Dungo, Paula Benilde D.

2019133218
Republic v. Sandiganbayan

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No.104768, July 21, 2003

FACTS:

President Corazon Aquino immediately issued an executive order upon her assumption to office
after the EDSA Revolution. E.O. No. 1 created the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance, whose primary task was to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, his family, subordinates, and close associates.

The PCGG had the power to conduct investigations necessary for the accomplishment of the
purposes of the aforementioned order. An AFP Anti-Graft Board was then created to investigate
reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel.

The AFP Board issued a report on the unexplained wealth of Ramas. Aside from several
properties, it was also disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano, who was the mistress of the former,
had military items in her house. These items were seized without the consent of Ramas.

The AFP Board prayed for the forfeiture of the respondent’s properties, funds, and equipment in
favor of the State. The respondent in turn filed an answer contenting that the property he owned
was not out of proportion with his salary and that ​that the exclusionary right arising from an
illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987
Constitution. He contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its
embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the
monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the
time of their seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the AFP Board was unconstitutional?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As
succinctly stated in President Aquino's Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA
Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."The resulting
government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal
limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure
government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Republic v. Sandiganbayan

It held that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Echegaray v SOJ
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

FACTS:

The petitioner in this case was convicted for the crime of raping the daughter of his common law
spouse. The child was 10 years of age. The petitioner was cnvicted on June 25 1996, and was
sentenced to death penalty. The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death
penalty for rape was challenged for the first time when he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The two motions were denied; the court found no
reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronounced Congress compliant with the requirements
of imposition.

The mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection, the congress had
seen it fit and passed RA 8177 to do this amending Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The Secretary of
Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement RA 8177 and had the Director of
Bureau of Corrections to prepare the lethal injection manual.

Convict filed a petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him as it
constituted cruel, degrading, and unusual punishment as well as contending that RA 8177 and
its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void, violative of due process, undue delegation
of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to
legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director. Along with this, the convict also filed a TRO until resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General stated that the Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the RA in
question. CHR files a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae
alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics
showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become
abolitionists in practice. The Solicitor General has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is
not cruel and unjust, and that lethal injection is the most modern, humane, economical, safer,
and easier to apply.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality
of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A.
No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern,
more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply. The petitioner filed a reply similar to
his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue
delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Echegaray v SOJ

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is a violation of our international treaty obligations?

RULING:

No, In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed
only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of
the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant
to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General
Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Poe v COMELEC

Poe vs. COMELEC

G.R. No.221697, March 8, 2016

FACTS:

During the May 2016 Presidential elections, Grace Poe declared in her certificate of candidacy
that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and that she was a resident of the country
from May 24, 2005 to May 9, 2016.

The presidential candidate was born in the year 1968. She was found as a newborn infant, and
was then legally adopted by actor Ronald Poe (FPJ) and actress Jesus Poe (Susan Roces).
She however migrated to the US in the year 1991 after marrying Theodore Llamanzares. She
became a naturalized American citizen in the year 2001. She then went home for good and
resided in the Philippines on May 24, 2005.

In the year 2010, she renounced her american citizenship in order to satisfy the requirements
for the reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship.

There were petitions filed before the Commission on Elections questioning her citizenship. The
petitions seeked to cancel her candidacy on the ground that she could not be considered as a
natural born citizen of the Philippines since she was a foundling and there was no way to
ascertain that her biological parents were Filipinos.

The COMELEC cancelled her candidacy. Poe then averred that she was a natural born Filipino
citizen since foundlings are considered such under the UN Convention Law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Grace Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen?

RULING:

The supreme court held that ​Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the
1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include
international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Poe v COMELEC

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at
the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization
laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the
applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth,".
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
CHR Employees v. CHR

CHR Employees vs. CHR

G.R. No.155336, November 25, 2004

FACTS:

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the
appropriations of the CHR.

Resolution No. A98-047 adopted an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission. The CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were:
one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and
one accounting Clerk II.

The CHR sought for the DBM’s approval. However the scheme was denied on the following
grounds: (1) It involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services. (2) In the
absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of
divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, such scheme should be
denied. (3) Pursuant to General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act of 1998, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or
directed by the President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public
Affairs Office cannot be given favorable recommendation. (4) Moreover, as provided under the
Compensation Standardization Law, the DBM is directed to establish and administer a unified
compensation and position classification system in the government. (5) Being a member of the
fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and
create positions without approval of the DBM.

The officers of CHREA on the other hand averrs that the DBM is the only agency with
appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and
upgrading, as well as creation of positions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CHR is a constitutional body clothed with fiscal autonomy?

RULING:

The Court held that the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not
included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
CHR Employees v. CHR

Even if the CHR enjoyed fiscal autonomy, the court shares the stance of the DBM that the grant
of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the
Salary Standardization Law.

While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such
authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position
Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as
the Compensation Standardization Law.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Carino v. CHR

Carino vs. CHR

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

FACTS:

Members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” on September 17, 1900 to
“dramatize and highlight” their plight because of the alleged failure of the public authorities to act
upon grievances.

When their motion was denied, they staged a walkout signifying to boycott the entire
proceedings. The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. The
respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to CHR to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

CHR continued hearing the case of the “striking teachers” and held that they “were denied due
process of law; they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the
Commission is empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not, CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate. Fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of
a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. Receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and
resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No.
90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Carino v. CHR

the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
EPZA v. CHR

EPZA vs. CHR

G.R. No.101476, April 14, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioners namely Valles, Aedia and Ordonez filed a complaint with CHR against EPZA. They
alleged that EPZA violated their human rights when the latter along with the PNP tried to level
the area occupied by the former.

The subject property was reserved for the purpose of development into the Cavite Export
Processing Zone. it was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, formerly Filoil Industrial Estate,
Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).

mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the happenings in the area
were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from them by members of the Philippine
National Police and some government officials and their civilian followers.

EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue
injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders. The Commission denied the motion.

The petitioners argued that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have
no clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction; that the CHR abused its discretion in
entertaining the private respondent's complaint because the issue raised therein had been
decided by this Court, hence, it is barred by prior judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the
acts complained of?

RULING:

The Court ruled that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not adjudicate.

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may
not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
EPZA v. CHR

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer
to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR
may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Simon v. CHR

Simon vs. CHR

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

FACTS:

A “Demolition Notices” was signed by Carlos Quimpo dated July 9, 1900 in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the office
of the City Mayor. This notice was received by the officers and members of the North Edsa
Vendors Association, Incorporated. In said notice the aforementioned members were 3 days to
vacate the premises of North Edsa. Roque Fermo, president of the association, et. al. were
informed by Quimpo that their stalls were to be removed to give to the “People’s Park”.

Fermo, filed a letter-complaint to the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) asking them to for a
letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to desist the demolition of the
stalls, stores, carinderias at North EDSA and ordering Simon, et. al. to appear before the CHR.

Simon carried out the demolition of the stalls, the CHR ordered the disbursement of financial
assistance of not more than 200,000.00 Pesos in favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light
housing materials and food under the CHR’s supervision. Simon was again directed to desist
from further demolition, violation of said order would lead to citation for contempt and arrest.

A motion to dismiss, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During the hearing, Simon, et. al. moved for
postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss had yet to be resolved, and likewise
manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. The CHR cited Simon, et. al. in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the
"order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. Simon, et. al. filed the
petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction, questioning
the extent of the authority and power of the CHR, and praying that the CHR be prohibited from
further hearing and investigating CHR Case 90 —1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et
al."

ISSUE:

Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a
fine for contempt.

RULING:

HELD. Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights''. On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally
authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Simon v. CHR

violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its
authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should
be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigatory powers
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Sec of National Defense v. Manalo

Secretary of National Defense vs. Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo

G.R. No.180906, October 7, 2008

FACTS:

The defendants are farmers from Bulacan who were abducted by members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Unit. They were suspected to be members or supporters of the
New People’s Army.

The defendants were kept in several locations namely in Fort Magsaysay, Camp Tecson, Camp
Luna, a house somewhere in Zambales, and a farm in Pangasinan. While they were detained,
they were subjected to different forms torture, sych as being blindfolded and chained, being
beaten, slapped in the forehead with a gun, being burned in some parts of their bodies, and
witnessing the killing of their fellow captives.

They were held captive for 18 months when they were able to escape in August 2007. They
filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) filed before
this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein
petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their
right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies,
Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and
all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) ​of the 1987 Constitution and
Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of ​Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as ​Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final ​Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of ​Amparo under Sec. 26 of the ​Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein
respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the
specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the ​Amparo
Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the ​Amparo Rule; (4) the
Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 18 of the ​Amparo Rule; and (5) all
other just and equitable reliefs.

The petitioner alleges The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and
giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted,
rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting the reliefs requested in the Amparo Petition?
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Sec of National Defense v. Manalo

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the CA ruled correctly in granting the writ of amparo.

It held that the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of ​Amparo​, this right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the
policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution.

As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of
the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or
their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Tapuz v. Del Rosario

Tapuz vs. Del Rosario

G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008

FACTS:

Private respondents, Sps. Sanson filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages with prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners, Tapuz et. al. and
other John Does totaling to 120 persons before Aklan MCTC.

Tapuz et. al., armed with bolos and suspected firearms together with unidentified persons,
entered a disputed land which is, according to the private respondents, allegedly registered
under them. Tapuz et. al., built thereon a nipa hut and a bamboo structure without the
respondents permission

Tapuz however denied the allegations and claimed that they are the actual and prior possessors
of the disputed land and that the private respondents were the intruders claiming that their title
of that land is spurious.

MCTC decided in private respondents’s favor. Such was appealed by petitioners to RTC.

On appeal, Judge Marin granted private respondents’ motion for issuance of writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond. Public Respondent Judge Del Rosario was the
one who authorized the immediate implementation of MCTC’s decision. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, while private respondents filed a motion for demolition

Del Rosario denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration to defer enforcement of preliminary
mandatory injunction.

Tapuz et. al., opposed the motion for demolition, but Del Rosario issued a special order, writ of
demolition, to be implemented within 15 days

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and the Order of
Demolition before the CA.

Meanwhile, Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate and for Demolition; hence, petitioners filed before
SC a petition for Certiorari with prayer for Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.

ISSUE:
Whether petition for Certiorari with Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data, is proper?
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Tapuz v. Del Rosario

RULING:

No. While Certiorari is dismissible on the grounds of (1) filed out of time; (2) forum-shopping;
and (3) substantive deficiencies, the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data cannot be granted on
the following grounds:

(1) On the Writ of Amparo – what is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither it is a writ that shall be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds.

What is involved is a property issue rooted from physical possession disputed by the parties. No
issues relating to life or liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence
of the past violence has been alleged. Right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the
extent of threats and harassment implied from the presence of “armed men bare to the waist”
and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons, however, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the right to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is
imminent or continuing.

(2) On the Writ of Habeas Data – there are no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security.

In this case, petitioners failed to allege, much less, demonstrate, any need for information under
the control of the police authorities other than those already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on insufficiency of efforts made to
secure information has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Data is nothing more than a “fishing expedition” that the SC, in drafting the Rule on
Habeas Data, had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Reyes v. CA

Robert Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.182161, December 3, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30,
2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were
brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip
L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not
there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion
and/or Inciting to Rebellion.

On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against
the petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause.

On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the
rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19, 2007,
petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure
List

The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated
petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power
to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.

On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and
denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.

ISSUE:

whether or not petitioner's right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no
authority to separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Reyes v. CA

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory
dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, the court saw no point in separately
and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie
showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is intended to
protectis immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing.

More so, Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show
any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a ​writ of amparo​. The
absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for the court on this occasion to
pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of
2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of
Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Garcia v. Drilon

Garcia vs Drilon

G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

FACTS:

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia, pursuant to R.A. 9262.
The Petitioner allegedly abused his wife; emotionally, psychologically, as well as economic violence
as a result of marital infidelity of Jesus. Rosalie also claimed that the petitioner threatened her of
deprivation of custody of her children as well as financial support.

TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO,
due to this Rosali filed another TPO. TPO was modified and the duration was extended as well.

A petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO was filed by Jesus to the CA, questioning
the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and
the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The petition was denied for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the
trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted collateral attack on said law, petitioner filed a motion of reconsideration but was denied
as well.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection clause?

RULING:

RA 9262 does not violate the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, the Court
ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to
each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate
the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the Senate extends its protection.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Melgar v. People

Celso Melgar vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No.223477, February 14, 2018

FACTS:

On the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, the said accused,
having the means and capacity to give financial support, with deliberate intent, did then and
there commit acts of economic abuse against one [AAA,] and her minor son, [BBB] (12 years
old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.

Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and AAA entered into a compromise
agreement on the civil aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval of the compromise
agreement on June 24, 2010, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally dismissed with
Melgar's conformity. One year later the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise
agreement and to revive the criminal action, on the ground that Melgar sold the property, which
was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son, BBB, from 2001
to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement.

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which
resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of
BBB as evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs
showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter
had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about one (1) year old, Melgar
stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted.
This notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was
constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar

The RTC found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.
The CA affirmed this decision and held that Melgar is legally obliged to support BBB. As such,
when he deliberately and with evident bad faith deprived BBB of support, he committed
economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA
9262?

RULING:

Yes. there was a violation of RA 9262. The Supreme Court held that RA 9262 is a landmark
legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
Melgar v. People

(VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, ​i.e., husband, former husband, or any
person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in, ​inter alia,​ economic abuse.

"Economic abuse" may include the deprivation of support of a common child of the
man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not. the
deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against
women and children. it was established that: ​(a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship,
resulting in BBB's birth; ​(b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; ​(c) Melgar had
failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (​d) his intent of not
supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property which was
supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
People v. Amarela

People of the Philippines vs. Juvy Amarela and Junard Racho

G.R. No.225642-43, January 17, 2018

FACTS:

On February 10, 2009, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, [AAA], a single housekeeper was
watching a beauty contest with her aunt at Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. The
contest was being held at a basketball court where a make-shift stage was put up. The only
lights available were those coming from the vehicles around.

She went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong Cooperative near the
basketball court. She was not able to reach the comfort room because Amarela was already
waiting for her along the way. Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She
was shocked and was no match to the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of
the day care center. He punched her in the abdomen Then Amarela undressed her. He boxed
her upper thigh and she felt numb. He placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside
her vagina and made a push and pull movement. She shouted for help and then three men
came to her rescue so Amarela fled.

She then proceeded on her way home. She went to the house of Godo Dumandan who brought
her first to the Racho residence because Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home.
Dumandan stayed behind So Neneng Racho asked her son to bring her to her aunt's house
instead.

[AAA] then said that Racho brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told
to lie down. When she refused, Racho boxed her abdomen. She resisted by kicking him but he
succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of [AAA].
Racho then inserted his penis into [AAA]'s vagina. After consummating the act, Racho left her.
So [AAA] went home alone.

Amarela testified for himself denying that he had anything to do with what happened with [AAA].
On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with [AAA] to bring her home but also denied raping
her.

RTC found AAA's testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho, to be clear,
positive, and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their denial as
these could not have overcome the categorical testimony of AAA. As a result, Amarela and
Racho were convicted of the crime of rape. The CA affirmed the RTC's judgment ​in toto.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
People v. Amarela

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime of rape?

RULING:

No. The accused are not guilty of the crime of rape. The Court acknowledged that a specific
location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish consensual from non-consensual sex. Rather,
other factors should be considered (such as, the frequency of lacerations and whether they are
located in different positions) to determine whether the sexual act was consensual or not. If the
frequency of lacerations is located in different areas of the vaginal orifice, then it would be a
good indicator that there was sexual abuse. On the other hand, if the lacerations are found in a
specific area, it could indicate forced rape, but could also suggest consensual intercourse.

In the instant case, the lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the
hymen. Considering the locality of these lacerations, the court cannot completely rule out the
probability that AAA voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA's
thighs-when she said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that AAA may have
had consensual intercourse.

What needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported by
proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty. Absolute guarantee
of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person of a criminal charge but there must, at
least, be moral certainty on each element essential to constitute the offense and on the
responsibility of the offender.Thus, the prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case
with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion.

The Court was constrained to reverse the RTC and the CA rulings due to the presence of
lingering doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
as quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case. Amarela and Racho are
entitled to an acquittal, as a matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
People v. Casio

People of the Philippines vs. Shirley Casio

G.R. No.211465, December 3, 2014

FACTS:

Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208. It was alleged
that around May 2008, at about 1:00 o’clock A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines the accused,
with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a minor, 17
years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as their
procurer for different customers, for money, profit or any other consideration.

A team of police were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to
entertain their guests. The accused noticed them and called their attention by saying “​Chicks
mo dong? ​ ” (Do you like girls, guys?). After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB.
Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex.

In defense, accused testified that she worked as a laundrywoman. On the same evening The
two men asked her if she knew someone named Bingbing. She replied that she only knew
Gingging but not Bingbing. The men informed her that they were actually looking for Gingging,
gave her a piece of paper with a number written on it, and told her to tell Gingging to bring
companions. When accused arrived home, she contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to
come because allegedly, she would be given money by the two males. In addition, AAA
admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her decision to display herself to solicit
customers

The RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt while the CA affirmed the findings of
the trial court but modified the fine and awarded moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that
AAA admitted that she works as a prostitute?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under
Republic Act No. 9208. As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in
persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent.

The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means
employed by perpetrators of human trafficking.​71 Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
People v. Casio

Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of trafficking in
persons, the accused performed all the elements in the commission of the offense when she
peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in
exchange for money. The offense was also qualified because the trafficked persons were
minors.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
People v. Aguirre

People of the Philippines vs. Aguirre

G.R. No.219952, November 20, 2017

FACTS:

Accused-appellants and accused Jeffrey Roxas y Aragoncillo (Roxas) were charged with
Qualified Trafficking in Persons for recruiting, transporting, harboring, providing or receiving, in
conspiracy with one another, ten girls, including seven minors, for purposes of prostitution and
sexual exploitation.

The private complainants AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD were convinced by accused-appellants to
go swimming and drinking, and to have sex, with foreigners in exchange for money and/or
shabu.

Arabit and Aguirre convinced AAA to go swimming and drinking with foreigners for which she
would get paid. As on a previous occasion, accused-appellants induced BBB to have sex with a
man in exchange for money and ​shabu. CCC, who had been invited by her classmate and
Ambit's cousin, EEE, to go drinking with their high school friends, went with EEE to Ambit's
house where accused-appellants told them that they would go drinking with some foreigners in
Quezon City in exchange for money. DDD initially declined Aguirre's proposition to introduce her
to a foreigner who would give them money and ​shabu for sex with her. She relented after
hearing that aside from money, they would also have one ​"bulto" of ​shabu for their personal use.
Thereafter, Paralejas fetched DDD from her house. Private complainants and six other girls
(EEE, FFF, GGG, HHH, III and JJJ) were later assembled at Arabit's house where
accused-appellants told them to primp themselves as they had to look good for the foreigners.

All ten girls, together with accused-appellants and Roxas, boarded the van and travelled to
Quezon City. On the way, Aguirre told the girls that they would be meeting some foreigners who
would take them abroad. At 7:00 p.m., they reached a two-storey apartment in Quezon City,
where they would rest after which they would proceed to a hotel to meet the foreigners. They
were looking for aluminum foil for the ​shabu when there was suddenly a commotion. Several
people, who came running down from the second floor of the apartment, identified themselves
as the police and told the girls to sit together. The police officers arrested accused-appellants
and Roxas.

Testifying for their own defense, accused-appellants and Roxas denied the charge. They
claimed that they were each simply invited to a swimming and drinking party.

The RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons. CA

rendered the assailed Decision affirming the RTC's Judgment.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
People v. Aguirre
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in its decision of convicting the accused-appellants?

RULING:

No. The Court held that Based on Section 3(a) of RA 9208,the elements of trafficking in persons
are:

(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of

persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders;"

(2) The means i1sed which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another;" and

(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes at a minimum

"exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."

The prosecution has satisfactorily established these elements.

Accused-appellants' actions clearly indicate their intention to exploit private complainants. They
establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants recruited and transported private
complainants for purposes of prostitution and sexual exploitation.

Contrary to the accused-appellant's argument, private complainants' testimonies as to what

accused-appellants told them cannot be considered hearsay. True, a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own
perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. In this case, however, the alleged
statements were addressed to and directed at private complainants themselves. Thus, private
complainants testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own perception.
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
People v. Bandojo

People of the Philippines vs. Bandojo

G.R. No.234161, October 17, 2018

FACTS:

Sometime prior to November 8, 2012, in the City of Manila the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each another, recruited and hired [AAA], a 17 year
old minor and [BBB] to engage in sexual intercourse with a police officer and other male clients
for monetary consideration, by means of taking advantage of her vulnerability and for the
purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation.

On March 2, 2012, AAA was about to graduate from high school when she met Christian Ileto ,
the brother of accused-appellant Kenny Joy. Sometime in August 2012, AAA and Christian,
together with their friends, went to Padi's Point. They were having drinks there when Christian
asked her, "​Be, gusto mo ng raket?"​ Thinking that "​raket"​ simply means chatting with men, she
agreed and gave her cellular phone number to him.

Kenny Joy recruited and hired AAA, a 17-year-old girl, to prostitute herself to paying customers,
taking advantage of the latter's minority, lack of discernment, and financial hardships.

The RTC convicted the accused-appellants for violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section
6(a), of R.A. No. 9208 while the CA affirmed the lower court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused-appellants for the crime of human trafficking?

RULING:

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements
constituting a violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 10(a), of R.A. No. 9208.

Pertinent to this case are Sections 4(a) and 6(a) of R.A. No. 9208, to wit:

Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person,

natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any

means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
Dungo, Paula Benilde D.
2019133218
People v. Bandojo
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of Prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage

The crime is further qualified under Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 9208 when the trafficked person is
a child.

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements of the
crime by testimonial and documentary evidence.

As to the first element and third elements, the testimony of AAA established that it was Kenny
Joy who recruited her to engage in prostitution by offering her rakets where she could earn
money by having sexual relations with clients the latter had found. ​AAA further averred that
Kenny Joy accompanied her to meet such clients, waited for her, and received money after her
relations with the clients concluded.

As to the second element, while AAA did not immediately accede to the proposition initially
made by Kenny Joy, she eventually yielded and asked for a raket because she needed the
money. It is, thus, apparent that the accused-appellants took advantage of AAA's and her
family's abject poverty in recruiting her to engage in prostitution.

Knowledge of private complainant's minority is immaterial and Proof of the conspiracy need not
be based on direct evidence; it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties