Contents

Introduction:...............................................................................................................................................1
Facts of accident..........................................................................................................................................1
Events Leading to the Accident...............................................................................................................2
Weather and sea conditions....................................................................................................................2
The sequence of events...............................................................................................................................2
Around 07:00...........................................................................................................................................2
Around 05:00...........................................................................................................................................3
Analysis:.......................................................................................................................................................4
Probable Causes:.....................................................................................................................................4
Recommendations:.....................................................................................................................................5
MARPOL Annex:..........................................................................................................................................5
References:..................................................................................................................................................6
 An Accident At Sea Which Is Relevant To MARPOL Annexes.

Introduction:

Accidents are bound to occur when you use any means of transport. Accidents are caused by
negligent errors, but they are durable and persistent. So many accidents have occurred and
have emerged that they have been tracked. The ocean is very wide and therefore there are also
numerous variations in accidents. In addition to humans, marine creatures, the marine
environment and ecosystem have an impact on marine accidents. 9 principal types of maritime
accidents we have brought to you can be listed as follows:

1. Rig Mishaps Offshore Oil

2. Mishaps cruise ship 

3. Mishaps in commercial fishing

4. Tugboat accidents

5. Crude oil tanker accidents and cargo vessels 

6. Drug and alcohol maritime accidents

7. Mishaps of the Crane

8. Shipyard accidents

9. Diving Support Vessel maritime accidents

Collision accidents are discussed in this report. Collision due to the assumption that there are
no other ships in the vicinity, while only keeping a visual lookout in high conditions.
Facts of accident

The Vessel A with the members of the Master A and 4 crew left the port of Keihin and went to
the south-west. The Vessel B, filled by the Skipper B and 3 onboard passengers, fished in a
drifting state. The two vessels struck off the northwest bank of Oo Shima at approximately
11:00, 12 June 2011. On the Vessel B one of the passengers was wounded and the straboard
cracked. The Vessel A held on to the bow.

Events Leading to the Accident

Vessel A (Cargo ship)
Gross tonnage:498tons
L×B×D
74.92m×12.50m×6.86m
Hull material : Steel
Engine : Diesel engine
Output : 1,471kW
Weather and sea conditions
Vessel B (Recreational fishing vessel)
Gross tonnage : 3.84tons
: Lr×B×D :9.20m×2.45m×0.71m
Hull material :FRP (Fiber Reinforced Plastic)
Engine : Diesel engine
Output : 65 (Engine Performance Index by Fishing Vessel
Act)

Cloudy weather, dark and cloudy areas Weather (Visibility about 2 - 5M) Tide and current of the
oceans: from 0.5 to 1.2 kn northeast to east

The sequence of events

Around 07:00

Vessel A went to Keihin Port Kawasaki Section heading for Takuma Port, Mitoyo City, Kagawa
Pref. Vessel A sailed south-west after crossing the Bay of Tokyo through Uraga Suido. Vessels A,
under hazy conditions, sailed at a speed of about 11 kn while confirming its position using the
use of two radars and the GPS plotter, and avoided fishing and other vessels through manual
guidance because there were many recreational fishing vessels and fishing crafts in this area
south of Tsurugi Saki. The vessel was switched to automatic steering north of Oo Shima and
moved south of Mikomoto Shima.
Master A did not use the radar only, and because there were no other ships visible in front of it,
Master A started to organize the charts of the ship. Chief Engineer A saw the fishing vessel's
mast moving into the bow and turned to Masten A, who was on the bridge, loudly calling to him
and waving his hands. Master A witnessed Chief Engineer A waving his hands and saw VesselB's
mast moving in the direction of its bow.

Around 05:00

Vessel B departed Futo Fishing Harbour, Ito City, Shizuoka Pref. for recreational fishing, arriving
off the Oo Shima North West Coast. At around 5:00 AM, Skipper B thought it would be enough
to keep the view only visually; hence, the radar stopped and kept a lookout in the control room
as the vessel was on its way. The passenger B1 was sitting on the mid-section straw, the
passenger B2 on the aft section's port and the passenger B3 on the aft straw. The skiper B of
the Passenger B1 was asked for the reel adjustment, and the skipper B began work including
the cable adjustment. He heard passenger voice B2 saying "A vessel is coming straight for us"
about three to four minutes after he began the work. Skipper B saw Vessel A's bow approaching
port at about 45 degrees towards bowing. Bow direction. The Vessel B star swung to the
starboard side as the vessel moved to the astern when he immediately hit the engine.
Analysis:

Vessel A and Vessel B have observation conditions Vessel A Master A stood alone at the
Navigation Clock. While 2 radars were in use, he did not use the radars and only kept an eye
view. He saw no other ships in front of him and thus erroneously assumed no other ships were
in the area. Then he started to organize the charts on the rear port side of the chart and wasn't
watching. Boat B B When Skipper B was planning to bring Vessel B back to its original position
prior to drifting, passenger B1 had requested that its electric reel be adjusted. Skipper B did not
use radar and, by visual observation, did not see any vessels other than the consort vessel;
therefore he assumed erroneously that there were no vessels in the area. In the tribboard side
passageway, he crooked up and started to work the connecting cord adjustment and did not
look out.

Probable Causes: The collision with two ships, Vessel A and vessel B, is likely to have occurred,
both Master A and Skipper B having failed to take a look at the north-west coast of Oo Shima
under hazy conditions, with Vessel A moving south-west and Vessel B drifting. It is probable
that Master A and Skipper B did not keep a glance because they both looked out only visually
under hazy conditions, without using the radar and did not see any other vessels, assuming
erroneously that no other vessels existed there.
Recommendations:

To prevent repetition

 Keep a good lookout, use radar and other methods effectively and don't just depend on
visual observation.
 When working other than maneuvering a vessel, after an accurate knowledge is
confirmed of the situation and safety of the surrounding vessels, complete the work
quickly so that a proper lookout is not impaired.

MARPOL Annex:

The main reason for human-induced accidents are the following: the Convention on
International Regulation for the Prevention of Sea Collisions (COLREG) violation of collision
accidents and the lack of communication between vessels; the failure of the surveillance
officer's interpretation and the lack of communication in the management of bridges for
landing accidents.

References:

1. Uğurlu, Ö., Köse, E., Yıldırım, U. and Yüksekyıldız, E., 2015. Marine accident analysis for
collision and grounding in oil tanker using FTA method. Maritime Policy &
Management, 42(2), pp.163-185.
2. Banda, O.A.V., Goerlandt, F., Montewka, J. and Kujala, P., 2015. A risk analysis of winter
navigation in Finnish sea areas. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 79, pp.100-116.
3. Uğurlu, Ö., Yıldız, S., Loughney, S., Wang, J., Kuntchulia, S. and Sharabidze, I., 2020.
Analyzing collision, grounding, and sinking accidents occurring in the Black Sea utilizing
HFACS and Bayesian networks. Risk analysis.