PURITA ALIPIO V. COURT OF APPEALS & ROMEO G.

JARING
29 September 2000 | Mendoza, J. |
Joint and Solidary Obligations: Defenses Available to a Solidary Debtor Against the Creditor

DOCTRINE: The concurrence of 2 or more creditors or of 2 or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply
that each of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the
prestations. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the
obligation requires solidarity (NCC 1207)

CASE SUMMARY: Jaring rented a fishpond in Bataan w/ a lease for a period of 5 yrs. He subleased the remaining term to
the Alipios and Manuels. The rent was P485.6K payable in 2 installments of P300K + P185.6K. Although P300K was paid,
P50.6K of P185.6K was still unpaid. Jaring sued both spouses for it. Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case bec. her spouse
died. She based this action on Rule 3 §21, 1964 RoC, now amended to Rule 3 §20, 1997 CivPro. RTC, affirmed by CA, denied
her motion on the ground that since she herself was a part of the contract, she could be independently impleaded in the
suit along with the Manuels to pay Jaring. Court reversed RTC’s ruling based on the above doctrine plus the family code
(bec. the rent was charged to the Alipios’ CPG that dissolved when Placido died). Court held that since both couples are only
jointly liable, the P50.6K is split between them to pay to Jaring.

FACTS:
 Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Hermosa, Bataan. Lease was for a period of 5 yrs. that ends
on 12 Sept. 1990
 19 June 1987, subleased the pond for the remaining period of his lease to spouses Alipio (Placido & Purita) and
spouses Manuel (Bienvenido & Remedios); rent was P485.6K, payable in 2 installments (P300K & P185.6K – 2 nd was
due on 30 June 1989)
 P300K was paid but P185.6K had a remaining unpaid balance of P50.6K.
 13 Oct. 1989, Jaring sued both sets of spouses for the P50.6K before RTC Bataan
 Purita moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Placido, husband, died on 1 Dec. 1988
o She based her action on Rule3 §21, 1964 RoC which is now amended to Rule 3 §20, 1997 CivPro
 RTC denied Purita’s motion on the ground that since she herself was a part to the contract, she could be independently
impleaded in the suit along with the Manuel spouses to pay Jaring; CA affirmed RTC

ISSUE: W/N the liability of the Alipio and Manuel spouses to pay the unpaid balance of the agreed rent (P50.6k) is considered
as solidary. – NO, it’s merely JOINT.

RULING:
 RTC ordered Purita + Manuel spouses to pay Laring the P50.6K w/o specifying if it should be jointly or solidarily.
 According to NCC 1207, if from the law, nature, or wording of the obligation the contrary doesn’t appear, the
obligation is presume to be joint = the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being
considered as distinct from one another
o Respondent doesn’t cite law which provides that when there are 2 or more lessees, the latter’s obligation to
pay is solidary
o If the lessees refuse to vacate the property after the lease period’s expiration, and despite the lessor’s
demands to do so, they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the property
 Basis for the solidary liability isn’t the contract but the rather them committing tort jointly
 In the case, there’s no allegation that Purita + Manuel spouses refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of
the sublease’s term. Plus, Laring’s collection of the P50.6K became due on 30 June 1989, long before the sublease
expires on 12 Sept. 1990
 Court ruled that the sublessees’ liability is merely joint. Each couple is liable to pay half of the P50.6K

DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED.

NOTES:
 Rule 3 §21 of 1964 Rules of Court (RoC)
o When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the CFI, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules
 Rule 3 §20 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (CivPro) -> amended Rule 3 §21 of 1964 RoC
o When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant
dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it
shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
 judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.

SIDE ISSUE + RULING: W/N a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the CPG – NO.
 Court held that a creditor can’t sue the surviving spouse of a deceased in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of
money chargeable against the CPG. Proper remedy is to file a claim in the settlement of the decedent’s estate
 Since Placido died 10 mos. before Laring filed the collection suit, the case falls outside the ambit of Rule 3 §21, which
deals with dismissals of collection suits bec. the defendant’s death was during the case’s pendency
 The sublease’s rent signed by the Alipios’ is an obligation chargeable against their CPG
o CC 161(1) states that the CPG is liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose in the cases where
she may legally bind the partnership
 When Placido died, the CPG dissolved automatically and all debts chargeable against it were to be paid in the estate
proceeding’ settlements, according to Rule 73 §2
o When the marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse
 For marriages governed by the rules of CPG, an obligation entered into by the spouses is chargeable against the CPG
and it’s that partnership that’s primarily bound for the repayment
o When the spouses are sued for the obligation’s enforcement, they are being impleaded as the CPG’s
representatives and not as individual debtors so the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between them,
doesn’t apply
 In lieu of the remedy being to file a claim in the settlement of the estate’s proceedings, Purita lacks the authority to
represent the conjugal estate since the court has the jurisdiction to appoint who will be the administrator of the
settlement proceedings
o The surviving spouse is not a de factor administrator and their powers of administration ceases upon the
death of the other spouse