Feminismo Libre de Género en Japón, Historia Del Mainstream y El Backlash

“Gender Free” Feminism in Japan: A Story of Mainstreaming and Backlash
Author(s): Tomomi Yamaguchi

Source: Feminist Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2014), pp. 541-572
Published by: Feminist Studies, Inc.
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Tomomi Yamaguchi
“Gender Free” Feminism in Japan:

A Story of Mainstreaming
and Backlash
In Japan, the introduction of the Basic Law for a Gender Equal

Society in 1999 and subsequent efforts to introduce municipal gender-
equality ordinances marked the mainstreaming of feminism in the coun-
try. Consequently, feminism became the target of an intense wave of crit-
icism by conservative forces. The attacks began around 2000, appearing
first in conservative organizations’ newsletters and pamphlets, and then
in conservative mass media and on the Internet. The criticism of femi-
nism has influenced the direction of local policy-making, the content of
some municipal gender-equality ordinances and plans, sex education in
public schools, and projects undertaken at municipal gender-equality cen-
ters. Japanese feminists adopted the English term “backlash” to describe
this wave of criticism, echoing the title of Susan Faludi’s 1991 book Back-
lash: The Undeclared War against Women.1
The buzzword “gender free” (jendā furī) became the target of the
antifeminist attacks. Coined by three Japanese scholars, Fukaya Kazuko,
Tanaka Toji, and Tamura Takeshi, the term first appeared in an educa-
tional booklet published by the Tokyo Women’s Foundation, a pub-
licly funded organization heavily subsidized by the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government. The term, which was intended to refer to freedom from
1. Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War against Women (New York: Crown,
1991).
Feminist Studies 40, no. 3. © 2014 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 541
542 Tomomi Yamaguchi
compulsory gender roles, quickly spread via governmental projects and

later appeared in books, articles, and speeches by feminist scholars and
groups. Although the term first signaled positive support for the main-
streaming of feminism in Japan, it quickly became a symbol, too, of the
backlash against that trend. The fate of the term “gender free” exempli-
fies the way a political argument can quickly be twisted and manipu-
lated. Analyzing the fraught path of the term “gender free” also provides
a useful case study of the ways feminists and antifeminist conservatives
have interacted over the past fifteen years in Japan.
This article provides a brief history of post-1990s feminism in Japan,
followed by an examination of the term “gender free”: how it was chosen,
interpreted, and used by feminists and others, and, ultimately, how it
met its demise. The fate of the term “gender free” shows how the voices
and histories of grassroots feminism are easily erased, modified, and
appropriated. When “gender free” first appeared, the already existing
notion of gender equality (danjo byōdō), widely used by feminist activ-
ists to counter gender-based discrimination, retroactively began to be
defined as having the connotation of “equality” between men and women
despite differences — different yet equal. Thus, the history of feminist
claims were modified and rewritten with the introduction and spread of
“gender free” rhetoric. Conservative critics also benefited from the vague
conceptualization of “gender free,” and they intentionally emphasized
the confusion among sex, gender, and sexuality in constructing their
activism against feminist-inspired policies and practices. Moreover, my
analysis of the “gender free” term reveals how it has been integral in
downplaying the diversity of opinions about the direction of feminism
and coopted in presenting a united feminist front, both in the hands of
feminists and their critics.
My discussion is based upon long-term field research conducted
since 2004 on both feminists and antifeminist conservatives involved
in the debates on “gender free” since the early 2000s in Japan. My own
involvement in feminism in Japan — in academia, activism, and online
debate as a blogger — plays a crucial role in my research. I started this
project first in 2004 to help a feminist woman fight a court case related
to the broader antifeminist backlash occurring at that time. The woman
was fired in 2004 from her position as director of a municipal gender
equality center in Toyonaka City of Osaka Prefecture, which, she argues,
was the result of pressure from conservative forces. My participation in
Tomomi Yamaguchi 543
that case quickly evolved into a larger research project on the backlash
against feminism in contemporary Japan, especially focusing on the per-
spectives and strategies of antifeminist conservatives. I have conducted
field research in cities where struggles between feminists and antifem-
inists were particularly intense with regard to the making of Gender
Equality Ordinances. I interviewed local citizens, bureaucrats, politicians,
and activists in urban Tokyo and Osaka areas and in small cities in rural
regions. I also met with freelance journalists and reporters for news-
papers backed by conservative religious groups that played key roles in
the backlash against gender equality ordinances and other local policies
and practices related to gender equality.2 I conducted archival research
of print media, websites, blogs, message boards, and social media sites
and acted as a participant in such discussion as a feminist blogger writ-
ing in Japanese.3 This research provides the basis for my discussion here
of the political history of the term “gender free” in Japan, its integration
into mainstream policy making, and the fear and resistance such main-
streaming engendered in conservative circles.
From Mainstreaming to Backlash:

Post-1990s Feminism in Japan
Since the advent of the women’s liberation movement (ūman ribu) in
Japan in the 1970s, Japanese feminists have participated in United Nations
International Women’s Conferences, starting with the 1975 conference in
Mexico City.4 During that time, the United Nations priorities for women
2. In particular, I met multiple times with people from the two newspapers
backed by religious organizations, the Nihon Jiji Hyōron (Japan Current
Review) supported by Shinsei Bukkyō Kyōdan (New Born Buddhism), and
Sekai Nippō (The World Times), which is related to Tōitsu Kyōkai (the Unifi-
cation Church).
3. Based on these studies, as well as my own involvement in academic and online
discussions, in 2012, I published a coauthored book in Japanese, Tomomi
Yamaguchi, Saito Masami, and Ogiue Chiki, Shakai Undō no Tomadoi: Fem-
inizumu no “Ushinawareta Jidai” to Kusanone Hoshu Undō [Social Move-
ments at a Crossroads: Feminism’s “lost years” vs. grassroots conservatism]
(Tokyo: Keisō Shobo, 2012). After the publication of the book, I conducted
follow-up interviews with the conservative anti-feminists involved in the back-
lash in Tokyo and Yamaguchi prefectures in winter 2012 and summer 2013.
4. On the history of 1970s women’s liberation movement in Japan, see Setsu
Shigematsu, Scream from the Shadows: The Women’s Liberation Movement in
Japan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).
started to influence both feminist activism and the government’s involve-

ment in gender policies in Japan. While grassroots feminist groups contin-
ued to exist in the late 1970s and 1980s focusing on their own agendas,
some of them started, along with mainstream feminists, to concen-
trate their efforts on pressuring the Japanese government to sign and
ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW).5 The most prominent struggle related to the
ratification of CEDAW was the fight to introduce a law that would ensure
gender equality in employment, which ultimately resulted in the Equal
Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) of 1985. Despite the clear limitations
of the EEOL, the passage of the law was portrayed by the mass media as
symbolizing a “new” era for women, especially amid the affluence of the
1980s.6 Keeping pace with international trends, academic women’s stud-
ies courses (joseigaku) began appearing in the late 1970s in colleges and
universities. In addition, interest in feminism and the position of women
in Japan also took hold in local community centers where middle-class
housewives gathered.
While the much-heralded “women’s era” quickly faded with the
collapse of the bubble economy, the 1990s was a pivotal moment in the
history of the institutionalization of feminism in Japan. The Beijing Inter-
national Women’s Conference in 1995 and the NGO forum associated
with it gathered vast numbers of Japanese feminists.7 Activities initiated
5. See Vera Mackie, Feminism in Modern Japan: Citizenship, Embodiment and

Sexuality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 174–92.
6. The EEOL was ineffective, in part because the articles on recruitment and
hiring, assignment, and promotion only required employers to make volun-
tary endeavors and there were no punitive measures for violations of the law.
See Nakano Mami, “Ten Years Under the Equal Employment Opportunity
Law,” in Voices from the Japanese Women’s Movement, ed. AMPO (Armonk,
NY: M. S. Sharpe, 1996), 65. Furthermore, the EEOL divided women (and
not men) into two tracks: career track and non-career track. See Barbara
Molony, “Japan’s 1986 Equal Employment Opportunity Law and the Chang-
ing Discourse on Gender,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 20,
no. 2 (1995): 292–293. Another legislation, the Workers Dispatch Act, which
passed in June 1985, further divided working women into full-time, part-
time, or temporary workers. It was a crucial step toward deregulation that
would serve to disadvantage both men and women workers beginning in
the 1990s.
7. See Linda White, Feminism Within and Beyond Japan: Women’s Movements
in Tokyo in 1995 (PhD diss., University of Colorado, 1999); and Mackie,
by the United Nations prompted the Japanese government to take action,

and the Office of Gender Equality was established in the prime minis-
ter’s office as well as a Council for Gender Equality. Such formal mea-
sures significantly transformed the landscape of Japanese feminism
from the mid-1990s on.8 The Council for Gender Equality then sub-
mitted two reports in 1996, one titled “Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Bijon” (A
vision of gender equality) and the other “Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Shakai
2000-nen Puran” (A national plan for gender equality for the year 2000).
The reports laid out governmental policies up to the year 2000 and paved
the way for the Council for Gender Equality, as well as politicians and
bureaucrats, to work toward creating the Basic Law for a Gender Equal
Society, which was passed in 1998 and implemented in 1999.9
Japanese policies typically follow a top-down trajectory, spreading
from the national to local governments, and this was the case with gen-
der-equality legislation. In the wake of the 2000 policies, local govern-
mental officials started to create municipal ordinances and basic plans
directed at gender equality. Anticipating such changes across Japan, the
first ordinances for Tokyo and Saitama prefectures as well as for three
other municipalities were passed in 1999, followed by laws in many other
prefectures, cities, and towns. As of 2011, all prefectures but Chiba Pre-
fecture had gender-equality ordinances, and a quarter of cities, towns,
and villages had passed ordinances.10 As part of this trend, the focus of
the mainstream feminist movement turned to the passage of municipal
gender-equality ordinances in cities and prefectures all over Japan.
After the first round of the movement to adopt a revisionist his-
tory textbook in public schools, which denies Japan’s atrocities commit-
ted during World War II, failed in 2001, conservatives’ attention moved
to gender-related policies. Two prominent freelance conservative jour-
nalists told me that they had been too busy in the textbook movement
Feminism in Modern Japan, 202–31.

8. See Osawa Mari, “Approaches to Gender Equality in the Mid-1990s,” in
Social Science Japan Journal 3, no. 1 (2000): 4–8.
9. Osawa Mari, “‘Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Bijion’ no Tokuchō to Igi” (The char-
acteristics and meaning of the “vision for gender equality”), Josei to Rōdō 21,
no. 18 (1996): 17–32; and Osawa, “Approaches to Gender Equality,” 7–12.
10. “Kyōdo Sankaku” [Co-participation and planning], website of the Gender
Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, accessed March, 2011, www.gender.go.jp/
main_contents/category/kyodo/201103/201103_04.html.
to pay close attention when the Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society
passed unanimously in the Diet (the national legislature in Japan) in
1998; however, realizing the “danger” of progressive measures on gender,
conservatives quickly moved to overturn them. First, they became vocal
in their opposition to the revision of the civil code that allowed separate
surnames for married couples.11 While conservatives still broadly crit-
icized the Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society, many of them specif-
ically targeted feminists’ attempts to create local gender-equality ordi-
nances. They also opposed local educational practices such as the use
of gender-mixed roll calls and sex education at public schools, and they
were against academic women’s studies and any other feminist-inspired
policies and practices.
In venting the Term “Gender Free”

The Tokyo Women’s Foundation was established in 1992 by the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government. It was housed in the newly built Tokyo Wom-
en’s Plaza, a gorgeous building that
opened in November 1995 in cen-
tral Tokyo. In the same year that
the plaza opened, the Tokyo Wom-
en’s Foundation published a booklet
(Figure 1) titled Gender Free: Wakai
Sedai no Kyōshi no Tameni (Gender
free: For young-generation teachers)
that was distributed to newly hired
high school teachers in the prefec-
ture.12 The buzzword jendā-furī
(gender free), written in katakana
(the phonetic syllabary convention-
ally used to transcribe foreign lan-
guage words), was coined and dis-
seminated in this booklet. None figure 1.
11. Oguma Eiji and Ueno Yoko, Iyashi no Nashonarizumu [Comforting nation-
alism] (Tokyo: Keio Digaku Shuppankai, 2003), 133–4.
12. Tokyo Josei Zaidan [Tokyo Women’s Foundation], Gender Free: Wakai Sedai
no Kyōshi no Tameni [Gender free: For young-generation teachers] (Tokyo:
Tokyo Josei Zaidan, 1995).
of the trio of writers appointed for the project had either an academic
or activist background in feminism: Fukaya Kazuko was a psychologist,
Tanaka Toji was an education scholar, and Tamura Takeshi, a practic-
ing psychiatrist. The authors used the expression “gender free” to refer
to freedom from compulsory gender roles. They explained that they had
chosen the phrase because it sounded advanced and nonconfrontational,
and that they meant it to apply exclusively to people’s thoughts and atti-
tudes. That is, they hoped to instigate a movement aimed at liberating
attitudes of citizens, but they had not intended to make any particular
change or policy.13
This group of three scholars took it as a given that the battle to have
gender discrimination recognized as a serious issue requiring remedy
had been mostly resolved at an institutional level; therefore, the task
facing Japan was tackling the opinions of private citizens. In the report
published about the project, they explained that they saw the main
problem of restricted women’s roles as lying in “gender bias” which they
defined as “stereotypes related to gender” existing in people’s conscious-
ness.14 In order to advocate gradual and careful change in removing this
hidden gender bias, the scholars argued that “gender free” was a more
appropriate term than pre-existing Japanese expressions such as danjo
byōdō (gender equality), which, they claimed, was emblematic of tack-
ling more formal systemic and institutional gender discrimination. Thus,
the authors — and the members of the Tokyo Women’s Foundation who
hired them — understood “gender free” to be a project focused on chang-
ing popular understandings of gender rather than focused on policies
and institutional changes aimed at eliminating gender discrimination.
In an interesting twist, the writers of the booklet depicted the grass-
roots Japanese feminist movement, which had been fighting against com-
pulsory gender roles since the 1970s, as simply ineffective. Instead, the
booklet’s writers credit the introduction of women’s studies courses at
universities and Japanese men’s raised consciousness regarding gender
issues as the main factors bringing about meaningful change in the
country.15 Their view was that women’s movement in Japan had little
13. Tokyo Josei Zaidan [Tokyo Women’s Foundation], Jendā Furī Kyōiku no
Tameni [For gender-free education] (Tokyo: Tokyo Josei Zaidan, 1995), 7.
14. Ibid., 7, 35.
15. Ibid., 7.
social impact— a perspective far removed from that presented in femi-

nist scholarship on feminist activism.
The “gender-free” concept, originally coined as a term for educators
in 1995 and intended to help break down traditional understandings of
gender roles, gained wider application in the late 1990s with the main-
streaming of feminism in Japan. The Tokyo Women’s Foundation pro-
moted the term by sponsoring lecture series, awarding grants to citizens’
groups, publishing educational pamphlets, and creating videos. Feminist
scholars started to be involved in these projects, as lecturers at educa-
tional seminars and workshops and as writers and editors of educational
publications. Following the example of the Tokyo Women’s Foundation,
the National Women’s Education Center (NWEC), then administered
directly by the Ministry of Education and Science, started to promote
the concept of “gender free” actively from 1997.16 In these NWEC projects,
“gender free” came to be defined as one of the areas constituting lifelong
education for schoolteachers, as well as a subject of social education for
women. Hence, there were competing definitions of “gender free” from
the very beginning, even among feminists and other promoters of the term.
With the term “gender free” being promoted by the Tokyo Women’s Foun-
dation, located in the capital of Japan, and by the NWEC, the “national
center” of gender equality, the term quickly spread to other regions.
In the 1990s, leadership within the feminist movement began to shift
from grassroots activist groups toward the more established segments
of the movement, led by national and local governments as well as the
scholars and activists who worked closely with them. Groups with close
governmental ties became stronger thanks to increased funding, while
the grassroots groups that remained critical of governmental projects
struggled. The Tokyo Women’s Foundation project on “gender free”
functioned to legitimize this transformation of power by ignoring the
history of grassroots feminism in Japan and by situating bureaucrats
and scholars as the appropriate leaders of feminism to educate “ignorant”
citizens and “enlighten” them on issues of gender consciousness. Influ-
enced by the governmental projects and scholars’ use of the term, some
16. For a detailed history of NWEC, see Tomomi Yamaguchi, Ogiue Chiki, and
Saito Masami, Shakai Undō no Tomadoi: Feminizumu no “ushinawareta jidai”
to kusanone hoshu undō [Social movements at a crossroads: Feminism’s “lost
years” vs. grassroots conservatism] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2012), 247–81.
citizens’ groups and labor unions had begun to adopt “gender free” in
their activism by the early 2000s.17
Feminist academics came to be involved in these projects through-
out Japan, actively promoting “gender free” as a concept and bringing
new meaning to the term. While the mainstreaming of feminism may
appear to have a positive influence, it is also problematic that the academ-
ics’ governmental ties made it difficult to criticize governmental direc-
tions and to question the dubious origins and usage of the term “gender-
free”, or to engage in critical discussion on the scholarly validity of the
concept. Rather, many academics embraced the role of promoting the
government’s project of disseminating the term by giving lectures and
engaging in booklet writing. A particularly influential scholar was femi-
nist Osawa Mari, who, as a member of the government’s Gender Equal-
ity Council, played a major role in drafting various government reports
leading to the creation of the Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society. In
1996, the Gender Equality Council published a document titled “Danjo
Kyōdō Sankaku Bijon” (Vision for a gender-equal society), the first gov-
ernmental document, according to Osawa, that included the term jendā
(gender).18 Given the policy of avoiding words with Western origin in
governmental documents, Osawa states that the expression seibetsu ni
kakawarazu (regardless of one’s sex/gender) used in the document actu-
ally meant “gender free.” 19 Osawa says that she was inspired by the concept
of gender used by Christine Delphy, a French materialist feminist, who
visited Japan in 1989 and delivered a lecture at the NWEC.20 Japanese fem-
inist scholar Ueno Chizuko adopted Delphy’s concept of gender, which,
according to Ueno, claims that gender is a division itself that results in
hierarchy. This is why, Ueno explains, the asymmetry caused by gender
should be destroyed.21 Adopting Ueno’s interpretation, Osawa explained
17. See Tomomi Yamaguchi, “‘Jendā Furī ’ Ronsō to Feminizumu Undō no Ush-
inawareta 10-nen” [The debate on ‘gender free’ and the lost decade of femi-
nist activism], in Backlash! Naze Gender-free wa Tatakaretanoka [Backlash!:
Why was gender free attacked?), ed. Sofusha Henshubu (Tokyo: Sofusha,
2006): 245 – 6.
18. Osawa, “Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Bijion,” 8.
19. The Japanese word “sei” can refer to both to sex and to gender (and to sex-
uality as well).
20. Osawa, “Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Bijion,” 8–9.
21. Ueno Chizuko, “Sai no Seijigaku” [The politics of difference], eds, Inoue Shun
et al., Iwanami Koza Gendai Shakaigaku 11: Jendā no Shakaigaku. [Iwanami
that “gender” could refer to commonly held notions about masculinity

and femininity, about being men and women. Heavily influenced by Del-
phy’s ideas, Osawa claims she originally saw the term “gender free” in
the Tokyo Women’s Foundation’s booklet and interpreted it to mean
“eliminating gender” (jendā sonomono no kaishō).22
The notion of “gender free,” now sanctioned by the publications and
speeches of scholars involved in governmental committees and proj-
ects, started to spread beyond the realm of education, and local govern-
ments began to include the term in their ordinances and policies. How-
ever, the term was far from being used in the same way and instead was
vested with diverse meanings, even by the people on the same side of the
political spectrum. Feminist scholar Saito Masami argues that, despite
such dissemination, gender-equality ordinances in various municipali-
ties that included the phrase “gender free” were vague and unconnected
to the formulation of concrete policies.23 Nevertheless, the movement
to create gender-equality ordinances continued to spread throughout
Japan from the early 2000s, accompanied by the propagation of the term
“gender free.” As the use of “gender free” became more ubiquitous and
mainstream, the backlash against feminism intensified.
Language Politics: The Debate on the Origin

of the Term “Gender Free”
While the concept of “gender free” had diverse interpretations from the
beginning, in the early 2000s, confusion arose also on the origin of the
term. The three authors who coined the term “gender free” in the 1995
Tokyo Women’s Foundation Gender Free booklet insisted that it was a
term that was already accepted and in use in the United States, thus
establishing the weight of precedent and calling upon the appeal of
Lessons Contemporary Sociology 11: Sociology of Gender] (Tokyo: Iwanami

Shoten, 1995): 11–14. In her book on Christine Delphy, Stevi Jackson states
that gender for Delphy is a “social practice which makes gender a category of
thought.” See Stevi Jackson, Christine Delphy (London: Sage, 1996), 122. Thus,
Osawa’s version of “gender” is significantly more psychologized than Delphy’s.
22. Osawa, “Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Bijion,” 8.
23. See Saito Masami, “Sorezore no Baniyoru Josei Undō no Taikō Senryaku”
[Strategy of resistance in each local community] (paper presented at a Gender
Colloquium discussing “The Relationship among Women’s Studies, the
Government, and Feminist Activism,” University of Tokyo, December 16,
2004), www.webfemi.net/?page_id=37.
international respectability. According to one of the three authors, Tanaka

Toji, he first encountered the term “gender free” in a 1985 (republished in
1994) paper by feminist educational philosopher Barbara Houston, titled
“Should Public Education Be Gender Free?” 24 The authors argued that
since it was a foreign term already in use in the United States, “gender
free” would receive less resistance from the public and be more appeal-
ing to the younger generation.
Thus, by assigning it the status of a “more advanced” term with a
Western origin, “gender free” came to be considered a new, innovative
idea that could transform the Japanese feminist movement, which had
been characterized as old-fashioned, ineffective, and unable to address
the issue of gender consciousness. In the booklet, the “West” is situated as
a model for Japan to follow, and Japan is characterized as “backward.” Addi-
tionally, “Westerners” are described as people who have logical think-
ing and behavior — thus they are more advanced in terms of gender
equality — while “the Japanese” base their actions on their emotions.25
As a result, the term “gender free,” a notion invoking the authority of
the West and focusing on citizens’ attitudes and thoughts rather than
institutional changes, was considered to be much safer and thus more
acceptable than the already-used Japanese expression danjo byōdō.
With more feminist scholars involved in the “gender free” projects
of the 1990s, books with “gender free” as part of their titles began to appear.
A particularly influential work, published in 2000, was Gakkō wo Jendā
Furī ni (Making schools gender free), in which authors Kameda Atsuko
and Tachi Kaoru invoke Houston, writing that the “gender- free” term
“does not mean to ignore gender, but to be gender-sensitive, to remove
gender-bias, and to realize equality between the sexes/genders.” 26 This
influential book, along with other books, articles, and conference pre-
sentations by academics and activists, further spread the Houston-ori-
gin theory of the term “gender free.”
24. Tokyo Josei Zaidan [Tokyo Women’s Foundation], Jendā Furī Kyōiku no
Tameni, 24; Barbara Houston, “Should Public Education Be Gender-free?”
in The Education Feminism Reader, ed. Linda Stone (New York: Routledge,
1994), 122–34. [Originally published as “Gender Freedom and the Subtle-
ties of Sexist Education,” Educational Theory 35, no. 4 (1985): 359–369.]
25. Tokyo Josei Zaidan [Tokyo Women’s Foundation], Gender Free, 35.
26. Kameda Atsuko and Tachi Kaoru, Gakko wo Jendā Furī ni [Making schools
gender free] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2000), 4.
The backlash against “gender free” started around 2000, and critics
of feminism brought up the issue of whether “gender free” was a legiti-
mate term in the English-speaking world. In response to this critique
that “gender free” was English-made-in-Japan, feminists started to trace
the term’s etymology to the Tokyo Women’s Foundation booklet and to
Houston’s paper. For example, Nijuisseiki Danjo Byōdō wo Susumeru
Kai (Group to advance equality between men and women in the twen-
ty-first century), of which the aforementioned feminist scholar Osawa
Mari is a member, wrote that “in English literature, there has been an
expression, ‘gender free education’ that has been in use since the 1980s,
meaning ‘education free of gender bias’ (‘gender free education’ is not
Japanese-English).” 27 Other scholars, as well as activists writing in news-
letters and speaking at meetings, spread the idea that Houston was the
originator of “gender free.” 28
In 2004, at the height of this debate, I became curious as to whether
the Houston-origin theory of “gender free” was actually correct. I read
Houston’s article and found that Houston had not used the term to mean
what the Japanese scholars thought it meant: “freedom from gender bias.”
Rather, Houston discussed how some interpreted “gender free” to mean
“freedom from gender bias,” but that thinking of it in that sense was a
nonissue because feminists should take it as a given that people should
be free from gender bias. Instead, Houston’s point in the article was to
criticize the practice of using “gender free” to ignore gender altogether
in education. Houston instead argued for “gender-sensitive” education.
In addition, Houston did not refer to psychology and thought processes
in discussing her approach, whereas Japanese scholars center psychol-
ogy and thought processes in their interpretations of Houston’s work.29
The scholars of the Tokyo Women’s Foundation define “gender bias” as
27. Nijuisseiki Danjo Byōdō wo Susumeru Kai, Daremoga Sonohito Rashiku,

Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku [Anybody can be themselves, gender equality] (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 2003), 22–23.
28. See especially, Ito Kimio, “Bakkurasshu no Kouzu” [The backlash outline]:
8–19; and Atsuko Kameda, “Kyoiku Sochi no Tsukurikae” [Remaking of edu-
cational apparatus]: 20–27; both in Joseigaku [Women’s studies] 11 (2003).
29. Houston, “Should Public Education Be Gender-free?” See also Jane Martin
and Barbara Houston, “Jendā wo Kangaeru” [Thinking Gender], trans. Tomomi
Yamaguchi, in Backlash!, 200–40; and Barbara Houston, “Jendā Furī Gainen
ni Kansuru Komento” [Comments on the Notion of “Gender-free”], trans.
Tomomi Yamaguchi, in Backlash!, 241–2.
“stereotypes and prejudices related to gender differences,” but educa-

tional philosopher Jane Martin, from whom Houston adopted the idea
of “gender-sensitive” education, explained “gender bias” as being part of
the system that was structured in ways that favor one group or another.30
Surprised, I decided to contact Houston, to make sure that my own
reading was right. Her reply to me indicated that my interpretation of
her work was correct. At her suggestion, I also contacted Martin from
whom Houston took the concept of “gender-sensitive” education. I vis-
ited Martin in 2004 and again in 2006 when I interviewed both Hous-
ton and Martin at Martin’s residence in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Both women were extremely surprised at how their ideas were being
represented in Japan — especially Houston, who had had no idea that
her name was becoming famous in a fierce debate. Her works had never
been translated into Japanese, and she had no connection with Japan or
Japanese feminism.
The spread of the Houston-origin theory was problematic not for
attributing “gender free” to Houston, but rather for the inaccurate inter-
pretation of the term. The misinterpretation had arisen out of a too-typi-
cal instance of propagating second-hand information, revealing a failure
on the part of multiple scholars to check the original source.31 This led to
a critical misreading of the term at the height of the backlash and the fight
against the backlash. Responding to this situation, I wrote a short article
in 2004 titled “‘Gender-Free’ wo Meguru Konran no Kongen” (The roots
of the confusion over ‘gender free’) for a small Japanese feminist maga-
zine, We.32 In the article, I pointed out that the alleged origin of “gender
free” (Houston) that was being widely cited by Japanese scholars and
activists at the time was inaccurate and that Houston in fact had a differ-
ent idea about what the term meant from the one that was widely under-
stood in Japan. The article created an unexpected controversy and was
cited in print media and on websites, blogs, and in the Wikipedia entry
30. Tokyo Josei Zaidan [Tokyo Women’s Foundation], Gender Free, 10; Martin
and Houston, “Thinking Gender.”
31. See Saito Minako, “Backlash! Naze Jendā Furī wa Tatakaretanoka?” [Back-
lash! Why was Gender-free Attacked?], book review, Ronza (September
2006): 317.
32. Tomomi Yamaguchi, “‘Jendā Furī’ wo Meguru Konran no Kongen” [The roots
of the the confusion over “gender free”], Kurashi to Kyoiku wo Tsukuru We
(November 2004).
on “gender free.” The Gender Colloquium event that I then organized

with feminist scholar Saito Masami in December 2004 at the Univer-
sity of Tokyo on the theme of critically examining the notion of “gender
free,” with feminist scholar Ueno Chizuko, further extended the con-
troversy. Originally planned as a small-scale meeting, it unexpectedly
became standing-room only, attended by more than a hundred people.
Most of the audience, including some well-known feminist scholars and
activists, were eager to criticize the panelists’ stance toward a critical
examination of the concept of “gender free,” as they valued the posi-
tive impact of the concept of “gender free” and thus wanted to defend
the concept. The discussion around my article for the feminist maga-
zine, as well as the Gender Colloquium event, were early signs of exten-
sive interest and diverse thoughts on the concept of “gender free” among
feminists in Japan.
Around this time, Sekai Nippō, a newspaper connected to Reverend
Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church and a major actor in the conser-
vative backlash against feminism, cited my article challenging the ori-
gins of the concept of “gender free.” In his article, reporter Yamamoto
Akira characterized me as a conservative-friendly feminist journalist,
who, alongside Houston, was arguing for sensitivity to the innate sex
differences between women and men. Sekai Nippō’s labeling of Houston
and me “conservative-friendly feminists,” which spread quickly on the
Internet, was particularly troublesome to me as a feminist scholar. My
name, along with my article, was cited on conservative blogs, social net-
working groups such as mixi (an online social networking service), mes-
sage boards, and even in the instructional booklet for followers of the
Unification Church.33 The concept of “gender free,” imbued with diverse
interpretations and surrounded by confusion, continued to be debated
through the mid-2000s.
How “Gender Free” Rhetoric Altered the History

of Feminist Activism
Besides the debate on the origin of the term, the relative validity of the
terms “gender free” and danjo byōdō (equality between women and men)
33. Annual Report, W-CARP Japan (youth division of the Unification Church),
Seishōnen Mondai Dōkō Hōkokusho [Report: Trend in youth issues], 2005.
http://big.freett.com/carpjapan/YI2005.pdf.
was also at issue. Danjo byōdō was considered “old-fashioned” by the

Tokyo Women’s Foundation and the many other feminists who pro-
moted “gender free.” Mainstream feminists tended to support the notion
“gender free” over danjo byōdō, a concept they imbued with the conno-
tation of “separate but equal.” With the introduction of the new para-
digm of “gender free,” the existing activism for gender equality in educa-
tion such as the push to have gender-mixed roll calls (instead of calling
boys’ names first and girls’ names second), was retroactively redefined
by the promoters of “gender free” as examples of “gender free” educational
practices, even though such advocacy had taken place decades before the
concept of “gender free” existed.
By this time, many teachers and teachers’ unions had started to use
the term “gender free” frequently, and some found the term gave rise to
less resistance compared to the already existing danjo byōdō. Hasegawa
Yoshiko, a high school teacher and former member of the Women’s
Action Group (which had been involved in the activism to introduce
gender mixed roll calls since the 1980s), criticized this move away from
danjo byōdō as a denial of the previous achievements of activist femi-
nists and teachers. Even more critically, the new use of “gender free” as a
safer, more acceptable term, contradicted the vision and mission of ear-
lier activism: Hasegawa wrote that the activism for gender-equal educa-
tion was, in fact, a critique of the “separate but equal” claims, and the
rejection of forced gender roles had always been at the core of the danjo
byōdō movement.34
Adding another layer of complication, some queer scholars and
activists supported “gender free” because they saw in the term’s literal
meaning a new possibility of working toward eliminating the binary
categories of “women” and “men,” categories that were reified in danjo
byōdō. However, when many feminists defended “gender free” in the face
of the conservative critiques, part of their defense consisted in denying
the gender-transcending queer understanding of “gender free.” 35
The conversations and debates on “gender free” among feminists
became abstract and theoretical rather than concrete. While these
34. Hasegawa Yoshiko, “Takaga Meibo, Saredo Meibo” [It is just a roll call, but
it is a roll call], in Backlash!, 340– 56.
35. See Shimizu Akiko, “Scandalous Equivocation: A Note on the Politics of
Queer Self-Naming,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 8, no. 4 (2007): 503–16.
discussions existed, scholarly feminists published books on the “gender

free” controversy during this period and continued to support the notion
of “gender free,” defending it from conservative attacks. The titles of
these books — Jendā Furīī Toraburu (Gender-free trouble), Danjo Kyōdō
Sankaku/Jendā Furīī Bashing (Gender equality/gender-free bashing), and
Jendā no Kiki wo Koeru! Tetteri Tōron Bakkurasshu (Overcoming the crisis
of gender! A thorough discussion on the backlash) — indicate that scholars
considered a primary focus of conservative critiques to be the notions
of “gender free” and “gender.” 36 As a result, discussion among feminists
dealt mostly with explaining and defending the ideas of “gender” and
“gender free” in an abstract manner.
Who Are the Antifeminist Backlashers?

Conservative intellectuals, journalists, and politicians were the most
visible antagonists in the backlash against feminism. The national con-
servative newspaper Sankei Shimbun, whose subsidiary company is the
publisher of a revisionist history textbook denying Japan’s responsibility
during World War II for such systems as the Japanese Imperial Army’s
institutionalized sexual slavery of women and girls (also known as the
“comfort women system”), has been a central mouthpiece for the move-
ment. Monthly conservative magazines such as Seiron (also published
by Sankei Shimbun Company,) included significant numbers of articles
criticizing feminism during this period. Moreover, antifeminist books
by conservative intellectuals were being published with such titles as
Shin Kokumin no Yudan: Jenda Furīī to Kageki na Seikyoiku ga Nihon wo
Horobosu (New negligence of citizens: Gender-free and extreme sex edu-
cation will lead Japan to extinction) and Koko ga Okashii Danjo Kyōdō
Sankaku (Here is what is wrong with gender equality), indicating the
36. Kimura Ryoko, ed., Jendā Furī Toraburu [Gender-free trouble] (Tokyo: Haku-
takusha, 2005); Nihon Josei Gakkai Jendā Kenkyukai, Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku/
Jendā Furī Bashing [Gender equality/gender-free bashing] (Tokyo: Akashi
Shoten, 2006); Wakakuwa Midori, Kato Shuichi, Minagawa Masumi, and
Akaishi Chieko, eds., Jendā no Kiki wo Koeru! Tetteri Tōron Bakkurasshu
[Overcoming the crisis of gender! A thorough discussion on the backlash]
(Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2006).
focus on the concepts of “gender” and “gender free” among antifeminists

precisely mirrored the feminist writings of the time.37
The Internet provided another important forum for antifemi-
nist sentiments and organizing. The conservatives made use of various
forums on the Internet, including 2channel, the largest message board
in Japan; antifeminist websites; anti-“gender free” online communi-
ties that arose within social networking services; personal websites and
blogs written by well-known conservative critics, politicians, and anon-
ymous authors; and entries on “gender” and “gender free” in Wikipedia.
As a result, the antifeminist discourse appeared as if it was flourishing
in many different sectors, which impacted the direction of real-life pol-
itics and activism.
While conservative commentary from renowned politicians and
intellectuals in the national media and also in online discussions caught
people’s attention, the majority of the leading voices in the backlash were
relatively obscure local politicians, activists, and religious leaders of the
grassroots conservative movement. The spread of grassroots conserva-
tism can be linked to the formation of the Society for History Textbook
Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukuru Kai) in 1996. This group
publishes history textbooks for public schools that promote a revision-
ist, nationalist history emphasizing the positive aspects of Japan’s impe-
rial colonialism in the pre-World War II period while downplaying its
war crimes.38 In 1997, Japan’s largest conservative alliance organization
Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi) was established, representing a com-
bination of traditionally conservative organizations, such as the Asso-
ciation of War-Bereaved Families, and the religious right, including the
extremely powerful Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Honchō) and
other conservative religious groups.39 Using the networks of the Society
37. Nishio Kanji and Yagi Hidetsugu, Shin Kokumin no Yudan: Jendā Furī to
Kageki na Seikyoiku ga Nihon wo Horobosu [New negligence of citizens: Gen-
der-free and extreme sex education will lead Japan to extinction] (Tokyo:
PHP, 2005); Yamamoto Akira, Koko ga Okashii Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku [Here is
what is wrong with gender equality] (Tokyo: Sekai Nippo-sha, 2005), 45–118.
38. Oguma and Ueno, Iyashi no Nashonarizumu.
39. See Uesugi Satoshi, “Nihon ni Okeru ‘Shūkyō Uyoku’ no Taitō to ‘Tsukuru
Kai,’ ‘Nippon Kaigi’” [The rising religious right in Japan and the society for
history textbook reform and Japan Conference], Sensō Sekinin Kenkyu 39
(2003), available at www.asyura2.com/0311/nihon10/msg/1179.html.
for History Textbook Reform and Japan Conference, two conservative

newspapers backed by religious organizations, Nihon Jiji Hyōron (here-
after referred to as Jiji Hyōron), supported by the New Born Buddhism
(Shinsei Bukkyō), and Sekai Nippō, supported by the Unification Church,
played significant roles in the backlash against feminism.40
Starting in 2005, I began interviewing antifeminist conservatives.
Over this time, I have met with people from the Jiji Hyōron and Sekai
Nippō repeatedly. According to reporters at both newspapers, it was the
movement to create municipal gender-equality ordinances that made
the conservatives wary of the “invasion” of feminism into local politics
and into their everyday lives. They claimed that the ordinance movement
was the major motivating factor for them to become actively involved in
the movement against feminism.
According to Yamaguchi Toshiaki, editor-in-chief of Jiji Hyōron, the
gender-equality ordinance of Yamaguchi Prefecture triggered his inter-
est in the issue of gender equality. Jiji Hyōron has extensively covered
“gender free” issues since 1998 and, in fact, has the first critique against
“gender free” that I could find in any publication.41 In 2000, the paper
initiated an extensive campaign against gender-equality ordinances, as
well as against the concept of “gender free” as they perceived it. The plan
to create an ordinance for the city of Ube in the Yamaguchi Prefecture
in 2002 became a critical fight for Jiji Hyōron. The paper considered it
a government invasion into the local spheres of citizen’s private lives
with extremist feminist ideology. Yamaguchi, as editor-in-chief, worked
closely with local conservative politicians, activists, and other followers
of various conservative religious groups to oppose the Ube ordinance.
The newspaper went on to oppose other gender-equality ordinances in
other municipalities.
40. Jiji Hyōron is headquartered in Yamaguchi City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, has

an official circulation of 30,000 copies, and is published by a relatively small
religious organization, Shinsei Bukkyō (New Born Buddhism), which has
about 10,000 followers. Sekai Nippō is headquartered in Tokyo and has a
close connection to the Unification Church. Originally established in South
Korea by Reverend Sun Myung Moon in 1954, its branch in Japan has a long
history of involvement in conservative and anticommunist activism in post-
war Japan.
41. “Tenroku Jihyō, Kongō Meibo wa Asajie!! Seisa wo Nakuseba Yoi Shakai??”
[Heavenly review: Gender-mixed roll call is a shallow idea!! Is gender-less
society a good society?], Nihon Jiji Hyōron, January 1, 1998.
When I first met him in 2009, reporter Yamamoto Akira of Sekai

Nippō told me that he also felt extremely threatened by the 2003 gen-
der-equality ordinance in the city of Miyakonojo in the Miyazaki Pre-
fecture. He told me that he had been particularly perturbed by language
in the legislation such as “regardless of one’s gender and sexual orienta-
tion.” Although Sekai Nippō was initially not as fervent as Jiji Hyōron in
its opposition of the “gender-free” movement, by the mid-2000s, Sekai
Nippō was one of the most prominent antifeminist platforms, using both
its newspaper and online outlets, as well as behind-the-scenes activ-
ism, to promote their antifeminist perspectives. Yamamoto and another
reporter, Kamono Mamoru, played significant roles in local activism
against gender equality ordinances in Miyakonojo and other cities.42
The groundwork done by these grassroots conservative media out-
lets was significant in the conservative activism against “gender free.”
The arguments against “gender free” developed by them spread to the
more mainstream Japan Conference and its members, to the conserva-
tive mass media, and eventually to numerous individuals on the Internet.
The Conservative Interpretations of “Gender-Free”

Jiji Hyōron and Sekai Nippō initiated an antifeminist discourse that
characterized the concept of “gender free” as a series of malicious fem-
inist schemes. The three major threats they railed against were (1) the
destruction of masculinity and femininity, resulting in the erasure of
the biological sexes, (2) the practice of kageki na seikyōiku (extreme sex
education), and (3) the promotion of homosexuality and “free sex.”
Conservatives described “gender free” as a feminist scheme to destroy
traditional gender roles, which, in their view, would eviscerate the cul-
ture and tradition of Japan. To the extent that feminists aimed for the
total erasure of cultural and biological differences between the sexes, the
critics claimed, they intended people to turn asexual, “like snails.” 43 The
worst part of “gender-free,” for conservatives, was an attempt to impose
42. See Yamaguchi, Saito, and Ogiue, Shakai Undo no Tomadoi, chap. 5.
43. According to Ogiue Chiki, legal scholar Yagi Hidetsugu is among the first
conservative voices who claimed that “gender free” is an idea that attempts
to make humans into unisex creatures with indistinguishable biological
sexes. Yagi Hidetsugu, Han “Jinken” Sengen [Anti-“human rights” declara-
tion] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2001), cited in Ogiue Chiki, “Jendā Furī
Bakkurasshu Sōdō Matome” [The summary of the controversy over gender
such values on housewives, (heterosexual) marriage, and traditional fam-

ilies. In 1998, Jiji Hyōron’s coverage of gender equality ordinances and
educational practices was one of the earliest to present this interpretation of
“gender free,” and the newspaper continued its extensive criticism into
the early 2000s. A representative “special issue” published by the paper
describes gender equality as getting rid of all the distinctions between
men and women, claiming that gender equality will lead to the elimina-
tion of Japan’s annual Girls’ Festival (Hina Matsuri, sometimes called the
Doll Festival, when people give offerings for the health and happiness of
their daughters), the introduction of unisex public baths, the rejection
of masculinity and femininity completely, the use of gender-mixed roll
calls in public schools, and the banning of gendered contents from sto-
ries, songs, and school textbooks.44 With simple, easy-to-grasp messages,
illustrations, and large fonts, the leaflet (Figure 2) also uses overstated
and provocative language such as “struggle,” “revolution,” “elimination of
all the distinctions completely,” and “extreme policies.”
In 2001, conservative politicians began using Jiji Hyōron’s rheto-
ric in their discussion of the Ube ordinance in Ube City council meet-
ings. As a result of their extensive activism, in June 2002, the conserva-
tives successfully passed their own gender-equality ordinance in Ube
that includes wording that has become infamous for feminists:
We must not unilaterally dismiss the idea that there is innate mas-
culinity and innate femininity, but rather recognize the distinctive
qualities of each sex…. We must not dismiss the role of the full-time
housewife, but rather help and support housewives who are the ones
supporting the family with mutual cooperation between men and
women.45
free and backlash], available at http://www12.atwiki.jp/seijotcp/pages/30.

html.
44. Nihon Jiji Hyōronsha, “Gōgai Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Tokushu Q: Danjo
Kyōdō Sankaku Shakai-tte Naani? A: Otoko to Onna no Issai no Kubetsu
wo Yamemasu” [Emergency issue on gender equality Q: What is gen-
der-equal society? A: It will discard all the differences between the sexes],
special issue, Nihon Jiji Hyōron, June 1, 2002.
45. Ube-shi Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Suishin Jōrei [Ube City gender equality pro-
motion ordinance], available at Ube City’s website, http://www.city.ube.
yamaguchi.jp/kurashi/shiminjinken/danjokyoudou/jourei/index.html.
figure 2.
In my interviews with Yamaguchi, editor-in-chief of Jiji Hyōron, as well

as with conservative Ube City assemblyman Hiroshige Ichiro, it was
clear that both men considered this language to be key in successfully
challenging the “extremist gender free” ordinances and policies. Conser-
vatives’ success in Ube was covered in the conservative media, and news
of it spread to other prefectures and cities. Local assemblies had exten-
sive discussions on the issue of “gender free,” in which conservative pol-
iticians in prefectures, cities, and towns tried to duplicate the success of
the model established in Ube. Jiji Hyōron continued its extensive cover-
age of these efforts and combined its reporting with heavy involvement
in anti-“gender free” activism until 2003, when it failed in its attempt to
create another conservative-friendly gender-equality ordinance in Chiba
Prefecture, primarily as a result of a split among the conservatives.46
Jiji Hyōron’s emphasis on traditional gender roles, and especially
on the importance of full-time housewives, was shared by conserva-
tive women writers and activists such as Okamoto Akiko and Edwards
46. Yamaguchi, Saito, and Ogiue, Shakai Undō no Tomadoi, 118–43.
Hiromi, who were also heavily engaged in Ube and in other ordinance
movements. Both Okamoto and Edwards are professional women; Oka-
moto is a journalist and Edwards is faculty teaching Japanese at the Uni-
versity of Maryland University College Asia, Iwakuni campus. Despite
their own status as professional women, Okamoto and Edwards empha-
sized their views that housewives should be protected.47 For conserva-
tives, a clear distinction between the sexes and traditional gender roles
are the foundation of Japanese culture and tradition, and they charac-
terized “gender free” as the attempt to erase the fundamental differences
between women and men.
Another conservative criticism of “gender-free” was that it promoted
“extreme” sex education. In 2002, female conservative Diet representative
Yamatani Eriko criticized the content of a booklet titled Shishunki no
Tameno Love & Body Book (Love and body book for adolescents), pub-
lished by a foundation with close connections to the Ministry of Health
and Labor, that she considered to consist of “extreme” sex education.48
As a result, the booklet, which had been distributed widely to junior high
school students, ended up being banned. With Yamatani drawing con-
nections between “gender free” rhetoric and “extreme” sex education in
national Diet sessions, criticism directed against “extreme” sex educa-
tion as a sign of “gender free” ideology spread rapidly. The link between
these two seemingly unrelated terms was further cemented by staff at
Jiji Hyōron and Sekai Nippō, as well as by another newspaper, Sankei, and
its magazine, Seiron, which produced extensive reporting consistently
suggesting that “extreme” sex education epitomized the serious prob-
lems of “gender free” ideology. Lines of questioning at local assemblies
and in the Diet cited each other, creating a circular stream of dialogue
opposing “gender free” and “extreme” sex education.
47. Okamoto Akiko wrote a piece for a conservative Seiron magazine that
begins: “Has there been any time in Japan when housewives, especially full-
time housewives, are so looked down upon?” Okamoto Akiko, “Soshite
Daremoga Fuko ni natta Danjo Kyodo Sankaku no 10-nen” [The ten years
of gender equality and everyone became unhappy], Seiron (June, 2013): 242.
When I interviewed her at her house in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Edwards
Hiromi repeatedly told me how great and important it was for women to
get married. When I asked for her autograph for her book, she wrote the
message: “Dear Tomomi, please get married soon!”
48. Yamaguchi Toshiaki told me in my interview with him in 2013 that he had
worked closely with Yamatani in planning her questions in Diet sessions.
The invention of the threat of “extreme” sex education and per-

sistent efforts to link it semantically with “gender free” rhetoric had seri-
ous real-world effects across Japan. In Tokyo Prefecture in 2003, for
instance, a conservative assemblyman accused educators at the Nanao
Special Education School of promoting “extreme” sex education, result-
ing in the punishment of the school’s principal and teachers. The princi-
pal brought the case to court in 2008, and the court ruled that the pol-
itician’s intervention in the content of education, as well as the Tokyo
Board of Education’s decision to punish the principal and teachers, was
an abuse of their discretion.
The menace of “extreme” sex education was often raised to push
municipal assemblies to consider petitions against “gender free” edu-
cation, which was considered by conservatives to mean a rejection of
all difference between sexes that could lead to the introduction of such
things as unisex locker rooms, the repudiation of traditional customs,
the introduction of gender-mixed roll calls, unisex physical examina-
tions, and the promotion of women’s reproductive rights. For example,
in 2003, the Kagoshima Prefectural Assembly passed a resolution against
“gender free” education, which catalyzed an “extreme” sex education
panic in the local assemblies. At the height of the backlash, in 2005, the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party organized a project team tasked with
conducting an investigation on “extreme” sex education and “gender
free” education, with then-Deputy Prime Minister Abe Shinzo leading
the project and Yamatani as the project team’s secretary.49 While Sekai
Nippō was already committed to supporting abstinence-only sex educa-
tion, the paper started to engage in extensive critiques of “gender free,”
saying that it promoted “extreme” sex education and caused promiscu-
ity and homosexuality among school children, because of its total denial
of differences between the sexes.50 Thus, rather than the concerns about
gender roles and traditional family values that Jiji Hyōron had, the core
issue for Sekai Nippō was sexuality.
Although the newspaper is not a publication of the Unification
Church, Sekai Nippō is backed by it, and its reporters are the followers of
the religion. Headquartered in South Korea, with a major branch in the
49. Ogiue Chiki, “Seiken Yotō no Bakkurasshu” [Backlash by a majority party

leading the government], in Backlash!, 357–70.
50. Yamamoto, Koko ga Okashii Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku, 45–118.
United States, the Unification Church has a similar attitude on issues

of sexuality as fundamentalist Christian churches in North America. It
opposes abortion and promotes abstinence-only sex education. In line
with the church, Sekai Nippō also takes a strong stance against homosex-
uality and gay marriage. I often heard Sekai Nippō reporters make com-
ments such as “homosexuality is a curable illness,” revealing their belief
that it can and should be corrected.
Yamamoto, the reporter I interviewed from Sekai Nippō who felt
extremely threatened by the 2003 gender-equality ordinance in Miyako-
nojo, was especially concerned with the words “regardless of sexual ori-
entation” in the clause and the implication that they could mean respect-
ing the human rights of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. Yamamoto
writes that including clauses on the rights of sexual minorities by using
the term “sexual orientation” was a sign of “extremist gender-free” ideol-
ogy and part of an agenda to promote “homosexuality” among citizens
with an aim of creating a “free sex commune.” 51 From articles by Yama-
moto and from the activism of local Unification Church followers, the
idea that “gender free” as an ideology promotes “free sex” and “homosex-
uality” spread among conservative assembly members. A female repre-
sentative, for example, told my coresearchers and me about citizens’ fear
for a city park becoming a “gay land,” which could make the city into a
dangerous place: a claim without any basis, but such fears were spread by
those opposed to gender-equality ordinances. With the already existing
confusion between sex and gender in “gender free,” sexuality was added
to the mix, and conservative critics of feminism intentionally exacer-
bated the confusion among sex, gender, and sexuality.
“Extremist Feminists” versus “Scary Backlashers”

The controversy over “gender free” shows the centrality of language
as a battleground. There is another phrase that was used frequently
by conservatives in their opposition to “gender free”— kageki na femi-
nisuto (extremist feminists). Conservative critics of “gender-free” often
described feminists as radical, communist, crazy, ugly, and even evil
51. Yamamoto Akira, “Dōseiai Kaihō-ku ni Mukau Miyakonojo-shi (Ge)” [Miya-

konojo City moving toward ward for the liberation of homosexuality (2)],
Sekai Nippō, August 31, 2003, www.worldtimes.co.jp/wtop/education/030830/
030831.html.
women who had a scheme of completely destroying the culture and tra-
dition of Japan. Osawa Mari and other Japanese feminists’ invocation of
French feminist Christine Delphy’s work was later interpreted by conser-
vatives as “proof” of feminism’s Marxist, evil scheme and “wrong” for-
eign ideology. Moreover, Yamaguchi of Jiji Hyōron saw the political power
that some feminist leaders have in present-day Japan as too extreme. The
conservatives perceived “gender free” as a term that feminists with close
connections with governmental projects were promoting.
In my interviews, conservative journalists such as Yamaguchi of Jiji
Hyōron and Kamono and Yamamoto of Sekai Nippō, as well as freelance
journalists such as Chiba Tensei and Nomura Hataru, acknowledged
that they intentionally wrote and spread overly sensational stories on
feminism; they clearly recognized their roles in setting the agenda and
gaining people’s attention with shock value. The expression “extrem-
ist feminists” was a great hook, they admitted, as it was simple and yet
grasped the essence of the perceived outrageousness of feminist thought
that they wanted to emphasize. Yamaguchi, for example, stated that his
target audience was fellow conservatives who he did not think were ter-
ribly interested in issues related to gender equality, particularly com-
pared to issues of national security and the economy. Other conservative
writers I interviewed also struggled to attract conservatives’ attention
to initiate the movement against feminism. They had to develop catchy
phrases, images, and illustrations to warn of the potential danger of
gender equality. Since there was already confusion around the definition
and interpretation of “gender free,” it was the perfect phrase for them to
target since it could be interpreted in any way they liked.
Many feminists did not take the backlash seriously at first, as many
of them underestimated their critics, regarding them as unintelligent
and unworthy of engagement.52 They also tried to frame the backlash as
a desperate attempt by conservatives to stave off the inevitable mainstream-
ing of feminism in Japan during the 2000s, following the implementa-
tion of the Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society that began in 1999.53 The
52. Ueno Chizuko, “Fuan na Otoko-tachi no Kimyō na ‘Rentai’ — Jendā Furī

Basshingu no Haikei wo Megutte” [Strange “solidarity” among anxious
men — On the background of gender-free bashing], in Backlash!, 379.
53. Hashimoto Hiroko and Hirooka Moriho, “Kihonhō Seitei-go no Jichitai
Jōrei no Dōkō to Kadai” [The movement and issues related to municipal
backlash, however, had more power than they thought; conservatives

successfully stopped the passage of feminism-inspired gender-equality
ordinances, with the Ube City case in 2002 and another failure to imple-
ment gender-equality ordinances in the Chiba Prefecture in 2002–2003
being the definitive cases.54 Critiques of gender-equal education and
sex education were rapidly gaining ground and attacks against “gender
free” intensified. Finally coming to grips with the power and efficacy of
conservative efforts, feminist scholars and activists started in 2003 to
become more vocal on the issue of the backlash. They organized dis-
cussions at academic conferences and activist symposiums; wrote and
distributed a Q&A document and booklets on gender equality, “gender
free,” and the backlash; published books and articles on the theme; and
developed a new listserv and websites.55
Print media, the Internet, and real-life politics became the battle-
grounds between conservatives and feminists over the meaning of the
term “gender free.” The spheres of feminists and antifeminists, however,
remained mostly separate and, except for the rare occasions of online
debates where opposing ideas were exchanged and discussed, there was
little debate or discussion between the opposing groups. When I met
and interviewed conservative activists, most of them said it was the first
time that they had had a conversation with a feminist in a nonconfron-
tational context— and the same could be said for me. Feminists also
demonized “backlashers”; I frequently observed fear expressed by fem-
inists on listservs and at conference sessions toward them. Each side
attacked the imagined other and the notion of “gender free” that each
side imagined the other was claiming.
While the backlash against “gender free” gained significant atten-
tion in Japanese academic feminists’ writings, there were also optimistic
ordinances after the passage of the basic law], Josei Tenbō (July, 2002), 10.
54. The failure to pass a gender-equality ordinance in Chiba, in particular,
came as a shock for the feminist community, as the movement in Chiba
was led by a woman governor, Domoto Akiko, who was an important figure
behind the passage of the Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society when she
was a Diet representative.
55. Nihon Josei Gakkai, “Gōgai: Q&A Danjo Kyōdō Sanaku wo Meguru Genzai
no Ronten” [Special emergency issue: Q&A current issues surrounding
Danjo Kyodo Sanaku], Nihon Josei Gakkai, Gakkai News [Women’s studies
association of Japan, association news], (March, 2003); Nijuisseiki Danjo
Byōdō wo Susumeru Kai, Daremoga Sonohito Rashiku.
reflections on the recent history of feminism seen through the lens of

the backlash. For example, in the introduction to the revised Feminism
in Japan anthology published in 2009, well-known academic feminist
editors insist that the backlash is actually a sign of how successful the
past fifteen years have been for Japanese feminism.56 Feminist scholar
Kanai Yoshiko also writes that the critique of “gender” could signify the
influence of feminism and is a sign showing the way the term has perme-
ated Japanese society.57 Feminist scholars have generally been positive
about the achievements of the feminist movement in Japan over the past
fifteen years due to the fact that feminism has become more mainstream
in policies and in academia and the pervasive influence of the concepts
of “gender” and “gender free.” Feminist scholars in Japan, such as Ehara
Yumiko, have been arguing that the primary force behind the backlash
is the alignment of neoconservatism and neoliberalism, but that the dis-
cussion has remained vague and without concrete analysis of actual inci-
dents and cases, especially the views of the antifeminist groups.58
What can we take away from all that happened around the concept
of “gender free” in Japan over the past two decades? The debate fueled
the production of diverse opinions about the definition of “gender free,”
even among feminists in Japan. It was also a period of intense pressure
among feminists, with any departure from mainstream positions seen
as counterproductive and even undermining in the face of the back-
lash. The debate also posed significant questions about the direction of
feminism: Should feminists support the notion of “gender free” simply
because the term was under attack by conservatives? Should the term be
supported as a notion that could open new possibilities by raising ques-
tions about the binary construction of gender? With its ambiguity and
multiple interpretations, is the term too confusing for the general public?
56. Amano Masako, Ito Kimio, Ito Ruri, Inoue Teruko, Ueno Chizuko, Ehara
Yumiko, Osawa Mari, and Kano Mikiyo, eds., “Zouho Shinpan no Henshū
ni Atatte” [Reflections on editing the new edition], in their Shinpen Nihon no
Feminizumu 8: Jendā to Kyōiku [New edition: Feminism in Japan 8: Gender
and education] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), v–vii.
57. Kanai Yoshiko, “Kaisetsu” [Commentary], in Kī-Kosenputo Gender Stud-
ies [Key Concept Gender Studies], ed. Jane Piltcher and Imelda Whelehan,
trans. Aki Katayama (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 2009), 207–9.
58. Ehara Yumiko, “Feminism in the Grips of a Pincer Attack—Traditional-
ism, Liberalism, and Globalism,” International Journal of Japanese Sociology
14 (2005): 13–14.
Should feminists consider “gender free” to be the groundbreaking notion

that changed the paradigm of feminism, despite the fact that since the
1970s Japanese feminism has questioned and attempted to change the
dominant construction of gender and sexuality? Finally, how should we
interpret the effects of the mainstreaming of feminism since 1995?
The Demise of “Gender Free”

As criticism of and confusion over the term “gender free” spread, local
and national governments started to turn against its usage. After the
Cabinet Office announced in April 2004 that it was better not to use
the term “gender free,” the Tokyo Metropolitan Government— the very
group that had created the Tokyo Women’s Foundation whose booklet
introduced the term “gender free” into Japan — issued a document claim-
ing that they would no longer use “gender free” because “its meaning
varies widely and misunderstandings and confusion are occurring.”59 In
December 2005, there was a second version of the Basic Plan for Gender
Equality issued by the Cabinet Office, which prohibited the inclusion of
“gender free” in governmental projects due to its ambiguous meaning and
gave an order to local governments to discourage the use of “gender free.”
Therefore, “gender free,” once introduced and promoted by the govern-
ment in a top-down manner, was rejected by the government, again in a
top-down manner.
Attacks on “gender free” declined after 2006. At the same time, there
was much less coverage of “gender free” or feminism in conservative pub-
lications after 2006. Nomura Hataru, a conservative journalist and editor
of the 2006 book Danjo Byðdð Baka (Gender equality fools), explained
that the book did not sell as much as he had hoped, and his interest sub-
sequently moved on to other issues. Yamaguchi Toshiaki of Jiji Hyōron,
once the leading voice against “gender free” and gender-equality ordi-
nances, repeatedly told me that he was tired of the debate, which he
felt was not going anywhere, and also tired of internal conflicts among
conservatives on the issue. Sekai Nippō also withdrew from the exten-
sive coverage of the issues after 2006. According to the reporters of
Sekai Nippō, “gender” and “gender free” were not newsworthy issues that
59. There is a sheet of paper by Tokyo Metropolitan Government that includes

this language attached to all the publications relevant to “gender free” by
the Tokyo Women’s Foundation, at the Tokyo Women’s Plaza Library.
could gain people’s attention for a prolonged period of time. As part of

his response to my coauthored book Shakai Undō no Tomadoi (Social
movements at a crossroads), freelance journalist Chiba Tensei wrote in
his blog that his own interest in feminism peaked around 2004, and he
admitted that the conservatives quickly withdrew from the antifemi-
nist movement. Chiba writes, “I have to say that if I see the movement of
‘backlash’ as a social phenomenon, because of the splash of ‘gender free,’
the backlash occurred, and because the splash of ‘gender free’ ended,
the backlash ended.” 60 As for the Internet, antifeminist blogs are not
as active as they were before 2005, and the “gender free” and “gender”
entries in Wikipedia do not attract the heated discussions and revisions
that they used to. Reported instances of backlash have decreased sub-
stantially since 2006, although they still happen, occasionally.
Some conservatives have concluded that the policies on gender may
not have the radical implications that they were originally afraid of and
so no longer seem worth attacking. In fact, there are cases in which con-
servative antifeminists have been actively involved in local projects pro-
moting gender equality as community leaders, for example, in Toyama
and Fukui prefectures. In Toyama Prefecture, a Sekai Nippō journalist,
Kamono Mamoru, was involved in a project as a local “gender equality
promoter” appointed by the prefecture.61
In addition, the governmental policies and projects related to
women under the Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society are often inter-
preted on the ground in ways that conservatives see as important for the
nation and its traditions. For instance, the preamble of the Basic Law for
a Gender Equal Society states that one of the reasons for the necessity
of promoting a gender-equal society is to solve Japan’s low birth rate, a
goal that could be interpreted as promoting marriage and childbirth for
women. As a result, municipal gender-equality offices host parties for
single women and men in local communities for them to meet potential
marriage partners. Due to serious budget deficits in many local govern-
ments, especially in rural areas, most projects that local gender-equal-
ity offices engage in are limited to offering counseling and shelters for
60. Chiba Tensei, “Shakai Undō no Tomadoi Sairon” [Additional notes on Shakai
Undō no Tomadoi], blog, January 22, 2013, tensei211.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-
47.html.
61. Yamaguchi, Saito, and Ogiue. Shakai Undō no Tomadoi, 211–12.
domestic violence survivors, distributing educational flyers, offering lec-

tures for raising citizens’ consciousness, and having poetry contests for
gender equality. The limited funding ensures that these projects are not
empowered to have a significant effect on the concrete situations of local
citizens. Therefore, for conservatives, these projects may not be seen as
threatening, and some of the projects — increasing marriages and child-
birth, for instance — might even be welcomed.
Few feminists actively promote “gender free” currently, even the
ones who actively supported and spread the concept in the past. Certainly
feminism has gained a more prominent place in the government, and it
is far more mainstream than it once was; but one of the consequences of
the conflict over “gender free” might be the further decline of grassroots
feminism. Mainstreaming undoubtedly has had advantages — the intro-
duction of laws, ordinances, and the consequent implementation of proj-
ects along with the earmarking of money and personnel. However, there
are pitfalls of government recognition and bureaucratic implementa-
tion. The controversy over “gender free” has raised questions about the
past history and future direction of feminism in Japan, about Japanese
feminism’s dependence on the United Nations and Western authorities,
and about the efficacy of mainstreaming efforts through governmental
projects.
There has been little critical assessment regarding the use of “gender
free,” especially how feminist scholars got involved in “gender free”-re-
lated governmental projects without carefully evaluating the validity
and meaning of the concept, as well as the misguided dependence on
a foreign academic authority. While the history of grassroots feminism
was ignored by the scholars who introduced “gender free,” there was also
a tendency for feminist scholars to represent the history of post-1990s
feminism as a positive and linear process that collectively advanced the
mainstreaming of feminism by cooperating with local and national gov-
ernmental committees and their “gender-equality” projects, while pre-
senting a unified front to counter the backlash. In this view of recent
feminist history and the current situation of feminism in Japan, multiple
voices within feminism and internal critiques of feminism by feminists
have been suppressed. Queer voices, minority voices, and critics of fem-
inism have been discouraged — under the premise that the prime goal of
feminism at the turn of the millennium was to unite together to counter
against the backlash. There also has been a lack of internal discussion,
debate, and critical examination of the strategies used to oppose the

backlash.
In December 2012, ultraconservative politician Abe Shinzo, once
a powerful voice of the backlash and the Liberal Democratic Party’s
project team leader in the investigation on “extreme” sex education and
“gender free” education, became the prime minister for the second time
(he first served from 2006 to 2007). In his current term, however, Abe
has begun a new campaign to promote “womenomics,” emphasizing the
“active participation of women in society” as the core of his economic
growth policy. In a speech delivered at the UN General Assembly in Sep-
tember 2013, he stated that his intention was to create “a society in which
women shine.” 62 But while it may appear as if the new Abe is support-
ive of women’s rights by discouraging traditional gender roles, in actual-
ity his “womenomics” policies are motivated by low birth rates, an aging
population, and a diminishing labor force in Japan.63 Increasingly, gen-
der-equality policies are being used for the purpose of resolving these
national economic crises rather than toward eliminating gender discrimi-
nation. Furthermore, Abe-appointed scholar Takahashi Shiro, who played
a significant part in the backlash against feminism in the early 2000s,
as a member of the governmental committee on gender equality. In his
recent talks and writings, Takahashi criticizes “gender free” and empha-
sizes his belief that a “typical” family, in which a husband works and a
wife stays at home, is the best family to increase Japan’s birth rate.64
62. Address by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo at the 68th Session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations,” September 26, 2013, japan.kantei.go.jp/96_
abe/statement/201309/26generaldebate_e.html.
63. While the Abe administration has introduced policies such as increas-
ing the number of government-subsidized childcare facilities, there has
been criticism of other policies, such as those requiring corporations to
allow three years of childcare leave for women, as unrealistic and likely
to hinder women from advancing in their careers. See “Abe Seiken no
‘Josei no Katsuyaku’ Seisaku ni Hanron Zokushutsu” [Many criticisms
against the “women’s active participation” policy under Abe administra-
tion], Nikkei Business Online, June 13, 2013, www.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/
matome/20130612/354019/?ST=business&P=1.
64. Tomomi Yamaguchi “Kigu sareru Kongaku no Yukue — Abe Seikenka no
Danjo Kyodo Sankaku tono Shinwasei” [The fearful direction of marriage
studies—its proximity to the gender equality policies under the Abe admin-
istration], α-synodos 140 (January 15, 2014).
In the current moment, with the ultraconservative Prime Minis-

ter Abe promoting women’s active participation in society for the pur-
pose of increasing the birth rate and resolving the labor shortage, the
danger posed by feminists becoming too involved in governmental proj-
ects without critical reflection is even greater. Looking back on the his-
tory of feminism since the mid-1990s, when “gender free” was invented
and the mainstreaming trend became visible is key to critically examin-
ing current feminist strategies and responses.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Elise Edwards, Norma Field, Bethany Grenald, Jennifer
Robertson, and Leah Schmarzbauer for their valuable comments and editorial
help. I would like to thank my coresearchers and other scholars who were on
the same conference panels tackling “gender free” rhetoric and its backlash: Emi
Koyama, Lauren Kocher, Kazuo Yamaguchi, Ogiue Chiki, and Saito Masami. I
would like to give my special thanks to Masaki Chitose, who assisted my field-
work in Miyakonojo. Funding to support my research in Japan was provided by
the Suntory Foundation Grant for the Humanities and Social Science; Scholar-
ship and Creativity Grant of Montana State University; and the Japan Commit-
tee, Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago.

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“Gender Free” Feminism in Japan: A Story of Mainstreaming and Backlash

Author(s): Tomomi Yamaguchi

“Gender Free” Feminism in Japan:

In Japan, the introduction of the Basic Law for a Gender Equal

Feminist Studies 40, no. 3. © 2014 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 541

compulsory gender roles, quickly spread via governmental projects and

From Mainstreaming to Backlash:

started to influence both feminist activism and the government’s involve-

5. See Vera Mackie, Feminism in Modern Japan: Citizenship, Embodiment and

by the United Nations prompted the Japanese government to take action,

Feminism in Modern Japan, 202–31.

In venting the Term “Gender Free”

social impact— a perspective far removed from that presented in femi-

that “gender” could refer to commonly held notions about masculinity

Language Politics: The Debate on the Origin

Lessons Contemporary Sociology 11: Sociology of Gender] (Tokyo: Iwanami

international respectability. According to one of the three authors, Tanaka

27. Nijuisseiki Danjo Byōdō wo Susumeru Kai, Daremoga Sonohito Rashiku,

“stereotypes and prejudices related to gender differences,” but educa-

on “gender free.” The Gender Colloquium event that I then organized

How “Gender Free” Rhetoric Altered the History

was also at issue. Danjo byōdō was considered “old-fashioned” by the

discussions existed, scholarly feminists published books on the “gender

Who Are the Antifeminist Backlashers?

focus on the concepts of “gender” and “gender free” among antifeminists

for History Textbook Reform and Japan Conference, two conservative

40. Jiji Hyōron is headquartered in Yamaguchi City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, has

When I first met him in 2009, reporter Yamamoto Akira of Sekai

The Conservative Interpretations of “Gender-Free”

such values on housewives, (heterosexual) marriage, and traditional fam-

free and backlash], available at http://www12.atwiki.jp/seijotcp/pages/30.

In my interviews with Yamaguchi, editor-in-chief of Jiji Hyōron, as well

46. Yamaguchi, Saito, and Ogiue, Shakai Undō no Tomadoi, 118–43.

The invention of the threat of “extreme” sex education and per-

49. Ogiue Chiki, “Seiken Yotō no Bakkurasshu” [Backlash by a majority party

United States, the Unification Church has a similar attitude on issues

“Extremist Feminists” versus “Scary Backlashers”

51. Yamamoto Akira, “Dōseiai Kaihō-ku ni Mukau Miyakonojo-shi (Ge)” [Miya-

52. Ueno Chizuko, “Fuan na Otoko-tachi no Kimyō na ‘Rentai’ — Jendā Furī

backlash, however, had more power than they thought; conservatives

reflections on the recent history of feminism seen through the lens of

Should feminists consider “gender free” to be the groundbreaking notion

The Demise of “Gender Free”

59. There is a sheet of paper by Tokyo Metropolitan Government that includes

could gain people’s attention for a prolonged period of time. As part of

domestic violence survivors, distributing educational flyers, offering lec-

debate, and critical examination of the strategies used to oppose the

In the current moment, with the ultraconservative Prime Minis-

You might also like

Feminist Studies 40, no. 3. © 2014 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 541