Original Article

Justifying Decisions
Making Choices for Others Enhances Preferences
for Impoverished Options
Jingyi Lu,1 Yiming Liang,2,3,1 and Hebing Duan1
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1
School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, PR China
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

2
Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, PR China
3
Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, PR China

Abstract: Prior research has found that people prefer impoverished over enriched options. However, individuals make decisions either for
themselves or for others every day. The present research investigates how and why the decision target (self or other) influences preferences for
impoverished and enriched options. We hypothesized and found that participants who made choices for others preferred impoverished over
enriched options more than those who made choices for themselves (Studies 1 and 2) because the former group believed that they should
justify their decisions to others more than the latter group (Study 2). Overall, the current research sheds light on self–other differences in the
trade-off between impoverished and enriched options, as well as the role of justification in this effect.

Keywords: self–other decision making, decision target, enriched option, impoverished option, justification

Perfect options are desirable but seldom available. In most
cases, individuals have to make choices among imperfect
alternatives, such as enriched and impoverished options.
An enriched option has extremely high and low values for
different dimensions, whereas an impoverished option has
moderate values for all dimensions (Ganzach, 1995; Shafir,
1993). For example, an enriched restaurant offers extre-
mely appetizing but expensive food. By contrast, an impov-
erished restaurant offers average tasting but fairly priced
food. Similarly, an enriched job candidate performs well
in certain aspects of a job but poorly in other aspects,
whereas an impoverished candidate performs averagely in
all aspects.
Research shows that decision makers generally prefer
impoverished to enriched options (Shafir, Simonson, &
Tversky, 1993; Wang & Murnighan, 2013). However, some
factors, including cultural orientation (Briley, Morris, &
Simonson, 2000), self-construal (Zhang & Mittal, 2007),
and need for cognition (Drolet, Luce, & Simonson, 2009),
moderate this effect.
Notably, individuals frequently make choices for them-
selves or on behalf of another in daily life. For example,
consumers choose a vacation spot for themselves, whereas
travel agencies sometimes choose a vacation spot for
customers. Similarly, investors select stocks for themselves,
whereas consultants make investment decisions for their
clients. Self–other differences are consistently found in
decision making (Danziger, Montal, & Barkan, 2012; Laran,
2010; Lu, Xie, & Xu, 2013; Polman, 2012a, 2012b). In the
current research, we investigate the effect of the decision
target (self or other) on preferences for impoverished and
enriched options.
Trade-Offs Between Enriched and
Impoverished Options
Comparisons Between Attributes
Consider the following scenario. Option A scores XA on
Attribute X and YA on Attribute Y, that is, A (XA, YA),
whereas Option B scores XB on Attribute X and YB on
Attribute Y, that is, B (XB, YB). An “economic man” bases
his preferences on the comparison between the scores for
each attribute of these two options (Tversky & Kahneman,
1986). Assuming Attributes X and Y are of equal impor-
tance, people should prefer Option A over Option B if
(XA
XB)
(YB
YA) > 0. By contrast, they should prefer
Option B over Option A if (XA
XB)
(YB
YA) < 0.
In addition, if (XA
XB)
(YB
YA) = 0, then people
should be indifferent between the two options.
In a typical case (Shafir, 1993), enriched options
score higher than average on some attributes (positive
attributes, P) but lower than average on other attributes
(negative attributes, N) compared with impoverished

Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103 Ó 2017 Hogrefe Publishing

DOI: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000302
 J. Lu et al., Justifying Decisions
options (e.g., enriched option [80, 20]; impoverished option
[50, 50]). That is,
ðPenriched option
Pimpoverished option Þ

ðN impoverished option
N enriched option Þ ¼ 0: ð1Þ
Therefore, neither option stands out.
Negativity Bias and Preferences
for Impoverished Options
Descriptive behaviors frequently violate normative
principles (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Normatively, indi-
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viduals should weigh negative and positive stimuli equally.
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However, negativity bias is prevalent such that people are
more sensitive to negativity than to positivity (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman,
2001). Prospect theory, which proposes that losses loom
larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), provides
evidence for negativity bias. In summary, people weigh
negative attributes more than positive attributes.
Let κ and λ denote the relative weights attached to
positive and negative attributes, respectively. Considering
negativity bias, κ < λ. Hence,
κðPenriched option
Pimpoverished option Þ

λðN impoverished option
N enriched option Þ < 0: ð2Þ
When this logic is followed, impoverished options are
preferred over enriched options.
Preferences for impoverished options are supported by
both the compromise effect and the generalist bias. The
former refers to the phenomenon in which a middle option
is selected more than an extreme option (Shafir et al., 1993;
Simonson, 1989). The latter refers to the tendency in which
generalists who perform averagely in all aspects are
preferred to specialists who are good in a limited number
of tasks (Custódio, Ferreira, & Matos, 2013; Wang &
Murnighan, 2013). Both middle options and generalists
perform moderately, and thus, they can be regarded as
impoverished options to a certain extent. Therefore, these
effects suggest preferences for impoverished alternatives.
Decision Target and Justification
In reality, people make choices not only for themselves, but
also for others. Although the decision problem itself is held
constant, a shift in the decision target leads to different
perceptions of the problem (Lu & Xie, 2014; Polman,
2012b). One of the differences lies on perceived justification.
Decisions for another person are more public than those for
oneself because the decision outcome will be seen and
evaluated by others. Therefore, individuals are more
concerned with justifying their decisions when making
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93
choices for others than for themselves (Lerner & Tetlock,
1999).
The relationship between the decision target and justifi-
cation was partially supported by Hong and Chang (2015)
who investigated the effect of self-construal on justification
seeking. Self-construal refers to the way by which people
view the self in relation to others. Individuals with an inde-
pendent self-construal define themselves by their internal
attributes, whereas those with an interdependent self-
construal define themselves by their relation to others.
Moreover, the latter group is more mindful of others than
the former group when making decisions (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991). Hong and Chang (2015) showed that indi-
viduals with an interdependent self-construal sought more
justifications than those with an independent self-construal,
suggesting that a greater focus on others caused more
justification-seeking behaviors. More direct evidence was
provided by Polman (2012a) and Polman and Vohs
(2016). They found that people who made decisions for
others thought about the reasons for their decisions more
than those who made decisions for themselves. Thus,
self–other differences exist in justification.
Justification, Negativity Bias,
and Preferences for Impoverished
Options
Negativity bias is stronger when people believe that they
need to justify their decisions to others. Tetlock and Boett-
ger (1994) found that when decision makers believed that
they should justify decisions to those who would evaluate
them, they would be more concerned about potential
negative outcomes to avoid blame. Hence, when the deci-
sion target shifts from self to others, κ (i.e., the relative
weight attached to positive attributes) decreases, whereas
λ (i.e., the relative weight attached to negative attributes)
increases. Therefore,
κ justification ðPenriched option
Pimpoverished option Þ

λjustification ðN impoverished option
N enriched option Þ
< κ no justification ðPenriched option
Pimpoverished option Þ

λ no justification ðNimpoverished option
Nenriched option Þ; ð3Þ
thereby leading to amplified preferences for impoverished
options.
The above prediction was supported by several
researches. For example, Simonson (1989) observed that
seeking justifications enhanced preferences for middle
options. Simonson and Nowlis (2000) showed amplified
preferences for all-average options when people were more
concerned with the evaluations of others. Similarly,
Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103
 94 J. Lu et al., Justifying Decisions

Maimaran and Simonson (2011) found that decision makers Table 1. Information of vacation spots (Study 1)
opted more for impoverished over enriched options when Attributes Spot A Spot B
they knew their decisions would be seen by others than Version 1
when they did not. Quality of beaches 71 51
On the basis of the relationship between the decision Quality of restaurants 29 49
target and justification as well as the relationship between Quality of environment 73 53
justification and preferences for impoverished options, Cost 27 47
we hypothesize that people who make choices for others General weather conditions 72 52
prefer impoverished over enriched options more than those Transportation facilities 28 48
who make choices for themselves because the former Overall average 50 50
perceives that they should justify their decisions to others Version 2
more than the latter. Previous research provides initial Quality of beaches 51 71
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evidence for our reasoning. For example, one study showed Quality of restaurants 49 29
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that people who made decisions for others tended to
choose a compromise option more than those who made
decisions for themselves (Chang, Chuang, Cheng, &
Huang, 2011).
The Present Research
The current research aims to investigate the effect of the
decision target on preferences for enriched and impover-
ished options. We hypothesize that people who decide for
others prefer impoverished over enriched options more
than those who decide for themselves. Moreover, a differ-
ence in justification is responsible for the aforementioned
self–other differences. In particular, people who make
choices for others believe that they should justify their deci-
sions to others more than those who make choices for
themselves. Study 1 tests whether self–other differences
exist in preferences for enriched and impoverished options.
Study 2 examines the role of justification.
Study 1: Vacation Spots
In this study, we aimed to explore self–other differences
regarding preferences for enriched and impoverished
options. The participants chose between two candidate
vacation spots, either for themselves or for others. One spot
performed well in some dimensions but poorly in others,
whereas the other spot performed averagely in all dimen-
sions. We expected amplified preferences for impoverished
over enriched options in the other condition than in the self
condition.
Method
Participants and Design
A total of 120 university students (28 men, 92 women;
Mage = 21.57 years, SD = 4.53) volunteered to participate
Quality of environment 53 73
Cost 47 27
General weather conditions 52 72
Transportation facilities 48 28
Overall average 50 50
Notes. The attribute values ranged from 0 to 100. Zero indicated worst, 50
indicated average, and 100 indicated best.
in the study. They were randomly assigned to one condition
in a 2 (decision target: self or other)  2 (option: enriched or
impoverished) mixed design, where the decision target was
a between-participant variable and option was a within-
participant variable.
Procedure and Materials
The cover story told to the participants was that the study
was aimed to investigate decision-making habits. First, the
participants in the self condition wrote down their own sur-
name, whereas those in the other condition wrote down
the surname of a friend. This task reminded all the partici-
pants of a specific person (Lu, Jia, Xie, & Wang, 2016).
Subsequently, the participants in the self condition con-
sidered that they were planning a vacation between two
candidate spots. Their performances are provided in Table 1
(adapted from Zhang & Mittal, 2007). The attribute values
ranged from 0 to 100 (0 = worst, 50 = average, 100 = best).
The order of the two options was counterbalanced across
participants. In the other condition, the participants imag-
ined that their friend whose surname they had written
down was planning a vacation. The friend was not sure
which spot to choose, and thus, asked the participants to
make the decision for him or her.
After reading the scenario, the participants indicated who
planned to go on a vacation in the scenario. This question
served as a manipulation check. Then, the participants
rated the likelihood that they would choose each option
on a 9-point scale (1 = unlikely, 9 = most likely). Thereafter,
they chose a vacation spot.
Previous research indicated an effect of self-construal
on preferences for enriched and impoverished options

Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103 Ó 2017 Hogrefe Publishing

 J. Lu et al., Justifying Decisions
(Zhang & Mittal, 2007). People with an independent self-
construal prefer enriched options over impoverished options
than those with an interdependent self-construal. To elimi-
nate such influence, we asked the participants to complete
a self-construal scale which was used to assess their disposi-
tional self-construal (Singelis, 1994). In this scale, 12 items
measured interdependent self-construal (e.g., “I have
respect for the authority figures with whom I interact”;
“It is important for me to maintain harmony within my
group”; α = .78), whereas another 12 items measured inde-
pendent self-construal (e.g., “I’d rather say ‘No’ directly,
than risk being misunderstood”; “Speaking up during a class
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is not a problem for me”; α = .64). The participants indicated
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their agreement with these items on a 7-point scale
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Then, information
regarding gender, age, and monthly consumption was col-
lected. Finally, the participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check and Control Variables
The raw data for Study 1 are provided as Electronic Supple-
mentary Material, ESM 1. Three participants who failed the
manipulation check were excluded from the subsequent
analysis. Meanwhile, the participants in the self and other
conditions did not differ in interdependent self-construal
and monthly consumption, ps > .147. Although the two
groups differed in independent self-construal (Mself = 4.71,
SD = 0.55; Mother = 4.48, SD = 0.68), F(1, 115) = 3.98,
p = .049, ηp2 = .03, neither independent nor interdependent
self-construal was correlated with the likelihood ratings for
enriched and impoverished options, ps > .234. Therefore,
self-construal was not considered in the subsequent statisti-
cal analysis.
Decision Target and Likelihood Ratings
Likelihood ratings were submitted to a 2 (decision target:
self or other)  2 (option: enriched or impoverished)
mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the deci-
sion target as a between-participant variable and option as a
within-participant variable. Consequently, the main effect
for the decision target was not significant (Mself = 5.48,
SD = 2.07; Mother = 5.20, SD = 2.24), F(1, 115) = 1.96,
p = .164, ηp2 = .02. By contrast, the main effect for option
was significant, F(1, 115) = 45.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, such
that the participants preferred impoverished (M = 6.30,
SD = 1.91) over enriched (M = 4.39, SD = 1.95) options
regardless of the decision target.
We also observed an interaction between the decision
target and option (Figure 1), F(1, 115) = 4.94, p = .028,
ηp2 = .04. The participants in the self condition were more
likely to choose impoverished (M = 6.13, SD = 2.05) than
enriched (M = 4.84, SD = 1.88) options, F(1, 60) = 10.15,
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95
Figure 1. Likelihood ratings as a function of the decision target and
option (Study 1). The error bars indicate the standard errors of means.
Likelihood ratings indicate the likelihood that the participants choose
an option.
p = .002, ηp2 = .15. The participants in the other condition
preferred impoverished (M = 6.48, SD = 1.74) over enriched
(M = 3.91, SD = 1.93) options, F(1, 55) = 40.59, p < .001,
ηp2 = .43, as well. From another perspective, the likelihood
ratings for enriched option were higher in the self condition
than in the other condition, F(1, 115) = 6.90, p = .010,
ηp2 = .06. However, the likelihood ratings for impoverished
option between the two conditions did not have any differ-
ence, F(1, 115) = 0.99, p = .322, ηp2 = .01. Notably, this inter-
action was crossover and nonremovable according to the
classification by Wagenmakers, Krypotps, Criss, and
Iverson (2012). Consistent with our hypothesis, these
results indicated that the participants who made choices
for others preferred impoverished over enriched options
more than those who made choices for themselves.
Furthermore, to test whether order would influence self–
other differences in the trade-off between impoverished
and enriched options, we conducted a 2 (decision target:
self or other)  2 (option: enriched or impoverished) 
2 (order: enriched option first or impoverished option first)
mixed-design ANOVA on likelihood ratings. The results
showed that the three-way interaction was not significant,
F(1, 113) = 0.38, p = .537, ηp2 < .01, suggesting that self–
other differences in likelihood ratings were not determined
by presenting order.
Decision Target and Choice
A chi-square test showed that the decision target had a
marginal effect on choice, w2(1, N = 117) = 2.97, p = .085.
In particular, in the self condition, 18 out of 61 participants
(29.51%) chose enriched option, whereas 43 (70.49%)
chose impoverished option. In the other condition, 9 out
of 56 (16.07%) chose enriched option, whereas
47 (83.93%) chose impoverished option. These results
Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103
 96
exhibited the trend that making decisions for others facili-
tated preferences for impoverished options yet attenuated
preferences for enriched options. However, these results
should be treated with caution because of the marginal
significant effect.
In summary, Study 1 showed that people who made
choices for others opted for impoverished over enriched
options more than those who made choices for themselves.
Nevertheless, limitations remained. To begin with, both
options scored higher on some attributes (i.e., quality of
beaches, quality of environment, and general weather
conditions) than others (i.e., quality of restaurants, cost,
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and transportation facilities) in the decision scenario. The
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observed self–other differences might be caused by varying
perceived importance attached to these attributes between
personal decision makers and agents. People who made
choices for themselves might weigh beach quality over
restaurant quality. By contrast, those who decided for others
might think that restaurant quality was more important than
beach quality. Although no literature, to our knowledge,
supported this argument, attribute values were counterbal-
anced across participants in the next study. Second, to
eliminate the effects of potential confounding variables on
preferences for enriched and impoverished options,
additional control variables, such as perceived responsibil-
ity, regret, and task difficulty, were included in Study 2.
Moreover, Study 2 was designed to test the reasons that
underlay the self–other differences demonstrated in Study 1.
Study 2: Hotels
The aim of Study 2 was twofold. First, we sought to repli-
cate the self–other differences found in Study 1 using a
different decision scenario. Second, the role of justification
in self–other differences regarding preferences for enriched
and impoverished options was explored.
The participants chose between two hotels, either for
themselves or for others. One hotel was an enriched option,
whereas the other was an impoverished option. Further-
more, the participants rated the extent to which they should
justify their decisions to other people. We anticipated that
the participants in the other condition would believe that
they should justify their decisions to other people more than
those in the self condition. Therefore, the former group
would opt for impoverished over enriched options more
than the latter group.
Method
Participants and Design
A total of 119 university students (37 men, 82 women; Mage =
23.13 years, SD = 3.36) participated in Study 2. Identical to
Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103
J. Lu et al., Justifying Decisions
Study 1, a 2 (decision target: self or other)  2 (option:
enriched or impoverished) mixed design was adopted,
wherein the decision target was a between-participant
variable and option was a within-participant variable.
Procedure and Materials
The procedure was similar to that in Study 1 with three
exceptions. First, the participants imagined that they were
choosing a hotel for a trip. The performances of two candi-
date hotels on six dimensions (i.e., cost, transportation,
room size, bed size, distance from spots, and check-in
service speed) are provided in Table 2. The order of the
two options was counterbalanced across participants.
In addition, half of the participants read the information
that both hotels had higher values in terms of cost, room
size, and distance from spots, whereas another half read
the information that both hotels had higher values in terms
of transportation, bed size, and check-in service speed. This
manipulation excluded the potential effect of varying
perceived importance attached to different attributes,
therefore remedying the limitation in Study 1.
Second, after completing the manipulation check and
likelihood ratings, and then choosing a hotel, the partici-
pants rated the extent to which they believed they should
justify their decisions to other people (“To what extent do
you believe you should justify your decisions to other
people?” 1 = unnecessary, 9 = extremely necessary).
Third, the participants did not complete a self-construal
scale because self-construal did not influence the likelihood
ratings in Study 1. Instead, they rated task difficulty (“How
difficult is the decision task?” 1 = easy, 9 = difficult), their
regret (“Will you feel regretful if your decision is not
good?” 1 = not regretful, 9 = very regretful), and perceived
responsibility (‘‘Do you feel responsible for the decision
outcome?” 1 = not responsible, 9 = highly responsible) as in
Lu et al. (2016). Perceived difficulty may differ between
tasks of making decisions for the self and for others
because people are more frequently to make choices for
the self than for others in daily life. Therefore, task diffi-
culty was considered as a control variable. The level of
regret was also controlled because research showed that
making decisions for others (vs. self) could trigger more
anticipatory regret (Beattie, Baron, Hershey, & Spranca,
1994). Perceived responsibility was controlled because
self–other difference regarding this variable was found in
previous studies (Lu & Xie, 2014; Lu et al., 2013). More-
over, dialectical thinking was included as a control variable
because higher dialectical thinking may be associated with
more tolerance of enriched options (“Every coin has two
sides”; “To pursue the advantages of an item, I can accept
its disadvantages”; 1 = totally disagree, 9 = totally agree).
The average value of the two items reflected dialectical
thinking (α = .62).
Ó 2017 Hogrefe Publishing
 J. Lu et al., Justifying Decisions 97

Table 2. Information of hotels (Study 2)

Attributes Hotel A Hotel B More black stars
Version 1
Cost wwwIIIII wIIIIIII Lower
Transportation wwwwwIII wwwwwwwI More convenient
Room size wwwIIIII wIIIIIII Larger
Bed size wwwwwIII wwwwwwwI Larger
Distance from spots wwwIIIII wIIIIIII Closer
Check-in service speed wwwwwIII wwwwwwwI Faster
Version 2
Cost wIIIIIII wwwIIIII Lower
Transportation wwwwwwwI wwwwwIII More convenient
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Room size wIIIIIII wwwIIIII Larger

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Bed size wwwwwwwI wwwwwIII Larger

Distance from spots wIIIIIII wwwIIIII Closer
Check-in service speed wwwwwwwI wwwwwIII Faster
Version 3
Transportation wwwIIIII wIIIIIII More convenient
Cost wwwwwIII wwwwwwwI Lower
Bed size wwwIIIII wIIIIIII Larger
Room size wwwwwIII wwwwwwwI Larger
Check-in service speed wwwIIIII wIIIIIII Faster
Distance from spots wwwwwIII wwwwwwwI Closer
Version 4
Transportation wIIIIIII wwwIIIII More convenient
Cost wwwwwwwI wwwwwIII Lower
Bed size wIIIIIII wwwIIIII Larger
Room size wwwwwwwI wwwwwIII Larger
Check-in service speed wIIIIIII wwwIIIII Faster
Distance from spots wwwwwwwI wwwwwIII Closer
Note. Overall, more black stars indicated better performances.

Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check and Control Variables
The raw data for Study 2 are provided as Electronic Supple-
mentary Material, ESM 2. Two participants failed the
manipulation check. Therefore, their data were excluded.
The participants in the self and the other conditions did
not differ in ratings for task difficulty, regret, perceived
responsibility, dialectical thinking, and monthly consump-
tion, ps > .093. Therefore, these variables were not consid-
ered in the subsequent analysis.
Decision Target and Likelihood Ratings
A 2 (decision target: self or other)  2 (option: enriched or
impoverished) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted on
likelihood ratings, with the decision target as a between-
participant variable and option as a within-participant
variable. The results showed that the effect for the decision
target was not significant (Mself = 5.55, SD = 2.17;
Mother = 5.63, SD = 2.39), F(1, 115) = 0.11, p = .738,
ηp2 < .01. The main effect for option was significant,
F(1, 115) = 41.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .27, such that the partici-
pants preferred impoverished (M = 6.58, SD = 1.97) over
enriched (M = 4.61, SD = 2.15) options.
Similar to Study 1, the interaction between the decision
target and option was significant (Figure 2), F(1, 115) =
15.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. The participants in the other
condition were more likely to choose impoverished
(M = 7.16, SD = 1.67) over enriched (M = 4.10, SD = 1.99)
options, F(1, 61) = 64.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .51. However, the
likelihood ratings between two options did not have any
difference in the self condition (Menriched option = 5.18,
SD = 2.20; Mimpoverished option = 5.93, SD = 2.09),
F(1, 54) = 2.71, p = .105, ηp2 = .05. Moreover, the likelihood
ratings for enriched option were higher in the self condition
than in the other condition, F(1, 115) = 7.84, p = .006,
ηp2 = .06. By contrast, the likelihood ratings for impover-
ished option were higher in the other condition than in the
self condition, F(1, 115) = 12.57, p = .001, ηp2 = .10. This inter-
action was nonremovable (Wagenmakers et al., 2012).

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 98
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Figure 2. Likelihood ratings as a function of the decision target and
option (Study 2). The error bars indicate the standard errors of means.
Likelihood ratings indicate the likelihood that the participants choose
an option.
In addition, to test whether self–other differences in the
trade-off between impoverished and enriched options would
be moderated by order, a 2 (decision target: self or other) 
2 (option: enriched or impoverished)  2 (order: enriched
option first or impoverished option first) mixed-design
ANOVA on likelihood ratings was conducted. The results
showed that the three-way interaction was not significant,
F(1, 113) = 0.38, p = .537, ηp2 < .01. Similarly, to test whether
self–other differences would be moderated by attribute
value, we conducted a 2 (decision target: self or other) 
2 (option: enriched or impoverished)  2 (attribute value:
lower cost or higher cost) mixed-design ANOVA on likeli-
hood ratings. Consequently, the three-way interaction was
not significant, F(1, 113) = 0.74, p = .392, ηp2 < .01. These
results indicated that neither order nor attribute value influ-
enced self–other differences in likelihood ratings.
Taken together, consistent with our hypothesis, the
participants who made decisions for others preferred
impoverished over enriched options more than those who
made decisions for themselves.
Decision Target and Choice
A chi-square test showed that choice was influenced by the
decision target, w2(1, N = 117) = 7.28, p = .007. In the self
condition, 21 out of 55 participants (38.18%) chose enriched
option, whereas 34 (61.82%) chose impoverished option.
In the other condition, 10 out of 62 participants (16.13%)
chose enriched option, whereas 52 (83.87%) chose impover-
ished option. These results demonstrated that making
decisions for others facilitated preferences for impoverished
options yet attenuated preferences for enriched options.
Decision Target and Justification
A one-way ANOVA test showed that justification ratings
were influenced by the decision target. The participants in
Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103
J. Lu et al., Justifying Decisions
the other condition (M = 7.27, SD = 1.76) believed that they
need to justify their decisions to others more than those in
the self condition (M = 5.58, SD = 2.22), F(1, 115) = 21.16,
p < .001, ηp2 = .16.
Mediation Analysis of Justification
We found self–other differences regarding justification and
preferences for impoverished and enriched options. In this
section, we analyzed if justification played a mediating role
between the decision target and preferences for impover-
ished and enriched options. First, we tested a mediation
model with the decision target as the independent variable,
justification as a potential mediator, and likelihood ratings
for impoverished option as the dependent variable.
The total effect of the decision target on the likelihood rat-
ings for impoverished option was significant, β = .31,
p < .001. However, when both the decision target and jus-
tification were included in the regression model to predict
the likelihood ratings for impoverished option, the effect
of the decision target became less significant, β = .23,
p = .018 (Figure 3A). A Sobel test revealed a significant
mediating effect (Z = 2.06, p = .040). These results indi-
cated that making decisions for others (vs. self) increased
perceived justification, which in turn, increased the likeli-
hood of choosing impoverished options.
Next, we tested a similar mediation model with the deci-
sion target as the independent variable, justification as a
potential mediator, and the likelihood ratings for enriched
option as the dependent variable. The total effect of the
decision target on the likelihood ratings for enriched option
was significant, β =
.25, p = .006. When both the decision
target and justification were included in the regression
model to predict the likelihood ratings for enriched option,
the effect of the decision target remained significant,
β =
.29, p = .004 (Figure 3B). A Sobel test showed that jus-
tification did not mediate the effect of the decision target
on the likelihood of choosing enriched option (Z = 1.00,
p = .319).
We intentionally measured the potential mediator (justi-
fication) after the dependent variable (likelihood ratings) in
this study to avoid demand effects. Measuring the mediator
before the dependent variable will remind participants of
the mediator, therefore artificially amplifying the influence
of the mediator on the dependent variable (O’Brien &
Kardas, 2016). However, the ratings of the mediator might
be influenced by the ratings of the dependent variable in
such a measuring order. To exclude this possibility, we
examined two alternative reverse mediation models where
the likelihood ratings mediated justification.
The decision target was treated as the independent vari-
able, the likelihood ratings for impoverished option as a
potential mediator, and justification as the dependent vari-
able. The total effect of the decision target on justification
Ó 2017 Hogrefe Publishing
 J. Lu et al., Justifying Decisions
(A)
(B)
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
(C)
(D)
was significant, β = .39, p < .001. However, when both the
decision target and likelihood ratings for impoverished
option were included in the regression model to predict
justification, the effect of the decision target remained sig-
nificant, β = .33, p < .001 (Figure 3C). A Sobel test showed
that this mediating effect was not significant, Z = 1.93,
p = .054. Statistically, the p value (.054) suggested the
possibility that the likelihood ratings for impoverished
option mediated the effect of the decision target on justifi-
cation. However, logically, it is impossible that a participant
believed he or she should justify his or her decision when
he or she had chosen an impoverished option more than
when he or she had chosen an enriched option. Instead,
choosing an enriched option is perceived as something to
Ó 2017 Hogrefe Publishing
99
Figure 3. Mediation model (Study
2). Likelihood ratings indicate the
likelihood that the participants
choose an option (A–D). Standard-
ized coefficients and their signifi-
cances are reported. The total
effects of the independent variable
on the dependent variable are
reported in parentheses, and the
standardized coefficients when the
mediator is included in the model
are reported above the arrow.
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.
be justified more than choosing an impoverished one
(Simonson & Nowlis, 2000).
Finally, we tested a mediation model with the decision
target as the independent variable, the likelihood ratings
for enriched option as a potential mediator, and justification
as the dependent variable. The total effect of the decision
target on justification was significant, β = .39, p < .001.
When both the decision target and likelihood ratings for
enriched option were included in the regression model,
the effect of the decision target remained significant,
β = .42, p < .001 (Figure 3D). The mediating effect was
not significantly revealed by a Sobel test, Z =
0.96, p = .337.
Overall, these results indicated that the decision target
influenced the likelihood ratings for impoverished option
Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103
 100
through justification. Making decisions for others (vs. self)
promoted perceived justification, hence causing more
preferences for impoverished option. In addition, because
the participants in the self and other conditions did not differ
in ratings for task difficulty, regret, perceived responsibility,
and dialectical thinking, as reported in the section of
“manipulation check and control variables,” suggesting that
these variables were not influenced by the decision target,
we did not test their mediation roles in the relationship
between the decision target and preferences for impover-
ished and enriched options.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
General Discussion
Previous research has demonstrated preferences for impov-
erished over enriched options (Shafir et al., 1993; Simonson,
1989) because people attach more weight to negativity than
to positivity (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman,
2001). That is, individuals tend to avoid negative outcomes
brought by enriched options. The present research provides
evidence for such preference. Individuals opt for impover-
ished over enriched alternatives regardless of the decision
target.
Moreover, we shed light on the role of the decision
target, which is a factor that can increase the attractiveness
of impoverished options. People who make decisions for
others prefer impoverished over enriched options more
than those who make decisions for themselves. The self–
other difference in justification accounts for the aforemen-
tioned effect. People deciding for others believe that they
should justify the reasons for their decisions more than
those deciding for themselves. Therefore, people who
decide for others tend to choose impoverished options,
which are easier to justify than enriched options.
Extremeness Aversion
Extremeness aversion is a prevalent phenomenon that
refers to the tendency that people prefer middle options
over extreme options (Neumann, Böckenholt, & Sinha,
2016). For example, Options A and B have both advantages
and disadvantages. If Option C is added to make Option A
the middle option, then individuals are more inclined to
choose Option A over Option B or C. Nevertheless, the
decision target serves as a moderator. In particular, making
choices for others amplifies extremeness aversion (Chang
et al., 2011). The current research shows that the effect of
the decision target on extremeness aversion is not limited
to cases with three options. Even in cases with two options
(i.e., one is extreme and the other is average), people who
choose for others demonstrate higher extremeness aversion
than those who choose for themselves.
Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103
J. Lu et al., Justifying Decisions
An interesting question is whether the effect of the
decision target on extreme aversion can be generalized to
the case with only one option (either an extreme or average
option). In other words, whether there will be a difference
between joint and separate evaluations (Hsee, 1996).
We conducted a post-study to answer this question.
We invited 232 university students to participate in the
study. They were randomly assigned into one condition in
a 2 (decision target: self or other)  2 (option: enriched
or impoverished) between-participant design. The materials
were similar to those in Study 2, except that the participants
were presented with only one option (Table 3). The manip-
ulation check question asked who planned to go on a trip in
the scenario. Next, the participants indicated the likelihood
that they would choose this option from 1 (= unlikely) to
9 (= most likely). The raw data for post-study are provided
as Electronic Supplementary Material, ESM 3. As a result,
six participants who missed the manipulation check ques-
tion and 16 who failed the manipulation check were
excluded from the subsequent analysis. This failure rate
was acceptable (Steffel, Williams, & Perrmann-Graham,
2016). The results showed a main effect for option,
F(1, 206) = 7.79, p = .006, ηp2 = .04. The participants pre-
ferred impoverished (M = 4.83, SD = 1.68) over enriched
options (M = 4.10, SD = 2.26). The interaction between
the decision target and option was also significant,
F(1, 206) = 4.18, p = .042, ηp2 = .02. The participants in
the other condition preferred impoverished over enriched
options (Mimpoverished option = 5.25, SD = 1.81; Menriched option =
3.94, SD = 2.25) more than those in the self condition
(Mimpoverished option = 4.46, SD = 1.48; Menriched option = 4.25,
SD = 2.29). Therefore, our work extends extremeness
aversion in the case of making decisions for others not
only from three options to two options, but also from two
options to one option.
Ease of Justification
The results of the mediation analysis indicate that people
who make decisions for others believe that they should
explain the reasons for their decisions to others; therefore,
they choose impoverished options. These results are in line
with those of previous findings, thereby suggesting that
impoverished options are perceived as easier to justify than
enriched options (Simonson, 1989).
Notably, we provide a new explanation for this effect.
Prior research has shown that justifying options with
average attributes is easy because such options are safe
(Simonson, 1989). Thus, these options are chosen to cope
with uncertainty. We believe that people perceive that the
disadvantages of enriched options cannot be offset by their
advantages because of negativity bias. Thus, choosing
impoverished options is easier to justify.
Ó 2017 Hogrefe Publishing
 J. Lu et al., Justifying Decisions 101

Table 3. Information of hotels (post-study) with an enriched option because both have a higher
Attributes Hotel More black stars variance. Similarly, a riskless option is similar to an impov-
Version 1 erished option to a certain extent because both have a lower
Cost wwwIIIII Lower variance (Maimaran & Simonson, 2011).
Transportation wwwwwIII More convenient Our results show that people who make choices for
Room size wwwIIIII Larger others opt for impoverished over enriched options more
Bed size wwwwwIII Larger than those who make choices for themselves because the
Distance from spots wwwIIIII Closer former group prefers lower variance more than the latter
Check-in service speed wwwwwIII Faster group. From this logic, riskless options with lower variance
Version 2 should be more attractive for people who make decisions
Cost wIIIIIII Lower for others than to those who make decisions for them-
Transportation wwwwwwwI More convenient selves. In summary, the commonality that underlies self–
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Room size wIIIIIII Larger other differences in preferences for impoverished options
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Bed size wwwwwwwI Larger and risk preferences is the self–other difference in the
Distance from spots wIIIIIII Closer perceived attractiveness of the outcome variance.
Check-in service speed wwwwwwwI Faster
Version 3
Transportation wwwIIIII More convenient
Self–Other Decision Making
Cost wwwwwIII Lower and Invariance Violations
Bed size wwwIIIII Larger
Economists assert that invariance is a fundamental princi-
Room size wwwwwIII Larger
ple of rationality. Invariance refers to that preferences will
Check-in service speed wwwIIIII Faster
remain stable if the decision problem itself remains
Distance from spots wwwwwIII Closer
unchanged. However, this principle is severely challenged
Version 4
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). People violate the principle
Transportation wIIIIIII More convenient
of invariance because of cognitive limitations and environ-
Cost wwwwwwwI Lower
ment structures (Simon, 1990).
Bed size wIIIIIII Larger
Self–other differences in the trade-off between enriched
Room size wwwwwwwI Larger
and impoverished options observed in the current research
Check-in service speed wIIIIIII Faster
demonstrate invariance violations. The decision problem
Distance from spots wwwwwwwI Closer
itself is held constant (i.e., choosing between enriched
Note. Overall, more black stars indicated better performances.
and impoverished options). However, preferences change
with the decision target. The decision target reflects the
structures of the environment which cause preference
changes. Therefore, self–other differences in decision
New Perspective on Understanding making provide evidence for invariance violations.
Decisions Under Risk
Our findings are also pertinent to research on self–other
differences in risk preferences. Although the results are
Limitations and Future Directions
inconsistent to a certain extent, some studies have indi- Overall, the results of the two studies are consistent.
cated higher risk aversion for people who make choices Compared with the participants in the self condition, those
for others than those who make choices for themselves in the other condition tended to choose impoverished over
(Dore, Stone, & Buchanan, 2014; Stone, Choi, de Bruin, enriched options. However, differences still existed.
& Mandel, 2013). Our research provides a new perspective In Study 1, the likelihood ratings for enriched option
on understanding why making decisions for others facili- differed between two conditions, whereas the likelihood
tates risk aversion. ratings for impoverished option did not differ. Nevertheless,
Scholars define risk through outcome variance (Mishra, the likelihood ratings for both enriched and impoverished
2014). An option with a higher variance (e.g., gain $100 options differed between the two conditions in Study 2.
with a probability of .5; otherwise, gain nothing) is riskier Such divergence might be caused by two reasons. First,
than an option with a lower variance (e.g., gain $75 with the relatively small sample sizes in both studies did not
a probability of .5; otherwise, gain $25), assuming that both cover the individual differences in preferences. Second,
options have the same expected value (Mishra, Barclay, & the varying decision scenarios between the two studies
Lalumière, 2014). A risky option has something in common might cause the inconsistency. Future research should use

Ó 2017 Hogrefe Publishing Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103

 102
multiple decision scenarios to test the robustness of our
results.
Moreover, our results show that individuals who make
decisions for others believe that they should justify their
reasons to other people. We infer that perceived justifica-
tion promotes weight attached to negative aspects more
than positive aspects. However, we did not provide empir-
ical evidence for this inference. Hence, we call for further
research to measure cognitive focus on negative and
positive aspects by eye-tracking technique.
In addition, future research may manipulate perceived
justification to provide stronger evidence for the mediator
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
of justification. In particular, participants should be
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
explicitly asked to justify their decisions to others or not.
If self–other differences in preferences for impoverished
or enriched options diminish, then the role of justification
will be further verified. Another way to further test the role
of perceived justification is to make impoverished options
harder to justify and to make enriched options easier to jus-
tify. If perceived justification indeed mediates the effect of
the decision target on preferences for impoverished and
enriched options, self–other differences in preferences
should diminish because enriched options are more
justifiable in this condition.
Last, although people who make choices for themselves
do not need to provide reasons to others in some cases,
they should still justify their choices to themselves.
Therefore, the difference between justifying to oneself
and to another in preferences for impoverished options is
a topic worth investigating.
Practical Implications
The results presented in the current research are valuable
for both marketers and managers. For example, clothes
with extraordinary styles (i.e., enriched options) should be
targeted at consumers who purchase clothes for themselves
because such options are distinctive, but not accepted by
everyone. By contrast, clothes with conservative styles
(i.e., impoverished options) should be targeted at con-
sumers who select clothes for other people because these
options, although common, are easily accepted by most
people. That is, marketers should pay attention to the
decision targets of their customers to promote sales.
Furthermore, in the job market, some job seekers are
generalists who perform averagely in various tasks, whereas
others are specialists who do well in certain tasks but
poorly in others. Research has found that small companies
benefit from generalists, whereas large companies benefit
from specialists (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner,
1968). Our results indicate that small organizations may
outsource recruitment to headhunters because head-
hunters, who make decisions for others, prefer generalists.
Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103
J. Lu et al., Justifying Decisions
However, large organizations should ask their own recruit-
ing departments to select employees because these
departments, who make decisions for themselves, will
prefer specialists.
Acknowledgments
Jingyi Lu and Yiming Liang contributed equally to the paper.
This research was financially funded by the programs of
National Natural Science Foundation of China (71501073)
and “Chenguang Program” supported by Shanghai Educa-
tion Development Foundation and Shanghai Municipal
Education Commission (16CG29). We extend our sincere
gratitude to Tian-Yi Hu, Huiyuan Jia, and Qingzhou Sun
for their comments on an earlier version. We are also grate-
ful to Rong Dong for helping collect data.
Electronic Supplementary Materials
The electronic supplementary material is available with the
online version of the article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/
1864-9335/a000302
ESM 1. Data (.sav).
Raw data for Study 1.
ESM 2. Data (.sav).
Raw data for Study 2.
ESM 3. Data (.sav).
Raw data for the Post-Study.
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Received July 12, 2016
Revision received October 27, 2016
Accepted October 31, 2016
Published online April 28, 2017
Jingyi Lu
School of Psychology and Cognitive Science
East China Normal University
200062 Shanghai
PR China
jylu@psy.ecnu.edu.cn
Social Psychology (2017), 48(2), 92–103