Others
Total 762181 7763 12050 506221 94329 31747 14101 95970

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
India 589050 7763 10832 385062 69102 19337 12772 84182
77.28 100.00 89.89 76.07 73.26 60.91 90.58 87.72
Pakistan 558 0 66 211 41 160 12 68
0.07 0.54 0.04 0.04 0.50 0.08 0.07
Bangalaesh 952 0 40 277 71 411 14 139
0.12 0.33 0.05 0.08 1.29 0.10 0.14
Bhutan 610 0 40 277 71 411 14 139
0.08 0.33 0.05 0.08 1.29 0.10 0.14
Sri Lanks 201 0 7 88 22 50 6 28
0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.03
Maldives 370 0 8 268 46 7 9 32
0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03
China 1354 0 44 587 154 382 16 171
018 0.37 0.12 0.16 1.20 0.11 0.18
Korea 2679 0 28 1990 462 83 16 100
0.35 0.23 0.39 0.49 0.26 0.11 0.10
Russia and Others 747 0 12 142 53 330 11 199
0.10 0.10 0.03 0.06 1.04 0.08 0.21
Japan 3726 0 88 2172 492 585 97 292
0.49 0.73 0.43 0.52 1.84 0.69 0.30
Hong Kong 12001 0 111 8249 1902 331 224 1184
1.57 0.92 1.63 2.02 1.04 1.59 1.23
Singapore 3363 0 30 1249 1044 347 145 548
044 0.25 0.05 1.00 1.09 1.03 0.57
Malaysia 6813 0 18 5521 892 37 5 340
0.89 0.15 1.09 0.95 0.12 0.03 0.35
Australia 2491 0 20 579 176 1487 62 167
0.33 0.16 0.11 0.19 4.68 0.44 0.17
Saudi Arabia 67460 0 123 54902 8907 56 18 3454
8.85 1.02 10.85 9.44 0.18 0.13 3.60
Qatar 24397 0 38 19278 3351 17 4 1259
3.20 0.31 3.90 3.55 0.05 0.03 1.31
Kuwait 3688 0 4 2957 543 4 2 178
0.48 0.03 0.58 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.19
United Arab Emirates 12544 0 28 9963 1932 50 10 561
1.65 0.23 1.91 2.05 0.16 0.07 0.58
Bahrain 2737 0 6 2180 421 9 2 119
0.36 0.05 0.43 0.45 0.03 0.01 0.12
Other Asian Countries 3849 0 70 1947 917 453 79 383
0.50 0.58 0.38 0.97 1.43 0.56 0.40
United Kingdom 7271 0 101 2513 2088 1631 200 738
0.95 0.84 0.50 2.21 5.14 1.42 0.77
Germany 1638 0 37 948 207 262 28 156
0.21 0.31 0.19 0.22 0.83 0.20 0.16
France 250 0 9 86 26 75 9 45
0.03 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.06 0.05
Other European Countries 1998 0 35 892 339 504 56 172
0.26 0.29 0.18 0.36 1.59 0.40 0.18
USA, Canada and Mexico 9557 0 238 2482 770 4930 261 876
1.25 1.98 0.49 0.82 15.53 1.42 0.91
Other Countries 444 0 1877 29 900 300 176 28
0.06 15.58 0.0 0.95 0.94 1.25 0.03
Source: CBS (2001:114–5). Population Census of Nepal 2001.

66 Hema Kiruppalini
and the nature of the jobs they pursue. According to officials from
Nepal’s Central Bureau of Statistics, the data do not take the Gurkhas
into account, because they were not present in Nepal at the time of the
survey.4 Furthermore, it is evident that the new lāhures in Singapore are
prominent in the business field (for example, restaurants, travel agen-
cies, garment stores, trade in precious gem stones and rudraaksa) and
it is unlikely that business pursuits are the least significant reason for
their absence from Nepal. In addition, after Singapore was marketed as
a ‘Global Schoolhouse’ in 2003, large numbers of students from Nepal
flocked to the state, especially between 2004 and 2008. This number
is absent from the official ‘Study/Training’ tabulation because many of
them came to Singapore on the pretext of being tourists but in actuality
were students searching for places in private schools.
There are approximately 7000 Nepalis in Singapore. Of these, approx-
imately 6000 are from the Gurkha Contingent and about 1000 are
professionals and semi-skilled workers.5 According to the President of
the Nepali Singapore Society, there are only about 30 Nepalis who have
taken up Singapore citizenship, and most of them are professionals.
Historicising the new Lāhures: state policies,

social networks and agents
State policies
During the 1980s, the Nepali government’s policies served to impede
Nepali emigration to foreign countries. From the middle of 2005
onwards, positive shifts were apparent in its attitude to foreign employ-
ment. The gradual liberalisation of policies concerning international
migration led to a growth in the number of recruitment agencies,
especially in Kathmandu. It has been noted that as of July 2002, 301
recruiting agencies had been registered in Nepal, mostly in Kathmandu,
and that Singapore was one of the listed destinations for Nepali workers
to be officially recruited (UNIFEM, 2006: 12).
Singapore’s immigration policies are also instrumental in determining
the nature of emigration from Nepal. One can easily notice the concen-
tration of Nepali migrants in the food and beverage sector and as semi-
skilled restaurant workers, while students who look to Singapore to
further their education do so mainly in the fields of hotel management,
tourism and hospitality. There are also increasing numbers of Nepali
professionals who reside in Singapore, either temporarily or perma-
nently. The nature of employment undertaken by the new lāhures is
very different from that undertaken by the other South Asian migrant
workers in Singapore. Nepalis neither work as construction or industrial
workers like those from India and Bangladesh, nor as domestic workers
like those from India and Sri Lanka.
Given this situation, questions arise as to why there is a selective
streamlining of Nepali immigrants in Singapore. Apart from a small
number who are citizens or permanent residents, most of the new lāhures
are Employment Pass or Business Pass holders. These categories require
individuals to be either skilled, professionally qualified or have a decent
level of education, namely SLC (School Leaving Certificate, equivalent
of the O’Level examination in Singapore) and above. The majority of
the Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan and Indian workers only hold work permits
issued to foreign unskilled workers and they enter Singapore as construc-
tion workers or domestic helpers.
Nepalis are not eligible for this kind of work permit. In its response
(on 16 June 1995) to an enquiry from maid employment agencies about
the implications of the Memorandum of Understanding signed between
Nepal and Singapore, Singapore’s Ministry of Labour stated that Nepal
was not approved as a source of foreign domestic workers, and that
only domestic workers from India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar
and the Philippines were eligible for work permits (National Archives of
Singapore, June 1995). A few weeks later, it was maintained that there
would be no move towards opening the labour market to non-traditional
sources like Nepal (Ibid: July 1995).
In trying to explain the concentration of Nepalis in selected job types
within the context of Singapore’s policy towards these immigrants, it is
apparent that the non-Gurkha Nepalis are concentrated in the food and
beverage sector, and that there are substantial numbers of professionals.
It may, therefore, be concluded that the pattern of Nepali emigration
to Singapore is distinct from the pattern of Nepali emigration to other
parts of the world. Nepalis work in menial jobs in India and Malaysia,
and as construction workers in Hong Kong and Gulf countries, and they
are known to be leading a working class lifestyle in America. However, in
the case of Singapore, a select group of Nepalis enter via professional or
skilled categories, and many of these are educated and from privileged
middle-class or upper middle-class backgrounds backgrounds.
Social networks in ethnic Nepali restaurants

At present, there are about nine Nepali restaurants in Singapore. Most
of them were set up from the late 1990s onwards. They include: Everest
68 Hema Kiruppalini
Kitchen, Shish Mahal North Indian and Nepali Cuisine, Albert Café
and Restaurant, Kantipur Tandoori Restaurant, New Everest Kitchen,
Gurkha Palace, Gorkha Kitchen, Himalaya Kitchen and Kathmandu
House.
Seddon, Adhikari and Gurung draw our attention to the idea of ‘paths
of migration’, based on the notion that social networks have contrib-
uted to mitigating the risks involved in migration. According to them,
these ‘paths’ are established on the basis of social networks and linkages,
which are themselves framed by kinship, caste, ethnicity, gender and
class (Seddon, Adhikari and Gurung, 2001: 66).
Interviews conducted in several of the restaurants in Singapore
suggest that most of the workers are directly employed by the restau-
rant owners. Harvey Choldin explains that ‘chain migration’ facilitates
the movement of prospective migrants who have their initial accom-
modation and employment arranged by means of primary social rela-
tionships with earlier migrants (Choldin, 1973: 164–5). This pattern of
‘chain migration’ is evident amongst the Nepali semi-skilled workers in
the restaurants.
Most managers and waiters working in Nepali restaurants in Singapore
managed to secure their jobs through personal recommendations and
kinship ties: most of them are relatives, distant relatives, or friends of
one another. Churamani Kharal, the owner of Pardesh Restaurant and
Café related that one of the main reasons he came to Singapore in 1993
is because he had a friend here.6 Binraj Dahjol, a waiter at Shish Mahal
Tandoori restaurant, came to Singapore as a student in 2004 to enrol in a
food and beverage course; his brother Muni Raj, who works at Kantipur
Tandoori restaurant, had assisted him with his journey here.7 Khagen
Limbu, a chef at the Gurkha Palace Restaurant, was directly employed
by the owner of the restaurant who happened to be his neighbour in
Nepal.8 The ethnic affiliation amongst those working in Nepali restau-
rants was further affirmed by Krishna Bahadur Pun, who related how
he came to Singapore through his relative’s recommendation, and how
his wife is also working now in the New Everest Kitchen restaurant.9
Employees of Nepali restaurants in Singapore offer an insight into how
kinship networks and social capital were mobilised to ensure job secu-
rity; these emigrants depend heavily on informal and personal connec-
tions to make a living in Singapore.
A connection between old and new lāhures is also evident: some
respondents explained that the presence of the Gurkha Contingent
played a part in their decision to come to Singapore. One informant
explained that his uncle, who had worked as a Gurkha, showed him
around Singapore and helped him settle in.10 Another informant, Laxmi
Gurung, said that one of the reasons he came to Singapore was because of
his relatives and friends who were in the Gurkha Contingent.11 Several of
the Nepalis working in the food and beverage sector are relatives, distant
relatives or friends of Gurkhas, thus indicating the direct connection
between the old lāhures (Gurkha families) and the new lāhures (those
working in the food and beverage sector in Singapore).
Both serving and repatriated Gurkhas have created an awareness
of Singapore in Nepal, and this further explains why the Nepalis in
Singapore hail primarily from the eastern and western regions of Nepal,
and accounts for their ethnic/clan similarities. The fact that the lāhures
and new lāhures come from similar regions is in part explained by the
existence of an exclusive informal network.
Nepali students and professionals

The role of intermediaries is critical to our understanding of the impact
that agents have on facilitating the process of migration. Between
2004 and 2008, hospitality, hotel management and tourism emerged
as popular educational choices among Nepali students who sought the
assistance of agents to secure a place in private schools in Singapore. In
the course of doing so, many students chose to work with private agents
rather than go through the formal process of sourcing an educational
institution (see Figure 3.2).
As the Maoist insurgency continued to disrupt Nepal at the turn of the
century, educational prospects in Nepal were bleak and Nepali students
were forced to consider going abroad for their studies. It was during this
period that hundreds of posters and advertisements by private educa-
tional agencies mushroomed across Kathmandu, capitalising on the
students’ desire to go abroad to countries like the United Kingdom, the
United States of America, Australia, Singapore and Cyprus. These posters
encouraged prospective students to pursue further studies, especially in
the field of hotel management and hospitality, or to work as waiters and
chefs in restaurants.
According to Ujjwal Satya from the Nepal Academy of Tourism and
Hotel Management (NATHM), subjects such as Hotel Management were
introduced at the post-SLC level in Nepali schools during the late 1990s.
This subject became immensely popular among students and approxi-
mately 15,000 students enrolled as it was deemed easier than other
subjects.12 Unfortunately, due to the dire state of higher educational
institutions in Nepal, only 4 per cent of the cohort could be accepted
into these institutions (ibid.), leaving the rest to pursue their interest
70 Hema Kiruppalini
Figure 3.2 An example of the numerous posters that encourage Nepali students
to go abroad to study in Singapore
in this field abroad. As a result of the massive advertising campaign for

overseas studies, and the large number of students who could not be
accommodated in Nepal, Singapore emerged as one of the prime desti-
nations for the pursuit of higher education. Nepal’s Education Ministry
data confirm that the courses most commonly chosen by Nepali
students in Singapore included Diploma in Hospitality Management
and Diploma in Tourism and Hospitality Management (Report of ‘No
Objection Letter’, 2008).
Coincidentally, in 2003, Singapore launched its education hub plan
and was marketed as a ‘Global Schoolhouse’. This plan worked well
with the thousands of students from Nepal who were seeking a repu-
table country where they could study. The cost of studying in Singapore
was considered to be more affordable compared to the United States or
the United Kingdom. In addition, the close proximity of Singapore to
Nepal (direct flights which take approximately five hours), the stable
social and political environment, and the perceived affinity of an Asian
country, placed Singapore in a favourable light among prospective
Nepali students.
More importantly, unlike the United States, the United Kingdom and
Australia, most of the private educational institutes in Singapore did
not require a ‘No Objection Letter’ from Nepal’s Education Ministry
(Report of ‘No Objection Letter’, 2008). The absence of this adminis-
trative requirement in Singapore, together with the easy availability of
on-arrival visas for Nepali students, contributed to an influx of Nepali

students during the period between 2004 and 2008.
While they came on the pretext of being students, many of the Nepali
migrants were keen to find a job. Among them, several were caught
working illegally (the Student Pass prohibits them from working) and
had to leave Singapore without completing their courses.13 The euphoria
of coming to Singapore was also short-lived for hundreds of students
who were left stranded after being cheated by unscrupulous agents.
One student, Subhas, was cheated by an agent, and his student visa was
subsequently cancelled. He lamented over how much money his family
had had to fork out for him to receive an education in Singapore, and
how he is now back in Nepal with no certificate.14 Nepali students were
among others from India, Sri Lanka, China, Vietnam and elsewhere who
were trapped by agents or were caught working illegally with a Student
Pass. It was reported that as of March 2009 there were 99,000 foreign
students in Singapore (Toh, 2009), and that the number of private
schools in Singapore had expanded from just 305 in 1997 to 1200 in
2007 (Business Times, February 2009). Many of these private schools,
despite lacking reputable credentials, managed to successfully market
themselves and lure foreign students.
Against a background of burgeoning complaints, numerous newspaper
articles between 2008 and 2009 brought to light the issues plaguing
foreign students (see Sim, 2008 and Davie, 2009). These articles, together
with the testimonies of returning foreign students, served to shatter
Singapore’s image as an education hub. Compelled to address criticisms
of Singapore’s global education hub, new rules have been promulgated
by the Singapore government. The fiasco created by shady agents and
disreputable schools has contributed to a decline in the number of
Nepali students entering Singapore. These students have since returned
to Nepal to embark on yet another journey to fulfil their education and
employment-related dreams.
Unlike students from Nepal, whose experiences in Singapore were
often intertwined with stories about unscrupulous agents, Nepali
professionals exercised self-agency in their employment in Singapore.
However, like the students, most Nepali professionals are in Singapore
for only a short period of time, and they are ambivalent about making
Singapore their permanent place of residence.
Many of the recent Nepali professionals regard Singapore as a
launching pad for their subsequent ambitions, and have made their
way to Singapore on a transitory basis after completing their degrees in
72 Hema Kiruppalini
other countries. Many of the Nepali professionals working as doctors,

accountants, engineers, or in banks, have studied in Canada, England or
Australia, and thereafter decided to transit in Singapore to find a job and
acquire work experience.
The transitory residence of the new Lāhures

A large number of new lāhures reside in Singapore for less than five years
and there are a variety of reasons for them forming part of a larger circu-
latory migration. Among the professionals, Singapore is seen as a country
where experience can be gained before aiming for something better
in countries like Australia, the United Kingdom or America, whereas
Nepali students and restaurant workers who are keen on prolonging
their stay in Singapore after two or four years are hindered by immigra-
tion regulations. In recent times, the inability of Nepali nationals to
extend their employment passes is most evident among those working
in the food and beverage sector and other service-oriented industries.
The liberal immigration policies that led to the influx of Nepalis have
been amended and this has led to a downsizing of the immigrant popu-
lation. Informants related that:
I have worked in ‘Welcome Om’ (restaurant) for slightly over 2 years

but my employment pass did not get renewed. I do not know why I
cannot continue to work in Singapore. I have to return to Nepal and
then try to come to Singapore again. Otherwise, I will have to go to
another country.15
Two years ago, those working in my restaurant were largely Nepali.
But of late, almost all their employment passes are not getting
renewed and they have gone back. I do not know what has caused
this change in immigration rules concerning Nepalis.16
Most of the contemporary Singapore-based Nepali professionals

obtained their tertiary education in Australia before coming to Singapore
to get jobs. Several have permanent residence status in both Singapore
and Australia. While there are a growing number whose options are
constrained by immigration rules, there are also others who are unde-
cided about settling down in Singapore, Australia or a third country.
Some respondents commented that:
It is not only the Nepali restaurateurs who have to return. Even among
the professionals, many of my friends are not able to extend their
employment pass or in some cases, their application for permanent
residency has been unsuccessful. They have gone back to Nepal and
perhaps they might re-migrate to the West ... As for me, I feel that it
is convenient to live in Singapore. It is neat, tidy and there is a good
infrastructure in place. It is very Asian and I don’t feel so foreign here.
But, whatever I’m doing here, I always say it is temporary.17
I knew this Nepali girl who studied in Australia, and she worked in
Singapore for five or six years. She was doing well. But she decided
not to settle here. Instead she went back to Sydney since she got a
better offer.18
Various informants who work as professionals admitted to the possi-

bility of becoming a citizen, but at same time they also expressed their
reluctance to make Singapore their home. They would frankly state:
I came to Singapore to get my MBA and my employment happened

by chance. I’ve been here for about 2 years or so but have never tried
to settle in Singapore. I will go back to my country; even my family
wants me back home.19
There are benefits if I become Singapore citizen. But I do not know
if I want to settle here. I do not know where I am going to be, I could
be anywhere.20
There is no problem for me to get a Singapore PR but I am defi-
nitely going back to Nepal. I spent my childhood in Nepal but left my
country for 30 years. It is only fair I give back something.21
The transitory residence of the new lāhures is a significant feature of their

migration to Singapore. The length of the migrants’ stay in Singapore is
determined not only by their occupation type and personal ambition
but also on the immigration rules relating to their respective vocation.
In general, Nepali migrants stay in Singapore for less than five years. The
exceptions are found mainly amongst professionals who have lived in
Singapore for a longer period of time.
A Nepali quasi-diaspora in Singapore

The ambivalent diasporic position of professionals who are undecided
over whether to take up Permanent Residence (PR) in Singapore, or
return to Nepal in order to venture into another country is striking.
Paradoxically, as much as they would like to settle down in Singapore,
which they regard as an ideal place to live, there remains an inclina-
tion to return to Nepal and/or venture to a country in the West. Most
of the new lāhures have lived in Singapore for approximately five years,
thus giving their residence some permanence. Yet, given the transient
74 Hema Kiruppalini
and complex nature of their migratory movements, their settlement in

Singapore lacks a permanent character.
William Safran has discussed a variety of collective experiences in
relation to diasporas: a historical trajectory of dispersal; conjuring up
memories of the homeland; feelings of exclusion in the host-country;
a longing for eventual return and a strong myth of return; rendering
support to the homeland; and a collective identity importantly defined
by this relationship (Safran, 1999: 364–5). The hallmarks of diaspora
include settlement in a foreign country, racialised discourses that under-
score the power dynamics and social relations between different groups
of people, and identity quandaries that render visible the tensions
produced by laying one’s roots elsewhere (Clifford, 2006; Brah, 2006;
Hall, 2006).
A pertinent question then arises as to whether the Nepalis in Singapore
are ‘transmigrants’ or ‘temporary migrants’. Are they ‘diasporic’ or are
the dynamics of the Nepali community in Singapore exceptional? The
community embodies two types of migratory flows: While the Singapore
Gurkhas are defined by a British colonial immigration heritage, the rela-
tively recent movement of new lāhures is a product of various factors, for
instance, foreign policies in both Nepal and Singapore, kinship networks
and the role of agents. The Nepali community in Singapore is marked by
differentiated histories and patterns of migration.
Rupa Chanda critically questions the classical tenets of diaspora
theory, postulating that,
While diaspora refers to people from one country who are settled
abroad permanently, does this only mean those who have changed
nationality, or does this also include those who have retained
their nationality but changed their permanent residence, or might
it include those staying abroad for a long time, without changing
either, perhaps because they are not permitted to do so as in the case
with the expatriate community in Gulf countries? (Chanda, 2008: 3)
The concept of ‘diaspora’ has long tended to be equated with permanent

settlement abroad, and Chanda questions this very notion. Similar to
the expatriate community in general in Gulf countries, the Gurkhas are
perceivably a diasporic community. This is despite the fact that they
have stayed in Singapore for a long time without integrating into their
host-country, retained their nationality, and that their permanent resi-
dence in Nepal usually remains unchanged. Similarly, the new lāhures
can also be considered diasporic although they have retained their
Nepali nationality, resided in Singapore for a substantial period of time,

and are still vacillating between leaving or staying in Singapore.
The Nepali community in Singapore simultaneously conforms to and
contests the classic bedrock of diasporic theory. In terms of conjuring
up memories of the homeland, it resonates with traditional notions of
diaspora theory. At the same time, disengagements are evident when
one tries to situate the community within other contexts such as a
historical trajectory of dispersal, a strong myth of return and a collective
identity. The unique dynamics of the Nepalis in Singapore serve as a case
study which challenges some of the prerequisites normally associated
with diasporic communities.
First, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal might have, to some extent,
pressured Nepalis to emigrate. Nonetheless, their migration to Singapore
does not entail being ‘dispersed’ as it does in the Jewish and Armenian
contexts. Second, Safran contends that diasporic communities retain
memories of their homeland, and this is evident amongst new lāhures
in Singapore. The Nepali Society in Singapore was formed in 2008 as an
initiative undertaken by members of the new lāhure community. The
society seeks to maintain its cultural and traditional identification with
Nepal through various events (for example, Dasaĩ, Nepali Naya Barsa)
organised by the society.
Third, in relation to the Nepalis in Singapore, the issue of ‘return’ is
not a myth. The new lāhures are allowed to settle in Singapore provided
they meet the necessary criteria to gain permanent residency. However,
as explained earlier, a negligible percentage of new lāhures are Singapore
citizens. The majority of them return to Nepal because of either a desire
to venture to another country, or because they are unable to prolong their
stay in Singapore due to the immigration rules. This makes the ‘myth of
return’ a misnomer among the Nepali community in Singapore.
Fourth, given the diversity present in the Nepali community in
Singapore, it is difficult to speak of a collective identity and group
consciousness amongst them. The lāhures and new lāhures live polar-
ised lifestyles in Singapore, and are subject to different rules and regula-
tions. To some extent, the expansion of the ethnic Nepali restaurants
over the last 15 years has helped to bridge the gap between the two
groups, thus facilitating the development of an overarching Nepali
identity in Singapore. Gurkha families patronise the restaurants and
sometimes participate in events organised in these restaurants by the
Nepali Singapore Society. Nevertheless, a dichotomy exists between the
two groups, and there continues to be minimal interaction between the
lāhures and new lāhures, given the Gurkhas’ role in Singapore’s national
76 Hema Kiruppalini
security. According to Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs, the Gurkhas’

principal roles now are to act as a specialist guard force at key installa-
tions and to serve as a force supporting police operations. They have also
provided security for major events such as the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank meetings in 2006, and the 13th ASEAN Summit in
2007.22 Increasingly, the Gurkhas assist the police in guarding Singapore
against terrorism.
Although it conforms to some of the traditional notions of diaspora
theory, the new lāhure community in Singapore exhibits some peculiar
features. In terms of relating to their homeland and defining themselves
with reference to Nepal, the new lāhures lend themselves to the classic
notion of diaspora. However, the unique dynamics of the community
serve to reconfigure notions such as a historical trajectory of dispersal, a
strong myth of return and a collective identity.
While recognising that the lāhures are sojourners and politically disen-
franchised individuals, the Gurkha Contingent as a community has
thrived in Singapore for 61 years and the longevity of the Nepalese ‘settle-
ment’ in Singapore vis-à-vis lāhure families allows them to be constructed
as a diasporic community. Return is not a myth for them, because lāhure
families return to Nepal after living in Singapore for 20 to 25 years. The
nostalgia for Nepal experienced by various lāhures during their service in
Singapore is just as salient as their exilic nostalgia for Singapore when they
resettle in Nepal. In this context, notions of ‘host-country’ and ‘home-
land’ undergo complex negotiations, shaping a dual sense of belonging.
On the other hand, the new lāhures in Singapore are still undergoing
an early stage of community formation. Composed of pioneer immi-
grants who are gradually putting down roots in Singapore after having
had Singapore-born children, they are arguably a community in the
making. Still in an embryonic stage, the Singapore Nepali community
has yet to fully develop, and thus the term ‘quasi-diaspora’ would be apt
as it articulates the incipient nature of the community.
Conclusion
Nepali emigration to Singapore began in 1949 with the entry of the

Gurkhas. The second phase gained momentum after 1991 and intensi-
fied following the turn of the twenty-first century with the emergence
of new lāhures. It is clear from the profile of the new lāhures in Singapore
that a majority of them hail from the eastern and western regions of
Nepal, similar to the Gurkhas, and also from the Kathmandu Valley. It is
possible that the Gurkhas have created awareness about Singapore, and
an exclusive informal network between the Gurkhas and the new lāhures
serves to explain the regional and even ethnic/clan affinity between the
two groups.
Seddon, Adhikari and Gurung postulate that it is not only in the Gulf
that Nepali migrants encounter ‘dirty, degrading and dangerous’ condi-
tions at work. Whether in Korea or Kuwait, Singapore or Saudi Arabia,
the risks and the hardships are real (Seddon, Adhikari and Gurung,
2001: 16). However, it has been demonstrated that Singapore’s immigra-
tion policies pertaining to the Nepalis hinge on the need for them to be
educated and skilled. The job scope for the new lāhures in Singapore is
distinct, considering that Nepalis are largely blue-collar workers in other
parts of the world. Singapore’s immigration polices continue to define
the occupational profiles of new lāhures.
Despite an increase in the number of new lāhures in Singapore, the
majority of them are not permanent residents. The mobilisation of social
networks in Nepali restaurants in Singapore has contributed to facili-
tating the movement of semi-skilled workers into the food and beverage
sector. Some of the owners of these restaurants are Singapore citizens,
and have integrated into the island-city because the stable political and
economic environment is perceived to be conducive for their businesses.
However, Nepali workers are affected by immigration regulations that
require regular renewals of their Employment Passes. It is often the case
that such workers live in a constant state of uncertainty in Singapore.
After the controversy over disreputable agents and private schools,
many Nepali students have returned to Nepal and are a negligible part of
the Nepali population in Singapore. While there are a handful of profes-
sionals who have become Singapore citizens, the majority of recently
arrived professionals are uncertain about making Singapore their perma-
nent residence. This uncertainty is further compounded by their ambi-
tions to migrate to Australia, America and other countries in the West.
For new lāhures residing in Singapore, the transitory nature of their
stay is a crucial aspect of their migration pattern. Arguably, the new
lāhures form part of a larger circulatory migration pattern. Their sojourn
in Singapore demonstrates that there are either structural impediments
to their ability to settle in Singapore or that they are themselves searching
for better economic opportunities.
Acknowledgement
This piece was first published as a journal article in the European Bulletin
of Himalayan Research (EBHR) in 2012.
78 Hema Kiruppalini
Notes
1. Personal communication, anonymous, Singapore, 10 January 2010.
2. Personal communication, Satya, Ujjwal. Interview. Head of Department
(Human Resource) at the Nepal Academy of Tourism and Hotel Management
(NATHM). Kathmand, 15 May 2009; Personal communication, Ghimire,
Ram Prasad. Interview. Executive Director. Nepal Academy of Tourism and
Hotel Management (NATHM). Kathmandu, 3 May 2009.
3. Personal communication, Ganesh Gurung. Nepal Institute of Development
Studies (NIDS). Kathmandu, 5 May 2010.
4. Personal communication, Rudra Suwal, Deputy Director, Chief of National
Accounts Section. Central Bureau of Statistics. Kathmandu, 9 June 2009.
5. Personal communication, Amar Chitrakar, President of the Nepali Singapore
Society, Singapore, 9 March 2010; Ong Keng Yong, Former Non-Resident
Ambassador to Nepal. Singapore, 4 May 2010; Jamie En Wen Wei, ‘Ex-Nepalese
prince and family relocate here’, The Straits Times, 20 July 2008.
6. Personal communication, Churamani Kharal, owner of ‘Pardesh Restaurant
and Café’. Singapore, 10 December 2009.
7. Personal communication, Biniraj Maharjan Dahjol, waiter at ‘Shish Mahal
Nepali and North Indian Restaurant’. Singapore, 24 September 2008.
8. Personal communication, Khagen Limbu, chef at ‘Gurkha Palace Restaurant’.
Singapore, 6 April 2010.
9. Personal communication, Krishna Pun, manager at ‘New Everest Kitchen’.
10. Personal communication, anonymous Restaurateur. Singapore, 16 April
2010.
11. Personal communication, Laxmi Gurung, Assistant Floor and Bar Manager at
‘Serenity: Spanish Bar and Restaurant’. Singapore, 19 December 2009.
12. Personal communication, Ujjwal Satya, Head of Department (Human
Resource) at the NATHM. Kathmandu, 15 May 2009.
13. Personal communication, Pujan Rai. Singapore, 19 October 2008.
14. Personal communication, Subhas. Kathmandu, 29 April 2009.
15. Personal communication, Ramesh Shrestha, waiter at ‘Welcome Om’.
Singapore, 14 November 2011.
16. Personal communication, Dan Bahadur Shahi, owner of ‘Everest Kitchen’.
Singapore, 3 May 2010.
17. Personal communication, Kishore Dev Pant, engineer. Singapore, 10 January
2010.
18. Personal communication, Amar Chitrakar. President of the Nepali Singapore
Society. Singapore, 9 March 2010.
19. Personal communication, Dhiroj Shrestha. Academic Executive Officer.
20. Personal communication, anonymous teacher. Singapore, 18 March
2010.
21. Personal communication, anonymous academic. Singapore, 24 March
2010.
22. Personal communication, Charlotte Loh, Senior Public Communications
Executive, Ministry of Home Affairs. Singapore, 16 October 2008.
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4
Migrant Remittance Supported
Micro-Enterprises in South Asia
Shahadat Khan
Introduction
This study focuses on migrant remittance supported micro-enterprises

(MRSMEs) in Bangladesh with a view to understand such micro-enter-
prises in the context of enhanced usage of migrant remittance. Migrant
remittance is receiving increased attention ( Rahman and Yeoh, 2008;
de-Haas and Rodrguez, 2010; Rahman, 2012, 2010; Rahman and Fee,
2005) as it has now become the second largest source of external devel-
opment finance (Cohen, 2005). Migrant remittance is also seen as an
indispensable part of economic survival for many developing coun-
tries (IOM, 2005). Furthermore, it has been considered a major factor
in poverty alleviation of recipient developing countries in terms of its
usage in consumption and investment (Beverland and Lockshin, 2001;
Glytsos, 2005). However, according to de-Haas and Rodrguez (2010),
migration development processes are heavily dependent on policies
adopted by labour sending states towards favourable general conditions
for human development.
In 2011, developing countries received an officially recorded remit-
tance figure of US$372 billion (three times the size of official develop-
ment aid) and it is expected to reach US$467 billion in 2014 (World
Bank, 2012). It is also widely accepted that a significant amount of remit-
tance remain unrecorded (informal and others), therefore the amount
that migrant workers remit to developing countries is expected to be
even higher. Hence, the usage and impact of migrant remittance (MR)
on development deserves due consideration.
While a considerable amount of available literature discusses the
determinants (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2009), motive, impact (Ratha,
2005a, 2005b; Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, 2007; Lueth and Ruiz, 2007;
81
82 Shahadat Khan
Ratha and Shaw 2007; Vargas-Silva, 2008; Brown and Jimenez, 2008;
Mamun and Nath, 2010), usage (Glytsos, 2005; Gupta et al., 2007; Lueth
and Ruiz, 2007; Sofranko and Idris, 1999) and some other aspects of MR
(Rahman and Yeoh, 2008), most studies provide bird’s eye views on the
aggregate picture. Furthermore, although most of studies indicate that
migrant remittance is invested in a variety of small or micro business
ventures, studies aimed at understanding or identifying factors related
to these business ventures at the grass roots level are rare.
Ample studies are also available in the area of small and medium-sized
businesses (Kirby, 2004; Chowdhury, 2007; Coy et al., 2007; Boohene,
Sheridan and Kotey, 2008; Bumpus and Burton, 2008; Mboko and Smith-
Hunter, 2009), even its small branches such as copreneurship (Cole and
Johnson, 2007) or business ventures established and/or run by migrants
in developed countries (Altinay and Altinay, 2008; Shinnar and Young,
2008; Rahman, 2012). However, research in the areas of migrant remit-
tance supported business ventures in labour sending developing coun-
tries is rare. This study, therefore, aims to achieve the following two
objectives:
i. Understand the existing status of migrant remittance supported

micro-enterprises in Bangladesh.
ii. Identify the impeding bottlenecks these enterprises face in sustain-
able operation and growth.
Review of relevant literature
MR’s role in poverty alleviation

Migrant remittance has been seen as a powerful means to have massive
economic impact on poverty reduction in developing countries due its
contentious nature (see, for example, IFAD, 2007; Gupta et al., 2007;
Lueth and Ruiz, 2007; Carling, 2005; Glytsos, 2005; International
Organization for Migration (IOM) 2005; Ratha, 2005a, 2005b). Page
and Plaza (2006) argue that a 10 per cent increase in the share of inter-
national migrants in the population or of remittance received in GDP
reduces the fraction of people living on less than a dollar a day by 1.9
per cent and 1.6 per cent respectively.
Remittance to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio was 4.1 per cent in
India as compared to nearly 11 per cent in Bangladesh and Philippines
in 2008 (Chinmay, 2011: 17). Chappell et al. (2010) in a multi-country
(Colombia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, Macedonia and Vietnam) study
suggests that migration increases the incomes of individual migrants
Migrant Remittance Supported Micro-Enterprises 83
as well as that of households from where they come and/or remit to.
Furthermore, the study also found that receiving remittances had a posi-
tive impact on business ownership. Households with returned migrants
also saw an increase in the likelihood of owning a business. The above
suggests that remittances not only enhanced opportunities for human
capacity development particularly by way of paving the opportunity for
better education of family members (particularly children) living behind
or better healthcare for family members, it also worked as a catalyst to
convert the unemployed into working force. Several studies show that
migrant remittance has emerged as a dominant source of household
income (Mahmood, 1994) which can also encourage, among other
things, micro-enterprise development, substantial employment and
income generation, thus spurring economic development and poverty
alleviation (Piotrowski, 2006; Buchenau, 2008). Stark (1991) (in Page
and Plaza, 2006), argued that remittances are fungible and investment
may increase, even if the cash received is not invested immediately.
However, Fee and Rahman (2006), in the context of Bangladesh, argue
that the current trend of usage of most migrant remittance is in specu-
lative investment in real-estate and to finance conspicuous consump-
tion. Therefore, there is a need to devise fiscal incentives in order to
encourage use of remittance into more productive sectors.
Remittance value and usage pattern

As shown in Figure 4.1, the flow of MR from originating to destina-
tion country follows a value diminishing process. The usage value of MR
funds at the recipient’s end is the net of the transaction cost as well as
opportunity cost to its value at origin.
Thus, the usage value of a given amount of MR is dependent on
the degree of efficiency in managing the transaction as well as the
usage process. The transaction cost includes, but is not limited to,
obtaining an appropriate exchange rate, paying a host of institutional
Remittance Opportunity cost

Cost (Inappropriate usage)
Monetary Value in Monetary Value in Usage Value in

Remitting Country Recipient Country Recipient Country
Figure 4.1 Value diminishing flow of migrant remittance

Note: Size of spheres is symbolic to value in respective location
84 Shahadat Khan
fees at both ends, and several kinds of direct and indirect social costs
in dealing with institutional bureaucracy, buying gifts for extended
family members and so on. Lack of knowledge or skills of both the
remitter as well as the recipient may play a large role in managing
these costs.1
One of the prime differences between MR, as investment capital,
and its two other competitors in the development finance market, that
is Foreign Aid (FA) and Micro-Finance (MF) is that the availability of
both FA and MF is conditional upon borrowers’ acceptance of specifi-
cally designed institutional support by the lending agencies. Support
includes, but is not limited, to lender’s guidance on (i) spending deci-
sions (ii) human capital development (iii) project operation, and (iv)
(Recipients) obligation for repayment of invested fund with some
returns. MR, on the other hand, especially at family level, is used with
almost no such assistance, and in all most all cases, recipients are rela-
tively free from repayment obligation. Investment of MR into micro-
enterprises provides income support for family members of unskilled
or semi-skilled migrant workers and provides the opportunity to work
for them when they finally return home (Lowell and Gerova, 2004).
Choice of investment in micro businesses may be more important and
desirable for this category of migrant workers. Although there are chal-
lenges (Rahman, 2012; Sofranko and Idris, 1999), the need for channel-
ling migrant remittances into the micro-enterprise sector was echoed by
practitioners (see, for example, Azad, 2004). Carling (2004) in (Page and
Plaza, 2006: 303) asserts that SME schemes (financial, infrastructure or
innovative) would be, among others, a policy option to stimulate invest-
ment of remittances.
As the bulk of unskilled or semi-skilled migrant workers and their rela-
tives receiving remittances from developing countries are drawn from
the relatively less educated part of society (Siddiqui, 2004; Rahman,
2009), it is expected that the recipient family members may not have
necessary skills to realise its optimum usage value for consumption as
well as investment. The lack of financial literacy, access to additional
capital as well as entrepreneurial skills are expected to be some of the
factors that prevent proper usage of MR.
Siddiqui and Abrar (2003) identify three broad categories such as Basic
Necessity (59%), Investment (30%) and Social Necessity (11%) in which
migrant recipient households spent MR. In an earlier study, Sofranko
and Idris (1999) indicated almost similar categories of usage such as
Basic Necessity (29%), Social Ceremonies/Luxury Goods (29%), Agriculture
(16%) and Business (13%). The items under the investment category in
Siddiqui and Abrar’s (2003) study included agricultural land purchase,

sending family member abroad, investment in business, savings/fixed
deposit, child education, taking mortgage of land and home stead land
purchase and Insurance. Singh, Cabraal and Robertson (2010) argue that
remittance also has a significant role in taking care of recipinet family
member’s health related expenses.
Spending a large portion of migrant remittance on basic necessities is
understandable as the majority of migrant workers, particularly those
from most developing countries, come from relatively lower socio-
economic backgrounds (Taylor and Lopez-Feldman, 2010; Mahmood,
1994,1995; Appleyard, 1996; Siddiqui and Abrar, 2003; Rahman and Fee,
2005; Piotrowski, 2006; Anna, 2009; O’Brien, 2009). It is also notable
that, while investment accounts for 30 per cent, as Rahman et al. (2006)
argue, most of these are speculative investments in real-estate to finance
conspicuous consumption. Furthermore, spending significant portion of
migrant remittance on Social Ceremonies/Luxury Goods (11 to 29% of
total migrant remittance) leaves the opportunity for diverting a portion
to productive investment, even if recipient families do not compromise
their conspicuous consumption.
Siddiqui and Abrar’s (2003) study indicated that most business invest-
ments (4.75%) went to micro-enterprises which were primarily run by
the family members. The study also indicated ‘dependence on agricul-
ture for living, lack of investment opportunity, wives or elderly recip-
ients of remittance’ as reasons for apparent low business investment.
Lack of social acceptance for women to run businesses prevented these
recipients from investing in businesses, while the elderly recipients
mostly viewed remittance as a flow of income for their living. Ahmad
and Zohora (1997) suggest the following nine broad categories of bottle-
necks in investing migrant remittance in Bangladesh:
i. Lack of promotional support in terms of information, advisory,

training and others;
ii. Services relating to investment in new and potentially successful
sectors;
iii. Perceived lower risk in the purchase of land and construction of
houses;
iv. Lack of ideas about investment opportunities;
v. High priority attached to household expenditure;
vi. Lack of expertise in the remittance receiving households for running
businesses;
vii. Investment environment not perceived to be conducive;
86 Shahadat Khan
viii. Interest in investing abroad;

ix. Unsuccessful past investments.
Possible consequences of improper utilisation of MR

Migrant remittance may also detrimentally affect an economy if meas-
ures are not taken for the proper utilisation of this capital influx. Glytsos
(2005) argues that depending on effective policy and nature of growth in
an economy, remittances may affect output in four distinct ways. These
are: (i) contribution to growth, (ii) moderation of recession, (iii) restraint
of growth and (iv) intensification of recession. Glytsos (2005) suggests to
seriously consider the flow of migrant remittance by remittance-depend-
ent-nations as a major pillar in their planning strategies for develop-
ment. Measures to attract more remittances or motivate recipients and
migrants to invest rather than consume would work effectively if these
were part of a more comprehensive development plan. Furthermore,
Saab and Ayoub (2010) argue that worker remittances, foreign grants and
oil revenues are the main factors behind the Dutch Disease Syndrome in
the Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia (ESCWA) region.
Dutch Disease Syndrome refers to an economic condition where the in-flow
of capital to the home country causes a decrease in exports, an increase
in imports, and affects the country’s currency value. Channelling remit-
tances through investments, subsidising output of lagging sectors and
imposing higher import tariffs are recommended to reduce the nega-
tive externalities of the Dutch disease. The above discussion provides
a cautionary note for policymakers in that merely an increase in the
flow of remittances (for which most developing countries are currently
concentrating efforts) can be counter-productive.
Life cycle of micro/small businesses

Organisations are at some point ‘born’, they then grow to one size or
another, and eventually they all ‘die’ (Lester and Parnell, 2008). Dodge
and Robbins (1992) suggest a four-stage model (Formation-Growth−Later-
Growth and Stability) in organisational life cycles, whereas Hill, Nancarrow
and Wright (2002) suggest a five-stage model (Existence−Survival−Succes
s−Take-off and Resource Mature). Winona National Bank,2 a financier of
small business, on the other hand, suggests that the life cycle of small
businesses goes through seven stages, as shown in Figure 4.2, which
includes (i) Seed (ii) Start-Up (iii) Growth (iv) Established (v) Expansion
(vi) Matured and (vii) Exit (Winona National Bank, 2010).
Growth
S S G E E M E
E T R S X A X
E A O T P T I
D R W A A U T
T T B N R
- H L S E
U I I
P S O
H N
E
D
Time
Figure 4.2 Stages of small/micro business life cycle
In different stages organisations need to address different levels of

activities in decision-making, information processing, operational
procedures, and on several structural issues that include reporting
relationships, the distribution of power and department or divisional
organisations (Lester and Parnell, 2008). Lussier and Halabi (2010) argue
that if small businesses have adequate capital, maintain good record
keeping and financial control, have specific plans, make use of profes-
sional advice, have higher level of education, and make use of marketing
activities, they will increase their chances of success. Servon et al. (2010)
identified five primary gaps facing small and micro business owners in
the context of New York City. These are: (i) skill gap (ii) information gap
(iii) commitment gap (iv) capital gap (v) institutional capacity gap and
service delivery gap.
Theoretical framework
Theories of organisational failures (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler,
1992) such as Human Capital Theory (Becker, 1975; Wills, 1986),
Organisation Ecology Theory (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) and Agency
Theory (Jensen and Meckilng, 1976) provide the theoretical framework
for this study. Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler (1992) with reference to
Human Capital Theory (Becker, 1975; Wills, 1986) argue that personal
characteristics of founders (owners/operators) such as education, career
history, family occupational background and so on are considered as key
factors in the survival of business ventures (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and
Ziegler, 1992). In the context of migrant remittance supported micro-
enterprises we expect that factors related to human capital would play
an important role in MRSMEs.
Organisation Ecology Theory (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989; Singh
and Lumsden, 1990 in (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler, 1992: 230) deals
88 Shahadat Khan
with evolutionary processes within and between populations of organisa-

tions observed over a long period of time. Therefore, this theory expects to
explain some aspects of behaviour of these firms. Furthermore, according
to Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckilng, 1976: 308) ‘a contract under
which one or more persons (principals) engage another person (the agent)
to perform some services on their behalf which involves delegating some
decision-making authority to the agent’. In respect to MRSMEs, the recip-
ient acts as an agent of the remitter (principal). The purpose of delegating
tasks to the agent is to achieve maximum welfare (including altruistic
gain) for the principals. However, McCue and Prier (2008: 3) argue that
‘principal-agent relationship is often forged’ and that an agent’s action
can be ‘either negative or positive for each of the actors’. McCue and Prier
(2008: 3) further argue that agents are ‘bounded rational, self-interested
utility maximisers’ and may take advantage of information asymmetries in
an opportunistic manner in an attempt to minimise efforts to fulfil tasks,
which may even be detrimental to the principals. In institutional agency
arrangement such as public-private or NGO-private situation, rules and
guidelines act as control mechanisms (Dixit, 1996; Pearson and Entrekin,
1998; Williamson, 1998) to eliminate or minimise negative impact on the
principal’s welfare. However, the possibility of existence of formal rules
or guidelines in the case of MR’s usage in investment, particularly where
micro-enterprises are concerned is next to nil. Moreover, research suggests
that even if formal rules exist, the use of such rules in many instances is
considerably compromised as organisations often use Unwritten Ground
Rules or URGs (Zhang, 2010; Khan and Schroder, 2009).
Research design
An exploratory case study (Yin, 1994) backed by search of relevant litera-
ture is adopted for this study. This method is most suitable when the
objective is concerned with recovering and understanding a situated
meaning as well as a behavioural divergence (Buelens et al., 2008). This
inductive approach enabled us to generate a list of possible problem
areas particularly by capturing the specific factors that the literature
review failed to identify. The scope of study, as shown in Figure 4.3,
focuses on micro-enterprises supported by migrant remittance received
by families.
Eighteen face-to-face in-depth interviews involving 31 MRSMEs
in Bangladesh provided data for this study. Some respondents were
involved in multiple micro-enterprises and the study considered all of
them. MRSMEs, as defined below, formed the primary unit of analysis:
Foreign Currency Local Currency
Beneficiaries Usage
Ivestment
Community
Charity and
MR Value at Questionable
MR Value at Receiving Country:

Consumption
Remitting Country Local financial
institutions Large and
Small
Investment
Family
MRSMEs
Disbursement/ Lackk of Exper tise

Other System
Remitting Cost Social factors
Cost
Focus of study
Figure 4.3 Scope of study

90 Shahadat Khan
MRSME (Migrant Remittance Supported Micro-Enterprise) is any

business that is independently owned and operated by family, not
dominating in the field, micro in size, with no more than 10 full-
time employees and with part or full capital support from a migrant
worker currently or previously working abroad.
An open-ended study protocol based on literature survey was devel-

oped. The protocol was modified after each interview for the next. The
researcher was fully committed to keeping all personal or organisational
information as confidential between the researcher and the interviewees,
and participation in the study was voluntary.
Results and discussions
Respondents’ profile
A brief background of the respondents involved in this study is provided
in Table 4.1
As shown, of the 18 respondents, ten (56%) were recipients and the
other eight (44%) were returnees. Table 4.1 also shows that 22 per cent
of respondents were under the age of 30, 44 per cent between 30 and
39 years of age, 28 per cent between 40 and 49, and 6 per cent were
more than 50 years of age. All the respondents under 30 years of age
and 75 per cent of respondents between 30 and 39 years of age were the
recipients. On the other hand, all the respondents over 40 years of age
were returnees.
The age distribution of respondents provides two other interesting
aspects. First, a relatively younger MR-dependent group (siblings or sons
of migrant workers) engaged in business activities at a relatively early
stage of their career. This, among other things, indicates their willingness
to become productive members and is in contrast to popular belief that
the seductive pull of wages and the rise of receiving-household incomes
from remittances cause dependents to suffer from ‘migrant syndrome’
Table 4.1 Respondents’ age (figures in parenthesis are in percentage)
Category of Age Recipient Returnee Total
Under 30 4 (40) 0 4 (22)

30–39 6 (60) 2 (25) 8 (44)
40–49 0 5 (62) 5 (28)
50+ 0 1 (13) 1(6)
Total 10 (100) 8 (100) 18 (100)
Table 4.2 Respondents’ educational background (figures in parenthesis are in

percentage)
Up to bachelor
Category of Up to year 10 degree
respondents (but not ssc) Up to HSC (pass or fail) Total
Recipient 4 (50) 5 (71) 1 (33) 10 (100)

Returnee 4 (50) 2 (29) 2 (64) 8 (100)
Total 8 (100) 7 (100) 3 (100) 18 (100)
(Reichert, 1981). Cohen (2005: 95) argues that ‘this syndrome traps rural
migrants in a vicious cycle of repeat migrations, because there are few,
if any, opportunities for work in communities of origin. The urge to live
well, make luxury purchases, and educate children cannot be sustained
locally; therefore, migration grows even more prevalent as tastes for
expensive consumer goods mounts’. In other words, dependents of
migrant workers become mostly unproductive members of society in
the home country.
From the respondents’ educational backgrounds shown in Table 4.2, it
appears that 40 per cent of MRSME operator-recipients (four out of ten)
had education up to Year 10, and further 50 per cent was educated up to
the higher school certificate level.
In other words 90 per cent of this group can be categorised as young,
educated, employable and motivated to be self-employed. Interestingly,
all the respondents from recipient-led-MRSMEs were under the age of 39
and 75 per cent of recipients were educated up to HSC. This identifies a
clear target group for any initiative that may be directed to enhance the
business capacity of recipient-led-MRSMEs.
Usage of MR (returnees’ perspective)

The relatively older respondents (39 to 50 years) were returnees who
have worked in countries where workers were allowed to stay only
for the contracted period. Therefore, upon return, they practically
become dependent on (i) whatever savings they have and (ii) other
possessions they were able to acquire during their employment over-
seas. It was found that most of these returnees mentioned agricultural
land, which they acquired using remittances as a source of alternative
income. However, the money earned during their overseas employ-
ment seems to have not been utilised properly or to their satisfaction.
One of the respondents in this regard said the following, which was
similarly echoed by others:
92 Shahadat Khan
While I was overseas, I used to send money to my wife. In most cases,

whenever someone (from my village or a nearby village) was coming
home I used to request him to carry money and give to my wife. My
wife was not literate and not capable to go to bank to get money.
In our village culture, it also was not perceived as acceptable for a
woman to visit the bank on her own.
There were other problems. As it was known to our family and
friends that my wife gets money from me, our relatives and friends
used to seek financial assistance from her whenever they had prob-
lems. You know, in our country everyone has problems. Therefore,
most of our savings went to our relatives and friends as ‘so called’
borrowings, and you see I need money in this business now but
hardly any one gives our money back.
Furthermore, as I was working overseas, my wife also felt obligated
to spend more money than required for festivals or giving expensive
gifts to relatives on occasions such as weddings, etc. She also was
highly dependent on her brothers, for any purchases, as she was not
able to go shopping alone. Hence, most of the time, when she went
shopping, she had to buy gifts for her companion as well as compen-
sate the time for the companion in indirect ways.
Another respondent said,
While I was working overseas, I was not married and remitted all
my earnings to my brothers, especially the elder one. I used both
banking as well as informal channels and was entirely dependent on
my brothers’ decision as to what to do with money. I was under the
impression that after repaying the debt of my overseas travel, they
would buy land and invest in business. More importantly, despite
repeated requests I did not know where the money was spent, except
the new house that was built.
During my visits home, I had to spend significant amounts of
money (almost equivalent to my three to six months wages) to buy
gifts for everyone in the family and close friends.
When I permanently returned home, got married and decided to
have my own household (breaking joint family into nuclear family)
all our joint family possession (inherited as well as acquired using
remittance sent) was divided between all brothers and sisters. My
share was little compared to the remittance I sent. However, with the
little savings that I had in my hand that I carried during my last trip
I started the business.
I do not blame my brothers as they really did not know what to do.
They used to think that any amount of money could be earned easily
overseas. Since they supported me in my overseas employment, all
benefits are to be shared between all brothers. They were also under
the impression that as I was working overseas they now can relax and
socialise, spending to earn prestige by giving expensive gifts or organ-
ising expensive occasions. Believe it or not, in my marriage, they
hired very expensive decorators, invited a large number of guests and
bought gifts for each member of our family and my in-law’s family in
order to show that their brother was working overseas.
If they could think to invest money for future earning instead of
showing up, we all would be in better position today.
From a migrant worker dependent nation’s point of view, as Saarela

and Finnäs (2009: 489) argue, ‘large flow of return migrants are not
exceptional’. Murphy (1999) argues that entrepreneurial activities of
returnees can make important contributions by promoting economic
diversification, particularly in rural areas. However, there is an absence
of any policy initiative(s) to redeploy this returned work force, often
with enhanced skills. Therefore, we also have a second promising group,
namely returnees willing and relatively experienced and employable
for any initiative that may be directed to enhance capacity of business
operators of returnee-led-MRSMEs. .
It is mentioned that ten recipient-respondents (Table 4.1) were oper-
ating one MRSME each. However, eight returnees were operating 21 busi-
nesses, which indicate that returnees were operating multiple businesses.
In fact, of eight returnees, one of them had five businesses, another had
four businesses, three of them were operating three businesses each, and
the remaining three returnees were operating one business each. This is
consistent with the fact that recipients were largely directed by migrant
workers to undertake business initiatives to train the working and aged
family members in a limited area of operation. It also indicates that the
migrant worker as investor seems to lack confidence in expanding busi-
ness operations beyond one venture. This is consistent with the Agency
Theory as put forth by McCue and Prier (2008: 3) which states that a
‘principal-agent relationship is often forged’ and that an agent’s action
can be ‘either negative or positive for each of the actors’. The theory
also highlights the propensity of the principal (migrant worker) to invest
in more than one venture when they are operating business by them-
selves. This is illustrated by a comment from one of the respondents (a
returnee):
94 Shahadat Khan
Don’t talk about it! When I was overseas I gave some money to my
brother to invest in business. I did not have any clue what he did with
the money. No visible growth of business over these years. Whenever
asked he said he was doing something and next time it changes. I was
trying to keep his business running with no success. On my return I
am trying to make some business. Whenever I am here it runs well. It
is difficult to trust anyone except myself.
Type of business and position in the supply chain

The MRSMEs represented in the study, as shown in Table 4.3, are clus-
tered into three categories: (i) Serving end consumers (23), (ii) Serving
intermediaries (5) and (iii) Others (3). 11 out of 31 (35%) of the MRSMEs
were operating as retail outlets selling goods and almost a similar number
(12 of 31 to 38%) were operating as service providers to consumers.
Among the retail outlets, stationery shops and clothing stores were more
popular (there were four each), whereas other shops selling hardware,
shoes or crockery seem to have attracted fewer entrepreneurs.
Of the 13 service providers, short-haul passenger transport and decora-
tion businesses (providing lighting, utensils and catering services mainly
for large weddings or other social parties) were more attractive. However,
although one each, the spread of business is an interesting aspect to
note. MRSMEs were also operating businesses such as Small Engineering
Worksop, Rice (husking) Mill, Small Generator (to sell electricity when
usual service fails), renting IPS, Internet Café, Small Tea Shop and even a
Massage House. The concentration of MRSMEs on the consumer-end of
supply chains indicates that respondents were choosing businesses that
were more visible. The five MRSMEs in the category of Serving Other
Intermediaries include Small Fish Culture Project (2), Buy and Sale Paddy
(1) and Dairy Farm (1). This is an encouraging aspect in that if a favour-
able environment can be created, MRSMEs can be engaged in relatively
more value-adding activities. The three MRSMEs in the Other category
can be broadly described as speculative investment for equity gain.
In terms of location of the MRSMEs, it appears that 41 per cent (13
of 31) businesses were operating in the semi-urban Upazila Shopping-
Complex, 32 per cent (10) in village shopping malls, 19 per cent (6)
were operating in remote villages and 6 per cent (2) were situated in
district town. Four of six MRSMEs that were situated in the village were
production oriented (Small Fish Culture Project, Small Poultry Farm and
Dairy Farm).
Table 4.3 Types of business, location and position in supply chain
Location of operation
Village
shopping Upazila
mall (union shopping-
Remote porishod complex or District
Type of business village managed) centre town Total
A. Serving end consumers 23

1. Retail outlet (reselling) 11
i. Variety/stationery store 2 2 4
ii. Clothing store 1 3 4
iii. Hardware shop 1 1
iv. Shoe retail shop 1 1
v. Crockery shop 1 1
2. Service 12
vi. Passenger service on short 3 3
route (tempo)
vii. Decoration business 2 2
viii. Internet café and computer 2 1
shop
ix. Small engineering 1 1
x. Rice mill 1 1
xi. Small generator 1 1
xii. IPS 1 1
xiii. Small tea shop 1 1
xiv. Massage house 1 1
B. Serving other intermediaries 5
xv. Small fish culture project 2 2
xvi. Buy and sell paddy 1 1
xvii. Small poultry farm 1 1
xviii. Dairy farm 1 1
C. Other 3
xix. Purchased land for 2 2
construction
xx. Purchased land for Motor 1 1
garage
Total 6 10 13 2 31
Distribution of MRSMEs by years of operation

As shown in Table 4.4, three out of 31 MRSMEs (10%) were less than a
year old, 4 of them (13%) were established one to three years ago, 11
of them (35%) were set up three to five years old and 13 of them (42%)
were more than 5 years old. It is interesting to note that ten MRSMEs
were recipient-led whereas 21 MRSMEs were returnee-led.
96 Shahadat Khan
Table 4.4 Years of operation of MRSMEs and ownership pattern
Recipient Returnee
Age operated operated Total
Less than a year 1 2 3

1–3 years 1 3 4
3–5 years 3 8 11
5 +years 5 8 13
Total 10 21 31
Table 4.5 Reasons for choosing business
Frequency
(Number of
times directly
or indirectly
Prominent reasons for choosing business indicated) Rank
1. Floundering (not knowing what to do) FLG 16 1

2. Need to do Something NTS 14 2
3. Migrant Relative Desires MRD 9 3
4. Risk Avert RSA 6 4
5. Desire to be Independent and Flexible DIF 5 5
6. Peers Group Influence PGI 5 5
7. Looks Prestigious LPG 4 7
8. Wanted Some Thing Home Based WSH 3 8
9. Continued Business Inherited CBI 2 9
10. Had Relevant Skills HRS 2 9
11. Difficulties in Job DCJ 1 11
Reasons for choosing the type of business

It appears that the MRSMEs concentrated on businesses which were more
visible in the market place. Other factors such as lower entry barrier, ease
of operation and, in some cases, looking prestigious played significant
role. Answers to the question ‘why was the business chosen?’ were classi-
fied into 11 categories as shown in Table 4.5. As it shows, most respond-
ents, both returnees and recipients, were ‘floundering’ (acronym FLG;
ranked first in the table) as they were unsure about what businesses they
would be undertaking. However, the second ranking factor appears that
most respondents ‘need to do something’ (NTS).
As discussed earlier, the feeling of ‘need(ing) to do something’ appears
to be a good sign particularly for recipients as they intended to become
less (or not at all) dependent on remittances for living. The third
ranking factor was ‘migrant relative desires’ (MRD). It should, however,

be mentioned that although this factor ranked third (9 out of 18), these
respondents comprise 90 per cent (9 out of 10) of recipient-led MRSMEs.
This indicates two important aspects that are significant in the utili-
sation of migrant worker earnings. First, these recipient-respondents
started business as their migrant worker relatives (father or brother)
wanted them to start something.
It seemed that migrant workers wanted to achieve twofold objec-
tives from these ventures. One, they wanted their dependents (children
or brothers) to initiate some productive activities instead of merely
depending on them. Next, most of the recipient-respondents also indi-
cated that their migrant worker relatives would join the business upon
their return. One of the respondent’s statements as appended (unedited)
below further supports this phenomenon,
Look, Dad (working overseas) asked me to start a business, as according

to him, going overseas is not a good option and life becomes unbear-
able. His intention was that if I start something, he would join us on
his return.
Interestingly, although 44 per cent of returnee-respondents specifically

indicated that they entered into business as they wanted do something
after their return, the data show that migrant workers’ desire to join
an already ‘built up business’ (second of their twofold objective) was
not achieved as only one of the returnees joined the business that was
started with his support while he was working abroad.
The fourth ranking factor was ‘risk aversion’ (RSA) where respond-
ents wanted to choose businesses with a lower risk of failure, a common
phenomenon among small business entrepreneurs. The fifth ranking
factors were ‘desire to be independent and flexible’ (DIF) and ‘peer
group influence’ (PGI). The seventh ranking factor was ‘looking pres-
tigious’ (LPG) which suggests that as the respondents also wanted to
achieve social status by doing business, the choice of business had to
appear as prestigious. In response to further queries on this aspect, one
respondent mentioned the following:
Look, as an educated person it would be appropriate for me to engage

in a business where I can have table and chair which enables me to
invite friends for gossiping. You know, it is essential for me in village
life.
98 Shahadat Khan
The ‘table and chair’ symbolised prestige and it was noted that the
respondent concerned was wearing trousers and a shirt, a symbol of
being a bit higher in social status from common villagers.
The eighth ranking factor was ‘wanted something home-based’ (WSH),
a factor important in the sense that, in most cases, recipients are sole
male members of the family responsible for taking care of other members
while their brother or father was working abroad. For returnees in this
category, it was easier and less expensive staying home, looking after
other possessions and at the same time pursuing business. A small portion
of respondents also mentioned ‘continue business inherited’ (CBI), ‘had
relevant skills’ (HRS) which ranked 9th while and the 11th ranking factor
was ‘difficulties in job’ (DCJ) as reasons for choosing business.
Organisational help
It was found that almost all respondents were unanimous in answering
that no meaningful organisational assistance, private or public, was avail-
able to them at any stage of their business. Two respondents expressed
their bitter experience in using some form of financial assistance from
formal financial institutions. One respondent said the following, which
echoed others:
One of my relatives living in Dhaka asked me to contact .Bank (an

NGO), and the bank allowed me to borrow Tk.1 Lac (US$1200.00).
To satisfy the requirements I had to spend so much of time, paying
money to solicitor, meeting bank officials on several occasions before
I finally secured the loan for a one-year period. However, I was not
aware that I had to start repaying instalment from Month 1 and they
deducted the first month’s instalment at the start day of the loan
year. It means that the money borrowed by me was not in my hand
for the year. Therefore, you cannot say that it was a one Lac taka loan.
Moreover, when processing the loan as well as when making repay-
ment, it seemed to me that they were making a big favour to me. You
see, for business this type of loan is not at all helpful.
However, one respondent said that he was given credit to buy small
passenger vehicles (locally called Tempo) on credit from the supplier
and was allowed to repay on instalment basis. One respondent said the
following concerning institutional borrowing:
Look, money is available if you can be trusted and repay them on

time. For example, I was given a Tk. 50,000.00 (US$500.00) loan
instantly by a local moneylender. Since I have a running shop, they

know me therefore no documentation was involved and no formali-
ties were required. I pay Tk. 500.00 every week as interest they do not
want principle.
This is much better as I am not required to go to bank, request
them, go through heaps of formalities and get money.
One respondent, however, mentioned about an NGO extending short-

term loan at 14 per cent per annum and they were reasonably satisfied
about their dealings.
Role of migrant workers in running recipient-led MRSMEs

It was interesting but not surprising that recipients and returnees had
contrasting views on the role of the migrant worker in running recip-
ient-led MRSMEs. Almost all the recipients expressed views that the
migrant worker (relative) while living overseas should not have any role
in running the business other than injecting more capital. According
to them, the interference by migrant workers sometimes led to adverse
results. For example, one respondent mentioned the following:
My elder brother is overseas for a long time therefore he does not at

all understand the way things are running in our country. Then and
there he would ask me to do this or that. Two years ago he insisted
all on a sudden to withdraw full capital from business and hoard rice
as much as possible. In order to keep him happy, we bought rice at a
higher price. In few months the price of rice went down substantially.
Coupled with that, as we did not have adequate facilities or experi-
ence in stocking rice, a portion of the stock became rotten. On the
other hand, due to shortage of capital our business also suffered and
we lost some key customers. It was a quite hard task for me to get the
business running again and still not returned to it’s a long way to go
to reach the stage where we were before.
The above indicates that the recipient-led MRSMEs wanted business

decisions to be solely left to them. However, the views of the returnees
were different. According to them, the recipients did not appreciate the
hard work that they were doing overseas and the price that they had
paid. They also felt that recipients made decisions on spending and
investment by themselves, with only a quick phone call sometimes to
inform them of the decisions. The following response from a returnee
echoes the views of others:
100 Shahadat Khan
Don’t mention sir, the unbearable situation that we face overseas

our family members back home are not able to imagine even. No
matter how much emphasis we assign to spend less, they would make
mention of their social prestige (otherwise relatives and villagers may
perceive that our family did not break the poverty cycle). I asked my
younger brother to start a business so that I could join him after I
returned. Upon my return, I found that the business is almost non-
existent. He gave a host of reasons. However, from my point of view
I almost lost earnings of my life. The main reason, the way I under-
stand it, he did not know what he was doing and had no commit-
ment at all. If you spend so much in luxury, you can’t make your
business a success. Look, the same business I turned it around from
almost zero and somehow it is running well now! How? Only hard
and dedicated work behind it.
The above conflict is consistent with Agency Theory (Jensen and

Meckilng, 1976: 308) quoted earlier as ‘a contract under which one or
more persons (principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform
some services on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-
making authority to the agent’. Although the purpose of delegating tasks
to the agent is to achieve maximum welfare (including altruistic gain)
of the principals, McCue and Prier (2008: 3) argue that the ‘principal-
agent relationship is often forged’ and the agent’s action can be ‘either
negative or positive for each of the actors’ and agents, are ‘bounded
rational, self-interested utility maximisers’ and may take advantage of
information asymmetries in an opportunistic manner in an attempt to
minimise efforts to fulfil tasks which may even detrimental to the prin-
cipals. All the respondents indicated that as members of the same family
(extended family included), there was no explicit or implicit arrange-
ment to repay the capital or share profit. This phenomenon clearly iden-
tifies a gap between the recipient and the migrant worker. While both
groups had the same goal (investing in business), each group had its
own way of going about it. The differences between these two groups
were as follows:
i. Decision to choose business;

ii. Strategy for day to day running;
iii. Grabbing sudden opportunity for expansion or diversification;
iv. Recipient’s lack of commitment (stemming from ‘no real obligation’
to repay invested money.
Table 4.6 Amount of initial capital and percentage for MR
Owner/ Initial Percentage

Operator Type of business capital from MR Range Average
a. Stationery 700 60 15–700 215

b. Clothing store 500 100
c. Clothing store 280 100
d. Variety store 200 30
Recipient e. Stationery 200 100
operated f. Variety store 90 100
MRSMEs g. Clothing store 80 100
h. Poultry farm 45 100
i. Workshop 40 25
j. Trading 15 100
k. Tempo 1,400 100 35–1,400 287

l. Hardware store 500 100
m. CNG tempo 400 100
n. Crockery store 350 100
o. Decoration 300 100
Returnee
p. Dairy farm 180 100
operated
q. Small fish farm 100 100
MRSMEs
r. IPS 85 100
s. Rice mill 50 100
t. Generator 50 100
u. Shoe retail 35 100
Note: Exchange rate of US$1 to Taka 85. Bangladesh Taka (Currency of Bangladesh).
Initial capital
Although the researcher was cautious in asking financial questions,
respondents operating or owning 21 MRSMEs answered questions related
to sourcing capital by indicating the amount and sources of their initial
investment. As shown in Table 4.6, the initial capital ranges from Tk.
15,000.00 to 140,00,000.00 with an average of Tk. 251,000.00 overall.
The portion of migrant remittance in initial investment ranged from 25
per cent to 100 per cent.
It is not surprising that with the exception of three MRSMEs, all of
them started business with initial capital from MR. For returnees, the
initial capital was sourced from their overseas earnings. However, for
one of them, the initial capital was sourced from the sale of land that
he had purchased while working abroad, whereas another had some
portion contributed by his brother working abroad at the time of data
collection.
102 Shahadat Khan
As discussed earlier, respondents in general were found to be (i) not

aware of the credit facilities from formal financial market, (ii) not confi-
dent that they would be eligible and (iii) reluctant to use financial
institutions because of (in their language) a barrage of formalities in
obtaining loans. One recipient-led MRSME who borrowed from a private
lender indicated that for a loan of Tk.150,000.00 he was paying interest
at Tk.1050.00 daily for six months (amortised). When asked why he was
taking this high interest loan, the respondent said:
The private informal investor comes to our shop to lend money in

cash as well as to collect the weekly premium. There is no documen-
tation or hassle. For few days overdue of premium, they make no
noise. If we had gone to a bank, there will be a host of formalities and
most of these are beyond our capacity to understand, and we have
to be dependent on bank officials who usually do not treat us well.
Therefore, loan from private informal investors are preferred.
The above reveals the existence of a significant informal capital and

investment market that requires servicing in different ways compared to
current practices of financial institutions in general. When asked whether
further capital was invested in business from overseas and if so from
which sources, the recipient’s answers were almost similar, indicating that
if business goes well and requires more capital the migrant worker rela-
tive remits money on request. It was also found that most businesses with
reselling operations were enjoying some sort of supplier’s credit ranging
from Tk.10,000.00 to Tk. 90,000.00. Suppliers usually made allowance for
credit on revolving basis, that is settling the invoices for immediate past
consignments while taking delivery of the subsequent ones.
Bottlenecks affecting MRSMEs

Respondents were asked to reflect on overall bottlenecks they faced
in their own businesses. The answers, in conjunction with all other
responses and discussion with focus group, are classified into five cate-
gories of gaps. These are (i) skill gap (SKG), (ii) information gap (ING),
(iii) commitment gap (COG; mainly by recipient-led MRSME’s), (iv)
capital gap (CAG) and (v) institutional capacity gap and service delivery
gap (ISG). These categories are consistent with Servon et al.’s (2010:
133–8) skills gap and commitment gap. Two other gaps, such as asset
gap and transitional gap as identified by Servon et al. (2010: 133–8)
were not applicable to the respondents of this research. The frequencies
of responses are presented in Table 4.7 below.
Table 4.7 Gaps identified in MRSMEs*
Gaps Frequency Rank
Skill gap (SKG) 36 1

Information gap (ING) 32 2
Commitment gap (COG) 15 3
Capital gap (CAG) 7 4
Institutional capacity gap and service delivery gap 2 5
(ISG)
Conclusions and implications
The study has extended our understanding of the behaviour of MRSMEs

in Bangladesh, and identified some aspects that need attention from
policymakers both on national and international levels. First, it identi-
fied five primary gaps that impede the sustainable operation of MRSMEs.
These are (i) skill gap, (ii) commitment gap, (iii) information gap,
(iv) capital gap and (v) institutional capacity gap and service delivery
gap. Of these, the commitment gap, particularly for recipient-led
MRSME operators, is found as the most important and difficult to fill.
This study also showed that MRSMEs, although concentrating on the
consumer-end of supply chains, were also involved in more value-
adding activities. Two distinct groups of MRSME stakeholders were iden-
tified in the study. The first group consisted of migrant workers’ next
to kin (sons or brothers) who are largely dependent on migrant remit-
tance for living. This group is relatively young and willing to engage in
productive activities. The second potential group consists of returnees,
who in most cases possess some capital base from their overseas earn-
ings. Both groups were found to be in need of specific institutional
services. Findings of this study indicate that NGOs and government
organisations may find a substantial niche market in assisting MRSMEs
within their social-business oriented micro-finance or poverty allevia-
tion programmes. Assistance by these prospective stakeholders to enable
MRSMEs to operate in a sustainable manner also will provide opportuni-
ties for the stakeholders to achieve their social-business or poverty alle-
viation related objectives. Policy initiatives, therefore, is recommended
for innovative support programme(s) especially those targeting existing
and potential MRSMEs.
Sustainable operation of MRSMEs is likely to add value to migrant
remittance value chains by reducing migrant remittance dependency
of families. This is achieved by diverting a large number of migrant
104 Shahadat Khan
remittance dependent unemployed family members to the work force. It

also opens up sustainable investment windows for relatively bottom-end
migrant workers, an unfulfilled but much desired need. Besides fulfilling
migrant workers’ altruistic motive to help their families, it provides a
more secure environment for them on their return. With more remit-
tance from informal to formal channels and net increase of remittance
flow, it paved the way for better utilisation of migrant remittance,
thereby protecting nations dependent on migrant remittance from the
detrimental effects of these capital inflows.
Acknowledgement
This research was sponsored by the Institute of Micro Finance, Bangladesh

(InM).
Notes
1. The indirect social cost of migrant workers’ remittance, however, if it could
be quantified, the cost of MR flow would be much higher. Social issues such
as (i) prime time of life in isolation, (ii) prolonged loneliness (Morgan and
Finniear, 2009; Muñoz-Laboy, Hirsch and Quispe-Lazaro, 2009), (iii) selling
human dignity at low price (Bracking, 2003), (iv) accepting ‘quasi citizen’s’
life (O’Brien, 2009: 1140), (v) uncertain future, particularly upon return,
(vi) losing ties with family, particularly spouse and children, (vi) or maltreat-
ment of spouse such as sorcery in many cases (Callan, 2007) are a few to
mention, the discussion of which are beyond the scope of this chapter.
2. Winona is a city in and the county seat of Winona County, in the U.S. State of
Minnesota.
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5
A Diaspora Route to Professional
Success in the Indian Context:
A Perspective
Ravi Mantha and Meng Weng Wong
Introduction
Under Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India began a major push
to actively engage with its diaspora in a process now referred to by
researchers as ‘transnationalizing citizenship’ (Gamlen, 2006). Gamlen
describes the components of the diaspora engagement policy as
capacity building, extending rights and extracting obligations. In 2004,
Mr Vajpayee set up the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs which has
launched various initiatives over the years. The annual Pravasi Bharatiya
Divas Convention is used to welcome and entice the diaspora to visit
‘home’ and the Indian diaspora has been actively recruited as a political
force in their own right. In 2003, the Indian Government passed a bill
creating a new type of citizenship called Overseas Citizen of India, which
offers qualifying diaspora virtually all the benefits of Indian citizenship
except the right to vote or hold public office (The Government of India,
Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2003).
This engagement has borne fruit in many ways, most notably in the
repatriation of huge amounts of foreign earnings to Indian banks and
investments in Indian real estate. In 2010 alone, India received US$55
billion in remittances from the diaspora, more than any other country
in the world (The IBRD; The World Bank, 2011). Even more impressive
than the remittance numbers are the numbers of diaspora Indians who
are returning to India and bringing back technical, creative, managerial
and entrepreneurial skills to the country.
An estimated 30 million people belong to the Indian diaspora. For
the purposes of this chapter, we can divide them into two distinct
109
110 Ravi Mantha and Meng Weng Wong
categories. The first large category of diaspora consisted of Indians who

went to the Caribbean, to Africa and to Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka
as indentured workers and their descendants. This migration began in
the 1830s. In the Caribbean alone, ‘over the period 1834, when the first
batch of indentured Indians arrived in Mauritius, to 1917, when the
indentured system was brought to a halt, nearly 1.5 million Indians had
sold themselves into debt-bondage. About 240,000 Indians had been
sent to British Guiana (now Guyana), 36,000 to Jamaica and nearly
144,000 to Trinidad’ (Lal, n.d.).
This group is ethnically and culturally Indian, but have little contact
with the ancestral homeland. They have been assimilated into their host
countries and communities. In this chapter, we are more concerned with
the second category of Indian diaspora which comprises the more recent
migrants, primarily the educated elite who left India in the last few
decades. These Indians and their children retain much stronger familial,
cultural and economic links to India and as such, make up the over-
whelming number of diaspora repatriates in India. It is also notable that
the Indian government is much more concerned about this second cate-
gory in terms of ‘capacity building, extending rights and extracting obli-
gations’ (Gamlen, 2006). For instance, unlike the Chinese or Germans
who extend citizenship on ethnic lines, the Indian extension of rights
is more closely targeted to first, second, third and fourth generation
diaspora who can prove Indian origin and residence and even their non-
Indian spouses (PIO Card, 2009).
There is a sub-category of Indian workers in the Middle East who are
there explicitly as guest workers on a temporary basis with no rights
of settlement and these are also excluded from the scope of this study.
The migration of the educated elite in the twentieth century is driven
almost exclusively by the economic disparity between India and the
West. For over 50 years, large numbers of graduates from Indian elite
universities headed overseas for further education or employment. The
numbers are significant: ‘In medicine, while migration rates for doctors
was about 3 per cent during the 1980s, it was 56 per cent for graduates
of the All India Institute for Medical Sciences − India’s most prestig-
ious medical training establishment − between 1956 and 1980 and 49
per cent in the 1990s’ (Desai, 2009). In 1986, 58.5 per cent of Indian
Institute of Technology (IIT) graduates in computer science and engi-
neering migrated’ (Siwek and Furchtgott-Roth, 1993). This is the first-
generation of Indian migrants who are professionals. Along with their
children who are second generation, they make up a significant number
of the recent diaspora who retain some ties to India. Although only
Diaspora Route to Professional Success 111
a tiny percentage of these have chosen to return to India, the overall

numbers are significant.
Risk appetite and migration
The universality of diaspora and return relates to another human arche-

type, the hero’s journey which was identified by the writer Joseph
Campbell (1949) as the myth common to all cultures. Whether a Neolithic
caveman on a day-long hunt or a child of European nobility embarking on
a year-long Grand Tour, the elements of departure, adventure, revelation,
transformation and a return with a boon are common to all great heroic
myths. Consider the great Indian epic, the Ramayana, which is a story of
exile, adventure and return. How many repatriates have, consciously or
unconsciously, found themselves following in Rama’s footsteps? Diaspora
Indians leave as princes and return as kings and upon their return, they
find that their sandals were always on the throne.
Where the Ramayana takes Rama out of place, the Bhagavad Gita takes
Arjuna out of time. He returns with a gift of wisdom and knowledge second
to none. Such is the nature of every heroic quest. With these archetypes
to inspire them, members of the Indian diaspora must feel on some level
that a return to India is a heroic act, the climax of their time away culmi-
nating not in retirement but in full engagement with fresh challenges
leading to great works at home – Kurukshetra before Ram Rajya.
Throughout human history, migration has been a risky undertaking.
There is an inherent risk in leaving behind the familiar – the cultural,
tribal, familial networks that provide a degree of comfort and moving
to a new land to start over. It is interesting that migration is analogous
to entrepreneurship in many ways because both involve venturing into
unfamiliar territory. Migrants often face challenges from the moment
they step into their newly adopted country of residence. Often, there
is a new language to master and there is scope for misunderstanding in
interaction with the locals until the linguistic acclimatisation is done
which can take months or years. There is a cultural alienation, which
initially puts the migrant on a lower socio-economic plane in the new
society than in the one they left behind. There are usually government
created barriers to work and travel and access to public services that rein-
force this inferiority. The first hurdle migrants have to overcome is this
loss of status and how they deal with it is often career and life defining.
Ultimately, what enable migrants to succeed are hard work, a toler-
ance for short-term failures and setbacks, the ability to find a niche
in the adopted homeland and the ability to position themselves as
‘value-creating’ in their host countries. These are precisely the same char-
acteristics that are necessary for success in entrepreneurship. Someone
who has successfully made the transition as a migrant is thus well
equipped to be an entrepreneur and the statistics bear that out. Professor
Vivek Wadhwa, at Duke University, has surveyed 1203 members of the
Chinese and Indian diaspora who had returned to their home countries.
He reports that 56.6 per cent of Indian respondents intended to start a
business in India in the next five years (Wadhwa et al., 2009). This is an
astonishing number, given the Kaufman Foundation statistic that the
rate of entrepreneurial activity in the US is around 3.5 per cent of the
population per year (Fairlie, 2012). This level of entrepreneurial interest
is a clear indication of the risk-taking ability of the returning diaspora.
Entrepreneurship and innovation
The situation in which many immigrants find themselves in the host

country – second-class members of society, often initially poor, with
fewer social support structures – force them to be resourceful. Hungry,
they seek opportunity. Having little to lose, they take unusual risks. With
great risk comes great reward. This provides the basis for explaining
why immigrants outdo both the locals in their host countries (who lack
hunger) and those they leave behind (who lack opportunity). In elabo-
rating this model of entrepreneurship, it is useful to distinguish between
two kinds of immigrants: poor immigrants whose hunger tends to
produce necessity entrepreneurship and relatively well-educated immi-
grants whose exposure to new cultures tends to produce a Medici effect
of cross-cultural fertilisation and opportunity entrepreneurship. As noted
earlier, we will be focusing on the relatively well-educated segment of
the Indian diaspora and thus on opportunity entrepreneurship.
Broadly speaking, immigrants are more suited to engage in ‘Disruptive
Innovation’ (Christensen, 1995) than locals as their different cultural
backgrounds give them the ability to imagine new possibilities. Their
social position as outsiders makes them more likely to launch a start-up
instead of battering against a glass ceiling in an incumbent firm. It is
scant wonder that over half of new ventures in Silicon Valley are founded
by immigrants (Wadhwa, 2009).
There is some truth to the stereotype of the immigrant as a resourceful,
shrewd, agile businessman, keen to explore new opportunities and
impatient with the status quo. There is of course a chicken-and-egg,
nature/nurture question here. Did they migrate because they had an
opportunistic temperament or was opportunism thrust upon them by
the immigrant situation? Answering this question is beyond the scope
of this chapter. It is enough to note that there is a cycle that relates

entrepreneurship to immigration.
In the context of diaspora and return, this cycle takes on an added
dimension. Having learned the skills of entrepreneurship and business
through experience, they see no reason to stop just because they are
back in their home country. On the contrary, the perspective of the
immigrant is something that has become part of their psyche. The spot-
ting of opportunities, the cross-fertilisation of cultures and the freedom
from incumbent shackles are all capabilities that apply just as well when
they ‘arrive where we started / and know the place for the first time’
(Eliot, 1922). In fact, these factors apply perhaps better. The advantage
of the Indian returnee is fourfold:
i. They have the advantage of an entrepreneurial temperament

nurtured abroad;
ii. They have the advantage of foreign education, networks and experi-
ence which improves cross-cultural vitality;
iii. They are out of sync with the norms because of their time away,
which adds an intriguing element of unpredictability; and
iv. They have the advantage of local networks and family
reputation.
Often, in traditional Indian culture, father is conflated with son, man

with tribe, caste with class. The returnee enjoys the option of choosing
positive aspects of homeland identity while substituting with foreign
experience any negative aspects. It is only an option – to exercise that
option is not always easy but this is not available at all to the local boy
who never left.
The degree to which repatriates are remembered more for what they
were, than for what they have become is evident in the Christian parable/
story of Jesus, himself a sojourner and, briefly a returnee.
When Jesus had finished these parables, he moved on from there.

Coming to his hometown, he began teaching the people in their syna-
gogue, and they were amazed. ‘Where did this man get this wisdom
and these miraculous powers?’ they asked. ‘Isn’t this the carpenter’s
son? Isn’t his mother’s name Mary, and aren’t his brothers James,
Joseph, Simon and Judas? Aren’t all his sisters with us? Where then
did this man get all these things?’ And they took offense at him.
But Jesus said to them, ‘A prophet is not without honor except in
his own town and in his own home.’ And he did not do many mira-
cles there because of their lack of faith. (Matthew, 13: 53–8)
The successful returnee takes these challenges in stride. After having

succeeded as an immigrant in a foreign country, having acquired all
manner of useful skills and perspectives, succeeding again in a culture
he now knows better than most locals should be far easier than the
first time. There are of course pitfalls, particularly in the Indian context
where public humility goes a long way towards acceptance. As Shashi
Tharoor found out on the social media site Twitter when he used the
term ‘cattle class’ to describe the back section of an airplane, words that
are innocuous for a diaspora diplomat are interpreted as phrases causing
grave offence in an Indian politician (Joshua, 2009).
We have this dichotomy where on the one hand, India’s dynastic
culture makes it difficult for individuals to establish an identity sepa-
rate from their parents, their tribe, their caste, their town and their
language. On the other hand, emigration and entrepreneurship are the
keenest routes to defining one’s identity. Perhaps the diaspora model
bridges this dichotomy. The returnee Indian may, paradoxically, be
more Indian than the one who never left. Just as entrepreneurship
and business building can become a habit, so can migration and
diaspora. This habit can be found in individuals, families and even
whole tribes. Some families have branches all around the world while
certain cultures have restlessness in their blood. Consider those Jewish
families which, having explored the world, consider a return to Israel
just a pit stop on their journey; or the Hakka, a tribe of Chinese known
as the ‘Guest People’.
Many of India’s repatriates have learnt the lessons of being a diaspora.
They return to India with the perspective of the permanent immigrant.
They may settle in a different part of India from where they grew up.
They will send their children to school in the United States and the
United Kingdom. They have cousins in Louisiana. They will explore
opportunities in Southeast Asia, Korea, China and Africa. They will
holiday in Eastern Europe and have become truly global citizens. And
they have become permanent entrepreneurs. Their time abroad, as
immigrants scrambling to settle in and establish themselves, has given
them not just material success but also the skills and the temperament
to recreate those successes at home.
The diaspora formula for success in Silicon Valley
The writer and venture capitalist, Victor Hwang, advances an

intriguing hypothesis about the culture of Silicon Valley (Hwang,
2012). It is well known that many mutually reinforcing elements of
Silicon Valley make it conducive to entrepreneurship. Some of those

elements, such as the availability of funding and the concentration of
technical talent at and around top-tier educational institutions, are
relatively recent, having appeared in the last half-century. But Hwang
argues that other elements have been latent since even before the
founding of California as a state. If the archetypal North American is
a first-, second-, or third-generation immigrant, then the archetypal
Californian is an immigrant’s immigrant – being from a family who
have already moved once from Europe to the East Coast of the United
States, found reason to move again, to the West Coast. According to
Hwang, the typical ‘Westward Ho!’ migrant was characterised by a
streak of individualism strong enough to uproot his family and risk
a continental crossing. Paradoxically, this was tempered with the
communitarianism spirit needed to form a wagon train comprising
many other rugged individualists, of very different languages, social
classes, religions and political beliefs. The culture of California was
thus a child of these opposite parents, at once staunchly independent
and protective of individual eccentricity, yet quick to welcome new
arrivals and rally to those in need. These cultural values, coming down
the generations, have enabled the flowering of entrepreneurship in
Silicon Valley (Hwang, 2012).
Arguably, these cultural values are now being transmitted back to India
by repatriates. Having attained a different perspective, the returnee may
consider the class, caste and language distinctions of the homeland to
be not so inviolable as once thought. Such an awakening may afford
repatriates greater access to opportunities back in the homeland – even
if such access is simply a matter of perception, their eyes having been
opened and their appetites having been primed by their immigrant
experience abroad.
V. S. Naipaul wrote of his own upbringing in Trinidad, ‘In these special
circumstances they developed something they would never have known
in India: a sense of belonging to an Indian community. This feeling
of community could override religion and caste’ (Naipaul, 2011). Such
an ‘Indian consciousness’ dissolves intra-national rivalries and the old
social order. Saxenian (2006) quotes Stanford student Kavita Goswamy,
‘Expatriates helped India create its niche in the global IT market ... in all
levels of management they not only supported doing business in India,
they have taken the initiative to champion it. ... The motivation derives
from a personal and patriotic attachment to India despite living in the
U.S. for many years, so that Indians go beyond the normal require-
ments of their jobs to make the India centre successful’ (Goswamy,
2003). These developments result in an importation of not only specific

business practices but also broader cultural values. Saxenian writes:
The new Argonauts are, however, building technological and entre-

preneurial capabilities in distant regions. They serve as role models,
mentors, partners, and investors for entrepreneurs in their home
countries – just as earlier generations of immigrants did for more
recent arrivals in Silicon Valley. (Saxenian, 2007)
The increasing globalisation and interdependence of regional economies

is creating the necessary conditions for a ‘California culture’ everywhere
in the world, that is respect for the individual, openness to ‘thinking
different’ and an attitude of friendliness towards all especially newcomers.
The modern diaspora experience is conducive to precisely these traits.
Drilled into the Indian psyche is a fear of failure which Kishore Biyani,
a successful Indian entrepreneur and founder of the Future Group
describes thus:
The biggest impact of socialism has been more insidious – it has

affected the Indian psyche. The bedrock of enterprise is the ability to
take risk. Failure is an inevitable stop in the journey of every successful
entrepreneur. But Indians tend to deride risk and ridicule failure. The
fear of failure is so ingrained in the Indian mind that even after expe-
riencing some success, entrepreneurs are afraid of taking their busi-
ness to the next level of scale and growth. (Biyani, 2012)
Conversely, members of the diaspora are less exposed to this mindset.

On the contrary, diaspora with experience in Silicon Valley positively
almost revel in failure. As billionaire entrepreneur and venture capitalist
Vinod Khosla says:
You mentally die the minute you stop doing new things. My willing-
ness to fail gives me the ability to succeed ... I’ve failed more times
than I have succeeded. But my failure has not affected my ability to
keep trying new things ... the mood in Silicon Valley is that failure is
not shameful. When something is not working, that’s ok. Just change
it. There are lots of mentors and coaches around that help you to see
if you are doing something wrong. (Khosla, 2011)
Organisations that effectively connect diaspora with India like The

Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE) have a major role to play in the transfer of
these values back to the homeland, and in mentoring and motivating

young entrepreneurs. Founded in Silicon Valley in 1992, TiE has
61 chapters around the world and is dominated by diaspora entrepre-
neurs in its non-India chapters. The annual TiE conference in Silicon
Valley is attended by more than 3000 entrepreneurs, the vast majority
of them diaspora. It was voted among the ‘10 Best Conferences for Ideas
and Entrepreneurship’ by Worth magazine (2011). More recently, TiE has
taken on an advocacy role on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)-related
matters with the Indian government. ‘Specifically TiE is credited to have
influenced liberalization of key sectors including Telecom & Venture
Capital investments in India’ (About-tie-faqs, 2012). As repatriates return
to India, it will be interesting to see how these values further transform
and are transformed by Indian cultural norms.
The IT revolution in India
In India, the history of commerce in the post-independence period is

conventionally described as the Licence Raj, a sad tale of over-regulation
and stifling bureaucracy that has led India to fall well behind countries
like China. Even now, two decades after the 1991 economic reforms,
large swathes of the economy remain hobbled by licensing laws.
The one exception to India’s bureaucratic muddle is the information
technology industry which started from the ground up in the mid-1970s.
Initially established by Indian industrial houses like the Tatas, the first
steps in the industry began with companies supplying Indian program-
mers to multinational companies abroad. Hardware of any kind was still
subject to the importing licence Raj, so companies naturally turned to
software development, which was an entirely new industry that escaped
regulation largely because it fell through the cracks of the existing regu-
lation. In the mid-1990s, Bangalore became the hub for software devel-
opment in India, with cheap land and a moderate climate being the
main points of attraction. Equally important, offshoring of software
development became possible once software was unbundled from hard-
ware in the 1980s. The development of the Internet and the communi-
cation revolution also enabled high-value added work to move to India
and with it the return of some of the diaspora talent that had departed
in the previous decades.
As this process unfolded, the government stayed out of the way.
Today the Information Technology industry in India is a US$100 billion
behemoth, making up 7.5 per cent of India’s GDP (Nasscom, 2012).
According to KPMG, Global IT spend is expected to reach US$2.7 trillion
by the end of 2012 (KPMG, 2012). India’s market share in this industry,
albeit small, is growing fast. It is an industry where large numbers of
diaspora Indians are employed and it has managed to avoid the tradi-
tional, stifling Indian regulations on other sectors.
Other fields
Returnees are to be found in every field, seeking the opportunity for

growth and to make a difference. Vir Kashyap, a second-generation
Indian from New York, returned to Bangalore to found babajob.com, a
website for recruiting blue-collar workers. His wife, Mallika, a returnee
from Canada runs a design talent consultancy. Sameer Mehta, another
second-generation Indian from the UK returned to become a venture
capitalist and healthcare investor in Chennai. Moncho Ferrer, an Indian
of Spanish and English parents, studied in England, and returned
home to help run Rural Development Trust in Andhra Pradesh, a very
large NGO focused on improving the lives of villagers in rural India.
Saif Pataudi returned home after schooling in England and became a
popular actor, following in the footsteps of his mother Sharmila Tagore,
who was an actress in the 1970s. Nagesh Kukunoor returned from the
US after nearly ten years and became a popular filmmaker. His first
movie, Hyderabad Blues, is a story of diaspora repatriates. Released in
1998, the film captured the zeitgeist of the first wave of repatriates and
their cultural adjustment to India.
Importance of language in diaspora success
One of the lasting remnants of British colonialism is the impact of the

English language. Proficiency in the language has provided the Indian
diaspora with an advantage that has become even more entrenched with
globalisation. This is the case in the legal profession. Nothing in commerce
functions without contract law and language becomes paramount when
a misplaced word or omitted clause in a contract can cost billions. The
diaspora advantage is entrenched here. Given the difficulties of using the
Indian court system where a judgement can take ten years or more, most
sizeable contracts these days, even those between Indian companies, are
done using English contract law with binding arbitration in countries like
the UK and Singapore. The international law firm Herbert Smith explic-
itly urges clients to avoid Indian contract law and agree to arbitration
with an offshore seat in the UK, Singapore or Paris (Smith et al., 2012).
Diaspora lawyers are at a natural advantage in this system.
In the medical profession too, there are advantages for a diaspora

Indian who chooses to set up practice in India. The value attributed by
Indian patients to a foreign medical degree is profound. Outside of the
top three or four medical colleges in India, even a degree from a low-
ranking school abroad is perceived as being more valuable than a domes-
tically obtained one. At the Apollo Hospital Group, a 50-hospital chain
with over 8500 beds, most of the doctors are trained in the UK, America
or Australia (Medical Tourism, 2012). Apollo is able to charge premium
prices versus domestic competitors due to perceptions amongst Indian
patients.
Diaspora experience as an aspiration
To some local born Indians, it appears that the diaspora experience is

the highest aspiration for the route to faster career and personal success
seems to lie in going abroad, and as early in adulthood as possible.
In India, everything from government licences to access to capital to
smoothing the inevitable bottlenecks in executing a business plan,
involve an intricate system of relationships. These in turn involve social
hierarchies, with family connections and caste playing a key role in daily
interactions. From the way they dress, to their last name and even their
accent, people conform to tribal/caste identities for the most part and
are in turn measured and judged on those criteria. Non-conformity is a
lonely experience, and over time, the individual is boxed into a meas-
ured career path that can appear largely pre-ordained.
India is a hierarchical society. Within Indian culture, whether in the

north or the south, Hindu or Muslim, urban or village, virtually all
things, people, and groups of people are ranked according to various
essential qualities. If one is attuned to the theme of hierarchy in
India, one can discern it everywhere. Although India is a political
democracy, in daily life there is little advocacy of or adherence to
notions of equality. (Heitzman and Worden, 1995: 19)
It is common knowledge that Indian society is highly stratified by class,

gender, caste and religion. Decades of affirmation action in the form of
quotas in government jobs and educational institutions have done little
to change this stratification. Areas such as business, politics, acting and
even sports are prone to spawn several generations of family members
given easy opportunities and a support network despite lacking any
special talent. This preference for pedigree discriminates against those
of lesser means, and significantly raises the bar for newcomers to break
through.
One can say that life in India can be analogous to a fish tank. It is
accepted wisdom that confinement in small tanks is stressful for fish
and they do not reach their maximum size. To get your fish to grow
bigger, you need a bigger tank. The diaspora experience is akin to taking
the small fish and placing it in a larger ocean. There are fewer social
and hierarchical inhibitors of the sort mentioned above, to reaching
one’s full potential. Even the children of elite can find themselves
constrained by their parents’ success. This is one reason why we see
that even members of the India’s first-generation homegrown elite
send their children abroad to study. Infosys founder Narayana Murthy
and Wipro founder Azim Premji are only two examples of successful
entrepreneurs whose children have studied abroad. For a member of
the Indian diaspora, the opportunity also appears strong to repatriate,
especially for those who are leadership or entrepreneurship oriented.
We have already addressed in many ways the advantages of being a
diaspora returnee.
It is relevant here to consider the implications of the Alchian-Allen
effect (Alchian, 1967). This effect was first postulated in 1964 and it
simply states that when you factor in an additional fixed cost equally to
two differently priced goods, consumption of the higher quality/higher
cost item increases, while consumption of the lower quality/lower cost
item decreases. Applying this effect to the diaspora yields some inter-
esting results. The free movement of people between India and the West
does not exist, hence there is a cost to overcoming this barrier. Over
the years, as countries have tightened their immigration policies, this
cost has risen. The Alchian-Allen effect predicts that when you increase
the barriers to migration, you end up with a better skilled migrant. In
certain countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand, this effect
is deliberate as they have put in place a point-based system based on
desired skills and experience to select high-quality migrants. In other
countries, this is a side effect. The consequence is that first-generation
diaspora are increasingly better educated.
Conclusion
We have shown that in many ways, the diaspora experience is a ‘supe-

rior’ route to career success in the Indian context. Advancements in
the fields of technology and communication mean that the tradi-
tional disadvantages of going abroad – of being cut off from home by
prohibitive costs of communication and travel – are no longer relevant

in an age of affordable and ubiquitous conference calls cutting across
time zones and countries. For local Indians, this means that the costs of
being a part of the diaspora have been falling, while at the same time,
the premium attached to the diaspora experience remains. For diaspora
repatriates to India, the same process works in reverse, the culture
shock of moving to modern India has been falling with India’s integra-
tion into the world economy and at the same time, they offer manage-
rial and professional skills that are in short supply in India. Repatriates
can easily keep in touch with the country of their upbringing through
frequent travel and communications, while at the same time benefit
from the career opportunities afforded by a fast-growing India. At the
same time, efforts by the Indian government to woo the diaspora have
made it easier for certain members of the Indian diaspora to reconnect
with the homeland.
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Part II
Religion
6
Religion, Politics and Islam in
the South Asian Diaspora
Pnina Werbner
Introduction: the Pakistani diaspora
Among overseas Pakistanis, the Pakistani diaspora in Britain was the

first emergent diasporic community and the largest formed since World
War II, following the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. Other
major concentrations of Pakistanis exist in the United States of America,
Canada and Norway, and smaller Pakistani communities can also be
found in most countries in the developing world, in Europe, Australia,
Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as among descendants of indentured
labourers and traders in Eastern and Southern Africa. By 2001, the
diaspora in the UK numbered close to one million and is estimated
to have grown greatly since then. Pakistanis are dispersed throughout
Britain, with marked concentrations in industrial regions, which were
the main recruiting grounds for cheap migrant labour during the 1950s
and 1960s from the Indian subcontinent.
Migrants from the Indian subcontinent, among them Pakistanis,
began arriving in Britain in substantial numbers after World War II.
They were recruited mainly to assist with the reconstruction of the
British economy by entering low-skilled jobs abandoned by the local
population in the post-war boom years. The initial migration was of
single young men, usually originating from smallholder peasant farms
in Punjab. Many of the earliest arrivals were East Punjabis from the more
developed, highly populated regions of Jullundur and Hoshiarpur (now
in India), which suffered from chronic land shortages and boasted better
educational facilities. A major stream of arrivals in the early years were
students from this region and from Karachi, studying in British univer-
sities. Most factory workers arrived through chain migration, following
the footsteps of relatives or co-villagers, but many were also recruited by
125
126 Pnina Werbner
agents who found them jobs in the British economy. The early arrivals
were, on the whole, relatively skilled and educated, at least to primary
or high school level. Some had served in the Indian or Pakistani armies,
while others had worked in factories in Pakistan or India prior to their
arrival (Dahya, 1974; Shaw, 2000; Werbner, 1990, 2002).
The Pakistani diaspora in Britain can only be fully understood in
context of its national origins in Pakistan, a postcolonial nation created
during the final years of British colonial rule in India. The Partition of
British India in 1947 came as a reluctant capitulation to the demands
of the Muslims of India for national autonomy. National independence
was granted in the so-called Muslim majority provinces of Punjab, East
Bengal, Sindh, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province after
attempts by the leader of the Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah,
to persuade Gandhi and Nehru to create a decentralised, multicultural
solution to postcolonial India failed. During World War II, the Muslim
League had supported the British in the fight against Nazi Germany
and they were thus owed a moral debt by the outgoing colonial regime.
The result of Partition was a blood bath as Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims
massacred each other in the Punjab and North India. This was followed
by a large-scale exchange of populations. Many Indian Muslims settled
in Karachi but the vast majority of Punjabi refugees from India were
granted land abandoned by Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab itself, and
were soon well-integrated into the Punjabi society.
Despite the traumatic events of Partition, a shared history and culture
has meant that Pakistanis in Britain cannot be thought of as being apart
from the broader South Asian diaspora. Moreover, their relationship with
Britain as the former colonial master colours first-generation immigrants’
oppositional diasporic sensibility, while creating common ground (in
their shared knowledge of English, love of cricket and respect for demo-
cratic institutions) for mutual regard and understanding (Werbner, 2002).
Overseas South Asians in Britain and elsewhere need to be understood as
forming a complex, segmented diaspora composed of four nationalities
(India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka), five major religions (Islam,
Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and Christianity) and a multiplicity of
languages and regional popular cultures. Among South Asian migrants to
Britain, Bengalis, Punjabis and Gujaratis predominate in numbers.
During the 1960s, a stream of migrants continued to arrive from West
Punjab, primarily from the rain-fed barani areas of Jhelum, Gujar-Kahn
and Gujranwala districts. These migrants originated mainly from small-
holder peasant farms, but many also came from Azad Kashmir. The
latter cohort was displaced by the Mangla Dam built by Pakistan. The
Religion, Politics and Islam 127
new Mirpuri arrivals used the compensation awarded to them by the

Pakistani state to migrate to Britain. These migrants from Mirpur (later
they called themselves Kashmiris), who speak a Punjabi dialect, were on
the whole less educated and less skilled than other Punjabi and Gujarati
Muslim immigrants. They also had far less experience of living and
working in urbanised areas in Pakistan before their arrival. Many came
from impoverished backgrounds and settled in northern towns, working
in the ailing wool and cotton mills of Yorkshire and Lancashire (Kalra,
2000). Indeed, they sustained this industry for some twenty years before
it finally collapsed. Other notable migration cohorts to Britain were
from East Africa in the early 1970s, following Africanisation policies in
Kenya and Tanzania and the expulsion of South Asians from Uganda by
Idi Amin. After some prevarication, the British government agreed to
recognise British passport holders’ rights to settle in Britain. Migrants
from East Africa were, on the whole, skilled or highly educated, but
many arrived penniless, having been forced to abandon their proper-
ties and savings behind. Many ultimately gravitated to London and the
East Midlands areas, particularly to Leicester. Another early cohort of
migrants was made up of doctors from the Indian subcontinent who
were recruited to the National Health Service. Other Pakistani migrants
arrived in Britain following the withdrawal of British troops from former
colonies such as Cyprus, Hong Kong and Malaysia (Bhachu, 1985).
In the early stages, Pakistani migrants concentrated in large numbers
in regions of Britain which were suffering from acute labour shortages,
mainly the West Midlands, Yorkshire and Lancashire, and in cities such
as Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester, Newcastle-on-Tyne and Glasgow
in Scotland. Kashmiris, who comprised 60 per cent of the Pakistani
population (there are no accurate figures) settled mostly in Birmingham,
Bradford, Oldham and in surrounding towns. South Asian trading
communities also emerged in most major cities, serving the culinary
and other ethnic consumer demands of the growing migrant popula-
tion, and establishing many other small businesses, particularly in the
clothing and textile trades.
The post-elections 1971 civil war between West and East Pakistan
which ended (after intervention from India on the East Pakistan side)
with the capitulation of the Pakistani army, and a split of the West and
East wings into Pakistan and Bangladesh, was followed in Britain by
splits in mosque management committees and hitherto unified Welfare
and Cultural Associations. The splits were, on the whole, amicable, and
not marked by violence. They pointed, however, to the close underlying
connection between diasporic institutions and national affiliations.
128 Pnina Werbner
More recently, tension over Kashmir between India and Pakistan, leading
at one point to nuclear confrontation, is associated with the growth of
an active Kashmir lobby in Britain.
Broadly speaking, by 2001, Pakistanis were more concentrated in the
North and West Midlands, East Africans and Indians in the East Midlands
and the Outer London area, and Bangladeshis in inner London, particu-
larly the East End. Sikhs were highly concentrated in Southall (an outer
suburb of London) and Birmingham, Indians in Ealing (London) and
Leicester. Despite these demographic tendencies, South Asian migrant-
settlers are found throughout Britain. They share ethnic consumer tastes
and regional cultures and are subjected to similar ethnic and racist stere-
otyping by other Britons. Economically, however, the populations have
diverged somewhat, with East Punjabis (Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus) and
Gujaratis (mostly Hindu, with some Muslims) prospering, especially, in
the larger cities.
The tightening of immigration laws affected patterns of migration
to Britain. Initially, migrants from the subcontinent were defined as
British subjects and were free to enter the country at will. In 1962, a
work voucher scheme was introduced, limiting migration, and although
initially this accelerated the scale of male migration, after 1969 migra-
tion was restricted to incoming marriage partners and nuclear family
reunions, including children under the age of 18. Pakistan allows dual
nationality and after 1969, most Pakistani migrants working in Britain
applied for British passports and began to bring over their wives and
children for fear that they may lose their entitlement to British citizen-
ship. What had initially begun as a pattern of circulatory labour migra-
tion, with young migrant men expecting to come to Britain to work for
short periods in order to save money before returning home, turned into
a process of permanent settlement. Ideology lagged behind the realities
of sinking roots locally, leading to a ‘myth of return’, an apt term coined
by Badr Dahya, a social anthropologist who studied the early years of
Pakistani migration and settlement in Birmingham and Bradford (Dahya,
1974). The ‘myth of return’ had consequences for patterns of investment,
savings and marriage, and continues to affect Pakistanis as a diaspora that
has retained strong ties and commitments in the Indian subcontinent.
Religion and political organisation: processes

of community incorporation
While South Asian culture in Britain has been relatively innovative and
responsive to diasporic experiences, this has been far less the case for the
transnational movement of Islam into Britain. Instead, the wide variety
of different religious streams, denominations and movements evident

in South Asia has been transposed into Britain almost wholesale, along
with the migration of Muslims from the subcontinent. Major religious
organisations and movements such as Tablighi Jama’at, Jama’at-i-Islami
(in Britain known as the UK Islamic Mission), Deobandis and Ahl-e-
Hadith, competed with new Islamic movements such as the al Muhajirun
or Hizb-ut-Tahrir, imported from the Middle East, which are attrac-
tive to some young South Asian Muslims (Wictorowicz, 2005; Lewis,
1994/2002). All these groups have their institutional embodiments in
the UK. In Manchester, for example, a city of some 30,000 Muslims,
there are 22 mosques, each representing a stream, sect, nationality and
city catchment area. In some neighbourhoods with high concentrations
of Pakistanis, there are four or five mosques within walking distance of
one another. This reflects the fact that Islam in Britain remains, on the
whole, nationally and ethnically divided.
Historically, as in the case of many other immigrant settler groups
in the religiously plural West, Islam began for South Asian Muslims
arriving in Britain in the post-war era as an acceptable incorporative
identity, non-racialised, high-cultural and highly valorised. The mosque
was the central locus of cultural value, the focus of communal factional
politics, a point of mobilisation, a haven for incoming migrants, and
a basis for solidarity in times of crisis (Werbner, 2002). It provided a
platform for subaltern orators and lay preachers excluded from British
formal political arenas (ibid.).
Over time, as the settler community grew, there was an efflores-
cence of religious spaces, with the variety of different religious streams,
denominations and movements in South Asia transposed into Britain.
This process of replication was often associated with acrimonious splits
so that by the mid-1970s, most religious groups also had their own
mosques. The process could be summed up as follows:
– Proliferation (of religious spaces);

– Replication (of South Asian Islam’s sectarian and ideological
diversity);
– Diasporic encounter (with Muslims from the Middle East);
– Confrontation and dissent (following the Rushdie affair);
– Identity-led religiosity;
– Adoption of Muslim diacritical ritual practices and attire in public;
– Voluntary ‘self-segregation’;
– The politicisation and racialisation of Islam in Britain;
– Confrontation and dissent (following the Rushdie affair and the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq).
130 Pnina Werbner
Importantly, this was a male-dominated process. Women created Islamic

spaces in the home and came to dominate the inter-domestic domain,
which is one of sociality, ritual and religious celebrations focused on
familial, friendship and neighbourhood networks. Women were also
involved in philanthropic work for the home country. Alongside these,
newly formed Pakistani Islamic women’s movements, such as al Huda,
which rejected customary traditions and espoused a return to the Koran
and veiling, have been imported into the UK since the 1990s (Ahmad,
2009; Tarlo, 2010; Werbner, 2007).
This points to a further historical process which occurred in Britain:
the diasporic encounter with other Muslims coming from the Middle
East. The encounter did not lead to convergence, with the exception
of a small minority of Islamic activists. Language, culture and nation-
ality have remained a major block to homogenisation of British Islam
despite public invocations of unity, and despite the fact that mosques
are open for worship to any Muslim, whatever his (and sometimes her)
affiliation, kinship or zat (Muslim caste). There is, however, evidence of
some Saudi influenced Salafi, born-again conversion among South Asian
students at British universities (Modood, 1992; Jacobson, 1998; Shain,
2000; Schmidt, 2004; Lewis, 2007; Tarlo, 2010).
Despite wishful thinking about the emergence of a ‘British Islam’,
and despite the fact that Pakistanis tended to control central Jami’a
mosques in almost all the major cities, Islam in Britain at the turn of
the twenty-first century remains nationally and ethnically divided.
There are Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Arab mosques, as well as Turkish
and Shi’a mosques, and the language of sermons and even supplicatory
prayers in the Pakistani mosques, whatever their tendency, is Urdu (or
English) rather than Arabic (Scantlebury, 1995). At the same time, chil-
dren are taught to read the Koran in Arabic, and few can read and write
in Urdu unless they study the language in high schools as an examina-
tion subject.
While the proliferation of mosques in Britain reflected differences
in nationality, language and religious tendency, the main theological
divide among Pakistani settlers was between the majority Barelvis, Sufi
followers who endorse the veneration of saints and love of the Prophet,
and an array of Islamic reformist groups, some more fundamentalist than
others, none Islamist in the sense of espousing violent revolution. All
these groups have continued to be linked through viable and ongoing
transnational networks to religious centres or saints’ lodges in Pakistan.
Until the 1990s, regional burial societies, known as ‘kommittis’,
ensured that most people who died in Britain were buried in Pakistan.
As families matured, there was the increasing tendency to bury in local

Muslim cemeteries allocated by local authorities in Britain, a sure sign
that many families were sinking roots in Britain. There has also been
an extensive development of federated umbrella organisations uniting
various Islamic groups across the whole of UK (Ansari, 2004: 340–80).
This was generally the picture of Islam in Britain before the Rushdie
affair in 1989, and before subsequent international conflicts brought
Muslims out onto the streets of British cities and onto global television
screens. The processes of differentiation and replication outlined here
took place relatively peacefully, beyond the public gaze.
The Satanic Verses affair and the visibilisation

of British Islam
Until the publication of The Satanic Verses, Muslims in Britain were

perceived as a law-abiding minority. The Satanic Verses, a novel written
by an eminent diasporic Pakistani author living in London, Salman
Rushdie, was an iconoclastic critique of Islamic fundamentalism and
of Thatcherite Britain. It was part of a broader South Asian postcolo-
nial literary movement which created a culturally hybrid form of the
English novel. The novel was regarded by most Pakistanis in Britain, and
by Muslims worldwide, as offensive. It led to a fatwa by the Ayatollah
Khomeini of Iran, denouncing the author as an apostate deserving of
death. The ensuing international crisis led to a radical change in the
public political activism of Pakistanis in Britain. Until the publication of
the novel, the diasporic public sphere which had evolved, although crit-
ical of India, Pakistan, Arab regimes and the West, was local and hidden,
invisible to outsiders. Pakistanis were often locked in the early settlement
period in fratricidal factional disputes in central mosques and divided
into tiny, fragmented ‘tonga’ voluntary organisations (Werbner, 2002).
It was difficult to imagine their mobilisation as a united front. The global
crisis, also known as the Rushdie affair, was highlighted by the book-
burning episode in Bradford, screened worldwide on television, and the
death sentence fatwa pronounced by Ayatollah Khomeini. This caused a
major international rupture between Iran and the West and made visible
the subterranean Muslim local-level politics to the public eye. A large
anti-Rushdie demonstration in London in 1989 mobilised Muslims,
primarily South Asians, across the different sectarian and organisational
divides (Asad, 1990; Modood, 1990; Fowler, 2000; Werbner, 2002).
This public exposure has since continued. Following the Rushdie
affair, a series of other international crises have disrupted processes
132 Pnina Werbner
of Pakistani integration into Britain and induced a sense of widening

alienation. The 1991 Gulf War, Bosnia, Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya,
the 11 September 2001 attacks, the nuclear confrontation between
India and Pakistan and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have all
mobilised Pakistanis and other Muslims on to the streets of Britain.
In response, Muslim representatives are regularly invited to Downing
Street even as Muslim MPs openly protest against the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Since the Rushdie affair, and even more so since the September 11
bombing of the Twin Towers in New York City, and the bombing of the
London Underground on 7 July 2005, a reversal of the usual process of
immigrant religious incorporation into Western societies has occurred.
Instead of religion being defined as a legitimate source of identity for
incoming migrants arriving in an established multi-faith society, Islam
has become a flag of political dissent. The growth of specifically anti-
Muslim prejudice, Islamophobia, has exacerbated this process. So, too,
has the related perception that mosques are sites of rhetorical vilifica-
tion of the West and in a few cases, of incitement to terror. Stripped
of its experiential dimensions, beyond personal belief, Islam is now an
oppositional badge. One may speak of an identity-led religiosity. This
has led to a serious questioning in the British press and media of the
loyalty of young, second-generation British Muslims and the extent of
their identification with British society (Werbner, 2009).
In this context, the first- and second-generation Pakistanis, men
and women alike, are increasingly adopting Islamic diacritical ritual
emblems and practices which act as boundary markers. These set them
apart from non-Muslim youngsters and other young South Asians. The
North Indian Islam of the migrant generation, embedded in Sufi tradi-
tions, tended to be relatively relaxed while in large measure the Muslim
middle classes abandoned veiling and ‘purdah’ when they settled in
Britain. In contemporary Britain, by contrast, the wearing of burqas,
elaborate veils, North African-style headscarves by women and beards
by men, are linked also to a total abstinence from drinking alcohol and
a refusal to participate in British youth and student clubbing culture
which celebrates music, dance, sexuality, drink and drugs.
This has led to a political discourse which accuses Muslims of self-
segregation, while Sikhs and Hindu youngsters appear increasingly well-
integrated, though evidence shows that they too sometimes support
extremist nationalist movements. Despite these accusations, young
Pakistanis are, nevertheless, very ‘British’: they speak with local accents
and move freely in the society. The number of university students has
grown hugely. The mosque attendance among the younger generation

is a matter of choice and often quite low, although as Jacobson’s (1998)
and Shain’s (2000) studies show, most youngsters are undoubtedly pious
and claim a strong Islamic identity, which they feel to be beleaguered
both locally and globally.
The predicament of the Muslim South Asian Diaspora in Britain has
been that rather than gradual integration, the community has been
unable to escape the stigma generated by international conflicts with
their globally transmitted images of book- or effigy-burning Muslim
mobs. Conflicts of loyalty and identification pose tragic dilemmas
for diasporas which, by definition, are transnational communities of
co-responsibility. Pakistanis in Britain identify deeply with the plight of
Palestinians, Bosnians, Kashmiris, Afghans or Iraqis. They see the West,
and especially the United States, as an oppressor, and this perception
has only intensified since the Taliban began a campaign of violence in
Pakistan. The result has been that, instead of peaceful integration, the
Muslim diaspora community in Britain has had to lurch from one crisis
to another, from the Rushdie affair to the first Gulf War, to September
11 attacks, July 7 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 The aliena-
tion these conflicts have generated have been exacerbated by inner city
rioting of young Pakistanis in northern British towns in August 2001,
and by the revelation that some young British Muslims had joined the
Taliban and other extremist groups. This has posed difficulties for Sikhs
and Hindus as well, who are often racialised as ‘Pakis’. Islamophobia
thus has an impact on all South Asians in Britain. The diaspora remains
complex, subject to fission and fusion, but not segregated.
It seems that the politicisation of Islam in Britain challenges the
view that religion mediates the peaceful integration of immigrants into
western democracies as they strive to achieve equality in the public
sphere. Against this relatively pessimistic prognosis, however, is the fact
that Pakistanis in Britain have remained, on the whole, peaceful and
pragmatic. Islam is a congregational religion which provides a valued
identity for immigrants. Much of it is home-based, focused around rites
of passage or communal Koran readings which mobilise family and
friends. In the process, there has been a proliferation of religious study
groups, known as dars, held in private homes. Some of the smaller Sufi
groups have mixed male and female zikr circles and purdah is not usually
practised at home. Most second-generation women move around freely,
drive and work in salaried employment. They are active in their own
philanthropic voluntary associations and have their own religious
experts. The younger generation, both male and female, is currently
134 Pnina Werbner
entering the open job market in large numbers. For many, Islam appears
to be an adventure of self-discovery, an enjoyable substitute for British
youth culture.
Education, citizenship and gender: emergent dilemmas
Muslims in Britain have made some notable gains in their struggle for
equal citizenship, especially the right to run their own state-funded
Muslim schools.2 The politics of dissent challenged the state to adopt
more explicitly multicultural policies and public declarations of toler-
ance. South Asian Muslims participate actively in formal British politics at
the local-level. In 2010, there were six Muslim MPs (out of which two are
women MPs elected in 2010), all representing the Labour Party (Adetunji
and Tran, 2010), and several hundred local authority Muslim South Asian
Councillors (out of a total of about 20,000). In 2010, there were 146 South
Asian Muslim Councillors in London alone (Purdam, 2000; Tatari, 2010).
Like religion and politics, marriage and gender are also highly politi-
cised in the diaspora and are subjected to public debate and criticism in
the United Kingdom. Pakistanis as Muslims permit marriages with first
parallel and cross cousins. Although they do not recognise hierarchy and
caste, Pakistanis prefer marriage within the biradari, a term referring to
a named, ranked, patrilineally defined endogamous group in a partic-
ular locality and, more broadly, an intermarrying kinship-cum-a-final
network bearing the same name. While caste endogamy is not strictly
observed as among Hindus, the preference for marrying close cousins
and marrying into the same families in successive generations ensures
that marriage is predominantly endogamous. Landowning (zamindari)
castes of the same status do intermarry, although marriage to artisans
and lower castes is rare, with the highest caste of Sayyids, who claim that
they are descendants from the Prophet, avoiding marriages outside their
group (Werbner, 1990, 2002).
Given a prevalent stress on status, honour and sexual modesty,
marriages are arranged by parents, a custom perpetuated in the diaspora
where it has come under increasing pressure and media scrutiny with
the maturation of the second-generation. Marriages are very expensive
large-scale events, which reflect on the honour and status of whole,
extended families. Much, then, is at stake in arranging a successful
marriage (ibid.).
Evidence from the UK Home Office indicates continuing high levels
of intercontinental marriages between Pakistanis in Britain and in
Pakistan. Marriage is a loophole enabling migration to the UK despite

strict immigration controls. Some of the dilemmas associated with
such long-distance marriages have been reflected upon by anthropolo-
gists (Charsley, 2005; Shaw and Charsley, 2006). Home Office statis-
tics show an influx of intended marriage partners from the Indian
subcontinent, with approximately 15,000 prospective spouses (male
and female) arriving in Britain during 2001 alone. The vast majority of
marriages are arranged by parents for their British-born children. This
has also led to an increasing problem of ‘forced’ marriages, in which
parents attempt to compel daughters and sometimes sons to marry
against their will, often during family visits to Pakistan. Relatively high
levels of divorce, even in cases where marriages were arranged between
British-based Pakistani families by consent, reflect the breakdown in
Britain of shared norms surrounding conjugal relations. In particular,
although detailed research is scarce, it seems clear that young Pakistani
women growing up in Britain expect high levels of decision-making
autonomy, freedom of movement, the right to work and to higher
education, companionship and marital sharing of household chores
and childcare.
While divorce and remarriage are permitted according to Islam, they
are regarded as dishonouring the family. This, along with the demand
by young people for the right to choose, has led to a steady increase
in ‘honour’ killings, especially in the case of girls caught with their
boyfriends, or who marry men against the wishes of the extended
family. Cases are reported of girls running away from coercive home
environments and of wives escaping violent husbands and seeking
protection in Asian refuges for battered women (Werbner, 2007). These
processes have led to some change in the pattern of arranged marriages,
especially among the urban middle classes. Increasingly, children are
being allowed to choose their own partners in the UK, with marriages
‘arranged’ post-hoc by their parents. Nevertheless, most youngsters
appear to accept some form of arranged marriage, in many cases to rela-
tives or overseas spouses.
While more Pakistani women are veiling and adopting overt Islamic
emblems in public, they are, on the other hand, also demanding greater
independence and autonomy. These two trends are not contradictory:
by embracing a certain version of Islam, young women assert the right
to education, to choose their spouses themselves and to move about
freely in public. They reject what they see as the mistaken customs and
traditions of their ‘ignorant’, ‘traditional Punjabi’ Muslim parents.
136 Pnina Werbner
Popular culture and alliance politics
Paradoxically, the new wave of South Asian satirical creative artistic

works and reformist Islam in Britain share crucial features in common.
Despite their apparent differences, both are rooted in critical, oppo-
sitional discourses which attack ‘culture’, ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’. By
focusing on family politics, they open up spaces for young people to
assert agency and autonomy, whether they draw on liberal discourses or
Islamic ones. Either way, their right to choose, to seek knowledge and
stand up to their parents is legitimised. There is as much camaraderie
in religious congregations and celebrations, as there is in youth culture.
Even in the public sphere, the politics of alliance rather than confron-
tation is also strikingly evident in Britain. In particular, the ‘Stop the
War’ alliance formed to protest against the war in Afghanistan in 2002,
and later against the war in Iraq in 2003, incorporated diaspora Muslims
as equal partners. The profoundly situational nature of identity, as a
personal badge, was made evident in the emergence of this peace coali-
tion, formed in Britain in the period leading to these two wars. Whereas
in the case of the Rushdie affair and first Gulf war, Muslims seemed appar-
ently isolated in their support for Saddam Hussein or their endorsement
of the fatwa against Rushdie, with their Islamic identity pitched against
a western or Judeo-Christian one, in the post-September 11 alliance
politics, Pakistanis’ dissenting views were shared with a large majority
in Britain. The Muslim Association of Britain, a federated national pro-
Palestinian organisation which represents Muslim opposition to the war
and unites Palestinians with South Asians, was consciously incorporated
by organisations such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
and the Stop the War alliance as an equal partner.
Transnational connections and local integration
Clearly, one can identify a dialectical process in the formation of the

Pakistani diaspora in Britain. On the one hand, Islam has been incor-
porative and integrative, providing a legitimate locational identity in
an immigrant society. At the same time, it has also generated its own
contradictions and dilemmas which have inhibited the integrative
process by politicising and racialising this very same religious identity.
As South Asians, Pakistanis are increasingly part of a wider trend towards
economic, cultural and social incorporation into British society, whether
as middle or working class citizens. It is likely that the community will
remain divided in its orientations between extremely religious and
secular minorities, with the majority – for whom Islamic piety combines
with growing assimilation into British culture – occupying the middle

ground.
Whether as South Asians or Muslims, the transnational commit-
ments and connections of Pakistanis in Britain remain, at the turn of
the century, powerfully compelling both ideologically and practically.
Home remittances from the UK to Pakistan through banks in 2002/2003
reached $273.83 million (out of a total of $4.23 billion, $1.23 billion
from the USA, followed by the Gulf). A continuous stream of marriage
partners and Muslim clerics from Pakistan augments the local commu-
nity and revitalises its distinctive culture, while investment and retire-
ment in Pakistan continue both for working and middle class Pakistanis.
Imported Pakistani non-terrestrial cable TV stations, classical or popular
music and Bollywood films are widely available in the UK with its
thriving South Asian consumer industry. So too are cassettes of leading
Islamic preachers. The UK ethnic economy continuously forges new
links to Pakistan and India. Visits by Pakistani dignitaries, politicians,
artistes, cricketers and religious luminaries follow a well-trodden circuit
of Pakistani urban concentrations. Above all, global events affecting
Muslims elsewhere, and persistent hostilities between Pakistan and India
over Kashmir, continue to shape the oppositional postcolonial diasporic
consciousness of the community and to animate discourses enunciated
by local leaders in the diasporic public sphere in Britain.
Public arguments: Islamic radicalism and the media
In an earlier book, I discussed the emergence of a Pakistani and Muslim

diasporic sphere at the local-level during the 1980s and 1990s (Werbner,
2002). Since then, the debate on the diasporic public sphere in Britain
today has shifted to the national scale and now needs to be seen in the
context of international politics and the so-called war on terror. This is
a subject I take up in detail elsewhere (Werbner, 2009).
It took some time after 9/11 attacks to discover that there were
British citizens fighting in Afghanistan or on the side of the Taliban.
Since then, the number of suicide bombers who were British citizens
or residents of Britain has increased. With between 1.5 and 2.5 million
Muslims living in Britain,3 almost 1000 have been arrested on suspicion
of terror, more than fifty have been charged and have been sentenced,
while the rest have been released without charge. A recent plot took
place in December 2010. Dubbed the ‘Christmas bomb plot’, it led to
the arrest of nine young Bangladeshis, aged 19 to 28, in three British
cities, who were allegedly planning to bomb six key targets, including
the Stock Exchange and the US Embassy (Gammell, 2010). The British
138 Pnina Werbner
Pakistani transnational connections to Pakistan have been underlined,

yet again, by the inquiry into the London bombings on 7 July 2005. In
February 2011, the inquest into the bombings heard that the leader of
the bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan, had received a series of calls on
a mobile phone, used solely to plan the attacks, from a number of public
call boxes in Rawalpindi (Topping, 2011). The bombers were all trained
in militant camps in Pakistan.
Revelations of seditious plots have led to dire predictions by security
personnel and politicians who convey the clear message that all British
Muslims are potentially hidden terrorists. In addition, media investiga-
tive reports regularly highlight the connection of apparently respect-
able Muslim organisations with extremist anti-Western sects, or their
secret links with fundamentalist organisations in Pakistan. The Tablighi
Jama’at (the ‘Fellowship of Preaching/Proselytising’) was exposed after
it emerged that seven of the 23 suspects, under arrest for allegedly plot-
ting to blow up transatlantic airlines, were affiliated to this movement
(Bajwa, 2006a). A second media exposé was that of the roots of the
Muslim Council of Britain’s leadership in Jama’at-i-Islami (the ‘Muslim
Fellowship’), an early fundamentalist organisation and political party
founded in British India by a journalist, Mawlana Mawdudi, who first
espoused the Islamisation of the state (Bright, 2005).4 The British organi-
sation created by the movement, UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), which is
centred in Leicester along with its various youth wings and offshoots
(Hussain, 2007), claims to be a separate organisation, hence distancing
itself from the parent movement and aiming to integrate into all
walks of British society (Rahman, 2006). Leaders have been accused of
dividing humanity into believers and unbelievers (kafir) (Bright, 2005).
Their puritanical ideology is also manifested in their public attack on
homosexuality in Britain and their attempts to censure Muslim cultural
festival celebrations allegedly transgressing strict Islamic codes of
conduct. Such emergent divisions among Muslims reveal the validity
of a post-Habermasian approach that stresses the pluralisation of the
diasporic Muslim public sphere in the UK (Werbner, 2009). Diaspora
Muslims include a wide range of nominally non-violent groups that are,
nevertheless, violently opposed, at least rhetorically, to any Muslims
they regard as transgressive or deviant.
Conclusion: multiculturalism, diaspora and

Islam in Britain
In the twenty-first century, Britain, though not officially a secular

society, is in practice a multicultural one. The most devout Christians
are Black African immigrants, and it is immigrants generally who tend

to be the most pious. Contra-Cameron, there are no pure imaginaries
of an English nation that exclude its immigrant and Muslim minorities.
Multiculturalism is not a matter of legislation primarily (there are very
few multicultural ‘laws’ though religious freedom is enshrined along-
side other freedoms). There is, however, an increasingly widespread
popular acceptance of ethnic and religious pluralism and difference.
At the same time, Britain has experienced some multicultural ‘tests’ of
national citizenship, most prominently in the case of the Rushdie affair.
These have been apparently intractable conflicts that have embedded
multiculturalism in the national historical memory. But such testing,
‘multiculturalism in history’ as I have called it (Werbner, 2005), differs
from everyday multicultural practice which is normal and widely
accepted.
In addition to locally generated global affairs, international conflicts
in the Middle East and South Asia have created a further potential
breakdown of trust between Muslim immigrants in Britain and the
rest of the population. One way this has been averted is through an
engagement and serious dialogue between British politicians and
leaders of the Muslim community via the media, ethnic and main-
stream press. Politicians would naturally like the Muslims of Britain
to be contained within the envelope of the nation-state, to live
scattered among the wider population and to be concerned mainly
with religious education and pastoral care. They reject not only the
extreme religiosity of many Muslims, including the second-genera-
tion, but their enclaved living and diasporic commitments not just to
their country of origin, but their continued links and commitments
to Muslim communities elsewhere, especially Palestine, but also Iraq
or Afghanistan. They demand a non-politicised religion, which they
label as ‘culture’. Muslims in Britain are far more pious than most
other British citizens and are equally emotional about their transna-
tional loyalties. This makes it seem that multiculturalism has not
only failed but supposedly foments hatred and division. Of course, at
another level, everyone, Muslims and non-Muslim alike, shares the
knowledge that intractable international conflicts are impinging on
the consciousness of young Muslims in Britain and encouraging a few
of them towards – in their own eyes – heroic deeds of self-sacrifice,
which to everyone else appear as unacceptable atrocities. How to
reach these young people is a predicament shared by all British citi-
zens, including Muslims.
In a sense, too, it may well be that British politicians feel on safer
ground when they criticise religion, even if they label it ‘culture’. They
140 Pnina Werbner
know from their own experiences of European history that religion can
be more or less extreme, more or less tolerant, more or less politicised.
Second, the term culture is also used to imply ‘community’. Ethnic
communities are expected by British politicians to exert moral control
over their members. The failure of the Muslim community in Britain to
control some of its youngsters is a failure of community and, hence, of
culture and multiculturalism.
Talal Asad makes the point that given that the public sphere is not
an ‘empty space for carrying out debates’, but expresses the ‘memories
and aspirations, fears and hopes – of speakers and listeners’, then the
introduction of new religious discourses into it disrupts ‘established
assumptions structuring debates in the public sphere’. It ‘threatens the
authority of existing assumptions’ (Asad, 2003: 186). In the case of the
war in Iraq, a secular war against a secular dictator has been redefined
by Muslims and some Christians (including, ironically, President George
W. Bush himself) as a religious war. The attack on multiculturalism may
be conceived as a rejection by British politicians and the media of this
invasion of the British public sphere by religious discourses. If the public
sphere is defined as a space of rational argumentation, economics and
politics, then faith and passion do not, it is implied, belong there (ibid.,
p. 187). Nevertheless, it could also be argued that the reasoned responses
of Muslim leaders, utilising the national platform of their own ethnic
press, has carved out a space of civility in which the responses of these
leaders to expositions of their alleged extremism are expressed passion-
ately and yet rationally.
Notes
1. Other conflicts have included the Danish cartoon affair, for example.
2. Of state-funded faith schools in England (both primary and secondary),
there were, in 2010, close to 7000 Christian schools, the majority (approx.
4600) Church of England or Roman Catholic (approx. 2000), with various
other denominations, such as Methodist, Greek Orthodox or Baptist making
up the rest. There are 38 Jewish schools, 11 Muslim, 4 Sikh and 1 Hindu. The
number of state-funded schools appears to have increased since 2007, when
there were 26 Jewish schools and 4 Muslim schools. The figures for 2010 were
disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act. http://www.whatdothey-
know.com/request/number_of_state_funded_faith_sch
3. The 2001 National Census enumerated 1.5 million Muslims but their numbers
are said to have grown to 2.4 in the past ten years through immigration and
natural growth.
4. Mawdudi’s many books have been extremely influential in fundamentalist
circles, even beyond Pakistan.
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7
Social Movements in
the Diasporic Context:
The Sathya Sai Baba Movement
Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Melissa Kelly
Introduction
Swami Vivekananda’s visit to Chicago in 1893, to attend the World

Parliament of Religions, paved the way1 for other Indian religious and
spiritual leaders who would also extend their influence beyond India.
More than a century after Swami’s historic visit, many Indian religious/
spiritual movements have succeeded in spreading around the world.
The Arya Samaj and other Hindu reformist movements are perhaps the
most well known in the West. However, the last several decades have
seen the emergence of several newer movements that are different from
those that came before them. Philanthropic and charitable activities
have always been an integral part of religious/spiritual movements. In
recent times, Indian religious/spiritual movements have had a partic-
ular interest in attracting overseas Indians living in the global Indian
diaspora (Anand, 2004; Coney, 2000).Through these movements, the
preservation of Indian religion and traditions are encouraged. In addi-
tion to providing a spiritual path, these new movements were also a
means through which overseas Indians can remain connected to their
ancestral homeland and renegotiate their Indian identity in diverse
parts of the diaspora.
This chapter illustrates how ideas, practices and even people have
moved across the globe through Indian diaspora networks by way
of the Sri (honorific) Sathya Sai Baba (SSB) movement. Through the
lens of diaspora studies, the chapter aims to show how the SSB move-
ment has attracted diasporic Indians2 and in doing so how it has
reconstructed the religious and cultural identities of Indians in the
diaspora.
143
144 Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Melissa Kelly
The SSB movement
The origin of the SSB movement dates back to the early part of the
twentieth century. Sathya Sai Baba (1926–2011), the head of the SSB
movement, was a saint from Andhra Pradesh, famous for possessing
supernatural powers and performing miracles. He was born on
23 November 1926 in Puttaparthi, a tiny village in Anantapur District
in Andhra Pradesh, where he died on 24 April 2011. He is considered as
the reincarnation of the earlier Sai Baba of Shirdi,3 a Hindu – Muslim
saint who died eight years before SSB’s birth. The movement gained
momentum in the 1940s when Sathya Narayan Raju – as Sathya Sai
Baba was named as a child – proclaimed himself as the reincarnation of
Sai Baba of Shirdi and declared that his mission was to bring about the
spiritual regeneration of humanity by demonstrating and teaching the
highest principles of truth, righteous conduct, peace and divine love
(Murphet, 1975). Although his teachings were not particularly unique,
the saint’s ability to transform sceptics through his healing of the sick,
as well as his performance of other seemingly impossible acts, greatly
contributed to his success. SSB’s universal vision and his interest in
recruiting people of all religions without expecting them to denounce
their existing beliefs further contributed to his popularity. Although the
movement is essentially Hindu, it is global in perspective, and therefore
also attracts Muslim, Christian and Parsee followers (White, 1972: 869).
Mobility and social movements
Social movements are defined by Cohen as societal forces that have

the ability ‘to rapidly mobilise, a vision of an alternative and prefer-
able existence and the use of unorthodox strategies for attracting public
support and confronting established institutions’ (Cohen, 1998: 9).
While past movements were often motivated by class conflict and mate-
rialist concerns, movements emerging over the last three decades have
more often been inspired by cultural conflict and focus particularly on
issues related to lifestyle and identity. As Buechler (1995: 446) points
out, leading scholars such as Habermas have come to see ‘the conflicts in
which new social movements engage’ as ‘less about material reproduc-
tion and more about cultural reproduction, social integration, and social-
isation. The new movements bring with them a new politics concerned
with quality of life, projects of self-realisation, and goals of participa-
tion and identity formation’. Cohen (1998: 5) argues that participants
in new social movements are often anxious to gain more involvement
Social Movements in the Diasporic Context 145
in decision-making processes, including more control over personal life.

Religious or spiritual movements that challenge existing norms and
structures may appeal to some, especially minority groups in search of
an alternative identity. The SSB movement could be considered a new
social movement insofar as it is a means through which Indians can
retain or in some cases even renegotiate their identities despite pressures
to assimilate to the new countries (in which they live) and cultures.
One of the fundamental features of ‘new’ social movements is their
ability to become transnational, mobilising both ideas and people across
space. ‘Mobility’ is a term often understood in relation to the physical
movement of people, but it can also refer to the movement of images
and information (Sheller and Urry, 2006: 212). Globalisation and the
evolution of speedy and efficient transportation and communication
facilities have helped socio-religious/spiritual, political and other move-
ments spread to diverse parts of the world, thereby shaping peoples’
identities in new ways and making national borders relatively insig-
nificant. As stated by Gerharz (2010: 150), ‘the observation that new
modes of transportation and communication have subdued space and
compressed time and space forms the starting point of most globalisa-
tion and mobility research’. The compression of time and space and
the growing opportunities for mobility of various types help to explain
the transnationalisation of social movements. However, the growth of
a shared consciousness is also significant. According to Cohen, move-
ments may become transnational when the issue being dealt with by
the movement transcends borders. Cohen’s argument, that there is a
growing tendency for people to see the world as interconnected and
to see issues as crossing borders, can be extended to religion as well.
As Hannigan (1991: 323) points out, spirituality is something that can
apply to humanity as a whole, which perhaps helps to explain the
growing number of global religious movements.
Although social movements are increasingly spreading across
dispersed networks of people, creating the space for new forms of
social organisation and social action (Cohen, 1998: 5), they are not
completely fluid or unfixed in geography or culture. As Beckford impor-
tantly argues, despite the globalisation of movements, religious or other-
wise, ‘in practice, the direction and control of the movements tend to
remain centred on one particular country – or among the nationals of
one particular country – even when their operations extend virtually
worldwide’ (Beckford, 2004: 257). As he sees it, some new movements
utilise globalisation to spread their cause and increase their member-
ship and power, but often ‘they try to do this in ways that are firmly
grounded in non-global cultures and forms of organisation’ (Beckford,

2004: 258). Such ideas are interesting to explore in the context of move-
ments like that of Sai Baba, which are essentially global in scope, but
remain associated with a specific place. The SSB movement is clearly
oriented towards India, and arguably even certain sites within India.
Outside of India, specific parts of the Indian diaspora are significant to
the movement in terms of the number of followers that live there, and
the availability of SSB-related activities and events. Rather than being
completely transnational, the SSB movement is based on the mobilisa-
tion of ideas and people between India and other specific sites within a
large and globally dispersed Indian diaspora.
Diasporic identity in a globalising world
As scholars of diaspora studies have pointed out, many established

immigrant communities may now be seen as transnational commu-
nities with wider networks stretching beyond the host and home
country to also include community members living across the globe
(see Glick-Schiller, 2003; Levitt, 1999; Lie, 1995). Faist has argued that
the transnational ties that migrants maintain with other migrants in
globally dispersed diasporas, or with less mobile people from their place
of origin, may provide immigrants with an alternative to assimilation
and ethnic pluralism models of adaptation (Faist, 2000: 201). Li has
similarly argued that immigrants do not necessarily assimilate in a
one-way direction to the societies in which they settle, but may rather
develop a lifestyle that draws on their transnational ties and resources
(Li, 1998). The transnational practices of immigrant communities may
include socio-economic, political and religious activities facilitated by
transnational networks or by imagined/virtual networks on a transna-
tional scale.
Johanna Lessinger notes that, ‘the cultural motivations which
have impelled Indian immigrants to remain so involved with India
are complex’ and involve different motivations (2003: 175), such as
the desire to remain in touch with one’s family, for example, or to
avoid losing one’s ancestral culture. A number of scholars (Brah, 1996;
Bhat and Sahoo, 2003; Patel, 2000; Shurmer-Smith, 2000) have never-
theless argued that the diaspora–homeland relationship has recently
been strengthened with the growth of communication and transpor-
tation technologies. The ease with which people are able to keep in
touch with and visit family and friends ‘back home’ has also contrib-
uted to a growing sense of belonging to a diasporic community. The
transnational networks of the Indian diaspora are perhaps best exem-

plified by the members’ participation in transnational associations
and organisations (Hearn, 2004; Portes, 2005; Smith, Pagnucco and
Romeril, 1994) and their involvement with the homeland through
investments (Dusenbery and Tatla, 2010; Geithner, Chen and Johnson
2005; Vishwanath, 2003) and personal visits for various purposes
(Voigt-Graf, 2004).
Being identified as Indian is important for many overseas Indians,
including those born in the diaspora (Hussain, 2005). As Gerharz (2010:
162–3) puts it, ‘identities are negotiated whenever social actors realise and
recognise difference and create social spaces over time’. By recognising
their belonging to a cultural or ethnic group, people develop percep-
tions about themselves and others. This helps us understand and analyse
processes such as inter-group discrimination, inter-group comparison,
social categorisation, and most importantly, maintaining one’s own self
identity. Thus, the issue of identity preservation has become the key to
understanding the Indian diaspora, which has spread across the globe to
include more than 25 million persons (http://moia.gov.in).
We argue that religious/spiritual movements play an important role
in transforming and reconstructing the religious and cultural practices
of immigrants in the diaspora. It also simultaneously strengthens the
diaspora’s relation with the homeland. This is done by encouraging
transnational participation and facilitating networking across borders,
where immigrants are encouraged to visit their homeland to participate
in the spiritual movement (Skrbiš, 2007). The teachings of Indian spir-
itual gurus may be disseminated across national boundaries through
transnational participation and through information and communica-
tion technologies. These activities may be rooted in political territori-
ality and linked to socio-economic and cultural networks, but they are
nevertheless global in scale and scope.
The Indian diaspora
Perhaps no other diaspora in the world is characterised by such diversity

in its composition as the Indian diaspora in terms of culture, language,
region, religion and other forms of social stratification. Emigration from
India has been widely varied in terms of the historical context, causes
and consequences of migration from India as much as the social char-
acteristics such as level of education, caste, gender, class, place of origin
and religious and linguistic affiliation of these immigrants. Indians have
moved to different parts of the world at different periods of time.4 During
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they emigrated to British,

French and Dutch colonies as indentured5 and kangani6 labourers, and
in this context they constitute the ‘Old Diaspora’ (Jain, 2008; Mishra,
2007). They also migrated to industrially developed countries of Europe
and North America during the postcolonial era as skilled workers and
professionals and thus constitute the ‘New Diaspora’ (Jain, 2008; Mishra,
2007). The latter continues to have close contact with the families and
relatives back home. Indians today have been successful in forming
their local, international, formal and informal networks by maintaining
relations with their kin around the globe. Their networks are facilitated
through various channels, such as regular communication and updates
over telephone and the Internet, visits and correspondences, as well
as remittances. While the ‘New Diaspora’ has retained a vibrant rela-
tionship with family and community in India, the majority of the ‘Old
Diaspora’ has lost contact with the motherland. In the course of their
long journey by ship to distant destinations, the co-passengers became
‘jahaji-bhai’ [literally meaning ‘ship brothers’], and forged a brotherly
affinity owing to travelling together. As Landy, Maharaj and Mainet-
Valleix (2004: 207) write:
During the journey migrants became jahaji-bhai (ship mates), which

created a new ‘kinship’ based on the memory of the journey on the
same ship, without any attention to caste or religion. The bonds were
so strong that marriage between children of jahaji was likened to
incest. Alongside the referent of the village and the region had arisen
a new referent without any specific location (a ship). This was the
first mutation in the geographical identity, the first identity marker
not connected to the origin in India. However, the memory of the
journey faded away for succeeding generations.
The Indian diaspora communities, formed during the colonial era, had
little access to their own folks in different plantations, let alone any
access to the means of transportation and communication (available
then) to engage with the motherland (Bhat, 2003). The postcolonial
emigrants, in contrast, not only enjoyed the advantage of being profes-
sionally trained, middle class, Anglophone Indians, but also earned an
adequate income that could facilitate visits and frequent communica-
tion with their place of origin, thanks to the recent advancement in
technologies of travel, transport, communication, information, and
Internet that has contributed immensely to the growth of transnational
networks and virtual communities (Bhat and Sahoo, 2003).
SSB movement and the Indian diaspora
Although established in India in the first half of the twentieth century,

it was not until the 1960s that the SSB movement became popular in the
Indian diaspora.7 Since then, the movement has been growing rapidly,
and ‘has attracted a substantial Indian following’ (Kent, 2000: 7). The
ethnic focus of the religion, as expressed by its use of Indian languages
in common rituals, and the fact that SSB’s headquarters remain in India
(www.sathyasai.org), has meant that while the movement is global in
its spiritual orientation, it has nevertheless retained its culture-specific
focus.
A number of scholars have conducted studies on Sai Baba’s following
in different parts of the Indian diaspora including England (Bowen,
1988), Malaysia (Ackerman and Lee, 1990; Lee, 1982; Kent, 2000, 2004),
Singapore (Pereira, 2008) and Trinidad (Klass, 1996). To better under-
stand the role of religion in Indian communities abroad, we took a
different approach and conducted fieldwork in India. The study was
aimed at understanding the views of diasporic Indians and their (re)
construction of religious and cultural identities while participating in
the SSB movement. We were also interested in exploring how ideas asso-
ciated with the SSB movement circulate, and how people become inter-
ested in becoming a member. Conducting fieldwork in India gave us the
chance to meet the Indian diasporic devotees from different countries,
in a single place. Although this fieldwork in India prevented us from
learning in more detail about how the movement has manifested itself
differently in different countries, it did give us (authors) the chance to
explore the global nature of the movement, and the particular role that
India plays in it.
Data collection method and sampling
Our study draws on empirical data collected between October 2004

and November 2006 from more than 100 participants involved in the
movement. All of them were overseas Indians visiting Puttaparthi,
a major site for followers of SSB in India. The study was carried out
in Puttaparthi, a popular destination8 for Sai Baba followers visiting
India from the diaspora. In the beginning, a nine-page questionnaire
was handed over to the respondents at Puttaparthi who hailed from
different countries. Apart from distributing the questionnaire, in-depth
interviews were conducted among 20 respondents. Overall, we secured
110 respondents. Although selecting respondents for this kind of study
was somewhat difficult at the initial stages in the field, the challenges
were gradually overcome. SSB’s devotees visit Puttaparthi during festival
times such as Deepavali, Durga Puja, Sivaratri and most importantly
their numbers increase during SSB’s birthday (23 November). We there-
fore, recruited our respondents at these events. As per the rules of SSB’s
centres outside of India, all members (including children) should wear
a prescribed dress. Alternatively, they can wear a neckerchief, which
includes their country’s national flag along with SSB’s organisation logo.
It was, therefore, relatively easy for us to distinguish between Indian and
foreign nationals. Since different religious groups with different beliefs
and practices are present in the SSB movement, we included respond-
ents from diverse religious groups. Eighty-four per cent of our respond-
ents were Hindus, seven per cent Christians, six per cent Muslims and
three per cent Zoroastrians. Most of our respondents were born outside
of India and belonged to the second, third and fourth generations of
Indians living abroad.
Recruitment
As we outlined earlier in this chapter, the transnationalisation of social
movements has often been seen in connection with broader globalisa-
tion processes. In particular, the growth of travel and communication
technologies has been cited as a reason for the global spread and popu-
larity of movements. Sixty-four per cent of our respondents said that
they came to know about the SSB through their parents who, in most
cases, had joined the movement in the 1960s. Fewer (16%) said that
their source of information regarding SSB was their relatives while even
less (11%) said that their friends and colleagues were their main source
of information. Only five per cent said that they had come to know
about SSB through print media including books, newspapers, magazines
and official newsletters available at the Sai Centres in their country.
Apart from these, four per cent of the respondents stated that they had
come to know about SSB simultaneously from several different sources,
including parents, relatives, friends and colleagues and from literature
such as newspapers, books and magazines, and most interestingly, from
internet sites. It would seem that diasporic Indians learn about the SSB
movement through a variety of ways but social networks, and particu-
larly familial networks, played the biggest role.
Since the SSB movement spread primarily through social networks,
our next question was whether our respondents had introduced any of
their friends or relatives to the faith. Only 32 per cent felt that they
had influenced their relatives and family members (especially their
children) towards the faith. Many respondents, instead, stressed that

the ‘self-curiosity’ of the devotee is the main motivating force behind
recruitment. As one respondent from Australia noted, ‘I used to go to
Sai Centre to accompany my parents. Although I was not interested in
it initially, later I was drawn into it’. Rather than being recruited aggres-
sively, members tend to become inspired by observing other devotees’
way of living. It would seem that the movement has taken root in the
diaspora not only because of the globalisation of communication and
travel technologies unto itself, but also because these technologies have
contributed to the growth of strong networks linking various parts of
the Indian diaspora to each other, as well as to the Indian homeland.
Family visits, telephone calls and the sending of emails are much easier
than before, and this has likely strengthened both personal ties as well
as the feeling of belonging to a global Indian community. As diasporic
linkages appear to be the focus for recruitment, it is important to point
out that not all recruits belong to Indian networks. Although, we do
not have exact figures, it is apparent that the movement has several
non-Indian9 followers. Its focus on Indian culture and the inclusion of
non-Indians is a curious aspect of the organisation that must be given
some consideration. We, therefore, asked respondents whether they had
inspired or motivated any of their friends/relatives/colleagues or coun-
terparts who are non-Indians in their country to become members of the
movement. Only eight per cent of respondents said that they had delib-
erately motivated foreigners to participate while the majority, instead,
emphasised that, like their Indian counterparts, non-Indian members
were usually motivated by their self-curiosity towards Indian spirituality
and religion. The majority of respondents said that non-Indians are very
much present at the respective Sai Centres in their country. Kent (2000)
has argued that the inclusion of non-Indians in the movement could
be a way to further validate the movement, and to promote the move-
ment’s image as a universal religion that appeals to all. She nevertheless
points out that, in practice, however, non-Indian recruits must conform
to Indian cultural values and customs when taking part in the move-
ment’s activities. Including non-Indians in the movement, therefore,
does not compromise the Indian-focus of the organisation. The move-
ment has, as already discussed, maintained not only a spiritual but also
a strong cultural dimension.
Religious and cultural practices

Much has been written on both the maintenance and the change of
Indian culture and religion in the diaspora (Nayar, 2004; Siddique, 2004).
The general consensus among scholars seems to be that a combination

of both processes occurs simultaneously. This section will look at how,
in practice, the SSB movement has actually been implemented in the
diaspora and the effect this has had on Indian identity. We will consider
religious practices and daily life, participation in bhajans/satsangs,10 and
participation in social service activities.
Religious practices and daily life

Our findings revealed that, for the diasporic Indians in our study, reli-
gion and spirituality are significant aspects of daily life. The majority
of respondents said that they devote one to one-and-a-half hours daily
to religious activities. This includes performing rituals like pujas11 and
bhajans. Furthermore, those who spend this amount of time or more
everyday in worship, tend to follow certain guidelines12 given in the SSB
theology (Gokak, 1983; Kasturi, 1968; Ruhela and Robinson, 1976). From
this study, it is revealed that the followers of SSB have kept their tradi-
tional religious rituals alive even when they are far away from India.
Another significant aspect of life in the diaspora is the major Indian
cultural festivals celebrated by overseas Indian communities, which
include Dasahara, Deepavali, Holi, Ramnavami, Hanuman Jayanti, Guru
Purnima, Ganesh Chaturthi, Krishna Jayanti,13 and Christmas and Eid.
These are festivals celebrated by Indians from a variety of backgrounds
and are not limited to SSB followers. In addition, there are some festi-
vals that are specific to SSB followers. These include SSB’s Birthday and
Easwaramma day [a celebration of the birthday of SSB’s mother]. SSB
followers, generally, celebrate both general and SSB-focused festivals in
their respective country’s SSB Centre/Temple.
As already mentioned, although Sai Baba followers may see themselves
as ‘Hindu’ or ‘Muslim’, in addition to being a SSB devotee, the move-
ment is very flexible and open and welcomes all religious communities.
Given the high level of tolerance encouraged by the SSB movement,
we were curious whether our respondents celebrated festivals outside of
their own specific faith. A majority of respondents identified themselves
as Hindus, but stated that they celebrate Christmas and Eid in addi-
tion to the Hindu festivals. Similar cases were found among Christian
and Muslim respondents, who frequently celebrated Hindu festivals.
We, therefore, argue that as the SSB philosophy teaches an inclusive
approach to all religions, the acknowledgement of different religious
festivals is consistent with the tenets of the movement. Hence, the SSB
movement provides Indians in the diaspora with the opportunity to
be multi-religious in orientation. This has a positive effect on Indian
identity, insofar as it makes the Indian community united and strong

and therefore more capable of working in pursuit of ‘Indian’ interests
than it otherwise would be. This could be important in the diaspora
context, where some Indian communities are relatively small and soli-
darity may be deemed as a prerequisite for gaining a voice in politics or
society.
Participation in devotional training programmes

SSB emphasises the path of devotion (bhakti). Devotional activities in
the Sai programme include study circles, devotional singing, prayer,
meditation as well as the observance of religious festivals. Programmes
are offered in the form of special courses for devotees, children and
others wishing to become acquainted with SSB’s life and teachings. The
most important programme in this case is the Summer Spiritual Courses,
offered at Brindavan (Whitefield in Bangalore, India), which is attended
by devotees from different parts of the world. Sai Centres outside India
have, however, also begun to offer similar programmes such as yoga and
meditation, wherever there is sufficient demand. A few of our partici-
pants had attended the meditation classes organised by the SSB Centre
in their respective countries. Although not considered part of formal
training, spiritual seminars and conferences also appear to be popular
among the SSB Centres in the diaspora (www.saiconference.org).
Participation in bhajans/satsangs
Bhajans play an important role in the SSB movement, as they are a part
of the Sai religious/spiritual preaching. In many of his teachings, SSB
emphasised the importance of devotional singing. With regards to its
significance to the religion, we asked our respondents whether they
organised satsangs either in their individual homes or at their respective
centres. We found that the majority do this at least once a month, with
several doing it as often as twice a week. When asked where bhajans are
held, one respondent from South Africa explained, ‘Usually when five to
six families are there it is possible [to hold them at somebody’s house]. If
there are more than five families, we go to the nearby Centre for bhajan
and satsang’.
According to majority of the respondents, the ‘religious/spiritual
motive’ is the most significant reason for participating in the group
bhajan programme. For others, ‘preserving tradition’ and ‘celebrating
home culture’ are very important. Many elderly respondents cited the
maintenance of ‘social contact’ as a primary motivator for participation.
It is not surprising that almost all the devotees are strong supporters of
the Sai bhajan programme considering its central place in the SSB move-
ment. As a respondent from Uganda said, ‘ ... There is nothing greater
than bhajan and it is this that binds us together, cutting across race and
religion’.
At Puttaparthi, bhajan groups sing the glory of Sai Baba in the Telugu
language, the official language of the State of Andhra Pradesh in India.
Most of the songs were written in Telugu and have only recently been
translated into several other national and international languages for
the convenience of the devotees. It is the devotional singing which
plays a significant role in binding Indians to SSB spiritualism in the
Indian diaspora. The frequency of participation in the group bhajan
programme, and the enthusiasm with which it is approached, shows
an important way in which religious and cultural identities were main-
tained and reconstructed in the diaspora (Kumar, 2000).
Participation in social service activities

One of the central aspects of SSB’s teaching is seva (selfless service) to
humanity in which the followers of SSB actively participate, even in
the diaspora. Eighty-nine per cent of our respondents stated that they
are aware of the community service activities that the SSB Centre has
undertaken in their country. These activities are organised by individual
Sai Centres and include activities such as childcare, care of the elderly
and AIDS awareness initiatives. The activities promoted by Sai Centres
in different countries include: (i) visits to hospitals and transporta-
tion of people with disabilities to attend their hospital appointments;
(ii) visits to prisons; (iii) visits to senior citizens’ homes; (iv) working
with homeless people; (v) mentoring young people; (vi) entertaining
the elderly and people with disabilities; (vii) supplying clothes and shoes
to homeless people; and (viii) environmental protection. It would seem
that participation in volunteer work by the followers of SSB is another
way to participate in the movement, and to further SSB’s universalist
belief in a shared world for all. Philanthropic and charity activities are
not uncommon in social movements, and as Anheier and Daly (2005:
160) point out, there is often a strong link between ‘religious teachings’
and philanthropic and charity activities.
Reconnecting India
Urry argues that in addition to the physical ‘presence’ of people in a

given place, we should view people’s relationship to places using rela-
tive terms such as ‘occasional co-presence, imagined co-presence and
virtual co-presence’ (Urry, 2002: 256). Using Urry’s concepts, we could

argue that SSB followers in the diaspora are not simply in or away from
India, but rather they are engaged in various states of proximity. In
associating themselves with other Indian followers in the diaspora, by
using Indian languages and practising Indian culture, SSB followers may
recreate India where they are, by living in a kind of imagined presence.
In other cases, when they actually connect themselves through techno-
logical or communication linkages to India, for example by talking to
people on the phone or following SSB’s spiritual programmes online,
then there is a ‘virtual presence’. ‘Occasional co-presence’ occurs when
followers physically move to the site of focus, if only for a short period
of time now and then. It is this physical mobility that the next section
will focus on.
Visiting Puttaparthi
One of the major findings of our study was that many followers placed
importance on physically visiting spiritual sites in India, and being with
fellow SSB followers from other parts of the world. A number of scholars
have commented on the importance of such interactions. As Gerharz
notes, for example, ‘in contrast to mobility expressed through virtual
and communicative modes of travel, meeting each other face-to-face
represents a dimension of social interaction with a particular quality’
(Gerharz, 2010: 154). People visiting a site like Puttaparthi may have the
chance to ‘sense’ the place physically, and to share the experience with
others, something they do not (at the same intensity) have the opportu-
nity to do at home. As Urry puts it, travel may be necessary to ‘sustain
normal patterns of social life often organised on the basis of extensive
time-space distanciation with lengthy periods of distance and solitude’
(Urry, 2002: 261).
Although, we cannot generalise for all followers of SSB in the diaspora,
except for those we spoke to in India, travel seemed highly signifi-
cant. In order to understand better the religious and cultural linkages
respondents keep with their Indian homeland, we asked them about
the frequency of their visits to Puttaparthi. Only 28 per cent said that it
was their first visit, while the majority (72%) said that they have visited
Puttaparthi twice or more. Some of the respondents claimed to visit
Puttaparthi four to five times in a year, from as far away as South Africa,
Mauritius, UK, the USA and Australia. Most of the respondents visited
Puttaparthi to celebrate festivals in the presence of SSB.14 The majority
of respondents stated that they come to India for a month or two and
stay in Puttaparthi for one to two weeks.
Puttaparthi is not the only site that is important for SSB followers;
there are other places in India like Shirdi15 (Ahmednagar, Maharashtra
State) and Brindavan (Bangalore, Karnataka state), which also attract Sai
Baba followers. During the 1970s SSB initiated a series of summer courses
on Indian culture and spirituality at Brindavan. These are open to both
Indian and non-Indian students. The courses contain SSB’s philosophy
and appear to be quite popular among diasporic Indians. Majority of
our respondents said that they had taken different courses such as the
Sathya Sai Education in Human Values Program16 and the Summer Courses
on Spirituality offered by the Sathya Sai Institution.
Visits to India often include not only time to develop one’s spiritual
identity, but also time to build one’s relationship with distant family
members and friends. Many spend their remaining time in India visiting
their hometown or other places for personal reasons. Others stay from
one day to one month at the Prasanthi Nilayam ashram depending on
the work and programme instructed by the SSB Central Trust.17 For
instance, those wishing to engage in social service activities may stay
from one week to one month or more according to SSB’s guidelines
for visitors. Most of the devotees come to Puttaparthi for pilgrimage
purposes and engage their time in several social activities. These include
organising blood donation camps, medical camps, cleaning of villages
in and around Puttaparthi and so on.
Reconstructing an Indian identity in the diaspora
Since our aim was to understand identity construction in the diaspora,

we asked respondents how their relationship with India has been affected
by their involvement in the SSB spiritual movement. A few respond-
ents mentioned how it has strengthened their affinities with the Indian
homeland. A respondent from the United States stated that ‘ ... Now
there is more than just blood relations to visit. This will remain forever’.
Another respondent from Singapore pointed out that, ‘ ... Even though I
was not born here, I feel a kinship’. This shows that the feeling of lone-
liness and isolation of being in the diaspora does not hold true in the
case of SSB followers. All the members of the SSB community feel that
they are one family. Respondents were also asked whether participating
in the SSB movement has strengthened their religious and cultural iden-
tity. The majority of respondents, that is 79 per cent, stated that it has
helped to a large extent in (re)constructing their religious and cultural
identities. A fourth generation Trinidadian Indian said ‘ ... After partici-
pating in the spiritual programme of SSB, we have really excelled in
getting back to what we imagined our ancestors’ land was ... as we were
totally cut off from our ancestor’s land because of unknown neighbour-
hood relationship for several years’. It would seem that by orienting the
movement towards Indian culture and by keeping many of its essen-
tial activities in India, the movement has helped Indians living in the
diaspora to feel an affinity with their Indian ancestors and relations.
Although ties between India and its diaspora may be strong, there are
also a number of local adaptations that have taken place. Given the diver-
sity prevalent among SSB followers, in terms of caste, class, ethnicity and
religion, one may expect differences of opinions. However, it seems that
within the SSB movement, there is a great degree of cooperation between
diverse groups. We asked respondents to explain the nature of coopera-
tion and support among the devotees of SSB outside the religious/spir-
itual program. Most of the respondents (68%) said that they are ‘brothers
and sisters of Sai family’ and that they help each other whenever there is
a need. A respondent from Mauritius mentioned that, ‘ ... There is strong
cooperation and support existing within the Sai members ... whenever
we meet for a community work or any kind of group activities we work
well as a team’. Community work and group activities are an impor-
tant feature of the SSB movement throughout the world. The SSB move-
ment, thus, has facilitated a strong sense of belonging between members
despite the organisation’s internal diversity. This may, in part, reflect the
fact that the majority of devotees share the status of ethnic minorities in
their respective countries of residence. A shared experience of migration
and possibly even marginalisation may override the potential impor-
tance of differences and divisions within the community.
Conclusion
The study was conducted to understand the views of diasporic Indians

and the (re)construction of their religious and cultural identities while
participating in the SSB movement. According to the diasporic Indians
involved in our study, participating in the SSB movement had trans-
formed their spiritual life and strengthened their connection to their
homeland. We argue that the diasporic Indians in our study attach great
significance to the SSB movement; this is not just to meet their spiritual
needs, but also to become close to their homeland and to (re)imagine
their identity which was partly lost in the process of their migration in
the colonial period. It is apparent from this study that members of the
Indian diaspora are held together by factors such as a common ethnic
identity and a collective relation towards the ancestral homeland, which
is in part symbolised through their participation in religious/spiritual

movements.
Like other scattered communities, the Indian diaspora has faced a
number of challenges concerning its identity and its ability to adapt
to new lands. Integration into new societies has proven difficult and
historically, cultural adaptation has not been easy. Overseas Indians
have, therefore, had to re-examine their cultural identity, values, reli-
gious beliefs and/or spiritual practices. Some of the Indian religious/
spiritual movements in recent times, with their global scope but home-
land orientation, have made a tremendous impact in integrating Indian
religious and cultural practices, thereby (re)constructing the identity
of Indians in the diaspora. It may be argued further that, while the
diaspora’s relationship to its ‘roots’, the original homeland, is an ideo-
logical one, religious/spiritual movements of recent times have success-
fully mobilised ideas, concepts, and even people, thereby transforming
what was mostly an imagined relationship into a reality (Genn, 2008).
As this study shows, participation in the religious/spiritual movements
of the homeland is now one of the mechanisms through which the
religious and cultural identity of immigrants in the diaspora may be
(re)constructed.
The (re)construction of the religious and cultural identity of Indians is
made possible through their participation in SSB spiritual programmes
in the diaspora, in the form of devotional training programmes,
bhajans/satsangs, and visits to the homeland. By participating in social
service activities in both their host countries as well as in the home-
land, these Indians have been able to (re)negotiate their diasporic
identities. The emphasis on ‘re’ in brackets implies that it is not the
SSB movement itself that has constructed the religious and cultural
identities of Indians in the diaspora but rather that this movement has
helped to revive, and in some ways even institutionalise, Indian tradi-
tions in the diaspora.
The present study concludes that the making of a diasporic community
and identity depends on several factors. For the 25 million plus Indians
overseas, their identity as Indians is based mostly on their ‘imagined’
homeland. But this identity is constantly being redefined, reformulated
and reconstructed due to tremendous changes in communication and
transportation technologies, as well as a growing diasporic conscious-
ness among members of the globally Indian diaspora. Thus, there is a
need to further analyse the type and range of identities an immigrant
can take on under these changing circumstances.
Notes
1. Swami Vivekananda’s presence in the World Parliament of Religions is symbolic
in the sense that ‘he was one of the earlier teachers to come to America from
the East, and the first swami to visit America’ (www.SwamiJ.com, accessed on
2 August 2010). His universal appeal, especially the speech at the Parliament
on ‘call for religious harmony and acceptance of all religions’, was greatly
appreciated by the participants. ‘Vivekananda’s tour of the United States also
had a revitalising effect on India. Previously, those who had gone to the West
from India were full of apologies for the state of their country. He was not. He
always spoke about his country with pride and respect. Thus, his work in the
West instilled self-respect and self-confidence in the Indian psyche and helped
India in its search for identity’ (Prabhananda, 2003: 233–4).
2. One of the major incentives behind attracting diasporic Indians is their
economic affluence which could be used to mobilise development activities
in India like the establishment of educational institutions (that is, Sri Sathya
Sai Institute of Higher Learning), healthcare institutions (that is, Sri Sathya Sai
Institute of Higher Medical Sciences) and so on.
3. Sai Baba of Shirdi or Shirdi Sai Baba (1856–1918) is believed to be the previous
incarnation of SSB. He had lived in the little village of Shirdi in the state
of Maharashtra (India) for sixty years, and was admired, in his lifetime, for
his austere lifestyle and particularly for the miracles that were attributed to
him. See more about Shirdi Sai Baba (Sahukar, 1997; Ajgaonkar, 1999; Warren,
1999).
4. Landy, Maharaj and Mainet-Valleix (2004: 203–4) have categorised Indian
emigration, from the historical to the contemporary period, into six broad
phases: (i) merchants who went to East Africa or Southeast Asia before the
sixteenth century; (ii) migration of various groups (traders, farmers) to neigh-
bouring countries (Sri Lanka, Nepal); (iii) indentured labourers to colonial
empires like the Caribbean, Fiji, Mauritius or Natal; as well as migration
through middlemen (kangani, maistry) to South East Asia; (iv) migration of
skilled workers after the World War II towards the developed countries (UK);
(v) migration of contract workers to the Gulf countries; and (vi) recent migra-
tion of knowledge workers to developed countries (USA).
5. The indentured labour system was introduced by the British as a substitute for
‘forced labour and slavery. The indentured “coolies” were half slaves, bound over
body and soul by a hundred and one inhuman regulations’ (Joshi, 1942: 44).
6. ‘The word kangani means overseer or foreman in Tamil and under this system,
the kangani, usually a labourer already employed on the plantation, was sent
by his employer to recruit labour from his village. The system was preferred
because of the lower cost involved in sending a kangani to recruit labour
compared with the cost of indentured labour obtained through recruiting
agencies’ (Kaur, 2004: 63).
7. SSB had visited East Africa (Kenya and Uganda) in 1968 to meet his devotees
who were living under inhospitable conditions due to ethnic/national prob-
lems. Although the visit of SSB to East Africa was his first visit (till his death
in 2011) outside homeland, his impact is seen today in the transnational
context.
8. Puttaparthi is a famous pilgrimage-cum-tourist destination for millions of

Indians as well as Indian diasporic devotees. The Prasanthi Nilayam (the resi-
dence of SSB) is situated in Puttaparthi. Though there are not much tourist
attractions in Puttaparthi, the magnificent and palatial ashram itself keeps
the attention of the visitors with its varied attractions. The SSB ashram is so
huge that it can house around 1000 devotees at a time and also has canteens,
libraries and even a museum (Steve, 2010).
9. Non-Indian followers refer to those followers other than the People of Indian
Origin (PIOs), such as Europeans, Chinese, Africans, North Americans and
other ethnic groups.
10. Bhajan means any type of Indian devotional songs which express love for the
divine. Satsang means gathering which involves listening to or reading scrip-
tures, reflecting on, discussing and assimilating their meaning, meditating
on the source of these words, and bringing their meaning into one’s daily life
(http://en.wikipedia.org/).
11. A form of worship, that relates to dedication and belief.
12. The devotees, who strictly follow the guidelines of SSB, took ten principles
to live spiritual life as laid down by him. They are as: (1) treat as sacred the
land in which you were born. Have patriotism to your nation – but do not
criticise other nations or put others down. Not even in your thoughts or
dreams should you think of bringing grief to your country, (2) respect all
religions equally, (3) recognise humanity as one family – treat everyone as
a family member – love all, (4) keep always the house and surroundings
clean – for this will promote hygiene and health, (5) practice charity – but
do not encourage beggars by giving money. Provide food, clothing, shelter
and help them in other ways (do not encourage laziness), (6) never give
a bribe or take bribe – never get in to corruption, (7) curb envy and jeal-
ousy, expand your vision and outlook, treat all equally regardless of caste or
creed, (8) try and do as much as possible by yourself – you may be wealthy
and have servants – your servants can help – but service to society must be
done personally, (9) have and cultivate ‘Love for God and fear of sin’ – have
hatred for sin, and (10) never go against the laws of the land, follow these
diligently both in word and in spirit to become an exemplary citizen.
13. Dasahara, Deepavali, Holi, Ramnavami, Hanuman Jayanti, Guru Purnima,
Ganesh Chaturthi, Krishna Jayanti are all Indian Hindu festivals devoted to
different gods and goddesses.
14. SSB was very much active even at the age of 84 (when he celebrated his
birthday on 23 November 2010); he made public appearances twice daily
(morning and evening) at his residence, Prasanthi Nilayam at Puttaparthi.
15. By saying that the place ‘Shirdi’ attracts SSB followers it implies those
followers who believed that SSB is the incarnation of Shirdi Sai Baba and
does not refer to the followers of Shirdi Sai Baba.
16. The programme is now used worldwide and is ‘developed and cultur-
ally adapted for use in countries as far apart as Australia, the UK, Sweden,
Canada, Malaysia, Thailand and Zambia’. Since the programme is ‘univer-
sally relevant and value-based’ it transcends all cultures and backgrounds
(Arweck and Nesbitt, 2007: 315–16).
17. SSB Central Trust was founded by SSB as a public charitable trust in 1972.
(www.sathyasai.org/ashrams/centraltrust.htm
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Part III
Media
8
Transnational Subject/
Transnational Audience: The NRI
Trope and Diasporic Aesthetic in
Diasporic Romance Films
Sarah A. Joshi
Introduction
When the film Pardes (Foreign Land) (Subhash Ghai, 1997) was released,
one of the accompanying promotional posters read ‘American Dreams,
Indian Soul’, with images of the New York skyline and Taj Mahal juxta-
posed behind the male and female protagonists. Indian national iden-
tity in the 1990s was increasingly negotiated outside India in diasporic
romance films often focused on the fantastical lives of wealthy NRIs. In
part, this reflects Bollywood’s conscientious effort to appeal to its over-
seas market which has proven to be extremely lucrative at times. Rising
demand for Indian movies abroad continues to drive the overseas film
market and profits are expected to grow from Rs. 8 billion in 2009 to Rs.
14.5 billion in 2014 (PWC Report, 2010: 54). In 2000, the first annual
International Indian Film Awards were held in London, signalling the
importance of the diaspora to the film industry, both as an audience
and as a narrative subject and setting. The popular films of the 1990s
and 2000s suggest that nationalism and globalisation are not incompat-
ible, where they reimagine the nation as a deterritorialised space that
embraces its diasporic community.1
Increasingly, Indian politicians, businesses and media have empha-
sised how important it is to cater to not only the growing middle-class
in India, but also to the massive diaspora outside it. By this, I refer to
examples such as the OCI card, the annual Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, or
Non-Resident Indian Day, amongst other initiatives. Jigna Desai states,
167
168 Sarah A. Joshi
‘Many hopes have been pinned on the success of Bollywood as a global

cinema for transnational, cosmopolitan, and diasporic viewers’ (Desai,
2006: 115). This chapter will provide a more comprehensive analysis of
the importance of diasporic romance films from the 1990s and the devel-
opment of a diasporic aesthetic and how the NRI trope functions within
them. The NRI trope is the result of a particular configuration of state,
political economy and cultural orientation of the diasporic Indian.
Those diasporic romance films which marked the emergence of the
NRI hero such as the 1990s films Kuch Kuch Hota Hai (Something is
Happening) (Karan Johar, 1998), Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge (The Big
Hearted Will Take the Bride) (Aditya Chopra, 1995) and Pardes are
directly related to the variation and evolution of the romantic genre to
include interracial romantic interests, and will form my filmic analyses
in this chapter. I will also consider the blockbuster Kabhi Khushi Kabie
Gham (Sometimes Happy, Sometimes Sad) (Karan Johar, 2001). These
films broke ground in their articulation of a new Indian subject, one
that was both Indian and international; the conjunction of which led
to a distinct expression of cosmopolitanism. While there were earlier
films which also represented NRIs and the West in this manner, there
is something of an intensity of concern in the narratives of the 1990s
films that was missing from earlier depictions. My main theoretical
position is that the NRI developed a diasporic aesthetic in the 1990s,
foregrounding the centrality of the NRI in popular Hindi cinema.
My focus of analysis primarily will be the films of the 1990s in which
both the diaspora and the figure of the NRI began to feature promi-
nently in film narratives, turning into a fully formed stock character by
the end of the decade, and in which the space of the diaspora is used
as a testing ground for conceptions of Indianness and cultural citizen-
ship. In other words, the 1990s signalled important developments in the
popular Hindi filmscape, solidifying the NRI trope and the contours of
the diasporic aesthetic. The diasporic aesthetic is a distinctive mode of
expression; its analysis is important, as Peter Brooks observes, ‘Aesthetic
forms are means for interpreting and making sense of experience’ (1976:
206). It is important to fully theorise the NRI trope as a socio-political
concept and its relevance to popular Hindi film.
Early filmic engagements with the diaspora
In the 1949 film Andaz (Gesture) (Mehboob Khan), Dilip, a new friend
of Neena’s, informs her he is from Africa, at which Neena laughs. This
prompts him to say jokingly that she probably wonders why he does
Transnational Subject/Transnational Audience 169
not look like a gorilla, but in fact, he is an Indian boy by origin. This
exchange is interesting given its direct mention of the diaspora, and the
ways in which the film pits Dilip and Neena’s husband-to-be Rajan, who
is often in Europe, against one another.2 There are a limited number
of early Hindi films which engage with the diaspora in a concerted
manner. Instead, there are instances of passing reference to someone
having just returned or departed, in which case their manner, speech
and dress may seem affected, or there are contrived reasons for being
abroad such as holidays, business or an intrigue of some sort.3 Much
like the government’s attitude of ambivalence or indifference, the early
film industry largely overlooked the diaspora. It is only later that the
diaspora is acknowledged as not just one of the key elements of Hindi
cinema in respect of the ‘tourist gaze’ (Mazumdar, 2011), but a loyal
audience as well. Therefore, to begin to formulate the trope of the NRI, I
must skip a large period of Hindi film and go to the year 1970.
One of the most important films on the diaspora, and one which
reflects particular attitudes of the time towards the NRI, is Purab aur
Paschim (East and West) (Manoj Kumar, 1970), a film which arguably
captures some of the anxieties and ambivalence held in India over the
large-scale migration from India to places such as the UK in the 1960s.
In fact, prior to the protagonist’s departure from India to London, his
guru complains of the ‘brain drain’ India is experiencing (a reference
to the anxiety of 1960s mass migration), and warns him against losing
himself and his culture while abroad. I will focus on this film in order
to lay a foundation on which later 1990s diasporic romance films have
built upon or attempted to re-envisage their cultural, racial and territo-
rial dynamics.
Purab aur Paschim is often popularly cited as showcasing the most
scathing critique of the NRI (and the West). The film centres on Bharat,
the son of a deceased freedom fighter, who journeys to London to study.4
Bharat’s core beliefs are put to the test while abroad, as he encounters
NRIs who hold no interest in or knowledge of India or Indian behav-
iours and values. While staying with an Indian family, Bharat endures
a test of his ‘Indianness’, especially in his budding relationship with
the family’s daughter, Preeti. She is appalled by everything Indian and
Bharat must try to convince Preeti and others that their way of thinking
must become Indian. Bharat’s experience with the family is jarring; the
father is disillusioned with life in London, the mother, a (what would
become stereotypical) NRI who has never been to India and never wants
to go, and their children, a hippie son and scandalous daughter Preeti,
are completely ignorant or dismissive of their parental culture.5
170 Sarah A. Joshi
When we see Preeti for the first time, smoking in the airport, title words
appear on the screen saying ‘And the West’, as she embodies the antith-
esis of Bharat (both the person and the country) in almost every way.
We are then presented with a montage of London and its nightlife, with
lots of strip clubs, Playboy bunnies and other markers of illicit Western
decadence. Throughout the film, Bharat meets many other Indians who
also represent the most detested stereotypes of NRIs: the NRI who has
never been to India, the NRI who has abandoned his Indian wife and
child for a white woman, the wealthy NRI businessman who sneers at
backward India, and so on. One of the latter kinds of villains of the
film, Herman, goes off on a rant at the India club, saying he prefers a
country where no one needs anything, and to be in a country that does
not depend on any other country. He insists that India has contributed
nothing, and leaves after Bharat sings a nationalist song. Herman’s son,
also a villain, represents a sort of demonic spawn whose character and
behaviour is the result of having been raised abroad. A secondary villain,
or at least, a very unlikable character, is Preeti’s mother, who detests
India despite never having been there. Upon discussing taking Preeti
to India, she tells Bharat that there will be no home for them to live in
there, no food, and not enough money to survive, again placing India
as a destitute third world country in terms of material resources and lack
of a capitalist economy.
Bharat, however, says he cannot leave his country for Preeti, but
agrees that in order to marry Preeti he will stay wherever she stays, on
the condition that she visit India and get his family’s blessings first.
Bharat says that the beautiful soil of his country fills even a stranger’s
heart, and he is confident he can get Preeti to want to stay in India once
she is there. Initially, Preeti hates India, finding herself frightened by
images of gods on posters, and continuing to smoke and drink on the
sly. However, by the end of the film, Preeti says every country has its
shortcomings, but that in India children are everything to their parents
and vice versa and she never realised that before about their relation-
ship. Preeti realises the problems with alcohol, smoking and Western
ways and so she throws out her cigarettes and alcohol. Her conver-
sion is so complete that she prays in a temple while wearing a sari and
vows she will never go back to London. At the same time, her once
callous mother tears up her and her husband’s plane tickets to London,
as she too has been won over to India. Bharat single-handedly rescues
a number of Indians while he is abroad, signalling a growing attitude
of the time that the diaspora could only be saved by a physical and
ideological return to roots.
Bharat, as representative of India and all that ‘Indianness’ entails,

is the shot of penicillin that saves Preeti’s family from their illness,
relieving the father of his heavy heart and restoring him to his patri-
archal position. In his restoration, he forces the mother into a position
of domesticity, the son into spirituality, and Preeti into the role of good
daughter and dutiful wife. While vindicating a sense of superiority for
the home audience with this kind of moral prerogative, a film such as
this simultaneously satisfies a desire to see the purportedly scandalous
yet glamorous lifestyle of the NRI, and the places he inhabits in the
West. This simultaneous desire for the NRI’s lifestyle and disdain for his
lack of morals and adherence to tradition is a construction I do not have
space to discuss here. It is not until the 1990s that the NRI would receive
a spotlight of the same magnitude as Purab aur Paschim.
It is important here to discuss the concept of ‘Indianness’ and early
Hindi film’s conversion of its NRI and diasporic characters. In films post-
independence through the 1970s, characters that resided abroad or had
resided abroad were most often represented negatively. They had to go
through a kind of detoxification to rid themselves of the disease that
was westernisation, and be revitalised to embody ‘Indianness’ in order
to be redeemed. This also points to the gendered aspect of the diaspora,
in that during this period it would have almost exclusively been single
young men acquiring the educational capital of going abroad, or
emigrating for labour purposes. In later popular Hindi films, the scope
of focus would widen to include representations of those diasporans
who chose to remain abroad permanently. Often, as in the case of Purab
aur Paschim, those who had stayed abroad were negatively characterised
through associations with westernised manners, such as drinking and
smoking, which made them similar to the criminal gangsters and molls
of 1970s films. In the 1990s, these stock-in-trade stereotypes began to be
more ambiguous where, for instance, with the example of films such as
DDLJ, it was possible to be Indian and reside abroad (although the nega-
tive stereotypes remained as a point of conflict and contrast to them in
the films). The trope of the NRI during all these stages is present, albeit
under constant negotiation and reinterpretation.
Now reely Indian: the NRI’s Indianness finds filmic

expression
For many years the films that were exported to the diaspora either
neglected to properly acknowledge its existence, or, when they did, did
so with a negative parody or caricature. The 1990s films were a shift
172 Sarah A. Joshi
from the previous ideology which marked the diaspora as outsiders, but
Jigna Desai attributes this change to greater forces:
In the early 1990s, with the rise of discourse on the death of the
nation due to globalization, diaspora was hailed as a deterritorialized
geopolitical community succeeding the nation in an age of increasing
globalization. (2004: viii)
Thus Indian identity was re-imagined as a deterritorialised cultural iden-

tity, dependent not on citizenship but on one’s Indianness, and the
figure of the NRI occupies the space of cultural citizenship in this figura-
tion. Bringing NRIs into the national fold meant conceptions of Indian
nationality were simultaneously being reconfigured:
In fact, if films could provide an ideology of Indian identity that

appealed to Indians in India as well as Indians outside the nation’s
borders, the project of nationhood could be embraced through the
imaginary of both groups and then used as a common tie to unite
them. (Malhotra and Alagh, 2004: 26)
A diasporic aesthetic thus emerges in the 1990s and the NRI was posi-
tioned as a hero; films like DDLJ, Pardes and KKHH centred on the loss
and recovery of Indianness, as well as on the economic aspirations of
the ‘good life’ that appealed to the mobile middle-class in India.
The NRIs in the films of the 1990s are shown living comfortable, or
even extravagant lives. Daya Thussu refers to the new diaspora cinema
as the ‘Manhattan-in-Mumbai’ genre (2008: 107–8). This wealth that
the NRI characters are shown to have is received with both desire and
disdain; it is coveted for its lavish displays of commodities and designer
goods and indication of the good life while simultaneously held in
contempt, and envied perhaps, for its ability to corrupt good Indian
morals of the other characters.
The designer hero: consumptive aesthetics
The climactic reunion scene of the blockbuster film Kabhi Khushi Kabhie
Gham (Sometimes Happy, Sometimes Sad) (Karan Johar, 2001), popu-
larly referred to as K3G, set in a shopping mall, reflects one of many new
spaces of filmic liberalisation. In these diasporic romance films, these
spaces function as dual signifiers of both locality and familiarity: Indians
are shown populating these new spaces of capitalist desire, spaces that
are also global and cosmopolitan and ‘anywhere’ in their non-specificity

or non-placeness (Augé, 1995). The diasporic romance films of the 1990s
focused on a new kind of subjectivity, one that reflected a transnational
sensibility and a desire to consume the Other. This was most successfully
embodied in the form of the NRI, who was often shown to possess the
cultural capital which identified them as cosmopolitan.
In particular, when thinking of conspicuous consumption as alluded
to by Ronald Inden (1999), one must remember that there are conse-
quences for the individual’s social standing. Cultural status is then deter-
mined by the amount of cultural capital one possesses. Furthermore, the
knowledge of which cultural capital to acquire comes through a degree
of cultural competence. The fluidity of movement across borders, and
the ability to adapt in the host country via the knowledge of English,
business, but more importantly, the knowledge of what to consume,
all characterised this new class, which Saadia Toor refers to as ‘cosmo-
politan yuppies’ (2000: 13).
The figure of the hero that emerged in popular films during the 1990s
no longer displayed a Nehruvian sensibility of deferment, but instead
a desire for immediacy and commodity gratification. The ‘new’ hero
consumes and carries the cultural capital unlike Bharat from Purab aur
Paschim, and it does not make him a bad person for doing so, if done
within limits. Popular films in India since the 1990s have embraced the
explosion of new commodities into the market, visibly displaying their
characters’ wealth through branded clothing, imported cars, and even
drinking particular beverages. Commodity aesthetics have remade the
misé-en-scene of contemporary Hindi film, saturating the screen as if it is
part of a commercial television advertisement.
This consumption often takes place in faraway places, either as the
result of lavish holidays or of the characters residing abroad. The post-
1990s middle-class became the new love object of popular film, romanced
on screen and accompanied by the itinerant images of a middle-class
lifestyle and practices of consumption. However, the operating morality
within these films remained one which accommodated the new visual
designer and often diasporic aesthetic, while maintaining Indianness in
terms of manners and beliefs (Partha Chatterjee’s ‘inner’, 1989).
The power of the film industry to promote and engage with interna-
tional symbols and styles of luxury and status has created an ambiva-
lence about luxury and traditional values. Coonoor Kripalani’s (2006)
article on product placement in Bollywood maps the relationship of film
and consumerism in India. Perhaps what makes the films of the 1990s
simultaneous with liberalisation and those post-millennial which are
174 Sarah A. Joshi
now part of this developed economy so important is that those with

contemporary storylines can be peppered, or more often flooded, with
conspicuous brands and products. With the rise of diasporic romance
films focused on wealthy NRIs abroad, viewers are blasted with logoed
clothing and technology, luxury cars and tourist sites. As Kripalani
notes, ‘The influence of the popular film media then provides the ideal
space to market goods that promote a certain lifestyle which reflect the
aspirations of its audience’ (2006: 198).
In these instances, these goods and products are associated with the
global world and with the wealthy, and with the view of globalisation as
being primarily positive. Ashis Nandy, however, notes the way in which
these products are reconfigured when localised through Indian films:
Elements of mass culture, disembedded from their global context,

can become popular (e.g. denim and cola drinks). But that by itself
means little; for these elements have to be processed through the
local popular culture which provides, exactly for that purpose, an
indigenously forged bicultural sieve. The Indian cinema not only
does this processing on behalf of a vulnerable section of the Indian
population, it also has a built-in plurality that tends to subvert mass
culture even when seemingly adapting to it passively. (1998: 13)
The media representations of middle-class lifestyles and consumption

have significant political consequences; an increased sense of national
identity and nationhood has accompanied the new consumer citizen-
ship (Lukose, 2009; Ong, 1999). The middle-class is constructed as
much through economics as symbolically in visual media. According
to Inden:
What we see since liberalisation is an attempt on the part of elites

and middle classes to reclaim the cinema as a vehicle for representing
themselves not only to themselves but also to the nation and the
world. (1999: 64)
The fantasy spaces in these films are predicated on a moral universe that
is contingent on the political economy, appealing to the aspirant classes
and reflective for the middle to upper class.
The 1990s brought about a surge in films that embraced the liberal-
ised economy and everything that it supposedly brought with it: a high
flying lifestyle, possession of designer goods from clothes to electronic
gadgets and entry into the upper echelons of society. This development
has been referred to as the designer film, which refers both to aesthetic
and narrative changes:
The designer film ... the global Indian who wears imported clothing,
flies to foreign lands at will, drives executive foreign cars and sports
a designer haircut. He exists in the film not merely to attract the
diasporic and urban Indian audience but also to signal the problems
that confront ‘India’s Generation Now’. He is an Indian who is still
rooted in the values of the land but is unapologetic about embracing
the material trappings of affluence and western influence. (Gokulsing
and Dissanayake, 2004: 115)
These films identify such issues as changing gender roles, family conflicts
over changing lifestyles, and the anxiety of living overseas, and typically
feature conspicuous consumption. However, this is not just a desire of
the middle-class; it is also one of the state, as Monika Mehta argues:
the expression of a commitment to those values as shown in films

like DDLJ overlap with the Indian state’s political, cultural, and
economic agendas, which seeks to attract the investments of non-
resident Indians and to constitute new national subjects. (2007: 36)
But while these films may have been expressing anxieties, they also, to a
certain extent, celebrated and glamorised the lifestyle of the NRI and the
urban middle-class in India. It is important to note that the appeal being
made is not to a sense of state or regional identity or membership, but to
culture, and hence to the appeal of cultural citizenship.
In diasporic romance films such as DDLJ, Pardes and KKHH, the
middle-class (or by film standards the upper middle-class) are depicted
in diasporic milieus, playing into the audience’s desire for difference,
the exotic, and for the lifestyle of the NRI. The NRI functions as a figure
that is simultaneously exotic and familiar, expressing sameness through
difference, and situated in a role of an aspirational figure. The fascina-
tion with the NRI is at the forefront of the diasporic romance films of the
1990s. This does not mean that the diaspora is represented as an unprob-
lematic space but rather the moral universe of popular Hindi cinema has
been geographically transplanted or reterritorialised to encompass and
embrace its diaspora.
What these films also focused on was the mobility between these
two settings: the home and the diaspora, and the ways in which some
Indians were corrupted, some remained true to Indian values, others
176 Sarah A. Joshi
hybridised and some who could not cope who returned to the home-
land. Conspicuous consumption, what one does with one’s wealth
and leisure time, particularly while abroad, is central in the diasporic
romance films of the 1990s. For example, in Pardes, Rajiv, the son of a
wealthy NRI family, is revealed to be corrupt and immoral, squandering
his money on parties, alcohol and cigarettes. However, his foster brother
Arjun, who is presented as slightly less affluent in that he runs his own
mechanic shop, embodies notions of Indianness in his moral sensibili-
ties and in his lack of conspicuous consumption, indicating a neo-Gan-
dhian restraint representative of the old middle-class.
However, films such as DDLJ and KKHH do not depict wealth as an
entirely corrupting force. Instead, the wealthy in these films often
perform traditional religio-cultural acts in keeping with notions of
Indianness, or rather Hindu-ness, representative of the new middle-
class. Mazzarella refers to this ‘cultural-religious chauvinism’ in his essay
on the Indian middle-class, drawing attention to the characteristics
of religious nationalism and mass consumerism (2005: 8). The media
reflected a new Indianness, one that was cosmopolitan, and attentive to
this middle-class:
This guardianship of cultural tradition was not just a matter of ‘high’

textual sources; rather the 1980s and 1990s saw the emergence of a
powerful new mass-mediated idiom of Indianness on television and
in the Hindi cinema that was at once globally savvy and often cultur-
ally conservative. (Mazzarella, 2005: 9)
The kind of global Indian male referred to here is reminiscent of Shah

Rukh Khan’s role in DDLJ and Salman Khan’s role in Main Pyar Kiya
(I Fell in Love) (Sooraj R. Barjatya, 1989).6 Led by the new ‘consumable
hero’, as Sudhanva Deshpande (2005) describes him, the films since the
1990s clearly put cultural identity at the forefront of diasporic experi-
ence, attempting to reconcile Indian identity with a globalised land-
scape, refer to Figure 8.1, Kabhi Khushi Kabhie Gham (Karan Johar, 2001).
Deshpande defines the new hero of popular Hindi films in the 1990s
against that of the 1970s ‘angry young man’. The angry young man
refers to the roles made famous by Amitabh Bachchan in the 1970s in
such films as Sholay (Embers) (Ramesh Sippy, 1975) and Deewar (The
Wall) (Yash Chopra, 1975). Deshpande’s new hero is instead an embodi-
ment of the newly liberalised economy: ‘In contrast, the new, liberalised
hero is neither angry nor is he particularly anti-establishment. He is, on
the other hand, rich and conformist in his social attitudes’ (2005, 187).
Figure 8.1 The consumable hero of Kabhi Khushi Kabhie Gham (Karan Johar,
2001)
However, Deshpande’s new hero is perhaps not entirely new, as Sumita

Chakravarty (2008) locates an earlier avatar which she refers to as
the ‘mobile hero’. What is significantly new is the extension of the
consumptive aesthetic to the representation of bodies; men display
chiselled bodies and women, supermodel features. The entrenchment of
commodification has led to a further commodification of bodies, to be
irrepressibly displayed, paraded and consumed.
Diasporic romance films (1990s)
The most prominent films to engage with the diaspora in the 1990s
were the blockbusters DDLJ and Pardes. The sweeping economic reforms
of the 1990s and the increasing globalisation of the media made the
construction of ‘Indianness’ on screen more urgent than before. In the
massive blockbuster DDLJ, the NRI as an object of desire and envy is put
to dramatic effect. Simran Singh is a young woman who lives with her
family in London, a first generation British Indian. Her father, Baldev
Singh, played sternly by Amrish Puri, has lived in London half his life.
He feels like a stranger in his adopted homeland where, as he states in
an opening voiceover, no one knows his name, he no longer belongs to
a country, and he longs to go back to Punjab where he would no longer
be shackled to his bread (money/work). The obligatory travel brochure
178 Sarah A. Joshi
shots of London are provided, with iconic shots of the river Thames,
the Houses of Parliament with its imposing Big Ben and sweeping green
parks. As Ranjani Mazumdar noted of 1960s travel films, and which can
be seen in diasporic-centred films still, ‘The camera strives for diverse
viewing possibilities, and a series of tableaux shots creates the pleasure
of travel’ (2011: 138). Shah Rukh Khan, the standard actor for the 1990s
articulation of the good NRI, plays wealthy Raj Malhotra.7 It is neces-
sary to pause for a moment on the importance of Khan’s role as the
key mascot of a modern and post-liberalisation India in popular Hindi
films. Khan has performed a particular version of the NRI which has
been promulgated by the conjunction of the highly successful films in
which he played these roles, his dominating industry status, and the
scripting of his characters as often admirable and deferential men who
can sport Indian and western attire and attitudes with equal finesse
(Dyer, 1979).
Raj plays Western sports like rugby, basketball and bowling, drives
motorcycles and Lamborghinis and leads a relatively carefree life.
Simran, from a more typical middle-class background, is devastated to
discover that she has been betrothed to a family friend before she was
born. Simran’s father thinks this is a sign of culture and etiquette, for
which being an Indian, he has instilled in her despite being raised in
London, as she is shamefaced and shy. Raj incidentally meets Baldev at
his convenience store where he steals beer from the store, an apparent
sign of his Western corruption and lack of respect for his elders, and a
sign that he is not Hindustani, as Baldev says. For Simran, India is the land
she has never seen, where she has been arranged to marry a complete
stranger, Kuljeet, the son of a family friend. Before the marriage Simran
begs to go on a month-long Eurorail tour of Europe.
On this tour her path crosses Raj’s and after a series of events they
find themselves in a hotel room together. Raj says he is not scum, he is
Hindustani despite being born in London and he knows what honour
means to a Hindustani woman, confirming that he did not in fact take
advantage of the inebriated Simran the night before. Simran’s father
is so upset over his daughter’s new found love that he sells everything
and moves the family to Punjab. Simran’s fiancé Kuljeet is made to
seem unworthy of her in that he seems cocky, enjoys hunting, is too
virile, and talks about knowing what she will be like after the wedding,
referring to sexual activities. The film ends with a bloody fight between
Raj and Simran and Kuljeet’s families, with Raj ultimately receiving
Baldev’s blessing when Simran is allowed to jump on a train to escape
with him.
Time and time again in the film Raj proves himself to be a Hindustani
and to embody the oft-cited traits of Indianness. Whereas Simran never
had to prove these qualities, Raj is made to affirm this status at multiple
junctures, perhaps none more notable than when he refuses to elope
with Simran, despite her and her mother’s willingness, and says he will
not take her unless Baldev consents. The character of Raj offered an NRI
who exuded so much Indianness that he was made to seem more Indian
than those at home could be.
Patricia Uberoi (1998) has written some incisive analyses of DDLJ and
Pardes, and her reading argues that DDLJ is unique for many reasons,
one of which is how it makes the issue of how to be Indian outside
of India a problem not just for the diaspora but for those based in the
subcontinent as well. However, the film is also important in that it
suggests that Indianness can be maintained outside of India, albeit with
replenishments from visits and time spent in India. There is an affective
resonance to the stock roles represented by Raj and Kuljeet, as well as the
actors who perform these roles in multiple films. This allows the spec-
tator to identify with the dynamics of their affective appeal, particularly
with Shah Rukh Khan as the emblem or mascot of the NRI, adored by
diasporic and home audiences. This ties into the concept of the consum-
able hero as well, and the transnational appeal of such a character.
In post-liberalisation India, DDLJ represented a rupture in the concep-
tion of the diaspora, national identity and the construction or embodi-
ment of Indianness. Suddenly, the problem of maintaining an Indian
identity abroad became a topic that resonated with Indians at home. A
certain anxiety over liberalisation and Western influences is articulated
through Simran’s betrothed, Kuljeet, as despite residing in India he is
less ethical as an idealised Indian discourse would have it than Raj as
he drinks, smokes and acts in a crass manner. Raj, on the other hand,
repeatedly invokes the two most important tenets of Indianness: respect
for elders and respect for women. Raj proves that the West is a space in
which Indianness can be maintained, while simultaneously embracing
a kind of cosmopolitan globalised lifestyle. Again, an appeal to cultural
citizenship seems to be made through this, in that Raj is as much, if not
more Indian as those who may actually hold those legal and political
rights. The possession of this cultural citizenship is more appreciated
than the actual holding of legal citizenship.
Just two years after the success of DDLJ, Shah Rukh Khan would
once again play an NRI hero as Arjun in the hit Pardes, which exposes
the moral vacuity of many NRIs. Amrish Puri reprises his role as the
diasporic patriarch, Kishorilal, this time as the foster parent of Arjun.
180 Sarah A. Joshi
On a visit to an old friend in India, Kishorilal meets his friend’s

daughter, Ganga, who like Bharat of Purab aur Paschim has a name
which reflects her embodiment of pure India, referring to the Ganges
river. Kishorilal asks his friend for his daughter’s hand in marriage to
his biological son Rajiv:
I’m asking for your daughter’s hand in marriage because we NRIs need
girls like her very badly. Because we’ve pushed our kids so deeply in
English books and manners, that somewhere or the other, even after
seeing so much success we feel as though we’re failures. And seeing
all this today, girls like Ganga are our only source of hope.
Kishorilal sees Ganga as the perfect match for Rajiv and arranges to
send his son and foster son Arjun to India to meet Ganga and finalise a
match. Rajiv was born and raised in the US by his widower father, and
like many NRIs has never been to India.
From the beginning of Ganga’s experience in the US, where she goes
prior to the wedding, all she encounters is hostility, condescension and
cultural corruption in Westerners, Rajiv’s extended family and Rajiv
himself. At one point, it is mentioned that half the people in Kishorilal’s
house are Indian and the other half, Western, in other words, there is
no in-between. On a trip, Ganga learns that Rajiv likes discos, smoking
and drinking to the point of belligerency. She also learns that Rajiv has
a white ex-girlfriend, Kelly, with whom he had a sexual relationship,
and that Rajiv identifies himself as an American and not Indian. Arjun
tells Rajiv that Ganga is not like other girls, that Indian girls, especially
those from rural areas, cannot bear this cultural shock, and that he
should wait to change Ganga slowly after marriage. It is interesting to
note a discussion in which it is essentially argued that it is imperative
to de-Indianise her.
Ganga goes to Vegas, the ultimate embodiment of Western profligate
sin, with Rajiv and his friends. Rajiv gambles, drinks and carries on,
says he wants to teach her how to make love, and that all his American
friends are enjoying things behind closed doors with their girlfriends.
Ganga responds, ‘Try to understand. They are Westerners, and we’re
Indians. Our culture forbids boys and girls doing such things before
marriage.’ Rajiv says that Indians are hypocrites because they whine and
cry about sex and keep men and women separate, yet they live in an
overpopulated country. He adds ‘You Bloody Indians’, implying again
that he is not one, and calls her and her family illiterate villagers. Rajiv
further insults Ganga and India by saying, ‘Your India is no better than
shit and stinks like cow dung’, to which Ganga slaps him and says: ‘You
abuse our India’. Rajiv always says ‘your’ and Ganga ‘our’ or ‘we’; Ganga,
transplanted in the US, continues to think of herself as part of the great
Indian family, in opposition to Rajiv who refuses to acknowledge himself
as part of that group which he holds in such contempt. Ganga repeat-
edly tries to recapitulate Rajiv as an Indian while he continuously tries
to disassociate himself. Ganga retorts that, ‘We consider your wealth
and your drug-infested America unworthy of holding a candle to India.’
He calls her a bloody bitch and slaps her. She fights him and he tries to
rape her so she hits him over the head with a bottle and runs away. She
is almost sexually accosted at a railway station by two men, an incident
that seems to draw the line on her experience of this foreign land. Upon
encountering Arjun, she says that she was lied to when she was told an
Indian could marry a foreigner (presumably meaning an NRI) and that
Rajiv is not Indian.
Unlike DDLJ, representations of NRIs in Pardes, barring Arjun, are
consistently portrayed negatively as scheming and cruel. The NRI
women dress in an inappropriate manner, showing lots of skin while
they ridicule India and Indian traditions. Rajiv’s family embraces the
belief that in America they should act like Americans, which, based on
their behaviour, does not speak highly of Americans. Arjun is not west-
ernised even though he has been in America for some time, perhaps
because he came over when he was ten, which must be the age of
immunity from the ills of westernisation. Pardes condemns the West
in no uncertain terms; the West assaults Ganga at every turn, and even
NRIs are enemies. For the audience at home, there is a sense of a fear
being instilled regarding the diaspora, as writer Amitava Kumar posits:
Imagine viewers in India who have never caught a plane abroad.

When they see such films, even when they are drowned in the titil-
lation of watching commodity culture on full display, they are also
consoled for having never made the wrong decision of crossing the
seven seas. (2002: 217)
Kishorilal had hoped to instil Indianness in Rajiv through marriage to

the pure Indian girl, Ganga, but his son is proved to be irredeemable.
Given the deep anxieties that Pardes expresses regarding the diaspora,
the nation is exalted as a space of safety that should not be left or
forgotten.
A final example from the 1990s comes from the hugely successful
Karan Johar’s film, which in itself marked a new aesthetic that the
182 Sarah A. Joshi
producer/director developed, the 1998 Kuch Kuch Hota Hai. KKHH

follows the lives of Rahul Khanna and Anjali Sharma, two college best
friends who despite their closeness only realised their feelings for one
another too late. Rahul instead falls in love and marries a new student,
Tina Malhotra. The NRI character, Tina, is the daughter of the school-
master, who has just returned to India from London having studied at
Oxford University. Tina wears Western clothing like short skirts, which
causes Rahul, once again played by Shah Rukh Khan, to say she is not
his type of girl as she is not Hindustani, as she studied and grew up
in London and that Londoners are quite different. Rahul reasons, ‘A
girl should make you feel like taking her to your mother.’ He teases
Tina, asking whether she has forgotten Hindi after living in London,
to which she surprises him by singing a spiritual song in Hindi. Tina
embodies a contradiction in Raj’s mind, between her appearance and
her substance (or inner Indianness), and it is one which paves the way
for his vicarious enjoyment of a good Indian woman in Western garb.
Tina informs Rahul, ‘By growing up in London or by studying there, I
haven’t forgotten our traditions.’
While Tina may outwardly at times display vampish Western traits
in her choice of clothing, she has maintained her inner Indianness. Yet
her character dies after a difficult childbirth and Rahul ultimately finds
romance with his old school friend Anjali. To what extent does this
problematise the NRI, in that she is expunged from the narrative? Rahul
himself becomes an NRI partway through the film, moving abroad and
raising his daughter with his mother. If NRI begets NRI, this is a slightly
unpalatable idea that must be remedied with yet again a return to roots,
as Rahul and his daughter then replenish their Indianness and secure an
Indian wife/mother to complete their family.
KKHH is one of the blockbuster hits of the 1990s that captures the
aspirations of the liberalised economy, and yet reinforces traditional
values. The characters, both male and female, are often dressed in
trendy western clothing, such as Anjali in her sporty track suits and
bob haircut. Diasporic backdrops are used in an appeal to tourism, set
in idealised iconic sites, with one song set in front of a ruined castle
in Scotland/England. Thus KKHH’s success can be attributed to several
important innovations. It had cross-generational appeal, offering the
younger generation conspicuous signs of designer goods and brands,
hairstyles and exotic locales. Yet it also worked within the prescribed
moral universe, reassuringly showing that Tina’s time abroad had not
corrupted her and also showing that despite all outer appearances of
westernisation, the youths in the film were always concerned with living
within the bounds of Indianness, through observance of religious rituals,

respect for elders and condemning of overly westernised Indians.
These dynamics continue post-millennially with the film Kabhi Khushi
Kabhie Gham (Sometimes Happy, Sometimes Sad) (Karan Johar, 2001).
Rahul, again played by Shah Rukh Khan, goes against the wishes of his
wealthy adopted father, and weds Kamala, a girl of a lower caste and
class, again played by Kajol. The newlyweds go to London after falling
out with Rahul’s family, live wealthy and successful lives in a big house
with their son Krishna and Kamala’s sister, Pooja (known as Poo). While
Rahul and Kamala are presented as trying to maintain Indian values,
Poo, who was much younger (and therefore more susceptible) at the
time of the move, is shown as a spoilt, westernised college student.
It is at this time, after living in the US for many years, that Rahul’s
brother Rohan, played by Hrithik Roshan, arrives. He is all grown up
and unrecognisable, and while pretending to be someone else, befriends
his brother and the family and woos Pooja while reminding her that she
is in fact Indian.
Rohan is able to represent a cosmopolitan Indianness: irresistible
to white women yet only desiring the Indian woman, flaunting his
muscular physique in designer clothes, dancing in the British Museum,
with the reunification of his family his sole priority. While Deshpande
refers to this as the new consumable hero, Aswin Punathambekar refers
to this as the ‘super Indian’:
The quintessential transnational cosmopolitan, who can navigate

multiple cultural spaces with consummate ease, Hrithik’s character
is, in fact, an embodiment of a ‘super-Indian’, whose Indianness tran-
scends both that of the resident and nonresident Indian. (2005: 162)
Kamala is presented as a nostalgic NRI. She is unwilling to assimilate,

making fun of her white neighbour in Hindi and refusing to address her
in English. She wants to teach her son about India, due to the fact that
he has never been there, as in her opinion India is the best country in the
world. Kamala is worried that their son is already half an Englishman,
and on his way to becoming a full one, expressing a diasporic anxiety
of wanting to prevent the acculturation of children. Kamala wishes they
were in India so their son would grow up singing the songs she sung,
and call her mother and not the English ‘mummy’. Kamala wants to
go home to India, saying these are not ‘our people’. K3G expresses the
anxieties of maintaining Indianness in the diaspora, as articulated by
the female characters of Kamala and her sister, Pooja, while also testing
184 Sarah A. Joshi
the new post-liberalisation hero who can easily move into the diaspora
while confidently remaining Indian.
Conclusion
All of the aforementioned films are an important part of the diasporic

romance genre, providing groundbreaking articulations of the diasporic
subject while grappling with the anxieties of maintaining Indianness,
embracing cultural citizenship, and reconciling home/diasporic persons.
In the films that focus on the figure of the NRI, Indianness is tested of
those both within and outside India. The ideal resolution to these films
is the reconciliation of the NRI and the natal Indian and their ability
to each fulfil the particular needs, desires and aspirations of the other.
The idea of des pardes, home from home or at home abroad, in the films
of the 1990s in particular, is rendered problematically given the need
for a return to roots in each film.8 These films also articulate important
gendered aspects of the diaspora in regards to women as bearers of tradi-
tion and the consumable hero as cosmopolitan, as well as conceptions
of contamination or pollution for Indians abroad.
Whereas the 1990s films featured the new sense of individual consum-
erism in the recently liberalised economy reflected in the development
of a diasporic post-liberal aesthetic, it did so within parameters of iden-
tification with Indianness, whether they are located in the subconti-
nent or overseas. This new aesthetic is characterised by: movement
through various transnational spaces, travel and tourism, commodity
placements and other aspects of consumer culture, libidinalised bodies,
as well as an erosion of certain aspects of the moral universe, some of
which are entrenched by the end of the film. These diasporic romances
are important in foregrounding the articulation of a new transnational
and cosmopolitan Indian subject, and the trope of the NRI. These films
also cast transnational relationships into the spotlight, albeit ones
that still conformed to the strictures of class, religion and other deter-
mining principles. Bollywood is constantly conceptualising the tension
of cultural maintenance outside of and within India, and the NRI has
become the figure to thrust this project onto.
Notes
1. There is a parallel process going on to William Mazzarella’s (2003) argument
that with globalisation/liberalisation comes a current to define India, Indians
and their products as distinct and distinctive.
2. The platonic relationship between Neena and the NRI Dilip was not counte-
nanced and Neena, in the end, is punished for it.
3. For example, the 1964 film Sangam (Confluence) (Raj Kapoor, 1964) uses an
extended honeymoon as a means to go to London, Rome, Venice and Paris.
4. Bharat’s name means ‘homeland’, as well as India.
5. The westernised Indian that must be rescued is a theme that is also explored
in the film Hare Rama Hare Krishna (Dev Anand, 1971).
6. Shah Rukh Khan is considered to be the biggest Bollywood actor/celebrity in
India, and is popular internationally as well. Shah Rukh Khan is colloquially
referred to as SRK, much as Bollywood legend Amitabh Bachchan is referred
to as the Big B.
7. Note the popularity of Hindu high caste names, many of which are Punjabi as
the icon of enterprising success not just in India but also abroad.
8. On an interesting side note, the film Des Pardes (Home and Foreign Land)
(Dev Anand, 1978), follows a disturbing narrative of East Indians emigrating
to the United Kingdom only to be living on the edge of survival, and paints
a bleak picture of the diasporic dream compared to the mythical wealth
of the 1990s to the present day that NRIs are shown to achieve in popular
films.
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9
Transnational Collaboration and
Media Industry in South India:
Case of the Malaysian–Indian
Diaspora
Shanthini Pillai
Introduction
We now talk of diasporas, and the double or triple spaces temporal,

cultural, spatial they occupy. Multiplicity in thought, memory, and
space seems to define individuals and societies everywhere. It is no
longer possible to retain the view that you come from a single-strand
dominant culture. The majorities define the minorities as much as
the reverse; in other words, the changing periphery causes alterations
at the centre, if there is still a centre. (Maniam, 1996)
The passage above from K. S. Maniam, one of the pioneer writers of

Malaysian–Indian fiction in English, encapsulates the layered history
of the Malaysian–Indian community. The history can be traced back to
the nineteenth century during the British colonial intervention in the
Federated Malay States (what is now Peninsular Malaysia). The migra-
tion took place through multiple entry points, namely assisted (and
coerced) migration where poor peasant communities were recruited
from the southern states of India. These individuals came with the
hope of a promised land but toiled under near slave labour condi-
tions and were denied basic rights. Then there was the group of a more
educated class that arrived mainly through independent migration
modes. These people served mainly in the administrative arm of the
colonial plantations and had different experiences as compared to the
labouring population. Both groups were characterised by multilingual
187
188 Shanthini Pillai
features, as even though they were primarily from South India, some
were Tamils from Tamil Nadu, some Malayalees from the State of Kerala,
Telugus from Andhra Pradesh, and Jaffna Tamils from Sri Lanka. While
there were these heterogeneous strands to the experience of diaspora,
there has been always a common centre – that of emotional ties to
India and its cultural axis. However, as Maniam also notes at the end
of the quoted passage, the centre itself is susceptible to the changing
periphery and might not in time remain a central focus of the latter.
This chapter posits the premise that the relationship between India
and its diaspora in Malaysia has changed tremendously since early
migration. While in the early years of the nineteenth century, engage-
ment was mostly from the periphery to the centre, there is now a more
collaborative relationship between India and its diaspora. This chapter
hopes to locate the manifestations of such transformations espe-
cially in the context of (i) the development of local Malaysian–Indian
popular music, (ii) impact on the media industry in South India and
(iii) the attendant development of entrepreneurship that reveal tran-
snational alliances between India and its diaspora. It concludes that as
the Malaysian imaginary intersects with the ancestral centre one can
find a myriad of transnational appropriations and interpolations that
ultimately shift the axis of the centre. The concept of interpolation has
been generally linked to post-colonial resistance, noted by Bill Ashcroft
(2001: 14) as the ‘entry, aggressive or benign of post-colonial acts and
modes of representation into the dominant discourse (of colonialism)
itself, an interpolation which not only interjects and interrupts that
discourse but changes it in subtle ways’. However, in the context of
this chapter, it is used to refer to the obvious entry into the dominant
discourse of the ancestral land, India, and the palpable changes that
are created. This epitomises the transformation of the Indian identity
as the ancestral original culture is re-territorialised with rhythms of
change from the diaspora.
However, in order to understand these changing notes, as a starting
point, it would be useful to trace the development of Malaysian–Indian
popular music.
Folk memory and the development of Malaysian–Indian

popular music
The history of local Malaysian–Indian popular music can be traced to the

late nineteenth century in the folk song genre of the early immigrants in
Malaya: the plantation and road and railway communities. The early folk
songs, sung by the pioneer Indian migrants, were in their original form,
Case of Malaysian–Indian Diaspora 189
and were a mirror of the ensemble that originated in India. However,

as these migrants began to engage with the host land, aspects of nativi-
sation slowly seeped into the songs. Hence, names of places in India
that were in the original lyrics were replaced with names of places in
Malaya. As they progressed without much hope of return to the home-
land, the songs ultimately began to be rooted in the land that became
home, Malaya, a classic tale of the diasporic experience. The three songs
below, transcribed from an audio production courtesy of Astro Vaanavil
Malaysia, may serve as illustrations of the transformation of the Indian
popular imaginary and its nineteenth century beginnings.
Song # 1
Araro Araro Arirari Araro,

(terms used to sing lullaby)
En rahsa maganey, nee urenghe,

(My dear son, please go to sleep)
Oyathe malaile, virughukudhe kadukulai,

(It has been raining all day long)
Manennai vanghethan kaasukkhe valiilla ...

(There is no firewood and I don’t even have the money to buy
kerosene)
Song # 2
Nalla thamby thothamley, Chinna thamby volleikaeile,

(Chinna Thamby being a labourer in an orchard)
Ellai kadhundhe vandhennadi,

(Leaving my homeland to a foreign land)
Pondhicheri kapal yeri, Penanghe nanhe parthennadhi,

(Sailed from Pondicherry and saw Penang for the first time)
Depotle adichandhi ...

(They (the colonial officers) detained me in the port)
Song # 3
Kalai illa elunthe kaduvadi tukhenum,

(Wake up by dawn and has to carry the rubber milk container)
Kadumai yaghe noorhu marhuthai vetthunam,

(Have to struggle and tap 100 rubber trees)
Olipali nanghe odha theyinum, varumeilay naghe vairu kaingi,

(Labourers face gruelling task and we are left in hunger)
Vellaiye seiya vitha mudheghuve pidithu talluvan ...

(If we fail to obey the commands given, they would thrash us to
the ground)
(Nathupuram Gananghal, Astro Vaanavil, 2011)
It is noteworthy that the epigraph alludes to the evolution of the immi-

grant psyche from its retention of the original form to its integration of
the local landscape and finally the disappearance of the ancestral land
from the horizon and the focus on local issues; in short, reflections of
the changing periphery and centre.
As the community made inroads into the country, each generation
inherited the treasure trove of customs and traditions that became part
of the collective folk memory. In terms of folk music, two rhythmic
patterns were extremely significant, one to do with birth (thalattu or
lullaby) and the other with death, (opari, or funereal requiem). Added to
these were songs that were sung during significant religious and cultural
festivals such as Deepavali, the festival of lights and Pongal, the harvest
festival. There are numerous references to these cultural rhythms of the
early Indian immigrants to Malaya, which were encouraged and sanc-
tioned by the colonial powers as it brought the promise of a satisfied
labour population. For instance, the report, Indian Immigration to the
FMS: Resolutions and Recommendations of a Commission appointed by the
Acting Resident General FMS 1900, documents that ‘any increase in the
facilities offered for the observation of religious functions must benefit
the cause of immigration. This is because natives will naturally prefer to
proceed to a country where they have reason to believe that opportuni-
ties for observances exist in a form similar to what they are accustomed
to in their native land’ (Federated Malay States, 1900: 5). The Annual
Report of the Agent of the Government of India in British Malaya 1930 sets
down numerous incidents of insubordination among labourers when
the boundaries of their cultures are seen to be intruded upon in similar
terms of the following excerpt.
Ten labourers of Parit Perak estate were charged for rioting and assault
on the Assistant Manager, who annoyed at the beat of drums, had
interfered unnecessarily with a marriage celebration conducted on

the estate.
Narratives by colonial planters, who spent many years toiling in the

plantations, also reveal similar references of folk festivities amongst the
Indian labour community. See for instance Henri Fauconnier (1985),
Pierre Boulle (1983), Geoffrey Ainsworth (1933), and Willard C. Bush
(1938) who mentioned booming drums, rhythmic dances and loud
rituals, albeit in rather Orientalistic terms.
However, before we examine the history of Malaysian–Indian music,
permit me to introduce another narration of the Indian immigrants.
A significant voice, K. S. Maniam, a descendant of the community,
represents the genre of creative fiction with a communal point of view.
Even in his early writings, Maniam depicted characters that are deeply
committed to creating a new narrative of existence that embraced the
world in which they lived instead of merely replicating a fossilised India
in a foreign land. Even more significant is that, one would find several
references to Nataraja, the Lord of Dance in Hindu cosmogony even with
his emphasis on a new narrative of communal beginnings. This deity is
often accorded a special place in numerous Carnatic performances. To
me, the figure of Lord Nataraja, which is a representation of the simul-
taneous phenomenon of destruction and creation best, epitomises the
Malaysian–Indian diaspora. I have used the figure of Lord Nataraja as
emblematic of the diasporic imaginary of the Indians in Malaysia, as it
is steeped in cosmic rhythm, movement and renewal (Pillai, 2007) as the
community regenerates the vestiges of India’s cultural ethos in a new
country by piecing together elements from the land that became home.
I choose to focus on one of Maniam’s short stories, Ratnamuni, which
highlights the aspect of folk tradition from India. The narrative opens
with the following words:
Repot-kepot ayah. I cannot tell straight. This Bedong I stay all my life
I did not come straight. When I was coming here – nothing. Only
her – the uduku. That man in Madras wearing the uniform asks me,
What is this, man? Everybody carrying big boxes and things, you
only a beggar’s bundle? I said, ‘The Lord Siva danced and made the
world’. (Maniam, 1994: 1)
The speaker is an Indian immigrant, Muniandy, who is about to embark

on the journey to Malaya. Once again, Maniam places the migrant
Indian coolie as the subject of his narrative. The parallel with Lord
Nataraja hints at Muniandy’s hope of creating a new terrain in the land
that he has chosen to reside. The story enacts the trials and tribulations
that he undergoes as he attempts to transplant an uprooted culture in
his new home. His aspiration to dance like Lord Siva in the new land can
be seen as one that follows the sequence (and the attendant symbolism)
of the deity’s ananda tandava. In addition, Muniandy likens himself to
Hanuman, the simian-featured god of the epic, Ramayana. He speaks of
his first employment in the new land as a ‘boat-rower ... carrying the
men, women, children-strangers from one bank to the other bank in a
gliding boat. The light making lines on the water. The people going from
one darkness to another darkness. I am Hanuman the rowing monkey
for them’ (Maniam, 1994: 1). Here, there is the notion of the taboo of
crossing the dark waters, that symbolic act that was to wash away all
traces of caste and, subsequently, all connection with the ancestral land.
Yet, Muniandy reinvents his role by placing himself at the centre of this
journey as a spiritual guide. This role is largely tied to his only posses-
sion, the uduku, that very drum that Lord Siva holds in his hands as he
dances. Maniam (1987: 220), speaking of the uduku in a separate article,
explains that ‘it is capable, when played by a person in a state of ritual
purity, of sending the player into trance and so reveal knowledge that is
otherwise not usually available’. In the story, Muniandy appears to have
visionary powers. Whenever he plays the uduku, he advances into this
trance-like state and elicits information of an ethereal kind, guiding the
residents to the spirit that haunted the local mango tree and the tar doll
with needles planted at the back of the dhobi’s house. He achieves almost
epic stature of his own in the community: ‘My name is going all over the
town, across the railway lines’ (Maniam, 1994: 3–4). The presentation
of snippets from this story acts as a metaphor for the creative power of
composition that was ultimately left out of colonialist documentation
of Indian immigrant life in Malaya. It is sufficient evidence that the
creative vision of the modern day Tamil popular artistes in Malaysia has
its roots in the early diasporic narrative of the community. It also makes
one reflect on the poignant fact that elements of folk arts represents a
vital aspect of the communal imaginary in the formative years as they
struggled to ensure that cultural lifelines thrived in a foreign land.
Many readings of the early experience choose to highlight the drudgery
and wretchedness of this struggle. Even the most recent Cage of Freedom
by Andrew C. Wilford (2006) repeats this subaltern discourse, even as it
articulates many strong points about the power of ritual. Hence, while
many choose to seamlessly repeat the creation of the emblematic ‘little
Indias’ of the diaspora, one should also pay attention to the alterna-
tive rhythmic patterns that were put into place in the early chapters of
the communal chronicle, revealing cadences of agency, hope and the
creation of hybridised rhythms. The folk songs that were introduced at
the outset are a preliminary revelation of this aspect, as are the literary
narratives of K. S. Maniam.
As social mobility was achieved by a large section of the Indian
community in Malaysia, Carnatic music came to be the emblematic
symbol of success that served to separate ‘folk art’ from ‘high art’. The
Tamil movie Sangamam (Krishna, 1999) which played out the dialectics
of such division in the tradition of Indian performing arts, with the
Carnatic form deemed as the cultured version and the folk form as
the unrefined and coarser version. M. S. S. Pandian (1996: 950) speaks
of the institutionalisation of Carnatic music. Bharathanatyam (Tamil
dance form) was equally instituted as Tamil high culture by the Madras
Music Academy in 1928. On the contrary, street folk culture in the form
of the ‘therukoothu’ was dismissed as low culture. The development
of Malaysian–Indian music, specifically music of the Tamil commu-
nity, reveals cadences of similar conflicts. For instance, Sumit Mandal
(2007: 55–8), in an engaging exploratory discussion of the develop-
ment of Tamil popular music highlights the rise of local Malaysian
Tamil popular music as a reaction against the hegemony of North
Indian Bollywood influence as well as Tamil Carnatic classical music.
He cites the band, The Keys, as the pioneer group that was responsible
for changing the landscape of Malaysian Tamil music history as they
incorporated the distinct rhythms of Tamil folk music and achieved
phenomenal success despite them being banned from Radio 6, the
then sole Malaysian Tamil language radio station. The ban was due
to allegations of inappropriate lyrics. The hegemony of high culture
over low culture was thus a noose around the Tamil popular musicians.
However, their rise to fame amidst the local youth of the Malaysian–
Indian community opened the portal for the establishment of many
other groups. Mandal records the advent of a number of music groups,
such as Kashmir Stone and even an all girls band, The Girls. The latter
consisted of an interesting mix of members who were Tamil and Malay.
Solo performers subsequently added to the communal music ensemble
with the advent of Sasi the Don, who received similar treatment as The
Keys by the same local station, with allegations of contravening the
formal standards of the Tamil language (Mandal, 2007: 46–7). However
as Suresh Canagarajah (2005: 429) has aptly argued, in the context of
the dialectics of the English language in Sri Lanka, it is important to
be aware of how languages are strategically employed by speakers in

interpersonal relationships to negotiate values, roles and relationships.
Even traditionally monolingual speakers from rural backgrounds can
deploy certain English borrowings to claim dual ethos or to straddle
both language communities.
When we place this argument within the Malaysian context, the
negotiation of values, roles, and relationships straddle a triple ethos,
with English, Tamil and Bahasa Malaysia, the axles on the popular imag-
inary. Consequently, no matter how much official mainstream mass
media policies moderate and diminish the spaces for creative articula-
tion by such multilingual artists, the sliced tiles of expression inevitably
assemble other spaces. In the case of the Malaysian Tamil popular music
artistes, this saw the advent of a new and more inclusive Tamil language
radio station, THR Raaga. According to Mandal (2007: 57), Sasi the Don
was invited to perform at the launch of the broadcast radio station in
2005. These allude to Canagarajah’s assertion: the reclamation of a new
ethos of expression and articulation. The title of the second English
single from Sasi the Don’s album, Don’t Panic! It’s Just Music: Put Your
Kaiyes Indi Air, encapsulates this ethos of expression, as it reflects an
‘Englishised’ Tamil (Canagarajah, 2005), with the added creativity in
the word ‘Indi’ for independent music. Such appropriations strategically
shift Tamil expressions from the margin to the centre of the nation’s
linguistic landscape.
These are fluid engagements within the national landscape, fuelled
by the development of a myriad of mass media platforms and acceler-
ated through cyberspace. However, now another more global network
has widened the ethos of Tamil popular music in Malaysia. This is none
other than transnational satellite networks that have facilitated the
borderless transfer of culture. As Sankaran and Pillai (2011: 280) have
argued in relation to the Malaysian–Indian diaspora and engagement
with India through media,
The advent of satellite television and its attendant transnational media

has widened the platform for more intimate engagement with the
ancestral land ... . It gives the diaspora diverse pathways to access and
select desired mediascapes, whether in the choice of news coverage,
film, music scenes from films, talk shows, game shows, or mega-serials.
In this way, images of India no longer emerge from the repository of a
fossilized site of ancestral or folk memory. ... Consequently, the diaspora
interacts with ancestral culture in a more familiar way, as it becomes a
lived culture instead of merely inherited legacy.
This intimate engagement, I argue, is no longer based on the sense

of filial attachment to the motherland but instead a space for critical
engagement and commercial ventures. The interactions that have
emerged, especially in recent times, reveal the extent to which the rela-
tionship between India and its diaspora in Malaysia has dynamically
transformed itself through transnational interpolations along the media
expressway. The media industry in India, and in particular South India,
has seen heightened engagement with its diaspora. The Malaysian–
Indian diaspora has gained quite an extensive ground in the realm of
the popular media industry, with popular music artistes playing a signif-
icant role. In the ensuing discussion, I will show the ways in which
the retention of ancestral culture and identity has evolved into tran-
snational collaborations that interpolate India as a commercial signi-
fier within the vestiges of a now more globalised communal collective
through Tamil music in Malaysia.
Transnational interpolations of India by Malaysian–Indian

popular music artistes
Recent years have seen the rise of transnational partnerships between

local Malaysian–Indian popular musicians and their counterparts in the
South Indian cinema industry (most commonly known as Kollywood).
Malaysian–Indian popular music artistes like Yogi B and Dr Burn have
collaborated not only on the music scores for Tamil movies, but have
also appeared in a number of such music interludes within the movies
such as Polladavan, Sivi, Kanden and Kuruvi. The latter is especially inter-
esting as it witnessed the interpolation of the Malay language within
the lyrics of a particular music scene. These collaborations call witness
to a number of key issues with regard to the transformation of the rela-
tionship between India and its diaspora in Malaysia. The discussion will
focus on Yogi B and Dr Burn as the quintessential Malaysian–Indian
hip-hop artistes to transgress the boundary markers between India and
its diaspora, and to locate the manifold interpolations of India in the
retention of ancestral culture to newer engagements.
To begin with, an interview was conducted with both artistes to gain
a preliminary view of their perspective on the role of India within their
popular imaginary, especially in terms of their use of the language, artists,
music instruments, as well as customs and folklore of Tamil origin. When
asked whether the composition of their songs was influenced by Tamil
Carnatic or folk traditions, both unanimously highlighted the latter. An
interesting parallel was their reference to the role of their mothers in
forming the early impressions of Tamil folk music in the form of the
Tamil Thalattu padalgal (Tamil lullabies). Yogi B expressed with much
nostalgia memories he had of his mother singing the Thalattu songs and
recalled that she possessed a creative streak as she would appropriate
and interpolate the lyrics with her own lines.1 In this way, transfigura-
tive capabilities or consciousness is seen at play, a legacy that influences
the music that her son would later produce on a more international
platform. Dr Burn too expressed the same sentiment, though he focused
more on the influential role of Tamil Saivite devotional poetry, Tevaram,
a legacy inherited from his mother.2 He spoke of recollections of his
mother singing the Tevaram at home having an impact on his devo-
tional leanings towards Lord Siva. His latest single and its accompa-
nying music video, Naduvan (Burn and Rao, 2012), vividly dramatises
this aspect. Yogi B made similar references to the influence of Tevaram,
though the platform of his engagement was mainly the temple. Apart
from devotional poetry, both artistes spoke of their great respect for, and
veneration of, works by the eminent Tamil poet, Mahakavi Bharathiyar,
who is known for his socially conscious and politically charged poems.
Dr Burn cited a keen admiration not only for the poet’s exaltation of the
Tamil language, but also for the fact that he epitomised an openness to
other cultures, alluding to the poet’s signature Western black coat that
he wore with the traditional thalapa and veshti. Such hybrid features are
significantly evident in the popular poetics of the music of Dr Burn and
Yogi B, as they draw heavily from the recesses of the communal cultural
storehouse. The level of global interpolation is equally substantial. This
global interpolation, however, does not reach out solely to metropolitan
musicscapes of the rap genre for which the two artistes gained popularity.
They have also become significant icons in the Tamil music industry of
South India, with a number of collaborative projects with famed South
Indian film and music directors.
It is however first necessary to locate the ways in which the simu-
lacrum of musical worlds developed for the two artistes. During the
course of the interview, the artistes were asked to elaborate on their
awareness and employment of Indian musical instruments in the audio
production of their music. Yogi B referred to the use of the tambura, the
mirdhangam and the uduku, while Dr Burn highlighted the role of the
thappu and parai as well as the sitar. These reveal a predominance of
hand-held percussion instruments that stem from the folk music tradi-
tion of South India, with the exception of the Hindustani, which is of
the Carnatic tradition. Both artistes also spoke of utilising pre-recorded
audio productions of Carnatic ensembles, mainly from India, which they
then synthesised into their musical productions. These demonstrate

interpolations of India on a transfigurative platform, revealing popular
poetics that emit more self-regulating tenor than the early strains, which
were steeped in ancestral immersion and cultural guidance. India has
evolved into a malleable construct and does no longer represent the
fossilised construct of the old diasporic imaginary.
We need only to look at a number of music videos of Yogi B and
Dr Burn to witness such creative transnational interpolations of India
within the popular imaginary. The song ‘Madai Thiranthu’ (2006),
collaboration between the two artists, is one such example. The song is
in itself a remix of an original production with the same title by South
Indian music maestro, Ilaiyaraaja. In the interview sessions, both artistes
unanimously expressed their preference for music by Ilaiyaraaja rather
than other music directors in the field. Their reasons were based on the
importance given to the poetics of rhythm and sound that celebrated
the Tamil folk lyrical heritage. In this, both Yogi B and Dr Burn revealed
a keen awareness of as well as reverence for ancestral tradition even
as they embraced the global form of hip-hop in the majority of their
music. Yogi B alluded to Ilaiyaraaja’s musical adaptation of the poetry
by Kannadasan, Tamil Nadu’s famed Poet Laureate, and spoke passion-
ately of the affirmation of traditional Tamil lyrical aesthetics as well as
the integration of both folk and Carnatic traditions of South India. Dr
Burn, in turn, voiced his admiration for the aesthetics of Tamil linguistic
pronunciation and enunciation that were key features of Ilaiyaraaja’s
musical compositions. These elements were notably transfigured into
their own musical productions, and the remix version of the song ‘Madai
Thiranthu’ bears witness to the dialogic of such diasporic engagement
with India.
The song begins with an introductory Carnatic interlude which is
subsequently overlaid by the emergence of the audibly hip-hop poetics
in the lines: ‘waa, now y’all/oh no/ oh no Its Yogi-B and Natchatra/ thats
why Emcee Jesz, dr burn, Mr G, so Yogi-B/vallavan makkalukku nee eduthu
sollu’ (2006). The chorus reveals the development of the global syncre-
tism presented in the song as it fluidly moves between hip-hop and
Tamil poetics: ‘dam it’s gonna blow/thaavum nadhiyalai naan/baby u should
know/koovum siru kuyil naan/ isai kalaingan en aasaigal aayiram/ ninait-
hathu paliththadhu.’ It should also be noted that Yogi B was featured
at a conference on South Asian Hip-Hop culture (or HipHopistan)
organised at the University of Chicago where he performed this very
song, a marked accentuation of his cosmopolitan reach. This fact is
alluded to in the song as he asserts his status as a significant Tamil rap
artiste straddling the globe: ‘Kola lumpur ho ... Chennai London tamilan
mc mudhalvan vallavan rap isai kalai vidhiin.’ The song ends with a reaf-
firmation of the hip-hop identity of the artistes, yet this is strongly
bracketed by their ethnomusic awareness in the integration of Tamilian
identity: ‘We the hip-hop homie/ Kavithai gundar for life ... isai, alli alli
parugevendiya / amulztham ada athu.’ The accompanying music video
of the song (Yogi and Natchatra, 2006) develops this facet of seam-
less interpolation with even more impact. In that semiotic space, the
Carnatic interlude emerges in a scene featuring an Indian male dressed
in the traditional attire of Carnatic musicians and carrying a traditional
portable hand-pumped wooden harmonium which he plays with much
spiritual engagement. The harmonium is a symbol of cultural adaptation
for it is believed to have been brought into India by French missionaries
during the Raj, and subsequently made inroads into the local rhythmic
landscape. The relocation of this instrument within the space of this
diasporic musical ensemble draws attention to the manifestation of
transnational interpolation. It simultaneously presents the past and the
present in a situation that can best be described in the words of Gregory
Diethrich (2000: 36) ‘where the homeland is semiotically conjured
through musical sound’. Here, one might add the conjuring of the
myriad sights of the homeland, or in the case of the Malaysian Indian
diaspora, the ancestral land. The homeland is undeniably Malaysia for
the artistes, for as much as the video projects multiple engagements
with India, the camera pans, and trains on a number of recognisable
signifiers of the local landscape of the city of Kuala Lumpur and hails
their identity as Malaysians. Other semiotic conjuring of India or ties
to India can be witnessed in the presence of the religious altar, the
theebum or lamp of prayer as well as the pictures of Gods and Goddesses
in the Hindu pantheon, particularly that of Lord Shiva, accentuating
once again the significance of the Lord of Dance and cosmic raga. The
song subsequently concludes with an integration of Tamil sangeetham
notes as well as a recognisable Tamil poetic discourse of the Tamil poet,
Mahakavi Subramanya Bharathiyar, held in high esteem by both Yogi
B and Dr Burn. The dialogic of diasporic engagement that draw in and
foreground India, coupled with the subsequent seamless fusion with the
global hip-hop genre earned them a global reputation for being pioneer
Tamil rap artistes, able to project Tamil poetics on the world stage. As
prominent pop music journalist, Nantha Kumar (2011) puts it,
The (Tamil) language itself is adequately supple to fit into hip-hop;

metered verses and beats are very much part of Indian music and
poetry. But to make it work within a framework that demands vigorous

pacing and placing calls for the singer, songwriter and wordsmith to
merge with one and another. The poet must become the musician as
well while respecting the sanctity of the Tamil language, a matter that
is upheld with a messianic zeal by the purists.
Such respect for the linguistic elements has already been attested to
in the course of the interview sessions as noted above. While there
may be counterarguments from linguistic purists, especially with
regard to diction and enunciation, the crux of the matter remains
that these artistes reveal a deep commitment to the globalisation of
Tamil poetics, creating associations not only with India but also with
the transnational Tamil community. Kumar goes on to elaborate on
the impact that Malaysian Tamil hip-hop had on India, as they began
to be ‘courted by South Indian film world’s prominent and emerging
composers’. In Yogi B’s case, it led to the actual entrance into the
Tamil film industry, when in 2007, he was asked to produce the song,
Engeyum Eppothum, which was a remix of an earlier song of the same
title from the South Indian film, Ninaiththale Inikkum, produced in
the late 1970s. This contemporary version was produced for the hit
movie, Polladavan. This feat is significant on a number of levels.
Firstly, it points to the audible interpolation of a diasporic voice into
an original South Indian production. Yogi B’s voice resounds loud and
clear in the introductory segment of the song. Secondly, it reveals the
creativity invested in transforming that original score sheet through
interpolating various musical forms and instruments as well rhythmic
patterns and linguistic forms. Yogi B raps in English and Tamil. Being
a remix, it retains selected segments from the original soundtrack
by then composer M. S. Viswanathan and prominent South Indian
lyricist, Kannadasan. It also sees the retention of one the original
singers, S. P. Balasubramaniam. Most significant of all is the entry
into the space of the Kollywood silver screen, as Yogi B emerges in
the song sequence of the movie, a hallmark debut that proceeded to
create inroads into the Kollywood media industry, as well as imprints
of burgeoning diasporic engagements with India. As Samy Alim and
Alistair Pennycook put it, ‘the relations between transcultural flows
of popular culture, the localisation of hip-hop and English, and
the mixing of other languages, suggest that hip-hop is a site where
languages and identities are refashioned, where new dynamics of
language use and identity are produced in the performance’ (Alim,
H. Samyand Alastair Pennycook, 2007: 94). In the performative poetics
of the remix version of Engeyum Eppothum as well as its sequence as

projected on the silver screen, we witness a refashioning the various
ethno musical elements noted above. More importantly, it transforms
the classic diasporic relationship with India towards active collabora-
tion, based on dynamically fluid negotiations and manipulations of
global cultural borders.
Such fluidity is made even more significant when integral identity
markers of the diasporic community are interpolated into the main-
frame of such transnational engagements with India. For quite some
time now, Kollywood films have used numerous global settings, and
Malaysian cities as well as its famed beaches in countless produc-
tions. However, when other linguistic tones and enunciations make
their way into the mainframe of Kollywood productions, they point
to the deepening of the axis of transnational interpolation. In the
Malaysian–Indian context, the Malay language, the language that
bespeaks of a different path of nationhood for the diaspora, is a differ-
entiating aspect distinguishing India from its diaspora. The involve-
ment of Yogi B and Dr Burn in the soundtrack for the Kollywood film,
Kuruvi (Stalin, 2008), revealed the multilingual diasporic interpola-
tion in an ancestral mainframe. The song ‘Happy New Year’, from the
movie soundtrack is a striking example as it begins with an interlude
of rap in the Malay language, the national language of Malaysia. The
song sequence in the film takes place entirely on one of the islands
of East Malaysia. The visual depictions of Malaysia, which has now
become quite a familiar setting in Kollywood song sequences, is
magnified by the audible interpolation through the interweaving of
Malay words in the Kollywood soundtracks. The emergence of such
foreign acoustics within the Kollywood panorama serves as a clear
signifier of the following: the transformation of the relationship with
the diaspora, and the integration and recognition of diversity in the
Tamil diaspora. This is further amplified by its seamless interweaving
with certain characteristic folk rhythms and intonations such as
the ‘Thnnane Thananane’ and the subsequent interspersing of Malay
dialogue by the Malaysian–Indian hip-hop artistes on screen. The title
of the movie, too, is an important signifier of transnational engage-
ment between diasporic Indians and the ancestral land, especially in
terms of its cultural and commercial connections. The term Kuruvi
refers to individuals who take on the role of unofficial courier service
providers, plying transnational routes between India and its diaspora;
the movie focuses on this aspect with cinematic scenes moving inter-
changeably between Malaysia and India. As much as the plot of the
film emphasises the enigmatic pull of India for the diaspora repre-
sented in the hero who leaves India for Malaysia on a filial quest,
meets and gains the attraction of a Malaysian–Indian lady, played
by Trisha, one of Kollywood’s renowned leading actresses. The latter
subsequently leaves Malaysia to follow the man of her dreams. Such
interlacing of the particularities of its diaspora reveals the changing
trajectory of India’s relationship with its diaspora.
The widening of such diasporic engagement has also facilitated numerous
incursions into other forms of media in South India. Yogi B, for instance,
has been featured in a number of advertisements for leading commer-
cial brands in South India such as Kajah Balm as well as Sree Devi Textiles
in Coimbatore. Engeyum Eppothum earned the best remix award at the
Sunfeast Tamil Music Awards in 2008 as well as Tamizhmovie.com’s Thirai
Isai Viridhu. Yogi B and Dr Burn are now familiar names in the line-up of
star performers at South India’s numerous media industry award ceremo-
nies. These are but thresholds of the vast grounds of diasporic engage-
ment that continue to expand as new pathways unfurl towards an India
that has transformed from the land of ancestral pilgrimages and spiritual
guidance to a lucrative space for collaborative trajectories of global capi-
talism. With every returning footfall of Tamil hip-hop ethno musicality,
new and transforming modes of engagement takes place between India
and its global diasporic community. It serves to reflect the ‘multiperspec-
tival productivity’ (Ien Ang), of multilocality, intertextuality and above all
a resonant synchronicity of the diaspora with its homeland.
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Shivani Ramanathan

who assisted in interviewing the popular artistes, Yogi B and Dr Burn,
transcribing the interview sessions as well as selecting content from
the audio CD, Nathupuram Gananghal. Special thanks also to Ms.
Gandhimathi Suppiah from Astro Vaanavil Malaysia for facilitating the
retrieval of the Audio CD in question.
Notes
1. Yogi B (Yogesvaran Veerasingam). Interview by Shivani Ramanathan. Kuala
Lumpur. 21 September 2011. All corresponding interview data are to this
reference.
2. Dr Burn (Athiruban Manoharan Naicker) Interview by Shivani Ramanathan.
Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 2011.All corresponding interview data are to this
reference.
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Editor’s Postscript
Gopinath Pillai
This collection of essays attempts to offer an empirical and contextual

understanding of South Asian diasporic engagement in their host coun-
tries. The aim of the volume is to shed light on some emerging issues
among South Asian diaspora that are likely to shape future research in
the field. We highlight these issues under three broad themes, namely
economics, religion and media. In this concluding chapter, we summa-
rise the key findings presented and discussed in the chapters, elaborate
on some emerging trends in South Asian diaspora research and analysis,
and identify areas for further research.
There are two trends in the economic realm that needs to be high-
lighted. First, the emergence of Japan as a destination for the South
Asian diaspora. Second is the growing importance of remittances to the
economies of the countries of origin of the diaspora.
While most professionals from South Asia migrate to the English-
speaking world, a number of Indian IT professionals have started to
migrate to Japan – a new destination for contemporary professional
migration. The ‘Indian IT diaspora’, despite language, food and cultural
differences, have successfully adapted to Japan. Previously, they were
mainly employed in the banking sector but they are now slowly moving
to other sectors in the Japanese economy, such as software development.
This move has created new business opportunities and horizons for soft-
ware companies located in India. In the process, the ‘Indian IT diaspora’
has facilitated the expansion and development of Indian IT-based
business ventures in Japan. The formation of a professional diasporic
community in a traditionally non-immigrant country like Japan in the
twenty-first century is a new phenomenon and this study has provided
some new insights into these developments.
204
Apart from Indian professional immigrants, Bangladeshis are also

slowly but steadily forming a new diaspora group in Japan. Unlike
Indian contemporary migrants, Bangladeshis have been migrating to
Japan as early as 1980s. Given the absence of a legal path to immigra-
tion, Bangladeshis entered the country often under short-term visas and
joined the labour market as irregular migrant workers. However, they
slowly circumvented the legal restrictions that were placed on irregular
migrants in Japan, and embarked on business ventures that yielded
business success for them. The pathway to entrepreneurship varied and
depended on ways to secure legal immigration status in the country.
Once they secured legal status, the migrants started or expanded their
businesses by employing innovative strategies to access a wider market,
both nationally and internationally by making use of available tech-
nology in communication, transport and globalisation of markets. Their
businesses in halal food, ethnic restaurants, apparel and used tyres; and
multinational for used cars, electronic accessories, calling cards and
Japanese herbal products went transnational. Bangladeshi entrepreneurs
in the diaspora represent a fascinating rags-to-riches story in Japan.
There are some changes in immigration laws and citizenship poli-
cies starting from 1990s, opening the door for selective immigration to
the country. Given the trend in demographic decline and consequent
economic implications for the country, Japan is expected to attract a
significant proportion of South Asian immigrants and be a major host
country for South Asian diaspora populations in coming decades.
The significance of the inflow of remittances to South Asia has drawn
attention of scholars and policy makers. In 2011, global remittance
flows to developing countries through formal financial channels alone
were over US$400 billion. South Asia, in particular, draws almost one-
fifth of total global remittances. This volume has documented financial
remittances that the diaspora remits to their families in their country of
origin. The relationship between remittances and development is highly
debated in the contemporary migration literature. While some studies
show that remittances induce development at the receiving end, other
studies suggest that remittances nurture the culture of dependency and
retard sustainable development. This book documents the problems and
prospects of migrant remittance-supported micro-enterprises. Besides
documenting migrant remittances and micro-enterprises in South Asia,
in particular Bangladesh, some of the chapters also point towards the
enhanced usage of migrant remittances and have recommended poli-
cies for economic development, which in the long-term will have wider
206 Gopinath Pillai
socio-economic implications in South Asia. Given the growing impor-

tance of such remittance flows to the developing countries, particularly
South Asia, a deeper understanding of the social, economic and political
implications at the regional level is required in the near future.
When remittances remain a major form of engagement for diasporas,
we also notice that many diaspora members are returning to the home
countries and establishing business ventures along with their coun-
terparts in home countries. There is a shift in mindset among the
part of diasporas that South Asian countries are also hoarding oppor-
tunities for them, especially in India after the opening up of Indian
economy in the 1990s. Some diasporic communities have responded
positively to the new opportunities available in South Asia and they
are returning to their home countries for business investment. This is
the case not only with India but also with Bangladesh and Pakistan.
However, this volume has documented the case of India. It has been
demonstrated that the diasporic experience is a superior route to
career success in the Indian context, offering an opportunity for the
reinvention and reinvigoration of both life and career. It is argued
that repatriates can easily keep in touch with the country of their
upbringing through frequent travels and communications, while at
the same time benefit from the career opportunities afforded by a fast-
growing Indian economy.
The Nepali diaspora contributes to almost one-fourth of Nepal’s
GDP through financial remittances. Despite their contribution to
the national economy in Nepal, Nepalese migration has not received
adequate attention from scholars and policy makers. The Nepali
diaspora is called ‘quasi-diaspora’ because they live in a situation of
temporality, although the phenomenon is permanent in Singapore and
many other migrant-receiving countries in Asia. The formation of such
‘quasi-diaspora’ groups has been an inseparable feature of the diasporic
landscape in the Gulf Cooperation Council states in the Middle East
and some other countries in East and Southeast Asia that demands
deeper and systematic study.
In the realm of religion, we have documented diaspora experiences in
two contexts: the experience of Pakistanis in the UK; and the Sathya Sai
Baba movement among the diaspora. In the former case, transnational
politics increasingly overlapped with religious ideologies. This has a
consequent influence on young Pakistanis growing up in the diaspora,
who are over exposed to the media, conspiracy theories, Islamophobia
and their parents’ sense of alienation and rejection. Highlighted are
responses of Muslim leaders who have utilised the national platform
of their own ethnic press to carve out a space of civility, where the
responses of these leaders to expositions of their alleged extremism
are expressed passionately and yet rationally. The book has also docu-
mented one of the salient features of South Asian diaspora life, namely
involvement in the spirituality that originated from the homeland. A
prominent spiritual movement is the Sathya Sai Baba movement, which
originated in India and has spread all over the world. Participating in
the Sathya Sai Baba movement has transformed the spiritual life of its
diaspora devotees and strengthened their connection to the culture of
their homeland. Again, more than serving their spiritual needs, religion
of their homeland helps to (re)construct their identity.
In the area of media and culture, two important trends have been
examined in this book: first, how Bollywood films have portrayed life in
the diaspora, and second the role of diaspora groups in the development
of the media industry in their country of origin. Indian films in the last
decade have started to feature the diaspora and Non-Resident Indians
(NRI) as fully formed stock characters and protagonists. The diaspora
is often presented as a testing ground for conceptions of nationhood,
Indianness and cultural citizenship in these films. They also cast tran-
snational relationships in the spotlight, albeit ones that still conform to
the strictures of class and religion among others. Bollywood, presently
the largest film industry in the world in terms of the total output of
films in a year, is constantly projecting its anxieties over the politics
and negotiation of cultural identities outside of, and within India, onto
the NRI. Also documented are transnational collaborations between
Malaysian Indian artistes in the diaspora and their South Indian coun-
terparts in the media (film) industry in South Asia. This has reached a
new threshold of diasporic engagement, and the homeland is described
as being ‘transformed from the land of ancestral pilgrimages and spir-
itual guidance to a lucrative space for collaborative trajectories of global
capitalism’.
Research on South Asian diaspora has traditionally revolved around
the social, economic and religious experiences of these groups prin-
cipally in the West. This volume captures glimpses of the settlement
experiences in several Asian countries and also documents financial and
cultural engagement with the home countries in South Asia. It therefore
embodies a shift in diaspora research by providing case studies of both
settlement and engagement experiences particularly in Asia. Along with
the conventional orientation of South Asian diaspora towards the host
country, we notice the emergence of renewed interest and engagement
amongst diaspora communities from contiguous regions in South Asia.
208 Gopinath Pillai
This reorientation with the country of origin is broadly conceptualised

in modern literature as transnationalism.
The various chapters make an effort to provide fresh case studies which
serves as a direction for future research on diaspora to draw new concep-
tual maps to better understand the nuances that have developed in the
diaspora–homeland nexus. The chapters provide both commonalities
and contrasts in the patterns of settlement between incipient communi-
ties and more established diasporas. We hope that this study will pave
the way for diaspora theorists to revisit the ‘dispersion and diaspora’,
‘home and homeland’ formative binary with new lenses. As the essays
articulate, the diaspora emerges as both the objects and co-subjects of
its analysis, alive to the effects of globalisation and migration, but also
attuned to the histories of colonialism and imperialism and often reflec-
tive of the paradoxical combination of localism and transnationalism.
In the final analysis, we would argue that the study of literature and
mass culture, and of the new digital media, must be brought closer to
the work of social scientists to facilitate a more holistic understanding
of the diaspora and prevent diaspora studies from becoming a promiscu-
ously capacious category.
One final point. The Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) is now
working on the second South Asian Diaspora Conference (SADC) in
November 2013. This will provide a broader platform than the first held
in July 2011. There will be greater emphasis on the business/economics
and media/culture. The presentations at the conference will be on ISAS
website and it is hoped that these will provide the basis for even more
serious research on the South Asian Diaspora.
Index
Afghanistan war, 129, 132, 136 Muslim diaspora in, 5–6, 125–40,
Africa, 110, 153 206–7
agency, 35, 136 popular culture in, 136
agency theory, 87–8 Rushdie affair and, 131–4, 136
agents, 23, 69, 71, 74, 77, 88, 100, South Asian culture in, 128–31
127 war on terror in, 137–8
Alchian-Allen effect, 120 Brooks, Peter, 168
alliance politics, 136 budget hotels, 47–8
ancestral homeland, 4, 143 Buechler, S. M., 145, 146
Andaz (film), 168–9 Bureau of Manpower Employment
arranged marriages, 134–5 and Training (BMET), 55n2
Arya Samaj, 143 burial societies, 130–1
Asad, Talal, 140 businesses
Ashcroft, Bill, 79, 188 see also entrepreneurship
Australia, 10, 24, 43, 51, 69,70, 71, 72, immigrant-run, 33–55
73, 77, 120, 125 life cycle of, 86–7
micro-enterprises, 81–104
Bangalore, 12, 117, 153 theories of, 87–8
Bangladesh types of migrant, 43–8
migrant remittances supported
micro-enterprises in, 3, 81–104 calling card trade, 44–5, 51, 53
Pakistan and, 127 Campbell, Joseph, 111
Bangladeshi diaspora Canada, 44, 71, 118, 120
demographic profile of, 38, 39–41 Canagarajah, Suresh, 193, 194
entrepreneurship and, 43–8, 205 Caribbean, 110
in Japan, 33–55, 205 Carnatic music, 193, 197–8
Beckford, J. A., 145, 146–7 Chanda, Rupa, 74
Bhagavad Gita, 111 China
bhajans, 153–4, 160n10 growth of, 24
bilateral partnerships, 14 India and, 10
Biyani, Kishore, 116 rise of, 9
Bollywood, 47, 54, 167–85, 193, 207 Chinese immigrants, in Japan, 15
brain drain, 13, 169 circular migration, 50, 72–3
brain gain, 13 see also return migration
Brazil, 15 cities, 12–13, 21, 29, 34, 37, 127–8,
Britain 130–1, 137, 200
East African migrants in, 127 citizenship, 6, 134
immigration laws in, 128, 135 consumer, 174
Islam and, 128–31 cultural, 4, 168, 172
Islamophobia in, 132, 133 transnational, 109, 208
mosques in, 129–30 cluster dynamics, 14
multiculturalism in, 134, 138–40 Cohen, R., 144, 145, 146
209
210 Index
collective identity, 74–6 divorce, 135

competition, 29, 55 doctors, 118–19
conspicuous consumption, 173–7 Dr Burn, 195–8, 200, 201
consumer citizenship, 174 Dutch Disease Syndrome, 86
consumptive aesthetics, 172–7
contract law, 117 East Africa, 127
copreneurship, 82 economic assimilation thesis, 35
co-presence, 154–5 economic development
cosmopolitanism, 168, 173 in Asia, 29
credit access, 49 diaspora and, 11–14, 204–8
critical mass, 14–15, 21–3 education
cultural analysis, 35 Muslim schools, 134
cultural capital, 173 as priority, 21, 23
cultural citizenship, 4, 168, 172 Singapore, 66, 69–71
cultural practices, 148, 151–4 technical, 26–9
Cyprus, 127 electronics, 51–2
emigration, 11, 12, 14
Dahya, Badr, 128 enclave spatial logic, 35–6
dance, 191–3 Engelen, E., 35–6, 50, 52
demographic changes, 24–9 engineering graduates, 12, 25, 26–9
demography, 11–14 English language, 118–19, 193–4
dependency ratio, Japan, 25 entrepreneurship
Desai, Jigna, 167–8, 172 innovation and, 50–2, 112–14
Deshpande, S., 176 migrant, 33–55, 111–12, 205
designer films, 175 pathways to, 48–50
des pardes, 184 in Silicon Valley, 114–17
devotional training programmes, 153 transnational, 36–7
‘diaspora in the making’, 4–5 ethnic magazines, 43, 47–8, 54
diaspora repatriates, 3 ethnic products, 43, 51
diasporas ethnic restaurants
collective experience of, 74 in Japan, 46–7, 52
contributions to home countries, Nepali, in Singapore, 62, 67–9
13–15 social networks in, 67–9
critical mass for, 13–14, 21–3 Europe, Asian migrant labour in, 34
engagement with, 109 exclusion, 74
formation of, 12–13, 21–3 expatriates, 14, 115
homeland and, 146–8
quasi-diasporas, 73–6 film, 4, 167–85, 195, 200–1, 207
social movements and, 143–60 folk music, 188–96
socio-economic development and, forced marriages, 134–5
11–15, 204–8 foreign aid, 84
technical, 13–15 foreign direct investment (FDI), 15,
diasporic aesthetic, 167–85 117
diasporic engagement, 3 foreign workers, in Japan, 15–24,
diasporic identity, 147–8 33–55
diasporic romance films, 167–85
Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge (film), gender issues, 134–5
168, 176, 177–80 Gerharz, E., 145, 146, 147, 155
disruptive innovation, 112 The Girls (band), 193
Index 211
global economy, 9 Japan and, 11, 15

Global Indian International School middle-class, 13, 14, 167–8, 172–6,
(GIIS), 23 178
globalisation, 10, 13, 36, 116, 118, Pakistan and, 128
146–8, 150 Partition of, 126
global realignment, 9 remittance flows to, 109
guest workers, 110 return migration to, 109, 113–15,
Gurkha Contingent, 60, 66, 75–7 118, 120–21
Gurung, Ganesh, 61 rise of, 9
Guyana, 109 social hierarchy in, 119–20
Indian diaspora, 109–21
halal food trade, 43–4, 53 aspirations for, 119–20
Hannigan, J. A., 145, 146 composition of, 147–8, 159n4
herbal products, 53 connections with homeland, 148,
heroic myths, 111 154–8
Hindi films, 4, 167–85, 195, 200–1, educated elites, 110–11
207 engagement with, 109
Hindus, 126, 128, 132, 133 entrepreneurship and, 111–14
hip-hop music, 4, 195–201 film industry and, 167–85, 200–1
home, 2, 3, 4 identity and, 146–7, 156–8, 171–2,
home countries, benefits of diasporas 178–9, 207
for, 13–14 indentured labour, 110
homeland IT professionals, 9–31, 13–14, 204–5
ancestral, 4 in Japan, 9–31
engagement with, 2–3, 4, 146–8, language and, 118–19
154–6 Malaysian-Indian diaspora, 187–201
film representations of, 175–6 in Middle East, 110
memories of, 74 mindset of, 116
visits to, 155–6 religious and cultural practices,
Hong Kong, 127 151–4
hospitality industry, 69 risk appetite and, 111–12
human capital, 36 Sathya Sai Baba movement and,
human capital theory, 87 143–60
Hussein, Saddam, 136 in Silicon Valley, 114–17
Hwang, Victor, 114–15 statistics on, 109–10
transnational networks and, 147–8
identity construction, 156–8, 171–2, in US, 10, 11–12, 30
178–9, 207 Indian food, 52
ILP Japan, 44 Indian International School in Japan
immigration, 11, 38, 42 (ISIJ), 23
immigration laws ‘Indianness’, 4, 168, 169, 171–2, 173,
Britain, 128, 135 176, 178–9
Japan, 42, 48–9 Indian professionals, in Japan, 4–5,
Singapore, 66–7 9–31, 204–5
imperial diasporas, 2 Indian students, 12
indentured labour, 2, 110 individualism, 115
India information and communications
China and, 10 technologies (ICT), 3, 9, 117–18
IT revolution in, 117–18 innovation, 36, 50–2, 54–5, 112–14
212 Index
innovation hubs, 12–14 Kuch Kuch Hota Hai (film), 181–2

Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Kumar, Nantha, 198–9
1, 208 Kuruvi (film), 200–1
intermediaries, 69
international schools, 21, 23 lāhures, 5, 59–77
interpolation, 188, 195–201 policies affecting, 66–7
investment capital, 84–5, 101–2 profile of the new, 61–6
Iran, 131 as quasi-diaspora, 73–6
Iraq war, 132, 136 social networks of, 67–9
Islam, 5–6, 128–40 transitory residence of, 72–3
Islamic radicalism, 137–8 labour markets, in Japan, 25–9, 38
Islamophobia, 132, 133 language, 118–19, 193–4, 198–9, 200
IT professionals legal profession, 118
diasporas of, 9–31, 204–5 Lessinger, Johanna, 146
in Japan, 9–31 Licence Raj, 117
literature, 191–3
Jamaica, 109 London Underground bombing, 132
Japan low-skilled workers, 42, 84
Bangladeshi diaspora in, 33–55, 205
demographic changes in, 24–9 Main Pyar Kiya (film), 176
dependency ratio in, 25 Malay language, 4, 195, 200
foreigners in, 15–24, 38, 42 Malaysia, 4, 10, 127
immigration laws, 42, 48–9 Malaysian-Indian diaspora, 187–201
India and, 11, 15 Mandal, Sumit, 193, 194
Indian IT professionals in, 9–31 Maniam, K. S., 187–8, 191–2
labour markets, 25–9, 38 marriage, 134–5
receptivity of, to foreigners, 12 Mazzarella, William, 176
residence permits in, 48–9 media industry, 4
rise of, 9 film, 167–85, 207
South Asians in, 4–5, 33–55 popular music, 188–95
technical education in, 26–9 transnational collaboration,
Japanese electronics, 51–52 187–201
Japanese herbal products, 53 medical field, 118–19
Japanese silk, 51 Mehta, Monika, 175
Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 126 micro-enterprises, 3
bottlenecks affecting, 102–3
Kabhi Khushi Kabie Gham (film), 168, initial capital for, 101–2
172–3, 183 length of operation, 94, 95–6
Kashmir, 126–8 life cycle of, 86–7
Kashmir Stone (band), 193 objectives of, 96–8
Kashyap, Vir, 118 organisational assistance for, 98–9
Kenya, 127 remittances supporting, 81–104,
The Keys (band), 193 205–6
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 131 role of migrant workers in running,
Khosla, Vinod, 116 99–100
kinship networks, 74, 119 theories of, 87–8
Kollywood, 195, 200–1 types of, 94–8
Korea, 17 micro-finance, 84
Kripalani, Coonoor, 173 Middle East, 110, 130
Index 213
migrant entrepreneurship, 33–55 profile of, 61–6

business types, 43–8 as quasi-diaspora, 73–6, 206
data on, 37–8 remittances by, 206
diversification of, 36 to Singapore, 59–77
innovation and, 36 social networks of, 67–9
innovation practices, 50–2, 54–5 students, 69–71
pathways to, 48–50 transitory residence of, 72–3
sales and distribution strategies, networking, 13–14, 23, 24, 116–17,
52–4 146–7
theoretical issues, 35–7 ‘new diaspora’, 2
migrant remittances supported micro- new migrant communities, 5
enterprises (MRSMEs), 3, 81–104, New Zealand, 120
205–6 non-resident Indians (NRIs), see
migrants/migration Indian diaspora
see also diasporas
characteristics of, 111–13 offshoring, 10, 11, 21, 23, 29, 117
circular, 50, 72–3 ‘old diaspora’, 2
entrepreneurship and, 111–12 online shopping, 53–4
new patterns of, 2 organisation ecology theory, 87–8
one-way flow of, 2 outsourcing, 9
restrictions on, 120 Overseas Citizens of India, 109
return, 13, 109, 113–15, 118, 120, overseas students, 12, 28, 42–3, 66,
121 69–71
reverse, 3, 13
risk and, 111–12 Padma Halal Food, 43–4
temporary, 34, 49–50, 74 Pakistan, 126, 127–8
mobility, 145–7, 175–6, 193 Pakistani diaspora
mosques, 129–30 assimilation of, 132–7
multiculturalism, 138–40 in Britain, 5–6, 125–40, 206–7
music, 4, 188–201 burial societies and, 130–1
Muslim Council of Britain, 138 composition of, 126–7
Muslim diaspora gender issues, 134–5
in Britain, 5–6, 125–40, 206–7 popular culture and, 136
gender issues, 134–5 religious and political organisation,
marriage and, 134–5 128–31
from Middle East, 130 Rushdie affair and, 131–4, 136
Rushdie affair and, 131–4 settlement patterns of, 128
war on terror and, 137–8 transnational connections, 136–7
Muslim League, 126 war on terror and, 137–8
Muslim schools, 134 younger generation, 132–4, 136
Pandian, M. S. S., 193
Naipaul, V. S., 115 Pardes (film), 167, 168, 176, 177,
Nathan, S. R., 1 179–81
Nepal, 61, 66 Philippines, 17
Nepal Academy of Tourism and Hotel pilgrimages, 156–7
Management (NATHM), 60, 69 poetry, 196, 197
Nepali migrants political economy, 168, 174
policies affecting, 66–7 politics, of alliance, 136,
professionals, 71 popular culture, 136, 174
214 Index
popular music, 188–201 Sangamam (film), 193

postcolonial literary movement, 131 Sasi the Don, 194
poverty alleviation, 81, 82–3 Satanic Verses (Rushdie), 131–4, 136
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas Convention, Sathya Sai Baba movement, 5, 143–60,
109 207
product innovation, 50–2, 54–5 Indian diaspora and, 149–60
productivity, 25 origins of, 144
professional networks, 13–14, 23, 24 Puttaparthi visits and, 155–6
professionals recruitment by, 150–1
contributions to home countries of, religious and cultural practices,
13–14 151–4
diaspora formation and, 12–13 satsangs, 153–4, 160n10
Indian, 9–31, 110–11 Saxenian, A., 115–16
IT, 9–31, 117–18, 204–5 Schumpeter, J., 36, 50
mobility of, 9–10, 29 science graduates, 12, 26–9
Nepali, in Singapore, 71 Seattle, 12
Purab aur Paschim (film), 169–71 September 11, 2001, 132, 137
Puttaparthi, 155–6, 160n8 Sikhs, 126, 128, 132, 133
Silicon Valley, 3, 12, 13, 114–16
Ramayana, 111, 192 silk, 51
rap music, 197–201 Singapore, 10, 24
religion, 128–31, 139–40, 206–7 Nepali migration to, 5, 59–77
religious identities, 5–6, 132–4, 136, state policies, 66–7
158 students in, 66, 69–71
religious practices, 151–4 skilled migrants, 5
religious/spiritual movements, 143–60 small and medium-sized businesses,
remittance flows, 3, 13, 42, 55n3, 204 82, 86–7
improper utilisation of, 86 social mobility, 193
to India, 109 social movements, 143–60
micro-enterprises and, 81–104, social networks, 67–9, 119, 150–1
205–6 social services, 154
poverty alleviation and, 81, 82–3 socio-economic development, 3,
statistics on, 81, 82–3 204–8
usage of, 91–4 Softbridge, 23
value and usage patterns, 83–5 software development, 117
repatriation, 113–15 118, 120, 121 South Asian diaspora, 1–6
reputational intermediaries, 10 South Asian Diaspora Convention
restaurant workers, 62, 67–9 (SADC), 1, 208
return migration, 109, 113–15, 118, Southeast Asia, 22, 33, 35, 38, 42, 50,
121 51, 110
reverse migration, 3, 13 South Korea, 34, 48
risk, 111–12 spatial logic, 35–6
ritual, 192–3 Sri Lanka, 110
Rushdie, Salman, 131–4, 136 SSB movement, see Sathya Sai Baba
Ryo International, 44 movement
structure, 35
Sadiatec, 44 students, 12, 26–9, 42–3, 49, 66,
Safran, William, 74 69–71
Sai Baba, Sathya, 144, 159n3 Sufism, 132, 133
Index 215
Sun and Sand Advisors, 23 transnational identities, 2, 5–6, 139,

147–8
Taiwan, 24 transnationalism, 109, 208
Taliban, 133, 137 travel agencies, 43, 47, 66
Tamil folk music, 195–6 Trinidad, 110
Tamil hip-hop artists, 4, 195–201 tripartite arrangements, 24
Tanzania, 127
technical education, 26–9 Uberoi, Patricia, 178
technical professionals Uganda, 127
diaspora formation and, 12–14 UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), 138
in Japan, 15–24 United States
technology, 36, 55 Indian diaspora in, 10–12, 30
temporal strategies, 53 Muslim diaspora and, 133
temporary migration, 34, 48, 49–50, offshoring by, 11
54, 74 universities, 12
terrorism, 132, 137–8 unskilled workers, 42, 48, 84
Tevaram, 196 Urry, J., 154–5
The Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE), 116–17 used car trade, 45–6, 51, 52–3
Thussu, Daya, 172
Tokyo, 21, 23, 24, 29, 37 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 109
Toor, Saadi, 173 Viswanathan, M. S., 199
tourism, 66, 69, 70, 182, 184 Vivekananda, Swami, 143, 159n1
transmigrants, 74
transnational audiences, 167–85 Wadhwa, Vivek, 112
transnational collaboration, 187–201, WiIlford, Andrew C., 192–3
207 women’s movements, 130
transnational connections, 136–7, work permits, 14, 42, 67
148
transnational entrepreneurship, 36–7 Yogi B, 195–201

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International Political Economy Series

Series Editor: Timothy M. Shaw, Visiting Professor, University of Massachusetts

The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises impacts

Gopinath Pillai (editor)

International Political Economy Series

ISBN 978-1-349-44909-5 ISBN 978-1-137-28597-3 (eBook)

List of Figures vii

List of Tables viii

Introduction: South Asian Diaspora: Patterns of

2 Bangladeshi Diaspora Entrepreneurs in Japan 33

3 From Sentries to Skilled Migrants: The Transitory Residence

4 Migrant Remittance Supported Micro-Enterprises in South Asia 81

5 A Diaspora Route to Professional Success in

7 Social Movements in the Diasporic Context:

Part III Media

9 Transnational Collaboration and Media Industry in

Editor’s Postscript 204

1.1 Changing permanent residents in Japan, 2006–11 19

1.1 Foreigners registered in Japan by country in

I would like to express my gratitude to the following people who have

Special thanks goes to

Ajaya Kumar Sahoo, Assistant Professor, University of Hyderabad,

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

This book’s approach is multidisciplinary and covers a broad range of

Anthony D’Costa makes a further point to illustrate that the more

the impact of global religious change in shaping transnational religious

in tapping the technical and commercial knowledge and wealth of their

Diaspora, demography and the innovation ecosystem

The literature on diaspora is squarely anchored in immigration and to a

global capitalism for a variety of economic and social reasons, including

innovation hub outside of their own country? Strong economic growth

of economic/sectoral growth. However, the second and third condi-

Indians and other foreigners in Japan

The number of foreigners in Japan is very low compared to the foreign

Source: Japan Immigration Association (various years).

Table 1.2 India’s share of technical talent in Japan, 1998–

Year 1998 2001 2004

Asia 54.8 57.6 56.8

Notes: Technical talent = sum of professors, researchers, engineers, and

Source: Japan Immigration Association (various years).

be large enough to begin to act as a diaspora. Japanese companies, hard

0 2122 2358 2720 3124 3383 3697

Figure 1.1 Changing permanent residents in Japan, 2006–11

professionals, despite their comparatively small numbers, are begin-

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

ratio of Indian women to men (252.7 women to 1000 Indian men),

of a critical mass of community members with families. In 2004, the first

Indian companies for cross-border business and thus acts as a ‘reputa-

Japan’s current predicament

in the Tokyo area suggests increasing acceptance of as well as opportuni-

2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011

Total 2,487,133 2,509,374 2,508,088 2,514,228 2,527,319 2,569,349

Note: As of 1 May every year.

clearly decreasing. What is troubling is the enrolment in natural science

Gap in Education Content

Figure 1.3 Software engineering curriculum deficiencies

be expanding in recent years. The overall picture is either a stable or

rather, it will be led by working IT professionals at junior and mid-levels.

India’s diaspora and looking East: some remarks

Asia is no doubt changing in some fundamental ways. There has been

Appendix 1 Data Source for Figure 1.2

D’Costa, A. P. (2008b) ‘The Barbarians Are Here: How Japanese Institutional

In recent decades, the emergence of migrant businesses has been a part