The Defence

Geographic Centre
Aeronautical Information:
Limits of Digital Mapping

AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 1
 Air Clues Air Clues

14 30 12 53 More Information:
Additional information can be found
in the following locations:
Foreword
by Acting Head Safety Centre
RAF Safety Centre
SharePoint Site:
https://modgovuk.sharepoint.
com/teams/23116

RAF Safety Centre Internet Site:

Due to a recent software upgrade
55 29 26 please go the RAF website and
search for “Safety Centre”
https://www.raf.mod.uk/

The information contained in Air

Clues is published on behalf of
subject matter experts. If you have
Group Captain Mark Manwaring
any questions or comments on
the content, please highlight your
concerns to the RAF Safety Centre. Just a few days before writing this, exist to review some qualification

Contents
we marked the one-year point from periodicities as evidence of extended
Find us and Like us on Facebook: the first Covid-related Military Aid to periods between revalidation (perhaps
RAF Safety Centre the Civil Authority (MACA) request. supported by additional mitigations)
This MACA was for the repatriation is analysed. However, we are not out
The views expressed within Air Clues of British Citizens from the Wuhan of the woods yet and the transition
Foreword by Acting Head Safety Centre 3 The UK Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre 36 are those of the authors concerned, Province, China. Since then, the to the ‘new normal’ will present its
and do not necessarily reflect those impact of Covid on day-to-day work own challenges.
Safety Awards 4 Docs Corner 39 of the Royal Air Force or MOD. in the Military has been enormous.
All rights reserved. No part of this From Op RESCRIPT readiness and Whether it be managing the end of
Civil Insights from the UK Flight Safety Committee 8 US Air Force F-35A Crash 40
publication may be reproduced, deployments, to working from home extensions, a return to any form of
stored in a retrieval system, or and social distancing, it has changed intensive training or just a return to the
The Truth About Wind Turbines 11 The Limitations of Current Digital Mapping Technology Pt 3 42
transmitted in any form without our way of operating. office from the home environment,
The Limitations of Current Digital Mapping Technology Pt 1 14 Hazardous Suspended Cables 48 prior permission in writing from the a ‘crawl – walk – run’ approach must be
editor. Unless by prior arrangement, Sometimes less evident, but of equal followed. If extensions and validations
Aeronautical Information (AI) 22 Scary Incidents 2020 50 articles and photographs will not concern, is the impact upon training, are cliff-edged, then unrealistic training
normally be returned. revalidation and assurance activity. The and assurance burdens might ensue.
We All Learnt About Flying from that ... 24 I learnt about Engineering About That 53 cancellation of significant numbers Similarly, in the return to intensive
Write to the Editor: of training events at the start of the training, whether that be in the
UK Distress & Diversion Notifications 26 Airprox Highlights 55 Air-SafetyCtre-WgCdrSpry Pandemic resulted in the requirement operational space or adventurous
@mod.gov.uk to review and carefully manage periods training in the mountains, we must first
The Limitations of Current Digital Mapping Technology Pt 2 30 Contacts 63 of validity, SQEP levels and other non- establish that the basics have not
compliances. This continues to be been forgotten.
Brexit 35
managed at the appropriate level, but
is constantly monitored by the Safety In whatever environments you
Centre, Group HQ Staff, Air Health and will be operating, and whenever it
Legal on behalf of DCom Ops. finally happens, good leadership and
Inspector Safety (RAF) Inspector of Flight Safety (IFS) Flight Safety supervision will be key to keeping our
Air Cdre Sam Sansome Gp Capt Mark Manwaring 01494 496884 / 6357 The team is currently tracking over 220 people safe. n
01494 497643 01494 496842 waivers and extensions, although since
sam.sansome136@mod.gov.uk mark.manwaring536@mod.gov.uk Safety Promotion its stand-up in June 2020, no issues have
01494 496412 / 7755 March 2021 required formal escalation for senior
CESO Air Safety Assurance Produced by Air Media Centre, oversight. Indeed, the atmospherics are
Mr Paul Byers (B2) 01494 496666 / 6387 Oversight & Analysis HQ Air Command. XXXX_20WP of a gradually improving situation as we
01494 497024 01494 496268 UK MOD © Crown Copyright 2021 normalise to the Covid experience. In
paul.byers375@mod.gov.uk addition, it might be that opportunities

2 AIRCLUES ISSUE 27 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 3

 Air Clues
Safety Awards
Pilot Officer Adam White - RAF Syerston (644 VGS) -
Well Done
On 24 February 2018, at RAF Syerston, and after a day’s
flying, Pilot Officer Adam White was tasked to complete the
after-flight servicing of a Viking T Mk1 glider aircraft.
As part of the servicing, a check of the controls was required
to check for full and free movement; with a full aileron control
column input the expectation is that the stopper is reached,
but Pilot Officer White noticed a banging noise and slight
vibration as the control column reached the stopper. This was
checked against other aircraft and, because the noise was
not apparent in those aircraft, he decided to inspect further.
Upon checking through the inspection panel, it could be seen
that the aileron rod was impacting what appeared to be a rib
within the wing structure and light scoring marks could be
seen. The aircraft was placed unserviceable.
Flight Sergeant James House - RAF Odiham - Well Done
On 11 May 2020, whilst on deployed operations, and whilst
crewing into a Chinook helicopter, Flight Sergeant House
began to conduct checks of his M60 weapon system prior
to aircraft start.
On reaching the safety catch integrity check he observed
that, despite the safety catch indicating safe, the bolt still
moved forward when the trigger was depressed. Noting this
anomaly, he stopped his drills and restarted his normal safety
precaution checks once more. With the weapon system in
the same configuration the bolt still moved forward, at which
time he declared the weapon unserviceable and sought
armourer assistance. On inspection of the weapon system by
armourers it was found that the safety catch assembly was not
fitted to the weapon correctly, a fault which would not have
been easily identifiable on a visual inspection.
4 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Air Clues
Corporal Jake Gray - RAF Odiham - Well Done
On 5 February 2020, at RAF Odiham in 7 Squadron's hangar,
Corporal Gray (SAC(T) Gray at the time) was stood on the
number 1 engine work platform undertaking fuel bleeds of
Chinook aircraft.
Despite not being on the inspection for this task, he noticed
that the spacing between the number 1 engine mount-
adapter was irregular and asymmetrical. Cpl Gray discovered
that the forward-most bolt had corroded and subsequently
sheared and immediately notified the task supervisor. His
actions potentially avoided an engine-mount failure and
the aircraft was able to ground-run safely and continue its
assigned transfer to another section with no delay.
SAC Billy Wren - Boscombe Down - Good Show
On 5 March 2020, SAC Wren was manning MOD Boscombe
Down’s Main Ops Room to cover a single Chinook aircraft
night flying sortie. The aircraft was scheduled to leave for
RNAS Culdrose. Before its return later that night, the airfield
facilities management team was planning to conduct what
was meant to be a controlled and benign ‘switch-over’ test
of the airfield’s main power supply. The activity had been
planned and risk assessed. It was believed that, worst case,
while the aircraft was to be away, some airfield systems
might have to rely for a few minutes on batteries from an
uninterrupted power supply while a generator came online.
other remedial action checks. Despite a reset, the power failed
However, when the test was carried out at 1800 hrs, all lights once again at 1950 hrs and SAC Wren conducted similar checks
and most computer and communications systems in the Ops to the first occurrence. He then assisted in the fault-finding that
room failed, as they had also done so in Air Traffic Control and restored enough airfield services to safely recover the aircraft
across the rest of camp. Alarm systems were triggered for with minimal fuss. The failure was so widespread that there
several pieces of air traffic equipment and regular land-line were no checklists for him to follow but, by applying logic and
comms failed to respond. In the dark, SAC Wren immediately reason, he worked back to a basic operating capability. His
checked the Crash Phone, which is the single critical link performance, for an airman 18 months out of trade training,
between Operations, Air Traffic Control and the Aerodrome on a night that would have challenged even an experienced
Rescue and Fire Fighting Services before conducting a series of Operations Controller, was impressive.
Cpl Travis Silver - Well Done - RAF Odiham
On 12 February 2020 during a flight servicing task whilst
on deployed operations, Corporal Silver identified a loose
retaining screw situated below a Chinook aircraft's tunnel
covers. On further inspection he realised that multiple
retaining screws securing the hydraulic pipes were also loose.
Immediately reporting the issue, a further check of all aircraft
at the deployed location found that a total of 18 screws were
loose. As a direct result of these findings an Urgent Technical
Instruction was subsequently issued by the Chinook Delivery
Team for all Chinook aircraft to be inspected ‘before next flight’.
If left undiscovered these screws could have become loose flying control rods, synchronisation shafts and other safety
in flight and potentially caused significant damage to the critical components.
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 5
 Air Clues Air Clues

Sgt Lee Brackenbury - RAF Waddington - Well Done
On 27 April 2020, at Royal Air Force Waddington, Sergeant
Brackenbury, an 8 Squadron Engineer, spotted a large piece
of metal on the road near the engineering accommodation.
He reported the item to the 8 Squadron Rectification
Controller, who initiated an immediate investigation and
Foreign Object Debris sweep. The piece of metal was found
to be from a Mark 12 Cooling Rig wheel and the cart, which
was positioned on an aircraft parking bay on Alpha Dispersal,
and was found to have two missing wheel studs and nuts.
Following a re-run of the route that the cart had taken
between GEF and 8 Sqn dispersal, the second wheel stud was
found on the road near to the 25-metre range.
The £1000 Air Safety Prize, which this year went to
deserving winner, Cpl Daniel Whorlton from 13 Sqn, RAF
Waddington. Part of a 3-man crew that fly the MQ-9 Reaper
Remotely Piloted Air System, his initiative and pro-active
actions as a Mission Intelligence Coordinator have made him
a credit to his profession.
Mr John Kennedy of the Met Office was awarded the
£1000 Meteorology Prize. His international contribution
is significant, he has chaired the UN World Meteorological
Organisation’s expert team on National Climate Monitoring
Products from 2010 to 2018, defining guidance and writing
software to build the capacity of more nations to produce
consistent climate monitoring products and contribute to
international assessments.
to develop a design revision to the F-35 original supplied
throttle control covers which more effectively protected the
switch gear. Once the design had been finalised, a fleetwide
production run was instigated, and all UK F-35 aircraft now
utilise the RAF Marham designed covers.
During a 35-year career, Mr Joss Kent has consistently
demonstrated exceptional ability to deliver challenging
technical projects. In particular, this nomination recognises his
leadership role in establishing and managing the Met Office
Civil Contingency Aircraft (MOCCA). An instrumented Cessna
421 intended to provide rapid-response volcanic emission
measurements in the event of a future eruption impacting
UK airspace, for which he received the £500 Meteorological
Observer Award.

The £500 Ground Safety Award was won by the Station Nominations for the 2021 awards have already begun and
Workshops Team, from RAF Marham. They were able to use Unit Flight Safety representatives are encouraged to identify
their extensive experience with sheet metal components, suitable candidates as per the guidelines laid out in GAI 1047.

2020 L G Groves
Awards Ceremony
by Sqn Ldr Nick Anthony,
ACAS-RTSA ATM SO2
2021 HQ Air Environmental Awards
The HQ Air Environmental Awards We are delighted to announce that the
Presented annually since 1946, the
scheme was launched by DCom Safety Centre received 11 entries by the
L G Groves Awards Ceremony was
Ops on 1 Apr 20. This recognises 1 Dec submission deadline. The entries
established in memory of Sergeant
outstanding contributions across were evidence that, even without
Louis Grimble Groves, RAFVR, 517
the AIR TLB towards enhancing the awards, a plethora of noteworthy
Sqn Coastal Command, who lost his
the environment and reducing Air environmental/sustainability projects
life while flying on a meteorological
Command’s energy consumption. The was already taking place within our TLB.
sortie on 10 Sep 45. Intending to
encourage the safety of aircraft and awards aim to acknowledge projects
which demonstrate the principles By the time you read this, the 2020
flying personnel and to stimulate
of Sustainability and Sustainable Awards are likely to have been
research in the science of meteorology
Development (SD) and will be primarily announced and presented, so this is a
to aviation, whilst also recognizing
focussed on the environment/energy good reminder to start thinking about
the work by personnel engaged in
domain. The awards are intended to entries for 2021. You can download an
meteorological observer duties; the
recognise and reward innovation and entry form from the RAF Safety Centre
awards are open to personnel from all
best practice across a broad spectrum Sharepoint site, along with guidelines
3 services, the Met Office and civilian
of disciplines, such as: environmental for each award category. Look out for
support staff.
protection, energy; conservation; waste the next edition of Air Clues to read all
and resource efficiency. about the 2020 winners!
Despite the ongoing restrictions
associated with Covid-19, the awards
went ahead, with the decision to hold
them remotely via the conferencing
facility, Zoom. Hosted by the ProjO,
Sqn Ldr Nick Anthony, the recipients
received lavish praise from Head of
the RAF Safety Centre, Air Cdre Mark
Jeffery, with the head of the Groves
Family, Mr Anthony Groves providing
a fitting history to the awards and the
Chief Scientist from the Met Office, Mr
Stephen Belcher providing context to
the Met Winner's achievements. Images: The Awards Ceremony was 'virtual' in 2020.

6 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 7


UKFSC
Civil Insights from the UK
Flight Safety Committee
by Air Cdre (Retd) Dai Whittingham, Chief Executive, UK Flight Safety Committee
Well, it seems Wg Cdr Spry is still talking to me after all and
would like you to know more about the lessons emerging
from the civvies!
There are plenty of areas of common interest and shared
pathways to unsafe situations, and these have been brought
into very sharp focus by Covid-19. Whilst military aviation
has been able to continue largely as before, albeit with the
handicap of a slightly benign quasi-CBRN environment,
civilian operations have pretty much ground to a halt. Skill
fade is now a very significant problem which affects all
aspects of the industry and it is made worse by a drastic
reduction in experience levels and intellectual capital in
many areas. The military parallel here is the loss of corporate
8 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
experience of operating fast jets from carriers, as the RN and
the Lightning force will be only too aware.
Besides the widespread job losses, many people have felt
forced to seek alternative employment rather than stay on
furlough. Some ground handling organisations have seen
a 100% turnover of employees, so they start with a real
problem when it comes to managing operational risks. How
do you fancy supervising a Voyager turn-round when the
entire supporting cast is straight out of training? Ground
handlers have always had high staff turnover, perhaps no
surprise when you can get the same or better pay working
in McDonald’s. Quite simply, handling is a business cost, so
nobody is interested in paying more than they need to.
This picture is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.
Attribution: aeroprints.com
The downside of low pay, high turnover and limited
experience is aircraft damage events, coupled with a culture
where it is often more expedient to sack someone than to sort
out the problem (process or training) that caused the event
in the first place. That culture goes some way to explaining
why IATA has evidence showing only 38% of aircraft damage
events are reported, the other 62% being found by ground
engineer or flight crew inspections; IATA records about 5
damage events for every 10,000 sectors. Ground handling
is also currently unregulated, at least in terms of licensing
- all you need is to be trained to a standard that satisfies
your organisation. And even armed with this information,
flight crew can still be surprisingly casual about pre-flight
walk rounds.
Skill fade is manifesting in a variety of ways, some detected
by flight data monitoring (FDM) with other events more
obviously apparent, such as unstable approaches leading
to go-arounds, or from level bust data. Between mid-Dec
2020 and mid-Feb 2021, 50% of commercial pilots did not
fly. And here is another area where we see commercial
pressures in play. The basic pilot currency requirements are
that in the previous 90 days they must have completed 3
take-offs and 3 landings in the relevant aircraft or full flight
simulator to lawfully act as PIC or co-pilot for a commercial air
transport flight. Operators therefore have a choice between
conducting expensive on-aircraft (base) training, putting
pilots through a recency simulator detail, or rostering them to
fly at a rate which meets the 90-day 3+3 requirement.
What would you do?
To put this in context, let’s suppose you flew as captain on
2 Jan this year and you managed to fly the take-off and the
landing on 3 out of your 4 sectors for the day. Your next
rostered flight is 1 Apr, at which point you are still legal to
operate. You have not set foot inside the aircraft, or been in
the simulator, the weather is marginal, and the only thing
you know about your First Officer (who you have not met
before) is that they joined the company in the last year direct
from training and may be as current as you are. Now how do
you feel?
Let’s not stop there. The extra Covid protocols now cut into
the time available to prepare the first leg, check the flight
plan etc. and still get to the aircraft without running into flight
time duty limitations and hence scuppering the final sector
that the company is expecting you to complete to avoid a
large compensation bill for the inevitable passenger delays,
additional parking and service charges. You also know the
day is based on a 25 min turn round at each intermediate
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 9
 Air Clues Air Clues

The Truth About

stop, even though that is hard to achieve at the best of times, Many years ago I was 3 months into a 5-month stint in the
because that is what the Finance Director is prepared to pay for. Falklands, when we were still operating the F4 out of RAF
Stanley and where the routine was 140 hrs on shift over a 10-

Are you going to spot the transposed figure on the load sheet
concealing the fact that you are out of CG limits? Will you
check the performance calculations properly? Will you or
your FO spot the ground damage in the 1-2 minutes you have
for a walk round? Oh, and both of you know the company is
starting another round of redundancies. Still fancy submitting
a fatigue report or drawing attention to mistakes you made
through rushing to make the off-blocks time? Or do you
send the automated off-blocks signal by releasing the parking
brake and holding the aircraft on the toe brakes, even though
you are putting the see-off crew at risk?
People at all levels are aware of skill fade, the questions are
about the amount of fade and a response to it. Matters
are always made worse by fatigue, and here you have the
insidious nature of fatigue on deployed operations. For all
the jibes about hotels and short deployments, the fact is that
fatigue is a killer in the air environment. It is not just about
making mistakes, it is also about taking short cuts and drifting
away from SOPs that were occasionally written in blood.
Wind Turbines
day cycle, holding QRA states of between 60 and 10 minutes
interspersed with regular flying. Every other night we were
sleeping ‘on state’ in green maggots in a cabin with 10 aircrew.
Airborne one morning on a pre-programmed trip, I asked my
very competent and experienced nav whether the Onion
range was open. “Don’t know, mate, I didn’t check…” came
the reply. We had a serious crew debrief after landing, as we by Mark Darlow – Task Team 7 Head, Defence Geographic Centre (DGC)
both recognised we had drifted into ‘just going flying’, not
actually thinking about it or planning anything.
20 years later, I had an exhausted pilot fall asleep halfway I have the ‘pleasure’ of Wind Turbines and other Vertical Obstructions
round the finals turn at Waddington, albeit I was doing the working alongside Flt Lt DGC maintain Wind Turbine and other Vertical Obstruction
flying. He had flown 225 ops hours in 6 weeks and had been Stewart within DGC whose data within the Digital Vertical Obstructions File (DVOF).
sleeping in a tent with the other 17 members of his crew. articles appear later in this Details about what DVOF contains and how it’s maintained
Fatigue doesn’t come into it. issue of Air Clues, and whilst can be found in my 2015 AirClues Issue 19 article entitled
I can’t boast Graham’s 7000 ‘Uncharted Obstructions’. But in short, the UK requirement
The lesson? Stay away from the limits when things get difficult flying hours, I can compete is to collect all obstructions 150 ft above ground level (agl)
or different and stick to your SOPs. That is the message we are in having over 43 years’ and above and 80 ft agl and above in Tactical Training Areas,
now pushing to a rusty commercial aviation community. n experience in cartography Northern Ireland and in areas covered by DGC’s GSGS 5737
working within various 1:50,000 Low Flying series. In reality we add all acquired,
organisations and have researched and reported points to UK DVOF over 50ft agl
supported the majority including small turbines and include everything over 10 ft agl
of overseas deployments that’s provided in Airfield Surveys, although the lower you go
since The Falklands, the the less comprehensive the cover.

New Inspector Safety (RAF)

As of 1 March 2021, Air Commodore
Sam Sansome MBA, BEng, CEng,
MRAeS RAF became the new
Inspector Safety (RAF) - a title change
from Hd Safety - replacing Air Cdre
Mark Jeffery, who has retired.
Air Cdre Sansome joined the RAF in
1986 as a graduate of Loughborough
University studying Engineering
Science and Technology.
Following Engineering Officer
Training, he fulfilled tours at
RAF Laarbruch, RAF Lossiemouth
(Buccaneer, Hunter and Tornado),
RAF Strike Command (Tornado Role
Office) and RAF Wyton (Harrier Fleet
Manager). Following promotion, he
served at RAF Benson, working on
Puma and Merlin helicopters, where
he also acted as OC Engineering and
Supply Wing for a 7-month period
during Op TELIC. On completion
of his command tour he moved to
the Personnel Management Agency
where he was the Desk Officer for
Squadron Leader Engineers.
As a Wing Commander, he was
posted to a future capability post in
Headquarters 2 Group with logistics
and engineering responsibility for
all 2 Group future platforms, both
ISTAR and AT/AAR and including the
REAPER UAV, A400M and Shadow R1.
In June 2008 he was posted to RAF
Brize Norton as OC Forward Support
Wing. Following his command
tour he became the Command
Planner at PJHQ at Northwood,
managing the transition of its
planning functions to Joint Forces
Command. After a further spell as
a Manning Desk Officer, this time
for wing commander engineers
and suppliers, he was promoted in
2012 and took up appointment at
DE&S Abbey Wood as Team Leader
of Chief of Materiel Joint Enablers’
Customer Support Team. On 27 Jun
2016 he returned to Air Command
and to 2 Gp, this time as Chief Air
Engineer and Gp Capt Support.
On 1 March 2021 he transferred to
the RAF Reserves on promotion
to Air Cdre and took up post as
Inspector of Safety (RAF) – the first
non-aircrew officer to lead the RAF
Safety Centre.
© Mark Darlow - DGC
last twelve years of which
have been spent in the Air Information world. This is the In addition to our other activities, DGC GAIT staff actively
first of two particularly topical articles relating to Vertical monitor UK Wind Farm developments and carry out
Obstructions that I’ve written for this month’s AirClues Imagery and Internet research programmes to improve the
regarding Wind Turbines and Hazardous Suspended Cables.
Most readers will be aware that there has been a significant
shift towards renewable forms of energy in recent years.
However many will not be aware that according to The
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
in their 26 March 2020 report, 36.9% of all UK energy
demands were met by renewables in Quarter 4 2019, the
majority of which was provided by wind energy.
DGC Role
DGC’s Task Team 7 Geospatial Air Information Team (GAIT)
is responsible for the maintenance and provision of Vertical
Obstruction and Powerline information to Defence. That
includes the capture of Wind Farm and Wind Turbine
data. The data supports all of DGC and No 1 Aeronautical
Information Documents Unit (No 1 AIDU) charting, plus
Partners Across Government (PAG) requirements, and is
supplied every 28-days in accordance with the Air Information
Regulation And Control (AIRAC) cycle to support Mission and
Flight Planning Systems, in-cockpit navigation and tablet
devices. Importantly, it’s also provided to the Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA) for publication in the UK Air Information
Publication (AIP) en-route section, the provision of the
United Kingdom’s Air Information Service through NATS
and also supports PAG UK Search and Rescue and Blue
Light communities.
220 ft agl Cornish Turbine © Mark Darlow - DGC

10 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 11

 Air Clues
dataset quality and content. We have a Code of Conduct
with RenewableUK, the UK Wind Energy Trade Association,
and the majority of bigger companies supply us with up-
front details on their new developments. We then follow
the developments until the final step when turbines are
being erected when we add them to DVOF. An often
misunderstood fact is that Turbine heights are recorded to the
tip of arc of the blade, not the hub height.
Ten years ago the standard onshore UK turbine height was
approximately 250 ft agl. Now they are routinely 400 ft agl
with the current highest at 635 ft and potential 720 ft turbines
in Scotland in the pipeline. Offshore they are generally even
larger with the highest currently 673 ft and the new North Sea
Dogger Bank development proposing turbines over 850ft agl
with a rotor diameter of 720ft, hence why it is imperative that
we include the blades and publish tip of arc height figures.
Limitations
The biggest limitation for DGC in maintaining UK DVOF is
that there is no legal obligation on anyone building or
dismantling tall structures in the UK to tell DGC that they
have done so. But the good news is that in part this is now
changing. DGC have been lobbying for over ten years for
mandatory reporting, and with the CAA adding their weight
to the argument in recent years, we have secured mandatory
reporting for en-route obstacles over 100m agl planned
from July 2021 onwards. This means that the vast majority
of Turbines built will fall under the legislation and will have
to be reported by law. A major step forward. But that won’t
mean that we are informed about everything as many sub
100 metre Turbines and Met Masts are erected by smaller
companies or farmers, and because these are not usually
members of any trade associations, we don’t receive details
of them all. Therefore we rely on our own analysis of imagery,
targeted research programmes and importantly DASOR
aircrew reporting to fill in the gaps. Last year DGC carried
out one such research programme utilising Ordnance Survey
data and added approximately 3500 new turbines, most of
which were under 100 ft agl but still important and visually
significant for low flying. All of this means that DGC now hold
details of over 14,250 UK onshore Turbines in DVOF and a
further 2350 offshore. The total number of UK Obstructions
has risen massively from 38,000 to todays 140,000 in the last
12 years.
Submitting an uncharted obstruction D-ASOR
For Uncharted Obstructions, Powerline or Hazardous
Suspended Cable Locations, to ensure DGC and Military
Airspace Management Cell (MAMC) are automatically sent
emails, when submitting a DASOR Occurrence Managers
should select
Causal Factors Organisation Factors Information
Geographical
12 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Distribution Tab Info Addresses Aircraft Type (as
appropriate) Option 08, ‘and here if uncharted obstruction’
Additionally if you email dvof@mod.gov.uk, this may make
the difference of being included before our next information
cut-off for our AIRAC Chart Amendment Document (CHAD)
and digital data outputs. DGC attempt to action all DASOR’s
within two working days and will reply to all submissions
stating what action we have taken and when the information
will be published, so if you submit a DASOR to DGC, always
check for the reply, occasionally we ask for clarification!
Air Chart Depiction of Turbines and Wind Farms
As Graham Stewart highlights in a later article, as with all
charts, the depiction of topography and features can only ever
be a representation of ground truth and a snapshot in time.
Charts vary in content dependant on scale, meaning that
DGC’s 1:50,000 M726-Air and GSGS 5737 charts show as many
individual Turbines in their correct position as is possible, only
generalising larger Wind Farms for clarity (Fig 1). No 1 AIDU
however cannot do this on their 1:250,000 M5219-Air and
1:500,000 LFC charts as they would become too cluttered.
At time of writing (Jan 2021) a single turbine symbol depicts
both solitary Turbines and Wind Farms on No 1 AIDU charts,
but a new multiple symbol to depict Wind farms is currently
in development for publication in Spring 2021 (Fig 2). If the
symbol depicts a Wind Farm, the symbol is positioned as close
to the centre of the farm as possible within a permissible
accuracy of 0.825 km (3.3mm) for the M5219-Air and 1.65 km
(3.3mm) on the LFC’s. However, it’s important to state that
DGC and No 1 AIDU charts will only depict turbines or other
obstructions that meet the obstruction inclusion specification
of the chart.
Figure 1 – DGC UK 1:50,000 Turbine Symbology © DGC
Air Clues
Common DGC and No 1 AIDU Obstruction chart
inclusion specifications
DGC charts
M726-Air 150ft agl and above, 80ft and above in TTA’s
GSGS 5737 150ft and above with Hazard Obstructions
80 – 149ft agl
No 1 AIDU charts
M5219-Air 150ft agl and above, 80ft and above in TTA’s
LFC Europe 200ft agl and above, 80ft and above in TTA’s
Station specific chart specification posters have been made
for a number of stations such as RNAS Yeovilton, RAF Benson
and RAF Odiham. If you would like some for your station,
please contact Mark Darlow via dvof@mod.gov.uk
Conclusion
In short, DGC make every effort to research and acquire
details of every turbine that’s being built in the UK as well as
acquiring many thousands more in our World dataset. But
despite our efforts and forthcoming legislation, users will
Figure 2 - No 1 AIDU UK Multiple Turbine Symbology Concept © No 1 AIDU always need to report uncharted obstructions to DGC to help
us keep you safe and the wider community informed. n
Air Safety Matters
The RAF Safety Centre Briefing Note
RAF Adopts the
DA FAiR II Model
The latest update to AP8000, leaflet 8001 – RAF Just Culture, sees the RAF adopting the Defence Aviation Flowchart
Analysis of Investigation Results II (DA FAiR II) model, aligning with the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Manual of Air
Safety (MAS).
The change updates and adjusts the question flow to establish the 5 top-level behavioural types: Mistake, Error,
Violation, Sabotage and Recklessness. The questions have been re-worded to ensure that the behaviours of the
individual(s), at the time of the occurrence and in the situation the individual was faced with, are properly investigated,
understood and addressed. Please see Air Safety Matters Leaflet Number 46 for more details.
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 13
 Air Clues Air Clues

The Limitations of Current Digital

Mapping Technology
Part one. ‘It’s all digital now…isn’t it !?’
by Flt Lt Graham Stewart SO3-Air, Defence Geographic Centre (DGC).

Firstly, before I go on to describe
in detail some significant
limitations that many aircrew
may be unaware of, a brief
disclaimer; the views expressed
below apply specifically to the
digital versions of topographic
air charts such as Low Flying
Charts (LFCs) and are entirely
those of the author. However,
they stem from my relatively
unique position of having been
a 30-year, 7000-hour rotary
pilot (SAR and SH) who has, for the last five years been
deeply embedded within Defence Intelligence (DI) in
the murky world of geo-spatial data (maps and charts to
the unenlightened). These views are simply intended to
inform users as to the limitations of currently in-use digital
mapping, to stimulate debate and to offer some food
for thought.
speaking, this will actually be point two; Aeronautical
Information (AI) and GEOINT can be quite dry subjects so
I’ve attempted to sprinkle in a little levity where appropriate
and use some tangential analogies which are unrelated to
mapping. With the formal excuses over, let’s crack on…
Frequently in my role at the DGC situated in glamorous
downtown Feltham, (think Hollywood, but without any of the
bits that make Hollywood glamorous), I hear the following
despondent sentiment at the other end of the telephone,
email or DASOR:
“But how is it possible that a digital map can be out-of-date?
Surely its digital !”
At this point, because of the sheer frequency of this comment,
those who are in the business of digital map production
have developed a slight tendency to sigh and roll their eyes.
But from where I stand as a poacher-turned-gamekeeper
(aircrew turned map provider), I can fully appreciate that
this is a completely reasonable question, and one which I
hope to address in plain and simple aircrew-speak below.
Unfortunately, we will find that the answer to the question
uncovers some harsh realities about just where we currently
are with regards to digital mapping in Defence, coupled
with some sizeable air safety implications. Crucially, I believe
that aircrew are largely oblivious to these limitations and
consequently, they really need to be given a public airing.
to be made, not simply about which maps we should be
providing, but about what technology provides the best
way forward.
What could possibly go wrong?
To focus the mind as to just how high the stakes can be, an
example of what geospatial information and data can offer,
and conversely what it can obscure. Recently a Chinook
carrying out a Concealed Approach and Departure (CAD) had
a very nasty encounter with a set of wires, strung across a
valley. The crew is lucky to be alive, let alone to have skilfully
saved the aircraft. Putting the specifics of this particular
incident to one side for a moment, let’s look generically at the
type of geospatial information which is centrally held about
such features and how it can be portrayed for you (Since this
incident, No 1 AIDU have swiftly undertaken a considerable
amount of work to clarify the depiction of such features).
The map example at Fig. 1 shows a suspended cable as
depicted on the 1:250K M5219A Low Flying Chart - it’s the red
196ft agl/345ft amsl vertical obstruction symbol in the middle.
Technically speaking, it’s incorrect to refer to this symbol as a
‘mast’ as the same symbol is used for a multitude of types of
obstruction, suspended cables being just one. At this scale,
the actual stretch of wires only constitutes a few millimetres
in length on the chart, a truncated red zigzag, unfortunately
hidden beneath other cluttered symbology. However, if you
were able to gather together all of the various data sources
held by DGC, and it should be noted that few air platforms
can do this, then this is how suspended hazardous cables
could be represented and what information could be made
available to you in the air:
I don’t think that anyone would disagree that the depiction
at Fig. 2 provides greatly improved situational awareness for
this application. You can also factor in that the static printed
version here lacks most of the considerable functionality
of the moving 3D electronic one. I could also have added
a satellite imagery layer, but the above was clearest for this
specific purpose.
For those with a technical inclination, the screen capture
shows the UK Ordnance Survey 1:50,000 scale chart in
GeoTIFF format, with Digital Vertical Obstruction (DVOF)

To set the scene, a little background information as to

Topographic air charts include such diverse map series and
scales as Global Navigation & Planning Chart (GNC 1:5
Million), Jet Navigation Chart (JNC 1:2 Million), Operational
Navigation Chart (ONC 1:1Million), Tactical Pilotage Chart
(TPC 1:500K), Joint Operations Graphic (JOG 1:250K), UK Low
Flying Charts (LFCs), M726-Air (UK Ordnance Survey with
Powerline and Obstruction Overlay1:50K) and GSGS5737 (UK
Helicopter Training Areas 1:50K).
Secondly, an apology - now I know that convention states that
you should never start with an apology, but I’m a contrarian
by nature, and so just couldn’t resist - and technically
exactly who provides mapping to Defence. The Specialist
Geospatial Centres (SGCs) are the organisations tasked with
providing geospatial data (GEOINF and GEOINT) to Defence;
essentially maps and databases relating to the physical world
in order that Defence can perform its various missions. The
SGCs comprise, The Defence Geographic Centre (DGC), No
1 Aeronautical Information Documents Unit (No1 AIDU),
The UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO), the UK Meteorological
Office and a sneaky-beaky deployable element known as 42
Geo. The general principle is that, within pre-defined criteria
and as long as due process has been followed, the SGC’s will
respond to any identified and articulated requirement from
Defence. However, I sense that we in aviation are reaching
an inflection point, where traditional geospatial air products
just aren’t meeting our users many and varied 21st century
requirements. We are at a crossroads where a choice needs
Fig. 1 Fig. 2

14 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 15

 Air Clues Air Clues

A For technical reasons, you as a user, can’t. I’ll elaborate

more in part two, but essentially, if something depicted is
incorrect or has changed, it will remain that way until a new
version is made from scratch and replaces the old one - just
like Martellus’ World Map above. For this reason, in Aug 18,
DGC and No 1 AIDU issued a joint Duty Holder Advice Note
(DHAN) entitled, ‘Provision of Digitised Mapping for Cockpit
Displays and Mission Planning Systems’ highlighting the issue.

Q4 In that case, how can I independently verify for myself

that I have the latest version of a digital chart?

A Again, you can’t. This is a complex situation involving

What could possibly go wrong? (see page 15)
overlay and Digital Vertical Elevation Data (DTED) model, all
orientated in the direction of flight along the valley to show
the perpendicular suspended cables to best effect. These
individual products and datasets are all currently available
from DGC. Unfortunately, not all users have the luxury of such
a depiction, however, although it is much improved, there are
still inherent limitations lurking within each individual layer of
data waiting to catch out the unwary.
Know Your Limits…
“Always ask the questions you want to; life is too short to know if
you’ll get a second chance to ask.” charts released?
(Kaitlin Hollon)
I’ve no idea who Ms Hollon is, but I feel that quoting someone
always add a bit of gravitas and isn’t quite as pretentious as
gratuitously throwing in random Latin phrases…
The motto of No 1 AIDU is ‘Quo Certior Eo Tutior (did someone
say pretentious?) – which means, ‘the more fully informed
the safer’, which, while a little stodgy to the contemporary
ear, is, in this context, particularly apt - almost like someone
had thought about it! In my introduction, I alluded to the
possibility of a gap in aircrew knowledge which, I fully accept
was a gutsy opening gambit. Regardless, the use of digital
products in the air, for safety of navigation or situational
awareness, without an appreciation of their inherent
limitations or even their basic specification (that which they
are mandated to show and that which they do not), contains
inherent risks. So, to justify my bold assertion of an aircrew
knowledge deficit, please humour and indulge me by taking a
quick stab at the following geospatial quiz. If nothing else, I’m
confident it will lower any unrealistically high, ‘iPad-generation’
expectations about the currency, fidelity and utility of our
current digital map and data capability.
Q1 I’ll start with an easy one - is this World Map at Fig. 3
created in 1489 by Henricus Martellus, the latest edition?
Fig 3.
A Technically speaking, yes, it is! The format, consisting of
meticulously hand-drawn manuscript on parchment paper,
does not have the ability to be edited after final completion
thereby preventing fresh discoveries (such as America and
Australia only a few years later) from ever being added. As
Martellus didn’t have the time and resource to make a second
updated edition, this original from 1492 remains the latest
edition in this particular series. A trick question no doubt, but
please bear in mind for later, the general principle that maps
go quickly out of date until a new edition is made, as things
haven’t changed all that much in the digital age.
Q2 How often then, are new editions of digital air
A Well, it depends... The only digital charts which
are updated every 28 days in accordance with AIRAC
(Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control) are the
UK 1:250K and 1:500K Low Flying Charts (LFCs). European
LFCs are updated by the host nation, at best, every 6 months.
Most US 1:500K FAA Sectional Charts are updated at least
annually, but in general terms most global digital air charts
(1:500K TPCs and 1:250K JOGs for example) are several years
old and in some cases decades old. Each individual sheet of
the 204 UK 1:50,000 M726-Air with Powerline and Obstruction
Overlay charts are typically refreshed by DGC every 5 years
or so, prioritised by how many user amendments they have
accrued. For some foreign sourced digital charts, it may say
in the accompanying metadata that the digital version was
produced recently, but the actual chart depicted could be
ancient; being simply a scanned digital version of a very old
paper air chart. Analogy; let’s say your bank asks you to email
them a scan of your original paper birth certificate. The digital
scan you make is dated today, but the birth certificate and the
information contained thereon, is dated 1965 (in my case).
Second important principle to bear in mind - even a current
digital map might depict some very out-of-date information -
such as Hong Kong still being a British territory for example!
Q3 So just how do you keep a digital chart updated
between editions?
multiple charts series, and many thousands of individual
topographic paper sheets or digital files collected from
mapping agencies around the globe. So, apart from the UK
1:250K and 1:500K LFCs mentioned above, you will have to
rely upon specialist advice from an SGC to be certain of what
is the latest edition available. DGC are working to perfect
a system called Auto-distribution which will automatically
ping out the very latest edition of a particular chart to any
customer who has requested this service. Watch this space.
Q5 What is the difference between the Aeronautical
Information (AI) produced by No1 AIDU and topographic
air charts provisioned by DGC?
A No 1 AIDU. No 1 AIDU products, by and large, depict,
‘airspace’ which is a wholly man-made construct. From
cradle-to-grave, the position, shape, size, height, dimensions,
symbology and rules and regulations are completely
manufactured and can be maintained up to date by reference
to amendment bulletins and documents. Furthermore, the
system regulating this is international, with individual nations
obligated to follow the same set of regulations worldwide.
Therefore, charts which solely depict airspace, such as
En Route Charts (ERCs) (Fig. 4) and Instrument Approach
Plates (IAPs) etc are considered to be assured aeronautical
information and, when kept fully amended, can be relied
upon to ensure the safe navigation of an aircraft. For UK
Fig 4.
Martin D. Adamiker, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
Defence, this dependency sits squarely within the realm of
No 1 AIDU based at RAF Northolt whose products are highly
specialised and intended primarily for use in aviation.
DGC. DGC provides the whole of Defence with what is
known in the business as, ‘Foundation GEOINF and GEOINT’.
Essentially this is designed to provide situational awareness
(information and intelligence) as to the, ‘lay of the land’ and is
used to facilitate practically every UK Defence effort (including
air) around the globe. As we say in the trade, ‘No map, no war’.
This provision not only takes the form of traditional maps
and charts, either made in-house or collected from a variety
of international sources, but also the raw geospatial data
(such as obstruction data, imagery, magnetic and gravity
models and terrain models etc) which can be ingested into a
multitude of systems to orientate them in one way or another.
(One notable exception to the above general rules are UK
LFC’s which require elements of co-production by both No 1
AIDU and DGC.)
Q6 What is the level of assurance of the Digital Vertical
Obstruction File (DVOF)?
A DVOF is Unassured. For background info, DVOF is a
simply generic term for the master obstruction database.
Individual output formats of DVOF are XVOD, VVOD and some
more obscure others. DVOF is the database which depicts all
known vertical obstructions, but it might interest you to know

16 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 17

 Air Clues
Wikimedia Commons - Released for use by Daniweb
that currently within UK law, there is nothing to compel an
individual to alert DGC that they have erected a tall vertical
structure, and this is despite DGC being the formal body
mandated to maintain the national dataset of tall structures
(hopefully this is about to change as a result of lobbying by
DGC and at least structures over 100m will legally be required
to be promulgated to us). Take, for example, wind turbines;
few will have missed the exponential growth of the renewable
energy industry over the last few decades with individual
wind turbines rapidly becoming sprawling wind farms and
every man and his dog setting up a small turbine or solar array
in his own back yard or field. Many of these are temporary
structures which appear, move, disappear or undergo a
change in height seemingly at random. Who’s to say that as
I write, someone isn’t erecting a 200ft wind turbine on their
farm to charge up their brand-new Tesla, hidden somewhere
deep within the UK Low Flying System?
The team within DGC who have the onerous task of
discovering all of these obstructions is the Geospatial Air
Information Team (GAIT) and while the process GAIT uses
to research and make DVOF is fully assured, the actual data
itself, outside of airfields, is not physically surveyed. Instead,
it is researched and compiled from a multitude of disparate
unassured sources such as council planning websites or
power company records. Hence the resulting product must
be considered to be unassured. That said, updated DVOF data
is published every 28 days and it is believed that the accuracy
of UK DVOF exceeds that available in any other country.
However, in the final analysis, DVOF remains only a database
18 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
of known obstructions, the unknown ones still exist of course,
but are yet to be discovered by our researchers and added
to DVOF.
Q7 Given the above, are topographic air charts, such as
UK LFCs, fully assured AI?
A I believe not. In general terms, assured data and
information can solely be relied upon to guarantee the
safe navigation of an aircraft, while unassured data and
information is provided merely for situational awareness.
As I described above, an IFR chart contains only information
over which, some accredited body will have ownership and
responsibility, and for which a fully auditable regulatory
process exists, and the whole can therefore be formally
assured. Now, given what we’ve already said about DVOF
being unassured, in the same way, it can be inferred that
topography also changes outside of anyone’s control, road
junctions change, forests are felled, buildings erected, rivers
change their course. Even whole cities pop up in China,
seemingly overnight, and global construction continues
unabated with no requirement for it to be reported to us
map makers.
Unlike airspace, topography literally has a mind of its own;
every day and everywhere, unfettered human activity and
unbridled ambition takes its toll on the physical surface of the
Earth. It may or may not have changed since the last map
edition was made - who could say without undertaking a
daily global satellite audit of the entire Earth’s surface? And
what about all of the air hazards and avoids we sprinkle
liberally onto the finished chart? Is the mink farm still in
business post COVID and did the farmer decide to convert his
light aircraft strip into a solar farm? Who knows, it’s all pretty
much unregulated - or at least the regulations don’t require
that map makers are informed. Given also that (outside of the
UK) an LFC or VFR air chart may only be refreshed 6-monthly
(at best) and yet vertical obstructions change daily, I’d
probably not trust my life to a VFR chart in the same way that
you have to with say a Terminal Approach Plate.
Add to this the fact that DGC does not make all of its global
topographic air charts in-house but collects the vast majority
from mapping agencies worldwide (over which we have little
control) and confidence over accuracy lowers further. Some
South American air charts date from the 1950’s but are still
the latest edition! Furthermore, question 3 above revealed
that you can’t hand-amend a digital chart even if you had the
information required. For all of the above reasons, I believe
topographic air charts, particularly digital versions, and even
the UK 28-day LFCs, must be assumed to be unassured air
information, and therefore should only be used to provide you
with situational awareness.
Q8 Given the limitations of topographic air charts
described in Q7, is it mandatory to have reference to
DVOF whilst flying at low level?
A Despite DVOF being unassured, it remains the single
most authoritative source available that describes all known
vertical obstructions. The information contained within
DVOF is meticulously maintained, is used to populate all air
charts, (including those made by No 1 AIDU and NATS for the
CAA) and it can be displayed as an overlay to moving maps,
tablets and cockpit displays. Whereas a chart may only show
obstructions greater than a certain height or specification,
DVOF shows them all (notionally above 50ft). Therefore, in
addition to your eyeballs, it may well be the only other thing
that will alert you to the existence of an obstruction on your
flightpath. Therefore, given its provenance, then the answer
to the question is obviously…
No, it’s not universally mandated for use. And this despite
collision with terrain featuring in pretty much every Top 3
air hazard across all Duty Holders within Defence aviation.
Unfortunately, some airframes simply aren’t physically able
to utilise this invaluable risk-mitigating resource. However,
where it can be ingested and displayed, I believe it should,
and where it can’t, I believe there should be serious attempts
to rectify this.
Q9 Why are there some obstructions in DVOF that are not
shown on the digital chart (and vice versa)?
A There are, of course, four answers to this one, so extra
points if you get them all…
a. While DVOF itself is updated every 28 days, the digital (and
paper) air charts may be several years old and consequently
show only the obstructions that were known at that time
(Martellus strikes again). For paper charts you can use CALF or
CHAD to hand amend, but this is not possible for digital – the
technical limitations which cause this are more fully explained
in part two.
b. DVOF contains all known obstructions, but to avoid clutter
at different scales, the charts only show those which are
Air Clues
above a specified cut-off height - beware, different chart types
have different specifications.
c. DGC take a data grab of the latest DVOF as close as
possible to the AIRAC cut-off date to ensure that as many
newly discovered vertical obstructions are captured and
promulgated as possible. Unfortunately, this date is too late
for No 1 AIDU to be able to take that data and then make
LFCs in time for AIRAC, therefore they must use the previous
month’s DVOF data.
d. If you fly a US sourced platform, say F-35 or P-8A, then
you almost certainly use a format of DVOF known as VVOD
(Vector Vertical Obstruction Data). DGC must send our home-
made UK XVOD format to the US where it is then converted
by the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) into
the US VVOD format and then it is returned to us to be made
available on MilFLIP for download. We estimate that the US
VVOD lags UK data by circa 2 AIRAC cycles (56 days). The
lesson here is that once you purchase a Commercial Off
the Shelf (COTS) platform, you become wedded to the data
requirements of that platform - which may not be supported
by UK Defence. (For example, NGA in the US are withdrawing
VVOD in 2024, so all operators of US air platforms and systems
will need to figure out how to ingest its replacement, called
TFADS-O. DGC have uploaded sample test data on MilFLIP
should you wish to do some preliminary investigation).
For all of the reasons above, it is therefore 28-day, DGC-
produced DVOF, and not the chart, which, when ingested
directly and digitally into an aircraft or mission planning
system, is the master, the bible, the very latest and greatest,
the vertical obstruction, ‘grand fromage’ if you will. Any other
depiction of vertical obstructions is likely to be out of date
when compared with the very latest DVOF data.
Q10 How do I report an uncharted obstruction in order
that all can be made aware?
A Assuming you spot an anomaly and none of the caveats in
Q8 above apply, then there are 2 options open to you:
a. D-ASOR. If the uncharted obstruction caused you to
lose a few heart beats, then obviously D-ASOR it asap (put
‘Uncharted Obstruction’ in the title to speed processing).
b. dvof@mod.gov.uk If on the other hand, you simply notice
an error on the chart in passing, then email us with the basics;
height, location, type of obstruction and lit or unlit (if known).
Regardless of how we receive a report, DGC’s GAIT will
respond, fully investigate and update DVOF if required.
Q11 Which overall body within Defence governs the
digital implementation and use of air charts and decides
and mandates best practice for all?
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 19
 Air Clues
A None. Each Command has its own policy and each
individual air system and platform has purchased its own
mission planning system, and each has different capabilities
and limitations, therefore a common best-practice solution
is just not possible. Sometimes even 2 Squadrons operating
the same type of aircraft will use the digital AI provided in
different ways or one will have a local expert who has a better
understanding of the mission planning system than the other.
This lack of commonality massively complicates the job of the
SGCs to support the whole of Defence and safety innovations
which could be employed would likely only benefit a minority
of users or might cause unintended consequences for others.
Q12 Which body ensures that when a new air platform
or system is brought into service, it is fully compliant with
the data formats and standards mandated by Defence (in
JSP 465 and DEFSTAN 00-102)?
A Not really a body, more a lone individual; the SDI
Gatekeeper based at Abbey Wood; cursed with the impossible
and thankless task of attempting to marshal and cohere the
disparate geospatial data requirements of a vast multitude of
new and complex air platforms and air systems such as F-35
Lightning II and P-8 Poseidon and a myriad of UAVs. Some of
which, can require over a hundred individual digital formats
and databases to safely navigate and operate. When Defence
decides to spend billions of pounds on a new system,
Commercially-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) from the US, it may arrive
in service long before its many data needs are fully resolved. If
you’re aware of an air system being procured which hasn’t yet
fully considered it’s through-life geospatial data requirements,
then you really should speak to the SDI Gatekeeper asap.
Q13 What future innovations and solutions
are in the pipeline to resolve current digital
mapping shortcomings?
A None. Spoiler alert, current map technology (explained
in more detail in part two), contains a fundamental flaw -
therefore no innovation is possible.
Q14 Where does this leave the concept of a
paperless cockpit?
A On shaky ground, I believe. The joint DGC/No 1 AIDU
DHAN I mentioned earlier comes to a similar conclusion. I
recall that it used to be written in the Release to Service (RTS)
of many airframes and many moons ago that, ‘sole reliance
on GPS/digital mapping was not to be relied upon to ensure
the safe navigation of the aircraft’, or words to that effect. It
would be interesting to know if this sound wisdom still stands;
it really should because little has changed over time. Perhaps
you have already concluded from the above, that it would be
foolhardy to dispense with good-old, hand-corrected, CALF,
CHAD and 28-day Amendment Bulletined paper maps and
documents? Or conversely, maybe you are flying without
paper already, doggedly trusting your life to a low resolution,
20 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Air Clues
out-of-date, unassured and unamendable topographic air
chart? There’s really no-one in a position to authoritatively say
who’s right or who’s wrong, or what best practice might be.
Q15 Are military personnel appropriately trained in the
handling of large volumes of digital data?
A Not universally. Considering the safety-critical nature
of the data in question, its sheer volume, the importance
of accurate data maintenance, the technical complexity
of mission planning systems and the opaque rules and
regulations involved, I’d say that the person in charge of
organising the digital map holdings would be comparable to
what is known as a data archivist in many civilian companies,
and therefore this role probably shouldn’t be delegated to the
most junior or newest member of the unit. Recent D-ASORS
suggest that on some units, there is no single, designated
person fulfilling the critical role of maintaining the mission
planning system’s digital map library.
A Digital Data Archivist appraises
and researches digital files, records
and documents to determine their
importance and potential value.
They then maintain holdings,
preserve and catalogue these
materials accurately in order
that others can access them,
while ensuring they're not lost
or overlooked.
Summary
Quiz over, no prizes for top marks, but perhaps you have
learned something interesting, or useful to your role.
Hopefully the above has also whetted your appetite to know
more about the limitations of the information upon which
you trust your very lives when flying. You will have noted
that none of the answers above were simple, straightforward,
practical, reassuring or obvious; which, is a little concerning
given the very real-world use of digital air maps and the
significant safety implications. Having operated in the Low
Flying environment for 30 years and in the world of the SGCs
for the last five, it’s been a bit of an eye-opener for me to say
the least. Rather than simply highlight the problem and then
slope off feeling smug, I thought it prudent to provide some
further background insight in part two and then tentatively
offer some solutions to this conundrum in part three. n
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 21
 Air Clues
Aeronautical
Information (AI)
by Flt Lt Darren Miller, SO3 AI Governance, DAATM
Most people would associate the term
‘AI’ with Artificial Intelligence however,
there is another meaning that, while
not as familiar, has and will continue
to play a vital role in ensuring our
aviation activities are safe, efficient,
and effective in delivering Defence
output.
So, what is AI? Simply put, it is
information resulting from the
assembly, analysis, and formatting of
aeronautical data (this data can range
from airfield opening times and phones
numbers, to vertical obstruction details
and runway dimensions). Essentially it’s
everything we need to ensure we can
effectively and safely operate our wide
variety of platforms wherever they need
to be, and therefore everything you’d
22 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
expect to find
in the Military
Aeronautical
Information
Publication (MilAIP).
Why is AI important
to me? Every time
a person, vehicle, or
aircraft moves around an aerodrome, or
indeed moves around the globe they
will be using Aeronautical Information
in some form or another. Whether it’s
opening times that allow pedestrian
access to an airfield, taxiway numbering
to allow vehicles to safely transit an
airfield, or segregated airspace to
ensure aircraft can carry out their sorties
safely; Aeronautical Information is
behind everything we do and ensuring
and assuring its quality is key to
maintaining safe operations.
So What? The quality of our decisions
is based largely on the quality of the
information we use to form them.
Inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading
information can very easily lead to
dangerous consequences, particularly
in the military and aviation contexts.
Take Turkish Airlines Flight TK726 in
Mar 15, for example: the aircraft was
inbound to Kathmandu Airport from
Istanbul and due to poor weather
had been holding off its arrival. The
crew had already made one attempt
to land and after going around
decided to reset for another attempt.
Unfortunately, on landing the left
main gear missed the asphalt surface,
hit the grass, and caused the aircraft
to veer off the runway. Thankfully no
catastrophic damage occurred, and all
235 Passengers and Crew were able to
safely evacuate.
So, what happened? There was
scheduled maintenance work due to be
carried out which had been correctly
announced by NOTAM, and that would
displace the runway threshold by 120m.
However, this work never happened
and the NOTAM cancelling this was
actioned too late. This crossover of
information resulted in the aircraft’s
Flight Management System (FMS)
having the wrong threshold information
stored…but, this is not where the story
ends. Compounding that issue was
an inbuilt calculation error: Lat/Long
positions can be calculated in a number
of ways, using a number of datums,
in this case the AIP Lat/Long position
data was in Decimal Seconds, and the
aircraft’s FMS was in Degrees/Minutes/
Seconds. This different formatting
method produced a further 26m
distance error that ultimately led to
the aircraft being too far to the left and
hitting the grass on touchdown – as the
photos below show.
Poor information alone was not the sole
contributary factor but, like all incidents
it played a significant part in increasing
the likelihood of the incident and
Imagery from Final Report of Runway Excursion of Turkish Airlines JOC, A330-303 at TIA, KATHMANDU, NEPAL on 4th March 2015.
severity of the outcome. This example,
among many others (including a recent
RAF Chinook wire strike) highlights
the importance of using accurate,
timely, and correctly formatted
Aeronautical Information.
AI Governance?
Most, if not all, information we use
conforms to one standard or another,
whether it be international language
norms, or more specialist terms used
in engineering or aviation. These
norms and standards are created and
regulated by a variety of national and
international bodies ensuring we as
users interpret the information the way
it was intended. The same applies for
Aeronautical Information, the standards
for which are set by ICAO and then
pushed down through national level
where, in the UK, they form the Civilian
CAP1054 and the Military JSP495.
These publications provide the support
and guidance needed to ensure the
data and information we use is of the
quality we need and presented in a
Accuracy
Resolution
Integrity
manner our systems and processes can
properly ingest.
The Aeronautical Governance Team
(based within Defence Airspace &
Air Traffic Management – DAATM)
is responsible for ensuring Defence
can meet its aeronautical information
quality requirements and is here
to provide day-to-day support and
guidance to: data originators, airfield
managers, aerodrome operators, and
anyone who handles aeronautical
information.
A simple explanation of what we do
and how we can help is to use the UK
Red Tractor scheme as an example.
You can think of aeronautical data as
the raw ingredients, generated from
a variety of sources and in a variety
of formats. Aeronautical information
would then be a recipe, the raw data
has been collated, checked, and
formatted into something we can then
use. The Aeronautical Governance
Traceability
Data Quality
Air Clues
Team (like the Red Tractor Scheme
does for the food chain) are here to
ensure the completeness and integrity
of the data chain ensuring accuracy
and resolution is maintained from
source to user. In order to support our
work, we have created JSP495 Part 1
(Defence Aeronautical Information
Policy) and will look to publish Part 2
(Guidance) later this year. In addition
to JSP495 we will be conducting briefs
and training to increase awareness
and knowledge of your responsibilities
towards aeronautical information and
working to bridge gaps in current
processes. Starting this year more
specific training will be delivered
during the MAA Aerodrome Operator’s
Study Period, and BM&Sp Airfield
Managers Course however, please
use the contact details below to ask
questions or seek support. n
For more details, contact Flt Lt Darren
Miller, SO3 Aeronautical Information
Governance
Tel: 0300 162 7894
Completeness
Format
Timeliness
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 23
 Air Clues
We All Learnt About
Flying from that ...
by Gp Capt Mark Manwaring, Inspector of Flight Safety
The Inspector of Flight Safety (Acting
Head of the RAF Safety Centre at
the time of writing), Gp Capt Mark
Manwaring, reflects upon the origins
of Human Factors, the successes of
Open Reporting and what has become
the Just Culture.
When we consider the time and effort
required to change or grow any culture,
it becomes evident that this does not
happen overnight. We are currently
transitioning to Substantial Assurance
through the implementation of the
Inspector Model. This is incorporating
tried and tested Flight Safety-type
assurance into some safety domains
that hitherto have not practiced honest
and open reporting. Whilst, to those
immersed in the Just Culture it seems
entirely natural, it must be remembered
that Human Factors and open reporting
RAF Bentley Priory - former home of the Inspector Flight Safety. Image: cc-by-sa/2.0 - © Peter Trimming - geograph.org.uk/p/6376547
24 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
are still relatively new to the 118 years of
manned powered flight.
The importance of human factors in
the causation of aircraft accidents was
recognised by the Inspector of Flight
Safety (RAF) in the late 1960s when
Boards of Inquiry (BoI) were instructed
to consider seeking the advice of an
Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM)
psychologist, or ‘behavioral scientist’.
The value of the expertise of the IAM
psychologist was rapidly appreciated
by BoIs. With the involvement of IAM to
investigate the human factors aspect
of accidents being firmly established
in the RAF by 1972. For many years this
task was fulfilled with great success by
John Chappelow. He also developed
a human error accident base at the
IAM. An important outcome of the
involvement of an IAM psychologist
in BoIs was the initiation of research
projects at IAM with the aim of
improving flight safety (RAF Historical
Society Journal, Edition 43).
I was lucky enough to work with John
Chappelow in the late 1990s when I was
Course Manager and Lecturer at the
Inspectorate of Flight Safety. John had
a splendid monotone voice and rarely
broke into a smile. Despite this, and the
feeling that he was continually psycho-
analyzing his audience, his presentation
was always the highlight of the course.
His line that ‘to err is human and this
is how we might prevent it leading
to an accident’ has morphed over the
intervening years into the current HF
Training package. The most memorable
part of his lectures was his theory on
how to avoid wheels-up landings…
“The reason crews see 3-greens that may
not be there during their pre-landing
checks, is because up to that moment,
they have always seen 3-greens – unless
they are a serial offender… This moribund
occurrence has had a predicable outcome
and therefore you know what you will
see and your subconscious expects it.
However, if it were possible to make it a
little more interactive and novel, then we
could challenge the subconscious. So,
I would propose a single-window fruit
machine under the undercarriage position
indicators. When the undercarriage is
lowered, the fruit machine spins and stops
when the lights are steady. Your call on
finals would be “Finals, 3-greens and a
cherry” – you would have to look very
carefully to check, as it might not be a
cherry, but could easily be a bell!”
I doubt whether John ever put this
suggestion forward to the Gems
Awards Scheme, but that kind of lateral
thinking, deserves the top prize! As
well as the human element, systemic
failures require constant examination
and improvement, and rely equally
upon wide and honest communication
to identify substandard areas. During
my IFS tour, we introduced a session
called ‘I Learnt About Flying From That’.
The one-hour session came at the end
of the middle day and relied upon the
atmosphere of openness that the Course
(and RAF Bentley Priory) engendered.
To get things going, I would start with
an occurrence that nearly cost me my
life and what I learned to prevent its
reoccurrence. With Chatham House
Rules in place, the sessions often
overrun as course members tried to
get numerous demons off their chest.
Due to the differing backgrounds of
the course members, they found it
to be an ‘experience-multiplier’ and
a great starting point for discussions
on supervision.
One particular session during a Flying
Authorisers’ Course had 2 co-pilots from
different C-130 sqns. One started the
proceedings with an account of how
whilst on exercise conducting a grass-
strip landing, the crew came very close
to landing wheels-up and overshot from
10 feet above the ground. He put the
occurrence down to a locally-produced
exercise addition to the Flight Reference
Cards (FRCs) that was not fit for purpose,
but did not share with the course on
how the occurrence was followed-up.
The very next to speak was the other
C-130 co-pilot. His story fully replicated
his colleague’s account and during
the heated discussion that ensued, it
Air Clues
became evident that the events were
just 4-weeks apart, but that neither had
reported the occurrence or had done
anything subsequently to improve the
FRCs.
The worst credible outcome from a
similar situation is where someone
fatally replicates a mistake that you got
away with – unnoticed by others - but
did not report. This has applicability in
all roles associated with aviation, not
just for aircrew. And it is a credible
outcome, as after 118 years of
aviation, there are very few new ways
of suffering a fatal accident.
We currently find ourselves in a period
of Covid restrictions and reduced flying
hours, which in turn leads to reduced
rehearsal of all related support activities
and associated currencies. This is
compounded by cancelled courses and
less face-to-face ‘chewing the breeze’ in
the crew-room, where newcomers are
able to learn from the experiences of
those around them. As a consequence,
we are all less current and experienced
as we might have been. So, every time
that you make a mistake, or better still,
foresee the potential for something to
go wrong – REPORT IT. If we increase
the ratio of ‘Near-Miss’ and predictive
3rd-Age Reports to Incident/Accident
Reports then we will enrich the
corporate knowledge-base. And your
shared experience may well prevent
someone else’s bad experience.
Keep talking. Keep reporting. Stay Safe! n
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 25
 Air Clues
UK Distress & Diversion Notification
of Emergency Situations with
Search and Rescue in the UK
by WO Barry Tucker, Flt Lt Jennings and Flt Lt Hardman, RAF(U) Swanwick
The Search and Rescue role in the UK was formerly under
the sole control of the Royal Air Force and has been through
many evolutions since the first real dedicated iteration in
1941. With many different control sites such as the dual
Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centres (ARCCs) based
at RAF Mountbatten (Plymouth), RAF Weeton (Preston)
and RAF Pitreavie Castle near Edinburgh. These sites
were combined to form the solitary ARCC at RAF Kinloss
in 1997. The Department for Transport transferred the
responsibilities to civilian control to Her Majesty's Coast
Guard in 2016, based at the National Maritime Operations
Centre (NMOC) near Fareham. The RAF retained the Distress
and Diversion cell located at RAF(U) Swanwick.
The purpose of this article is to provide the aviation
community a greater insight as to how it is served by the
current evolution of UK SAR. Co-written by D&D and ARCC
serving personnel ensures the most accurate and up-to date
information is provided.
Distress and Diversion (D&D) cell
D&D (RT callsign 'London Centre') is a section within RAF(U)
Swanwick manned wholly by RAF serving and reserve
personnel covering both the London and Scottish FIR/ UIRs.
The core periods are manned by a watch of 2 controllers (Sgt
– Flt Lt) and 2 support controllers (SAC – Cpl). Outside of these
times, there is 1 of each cadre.
D&D, in some circles referred to as the Alert and Fixing Cell,
has always monitored and responded to emergencies for
military aircraft on 243.00MHz and was ceded 121.500MHz
to preserve its integrity and ensure it is always monitored.
Providing a fixing service, in addition to emergency assistance
when required, these frequencies are commonly referred to
as 'Guard'.
At the time of writing, the UK is the only country which has
a dedicated cell to monitor the guard frequencies constantly
and does so on the behalf of many aerodromes. Where radar
and radio coverage are available at circuit height (such as
Humberside, Doncaster, Southend to name a but a few),
D&D takes responsibility of the ICAO mandated task of guard
monitoring thus reducing the burden on busy terminal
26 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
controllers and removing any ambiguity of which Unit
should respond.
Aircraft declaring an emergency on guard
Any aircraft can declare their emergency on guard for D&D
to react to. This has varied from 'PANs' e.g. aircraft uncertain
of position (lost), rough running engine, sick passengers
to 'Maydays' e.g. engine fire (leading to ejection), light Civil
developing smoke and fumes in the cockpit or engine failure
over water; the list is long.
Predominately, military aircraft will declare their emergency
on the frequency they are working without recourse to Guard
but, if operating autonomously, or, for example, at low level,
then it is the only option. On one such occasion a Hawk
aircraft suffered an engine failure at 500 ft and, converting
speed to height, the pilot climbed and called 'Pan' on 243.00.
Despite only passing 1000 ft on the initial call the aircraft was
immediately located on the Auto-triangulation display seconds
before the 7700 squawk triggered the alarm on the radar
display. The call was acknowledged, and the aircraft given a
steer to the nearest suitable diversion – in this case Shawbury
at a range of 40nm. There was some concern that he might
not be able to achieve sufficient height to carry out a Radar
AFL procedure, however the engine was restarted at height
and the aircraft was handed over to Shawbury Approach to
Air Clues
STORNAWAY
WICK
LOSSIEMOUTH
the list is not exhaustive); the civil aerodromes range from
all major airports to grass and farm strips. At the click of a
WINDY HEAD button the available runways, Landing Distance Available
BENBECULA
and frequency, should they have one, is known. Immensely
valuable when dealing with the GA community, the mapping
TIREE
LEUCHARS can be adjusted to view the entire British Isles or zoom in from
200KM to 100m Ordinance Survey. With a majority of light
PRESTWICK
BOULMER
aircraft being not above 4000ft amsl, the features we are able
WEST FREUGH
to point out when an aircraft is lost or simulating lost are easily
NEWCASTLE
SILLOTH
identifiable and relatable for the pilot to readily assimilate e.g
LEEMING motorway junctions and service stations, major A roads, train
LINTON-ON-OUSE lines and railway stations to name but a few.
WOODVALE
VALLEY CONINGSBY It is not unusual for light aircraft to get lost and the earlier the
SHAWBURY MARHAM pilot calls D&D, the greater the chance of preventing airspace
WITTERING
infringements and the loss of capacity in themselves due to
WATTISHAM
L. RISSINGTON
BRAWDY rising stress levels.
NORTHOLT
ST ATHAN MANSTON
ODIHAM
CHIVENOR
YEOVILTON The example below shows how the Auto-T can locate an
THORNEY ISLAND
aircraft transmitting on VHF. This aircraft is approximately
CAMBRIDGE PORTLAND
CULDROSE
17.2NM ESE of Nottingham.
continue recovery on 243.00. The entire incident took about
3 mins from call to handover. If the pilot had not been able to
relight and was forced to abandon the aircraft, then D&D has a
lot to do in a very short time. More on these actions later.
D&D uses Automatic Triangulation (Auto-T) equipment which
will 'lock-on' to whoever is transmitting on either of these
frequencies to give a source location immediately. Around the
country we have 30 UHF, 31 VHF and 12 Practice Emergency
Training Frequency (PETF mil only) antennas. If it is appropriate
Map images - Crown Copyright ©2021. Reproduced by kind permission of Leonardo MW Ltd.
to the situation, a 'steer' can be provided based upon that
first transmission if enough relevant information has been
given. It goes without saying, any pilot is going to be working
extremely hard during the initial stages of fault finding/using
the Flight Reference Cards (FRC’s) to try and resolve the issue Upon ranging in, we can be more accurate by pointing out
if practicable. When it is a military aircraft, D&D can assist in that the Urban area due N by 1.5nm is Grantham. The Range
the selection of a suitable aerodrome as the latest details of and bearing shown here is the reciprocal data for a steer to
all open military aerodromes are displayed on wing boards Fenland airfield.
within the operations room. The wing board displays such
information as runway in use, including landing distances,
airfield serviceability's and weather details; it would be rare
that a pilot would not have a plan on where to divert should
it be necessary but just like an aircraft, any aerodrome can
have malfunctioning equipment or the runway be declared
unavailable at short notice.
Diagram: Current DF Sites
RED = UHF
BLUE = VHF
BLACK = PETF
The Auto-T system is unique. A huge database has been input
and painstakingly maintained with the details of 34 mil and
143 civil aerodromes currently (Pooleys and Farm guides, but
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 27
 Air Clues
To illustrate how effective auto-triangulation can be, a light
civil aircraft called on 121.5 – 'Mayday Mayday'. There was no
other transmission – no callsign, no type of emergency, no
intentions. However, the transmission was enough to pull
traces on the auto-triangulation display indicating the aircraft’s
position. The relevant police authority was contacted and a
police helicopter in the area was tasked to search. The aircraft
was found in a field 10 minutes later. It had successfully force-
landed after running out of fuel. Not all force landings end
so well.
Aircraft in emergency already receiving an ATC service
When aircraft experience an emergency and are already 2-way
with an ATC provider, whoever that might be, it would not
be prudent to increase the pilot's workload by getting them
to change frequency. In such circumstances D&D would
delegate Operational Control for the duration of the event.
Situations are always closely monitored until the outcome of
the aircraft is known to liaise with any relevant emergency
services. For example, a light aircraft was en-route to Iceland
from Blackpool, approximately 90nms North of Stornoway
when it suffered an engine malfunction. Declaring a Mayday
with Scottish Flight Information, with the real possibility of
the sole engine seizing, the aircraft squawked 7700 and D&D
was passed the details. Whilst one controller activated the
SAR response by calling the ARCC, another controller saw
on radar that RAF Lossiemouth had aircraft in its locality and
requested any aircraft with enough fuel for assistance. A
Typhoon immediately responded and was provided vectors
on UHF guard by D&D to the troubled Cessna becoming visual
and remaining above, acting as 'top-cover' should the worst
happen. Due to its added height, it was also able to actively
assist the SAR helicopter to home in and follow (original article
in RAF News 08 August 2016) until a safe landing took place at
Stornoway airport.
Tracing Action
Locating aircraft that are overdue at a destination is a
significant task which, although often time consuming, is an
essential task. Each time this is undertaken it has the potential
to end up with being an aircraft crash and is therefore treated
accordingly with urgency and diligence. Using various sources,
it may be that we trace them through ATC units, contact
the pilot by telephone if known or by use of radar replays.
Replays can be obtained within approx. 10-15 minutes and
then need to be reviewed; this is the task that requires as
much information that the person/unit can provide (time of
departure, squawk etc). More often than not, the reason is
due to the pilot forgetting to check off frequency as it transits
or is out of radio coverage but, if there is any doubt as to the
safety D&D will search until found or all avenues have been
exhausted. Quite often the aircraft (GA community) were never
even airborne – poor weather or other such circumstances
have led to more than one case of overdue action being taken
when they had not arrived for a land away.
28 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Air Clues
Oxford Kidlington called at approx. 1700hrs on a Saturday
looking for a light aircraft which had departed late morning
and had not been heard of or seen since. Prior to departure,
the pilot had left on a post-it note 3 aerodrome ICAOs, 2 of
which were scrawled through but all of the aerodromes were
in Hampshire and Sussex. Having blanketed the south of
England calling any and all ATC agencies which were still open,
the aircraft seemed to have got airborne and disappeared. A
radar replay was obtained and although the aircraft had not
been assigned a discrete Mode 3, a likely target squawking
7000 was seen at the reported departure time. It was observed
heading west initially and then surprisingly went north. The
target continued N-N Westerly and then making an approach
to Welshpool before radar contact was lost. We telephoned
the FISO on duty just as the pilot and his passengers were
returning from an extended lunch nearby and closed the
incident.
Aircraft Crash
Firstly, the ARCC must be informed with the position, altitude,
direction and speed of travel (if known). The ARCC will
immediately launch an SAR asset towards the area. Secondly,
D&D will contact the Police Control room in whose area the
aircraft has gone down. D&D has direct numbers for regional
Police Authorities in the UK (there is still always 999 of course),
and it is through them that local Fire and Rescue will be
notified. Help may also be sought from the National Police
Air Service who, if they are able, may task assets in the area
to assist. be done as swiftly as possible without having to authenticate incoming
callers. If you feel that you should be on this notification list, please
After an ejection the main concern is to locate the contact OC D&D or WO I/C D&D and we will put it to the powers that
crew, assuming the abandonment was successful. Any be for a final decision.
accompanying aircraft will be interrogated whether any
‘chutes seen’ and any aircraft in the area, military or civil, may We must be cautious of course with details of any on-going incident as
be co-opted to look for any indications on the ground. As SAR I am sure you would appreciate. The last thing anybody wants is for a
assets get nearer, airspace restrictions will be put in place to family member or friend to find out about casualties in an uncontrolled
facilitate more systematic search procedures. Ejections at sea manner as it is almost always erroneous on the rumour mill.
are particularly problematic. If the ejection was at height, then
D&D may look at the upper winds structure to get some idea Liaison with ARCC
in which direction chutes may have drifted but in general it D&D is constantly in touch with the ARCC. ARCC controls all SAR
is impossible to guesstimate where a pilot may have come helicopters and the timely passing of information is essential. ARCC
down. Unfortunately, Auto-triangulation will not pick up a is passed all details of aircraft in emergency – callsign, type, number
PLB transmitting on the surface. PLB signals will be picked up of persons on board, current location and intentions. With Tracing
by the Coastguard and position can be fixed via satellite on Action, the ARCC is informed as a matter of course at 30 mins from
406mhz. It is also possible for SAR assets, and some military commencement or earlier should the situation dictate.
aircraft to home in on UHF and VHF guard transmissions.
Location is dependent on the Coastguard’s skills in the search SAROPS
element of SAR. Upon declaration of Search and Rescue Operations by the ARCC, D&D
will notify relevant aerodromes and agencies of the location and nature
Please don't call D&D for information…. (if required) of the tasking. The SAROPS message is then broadcasted
In the event of an accident, I strongly urge all agencies not on UHF and both U/VHF for Temporary Danger Areas (TDA), in order to
directly involved in the incident to not call D&D for details. inform aircraft in the vicinity of the incident so that they can give the
This is not only detrimental to our response in getting the SAR asset a wide berth. TDAs are often imposed but ultimately, these
information to those who need to know by slowing us down, are only mandatory avoids for Military aircraft (civil should comply with
it could result in confusion as to who has been called and who instructions of the Emergency Controlling Authority if they are aware of
has not. We have our set procedures on who to call so it can the restriction). n
Image by Ryan Sinclair. Reproduced by kind permission.
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 29
 Air Clues
The Limitations of Current
Digital Mapping Technology
by Flt Lt Graham Stewart SO3-Air, Defence Geographic Centre (DGC).
PART TWO. Technical, Fundamental and Historic Limitations.
In part one, I described the practical limitations that you
will encounter if you attempt to use a digital product to
solely ensure the safety of navigation of your aircraft, and
why I strongly believe, that you should not try to do so!
In part two, I’d like to try and explain what causes these
limitations and how they have come to be. Essentially;
exactly why is it that the digital mapping doesn’t do what
we really need it to do? Once we’re all agreed on this, we
can move on to identifying a potential solution in part three.
Unfortunately, the limitation is a bit fundamental; somewhat
like asking why your petrol car can’t run on electricity or why
microwave oven won’t stream Netflix (yet). Hold on to your
hats, if you fully grasp this, then maybe you can come up
with a solution better than the one I offer?
Raster Technology and Production Methods
The rasterisation process was invented in the 1970s to turn
an image produced graphically (say by optical photography)
30 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Trinitron-bars.jpg: Ubcule at Wikimedia Commonsderivative work: Ubcule,
CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>, via
Wikimedia Commons
into a format that could be stored digitally and displayed on
a TV screen. A rasterised image therefore is simply a scanned
copy of a picture comprising of many coloured pixels. These
pixels can be easily displayed on a TVs screen which is similarly
configured to show points of light.
Rasterised Air Charts
Raster is the generic term for a digital image, whereas our
raster output formats are the NATO standard ASRP format and
the US CADRG format (with a smattering of GeoTIFF for those
who can take it.
The production process specifically to make rasterised digital
air charts further compresses a large graphical image file
consisting of millions of colours into a much smaller sixty
colour file that can be ingested into an aircraft (which has
only limited processing power), whilst hopefully retaining its
legibility. While an original image may be 250mbs in size, the
compressed CADRG is 50 times smaller at around 5mbs.
When a digital air chart is initially made by an air cartographer
on a dedicated Geographical Information System (GIS),
initially it does consist of a vast wealth of editable data (such
as radio frequencies, HIRTAs, place names, topographic layers,
airspace, vertical obstructions etc) held in numerous databases.
However, at the point that the digital chart is finalised
(rasterised) all that data becomes fixed (flattened) and is simply
portrayed as a graphic image. It is important to note that once
rasterised it is impossible to go back and make any changes
to the chart. So, for example, if a new vertical obstruction
is discovered after rasterisation, it will not be shown until a
brand-new edition of that chart is made - from scratch!
A raster chart doesn’t have any greater utility than paper, other
than that you can send it electronically and can view it on a
screen. Ironically; paper has the advantage over digital in that
it remains editable by the user. Therefore, a rasterised chart
is not truly, ‘digitally flexible’ in the way that we commonly
understand it today; you can’t really do much with it other
than simply display it. For aviation mapping, this basic
limitation has some very big ramifications.
Analogy: Imagine you worked on the floor of the London Stock
Exchange as a trader for a large hedge fund, but you didn’t use
the live-streamed share price information on your terminal or
a live newsfeed to inform your decisions to buy or sell. Instead,
you, being old-school, used the financial section of a reputable
broadsheet newspaper, delivered every day, except weekends.
If the market suddenly crashed, you’d only discover when you
read your newspaper’s headlines the next day the reason why
everybody (but you) were in a mad panic to sell.
Air Clues
As outdated as it may sound, that’s where we are with digital
charts; they’re not live, they arrive only periodically and go
immediately out of date. In fact, within aviation, the situation is
worse than in my example; at least in the case of a newspaper,
updates come daily; in our military setting, we could be
waiting several years for the news of the market crash to arrive!
Therefore, in the field of mapping, despite the allegedly
‘digital’ credentials of the format, the basic fundamentals have
remained unchanged for centuries – if the information you’ve
included on your map changes then you need to make a
completely new one in order to correct it.
‘But hold on a second, what about DVOF?’, I hear some of you
cry, ‘That is updated every 28 days and I can manipulate it
on my mission planning system and in the aircraft too!’ Very
astute, for this is the very crux of the matter; DVOF is not a
raster format, it is a vector format – of which, more in part three
when we look at potential solutions.
Having described an outdated, inappropriate and fatally flawed
technology and subsequent output format, I’m now going
to unfortunately add insult to injury by adding that we as
map makers don’t have a fully automated process to output
it and have only limited in-house production resource. Raster
production (and map making in general) currently still requires
a large amount of cartographic time and skill, and in the case
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 31
 Air Clues
of ASRP, it requires time consuming manual colour balancing.
Without care and attention, the reduction of 60 million colours
down to just 60 could result in some critical information being
lost as several different colours were generalised into one.
Furthermore, the requirement to make a completely new
replacement chart from scratch, places a burden on the other
map production teams within DGC. Rasterisation is simply the
final step in a long chart production process. Because the final
product cannot be edited or tweaked, all of the many teams
involved in the production are similarly required to begin
making the new edition again. As a result of its of limited map
production and raster resource, DGC applies the following
priorities to our output - wherever possible:
1. UK LFCs and some US air charts (FAA Sectionals) in
accordance with the 28-day AIRAC cycle.
2. Urgent operational and exercise tasks.
3. European air charts.
4. DGC then attempts to address the backlog of collected
global air charts which require to be rasterised.
However, despite DGC's intent to rasterise a newly acquired
air chart within two months of receipt, for global air charts it
is entirely possible, if not likely, that our global digital charts
are not as current as their paper equivalent. While moves are
afoot to streamline and automate the production process, the
fundamental limitations of the raster format (that it cannot be
edited and must be remade) will always remain. Improved
automation, while permitting a quicker refresh cycle, would
simply be the cartographic equivalent of putting lipstick on a
pig - addressing only the symptoms, not the cause.
Digital Transformation.
Time to really get under the bonnet and identify exactly
where we’ve gone off route and what we could do to get
back on track. It may seem a little tangential, but if you don’t
appreciate the implications of the following concept, then
any alternative solution you might propose is likely to be no
more than exactly the kind of porcine makeup, I referred to
32 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
above. A Digital Transformation (look it up, it’s a real thing) is a
formal and well-documented process whereby an organisation
undergoes changes which take it from the making of a
physical product, to the provision of digital data instead. It’s
essentially what became possible when we moved from the
Industrial Revolution to the Digital Age circa 1960.
There are 5 basic stages; let’s take the music industry as a
parallel example:
1. Data. Music (i.e. the raw data) existed in a non-permanent
form, could only be performed by trained experts (musicians)
in a live setting and using physical instruments. With the
advent of printing and musical notation, it became tangible
and could be written down for other experts to perform.
This mode persisted for centuries.
Hank Marvin - Image by genesee.gbh, CC BY 2.0 <https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
2. Product. With the invention of analogue recording in
1877, music could now be turned
into a physical consumable
product (Long Player records and
tape cassette for example) which
could then be mass produced
and transported for reproduction,
on demand, at home by non-
musicians.
This mode persisted for decades.
3. Digitisation.
With the invention of the
CD in 1980 by Sony and
Phillips, the music itself
could be digitised into raw
data and made available
on physical CD and DVD.
This mode persisted for
about 10 years.
4. Digitalisation. Music as data
became freed from the need to be
held on a dedicated physical medium
and could be stored in vast quantities
or transferred electronically directly to
the customer (think late 1990’s .Mp3
players). This mode persisted for a
few years.
Ipod image Jpmawet, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
5. Digital Transformation.
With the advent of streaming
digital media (think YouTube,
Napster or Spotify) in the early
2000s, music (as well as a pretty
much all other digital media)
became liberated from the
need for a specialised playing
device; the data can be used on practically any device (TV,
laptop, iPod, tablet, desk top computer, smart phone, Alexa,
Google Nest etc etc) and is infinitely configurable to the user’s
particular taste or requirement (playlists, genres, artists, mood
etc etc) coupled with pretty much universal access to the full
back catalogue of mankind’s entire musical output throughout
the ages - all now available at your fingertips in high resolution
and fidelity, wherever you are on the planet!
Some will see the above as simply a juvenile attempt to be
the first person ever to get Hank Marvin into Air Clues, but
regardless of the voracity of this claim, I maintain that the
example of a comparable digital medium to mapping is both
valid and relevant. Just as you no longer have to wait a year
or two for your fave band to release their latest Long Play (LP)
vinyl album for use upon your, ‘turntable’ and you can simply
stream their latest single straight to your i-device, so it should
be for mapping. Younger readers will be particularly alarmed
to discover that because of the inherent limitations of the LP
production process and format, you were forced to buy tracks
you didn’t even like just to get the one song you did like…
the horror!
Who knows what will come next, almost certainly it will
involve some form of manipulation by Machine Learning and
Artificial Intelligence? Perhaps you will be able to make your
Air Clues
own professional grade music without having any natural
talent at all – some will say we might already be there! Quite
a journey, I’m sure you’ll agree, but the benefits of a Digital
Transformation are clear for all to see. Perhaps when users
have access to the raw, but authoritative geospatial data
themselves they will be able to quickly produce their own
bespoke charts, tailored to the required application and
overlaid with locally produced layers of intelligence?
So, Where Are We Along the Road to a Digital
Transformation in Defence Aviation?
Before I answer this question, permit me dear reader, to
reminisce for a brief moment and wax lyrical about the good
old days, (come on, you knew I wouldn’t be able to resist it –
you’ll be doing exactly the same one day!). Back in the day,
(I’m thinking Jet Provost 3A and Wessex HC.2 here) with not
a multi-function display in sight - before Global Positioning
Satellites, pesky computers and infernal non-standard data
formats and endless, ‘computers saying no’, there existed a
single, common, universally adopted and fully editable
format - that of paper! The technology wielded by the
ancients was truly astounding. Life was a lot simpler back then;
if your trusty UK 1:50K and 1:250K LFCs were the latest editions
and had been manually kept up to date with reference to
the relevant amendment documents, bulletins and NOTAMS,
then you were pretty much good to go. You’d simply look
at the map and compass, cross reference with the real world
outside and zoom around at 50ft avoiding anything you could
physically see. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not advocating a
return to paper, merely stating that from a safety perspective,
at least you knew exactly where you stood.
Slowly, almost imperceptibly, but relentlessly over time, things
changed - enter GPS and moving map displays (first using film,
but then digital rasterised images of maps), and a whole host
of digital aids, mission planning systems, tablets, data formats,
satellite imagery, heads up displays and more. Because these
changes happened slowly, incrementally and asymmetrically
across old and new fleets, affecting all in different ways, and
because no-one at the time knew where it was all going, no-
one stepped back and took an overview or asked, ‘ok what’s
the policy here, what is the best way to use all of this, what will
be the standard and who will safely govern it for everyone?’
Who will provide the required data and in what format, what
do we need it to show us, how will we use it and what are
the safety implications? Each fleet embarked on programs to
adopt and integrate the new technologies in isolation, with
no pan-Defence oversight in a position to go back to first
principles and come up with a best-practice plan that
all must follow and one that the map providers could
practically support.
Unfortunately, Defence aviation has drifted aimlessly from
paper to digital with no direction or destination in mind –
essentially no effective plan for a unified Digital Transformation.
Furthermore, not everyone is now in the same place on
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 33
 Air Clues
this journey, with some paper-less and some paper-only,
and most somewhere in between with a confused hybrid
solution. Some are advantaged, some disadvantaged and
some completely left behind. Maps and charts are clearly just
another form of media, almost identical to the newspaper or
publishing industries who have completely transformed. So
just how far have we in Defence ambled along the road to a
full Digital Transformation and the attainment of the many,
many benefits we simply now take for granted in the world of
music, film, radio, TV, news and other media?
Sadly, we must conclude that, despite the hype as portrayed
in your typical Defence contractor’s, fully integrated,
interoperable, joined-up-able, seamless electronic battle-field
poster, at best, some air platforms and systems might perhaps
have reached the digitisation stage (1980s) still requiring to
ingest a physical product. This is certainly about where the
air chart producers are. Cruelly, because this product the
(rasterised map) is not editable but does need to be kept up
to date, paper is still required to be carried as a backup which
implies, we might actually still be somewhere in the late
19th century! The reliance of Defence aviation on a finished
physical product (be it paper, CD, DVD or raster image) is a
fundamental limiting factor. The physical product, even if it is
a rasterised image, is not flexible or intelligent enough for our
actual needs and its production and delivery require resources
that the SGCs simply no longer have. To free yourself of these
limitations you must free yourself of the requirement to make a
‘product’, the two are synonymous.
With respect to geospatial information, Defence aviation
has not completed a digital transformation and is still stuck
somewhere pre-1980s. This results in the SGC’s simply not
having the resource to continue to make artisan, ‘physical
products’ for a diverse customer base that has no single
unified requirement.
34 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Supplying digital mapping to Defence aviation is the geospatial
equivalent of continuing to attempt to run a Blockbuster Video
store (they went bankrupt years ago) for a niche group of
customers who are slavishly holding on to their video recorders
(google them if you’re under 30 years old) and who complain
endlessly that the latest Avengers movie isn’t available on
Betamax! Interestingly, there are currently some very senior RAF
Officers asking a very similar question; just why is it that their
personnel must give up the flexibility, speed and utility of the
rich digital experience they enjoy at home, the moment they
step into the professional work environment?
I really wish I could say that there was an easy fix to the current
geospatial conundrum, but unfortunately there just isn’t; we’re
all deeply in this together and in most instances have doubled
down on expensive equipment purchases. Regardless, cutting
through the politics, the history and the noise of where we are,
it seems to me that it is the rasterisation technology, process
and format and the subsequent reliance upon digital images
of maps as a tangible product that is the fundamental limiting
factor to progress. Agreed, technically speaking, the rasterisation
of a map does result in a, ‘digital’ product, but it is one that has
hardly any of the many significant advantages that we all now
implicitly expect will come with truly digital data. Because the
rasterisation process is so labour intensive and the backlog of
charts requiring rasterisation is so large, apart from the 28-day
UK LFCs, it is now actually the norm that by the time you get
your digital version of a chart, one or two new paper editions
may have been released. Your digital chart may well be out-
of-date on the day you receive it, and you can’t even update it
anyway if you wanted. It is the dumb, resource-intensive, 1970’s
raster process and its dependence on the output of a physical
product that is the problem and it must be replaced. But with
what – how can we receive mapping, but paradoxically, not
receive a product? The answer is, of course, data - see you in
part three… n
And UK Military Aviation
by Alan Lindsell, SO2 ATM CNS Defence Airspace and Air Traffic Management
What does the end of the EU Exit
Transition Period mean to UK
Military aviation?
At the end of the EU Exit Transition Period on 1 Jan 21
the UK left the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
and the overarching EU regulations pertinent to military
aviation stopped applying to the UK. So, what do we use
instead as reference documents to promote safety and
interoperability with civil aviation?
Statutory Instruments (SI). There are thousands of SIs
covering every legal issue you can imagine, and all are
accessible via the Legislation page on the GOV.UK website.
There are five that brought EU regulations relevant to UK mil
aviation (specifically ATM-CNS) into UK law, the main one
being SI 2019-459, the snappily titled “Air Traffic Management
(Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019”. This brought
in the big five Legislative Acts, or “framework documents”, to
which all subordinate Implementing Rules (IR) refer.
The main SIs are (not an exhaustive list) (by a long way):
• 2019-459 Air Traffic Management (Amendment etc.)
(EU Exit) Regulations 2019
• 2020-659 Air Traffic Management (Amendment etc.)
(EU Exit) Regulations 2020
• 2020-784 Air Traffic Management (Amendment etc.)
(EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2020
• 2020-1116 The Aviation Safety (Amendment)
(EU Exit) Regulations 2020
• 2020-1498 Air Traffic Management (Amendment etc.)
(EU Exit) (No. 3) Regulations 2020
This legal blah sounds dull, but there’s an important aspect
to this that we all need to be cognisant of and continually
monitor. The “Basic Regulation” (2018-1139) contains an article
which, to all intents and purposes, is a blanket exemption
for military aircraft and airfields from much of the (civil)
regulation. It is referred to in most of the IRs and allows for
military operations and training to be exempt from rules
which apply mostly to civil aviation.
Air Clues
Woohoo! Exemptions for everyone! Wait. What…?
This blanket exemption sounds great especially when
regulations require the procurement and fitment of costly
avionics, but the exemption doesn’t always apply. The
surveillance, performance and interoperability regulation (SPI-
IR) places specific requirements on military aircraft to equip
with Mode S (elementary) and transport aircraft are mandated
to go further and equip with Mode S (enhanced) and ADS-B
(see earlier article). This is one example of an exemption to
the exemption.
And there are many more. They’re just very difficult to find due
to the way the regulations are written. One document refers
to another which in turn refers to another and this is now far
worse given that all regulations are now UK regulations which
apply to the UK version of the EU regulations. Stay with me on
this. DAATM can help navigate this through the International
Aviation Regulatory Compliance (IARC) community
and maintains a presence in Brussels in Eurocontrol and
NATO HQs.
The main thing to remember is that military air systems must
comply with civil regulations as best effort. Procurement
constraints and a lack of funding are rarely good enough
reasons to abstain from equipping when a platform has
to operate safely in airspace shared with civilian aviation
for years to come (out of Service dates are typically a valid
reason for non-compliance). The oft-mentioned adage within
Eurocontrol is “best equipped = best-served”.
To the UK FIR boundary… and beyond!
It is important to remember that this transfer of power
from Brussels means that the law applies to UK airspace
only. Possibly the most fundamental element of flying is
the ability to reach long distances quickly and any asset
wishing to fly beyond the UK FIR/UIR will still need to adhere
to EU regulation. As a result of the Trade and Cooperation
Agreement signed on 24 Dec 2020, the UK does now have
a bilateral agreement with EASA which is being continually
updated as details emerge. See their Brexit web page
for details. n
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 35
 Air Clues
The UK Aeronautical Rescue
Coordination Centre (UKARCC)
by Neil Blewett, ARCC
On transferring to HM Coastguard ownership, the
responsibility for the UK ARCC began operations from
the National Maritime Operations Centre in Fareham.
Under CAP999, it remains the only Tasking Authority for
aeronautical SAR assets within the UK SAR Region. We
operate with 4 Watches of 8 personnel: an Aeronautical
Operations Controller (AOC) at a Tactical Level, a Team
Leader (TL) at the Operational Level and up to 6 Senior
Aeronautical Operations Officers, (SAOO). These all work a
rolling 12-hour shift pattern 0700-1900hrs. At the time of
writing this our manning was a mixture of aviation and non-
aviation ex-military and civilian staff.
To deliver effective tasking function the aim is to prioritise the
use of SAR helicopter assets, which are operated on behalf
of the State, such that they are always available to those that
need them most 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The area of
coverage of the UK Search and Rescue Region is approximately
1 million square miles. Unlike other Emergency Services the
UKARCC can only take direct requests for assistance from
approved Stakeholders:
Police
Fire and Rescue
Ambulance
HM Coastguard
Distress & Diversion
In 2019 the ARCC managed 3849 incidents which ranged from
medical evacuations, mountain rescue, sinking ships, missing
persons, aircraft emergencies the list goes on.
The ARCC delivers an effective tasking function:
• Prioritising the use of the UK national declared SAR
helicopter and fixed wing assets, to ensure that they are
always available to those that need them most 24 hours a
day, 365 days a year.
• Liaising with neighbour states to share SAR assets.
• Liaising with the Defence staff to gain support for
military assets
ARCC Comms utilises the callsign ‘UK Air Rescue’ on the
airwave, HF and VHF frequencies. The 10 bases hold 2 rotary
wing assets at each base, operating with one crew on a 24hr
shift . The fleet operates with S92 helicopters at Sumburgh,
Stornoway, Caernarfon, Newquay and Humberside, and AW189
36 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Air Clues
Initiation Phase – This comprises the
Call Collection, Flight Planning and Asset
Allocation then Scramble
Once the aircraft is airborne, we
enter the:
Continuation Phase – Proceeding, On
Scene, Transit on Task (this can be to
hospital or any place of safety) then RTB.
helicopters at Lydd, Lee on the Solent, St Athan, Prestwick and We will allocate the most appropriate
Inverness. Common to both types are: helicopter to the scene and which is
most likely to be the quickest one we
• Readiness States – RS15 0800-2200, RS45 2200-0800 can get there. Depending on the nature
• Flight Crew – 4 and likely number of casualties, we may
• Capacity – AW189 =16, S92 =21 allocate further assets to achieve the aim
• Radius of operation approx – 200nm of getting casualties to a place of safety
in the shortest time and safest manner. In
We also have Fixed wing assets: 2 King Air and 2 PA31 our Initiation Phase we will call D&D back
operating from Doncaster (formally RAF Finningley). Diagram 2. Base and Coastguard locale to notify 'SAROPS On', with Restrictions
(frequency to enable unhindered searching of any emitting
The Future We continue to operate using the same methodology as RAF beacon). To afford some protection to ourselves and the site
We continually explore ways to improve the service, both in Kinloss did. To task an asset we must ensure the request is: we will request a Temporary Danger Area (TDA) be established.
the present contract and also in preparation for the next SAR For something more enduring we can look at applying for an
contract. Looking to the future we are well into the tendering • Appropriate – received from an approved Stakeholder and Emergency Restriction of Flying (ERF). In all cases we look at
for the next SAR generation under the auspices of SAR-2G. Part appropriate use of a SAR helicopter. the location and likelihood of traffic. Obviously, in the middle
of this is exploring the effectiveness of drones in various SAR • Achievable – consideration given to factors such as of the North Sea is not going to be as busy as say overland in
situations. Drones now operate from Lydd in Kent and have weather, range, timeframe. areas known for high density of military low level traffic. Having
undertaken feasibility trials out of Caernarfon airfield. • Compliant – meeting Appropriate and Achievable makes it said that, knowing when Ex JOINT WARRIOR and similar are
Compliant under CAP999 and may adopt a Rescue callsign. active would also be factored into our decision making.
UK SAR Helicopter Coverage
S92
Radius of Operation: Here's an example: Checking NOTAMS, we will also enter our flight onto the
250nm
AW189 Who - D&D Central Aviation Data Service (CADS) website to see what
200nm
Radius of Operation:
What - Aircraft crash, 1 POB ejected. Aircraft type other flights maybe in the area and warn of our presence. In
Diagrams 1 and 2 - Crown Copyright 2021. Reproduced by kind permission from the
and Callsign this instance, as we have requested a TDA, we have a nominal
Where - North Sea with a Lat/Long (overland by Grid, amount of protection. However, in incidents where we do not
What3Words, Eastings and Northings). request a TDA, and where time permits, we will attempt to call
Sumburgh
the POC/Sqn Ops on the Nav Card and confirm if their aircraft
Stornoway It will be important for us to confirm the position given is for is airborne and on time. As we are not a Controlling Authority,
Inverness
the aircraft or the pilot. We want to get to the pilot/crew and we can only pass to our assets “CADS indicates ……” In this
not necessarily the aircraft when taking drift into account example of a crash over the sea we will call our colleagues in
following separation and the descent. the closest regional Coastguard Operations Centre to ensure
the maritime element is aware. We will use their expertise in
Prestwick
When - Reported by playmate at ????Z. tides and drift with the current sea state to give our crew a
Why - In this instance it may seem obvious for the ARCC, defined search area that an ejectee could end up in a given
Humberside
but we must know what the requestor actually time period. Depending on the distance from shore they may
Caernarfon wants us to do so we do not duplicate efforts also launch lifeboats and seek assistance from any nearby
Maritime and Coastguard Agency
needlessly. vessels in the immediate aftermath of the incident.
St Athan Weather - On scene visibility and cloud base as a minimum
Lee-on-Solent
Lydd
Newquay where possible. We have access to ‘Helibrief’ from Whilst the flight will always be a Captain’s responsibility, the
the Met Office. UK ARCC will endeavour to support throughout; this could
Note:
Watch - Other responding assets to enable deconfliction be calling a power station or prison site to enable overflight
This is representational and to build a coordinated plan of rescue. for the shortest possible route or if actually searching within
only. It is not drawn to scale
and is not to be used for those areas. We will also call Danger Area operating authorities
navigation.
As soon as the D&D phone lights up to report the incident we to check whether 'Hot' or 'Cold' and if they can go 'Cold' for
will enter into an: our transit.
Diagram 1. Area of Coverage
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 37
 Air Clues
Throughout the rescue we will continually assess the need
for an enduring search and need for multiple assets and their
reliefs on scene. This will also take into account our refuelling
options, be that on land or at sea on an Oil and Gas installation,
or even if a carrier happens to be in the area. Again,
depending on location we can, and do, request assistance
from any foreign rescue asset. We often utilise the Irish
Coastguard and Norwegian operated rescue helicopters where
we calculate them to be the quickest asset to the scene of an
immediate threat to life incident. Where Top Cover is required,
and an enduring rescue mission is likely, we could task one
of our fixed wing aircraft out of Doncaster. However, we will
also make use of any military asset on scene, using them as
part of our overall plan. We will also be communicating with
the relevant military authorities for any updates or special
instructions we need to be aware of to provide as much
safety information to our crew and chance of rescue to
missing aircrew.
On a successful search and rescue, the UKARCC may anticipate
and book into the most suitable hospital for known or
expected injuries. We can always change it once our crew call
us with an 'ATMIST'. As many of our incidents are a short flying
time from hospitals it is important for us to try to get ahead of
the game, especially on busy days. Depending on the hospital
we go to, some require just a trolley push while others require
us to book an ambulance to carry the casualty from the HLS
into A&E. Any requirement for a Crash Team, when appropriate
and requested by our crews, will be booked to meet the
helicopter on arrival.
Once complete we will collapse any TDAs and call 'SAROPS Off'
through D&D. Our crew will return to the relevant Readiness
State for the time of day dependent on their crew fatigue
and serviceability of the aircraft or spare. Any time our aircraft
go off state or have limitations we will notify the Low Flying
Airwolfhound from Hertfordshire, UK, CC BY-SA 2.0
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
38 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Booking Cell, who also call us each morning for our current
serviceability state.
Our Mission Control Centre (MCC) may pick up the Beacon
Alert before D&D call us. On receiving the information we
would call D&D ourselves to see if they had reports of anything
untoward in the area and task an asset accordingly. It is
important to note that when a Distress incident is called in we
do not need to wait until all the details have been received.
We can and regularly work to the ‘Task While You Ask’ principle
that RAF Kinloss previously used. This means we can cut down
the time it would take to get our asset on scene by passing
some of the information once they are in the air.
Our tasking requests cover the whole of the UK and
encompasses land, sea and in the air. While historically
receiving fewer calls in the winter months these can often
be the trickier tasks we attend. Complicated searches in the
mountains in poor weather place a particular demand on our
crews. We work closely with all Mountain Rescue Teams (MRT)
to bring a coordinated and viable rescue plan to bear. We will
triage all requests giving the highest priority to Distress Phase
incidents. If we need to pull an asset from another region we
will do so, taking into account the need to maintain a full SAR
coverage across the country. During the height of summer
and at weekends we can sometimes find ourselves juggling
assets in each other’s AOR and trying to get them back into
their own zones by the end of the day. There have been
instances where a number of back to back incidents have
made it impossible for us to get the required asset back into
their home patch until late into the night. So, we will always
advise the flanking stations of a gap in the SAR picture and the
need to take this into account in their training areas for the day.
In instances, where an incident occurs closer or with a quicker
response time from a foreign asset we will request their
support. This being primarily
with Eire for Northern
Ireland and in the Irish Sea
and Norwegian assets in
the North Sea. This is two
way and we will also review
requests and support them.
Obviously, due to our close
proximity we will also look
to Holland, Belgium and
France should the need
arise.
We are always available for
a chat over the phone to
answer any questions you
may have. n
Air Clues
Doc's Corner:
Anxiety
RAF Safety Centre
Anxiety is something everyone experiences at times
Signs of anxiety
and feeling anxious is a perfectly natural reaction to
Anxiety can show in a variety of ways. This can be as
some situations. But sometimes feelings of anxiety can
changes in your body, in being constantly worried or
be constant, overwhelming or out of proportion to the
changes in your behaviour, such as becoming overly
situation and this can affect your daily life. The good news
careful or avoiding things that trigger anxiety.
is there are plenty of things you can try to help cope with
You may:
anxiety. Moreover, your medical staff can provide support
• feel tired, on edge, restless or irritable
to help you look after your mental health and wellbeing
• feel a sense of dread
if you are feeling worried or anxious about coronavirus
• be unable to concentrate or make decisions
(COVID-19).
• have trouble sleeping
• feel sick, dizzy, sweaty or short of breath
What is anxiety?
• be shaky or trembly
Anxiety is a feeling of unease, like a worry or fear, that can be
• get headaches or tummy aches
mild or severe. Everyone feels anxious from time to time and it
• avoid situations or put off doing things you are
usually passes once the situation is over. It can make our heart
worried about
race, we might feel sweaty, shaky or short of breath. Anxiety
• have difficulty falling or staying asleep
can also cause changes in our behaviour, such as becoming
• experience a noticeably strong, fast or irregular
overly careful or avoiding things that trigger anxiety. When
heartbeat
anxiety becomes a problem, our worries can be out of
• have pins and needles
proportion with relatively harmless situations. It can feel more
• have a dry mouth
intense or overwhelming and interfere with our everyday lives
• sweat excessively
and relationships.
• repeatedly check things or seek assurance from others
What causes anxiety? If your anxiety is affecting your daily life or causing you
Anxiety affects everyone differently and can be brought on distress, you should consider seeking further support from
by different situations or experiences. It is our body's natural your medical centre. n
reaction to perceived danger, focusing our attention and
giving us a rush of adrenaline to react, sometimes called Crown Copyright ©2019 Department of Health
the 'fight or flight' response. Sometimes it can be difficult to https://www.nhs.uk/oneyou/
know what is making you anxious, which can be upsetting
or stressful in itself. That's why learning to recognise what
is making you anxious can help so you can deal with the “ Error in Issue 33. In Issue 33 of Air Clues, the article
uncertainty better. Some people naturally react more than To beard or not to beard…that is the question”
others, and there are times when everyone may go through by Sqn Ldr Joe Britton, Aviation and Space Medicine
stressful situations and feel anxious because of uncertainty or Registrar, RAF CAM, was published. Regrettably, the
perceived threat. author had supplied an update to the article which was
not included in Issue 33. The author has assured us that
There are lots of things that can influence our mental health, the published article is largely correct with only minor
such as our upbringing, childhood environment, things that amendments including more up to date supporting
happen to us and even our temperament. Learn more about data. The editors wish to apologise for this error. If anyone
what affects our mental health and what support is available wishes to see the updated version, please contact the
for life's challenges. editor at Air-SafetyCtre-WgCdrSpry@mod.gov.uk. “
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 39
 Air Clues
US Air Force F-35A
Crashes After Landing 50 Knots Hot
By Sqn Ldr Stuart (Ozzy) Osborne, RAF Safety Centre
Reference:
United States Air Force Aircraft Accident Investigation Board
Report, F-35A, T/N 12-005053, 58th Fighter Squadron, 33rd
Fighting Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida.
On 30 September 2020, the U.S. Air Force released the
report of the Accident Investigation Board (AIB) about the
mishap of an F-35A at Eglin Air Force base, Florida.
The incident occurred on the night of 19 May 2020, when
the F-35A crashed 4600ft down the runway. The pilot
ejected safely, sustaining minor injuries, while the aircraft
carried on rolling, caught fire and was destroyed (F-35A
valued at $175,983,949).
The F-35A flew at a constant 202kts calibrated airspeed (KCAS)
throughout the approach and landing; the Angle of Attack
was 8 degrees shallower and the speed was approximately
50kts faster for the gross weight of the aircraft at the time of
landing. The nose gear contacted the runway immediately
after the main landing gear, causing a significant nose-high
40 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
bounce. At that point, the pilot attempted to recover the
aircraft but quickly fell out of synch with the aircraft pitch
oscillation, creating Pilot Induced Oscillations (PIO).
Approximately 2 seconds later, the pilot attempted a go
around, selecting aft stick and full afterburner. Unfortunately,
due to the PIO, the Flight Control System became saturated,
biasing the flight control surfaces towards nose down
denying any chance of a go-around. With the F-35A not
responding to pilot input and oscillations worsening, the pilot
ejected approximately 5 seconds after touchdown.
The AIB President found:
"The mishap was caused, first, by the F-35 touching down at
202 KCAS and, second, by the flight control surfaces, namely
the tail of the aircraft, conflicting with the pilot inputs upon
landing, resulting in the pilot's inability to recover from the
aircraft oscillation."
Air Clues
Moreover, the distraction caused by the HMD.
The AIB President also found 4 subsequent causal factors:
• The pilot landed with Speed Hold engaged. • The pilot lacked systems knowledge on flight
This was the root cause of the accident and ensured control logic.
that the speed was maintained high throughout the
approach and landing.
Despite the complexity of the system, there was minimal
discussion about these in the F-35 manual and relevant
academics. During synthetic training and high-speed
• The pilot Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) landings, the flight modelling allowed for the aircraft to
misalignment distracted the pilot during a critical recover from high-speed landings and PIO.
phase of flight.
The HMD is a projected image on the visor that displays The AIB president opined:
the information that a traditional Head Up Display (HUD) "If the pilot had a better understanding of the Flight Control
would and more, making a physical HUD redundant. System logic and how the aircraft would respond to inputs
The result of the misalignment meant the projected image and did not have the negative learning from the simulator,
no longer matched that of the real world. This conflict in he might have been able to recover the aircraft despite the high-
flight data consumed the pilot's attention and was the speed landing." n
main source of distraction.
• The pilot experienced cognitive degradation due
to fatigue.
Various strands contributed to this degradation: mental
fatigue due to the re-tasking ahead of the sortie;
interrupted sleep; concern about the possible exposure
to Covid-19 notified the day prior to the mission.
Wg Cdr Spry's Comments:
Even though this was a F-35A incident, there are many lessons that can be transposed across all fleets.
I’m sure that everyone can relate to one of the experiences felt by the pilot of the F-35A at one stage in their career.
I would like to focus on three important lessons from this case study:
Distraction. This played a huge part in this occurrence due to the HMD misalignment. It caused critical pieces of
information and checks to be missed that would have routinely been picked up. Distraction can also come from the
wealth of information afforded to you inside the modern cockpit. It is so easy to go ‘heads in’ for elongated periods
of time, where the peripheral hazards are ignored. The hazards from distraction can potentially lead to routine checks
being missed, unrecognised height loss, loss of safe separation with another aircraft, to name but a few.
Cognitive Fatigue. In this incident, Covid-19 played on this pilot’s mind and could have been a source of distraction.
This epidemic has placed extraordinary pressure on individuals work life and home life alike. The effect this can have
on mental health and ‘cognitive fatigue’ cannot be underestimated. Cognitive fatigue can make dealing with multiple
inputs and complex demands, that come with military aviation, more challenging and could lead to significant errors.
The big question before you fly is Are you mentally ‘fit to fly’?
Negative Learning. This concept was covered in Air Clues Issue 32: 'Safety and the Live Synthetic Balance'.
The potential for negative learning (or negative training transfer) is a significant hazard with synthetic training and
this incident serves to highlight this risk. Synthetic DASORs are vital to help understand the risks, particularly as this
type training becomes more prevalent. Understanding the differences between the simulator and the actual aircraft
will help mitigate against the potential for negative learning and transfer to the live environment. n
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 41
 Air Clues
The Limitations of Current
Digital Mapping Technology
by Flt Lt Graham Stewart SO3-Air, Defence Geographic Centre (DGC).
PART THREE. The Utilisation of Raw Data
In part one I highlighted the limitations and hidden risks
associated with our current digital map technology. In part
two, I described the fundamental problems, both technical
and historic which have resulted in our current geospatial
predicament. Given the nature of these issues, what could
possibly replace raster and at the same time reboot our
Digital Transformation? The answer, I believe, is Scalable
Vector Graphics (SVGs). To appreciate the opportunities
they offer us, we must delve a little deeper into how
computers manipulate display graphics. This reveals that
there are two main graphical standards, raster and vector.
As we have seen, in the raster world, we have fixed grid cells
(pixels or bitmaps) however, in the vector world, images
are defined by data consisting of points, lines, curves and
polygons which, crucially, always retain the ability to be
edited, rescaled and manipulated. A geospatial vector
used for mapping purposes usually originates from an
authoritative (perhaps even fully assured) central database.
Bitmap vs vector.png: Fbj / Wgabrie Perhelion, CC BY-SA 2.5
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5>,
via Wikimedia Commons
Vectors form the type of intelligent graphics you see on
your car Satnav, which is why if, there’s a traffic jam on
route, you can be alerted and rerouted automatically. Ever
wondered why, when you fly from North to South, the textual
information is upside-down on your rasterised moving map
display, and yet it is always correctly orientated in your car’s
satnav? The answer is SVGs. Ironically, while your car Satnav
and even your phone can accept live, over-the-air traffic
42 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Photo: Jayne Popper
updates and automatic map refreshes, your 5th generation
aircraft’s moving map raster display does not have this
functionality - even with a full dedicated desktop mission
planning system. Vector mapping is the reason that a car
sat nav has so much more utility than an aircraft’s moving
map display. Consequently, the fundamental limitations of
the raster format will go on to inhibit 6th generation aircraft
and beyond. That said, there is likely one enduring use for
raster, that of displaying satellite imagery - as a backdrop to
additional intelligent vector layers.
DVOF is actually a very good example of the vector format;
the raw data relating to the vertical features depicted (points
and lines) is maintained by experts and is held centrally in a
database. Currently it is refreshed every 28 days and made
available on MilFLIP for you to download. The digital fluidity
of the DVOF database permits the addition, removal or editing
of vertical obstructions simply by diligently maintaining
the database. Technically speaking, if everyone were able
to access the DVOF database directly from the server, then
it would theoretically be possible to offer live updates of
vertical obstructions much in the same way as your chosen
newsfeed pushes out breaking news about the Kardashians
straight to your laptop, phone or tablet. Unfortunately,
neither DGC, nor our customers are currently configured for
this capability – rendering us completely blind to any and
all Kardashian activity. Of greater relevance to aviators, the
moment that a change is made to the obstruction database,
say a newly erected 400ft wind turbine is discovered, it could
be pushed out, ‘live’ to all users and automatically update any
existing vector chart which would then correctly depict that
obstruction - in accordance with the benefits of a true Digital
Transformation.
Furthermore, vector graphics can be used for absolutely any
element that is depicted on a map; topography and airspace
included. One obvious benefit would be that you would
always have the latest edition and never need to amend it –
assuming that the master databases remained accurate, but
this upkeep would be the dedicated job of a centralised team
of experts, dispensing with the requirement for an individual
to be identified on every single Sqn or unit.
Imagine being able to carry out a low-level abort and your
moving map automatically zooming out seamlessly from 50K
to 250K to 500K scales and then displaying the 1:1million ERC
layer, each bang up to date and with automatic warnings to
any hazard, relevant NOTAM or airspace above, below or on
track, perhaps with your own aircraft’s icing level depicted too.
Or the reverse as you descend into low level, with only the
obstructions, airspace and features relevant to your height or
speed being shown. It all becomes possible once you’re freed
from the digital product and can portray and manipulate the
layers of raw vector data. In addition, the map producers
themselves would be freed from the burden of having to
continually produce, distribute and provide amendments for
a fixed physical product (be it paper, or raster based) on an
endless periodic cycle; they would simply need to collect and
maintain accurate databases.
Although a change of data format from raster to SVG offers
clear advantages and futureproofing, in reality, the SGCs
(except the UK Hydrographic Office - for reasons described
below) would need to reconfigure their own equipment,
workflows and outputs and begin the collection of global
vector datasets; not an easy task by any stretch of the
imagination. Luckily DGC has data sharing memorandums of
understanding with most nations around the world, including
the US National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and
geospatial vector datasets are common - outside of Defence.
VMAP was a 1990’s version of such a product which would,
had we then had the vision, have put us 20 years ahead of
where we are now. I anticipate that the job of achieving a
global geospatial vector dataset suitable for Defence use
would only be one of collection and not one of large-scale
production. This would leave DGC with the simpler tasks
of compilation and assurance of the dataset. Not straight
forward by any means, but in principle DGC has been doing
this very task, in various guises, for hundreds of years.
Air Clues
The Equipment Side of the Equation
Data, however, is only half of the mapping equation, and this
is where it all gets a little tricky and expensive. Currently we
are faced with what might be termed a cartographic Mexican
Standoff. Customers have all purchased platforms that can
only ingest rasterised mapping because that’s what the SGCs
produce. Why do the SGCs only produce rasterised mapping?
Because that’s exactly what the customer can ingest and
requires! Each side has sunk millions of pounds into this
solution and has invested heavily in training, simulators and
support. Each air platform and air system are now configured
in a different way with a different digital mission planning and
navigation solution, but all are raster based.
Reversing out of this long, winding dead-end road is simply
not an option. The only long-term ultimate solution I can
suggest would be that a future line in the sand is drawn, with
a date set after which all data providers and newly acquired
platforms and systems would conform to the new vector
standard – I’m thinking it could be a 10 year plan at best.
Much like the electrification of the automotive industry and
related infrastructure, you just have to make a start, accepting
that you yourself might not experience the benefits, but
future generations will be eternally grateful! Despite the
treacherous route, for us, the only way out is to ultimately
achieve what every other form of media has already done,
from newspaper to motion pictures; to go truly digital and
complete our Digital Transformation.
Intelligence Mission Data (IMD) – A Driver for Change?
IMD is a term you’re probably about to hear used more and
more in Defence, it goes hand-in-hand with Machine Leaning
(ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI). In aircrew speak, IMD is
the reprogrammable data required by 5th generation and
beyond platforms and systems (think F-35 and P-8A Poseidon
amongst others) in order for them to complete their mission.
You could think of it as, ‘No data, no war’. In this context,
‘reprogrammable’ means that on becoming aware that one
of the following elements is out-of-date, then a refresh of the
Photo: SAC Richard Dudley/MOD, OGL
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 43
 Air Clues
platform’s software takes place and all other platforms (land,
sea, air, space and cyber) are similarly updated and become
more capable.
1. Characteristics and Performance (C&P)
2. Signatures (Sigs)
3. Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming (EWIR)
4. Order of Battle (ORBAT)
5. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT).
The easiest use of IMD in action to visualise is, ‘Signatures’
which is the remit of the Joint Electronic Warfare Operational
Support Centre (JEWOSC) at RAF Waddington. For example,
if a new enemy radar signature is detected by whatever
means, then it should be analysed and re-programmed into
all platform’s automatic threat protection software to enable
them to detect and defend themselves against, or strike
out against it, as soon as possible after first detection. For
GEOINT becoming rapidly reprogrammable would present
the opportunity for all friendly forces to work from the same,
up to date map of an ever-changing battlefield. The moment
a bridge or communications tower was destroyed, all maps in
existence would automatically reflect the change – or at least
that’s the theory.
However, as we’ve seen, the raster format (ASRP or
CADRG) used by UK Defence (and allies) is NOT currently
44 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
reprogrammable and nor can it ever be made to be
reprogrammable due to the ‘flattening’ that takes place
during production which results in all inherent, intelligent
data and knowledge being lost forever and being replaced
by a dumb scanned picture. Currently a complete remake
of a topographic air chart from scratch could take circa 2
months rendering it out of date for practical and tactical
purposes. The only way forward that I can see for GEOINT as
meaningful IMD, and one which would set up Defence for
future innovation, is to adopt the SVG format as a standard for
the representation of geospatial information and intelligence
on all platforms and systems. Once GEOINT was disseminated
and universally ingestible as vectors then it would also
be useable by machine learning and artificial intelligence
making it useful not only for navigation, but across the whole
spectrum of Defence Intelligence. GEOINT would therefore
also become the intelligent base layer situating all intelligence
and not just the briefing-slide backdrop it is often relegated
to. IMD is already a pressing UK requirement, but it’s overall
progress could be limited by GEOINT’s (and others) stalled
Digital Transformation.
Given the scale of the issue, what could be done now?
The following from a recent DASOR:
“I was operating in the civilian world when we transitioned
from paper to Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) and the improvement
to planning, SA and operational flexibility were obvious and
immediate in allowing us to operate smarter and safer. We
were often in situations where we had to change runway or
destination at the last minute due to weather or tasking and this
could be done almost seamlessly when using an EFB as opposed
to scrabbling around for paper charts in the back of the cockpit.
Enroute we had the ability to constantly assess airfields for their
suitability as an emergency diversion option, bringing up all
the information required (airfield and terrain) to make sensible
decisions on where to go should disaster strike. The issue of a full
functioning EFB is an ongoing work in progress which I hope can
be expedited ASAP.”
Having had sight of most of the current technical options
on my travels far and wide (pre COVID of course) and having
witnessed the pain and expense in the rotary world of having
to reconfigure or reverse engineer an entire aircraft cockpit, I
believe that the only possible, ‘catch-all’, off-the-shelf answer
that could be implemented almost immediately would be
the universal adoption of a common standalone, carry-on
tablet - which some fleets have already naturally gravitated
towards. Not only can these be used to display existing raster-
based products and vector datasets, but they can also fulfil
the role of Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs). Each one easily and
individually configurable to the particular application required
but able to sit within an overarching policy and governance
framework set for all users and roles without requiring full
integration into the existing cockpit nav/tactical solution.
At this point I can already hear voices of dissent crying, ‘but
my aircraft doesn’t have anywhere to put one or I can’t be
spending all of my time head in the cockpit at low level, or
it makes my leg sweaty, or the battery change is fiddly...and
so on. As someone who has used them in anger and was
initially very sceptical, I do feel your pain, but these concerns
will simply need to be resolved one by one. Put simply, the
advantages far, far outweigh the disadvantages, especially
when compared with the only current viable alternative
universal solution to the digital problem - we all go back
to paper. While it would not fully complete our Digital
Transformation, unlike paper, an appropriately selected and
governed tablet:
1. Can display raster and vector mapping and data.
2. Provides self-orientating moving map functionality.
Image- MOD Crown Copyright 2019 - Darren Edds
Reproduced by kind permission of Inzpire Ltd.
Air Clues
3. Is clearly viewable at night and under NVD without the use
of a torch.
4. Offers self-amending documentation.
5. Provides intelligent alerting to hazards.
6. Can replace a small library of paper documentation (EFB).
7. Contains intelligent Flight Reference Cards (FRC)
with hyperlinks.
8. Can display user-selectable layers of detail (declutter).
9. Permits user-definable layers of data.
10. Has global mapping potential.
11. Has commonality of operation system, offering
interoperability between fleets.
12. Has a single training package for all aircraft types
and implementations.
A Farewell to CHAD (Chart Amendment Document)
With the universal adoption of a carry-on tablet capable of
displaying both raster and vector products, the holy grail
of UK low level mapping becomes instantly possible; a
UK 1:50,000K that shows only the most up to date known
obstructions and requires no user maintenance (apart from
NOTAMS) before flight. The current depiction, shown below,
and only available to the few who have already adopted such
a solution, could be improved further with the suspended
wires (the horizontal blue zigzag symbol) being fixed and
orientated to physically connect between the two 414ft
masts. The only reason it doesn’t do this already is because
not all users have the capability to show the powerlines
(linear data) as well as the pylons (point data) and need the
artificial horizontal zigzag symbol to alert them that there is a
suspended wire at that location. Again, because there is no
agreed standard, all are currently brought down by the lowest
common denominator.
Although I genuinely do have sympathy with the, ‘head in
the cockpit for too long at low-level’ argument, how is this
limitation any different from using paper? At least with a
tablet you don’t have to occasionally, ‘wallpaper the cockpit’
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 45
 Air Clues
to refold your map, completely obscuring your view, and
this coupled with all the routine heads-in management
requirements of a paper map – ever dropped one on the
cockpit floor or seen it sucked out of the window?
Another criticism often raised, is that when the tablet alerts
you to a hazard, it doesn’t do so with an audible warning
directly into your headset. Surely a paper map doesn’t even
automatically alert you to a hazard at all (and that’s assuming
you’ve hand-amended the map to show the hazard in the
first place). Some compromise is unavoidable and technical
solutions, such as choosing a tablet with perhaps a very loud
external speaker or vibration feature, will need to be found.
Sometimes you just have to move forward with an iterative
solution as the 100% solution just ‘aint happening anytime
soon. Displaying data on a tablet is likely only a transient
solution, ultimately the data will be projected directly to the
pilot’s eyes or helmet mounted display. Spoiler alert, if you
ever want to do this, you’re still going to need a geospatial
vector dataset to project.
When each of the other major media formats went digital, the
process was undoubtedly painful, but ultimately it resulted in
a huge amount of innovation and benefit to customers, which
in our context can be quantified as, ‘increased safety and
operational effectiveness’. Luckily for us, many others have
gone down the path of Digital Transformation, and it is now
extremely well-trodden. There are even consultants who, for
an incredibly large fee, will digitally transform your business
model. Clearly, it cannot be achieved overnight, but some
form of road map (forgive the pun) should be formulated
now, lest we’re still having this conversation in 10 years’ time
and wondering why our military, like Blockbuster Videos of
old, has become irrelevant.
Crown Copyright 2020. reproduced by kind permission of the UK Hydrographic Office under UKHO Licence HO35870
46 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Perhaps you think my long-term proposal for a complete reset
of mapping and the adoption of scalable vector graphics
across the whole of Defence rather grandiose, fanciful and
naïve? In part, I’d have to agree with you, it would indeed be
a huge undertaking, but despite this, it is one that the nautical
world has already made. Scalable vector graphics is how
charting is done in the nautical world and has been for many
years, with the UKHO a leading global producer. Unlike their
elderly raster counterparts, nautical charts reveal more and
more detail and information when zoomed, not pixilation.
Embarrassingly, the nautical Digital Transformation is at least 2
stages ahead of ours in aviation, with formats, equipment and
standards pretty much universally adopted, governed and
regulated1. However, this provides us a template that we in
aviation could perhaps simply adopt, as it is a transformation
which offers us the following huge advantages:
1. Improved efficiency and automation of air chart production.
2. Ongoing cost savings for producers and users.
3. The potential for live or at least more frequently
refreshed mapping.
4. An end to manual, user-applied amendments to products.
5. Greater utility for users with locally produced additional
bespoke/individual data layers possible.
6. Paperless cockpits and Electronic Flight Bags.
7. Interoperability and commonality across all platforms.
8. GEOINT now useable by Defence Intelligence to situate
and locate all other forms of intelligence.
9. Satisfies an already existing IMD requirement.
1 S-57, S-63 and S-52 are some of the standards met by all charts in
the ADMIRALTY Vector Chart Service, these standards have been put
into place to ensure that all Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs)
are accurate, secure, can be interpreted correctly by type-approved
Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) and facilitate
automated production.
10. Facilitates the present and future benefits afforded by
a true Digital Transformation.
11. Increases operational effectiveness.
12. Greatly improves Air Safety.
What’s the Current Requirement?
Sadly, as of now, there has been no fully defined and unified
requirement from the Front-Line Customers (FLCs) that
demands anything more of the map producers than periodic
tweaks to existing maps - suggesting a tacit acceptance of
the current, flawed and outdated raster technology. There
simply has been no formal request for change or innovation.
Therefore, the SGC’s are doggedly but correctly fulfilling their
remit to Defence. Some may find this disappointing and my
sincere apologies if this is the case for it wasn’t my intention,
but hopefully you will agree at least I’ve fully described exactly
why this is the case and also what we could do about it, both
immediately and in the future. Unfortunately, change does
not simply originate as a result of innovation, but often only as
a result of an identified requirement.
While IMD may prove to be just such a catalyst to force the
much-needed change, currently there remains an existing
limitation that hides some significant air safety hazards, while
simultaneously holding back operational effectiveness and
future innovation. Hopefully though, you will have considered
the above insight to be at least thought-provoking, but
perhaps also you can derive some practical safety benefits to
modify or improve the way you currently operate? The more
fully informed, the safer.
Air Clues
And so, we get to the bit where I wax lyrical and start quoting
philosophers in a pitiful attempt to signpost that we’re
finally reaching the end of this humble diatribe. According
to Confucius, “The best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago,
and the second-best time is now.” Clearly for aeronautical
information, both of these proverbial ships have sailed,
but couldn’t we all at least agree to plant a tree sometime
soon? Only a few years ago, we all had video recorders and
hundreds of carefully labelled video tapes stacked high, and in
a few years’ time we will all drive or be transported by electric
vehicles and petrol stations and pollution will be a thing of
the past.
Summary
To return all the way back to where we started in part one,
and in answer to the perennial question raised so often…“But
how is it possible that a digital map can be out-of-date?
Surely its digital !”
The answer is painfully simple, and it goes along these lines; ‘It
isn’t really a digital map at all, and nor have you, the chart user,
or us, the chart producers undergone a Digital Transformation
- so how could it possibly be up to date?’
For years now Defence has been talking the digital talk. Isn’t
it high time we all walked the Digital Transformation walk,
together and in step? n
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 47
 Air Clues
Hazardous Suspended Cables –
What you need to know
by Mark Darlow – Task Team 7 Head, Defence Geographic Centre (DGC)
In this article, I want to discuss
Hazardous Suspended Cables,
how they are captured, stored,
published and the role of the user in
their reporting.
Hazardous Suspended Cables (HSC)
have always posed a significant threat
to the low flying community as has
been demonstrated by accidents in
Europe and the UK; most recently the
Chinook wire strike in Wales in July
2020. In short, the Welsh cable location
was published and there were many
causal factors behind the accident,
however it highlighted the importance
of the reporting of these key hazards to
flight, their chart symbolisation and the
lack of understanding in the role of DGC
in their capture.
It is important to note that HSC
locations are unusual in that DGC
Geospatial Air Information Team (GAIT),
record them in two separate datasets.
Like Wind Turbines and other Vertical
Obstruction data, DGC record HSC
locations within the Digital Vertical
Obstructions File (DVOF), specifically
as a ‘900’ code ‘Aerial Cable’ feature.
However because of their linear extent,
HSC’s are also recorded in our linear
Powerlines dataset. So why do we
record locations twice? The answers lie
in the history of how DGC is supplied
Powerline information and differing
Defence user system requirements.
Utility Companies do not routinely
record the heights of Powerlines, pylons
or poles, only their voltage, which is
why Powerline ‘heights’ are linked to
the voltage in height bands in our
linear Powerlines dataset. Companies
certainly don’t record where lines are
suspended above the ground across
48 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
Figure 1 - DGC UK M726-Air 1:50,000 HSC- © DGC
valleys or where Defence users might
think they are more dangerous than
others. By recording the actual extent
of the suspension in our Powerlines
dataset, this allows systems such as our
chart production systems or some user
mission planning and tablet devices to
generate the familiar zig-zag symbols
as shown in Fig. 1. However, other
users of DGC data such as Typhoon
cannot display our linear data in their
systems at all, therefore the only way
for them to have sight of the HSC
locations is through use of the point
feature in DVOF, hence recording the
position in two datasets and No 1
AIDU’s portrayal of the two features on
their charts; the linear zig-zag and the
obstruction symbol denoting the ‘900’
code obstruction.
Powerlines
As described earlier for turbines, the lack
of mandatory reporting is the same for
UK Powerlines. A number of years ago,
DGC managed to persuade all but one
UK Powerline company to give or sell
us their data and in a 15-month project
GAIT captured the remaining data over
the whole of East Anglia from imagery.
We now routinely review the dataset
against imagery prior to 1:50,000 chart
Figure 2 - 11kV ‘domestic’ Powerlines
© Mark Darlow - DGC
production to improve the accuracy
and currency of the data as well as
processing company updates when
received. The result is that our UK linear
Powerlines dataset is ‘complete’ from
400kV National Grid to 11kV ‘domestics’
(Fig 2) , although as always whilst
we are provided with updates from
most companies, we can never fully
guarantee 100% cover, hence the need
for continued user reporting via DASOR
and dvof@mod.gov.uk.
Because power companies rarely record
the height of their lines, DGC maintain
UK Powerlines within a linear dataset in
the following three height bands based
on voltage.
Band 1 11kV ‘domestics’ 0 – 79ft
Band 2 132kV 80 – 199ft
Band 3 400kV National Grid 200ft
and above
We know that these height bands can
overestimate actual heights, however
with over a million pylons and poles
Air Clues
in the UK it is impossible with current
resources to height them all individually.
However, because certain aircraft
span, age and size of cable, temperature
etc we can only calculate the cable
height with the assumption that the
platforms and systems cannot view
linear data, GAIT captured ‘all’ 80,000 80
ft agl and above UK Band 2 and 3 metal
pylons within DVOF meaning they
cable is taut, (Fig 4). This can lead to
overly high figures that cause problems
for users, in particular when night flying,
therefore if users provide estimated
are visible in all UK Defence systems; cable heights, we are happy to add
a major safety step forward for which them to the database as reported.
DGC won the 2017 MOD’s Analysis
Innovation Award. DGC is unlikely to Conclusions and Further Information
add individual ‘domestic’ wooden poles DGC work closely with No 1 AIDU,
to DVOF although we are currently Military Airspace Management Cell
undergoing a programme of work to (MAMC), MAA, CAA, the Renewables
improve their positional accuracy using Industry and most importantly you the
imagery in line with our 1:50,000 chart users, but despite huge efforts, with
production programme. regards to obstructions, DVOF is unlikely
to ever hold 100% of Turbines, Cables
DGC UK 1:50,000 charts depict all and other Obstructions that you may
known Powerlines in all three height encounter. Therefore, your accurate
bands including ‘domestics’, whereas No reporting of Uncharted Obstructions,
1 AIDU charts only depict the Band 2 Powerlines and Hazardous Cable
and 3 Powerlines to avoid chart clutter Locations is key in helping us improve
at smaller scales. Outside of the UK, our datasets for you our users.
apart from a few overseas Training
Areas, Cyprus and The Falklands, all For further information or when
Figure 3 – Emirates Airline Cable Car
known Powerlines are only held as © Ian Davey - DGC permitted to arrange a Station visit and
individual point pylon data within DVOF expanded presentation of the above,
and not within a linear dataset as we article earlier in this issue for details on please contact DGC via dvof@mod.gov.
simply don’t have the information. how to submit a DASOR to DGC. If users uk or No 1 AIDU via the MilFLIP Contact
provide the HSC start and finish co- Us page. n
Hazardous Suspended Cable ordinates, GAIT can calculate the above
Definition ground level height. However due to
As I said, accidents in the UK and
Europe have highlighted the need to
portray HSC locations on air charts.
DGC routinely research the obvious
locations where Powerlines cross open
water etc. prior to chart production,
but it is the responsibility of users
to report additional HSC locations
seen as a threat. Any location users
deem hazardous can be added to our
database for symbolisation on DGC and
No 1 AIDU products with the zig-zag
symbol.  Hazardous Cables can be
anything from the classic Powerline
across a valley to simply hard to spot
cables or even zip wires and cable cars
such as the Emirates Airline Thames
crossing (Fig 3). If you, the user think
it’s dangerous and want it portrayed on
your charts, report it!
DASOR reporting of HSC locations is key
so please see my previous Wind Turbine
Figure 4 – HSC Calculation Methodology © Mark Darlow - DGC
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 49
Air Clues
Keep Your Wits
about You!
Scary Incidents in 2020
RAF Safety Centre
Here again is our annual roundup of some of the scary incidents that happened in the previous year. Many of these were
avoidable. Keep your wits about you and stay alert.
16 Jan 20 - A400M.
Loss of Wheel on take-off. On what seemed like a normal
departure from runway 30R from Bahrain Int, at around 300ft
AGL the crew were informed by ATC that several aircraft
had witnessed one of the main gear wheels falling from
the aircraft.
20 Jan 20 - Chinook.
Minigun detached in flight. During a transit, a passenger on
the aircraft alerted the crew that he had just witnessed the
port minigun fall from the aircraft. It was observed that the
minigun attaching spindle had sheared and upon further
inspection it became apparent that the gun was hanging
from the aircraft by the electrical leads.
23 Jan 20 - Rivet Joint Struck by GSE.
Whilst preparing to carry out
rectification work on a Rivet Joint
aircraft, the maintenance team noticed
impact damage to an engine intake
cowl. An assessment of the damage
indicated it was caused by ground
equipment contact.
28 Jan 20 - Ground Power Unit towed
whilst still attached to Typhoon (#1).
A GPU was towed away by a MATT
tractor whilst still connected to a
Typhoon aircraft, causing damage to the
aircraft's GPU receptacle.
30 Jan 20 - Puma Kite Strike.
During deployed ops, a Puma crew was informed that they
had a kite wrapped around the tail. Engineers removed a large
amount of monofilament kite cord from the tail rotor gearbox.
50 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
1 Feb 20 - Rivet Joint Towing Strike.
During a briefed aircraft move, the tow
supervisor heard a warning air horn
sound. The supervising NCO signalled to
the tow tractor driver to stop. The aircraft
came to a controlled halt but too late to
prevent it contacting with a metal earthing spike which was
anchored into the ground.
2 Feb 20 - Typhoon Brake Chute Pin Missing.
A Brake Chute Pin was discovered to be missing from the
brake chute door housing during see off. It was noted that
this pin can easily be withdrawn from its housing by strong
winds acting on the pennant. Previous opportunities to notice
that the flagged pin was absent were missed.
3 Feb 20 - Lightning Fire Suppression
System operated during engine
ground run.
During maintenance activity at Ex Red
Flag, the IPP Exhaust Fire Suppression
Cylinder was inadvertently discharged.
One of four Optical Fire Detectors
located in the IPP Bay remained electrically connected at
a point in the procedure when all four should have been
disconnected.
25 Feb 20 - Cadet near miss with Taxying Tutor. An
Air Cadet Adult Staff member did not follow the briefed
procedure while escorting a cadet to an Air Experience Flight
aircraft and placed both himself and the Cadet in proximity to
a taxying Tutor aircraft.
11 Mar 20 - Puma Inadvertent Release of Underslung
Load. Whilst conducting a low level underslung load circuit,
the load release button was pressed when it was believed to
have been instead a selection to acknowledge/cancel a low
height warning. The risk of this happening was exaggerated
by the close proximity of the AVAD warning cancel button
and the load release button.
12 Mar 20 - Ground Power Unit towed
whilst still attached to Typhoon (#2).
On deployed ops, a Ground Power Unit
(GPU) was towed away from a Typhoon
causing damage to the aircraft (the GPU
power lead was still connected).
18 Mar 20 - Sentinel wingtip impacts
staging during aircraft tow. The
aircraft was being pushed back into the
rear of a hangar when the top section of
the winglet impacted nearby staging.
Air Clues
23 Mar 20 - Hawk Aircrew Leg Restraints Not Connected.
The pilot noticed in flight that his leg restraints were not
connected. The pilot had not connected them to the ejection
seat and did not check that they were connected during the
canopy closing drill. The ground-crew had changed their
local procedures to mitigate against Covid-19 spread by not
observing the strap in procedures and therefore this back up
opportunity to spot a mistake had been lost.
14 Apr 20 - Hawk Rear Seat MDC Detonator Unit Safety
Pin Not Removed Before Taxy. A Hawk T2 MDC Safety
Pin was not removed prior to taxi. The QFI cited reduced
familiarity with the new COVID-19 strap-in procedure and lack
of currency as potential contributory factors. The other pilot
noticed the missing pin and the issue was rectified prior to
flight. Ground crew also missed the '6-pin check'.
16 Apr 20 - Ground Power Unit towed whilst still
attached to Typhoon (#3). Following
a change of priorities and the diversion
of a tradesman to other duties, a
ground power unit that was suddenly
needed elsewhere was towed without
disconnecting the power lead. The
aircraft sustained damage as a result.
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 51
 Air Clues Air Clues

5 May 20 - Sentinel Aircraft Damaged

by Collapsing GSE. Tornado cockpit
access steps (which were in the hangar)
their gloves at the refuelling point and
this distraction contributed to both
the student and the QFI leaving the
I Learnt About Engineering
were used to check the engines of a
Sentinel aircraft during an after-flight
service. Despite locking the feet in place,
magnetos live.

25 Sep 20 - Typhoon Drag Chute pack

the steps gave way and the tradesman
fell to the ground, uninjured. The steps
collided with the aircraft fuselage and inboard flap.
7 May 20 - Unaccounted Tools Left
Beside Puma in Hangar. A test set
and pipes were found on the floor next
to a Puma in a hangar. The items were
found not to have been tallied out and
the Issue Centre Custodian's (ICC) office
had been accessed over night with his
front door left open. Investigation revealed this to be a case
of people trying to get important work done quickly under
pressure - 'can do' rather than 'can do safely'.
15 May 20 - Texan Ejection Seat
Pin Not Engaged Safely. On being
prepared for the line, the rear ejection
seat pin of a Texan aircraft was found to
be incorrectly engaged. This had been
missed post flight by the aircrew, the
tow team and the post flight technician.
3 Jun 20 - Flatbed Truck Impacts
Hawk. A flatbed truck moved 50 yards
across a flight line unassisted and
impacted a parked Hawk aircraft. Upon
inspecting the damage to the aircraft it
was noticed that the handbrake was not
applied to the truck.
not fitted after rectification work. A
replacement drag chute was not fitted to a Typhoon aircraft
and the omission was not detected until
after it had been declared serviceable
and placed on the flight-line.
25 Sep 20 - Lightning Engine Oil
System contaminated with Engine
Inhibitor Oil. Two Lightning aircraft had
the engine oil systems contaminated by
being replenished with incorrect fluid.
13 Oct 20 - Ground Power Unit towed
whilst still attached to Typhoon (#4).
A GPU was towed with the cable still
connected to an aircraft, until the driver
felt resistance and stopped the tractor.
He realised that the cable had been
pulled from the aircraft. The aircraft was
not damaged.
15 Oct 20 - Near miss between Air
Loadmaster and engineering line
vehicle. During a Hercules engine start,
a flatbed vehicle passed between the
ALM and the aircraft at an estimated
speed of 30mph. The vehicle passed so close to the ALM that
he had to jump backwards to avoid
being hit; the vehicle ran over the ALM's
communication lead, disconnecting it.
from that ...
by Anon, name and address supplied
As a newly qualified JT, fresh from brats, I was fortunate
to be posted to 60 MU, and was tasked with a small group
of very experienced engineers to an ongoing main plane
change on the Gnat aircraft at 4FTS. The rolling programme
was intense, and we experienced much pressure to
achieve a quick turn around on the programme. The 'local'
rectification Flight OC was a particularly aggressive man
whose daily visit to us was to give a 'briefing' on how
desperate he was to make targets. We would often work
day and evening shifts to reach stages to get the guy off
our backs.
The NCO in our little group was an experienced fatherly figure
who was a very popular man, and a man we would support to
the hilt. The evening in question was one where we returned
to complete an evening shift, to remove the old main plane
and fit the jury strut. Tired and stressed we achieved just that.
However, on lowering the jury strut, the bridle slipped and
the port attachment bracket fell onto the top of the port
air intake, creating a large rip of about 4 inches by 2 inches.
Absolute silence followed for about two minutes; then, with a
flurry of activity, the strut was removed. A 'council of war' was
convened to decide what action to follow. Being the youngest
and least experienced of our team I had little to offer as to
what we should do.
I knew we were in deep trouble with the OC, both local and
back at base. Eventually our Sgt decided to repair the rip,
without informing anyone and not to F700 it.
Being the skinniest, I was tasked with squeezing into the air
intake with outstretched arm to tap the rip into place. Paint
stripper was applied top and bottom, and an ingenious
araldite patch applied to both sides. When it dried there was
a very slight bulge hardly noticeable. Fresh paint was applied,
silver on top and polyurethane grey inside. We finished late
with the night shift. Very tired and stressed, we strolled back
to our billet, showered and then collapsed in bed.
I felt worried and thought we should have come clean. It was
an accident after all, but because of the bullying nature of the
OC, I could understand the gang NCO wishing to attempt
to effect a repair himself. Ideally a 'flush patch' should have
rectified the problem, but this would have delayed the job
by at least a week. With the task completed, we moved onto
another aircraft. The Sergeant returned to base to head up a
Lightning (Mk 1) fuel leak programme in Akrotiri.

3 Jun 20 - Chinook Rescue Hoist 19 Oct 20 - Ground Power Unit towed

Armed Upon Removal. Upon fitment
of the hoist, the armament section was
requeste to fit the cartridges to re-arm
the hoist. It was then notedthat the hoist
was already armed, and the expolosive
cartridges were still fitted from when it
was originally removed from the aircraft
5 Jun 20 - BBMF Spitfire Incorrect Rudder Trim Function.
On a post maintenance check flight during the initial climb
it became apparent that the rudder trim was working in
the opposite sense. Investigation revealed that Rudder Trim
Cables were cross connected.
whilst still attached to Typhoon (#5).
The GPU was hooked up to the tractor
and towed away although the cable
was still connected to the jet. The cable was pulled round
the back of the GPU and pulled under the jet as the GPU was
connected from the opposite side. The
tractor was stopped and turned off once
it was realised that the power cable had
been pulled from the jet. The aircraft
sustained damage. n

23 Sep 20 - Magnetos Left Live on

Tutor. After refuelling, a Tutor was taxied
back to the UAS dispersal at Aldergrove.
The student then realised they had left
Gnat T1 of No4 Flying Training School © RuthAS, CC BY 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

52 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 53

 Air Clues Air Clues

With a fresh team, I carried on developing my knowledge
on the Gnat, it was an engineer's nightmare. Access was
horrendous. I would constantly check the aircraft in question
when it returned to the hangar to see if the repair held up. I
Airprox
What should I have done? I had complete confidence in my
Sergeant, but I know if I had disclosed what had happened,
this would have no doubt resulted in a tech courts-martial,
and ruined his hitherto faultless career. My involvement

was later posted to that same unit and I would continue to
look down the intake to check if it was holding up; it was.
Then posted out once more, I never saw the aircraft again.
That is until nearly 20 years later, when I spotted it at an air
show, sitting on a static display. I instantly recognised its fleet
number, and could tell it was no longer flying, thankfully.
Highlights
would have to be accounted for, and for a while I was very
worried. Subsequently I have often felt unease as a result of
this event. Take heed young engineers. Argue your feelings
and stand by your convictions; this, had it gone wrong,
could have resulted in loss of life. Better to have a rollicking,
than to be a primary witness at a Board of Inquiry into the
death of a pilot.

I stepped over the barrier and spoke to the Marshal, asking My conflict was between loyalty and professionalism.
if I could have a closer look at the Gnat , as I used to work I hope you are able to publish this, as it would square a circle With Comments from Wg Cdr Spry
on her. He agreed and, after a long conversation about the for me. This is something that still weighs heavily on mind
pros and cons of the design, I removed the engine blank and after 48 years, so please do not publish my details, thank you.
looked in (no engine) and lo and behold that ad-hoc repair
was still there and still intact. I felt relief, but that relief was
tinged with guilt.
Spry's Comment:
Do you think this story could only happen 48 years ago? Do ad-hoc repairs or other short cuts happen in your
unit? Are you a leader who has an autocratic and bullish style of leadership? Have you ever thought that your young
techies, and even seasoned Sergeants, might be afraid of you to the point that they would rather risk a sanction than fess
up to a mistake? Let's not fall into the trap that, because of all the zero-tolerance policy and online education that we have
nowadays, we no longer have any problems with relationships and trust. n
Typhoon vs Typhoon
22 Gp Air Safety now on Defence Connect 5 Dec 19
The Typhoon (A) Pilot reported that,
upon joining the tanker, his formation
joined in front of another aircraft that
was joining the tanker at the same time,
crossing its level in the process. His
post-mission debriefing and analysis
confirmed that his formation appeared
in the windscreen of Typhoon(B), co-
22Gp ASAR has replaced the old 'Bristol Bugle' newsletter with an interactive page on Defence Connect. It is an open level, and at a range of approximately
group to all in MFTS (even ENJJPTS out in the US) and anyone can post blogs, links and comments on Air Safety, 1800ft. The Typhoon(B) pilot had radar
Leadership and Mental/Physical Health. They have a range of categories from Human Factors, DASOR Digests etc to situational awareness (SA) on them
more informal/humorous “Dumb ways to die” and “I goofed….” a bit like the Darwin Awards. joining at much greater range, but
switched his attention to the visual join
Accessed via Defence Gateway in a similar manner to DLE, anyone with a JPA Service Number can log on, so they can on the tanker. The Typhoon(B) pilot’s SA
go out to UAS students or others without MODNET access. It's a great initiative. was next updated when Typhoon(A)’s
The link is: https://jive.defencegateway.mod.uk/groups/22asar formation appeared visually in front of
him in his windscreen. The Typhoon(A)
pilot’s situational awareness (from radar,
MIDS2 and ATC) was that the tanker
had ‘2 chicks in tow’. They were cleared
to join at FL310 by Swanwick(Mil) and
then changed to the boom frequency.
They were surprised to see only one
aircraft [Typhoon(C)] behind the tanker
when they acquired it visually during
the join. On check-in on the boom
frequency, it immediately became
apparent that they had cut-in ahead of
another aircraft that was in the process
of joining the tanker. The Typhoon(B)
pilot reported (on the boom frequency)
that he was visual with them. They
were not visual with Typhoon(B) at
any point because they were ‘belly-up’
during the join and he was now in their
6 o’clock. The tanker then re-ordered
the formation for them to join ahead
of Typhoon(B). The Typhoon(A) pilot’s
main concern was that they were
cleared to a level that was not vacated
and it would seem that SA had broken
down between all aircraft involved
and ATC. It was by luck, rather than
judgement, that the 2 aircraft didn’t
conflict, co-altitude, with Typhoon(B)
at a much closer range. In addition
to being given a conflicting joining
level, there were several aggravating
factors: not all aircraft had functioning
MIDS; the air-to-air TACAN link was
not established between Typhoon(A)
and the tanker; they changed to the
boom frequency relatively late; the
tanker was late on-task, meaning the
planned AAR3 slots were not running
as scheduled – some of the Typhoons
had been made awareof this but the
Typhoon(A) formation had not, and
arrived on-time for their scheduled
slot; the other planned formations on
the tanker tasking had suffered aircraft
unavailability fall-out, confusing the
plan further.
THE Typhoon(B) Pilot reported that he
was cleared by Swanwick(Mil) to FL290
prior to switching to the tanker’s boom
frequency. At this point, Typhoon(C) was
ahead of him and cleared to FL300. The
Typhoon(A) formation then came up
on the frequency and were cleared to
FL280. On contacting the tanker, he was
cleared to remain at FL290 and then,
once cleared, to expect to climb to
FL310. He became visual with the tanker
at 3 miles trail and was cleared by the
tanker to join visually. The Typhoon(B)
pilot then called that he was leaving
FL290 for FL310 while he continued
to close on the tanker, which was at
FL320. At 2 miles trail, the Typhoon(A)
formation came up on the tanker
frequency requesting to join at FL310.
At this point, he was now established at
FL310 and, from previous radar SA on
the Typhoon(A) formation, knew they
were joining from the head sector to his
right. He looked right and saw the pair
of Typhoons, co-altitude, approximately
half-way way around their final turn
onto the tanker. He selected his
throttles to idle and carried out a
small weave in order to build range.
Throughout this turn, the tanker crew
was trying to establish if the Typhoon(A)
formation’s pilots were visual with
Typhoon(B). The Typhoon(A) pilot called
visual with the tanker and one chick in
trail (Typhoon(C)). The Typhoon(B) pilot
then called visual with the Typhoon(A)
formation and that he would remain
clear. At this point, the tanker crew
cleared the Typhoon(A) formation to
continue their join and cleared the

54 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 55

 Air Clues Air Clues

to-Air TACAN. This was discussed with
the receivers post flight and, due to the
number of receivers in close proximity
from both north and south, may only
have given the tanker crew SA on a
single pair at any one time.
MIDS is a useful tool but, at the time
of this event, the tanker crew was
concentrating on the delivery of fuel
and the use of the cameras for the
movement of the refuelling process
with Typhoon(C).
The communications switch-overs
were very efficient, but lacked the
time to make the joining call from
tanker to receivers. Proper joining
calls may have avoided the initial level
confliction, or at least highlighted the
potential confliction.
The perceived picture from the tanker
was that the Typhoon(B) pilot called
visual from a good distance out and
was cleared to join from a lower altitude
(FL290). The Typhoon(A) formation was
then cleared to move into the joining
level (FL310) by Swanwick(Mil), which
was above the level of Typhoon(B)
and the formation was considerably
closer at the time of the switch-over
to the boom frequency. Hence, both
the formation and Typhoon(B) were
joining from differing levels but
now competing for the same piece
of airspace. This was identified and
resolved late in the joining process due
to the communications handovers and
close range of the receivers. n

Typhoon(B) pilot to descend to FL300.
The range between the Typhoon(A)
formation and his aircraft was assessed
to be around 1800ft at its closest, as the
Typhoon(A) formation rolled out in his
12 o’clock.
The Voyager Tanker Pilot reported
that his aircraft was scheduled to refuel
3 pairs of Typhoons between 1230-
1300Z. During the joining process he
was established at FL320, above the
normal allocated AARA block due to
the weather below in the area being
unfit and a request from the receivers
for that altitude block, and cleared by
Swanwick(Mil) to conduct AAR. He
was established in an east-west circuit
at FL320 with an operating block of
FL300-FL330. Typhoon(C) joined and
was in-tow conducting AAR on the
right hose. The Typhoon(B) pilot then
contacted Swanwick(Mil) with his
position at FL290 and confirmed that
he had radar contact on the tanker.
Swanwick(Mil) informed him of the
range, bearing and flight level of the
tanker and then offered assistance for
the join. The Typhoon(B) pilot confirmed
this was not required and requested to
change to the boom frequency, which
was approved. The tanker crew reported
that the joining level was clear, but
no initial joining call was made to the
pilot of Typhoon(B) due to the rapid
switch-over to the boom frequency. The
Typhoon(B) pilot was now on the boom
frequency, called visual and requested
join; the tanker crew cleared him to join
on the boom frequency. During this
process, the Typhoon(A) formation was
with Swanwick(Mil) and reported radar
contact on the tanker. Swanwick(Mil)
informed the Typhoon(A) formation
of the range, bearing and level of
the tanker and asked if they required
assistance for the join. The formation
declined due to having radar contact
and requested to switch to the boom
frequency. Swanwick(Mil) cleared the
Typhoon(A) formation to FL310 for the
tanker and passed the boom frequency.
At this point, the tanker crew discussed
the current and expected air-picture;
the PM confirmed with the PF that he
had indeed cleared the Typhoon(B) pilot
for the join and that the Typhoon(A)
formation was now cleared to the
joining level of FL310 by Swanwick(Mil).
When the Typhoon(B) pilot called
visual, he was climbing from FL290
and, at this point, at a range that was
unknown to the tanker crew. The MIDS
was not consulted due the current
AAR operation with a receiver in-tow.
The Typhoon(A) formation was now
perceived to be closing fast from the
south [the formation was, in fact, closing
from the north] and perceived to be
in a higher block than Typhoon(B). The
tanker crew called Swanwick(Mil) and
asked them to confirm who they were
sending to the tanker first (due to the
uncertainty with the levels) but received
no reply. The Typhoon(A) formation
was now in the process of switching to
the boom frequency. The PM, working
the Swanwick(Mil) frequency, informed
the PF, working the boom frequency,
that there was a confliction of levels
and asked him to confirm with the
Typhoon(A) formation their position,
because they were in the process of
switching to the boom frequency. The
Typhoon(A) formation checked-in on
the boom frequency, called visual and
requested join. The PF immediately
asked them for their position and if
they were visual with both receivers
(Typhoon(B) joining and Typhoon(C) in-
tow). The Typhoon(A) pilot reported that
they were only visual with the aircraft in-
tow. The Typhoon(B) pilot immediately
reported (on the boom frequency) that
he was visual with all aircraft and happy
to re-fuel second after the Typhoon(A)
formation. The tanker instructed the
Typhoon(B) pilot to separate vertically
by 1000ft (to FL300) and the Typhoon(A)
formation to maintain FL310 as they
were, in fact, closer in proximity to the
tanker. All receivers complied and were
subsequently cycled through AAR with
no further incident.
The Voyager tanker pilot noted
the following:
The receivers arrived in quick succession
and with minimal assistance from
Swanwick(Mil) due to the fact they had
good radar SA on the tanker. This could
have had a negative effect because,
although this can be more efficient
for receiver pairs on the tanker, it may
be less so for other joining receivers
being vectored from opposite sides and
differing altitudes. Some SA was lost by
the entire formation due to the lack of
spatial SA on all players, compounded
by radio frequency changes.
The lack of joining call for some of the
receivers negated the use of the Air-
For the full report, see Airprox Report No 2019329 on the UKAB website.
Typhoon v Typhoon - Spry's Summary:
Air to Air refuelling (AAR) is a routine event; however, this doesn’t mean that the risks involved are fewer. The task is
demanding and requires a high level of accuracy and concentration, all of which can reduce capacity and the ability to
assimilate external factors. In this Airprox, there were many good intentions by all those involved to try and make the joins as
expeditious and efficient as possible. Unfortunately, omitting a few simple transmissions allowed the air picture to become
confusing, meaning that everyone’s situational awareness was low. This occurrence demonstrates how events can quickly
develop and emphasises the need to follow the processes and procedures accurately to reduce the risk of ambiguity.
Although AAR requires the transponder to be at standby for the join, think about what range would be appropriate to do
this or when you are controlling the join, when you are comfortable for this to happen. In this scenario, the trailing Typhoon
was at a range of 7.5nm from the tanker when the request was made to switch to the Tanker frequency and when they
were instructed to switch transponder to standby. Trying to get on with things too early to make the join more expeditious
inadvertently denied the opportunity to detect the confliction that subsequently happened. n
profile required for them to execute the for conducting the PFL. After the alert,
approach, so the Captain instructed and the descending action taken, the
the rear seat student QFI to break TCAS contact appeared to be just within
off the approach and reposition for 2 miles and the transition from breaking
another one; they were just IMC at this off the approach to the descent meant
point in a thin layer of cloud. During the contact indicated, briefly, 100ft
the transition from the glide to going separation before the action took
around, applying power and raising positive effect. It transpired that the
the gear, the TCAS alerted ‘traffic’. Upon contact was a Texan executing a SID
processing the TCAS info, with the traffic from RW31 at RAF Valley, a profile that
in the 12 o’clock and indicating 300ft tracks through the Mona overhead.
above, the Captain instinctively adjusted Unfortunately, the Texan video replay
the aircraft attitude to nose low and told was not available to corroborate the
the student QFI to descend to get some lateral or vertical separation. In this
separation on the traffic. During this instance TCAS was an invaluable
Hawk vs Texan action the student QFI became visual SA builder that prevented a closer
14 May 20 with the Texan. At the time they both encounter; until the TCAS ‘traffic’ alert
The Hawk Pilot reports conducting thought the traffic was in GH area north, they were not aware of any other
a student QFI sortie that required overhead Mona. Upon reviewing the aircraft in the vicinity.
teaching and practicing straight in HAMPA replay video, the TCAS contact
PFLs. They were conducting the PFLs appeared on the display approximately The Texan Pilot reports conducting
into Mona, using RW22. On one PFL 45sec before the alert but at this stage a student QFI sortie for instrument
they were slightly higher than the they were focusing on the parameters flying training prior to an instrument

56 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 57

 Air Clues
rating test. They had just departed
RAF Valley on a SID 31 East. They
had climbed and levelled at FL50, as
requested by ATC and were tracking
129° on the penultimate leg of the SID
before tracking the Valley 099° radial.
The published SID 31 East has a not
below height of FL50 (by the VYL 039°
radial) and the ground track takes
the aircraft through the RAF Mona
overhead. Meteorological conditions
were generally VMC with few amounts
of cumulus over Anglesey. As they
approached the Mona overhead, they
entered the tops of a single cumulus
cloud. At the same time as entering
the cloud and going IMC the TCAS
warning of ‘Traffic, Traffic’ alerted them
to a possible contact on the left-hand
side. They discussed the alert as a crew
and acknowledged that they had not
been made aware of any other traffic
or any possible conflictions by ATC. The
TCAS contact initially appeared close
to their aircraft laterally and indicated
500ft below their flight level. However,
it is sometimes difficult to ascertain
range on the Texan TCAS display and
contacts can be displayed with lag on
the actual position. The TCAS contact
rapidly climbed from 500ft below their
level to indicating 100ft below. Despite
discussing the contact in the cockpit,
they chose not to take any avoiding
action because they had not been
made aware of any conflicting traffic.
They presumed the contact was either
further away or spurious. The contact
appeared for approximately 30sec by
which time they had exited the cloud
tops. It was at this point they received
a radio transmission from ATC about
a radar contact 1NM north at a similar
level. Due to the brief flight in IMC they
were not visual with the reported traffic
at any point.
They landed from the flight, debriefed
and the instructor prepared for the
second sortie. At the end of the
flying day a call was made to the
ATC supervisor to discuss the TCAS
contact on the first sortie, at this point
the instructor was still unaware of
the seriousness of the incident. The
supervisor commented that nothing
58 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
had been reported and no concerns
had been raised from the morning
flying programme; each entity had
continued with their daily programme.
In order to find out more information
the QFI decided to call the other Sqn
and identify which crew had been
operating at Mona that morning.
Simply to get their version of events
and to see if there was anything they
could all learn from it. The other captain
had also flown again that day and
was still debriefing their second sortie
at 1800hrs. It was not until later that
evening that they spoke to each other.
The Hawk captain had watched the
video playback of the sortie and HAMPA
video replay apparently showed 100ft
separation, which coincided with the
indications in the Texan cockpit. The QFI
noted that as with most modern aircraft
the Texan is equipped with a data
transferring device (DTD or ‘brick’). This
records all aircraft parameters including
what is displayed on the cockpit MFDs
and all communications. Currently the
flight data that is recorded on the brick
cannot be saved, due to a pending
software update, and is deleted after
each sortie. Had they realised the
seriousness of the incident at the time
they would have impounded the brick.
There is currently no ability to download
flight data for later reference.
The Mona Controller reported that
they were made aware by the Valley
Approach controller that a Hawk T2
aircraft was about to conduct a straight-
in PFL (SIPFL) at Mona. They advised the
Approach controller that some vehicles
had just been cleared onto the airfield
to carry out daily checks, so agreed to
allow a high approach only. The T2 did
not come on to the Mona frequency as
planned. For reasons unknown at the
time, the pilot broke off the approach.
They made a second attempt at which
point the vehicles were clear of the
runway and the standard procedure
was followed. The controller was not
aware of the incident with the Texan
aircraft until told about it at a later date.
Neither aircraft were under their control
at the time of the incident.
The Valley Controller reported that
at the time of the occurrence they
were band boxing all radar tasks (Radar,
Approach/Director, LARS, Low-level)
due to COVID restrictions. They were
moderately busy with a mix of GH
traffic, recovery into Mona, straight-in
app at Valley, a prenote outbound, and
rotary low-level transiting outbound.
They had recently taken over the
position and were additionally catching
up with associated 'admin' as the
Electronic Tote (ET) had been U/S all
Air Clues
morning, meaning that the weather track predict in order to assess the the pilot replied they had it on TCAS.
was a printed sheet and there was no speeds of the 2 aircraft, was confident The controller reported that they hadn't
record of what aircraft were airborne. that the Hawk would be ahead of the noticed the Texan disappear from radar
Flight Strips were prepared pending Texan, so instructed the Texan pilot as it approached the SSR radar overhead
departures and recovery strips for "SID East, climb FL50, Traffic Service". but was unsure which of the additional
those aircraft already airborne in order The normal liaison calls to Mona Tower tasks they were focused on at the time.
to reduce the workload during the were carried out for the turn inbound They also noted that from an Air Traffic
pending recovery phase. A Texan was and joining clearances, and the Hawk and procedures perspective, historically,
prenoted outbound to depart SID was released to Mona Tower. Although SID East was used primarily for airways
East, FL50 for a practice diversion to they couldn’t recall the exact timeline, joining traffic at ROLEX/REXAM and
Liverpool. At a similar time, a recovering around this time they remembered was usually with an associated climb to
T2 had called for a SIPFL at Mona. The being caught off guard by the FL90. This could explain why confliction
Hawk was 30NM SE of Mona with the appearance of the Texan emerging SE between such departures and SIPFL
intentions of touch-and-go to join the of Mona overhead approximately 2NM descending inbound from 7000ft had
circuit. As the Texan climbed out of from the T2, which was immediately not occurred before. n
RW31RH the controller selected the called as Traffic Information, to which
For the full report, see Airprox Report No 2020037 on the UKAB website.
Hawk v Texan - Spry's Summary:
This Airprox emphasises the importance of a Collision Warning System (CWS), as that's what ultimately
prevented a more serious incident from occurring. The Hawk T2 crew were alerted to the conflict and were able to take
avoiding action and get visual with the Texan. There were many factors that conspired against ATC from being able to
effectively monitor the aircraft and with reduced manning, due to Covid-19 restrictions, these challenges are set to continue.
Although the relative bearing of the conflict on a CWS may not be reliable, you shouldn’t ignore the information that is
presented to you. This occurrence has proven; if there is any doubt, question a conflict or act on it. n
‘weaponeering’. At about 4km from planning to conduct a simulated strike
the target, the No2 [rear-seat] handling on a pre-planned target. During transit
pilot (HP) noticed convergence of manoeuvring to establish at the Initial
the two aircraft and started to roll Point for the target he noticed the
right (~15-20° AoB) to adjust heading. unexpected close proximity of the
Feeling the roll, the CPG looked up No2 aircraft, immediately followed by
and saw the convergence continuing it turning hard away. After this the No2
at an uncomfortable rate through his called “knock it off”. At the time and
left (unaided) eye. As they were still immediately subsequently he did not
converging, the HP positively increased interpret the incident as an Airprox as it
AoB to about 80° right wing low, to occurred within a formation.
turn hard away from the lead aircraft
and avoid collision. The CPG noted that The Brize Norton Controller
they experienced rapid and unexpected reported that the Airprox occurred 2
closure leading to their aircraft months previously, was not declared
Apache vs Apache being unpleasantly close to the lead on frequency and that he had no
11 Feb 20 (estimated as 2-3 rotors by both Apache recollection of the event.
The Apache(2) Co-Pilot/Gunner crews). This was possibly due to the
(CPG) reported that he was acting orientation of the attack and the closure The Brize Norton Supervisor
as aircraft commander in the front not being observed immediately due to reported that he was ATCO IC at the
seat as No2 of a formation pair at the monocular nature of the Pilot Night time of the event. He took over the
night at 250ft agl. Both aircraft were Vision System. control position because the Apache
operating in a heavy fit. When 15- formation had requested to divert
20km from the target, the formation The Apache(1) Rear-Seat Handling with a technical ‘snag’. They did not
lead delivered orders for a simulated Pilot reported leading a pair of Apaches, declare an emergency, or state that they
strike on Wroughton disused airfield. conducting Combat Ready (CR) training would require any further assistance at
Both Apache CPGs were eyes in in the south and east of England, the time.
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 59
Air Clues
Phenom vs Tutor
12 Feb 20
The Phenom Pilot reported that
he was the QFI operating as Pilot
Monitoring in the right-hand seat. His
student was an experienced Chinook
pilot on a multi-engine crossover
syllabus sortie, operating as the Pilot
Flying (PF) in the left-hand seat. They
had been cleared on a Standard
Instrument Departure with onwards
clearance to join controlled airspace.
The student had briefed an IF take-off.
They were instructed to line-up after a
20min hold due to traffic. The TCAS was
set to TA/RA in accordance with the
Runway Checklist. Take-off clearance
was given once landing traffic had
cleared the runway. He visually acquired
a Tutor on the dead-side during the
take-off roll and monitored it whilst the
after take-off checks were completed.
He transmitted on the Tower frequency
"Tutor on the dead-side do not turn".
For the full report, see Airprox Report No 2020035 on the UKAB website. Simultaneously, the Tutor pilot started
his upwind turn. He directed the PF
Apache v Apache - Spry's Summary: to "level off" and then "descend" in
order to avoid a mid-air collision. He
At the critical point of their IP-to-target run, the crew of Apache 2 was busy focussing on the target but was estimated that they passed 100ft below
also suffering from distraction due to complications with their radios. Helmet mounted NVDs generally restrict an operator's the Tutor. Before changing to the
field of view, so any effective lookout scan must include consistent movement of the head. A lookout scan will often break departure frequency, he informed the
down when workload increases, and this is especially true when operating on NVDs. Can you identify when your workload Tower controller that he intended to file
is affecting your ability to conduct an effective lookout scan? During the planning stage, consider when busy periods could an Airprox report.
occur in a sortie and remind yourself to keep your head moving. Monitoring other crew members can help also.
The Tutor Pilot reported that he was
The Occurrence Safety Investigation into this Airprox identified some inadequacies in the IP-to-target plan which led to on his second solo sortie and was trying
the expected formation separation becoming eroded. Often, the biggest risk of mid-air collision will be from within your his best to negotiate a busy circuit with
own formation. Are your sortie plans always considerate of safe separation? How robust are your formation deconfliction a stream of additional instrument traffic.
procedures? Do they exist for all stages of your sortie? Have you thought about potential contingencies? Expect the Following a go-around for approaching
unexpected, even (or perhaps especially) from a playmate. n instrument traffic, he entered the dead-
60 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34
side and prioritised his flying of the
aircraft (after take-off checks and R/T). It
appears that, in attempting to assimilate
the many factors facing him in the
circuit at that time, he did not factor-in
the much faster Phenom's departure
adequately, not noticing its position
until he began his turn at the nominal
upwind point as it passed beneath
him. He now considers that he should
have checked more thoroughly for
departing traffic and extended further
upwind before safely commencing the
turn. Prior to the sortie, he had been
thoroughly solo-briefed by his QFI
regarding various circuit permutations
etc; however, it is hard to cater for
eventualities such as this one. He has
learnt a huge amount from this sortie
and will endeavour to incorporate this
experience into his future circuit flying.
The Tutor Pilot's Supervisor reported
that his solo student performed well
during the dual element of the sortie
detail. He had previously performed
well on circuit sorties and is a pilot
bursar with much potential. During his
30min solo sortie, and following a go-
around, he commenced a turn at the
normal upwind point from the dead-
side without regard for a departing
Phenom. The 2 aircraft came into close
proximity and prompted the Phenom
captain to submit an Airprox.
Prior to the sortie, solo briefs et al were
conducted in accordance with 6FTS
Orders. In addition, he had covered
as many permutations as he could
with respect to when and when not
to turn/continue/go-around. It was an
incredibly busy and complex visual and
instrument circuit scenario involving
all 3 station-based aircraft types as his
student taxied to the hold. He could
have chosen to step-in and prevent
his going solo at this point. He did not,
in an arguably 'archaic' belief that one
can glean a great deal of experience
from negotiating a busy circuit. The
Tower controller was working hard at
successfully dovetailing all the demands
from 3 differing aircraft types. His
student held at the holding point for
circa 20-30min prior to getting airborne
due to the aforementioned busy
Air Clues
nature of the circuit. Again, he could
have intervened, and started to do so
on the basis that the student’s mental
state might not be optimal given the
wait; however, an opportunity to get
him airborne arose. After consultation
through the Ground controller at
the supervisor’s behest, the student
stated that he was fine and happy to
continue. Again, he could have chosen
to terminate the sortie regardless of the
student’s reply. In hindsight, he could –
and perhaps should – have decided not
to send him solo into a busy, complex
circuit. He subsequently regretted
not having instructed the student to
terminate the sortie from the hold.
The Cranwell Tower Controller
reported that this was a busy tower
session. The circuit had been full for
some time and the Tutor had been
waiting at the hold to launch into
the circuit for approximately 20min.
There were 2 Phenoms behind the
Tutor waiting to depart. Once there
was room in the circuit, the Tutor pilot
was cleared for take-off and then there
was a slight delay before the [Airprox]
Phenom was released for departure
due to radar traffic using the runway.
The Tutor pilot was told to go-around
for the instrument traffic and went-
around dead-side. As the Phenom
departed, the Tutor was dead-side and,
as the Phenom climbed out, he was
obviously concerned about the Tutor’s
positioning as he transmitted a warning
“Tutor dead-side, do not turn”. She heard
the warning, looked to see where the
Tutor was at that point and saw that
he was already turning. The Tutor pilot
either did not acknowledge or did not
hear the warning and turned across
the Phenom’s departure path. The
Phenom pilot descended to maintain
separation from the Tutor. The Phenom
pilot informed the Tower controller that
he would be filing an Airprox before he
changed frequency.
The Cranwell ATC Supervisor
reported that he was present in the
VCR because the visual circuit was
full and had been for much of the
afternoon. There were several aircraft
AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 61
 Air Clues
Safety Contacts: Air Clues

that his student be asked if he was still Group / Station / Unit Flight Safety Officers Health, Safety & Environmental Protection Advisors
content to continue his sortie; this was 1Gp 01494 495454 -
completed by the Ground controller 2Gp 01494 495049 -
and a positive response received. 11Gp TBC -
The Tutor pilot was given take-off 11Gp Space and BM 03067707165 -
clearance with 2 Prefects in the visual 22Gp 030 6798 0101 -
circuit and radar traffic inbound to land. 38Gp 01494 497923 -
When the Tutor approached finals, the BM 03067707165
radar traffic was ahead and the pilot JHC 01264 381526 -
was cleared to ‘continue’. Then, because Test & Evaluation (ASWC) 01522 727743
as he hadn’t initiated a go-around, the 1ACC 01522 603359 -
QFI asked the ADC to send the Tutor 2FTS 01400 264522 -
around with one ahead. This was carried 3FTS 01400 267707 -
out and, when the radar traffic landed, 4FTS 01407 762241 6666
the [Airprox] Phenom was lined-up for 6FTS 01400 266944 -
departure. Once the radar traffic had Air Cadets (RAFAC) - 01400 0267817

vacated the RW, the [Airprox] Phenom Boulmer 01665 607325 01665 607282 / 7289

pilot was given take-off clearance. When Benson 01491 837766 6666 01491 827109 / 7254

the [Airprox] Phenom was airborne the MOD Boscombe Down 01980 662087 01980 662312
Brize Norton 01993 895764 / 6666 01993 895525 / 7062
2nd Phenom at the hold was then given
Coningsby 01526 346575 01526 347256 / 7196
take-off clearance; as the Supervisor
Cosford 01902 704037 01903 37472 / 237
went to intervene, the ADC realised
Cranwell 01400 266666 01400 267469 / 7498
that IFR separation was required and
Defence Geographic Centre 0208 818 2816 -
amended the clearance to ‘line-up and
Fylingdales - 01751 467216
wait.’ When the Supervisor looked back
Halton 01296 656666 01296 657640
up, he saw the [Airprox] Phenom bunt
Henlow 01462 851515 6150 01462 857604
down slightly before commencing the
High Wycombe 01494 494454 01494 496489 / 5094
taxiing and, at the hold, was a Tutor no visual circuits to land, and multiple climb again outbound. Because the sun
Honington 01359 236069 01359 237782 / 7516
which was waiting to depart into the aircraft on radar – some requesting to was quite low it was difficult to judge
Swanwick 01489 612082 -
circuit on the solo phase of a dual to join, others for further radar or to depart. distance between the two aircraft.
Leeming 01677 456666 01677 457637 / 7231
solo consolidation sortie. Behind the Having liaised with the Approach The Phenom pilot reported an
Leuchars 01334 856666 -
Tutor were 2 Phenom aircraft to depart controller and the ADC, a plan was Airprox and then changed frequency
Linton-on-Ouse 01347 848261 6666 01347 847422 / 7617
on SIDs. There were 2 further aircraft agreed to get the waiting aircraft to departures. n
Lossiemouth 01343 816666 / 7714 01343 817796 / 7697
awaiting clearance to join, 2 requiring airborne. The QFI supervisor asked
Lyneham - 01189 763532
For the full report, see Airprox Report No 2020018 on the UKAB website. Marham 01760 337261 6666 01760 337595 / 7199
No1 AIDU 020 8210 5344 -

Phenom v Tutor - Spry's Summary: Northolt 020 8833 8571 02088 338319 / 38521
Odiham 01256 702134 6666 / 6724 01256 702134 7650 / 7733
Scampton 01522 733053 01522 733325 / 3137
Visual and instrument traffic is often mixed at RAF airfields due to the nature of the flying training undertaken Shawbury 01939 250351 6666 01939 250351 7529 / 7559
and to maximise training opportunities. A number of mitigations exist to prevent conflict between visual circuit and Spadeadam - 01697 749204
instrument pattern air systems (e.g. electronic conspicuity, supervision, SOPs) but in this Airprox these were less effective St Athan 01446 798394 01446 797426 / 8250
than might have been expected. St Mawgan 01637 857264 / 7858
Syerston 01400 264522 -
On the day this Airprox occurred, the circuit was busier than normal with various aircraft types present and various sortie Tactical Supply Wing 95521 7232 -
profiles being undertaken, following a period of bad weather which had precluded any flying training activity. Consequently, Valley 01407 762241 6666 01407 767800 / 7685
this may have increased the pressure on all parties involved to achieve the flying task. How well do Squadrons understand Waddington 01522 726666 01522 727652 / 7783
each other’s intentions regarding visual and instrument procedures where you operate? Is flying activity co-ordinated to Wittering 01780 416377 01780 417611
minimise the potential for conflictions? How might a surge in operations affect your ability to co-ordinate and therefore Woodvale 01704 872287 Ext 7301 -
deconflict activity? Wyton 01480 52451 7146 -
Overseas Flight Safety Contacts Telephone Email
Elements of inexperience, distraction, time pressure, high workload and environmental factors (setting sun) all conspired to Al Udeid 9250 060 451 3043 83EAG-DepFSO@mod.gov.uk
set the circumstances for this incident. However, the Phenom QFI did well to maintain good situational awareness, anticipate Ascension 00247 63307 BFSAI-ASCOpsOC@mod.uk
the actions of the Tutor pilot and take timely and appropriate action to resolve the potential confliction. This Airprox serves Akrotiri 94120 6666 Leigh.Robertson677@mod.gov.uk
to highlight the necessity to remain alert, especially in such a busy circuit environment, improve the SA of others if possible 83 EAG 9250 060 451 3050 83EAG-AIROPSFSO@mod.gov.uk
and ultimately act decisively should a loss of safe separation look probable. n Gibraltar 9231 98531 3365 GIB-RAF-ASM@mod.uk
MPA 0050 073620 (94130 3620) BFSAI-FLK-905EAW-ASM@mod.uk
Tactical Leadership Programme 0034 967 598527 aa3@tlp-info.org
Naval Air Station Jacksonville 001 904 542 4738 -
62 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34 63
Air Clues

64 AIRCLUES ISSUE 34