Running head: RUSSIA-ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 1

Russia-Illiberal Democracy

Joey Weng

Professor Calin

SCSU

9th March 2021

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Russia-An Illiberal Democracy

Back in the late 1990s, an Indian American journalist named Fareed Zakaria wrote a very

influential article in the Foreign Affairs Journal that discussed the term “illiberal democracy”.

The term refers to powerful leaders that have broken the promise of democracy both to their

citizens and to the countries by crossing the line of constitutional limits and abusing the powers

of their offices (Zakaria, 1997). In this paper, the term “illiberal democracy” will focus on Russia

in terms of the level of transparency and fairness in its presidential & legislative elections,

government powers, and Russian citizens’ basic rights & civil liberties.

First off, this essay will investigate whether the Russian elections are fair and free with a

focus on elections of the Russian president and the Russian Legislative Branch. President

Vladimir Putin is a powerful leader, but he has made the presidential elections severely unfair

and lacks transparency. There are a lot of irregularities and allegations surrounding federal

elections in Russia. Putin’s 2018 election, for example, revealed what he has planned long before

election day: a sophisticated scheme to stay in power at all costs for as long as possible. Even

though the polls indicate that Putin has become the most popular leader in recent presidential

elections (nearly 80% of the voters voted for Putin to continue his capacity as Russian president

in the 2018 election), in 2017, Putin’s biggest rival, Navalny, was denied the right to run for

presidency against Putin on minor technicalities. "Putin is doing everything to convince himself

that Navalny isn't dangerous," according to a well-known Russian political analyst Tatyana

Stanovaya of the Carnegie Moscow Center (Kim, 2018). This is not the first time that Navalny

has been denied the right to run for president.

During election day on March 18th of 2018, a massive number of voters witnessed and

posted on social media such as Twitter (a video of poll workers stealing and stuffing ballots at a
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polling station in Russia was also reported by AP News, Reuters, and Washington Post) on the

way that Putin’s campaign committee and his loyalists stole ballots, blocked surveillance

cameras from monitoring the vote count process, and coerced people to vote for Putin at several

polling stations. Among the witnesses, two observers reported that they saw “an unusually high

influx of people going to the polls between noon and 2 in the afternoon at a polling station” in

Yekaterinburg, A doctor at a hospital in the Ural Mountains City told the AP News that 2 p.m.

was the deadline for health officials to report to their superiors that they had voted. The number

of votes for Putin suddenly experienced a peak right before the voting registration closed (Heintz

& Isachenkov, 2018). All the irregularities indicate that even though Putin was almost certainly

going to get re-elected, the presidential election in 2018 was tainted to some degree because

Putin’s administration went to the full extent to consolidate power.

After discussing the level of fairness and openness of Russia’s presidential election,

recent parliamentary elections in Russia also led to reports of coordinated election fraud in favor

of the Kremlin backed party, United Russia. The 2007 & 2016 State Duma (Lower Chamber of

the Russian Legislative Branch) elections are classic examples of fraudulent. According to a

peer-reviewed journal written by Debardeleben (2008), top leaders of the Russian government

have been constantly promising transparency in elections of the democratic regime, but the State

Duma elections say otherwise. During the 2007 State Duma election, the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSEC) stated that Russia had no true intent on letting them

perform their duties as election observers, and Council of Europe stated the 2007 election was

unfair. Russian state media was banned from broadcasting voting activities and campaigns by

rival parties of the United Russia party except for a few other less powerful parties sanctioned by
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the Kremlin. Voters affiliated with a lot of opposition parties were threatened, removed, and

arrested based on selective enforcement of the laws by Russian authorities (p. 275-p. 276).

In the end of the 2007 parliamentary election, United Russia secured another victory with

majority of the seats in the State Duma, which then powered the agenda of Putin’s successor,

Dmitry Medvedevto, the Russia president elected to office from 2008 to 2012. One thing to note

is that Medvedevto happens to be one of Putin’s closest allies (Tanrisever, 2008). Just nine years

later in 2016 under Putin’s regime, United Russia again secured a huge victory, winning 343 of

the 450 seats in the Lower House. Voters and the voting process of opposition parties faced a

similar dilemma once again during the 2016 election (“Russia election: Big victory for Putin

backed party United Russia,” 2016).

After discussing elections in Russia, this paper will examine whether the three branches

of the Russian government currently act within its original constitutional limits. The answer is

no. According to The Politics of Presidential Term Limits, “Altogether, during the period 1945–

2017, ninety-four presidents from across the world, whether in democratic or non-democratic

regimes, increased the time of their presidential terms in one way or the other” (Chaisty, 2019).

These presidents broke the constitutional limits by extending presidential terms and using

temporary replacements. The lengthy list includes Putin. Putin was firstly elected as president

from 1999-2008. Then, Putin stepped down briefly for four years and allowed his successor

Dmitry Medvedevto to take over the presidency to avoid the legal obstacle of “serving a

maximum of two consecutive terms.” In 2012, Putin was reelected to office and is the current

president of Russia (Shevtsova, 2008, p.34-p. 40). The 1993 Russian Constitution specifically

states that presidents can only serve two consecutive terms with six years in each term (“The

Constitution of the Russian Federation,” 1993). However, Putin was able to use his executive
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overreach to influence the State Duma of the Russian Legislative Branch to revise the

constitution and add the amendment back in 2020 that passed with overwhelming votes (Putin’s

ally party, United Russia, controls the house). The new amendment states that Putin could remain

in office until 2036 (Kirby, 2020). Even though the new law states Putin can legally run for

president again (loopholes within the constitution allow the federal government to change laws

without many limitations), if elected, this extension of powers is illegitimate because it violates

the original intent of the 1993 Russian Constitution as it was designed to limit a sitting

president’s powers. So, in terms of this example, the Russian government broke its original

constitutional limits by abusing its powers and continuing to adopt new amendments to suit

Putin’s “power grab” tactics.

Also, Russia’s 1993 Constitution’s Article 10 specifies that there shall be a separation of

powers between the three branches of the federal government: Executive Branch, Legislative

Branch, and the Judicial Branch, and for good reason (“The Constitution of the Russian

Federation,” 1993). Separation of powers means that each branch is supposed to be independent

of each other and not one branch should have the power to influence other branches’

governmental decisions. However, reality is far from the law. According to Sakwa (2008), Putin

has declared himself as a “dictator of the law” by attempting to grab as much power as possible,

even if it means overstepping himself to the Legislative and Judicial branches’ sides (p. 879-p.

885). A prime example is Putin’s illicit use of his executive powers on Russia’s Judicial Branch.

The Judicial Branch consists of three types of courts: Constitution court, General Courts that

deals with criminal and civil cases, and Commercial Courts. Among the three, Commercial

Courts were the most impartial courts that dealt with foreign and domestic business disputes.

Since 2014, Putin exploited his powers to influence the State Duma to quickly pass a law that
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merged the Commercial Courts with the “political driven” General Courts under a single

Supreme Court. Putin also handpicked dozens of new judges and the Prosecutor General’s

deputies, which effectively increased the Kremlin’s control over the so-called “independent”

judiciary (Reevell, 2014).

Another example of the Russian government’s abuse of the constitution would be the

infamous case against a Russian billionaire, Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, who constantly funded

Putin’s opposition parties and opposed Putin’s ideas of governing before he was sentenced to jail

for more than a decade. Khodorkovsky was convicted in 2003 for tax evasion, theft, and money

laundering (Reevell, 2014). The courts in Strasbourg hardly presented concrete evidence and

Russia does not normally jail rich and powerful citizens. The arrest came shortly after

Khodorkovsky criticized Putin’s policies and announced that he would aid more to the

opposition political parties (“Mikhail Khodorkovsky case: European Court faults Russia,” 2011).

Experts around the world believe this is not a coincidence and the long sentence is politically

motivated as Russia has a habit of sending those who oppose Putin to jail or even committing

murder. Navalny, for example, a long-term Putin critic, was poisoned in jail by Russia’s Federal

Security Service (FSB) in 2021 (Subramanian, 2021). This suggests the Judicial Branch is no

longer impartial and judges would violate their oaths to carry out their duties under the

constitution’s separation of powers in political sensitive cases.

The last example of the Russian government not acting within the constitutional limits is

a massive criminal pardon passed by the State Duma in 2013. The amnesty targeted about 9000

entrepreneurs who committed felonies such as fraud, tax evasion, and money laundering. The

goal of this round of pardon was to “restart economic development in Russia,” as announced by
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Putin. However, the plan of putting a staggering number of criminals back on the street hardly

justifies anything (“Russian Duma orders amnesty for businessmen,” 2013). The abuse of

criminal pardons by the Legislative Branch simply indicates that the Russian government has

become a political tool under Putin’s regime.

The last part of the paper will be about Russia citizens’ basic rights and civil liberties.

The Russian Constitution explicitly states that citizens of the Russian Federation should be

granted the basic rights including but not limited to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,

reasonable privacy on the internet, and freedom of press (“The Constitution of the Russian

Federation,” 1993). All these enacted laws were meant to create a democratic nation after the fall

of the Soviet Union. However, the Russian government has largely abandoned the fundamental

principles of the constitution regarding citizens’ rights and civil liberties. The freedom of rights

and civil liberties in Russia have crippled. State media in Russia is undoubtably controlled by the

government at times and censorship is in place on political topic coverage. The Russian

government is willing to commit gruesome crimes to silence reporters who fight for freedom of

press, a basic right that is guaranteed under Article 29 of the constitution (“The Constitution of

the Russian Federation,” 1993). For example, a well-respected journalist named Anna

Politkovskaya was assassinated in Moscow in 2006 by an independent contractor who was

allegedly hired by the Russian government to keep Politkovskaya from reporting on detrimental

political events. All suspects were ruled “not guilty” by the Russian General Courts after an

oddly timed release of sensitive information containing the suspects’ names during a press

conference before trial by the Prosecutor General. According to Russian media reports such as

the Novaya, the real suspect escaped from the country almost immediately following the press

conference. Since the 21st century, more than just a few Russian reporters that covered unsavory
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political topics have been killed in Russia, but all murders and/or accidents are rarely properly

investigated. Dozens more journalists are arrested and unlawfully detained without just cause.

Nevertheless, Russia does allow some freedom of press when the interests of the elites are not

infringed upon. For example, newspapers like Novaya Gazeta and Kommersant regularly report

news on government corruption, breaking news from the Kremlin and the economy (Lipman,

2010, p. 154-p. 155).

The lack of freedom of press is not the only problem among the list of “guaranteed” basic

rights in Russia. Under Putin’s regime, freedom of speech is a very concerning issue. Citizens

who oppose his ideology in public are harassed and beaten by “patriots,” who support Putin. The

criminal actions of those so called “patriots” often went unpunished. On the other hand, Putin’s

opposition believers are being illegally jailed for voicing their own ideas. Online activities in

Russia are also tightly monitored by intelligence agencies such as the Federal Security Services

(FSB) and other law enforcement agencies. They actively ban any “insults” against Putin’s

administration and the country (Beschastna, 2013). For example, if someone posts on an online

forum and says that “Putin is a dictatorship who murdered hundreds of innocent people to stay in

power,” that person will almost certainly get arrested just because he stated his opinion about the

leader. Freedom of assembly is also not a guaranteed right in Russia. The case of Bolotnaya

Square sums it up. Following Putin’s victory on reelection in 2012, tens of thousands of people

hit the road and gathered at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow to protest election results. Police

arrested more than 30 people and accused them of assaulting police officers and participated in

mass riots. However, multiple human rights organizations, both internationally and in Russia,

stated that a lot of protesters that got rounded up by police did not commit the alleged crimes and
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that the Russian authorities were trying to ban the protest to make Putin “look good.”

(Beschastna, 2013, p. 1110-p. 1134).

Human rights in Russia have also become a very worrying problem. Specifically,

suspects in police custody and prisoners in jail, where the most human rights violations occur.

Police in Russia are used to the tradition of torture. According to the European Court of Human

Rights, several hundred detainees who were eventually proven innocent suffered extreme torture

by police in 2010 alone, such as by electroshock, nightsticks, starvation, and waterboarding.

Police use torture to force confessions or to plant evidence (Levina, 2013, p.105-p. 112).

According to statistics released by a U. N’s Special Commission on Torture:

In 2010, Russia had over 15 percent of the prison population in pretrial detention. The

most recent available statistics indicate that of the 120,000 people in pretrial detention, 30

percent are untried, 33 percent are convicted but unsentenced, and for 36 percent the

sentence is unconfirmed (2013).

Pre-Trial detainees in prison suffer from torture, diseases, and mental illness more than prisoners

in other stages of confinement due to the inhumane conditions of living and unsupervised actions

by prison guards in temporary facilities. Many individuals are detained illegally for years without

getting their days in court. In 2009, Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian tax lawyer, was arrested for

fraud and tax evasion, and he was kept in prison for nearly a year without trial. During his time

in Butyrka prison, he suffered from major health illnesses that were ignored, was denied family

visits, and was eventually tortured to death by prison guards. The worst nightmare for these

people is that perpetrators’ actions are ignored by judges and prosecutors. They are afraid of

coming forward with their stories to the international human rights courts and watchdog groups
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in fear of retaliation by Russian authorities (Levina, 2013, p.105-p. 112). Violations of human

rights in Russia is unambiguous.

Lastly, major civil rights violations committed by Russian police officers are occurring

across the country when the coordinated mass protests organized by Russian civilians on “the

return of Navalny” began since January of 2021. The long time Putin critic, Navalny, was

detained by airport police when he returned to Moscow on January 17th due to “trumped up”

criminal charges. This is not the first time that Navalny was treated discriminately by the

authorities due to his political beliefs. In 2014, he got a suspended sentence for Embezzlement,

but the prosecution did not produce significant evidence as well. Following Navalny’s

detainment, countless protesters hit the streets and opposed the unfair treatment carried out by

the Russian government. Law enforcement agencies including police in Moscow and St.

Petersburg immediately started to arrest and beat up protesters with weapons such as tasers and

batons. The activities by protesters are supposedly be protected by the Russian Constitution

under “freedom of assembly and freedom of speech” (“The Constitution of the Russian

Federation,” 1993). But so far, over 10,000 people got arrested without speedy trials in police

stations. Many of whom are denied the right to seek legal counsel and got striped away their

most basic rights to eats, sleep, and to use the toilet. Judges denied to review crucial evidence

and witnesses presented by defendants (Dixon, 2021). These are unacceptable civil rights

violations on a large-scale in Russia and the situation is escalating.

In sum, the paper covers a wide range of topics, including the level of freedom and

transparency of Russia’s presidential and parliamentary elections, citizens’ basic rights and civil

liberties, and Russian government’s violations of constitutional limits on multiple instances.

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After an intensive gathering and analyzing of more than a dozen credible sources, it has been

determined that Russia does have an “illiberal democracy.” The readers of this paper can be

political science students, professors, and members of the public. The angle of this paper is to

demonstrate the complex issues on civil rights, the Russian Constitution of 1993, governmental

overreach, and Russian federal elections.

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