REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PART X to XIV ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion to Quash filed by the accused on the two
Case Digests
Rule 117 Motion to Quash
1. Dimayacyac v. CA (2004)
FACTS:
An information for falsification of public documents was filed in the RTC of Quezon
City against Dimayacyac along with some others (the accused). It was alleged in the
information that the accused conspired together to falsify public documents and they
knew all the time that the documents were fake and spurious but used the same in the
Petition for Reconstitution of Records of the technical description of lots of the
Piedad Estate and the issuance of a title filed by Estrella Mapa. Pursuant to these
falsified documents, the certificates of title were transferred in the name of Mapa and
consequently enroached properties belonging to Gomez, Agbada, Agbada-Cruz, and
Aristorenas.
Before his arraignment, the accused moved to quash the information on two grounds,
namely: (1) officer who filed the information had no legal authority to do so and (2)
that more than one offense was charged in the information. Pending this motion, he
was arraigned. The judge to who the case was raffled to granted the motion upon the
second ground.
More than two years after the quashal, the prosecutor filed against the accused two
informations for falsification of public documents. This arose from the questioned
acts of the earlier quashed information. The accused filed a motion to quash thereof
on the ground of double jeopardy. But the judge to whom the two new informations
were raffled to held that the information involved a different document from the
previous and thus denied the motion to quash and ordered his arraignment.
Accused then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which denied the petition,
stating that since the first information was quashed based on more than one offense
charged, he is not placed in double jeopardy.
It was argued by the OSG that by filing the motion to quash and refusing to withdraw
it after he was arraigned, the accused had deemed to have waived his right against
double jeopardy since the motion to quash constituted his express consent for the
dismissal. But the OSG did have the view that the criminal case herein be dismissed
for inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
informations filed against him should be granted based on the ground of double
jeopardy. No, there is no ground for a motion to quash.
RATIO:
To raise the defense of double jeopardy three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as
that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e)
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
The SC had ruled in People v. Bugayong that when an appellant fails to file a motion
to quash within the time prescribed, he is deemed to have waived the defect in the
Information. It was also held in People v. Manalili that an accused who fails to object
to a prior arraignment to a duplicitous information may be found guilty of any or all
of the crimes alleged therein. A duplicitous information is valid since such defect
may be waived and the accused, because of such waiver, could be convicted of as
many offenses as those charged in the information and proved during trial.
In this case, the termination of the first criminal case was upon motion of the
accused. Accused is then deemed to have expressly given his consent to such
dismissal. There could be no double jeopardy in this case since one of the requisites
is absent.
As to whether the subsequent two informations constitute a violation of the accused’s
right to speedy disposition of cases, the SC held that it was not a violation. In this
case, no proof that accused was made to endure any vexatious process during the
2-year period before filing the proper informations. The right to speedy disposition is
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
In this case, there is no record to show what happened during the 2year period. It
cannot be ascertained that peculiar situations existed to prove that delay was
vexatious, capricious and oppressive. What the records do show is that accused never
asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case. It was only the OSG that
brought to light the issue.
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2. Soriquez v. Sandiganbayan (2005)
FACTS:
Petitioner Florante Soriquez, in his capacity as Program Director of Mt. Pinatubo
Rehabilitation-Project Management Office (MPR-PMO), along with nine others,
were charged with Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Specifically, petitioner and his
co-accused were indicted for having allegedly conspired, through evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence, in allowing the contractor, Atlantic Erectors, Inc., to
deviate from the plans and specifications of the contract in connection with the
construction of the Pasig-Potrero River Diking System, popularly known as the
Megadike. This breach of contract allegedly resulted in the collapse of the Megadike,
thereby causing damage and undue injury to the government.
On arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "Not Guilty". In the ensuing trial, the
prosecution presented its lone witness and it formally offered its documentary
evidence and rested its case. Instead of going forward with defensive evidence,
petitioner, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Dismiss),
substantially alleging that the evidence presented by the prosecution is grossly
insufficient to warrant his conviction, hence, he is entitled to an acquittal.
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Demurrer. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the same but was likewise denied by the same court. Hence, this
petition. Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to establish his participation in
the alleged conspiracy to violate the contract for the construction of the Megadike,
adding that the very observation of the respondent court itself that only a prima facie
case was established against him all the more warrants the dismissal of the charge
and his acquittal therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
denied accused-petitioner’s demurrer to evidence despite a finding that only a prima
facie case has been established by the prosecution.
RATIO:
NO. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
Given the sufficiency of the testimonial and documentary evidence against petitioner,
it would be premature at this stage of the proceedings to conclude that the
prosecution’s evidence failed to establish petitioner’s participation in the alleged
conspiracy to commit the crime. Likewise, the Court cannot, at this point, make a
categorical pronouncement that the guilt of petitioner has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. As there is competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment for the crime charged, it behooves petitioner to adduce evidence on his
behalf to controvert the asseverations of the prosecution. Hence, respondent court did
not gravely abuse its discretion when it found that there was a prima facie case
against petitioner warranting his having to go forward with his defensive evidence.
The determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence presented by
the prosecution as to establish a prima case against an accused is left to the exercise
of sound judicial discretion. Unless there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the trial court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss or a demurrer to evidence may not be disturbed
Petitioner implores the Supreme Court to review the evaluation made by respondent
court on the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Such a review cannot be
secured in a petition for certiorari and prohibition which is not available to correct
mistakes in the judge’s findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of
law and fact. It should be noted that an order denying a demurrer to evidence is
interlocutory and, thus, not appealable. When such an adverse interlocutory order is
rendered, the remedy is not to resort to certiorari or prohibition but to continue with
the case in due course and when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an
appeal in the manner authorized by law.
This rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions, as when the assailed interlocutory
order is patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion. In the present
case, however, the Court is not inclined to agree with the petitioner that the
respondent court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence is erroneous or tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
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3. People v. Bautista (Pamie)
April 27, 2007 | AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. | Motion to Quash
PETITIONER: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENT: CLEMENTE BAUTISTA
SUMMARY: On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between Bautista and Goyena. On
August 16, 1999, Goyena filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor a Complaint
for slight physical injuries. After preliminary investigation, a Joint Resolution was
issued recommending the filing of an Information. Such recommendation was
approved by the City Prosecutor, but the date of such approval cannot be found in
the records. The Information was filed with MeTC Manila only on June 20, 2000.
Bautista sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that when the Information
was filed, the 60-day prescription period from the date of the commission of the
crime, June 12, 1999, had already elapsed. He argues that upon approval of the
investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an information, the
period of prescription began to run again.
ISSUE: Did the prescriptive period begin to run anew after the investigating
prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal information against
Bautista was approved by the City Prosecutor? NO. The proceedings against
Bautista was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The
prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or
acquitted by the proper court.
DOCTRINE: It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the
fiscal’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
(Note: No discussion on motion to quash)
FACTS:
1. On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between Clemente Bautista and his
co-accused Leonida Bautista, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr..
2. When no settlement was reached at the barangay level, the barangay
chairman issued a Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
3. On August 16, 1999, Goyena filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor a
Complaint for slight physical injuries against the 2 accused. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Junsay-Ong issued a
Joint Resolution recommending the filing of an Information against
Bautista. Such recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, but
the date of such approval cannot be found in the records.
4. The Information was filed with MeTC Manila only on June 20, 2000.
5. Bautista sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that
when the Information was filed, the 60-day prescription period from the
date of the commission of the crime, June 12, 1999, had already elapsed.
6. MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.
7. He elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but the RTC
concurred with the opinion of the MeTC.
8. Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
9. CA held that the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the
Goyena filed a Complaint with the OCP on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless,
the offense had prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the
MeTC. Although the approval of the Joint Resolution bears no date, it
effectively terminated the proceedings at the OCP. Hence, even if the
10-day period for the CP to act on the resolution is extended up to the
utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as late as the last day of the year
1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on June 20, 2000,
or already nearly 6 months into the next year.
10. Under Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was "unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very
much more than the prescriptive period of only two (2) months. The offense
charged had, therefore, already prescribed when filed with the court on June
20, 2000.
11. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the People of the
Philippines assailing the Decision of the CA.
12. The CA and Bautista are of the view that upon approval of the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an information against
respondent, the period of prescription began to run again.
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 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

ISSUE: Did the prescriptive period begin to run anew after the investigating
prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal information against Bautista
was approved by the City Prosecutor? NO

RATIO:
1. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. Computation of prescription of
offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
2. It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office
suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
3. The proceedings against Bautista was not terminated upon the City
Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that
an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains
tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted
by the proper court.
4. The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the
information but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the
interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte, it is
unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the
offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint.
5. The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked
here considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary
investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the Information after the
City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the investigating
prosecutor to file the information.
6. The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors’ apparent lack of a sense of
urgency in fulfilling their mandate. Under the circumstances, the more
appropriate course of action should be the filing of an administrative
disciplinary action against the erring public officials.

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 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

04. Jadewell vs. Lidua (ALEX) DOCTRINEs:

07 Oct. 2013 | Leonen, J. | Motion to Quash-Prescription
With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only
statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws
PETITIONER: JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive
represented by its manager and authorized representative Norma Tan period, and the law does not provide any other distinction.
RESPONDENT: HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of
The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, the running of the
EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court
and not on any date before that.
SUMMARY:
Jadewell filed a complaint-affidavit against the private respondents for robbery The proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act. 3326 are "judicial proceedings”.
of a clamp with fines and penalties. OCP found probable cause only for violation The recent People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not
of Sec. 21 of City Ordinance 003-2000 and filed the corresponding informations. controlling as far as special laws are concerned. However, the doctrine of
Private respondents filed a Motion to Quash on the following grounds: Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the
Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges
FACTS:
on respondents with more than one offense. Respondent Judge granted the
1. Jadewell is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the
Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases. Jadewell filed a MR arguing that the
parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to a City Ordinance. It is also authorized
filing of a Complaint with the OCP tolled the prescription period of two months.
to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the
However, the Judge upheld the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash.
vehicle is illegally parked.
Jadewell then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC. The
2. Jadewell alleged that the respondents dismantled, took and carried away the
RTC dismissed.
clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Car. The car was then illegally parked
Issue: WON the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp is
on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense
₱26,250.00. The fines of ₱500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of
charged? - NO. The crime has prescribed.
₱500.00 were also not paid by the respondents.
Held: With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the
3. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special
Baguio City on May 23, 2003. A preliminary investigation took place.
laws and municipal ordinances. It is now without question that it is two months
4. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell
for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000. The procedural rules
president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of
that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Under
Authority/Grave Coercion
Section 9, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without
5. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause against the respondents
need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation". The case
for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 and filed the
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
corresponding informations in Court.
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the
6. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually
Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or
filed in court and not on any date before that.
liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged
5

an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one
offense.
7. Respondent Judge granted the Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
8. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
9. The respondent Judge upheld the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash.
10. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional
Trial Court.
11. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May
23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense
charged? - NO. The crime has prescribed.
RATIO:
Petitioner:
1. The prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No.
3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a
city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo
that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This
is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other
chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor
unless otherwise provided in their charters.
Respondent’s Comment:
2. Respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on
prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they
raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted no
offense and that respondents were charged with more than one offense, were
sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioner’s Reply:
3. The respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of prescription,
since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order
dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on which
the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings
contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in light of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
The Petition is denied.
4. The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law
and the procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to
the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and
municipal ordinances.
5. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does
not provide any other distinction. With regard to the period of prescription, it is
now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under City
Ordinance 003-2000.
6. The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code. The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure1.
7. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 11), only the
filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is
involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the
rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
8. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow
that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
9. Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation". The case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides
to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court
and not on any date before that.
1
SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the <MTCs> in the following
cases falling within their jurisdiction:
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances
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 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

10. This interpretation is in consonance with Act No. 3326 which says that the
period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that
they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
11. At any rate, the Court feels that if there is a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights." Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
12. The recent People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not
controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other
cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan
pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.

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5. People v. Court of Appeals and Florece (Anne)
November 16, 2011 | Reyes, J.| Rule 117, Sec.7- Double Jeopardy
PETITIONER: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, FELIX FLORECE, JOSE
FLORECE, AND JUSTINO FLORECE
RESPONDENT: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND SOCORRO FLORECE
SUMMARY: An information for falsification of public documents was filed
against spouses Hilario and Socorro Florece in the MCTC of Camarines Sur after
finding of probable cause.. The falsification involves the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale transferring title of a parcel of land to Hilario’s parents. The MCTC
rendered a Judgment convicting Hilario and Socorro of the crime charged because
the accused Hilario and Socorro, being in possession of and having made use of the
alleged falsified deed of sale, are presumed to be the material authors of the
falsification. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC and denied the MR.
Hilario having passed away, Socorro filed a petition for review with the CA
asserting that the RTC erred in affirming her conviction of the crime charged. The
CA rendered the decision in favor of the accused and acquitted Socorro of the
crime charged ruling that they were never parties to the execution of the deed and
so they are not to be presumed as forgers. The petitioners instituted the instant
petition for review on certiorari before the CA on the ground of extrinsic fraud
The issue here is WON the CA had committed reversible error and/or grave abuse
of discretion in reversing the Decision of the RTC which convicted Socorro. NO.
The instant petition for review on certiorari was not filed on time. Moreover, the
review of the findings of the CA acquitting Socorro of the charge against her is not
warranted under the circumstances as it runs afoul of the avowed constitutional
right of an accused against double jeopardy.
DOCTRINE:
A verdict of acquittal is immediately final, and a re-examination of the merits of
such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the
same offense.
FACTS:
1. The instant case stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by the petitioners
against Hilario and his wife Socorro for falsification of public documents
punishable under Article 172 of the Penal Code.
2. In the complaint, the petitioners alleged that they are the children heirs of
the late spouses Gavino and Clara Florece, who were the registered owners
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
of a parcel of land in Camarines Sur.
3. After the death of their parents, the petitioners, together with their other
siblings, orally partitioned said parcel of land amongst themselves.
4. Sometime in 2003, Felix decided to erect a nipa hut in said parcel of land.
However, Hilario protested the same, claiming that said parcel of land was
already registered under his name and that he acquired the same by virtue of
a deed of transfer from his parents.
5. Hilario's parents, in turn, acquired the property from the petitioners as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
6. Claiming that they never executed said Deed of Absolute Sale, the
petitioners filed a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office,
which after finding probable cause to indict Hilario and Socorro for
falsification of public document under Article 172 of the Penal Code, filed
the corresponding Information with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Nabua-Bato, Camarines Sur.
7. The MCTC of Nabua-Bato rendered a Judgment convicting Hilario and
Socorro of the crime charged. The MCTC of NabuaBato opined that
accused Hilario and Socorro, being in possession of and having made use of
the alleged falsified deed of sale, are presumed to be the material authors of
the falsification.
8. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision and denied the MR.
9. Meanwhile, accused Hilario passed away. Thereafter, Socorro filed a
Petition for Review with the CA asserting that the RTC of Iriga City erred
in affirming her conviction of the crime charged.
10. Socorro asserted that the prosecution failed to prove that she indeed
falsified the questioned deed and that her conviction for the offense charged
was merely based on presumption. The CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision, acquitting Socorro of the crime charged. The CA concurred with
the lower courts insofar as their finding that the prosecution was able to
prove that the questioned deed was indeed forged. Nevertheless, the CA
pointed out that Hilario and Socorro were not parties and were never shown
to have participated in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and thus,
could not be presumed to be the forgers thereof.
11. The petitioners instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari before
the CA on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA had committed reversible error and/or grave abuse
of discretion in reversing the Decision of the RTC which convicted Socorro.
RULING: Petition DENIED..
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 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

RATIO:
1. None of the foregoing circumstances exist that would justify a finding that
extrinsic fraud was extant in the proceedings before the CA.
2. The records would show that in the CA, the respondent complainant was the
People of the Philippines represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). The OSG had in fact participated in the proceedings before the CA.
3. The fact that the herein petitioners were not able to participate in the
proceedings before the CA is immaterial. Insofar as the petitioners are
concerned, they were not parties to the criminal case. The petitioners, as
private complainants in the case, were merely witnesses for the prosecution.
Thus, the People of the Philippines was not prevented from fully exhibiting
its case before the CA. While there may be instances where a private
complainant or offended party in a criminal case may be allowed to file a
petition directly with this Court, as when there is a denial of due process,
the foregoing circumstance is not extant here.
4. The instant petition for review on certiorari was not filed on time. A petition
for review on certiorari must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
judgment. The bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a
magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural
rules.
5. IMPORTANT: The review of the findings of the CA acquitting Socorro of
the charge against her is not warranted under the circumstances as it runs
afoul of the avowed constitutional right of an accused against double
jeopardy. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final, and a re-examination
of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the
accused in jeopardy for the same offense.

9

6. Fuertes v. Senate (Marcelo)
January 07, 2020 | Leonen, J. | Motion to Quash - Timeliness
PETITIONER: DEVIE ANN ISAGA FUERTES, PETITIONER
RESPONDENT: THE SENATE OF PHILIPPINES, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL
SUMMARY:
Accused is a member of Tau Gamma Sigma that was allegedly present at
an initiation rights, which caused the death of Chester Abracia. An
Information was filed on October 20, 2008, charging the 46 members of
Tau Gamma Phi and Tau Gamma Sigma for violation of Republic Act No.
8049. This included Fuertes. Even before her arraignment and merely after
the information has been issued, Fuertes filed a Petition for Certiorari
before Supreme Court, raising the sole issue of the unconstitutionality of
Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law. At the time, she had not yet been
arraigned and was at large. The issue is whether a petition for certiorari is
the proper remedy? No. A motion to quash is.
DOCTRINE:
A motion to quash an information may be filed at any time before a plea is
entered by the accused. The accused may move to quash an information on
constitutional grounds, based on the theory that there can be no crime if
there is no law, the law being invalid (nullum crimen sine lege).
Further, the relief Fuertes is asking from the SC would have been
addressed by a mere MTQ with the court of origin. Fuertes recognizes that
the issue of the constitutionality of the Anti-Hazing Law's provisions is not
incompatible with the quashal of the Information. Aside from her bare
invocation that her substantive rights are being derogated, petitioner fails
to explain the necessity and urgency of her direct resort to this Court.
FACTS:
1. Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes (Fuertes) is among the 46 accused in Criminal
Case No. 2008-895. She and her co-accused had been charged with
violating the Anti-Hazing Law for the death of Chester Paolo Abracia
(Abracia) due to injuries he allegedly sustained during the initiation rites
of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. Fuertes is a member of the fraternity's
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
sister sorority, Tau Gamma Sigma, and was allegedly present at the
premises during the initiation rites.
2. Abracia died on or about August 2, 2008 in Tayabas City, Quezon. An
Information was filed on October 20, 2008, charging the 46 members of
Tau Gamma Phi and Tau Gamma Sigma for violation of Republic Act
No. 8049.
3. Relevant part the Information, to wit:
a. That on or about the 2nd day of August 2008, [...], Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all active members
of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity and Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority,
acting conspiracy with one another, without prior written notice
to the proper school authorities of Manuel S. Enverga
University Foundation, Inc. (MSEUF) made seven (7) days
prior to aforementioned date and in the absence of the school's
assigned representatives during the initiation perform and
conduct initiation rite on the person of neophyte and herein
deceased victim Chester Paolo Abracia as a prerequisite for his
admission into membership in the said fraternity by hazing
accomplished through subjection to physical suffering or injury,
to wit: by successively hitting his body, using paddle and fist
blows, thereby [inflicting] upon him contusion and abrasion
located on his chest, abdomen, leg and thigh which resulted to
cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to pulmonary embolism and
acute myocardial infarction which is the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.
4. Fuertes, a member of Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, admitted that she was
at the premises during the initiation rites. She was then 17 years old and
was a student of Manuel S. Enverga University Foundation.
5. On August 1, 2013, Fuertes filed a Petition for Certiorari before the SC,
raising the sole issue of the unconstitutionality of Sections 3 and 4 of the
Anti-Hazing Law. At the time, she had not yet been arraigned and
was at large.
6. She insists that Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law violate Sections
1, 14, and 22 of the Constitution. She claims that the Anti-Hazing Law
presumes that there is a conspiracy to commit murder or homicide.
Further, the Anti-Hazing Law treats persons as principals or
co-conspirators simply because of their presence at an initiation rite, or
while they are an active member of the fraternity or sorority, even if one
did not know, or actually participate, in the act that caused the crime
10

charged. She argues that she and other members of Tau Gamma Sigma
should not have been charged, there being no showing that they knew, or
actually participated in the hazing which led to the death of Abracia
7. Fuertes likewise claims that Sections 3 and 4 are a bill of attainder — a
legislative act declaring persons guilty of a crime without judicial trial—
because they treat members of a particular group as principals or
co-conspirators, even if they have no actual knowledge or participation in
the act. She argues that in imposing these provisions, Congress has
abrogated judicial power upon itself, since the determination of the
degree of participation in a crime is a judicial, and not legislative,
function.
8. To raise defenses, Fuertes filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sections 5 and 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law should be
declared unconstitutional. No. This is a disputable presumption.
2. [Remedial Law Issue] Whether Fuertes’ petition for Certiorari with the
SC is the proper recourse? No. A MTQ would have been her proper
remedy.
RATIO:
On Issue 2 on Remedial Law:
1. Petitioner's direct resort to this Court, when there is a perfectly
competent trial court before which she may raise her constitutional
question, abrogates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
2. The SC reiterates the exemptions, namely:
a. First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the
most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes
availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail
On Issue 1:
the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive
branches of the government.
b. A second exception is when the issues involved are of
transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence and
clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to
constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly
faced with the need for substantial protection.
c. Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this
court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists
that will guide the lower courts on this matter.
d. Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this
court.
3. None of the exemptions apply in this case.
4. Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief
can be obtained in the lower Courts. This holds especially true when
questions of fact are raised. Unlike this Court, trial courts and the Court
of Appeals are better equipped to resolve questions of fact. They are in
the best position to deal with causes in the first instance.
5. A motion to quash an information may be filed at any time before a plea
is entered by the accused. The accused may move to quash an
information on constitutional grounds, based on the theory that there can
be no crime if there is no law, the law being invalid (nullum crimen sine
lege).
6. Further, the relief Fuertes is asking from the SC would have been
addressed by a mere MTQ with the court of origin. Fuertes recognizes
that the issue of the constitutionality of the Anti-Hazing Law's provisions
is not incompatible with the quashal of the Information. Aside from her
bare invocation that her substantive rights are being derogated, petitioner
fails to explain the necessity and urgency of her direct resort to this
Court.
7. But in any event, pursuant to judicial economy, SC said that it will also
resolve the substantive issues.
1. The constitutional presumption of innocence is not violated when there is
a logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed. When such prima facie evidence is unexplained or not
contradicted by the accused, the conviction founded on such evidence
will be valid. However, the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The existence of a disputable
presumption does not preclude the presentation of contrary evidence.
11
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

2. Here, the mere filing of an Information against petitioner and her fellow
sorority members is not a finding of their guilt of the crime charged.
Contrary to her claim, petitioner is not being charged merely because she
is a member of the Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, but because she is
allegedly a principal by direct participation in the hazing that led to
Abracia's death. As stated, these are matters for the trial court to decide.
The prosecution must still prove these offense, and the accused's
participation in it, beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner, in turn, may
present her defenses to the allegations.

12

Rule 119 Trial
1. Cabador v. People (Marian)
2 Oct. 2009 | J. Abad | Demurrer, Rule 119
PETITIONER: Antonio Cabador
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines
SUMMARY: The public prosecutor accused Cabador before the RTC of Quezon
City of murder. On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over
five years of intermittent trial, the RTC required the prosecution to make a written
or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. But the
public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time. Still, the prosecution did not
make the required written offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case,
complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention
in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further, he claimed that in the
circumstances, the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had
not been formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did
not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.
On August 31, 2006, the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s motion
to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave
of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his
defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision. Cabador
questioned the RTCs actions before the CA. The latter denied his petition and
affirmed the lower courts actions. Petitioner seek the help of Supreme Court via a
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss before the trial court
was in fact a demurrer to evidence. — No, it is not.
RULING:
Supreme Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. In
criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the
accused’s right to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable,
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified
postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.
It can be said that petitioner Cabador took pains to point out how trial in the case
had painfully dragged on for years. The gaps between proceedings were long, with
hearings often postponed because of the prosecutors absence. This was further
compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecutions repeated motions for extension of
time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within such time. Cabador then
invoked his right to speedy trial. But the RTC and the CA simply chose to ignore
these extensive averments and altogether treated Cabadors motion as a demurrer to
evidence.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any
demurrer and the prosecution was not yet deemed to have rested its case on that
date. He did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to
show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime
charged. His so-called demurrer did not touch on any particular testimony of even
one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Thus, the petitioner’s motion to
dismiss cannot be treated as a demurrer to evidence.
DOCTRINE: “Demurrer to Evidence” and “Motion to Dismiss,” Distinguished;
Pleadings and Practice; to determine whether the pleading filed is a demurrer to
evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it
made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the
primary objective of the party filing it.
A demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case;
where the accused filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the
prosecution’s formal offer before the trial court could act on the offer, and before
the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had intended his
motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.
FACTS:
1. The public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador of murdering, in
conspiracy with others, Atty Jun N. Valerio.
13

2. After presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the
RTC declared at an end the prosecution’s presentation of evidence.
3. Petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case
a. He complains of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case since his
arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy
trial.
b. He claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not
consider any evidence against him that had not been formally
offered.
c. He also pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did not have
knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.
4. RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss as a
demurrer to evidence.
a. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC
declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his
defense. T
5. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision insofar as he was
concerned.
6. Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied
it.
7. CA: Cabador questioned the RTC’s actions but CA denied his petition and
affirmed the lower court’s actions.
8. SC: With the CA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner came
to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial court was in
fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that
he effectively waived his right to present evidence in his defense and
submitted the case for decision insofar as he was concerned. — NO.
RATIO:
1. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be
considered submitted for judgment. On occasions, this presents a problem
such as when, like the situation in this case, the accused files a motion to
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a demurrer to evidence.
Cabador insists that it is not one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled that
it is.
2. This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections that, to determine
whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss,
the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the
stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of
the party filing it.
3. In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial
of the accused’s right to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by
unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused,
or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.15
This was the main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the
right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
4. Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in
paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12, saying that the trial court "has no evidence to
consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and that "the witnesses x x x
had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the
accused in the incident." But these were mere conclusions, highlighting
what five years of trial had accomplished.
5. The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in
any demurrer. He did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented
against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the
elements of the crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on
any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary
exhibit. Indeed, he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution
finally made its formal offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his motion
to dismiss. To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to
the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming
that he had touched a wall.
6. Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already
rested its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, reads:
a. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
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 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed

by the accused with or without leave of court.
b. Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on
August 1, 2006, the same day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss,
the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to
the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal
offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be
deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion to
dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer,
before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the
prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had
intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.
7. In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that
petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of
his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot be declared
to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.

15

2. Ampatuan v. De Lima (2013)
FACTS:
For the Maguindanao massacre, NBI and PNP charged more than a hundred
suspects. One of the principal suspects was petitioner Ampatuan. Ampatuan pleaded
not guilty to each of the 41 information for murder when he was arraigned.
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged
196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. In
issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied
on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag (both dated December 7, 2009).
Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ on August
13, 2010.
On October 14, 2010, Ampatuan, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of
Justice De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Fadullon to request the
inclusion of Dalandag in the information for murder considering that Dalandag had
already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn
declarations. Ampatuan reiterated the request twice more but Secretary De Lima
denied Ampatuan’s request. Ampatuan brought a petition for mandamaus in the RTC
in Manila seeking to compel De Lima to charge Dalandag as another accused in the
various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC. RTC dismissed the petition for
mandamus. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Lima et al may be compelled by writ of mandamus to
charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. No.
RATIO:
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or
information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions,
one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state
witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a
state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section
17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with
Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act).
These modes are intended to encourage a person who has witnessed a crime or who
has knowledge of its commission to come forward and testify in court or
quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting him from
reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government
as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of
his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges. All the
conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he
admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no
hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness,
for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he
could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as
to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to
testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his
discharge against those now charged for the crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which
it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted
to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to
take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion
is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in
the exercise of judgment or discretion.
16
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

3. People v. Fuentes (2016)

FACTS:
Accused-Appellant Fuentes (“Fuentes”) is charged for allegedly raping his niece
(AAA). After filing the case, AAA executed an Affidavit of Desistance. Upon
arraignment, Fuentes pleaded not guilty. During the trial, AAA expressly renounced
the said Affidavit of Desistance. Subsequently, the trial court found Fuentes guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In its decision,
the CA upheld the express renunciation of the affidavit based on her AAA’s
explanation that she was merely lured by the wife of Fuentes into signing the
affidavit in exchange for sending her to school. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the renunciation of the Affidavit of Desistance must be

considered by the Supreme Court in reversing the judgment of conviction against
Fuentes.

RATIO:
NO. Jurisprudence has regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable because it
can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation
or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would
later on be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be indeterminable.
Indeed, in the present case, the Supreme Court cited the observation of the CA that
the affidavit executed by AAA is highly suspect. Particularly, the CA noted that
during the trial, AAA expressly renounced the affidavit. Furthermore, she was able
to explain why she executed the same. The document was a product of compulsion
and influence on the part of her aunt (appellant’s wife) to force her to sign the
document in exchange for the offer that she will be sent to school until she finishes
her education. Thus, the affidavit should not be given any probative value by the
court in determining the guilt of the accused Fuentes in this case.

17
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

4. People v. Densurto (2016)
FACTS:
Two informations were filed against Bensurto for willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously having carnal knowledge with his 9-year old daughter (AAA) against her
will on Feb. 1999 and June 2000. AAA was only able to tell her mother, BBB, of the
rape on November 2000 since Bensurto made death threats upon her and BBB.
Bensurto offered denial, alibi and no ill motive as defenses alleging that AAA was
merely forced to file the criminal case against him because he knew of his wife’s
affair with her paramour and that she wanted to escape from Bensurto for fear that he
would kill her together with her paramour.
AAA testified during trial but after more than 7 years, she retracted her previous
testimony that she was raped by Bensurto, stating that she was not raped rather
dictated by her mother to fabricate the rape charges.
On 2011, RTC convicted Bensurto of 2 counts of qualified rape under Art. 266-A of
the RPC notwithstanding the recantation of AAA. CA dismissed Bensurto’s appeal
after giving credence to AAA’s corroborative AAA’s testimony and presence of
healed lacerations. CA held that a recantation or an affidavit of desistance should be
viewed with suspicion and reservation. All the more so as the recantation in this case
was made only 7 years from date of AAA’s last testimony. Hence, the present appeal.
SC upheld the CA’s reasoning that AAA’s testimony for the prosecution was more
credible and more worthy of belief rather than her recantation made in open court by
testifying for the SC has ruled that when a rape victim’s testimony is straightforward
and marked with consistency despite examination, it deserves full faitha nd
confidence and cannot be discarded. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does
not necessarily vitiate her original testimony.
Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be
truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. Before allowing
the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing to accept it, but must test
its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely
affected to cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the
recantation and the motivations for it.||| The recantation, like any other testimony, is
subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances,
including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand.

ISSUE: whether or not prosection was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt

RATIO:
The Court held in the affirmative and dismissed the appeal. The Court held that all
the elements of rape under paragraph (1) (a) of Art. 266-A were present. AAA’s clear
testimony as corroborated by medical findings show beyond reasonable doubt that
AAA was already in a non-virginal state after the rape. Such is sufficient foundation
to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.

The Court is also not persuaded by appellant's contention that AAA's delay in
reporting the crime indicates that the accusations against him are false. Delay in
prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Furthermore, on
account of AAA’s lack of resistance, such absence does not tarnish AAA’s testimony
as raised by the accused. Resistance is not an element of the crime of rape.

18
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

5. Republic v. De Borja (2017)

FACTS:
The case stemmed from a Complaint filed by the Republic, represented by the
PCGG, before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for the recovery of ill-gotten assets allegedly
amassed during the administration of the late President Marcos. Republic claimed
that De Borja collected the address commissions which were supposedly due to the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). De Borja is the nephew of the Chairman
of the PNOC. De Borja filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which was granted by the SB.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SB committed reversible error in granting De Borja's
Demurrer to Evidence.
The insinuations of the Republic in the instant Petition can best be described as
speculative, conjectural, and inconclusive at best. Nothing in the testimony of Verano
reasonably points, or even alludes, to the conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy
or conduit of Velasco in receiving address commissions from vessel owners.
The Court found that the evidence adduced was wholly insufficient to support the
allegations of the Complaint before the SB. Thus, for failure of the Republic to show
any right to the relief sought, the Court affirmed the SB in granting the Demurrer to
Evidence.

RATIO:
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. It is a remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence
produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make
out a case or sustain an issue. The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to establish a prima facie case.

Case law has defined "burden of proof" as the duty to establish the truth of a given
proposition or issue by such quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at
which the issue arises. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his case by preponderance of evidence.

In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of "preponderance of

evidence" because it is filed prior to the defendant's presentation of evidence; it is
precisely the office of a demurrer to evidence to expeditiously terminate the case
without the need of the defendant's evidence. Hence, what is crucial is the
determination as to whether the plaintiff’s evidence entitles it to the relief sought.

The only evidence presented with respect to De Borja’s liability were the testimony
of Verano and the affidavit of one Jose M. Reyes. With respect to the affidavit of
Jose M. Reyes, his non-appearance before the SB due to his untimely demise
rendered the same inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay, as correctly observed
by the SB.

19
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

6. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People (2017)
FACTS:
Sandiganbayan denied GMA’s demurrer to evidence. GMA sought review of the
denial of the demurrer before the higher courts. The Supreme Court eventually
granted GMA’s petition, reversing the denial of the demurrer to evidence. Now, the
People are seeking reconsideration of the disposition of the Supreme Court on the
following grounds: (1) granting due course to the review of the denial of demurrer to
evidence violates the Rules since it provides the denials of demurrer may not be
questioned on appeal or certiorari before judgment; (2) the Court committed grave
errors which deprive the State of due process.
ISSUE: Whether the grant of due course (and subsequently granting) the demurrer to
evidence filed by GMA is valid.
RATIO:
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because
the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers
to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we shall
soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence
of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and
despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.
In any case, the motion for reconsideration should not be granted since to do so
would put the petitioner-accused in double jeopardy. The demurrer to evidence in
criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had rested its
case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer
to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the
same offense bars not only a new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in
the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such, every acquittal becomes final
immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment.
With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for
reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the
petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their acquittal.

We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition contained in
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is not an insuperable obstacle to the
review by the Court of the denial of the demurrer to evidence through certiorari. We
have had many rulings to that effect in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v.
Sandiganbayan,4the Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the
proper remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.

20

7. Napoles v. Sandiganbayan (2018)
FACTS:
On 20 December 2017, Janet Napoles (Napoles) filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Supreme Court’s decision dated 7 November 2017, which dismissed her
petition and affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s (SB) resolution. The assailed SC decision
upheld the SB’s resolutions dated 16 October 2015 and 2 March 2016, denying
Napoles’ application for bail, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the SB’s part.
Napoles now invokes the ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, promulgated 19
July 2016. In that case, the SC reversed SB’s denial of the demurrer to evidence in
the plunder case against former president Arroyo (GMA) based on the prosecution’s
failure to specify the identity of the main plunderer, for whose benefit the ill-gotten
wealth was amassed, accumulated, and acquired. According to Napoles, that case
should have been applied to her case. Hence, this MR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo should have been made
applicable to Napoles’ case? No, a demurrer to evidence and a petition for bail have
different standard of proof required.
RATIO:
In a demurrer to evidence, as in the Macapagal-Arroyo case, the accused imposes a
challenge on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s entire evidence. This involves a
determination of whether the evidence presented by the prosection has established
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Should the trial court find the prosecution’s evidence
insufficient, the grant of the demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the acquittal of the
accused.
The stage at which the accused may demur to the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence is during the trial on the merits itself—particularly, after the prosecution
has rested its case. This should be distinguished from the hearing for the petition for
bail, in which the trial court does not sit to try the merits of the main case; neither
does it speculate on the ultimate outcome of the criminal charge. In the case of Atty.
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, the SC explained the difference between preliminary
determination of guilt of the accused in a petition for bail, and the proceedings
during the trial proper: In a petition for bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail.
The court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight that ought
to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome
of the trial or on what further evidence may be offered. It may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to
a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are
not essential to the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of 2 separate petitions for bail by 2 accused will of course avoid
duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes
the prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants for bail are charged of
having conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces
essentially the same evidence against them. But, the SC said that in the Serapio case,
the joinder of the hearings of Serapio and former president Estrada, in the hearing of
Serapio’s petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a completely different dimension;
the proceedings will no longer be summary and as against Estrada, the proceedings
will be a full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. With the
joinder of the hearing of Serapio’s petition for bail and trial of Estrada, the latter will
have the right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for the
prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of Serapio. If Serapio will adduce
evidence in support of his petition after the prosecution shall have concluded its
evidence, Estrada may insist on cross-examining Serapio and his witnesses. The
joinder of the hearing of Serapio’s bail petition with Estrada’s trial will be prejudicial
to Serapio as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of Serapios’ right to
obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from the SC if his petition is denied by the
SB.
The SC has discussed in its decision that the trial court is required to conduct a
hearing on the petition for bail whenever the accused is charged with a capital
offense. While mandatory, the hearing may be summary and the trial court may deny
the bail application on the basis of evidence less than that necessary to establish the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. In this hearing, the trial court’s inquiry
is limited to whether there is evident proof that the accused is guilty of the offense
21
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

charged. This standard of proof is different from that applied in a demurrer to

evidence, which measures the prosecution’s entire evidence against the required
moral certainty for the conviction of the accused.

The distinction between the required standards of proof precludes the application of
Macapagal-Arroyo in this case. The SB’s denial of the demurrer to evidence in
Macapagal- Arroyo was annulled based on the paucity of the prosecution’s evidence,
which failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that GMA was the mastermind of the
conspiracy to commit plunder. There was a final determination of GMA’s innocence
of the crime charged. In this case, the issue that the SC resolved in its decision was
whether the SB gravely abused its discretion in denying Napoles’ bail application.
This involved a preliminary determination of her eligibility to provisional liberty.
Resolution of this issue does not involve an inquiry as to whether there was proof
beyond reasonable doubt that Napoles or her co-accused was the main plunderer for
whose benefit the ill-gotten wealth was amassed or accumulated. These are matters
of defense best left to the SB’s discretion in the resolution of the criminal case. It was
sufficient that the denial of Napoles’ bail application was based on evidence
establishing a great presumption of guilt on Napoles’ part.

22

8. Go v. People (Sel ℅ Bam)
18 July 2012 | Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Sec. 15 Rule 119 - Deposition
PETITIONER: Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go
RESPONDENTS: People of the PH and Highdone Co. Ltd. et al.
SUMMARY:
Sometime in 1996, the petitioners defrauded Highdone Company Ltd. by
mortgaging their equipment installed and fixed in the BGB Industrial Textile
Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone even if the same
were already foreclosed by Chinabank in 1994.
Li Luen Ping, representing Highdone Co. Ltd as the main witness, is a frail old
man who had to travel back to PH and attend the initial hearing but was unable
to do so and caused the trial dates to be postponed. The private prosecutor then
filed Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping abroad as he was being
treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital and could not travel
based on the advice of the doctor.
The issue in this case is whether the prosecution’s witness may be deposed
abroad. - No SC held that in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where
the case is pending. Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial trial
proceeding. Li is a non-resident alien who can leave without definite date of
return and his health condition should be unmistakably apparent. Thus, the
prosecution should have taken his deposition before the MeTC.
DOCTRINE:
In criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged
before the MeTC of Manila for other deceits under Art. 318 of the RPC.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
2. Sometime in 1996, the accused allegedly defrauded Highdone Company
Ltd. when they fraudulently represented to Li Luen Ping that they had
chattels (machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials) installed and
fixed in the BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan
Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) and mortgaged them for $ 464,266.90 or
Php 20,892,010.50 in favor of ML Resources and Highdone Co. Ltd even
when the chattels were already foreclosed by Chinabank as early as 1994.
3. The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old
businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled back to the Philippines in order
to attend the hearing. The trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his
unavailability.
4. The private prosecutor filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen
Ping, alleging that he was at the Cambodia Charity Hospital as he was being
treated for lung infection and was advised by the doctor that he can’t travel
due to his ill health.
5. MeTC granted the motion. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari
before RTC which was granted.
6. RTC: Reversed the MeTC and ruled that Section 17 Rule 23 on the taking
of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply because there is a
specific provision in the ROC for witnesses in criminal cases.
7. CA: Reversed the RTC and ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion
done by the MeTC. The petitioners may still cross-examine the witness and
raise objections through counsel or the consular abroad
ISSUES:
1. W/N prosecution’s witness may be deposed abroad - No
2. W/N the Rules on taking of the deposition of witnesses in civil cases may
be applied suppletorily - No
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open
court. It enables the judge to test the witness’ credibility through his manner
and deportment while testifying. The exception, as the Rules of Court
23

recognizes, is the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
2. In criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be
made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending.
3. Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place
at no other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly
nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li
Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.
4. SC quoting the RTC: Since witness is sick and of advance aged, he is
allowed under Section 15 Rule 119 of the ROC but he should be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending.
Nowhere in the said rule permits the taking of depositions outside the PH
whether the deponent is sick or not.
5. (see notes for the procedure) It is argued that the Rules of Civil Procedure is
made explicitly applicable in all cases, the deposition before a Philippine
consular official should be deemed allowable. In Vda. de Manguerra v.
Risos, the suppletory application of Rule 23 has been categorically ruled out
by the Court.
6. The CA was incorrect in opining that petitioners would still be accorded the
right to cross-examine the witnesses and raise their objections during the
deposition-taking in the same manner as in a regular court trial.
7. There is a great difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a
public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the
cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in
the absence of a trial judge.
8. The CA applied the ruling in People v. Webb that the taking of an
unavailable witness' deposition is in the nature of a discovery procedure the
use of which is within the trial court's sound discretion which needs only to
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the
law.
9. But the ruling is inapplicable in the case at bar. The witnesses sought to be
deposed were all residents of US. We disallowed the deposition-taking on
the ground that there was no necessity as the matter sought to be proved in
the depositions were merely corroborative. In the case at hand, the
witness sought to be deposed is the complaining witness against the
accused. Sec. 5 Rule 119 should be strictly followed.
10. Finally, the Court takes note that Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the
initial trial proceeding. Li is a non-resident alien who can leave without
definite date of return and his health condition should be unmistakably
apparent. Thus, the prosecution should have taken his deposition before the
MeTC.
11. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness to leave the court's
jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure intended to preserve the
testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no other
party.
SEPARATE OPINIONS: None.
NOTES:
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the ROC allows the taking of depositions in
civil cases,
➔ either upon oral examination or written interrogatories,
➔ before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at
any time or place within PH, or
➔ before the PH consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized
to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, provided there is
reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
24

9. People v. Sergio and Lacanilao (Mika c/o Vi)
October 9, 2019 | Hernando, J. | Rule 119/ Modes of Discovery
PETITIONER​: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS​: MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO and JULIUS L.
LACANILAO
SUMMARY​: Mary Jane found guilty of drug trafficking in Indonesia and was
sentenced to death. She claimed to know nothing about the drugs in her bag
and was merely offered a job by Cristina and Julius. The people who hired her
and gave her the luggage with drugs, Cristina, and Julius, have pending cases in
the Philippines. The execution of Mary Jane was deferred pursuant to its
obligations under the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty to afford her an
opportunity to present her case against Cristina, Julius, and "Ike". This was
subject to certain conditions such as: (a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia; and (b) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane
shall be in writing. Hence, since she cannot go to the Philippines, the State filed
a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane
Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories". ​
Issue: 1. Whether Mary Jane's testimony may be validly acquired through
deposition by written interrogatories. – YES.
2. WON Sec. 15 of Rule 119 is applicable. - NO.
​Cristina and Julius claim that this should not be allowed in accordance with
Rule 119, Sec. 15 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. (See Doctrine) The
Court ruled that her testimony may be taken by deposition upon written
interrogatories. The extraordinary circumstances of the case warrant the resort
to Rule 23. Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding. Rules of procedure should facilitate an orderly administration
of justice. They should not be strictly applied causing injury to a substantive
right of a party to case. It would hinder the right to due process of MJ and the
State if this will not be allowed. The Court has allowed in certain cases that the
rules of civil procedure be applied in criminal cases when the circumstances
warrant such and in the interest of justice. The right to confrontation of Cristina
and Julius will not be infringed because there are guidelines set which allows
them to also ask their questions, comment, and ensure that the testimony of MJ
be given before a judge. Hence, MJ may testify through deposition upon
written interrogatories.
DOCTRINE:​Sec. 15, Rule 119 is inapplicable because under this, in order for
the testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where the
case is being heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either:
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
(a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court,
or (b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. MJ is
neither of these. The doctrines in cases which demanded strict adherence to this
rule does not apply because the circumstances are different. MJ is in prison and
among the conditions imposed by the Indonesian government is that she cannot
leave.
In the interest of justice and in order to not impede the right to due process,
deposition upon written interrogatories may apply to give a testimony in a
criminal case.
Rules on civil procedure may apply to criminal cases based on the
circumstances.
FACTS:
1. Mary Jane (MJ), Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao
(Julius) were friends and neighbors. Taking advantage of her dire situation
and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered MJ a job as a domestic helper
in Malaysia. MJ saved money, borrowed from relatives, and sold her
husband’s motorcycle to pay for the placement fee.
2. On April 21, 2010, MJ and Cristina left for Malaysia. Upon arrival in
Malaysia, Cristina told MJ that the job was no longer available.
3. After spending a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent MJ to Indonesia for a
7-day holiday with a promise that she will have a job upon her return in
Malaysia. Cristina gave MJ her plane ticket and luggage to bring on her trip.
4. Upon her arrival at the Adisucipto International Airport in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly carrying
2.6 kgs of heroin in her luggage. She was charged with drug trafficking
before the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
5. MJ's family confronted Cristina. Cristina instead threatened them to keep
the matter to themselves and not to tell the media. She told MJ's family that
she is part of an international drug syndicate who would spend millions to
get MJs out of prison
6. In October 2010, the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia,
convicted MJ of drug trafficking and sentenced her to death by firing squad.
This was affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court of Indonesia.
MJ and 8 other felons were brought to a prison facility to await their
execution.
25

7. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested by the
operatives of the Anti-Human Trafficking Division of the NBI. They were
charged with qualified trafficking in person in They were also charged in
two separate Informations with the crime of illegal recruitment and estafa.
They pleaded ”not guilty".
8. Representatives of PDEA interviewed MJ in Indonesia. In her Sinumpaang
Salaysay, MJ narrated how she was recruited by Cristina and Julius. She
alleged that while in Malaysia, she and Cristina stayed at Sun Inn Lagoon
since her supposed employer was not in Malaysia. Cristina has a boyfriend
named Prince whom she conversed only by phone. Prince has a brother
named "Ike." On April 24, 2010, MJ and Cristina went to the hotel parking
lot and met with "Ike". Inside the car, "Ike" handed the luggage to Cristina.
When they returned to the hotel room, Cristina gave MJ the luggage. MJ
noticed that it was unusually heavy but found nothing inside. The luggage
was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she
was apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained
prohibited drugs.
9. On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the
Indonesian Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane.
It informed the Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of
Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the
prosecution of Cristina and Julius. The President of Indonesia granted her
an indefinite reprieve.
10. Pursuant to its obligations under the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty, the Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of
Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to present her case against Cristina,
Julius, and "Ike".
11. The Indonesian authorities imposed the following conditions relative to the
taking of Mary Jane's testimony: (a) MJ shall remain in detention in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia; (b) No cameras shall be allowed; (c) The lawyers of
the parties shall not be present; and (d) The questions to be propounded to
Mary Jane shall be in writing.
12. The State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of
Complainant Mary Jane V eloso by Deposition Upon Written
Interrogatories". It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through
the use of deposition upon written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
of the Revised Rules of Court because she is out of the country and will not
be able to testify personally before the court due to her imprisonment. The
prosecution also pointed out that Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies
suppletorily in criminal proceedings and the use of deposition upon written
interrogatories in criminal cases is not expressly prohibited under the Rules
of Court. It pointed out that the Supreme Court has allowed dispensation of
direct testimony in open court under the Rules of Environmental Cases and
the Judicial Affidavit Rule. Lastly, the OSG averred that Cristina and Julius
will still have an opportunity to examine MJ by propounding their own set
of written interrogatories through the designated consular officer who will
be taking the deposition. Moreover, they were not precluded from objecting
to the questions and answers.
13. Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition
should be made before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules
23 and 25 of the Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual
testimony of the witness in open court and the use is confined only in civil
cases. They argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their
right to confront the witness, or to meet her face to face as provided under
Sec. 14(2) of the Constitution. Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's
reliance on the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases and the Judicial
Affidavit Rule was misplaced because the affiants therein were still subject
to cross-examination.
14. RTC: ​Allowed taking the testimony of MJ by deposition and enumerated
conditions.
15. CA: ​Reversed the trial court. The conditional examination of witnesses in
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by Rule 119 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. According to the appellate court, the State failed to
establish compelling reason to depart from such rule and to apply instead
Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which only applies in civil cases.
Thus, pursuant to Rule 119, the taking of deposition of MJ or her
conditional examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the court
where the case is pending.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Mary Jane's testimony may be validly acquired through
deposition by written interrogatories. - YES
26

2. WON Sec. 15 of Rule 119 is applicable. - NO.
RATIO:
1. The OSG says that there are extraordinary circumstances (her conviction by
final judgment, her detention in prison, conditions by the Indonesian govt to
suspend the execution with certain conditions, such as to remain in
confinement and any question propounded to her must only be in writing)
which warrant suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
2. The SC ruled that the contentions of the OSG are meritorious and that Rule
23 may apply.
3. Sec. 15, Rule 119 is inapplicable because under this, in order for the
testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where
the case is being heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution
witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed
by the order of the court, or (b) has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning. MJ is neither of these. The doctrines in cases
which demanded strict adherence to this rule does not apply because
the circumstances are different. MJ is in prison and among the
conditions imposed by the Indonesian government is that she cannot
leave.
4. Unfortunately, in denying the State's motion for deposition through written
interrogatories and requiring the presence of MJ before the RTC, the CA
strictly and rigidly applied and interpreted Sec. 15, Rule 119 without taking
into consideration the concomitant right to due process of MJ and the State
as well as the prejudice that will be caused. It was akin to a denial of due
process on the part of MJ and the State. The peculiar circumstances made it
impossible for MJ to appear before the RTC.
5. The extraordinary circumstances of the case warrant the resort to Rule 23.
The Court is always guided by the principle that rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure
should facilitate an orderly administration of justice. They should not be
strictly applied causing injury to a substantive right of a party to case. This
precept has been elucidated by the Supreme Court in ​De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan​.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
6. There are several instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules
to serve substantial justice because of any of the following reasons: (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby. But invoking “substantial justice” is not a magic phrase to suspend
the procedural rules except only for the most persuasive reasons.
7. Article 1, paragraph 2(a) of the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
states that mutual legal assistance can be rendered by the state parties in
case of taking evidence or obtaining voluntary statements from persons,
among others. The legal assistance sought by the Requesting Party from the
Requested Party is not without limitations. But among the conditions
imposed on MJ are that: (a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia; and (b) The questions to be propounded to Mary
Jane shall be in writing.
8. Nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how
a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted
of a grave offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign
jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such witness.
The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a
witness who is unable to testify in open court because he is imprisoned
in another country.
9. Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written
interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it
may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is
compelling reason. There are certain cases like ​Canos v. Peralta ​where the
provisions on civil procedure were applied to a criminal case.
10. The conditions laid down by the Indonesian Government support the
allowance of written interrogatories under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
Besides, the disallowance of the written interrogatories is not in congruence
with the aim of ASEAN MLAT, that is to render mutual legal assistance in
criminal matters among signatory states including the Philippines.
27

11. Therefore, the Court allowed to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23
of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and
fairness. Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail
Mary Jane's right to due process.
12. The deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional
right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius. The right to
confrontation is a basic right of the accused and a part of due process. It has
a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to
test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily,
to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness
13. The terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are
given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written
interrogatories so as not to defeat the 1st purpose of their constitutional
right. The trial court requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to
file their comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in the
written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge
shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions
would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his
designated representative. The answers of MJ to the propounded questions
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be
given to the counsel of the accused who would, in turn, submit their
proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the
prosecution raise any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly
rule on the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the
deposition of MJ will then be conducted. MJ's answers in the cross
interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy
thereof shall be given to the prosecution.
14. The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise
been upheld. As stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of
deposition, the trial court judge will be present during the conduct of written
interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give her ample opportunity to
observe and to examine the demeanor of the witness closely. Although the
deposition is in writing, the trial court judge can still carefully perceive the
reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she answers each question
propounded to her both by the prosecution and the defense.
15. This is also akin to a dying declaration because MJ will be giving this
testimony with the consciousness of an impending death.
28

Rule 120 Judgment
1. Hernan v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the (DOTC), Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she served as an accounting
clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the position of Supervising Fiscal
Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as cashier, disbursement and collection
officer. As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and
clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special message fees.
The collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the
(LBP), Baguio City Branch.
On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the Commission on Audit
(COA), conducted a cash examination of the accounts handled by petitioner as
instructed by her superior, Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez came across deposit
slips dated September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of
₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20, respectively. Upon close scrutiny, she noticed that said
deposit slips did not bear a stamp of receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated.
Thereafter, the auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the ₱81,348.20
remittance but not for the ₱11,300.00. The LBP then denied receiving any
₱11,300.00 deposit on September 19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the
DOTC. Thus, the COA demanded that she pay the said amount. Petitioner, however,
refused. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for malversation of public funds
against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon which, after due
investigation, recommended her indictment for the loss of ₱11,300.00. Accordingly,
petitioner was charged before the RTC of Baguio City.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the Information. Sandiganbayan affirmed. MR denied. On June 26, 2013,
the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration became final and
executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. Petitioner's counsel
then filed a motion to reopen a case then a "petition for reconsideration", both of
which were successively denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the case should be reopened. Yes (but not because of petitioner's
arguments, but because of an exceptional circumstance)
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
RATIO:
Indeed, in the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient
proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did not have
them in her possession when demand therefor was made, and that she could not
satisfactorily explain her failure to do so. Thus, even if it is assumed that it was
somebody else who misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held
liable for malversation. Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the
amount of P11,300.00 and the corresponding deposit slip with the Bank Teller
Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve the deposit slip later, is to be believed and then
it came out that the said P11,300.00 was not credited to the account of DOTC with
the Land Bank and was in fact missing, still accused Hernan should be convicted of
malversation because in this latter situation she permits through her inexcusable
negligence another person to take the money. And this is still malversation under
Article 217.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that the reopening must
be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already cripples the motion. The
records of the case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become
final and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry Book of
Judgments on June 26, 2013. In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the
Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioner's motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration are practically second and third motions for reconsideration from its
Decision dated November 13, 2009. Under the rules, the motions are already
prohibited pleadings under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court due to the fact
that the grounds raised in the petition for reconsideration are merely a rehash of those
raised in the two (2) previous motions filed before it.
Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies
must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the
general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and
29

inequitable. None of the exceptions is present in this case. Indeed, every litigation
must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the
instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the
Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays
for, but in order to modify the penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that
a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may
no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering
its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en bane and give due regard to
such exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c), Rule II of the Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising novel questions of law are
acted upon by the Court en bane. To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and
Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised
Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the
"Revised Penal Code" as Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable
to the crime charged herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance.
Pursuant to the Section 40 of said Act, therefore, We have here a novel situation
wherein the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become
final and executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue
of the passage of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be
modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the
sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may even apply for probation, as long
as she does not possess any ground for disqualification. Thus, in order to effectively
avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of
suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and
recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan in order to
lower the penalty imposed on the petitioner.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and
such other officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of
RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts
of each case. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall
find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the
judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already
begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of
the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has
already begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already accomplishes
the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the Court, in the
interest of justice and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an action
before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original petition
filed for a similar purpose. Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the
passage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable
to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and
immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of
guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and Decision dated November 13, 2009 of the
Sandiganbayan 2nd Division are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum term, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days
prision correccional, as maximum term.
30

Rule 121 New Trial or Reconsideration
1. Cu v. Small Business Guarantee (2017)
FACTS:
Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation [SB Corp.] is a government
financial institution, which is mandated by law to provide easy access credit to
qualified micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) through direct lending or
through its conduit participating financial institutions for re-lending. One of its
clients was Golden 7 Bank [G7 Bank], a banking corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws.
An "Omnibus Credit Line Agreement" was executed, whereby G7 Bank was
initially granted credit line of ₱50,000,000.00 by SB Corp. for re-lending to
qualified MSMEs as sub-borrowers. Eventually, the credit line was increased to
₱90,000,000.00, and in line with said increase, the Board of Directors of G7 Bank
authorized any two of its officers, namely Fidel L. Cu, Allan S. Cu [Cu], Lucia C.
Pascual and Norma B. Cueto, as signatories to loan documents, including
postdated checks.
Subsequently, various drawdowns were made from the line and each drawdown
was covered by a promissory note, amortization schedule and postdated check. Cu
and his co-signatory Pascual then issued more than a hundred postdated checks as
payment to the various drawdowns made on the credit line, including checks
subject of the criminal cases filed against Cu and Pascual
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) placed G7 Bank under receivership by the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). Consequently, PDIC closed all
of G7 Bank's deposit accounts with other banks, including its checking account
with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) against which the disputed checks
were issued.
Upon maturity of the postdated checks, SB Corp. deposited the same to its
account with the LBP, but all were dishonored for reason of "Account Closed".
Then, SB Corp. sent demand letters to Cu and Pascual demanding payment of the
amounts represented in the dishonored checks. Despite receipt of the demand
letters, Cu and Pascual failed to make good the dishonored checks, prompting SB
Corp. to file a Complaint-Affidavit for Violation of B.P. 22.
After finding that probable cause exists to indict Cu and Pascual for Violation of
B.P. 22, on five counts, Informations were filed in court. Before the scheduled
arraignment, Cu and Pascual filed an "Omnibus Motion alleging the following:
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
1. The checks were intended to cover the installment payments of the credit line
drawdowns obtained from SB Corp. However, the funding of the checks could not
be validly done because G7 [Bank] was placed under receivership; and
2. The notice of dishonor was not received by them and in the meantime, there is
already a petition for liquidation assistance pending with the RTC of Naga City
filed by PDIC. Accordingly, the liquidation court has original exclusive
jurisdiction over the settlement of all the obligations of G7 Bank, including the
amounts covered by the subject checks.
Thereafter the MeTC dismissed the B.P. 22 cases. SB Corp. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the MeTC. It then appealed to the
RTC arguing that a pending liquidation proceedings does not extinguish the
criminal and civil liabilities of the signatories to the dishonored corporate checks.
The RTC affirmed in toto the dismissal of the cases. SB Corp. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Hence the petition for review
under Rule 42 was filed with the CA. The CA granted the petition. Cu's motion
for reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in not dismissing the SB Corp.' s petition because an
appeal from the dismissal of a criminal case may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General
RATIO:
The Court observed in Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa that:
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising
therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is
concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an
appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended
party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case. However, the offended party or private complainant may file a
motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but
only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private
complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the public
prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private
complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorari or
31
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown

and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or x x x adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

Following settled jurisprudence, being a mere private complainant, SB Corp.

lacked the authority to represent the State in the appeal of the criminal cases
before the CA as this authority is solely vested in the OSG. The OSG is the law
office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of
representing the Republic and/or the People before any court in any action which
affects the welfare of the People as the ends of justice may require. Accordingly, if
there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, it is only the OSG that
may bring an appeal of the criminal aspect representing the People.

This Court has, however, taken exceptions and given due course to several actions
even when the respective interests of the Government were not properly
represented by the OSG, namely, when the challenged order affected the interest
of the State or the People, the case involved a novel issue, and the ends of justice
would be defeated if all those who came or were brought to court were not
afforded a fair opportunity to present their sides.

The Court is inclined to interpose the exception in the present petition for justice
to prevail and if only to write finis to the criminal cases from which the petition
originates.

32

2. Aguinaldo v. Torres (2017)
FACTS:
Sps. Aguinaldo filed a complaint for annulment of sale against Torres. The former
claims that they are the registered owner of the subject property. They discovered
that the titles were transferred to Torres in bad faith and through fraud, deceit and
stealth cause the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Torres denies this
allegation and claims that the subject property was validly sold and caused the
registration by Sps Aguinaldo to him. RTC ruled that Sps Aguinaldo failed to
establish their claim by preponderance of evidence. On appeal, the CA ruled that
the 1979 deed of sale was spurious after conducting its own examination of
Aguinaldo’s
signatures thereon and on other pertinent documents, and thus, did not transfer
title over the subject properties to respondent, it declared that there was,
nonetheless, a valid sale to the latter, considering that Aguinaldo failed to rebut
the authenticity and due execution of the 1991 deed of sale on account of their
genuine signatures thereon as established by the NBI reports, and the CA's own
independent examination of their signatures on various documents submitted
before the court and Nelia admitted the existence of the sale of the subject
properties in her November 12, 1998 letter to Torres. Sps Aguinaldo filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence this issue.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling that there was a
valid conveyance of the subject properties?
RATIO:
No. The Court agrees with the CA that a valid conveyance of the subject property
to Torres was established. The central to the resolution of the instant controversy
is the determination of the authenticity of the 1991 deed of sale which, however, is
a question of fact rather than of law. It bears to stress that it is not the function of
the Court to re-examine, winnow, and weigh anew the respective sets of evidence
of the parties, absent a showing that they fall under certain recognized exceptions,
none of which are present here.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the 1991 deed of sale was improperly
notarized, having been signed by Torres and witness Bucapal in Makati City and
by Sps Aguinaldo in the USA, but notarized in Cavite, which is in violation of the
notarial officer's duty to demand that the party acknowledging a document must
appear before him, sign the document in his presence, and affirm the contents and
truth of what are stated therein.
The improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale stripped it of its public
character and reduced it to a private instrument. Hence, it is to be examined under
the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which pertinently
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
provides that before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone
who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
In relation thereto, Section 22, Rule 132 of the same Rules provides the manner
by which the genuineness of handwriting may be proved, i.e.: (a) by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness
has acted or been charged; (b) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
The CA made an independent examination of Sps Aguinaldo's signatures on the
1991 deed of sale (questioned signatures), and concluded that they are the same
signatures found on other pertinent documents (standard/sample signatures),
which is the same conclusion arrived at by the NBI. The due execution and
authenticity of the said deed having been ostensibly established by the finding that
the signatures of Sps Aguinaldo thereon were genuine, the burden was shifted
upon the latter to prove by contrary evidence that the subject properties were not
so transferred.
In this case, the claimed forgery was ruled out by a comparison of Sps Aguinaldo
questioned signatures with their standard/sample signatures, but other than their
own declaration that their signatures on the 1991 deed of sale were forged, they
failed to present any evidence to corroborate their claim.
Although the improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale did not affect the
validity of the sale of the subject properties to Torres, the same, however, rendered
the said deed unregistrable, since notarization is essential to the registrability of
deeds and conveyances.
33
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

3. People v. Antido (2018)

FACTS:
The Supreme Court on April 7, 2014 adopted and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated December 7, 2012 finding Romeo Antido guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to par.
5 of Art. 255-B. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
was ordered to pay private complainant P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as
moral damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages. However, Antido died on
December 28, 2013 before the promulgation of the resolution.
There is a need to reconsider and set aside the April 7, 2014 resolution and enter a
new one dismissing the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused appellant prior to the
promulgation of the decision of his appeal extinguishes his criminal and civil
liability?

RATIO:
Yes, the death of Antido prior to final conviction renders dismissible the criminal
cases against him, as provided in Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. In
such case, the criminal liability is totally extinguished. The criminal action is
extinguished such that there is no longer a defendant to stand as accused. The civil
action instituted for the recovery of the civil liability arising out of the criminal act
is extinguished by operation of law as it is grounded on the criminal action.
However, the civil liability of deceased accused-appellant in connection with the
acts against the victim may be based on sources other than delicts. In which case,
the victim/private- complainant may file a separate civil action against the estate
of Artido, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

34

4. People v. Jagdon (Charlie)
March 27, 2019 | J. Reyes, Jr., J. | Rule 122 (Appeals)
PETITIONER: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: ELIZALDE JAGDON Y BANAAG A.K.A. “ZALDY”
SUMMARY: Jagdon was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 after a buy-bust operation was conducted in his home. The
RTC convicted Jagdon of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
On appeal to the CA, Jagdon argued that the police did not comply with the
requirements or procedure set forth in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Particularly,
he notes that the witnesses required by law were not present during the marking
and inventory of the drugs allegedly recovered from him. Thus, Jagdon believes
that the identity and integrity of the drugs in question had been tainted.
Meanwhile, the CA opined that Jagdon can no longer assail the police's alleged
failure to comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 because he did not
challenge the same during trial, and explained that he is precluded from
questioning it for the first time on appeal. The issue is WON Jagdon can raise
the issue of compliance with the Section 21 procedure for the first time on
appeal. SC held YES. The issue whether the procedure under the law was
observed is relevant as it touches upon the corpus delicti itself or the drugs
seized from Jagdon as a result of the buy bust operation and his subsequent
arrest. Matters which relate to the sufficiency of evidence to convict an accused
may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal.
DOCTRINE: When an accused appeals his conviction, he waives his
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy as the entire case is open for
review. The Court then renders judgment as law and justice dictate in the
exercise of its concomitant authority to review and sift through the whole case
and correct any error, even if unassigned.
FACTS:
1. On March 17, 2010, the Office of the City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Force Group (CAID-SOTG) of the Bacolod City Police
received a tip from one of their confidential informants (CIs) that Jagdon
is selling marijuana in Barangay Handumanan. The Bacolod City Police
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
organized a buy bust team led by Police Senior Inspector Joemarie
Occeño (PSINSP Occeno) and Police Officer 2 Ian Piano (PO2 Piano) as
the poseur-buyer. At around 12:45 p.m., the buy bust team proceeded to
the location where PO2 Piano and the CI went inside a junk shop where
Jagdon allegedly transacted with his customers.
2. Once inside, the CI, who knew Jagdon, informed him that they wanted to
buy 12 sticks of marijuana. PO2 Piano handed over the marked money
totalling P220.00 to Jagdon, who, in turn, gave 12 sticks of suspected
marijuana, which he took from a small blue bag. After the transaction,
PO2 Piano identified himself as a police officer and signalled PSINSP
Occeño to make the arrest.
3. During the arrest, Jagdon surrendered the small blue bag he was carrying.
PO2 Piano searched the same and found another 45 sticks of suspected
marijuana. After marking the recovered drugs, they were inventoried and
photographed in the presence of two barangay officials — the barangay
secretary and a Purok President. Jagdon and the seized items were then
brought to the police station where the incident was recorded in the
blotter. Thereafter, the purported marijuana sticks were sent to the crime
laboratory for analysis, where they yielded a positive result for
marijuana.
4. According to the defense, Jagdon was inside his house where he was
about to put his son to sleep. His younger brother asked permission to go
out of the house, but before he could do so, two persons suddenly barged
into their home looking to buy marijuana. Jagdon told them that no one
was selling marijuana in their home and one of the men asked if he knew
a Rocky, Bongrich, and a Nonoy Gopio. When he denied knowing them,
he was handcuffed, while the men, with their five other companions,
proceeded to search his house.
5. The RTC convicted Jagdon for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165. The trial court opined that the testimony of PO2 Piano
categorically established all the elements of the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. It pointed out that he positively identified Jagdon as the one who
gave the sticks of marijuana and received the marked money as payment.
The RTC upheld the validity of the buy bust operations highlighting that
the CAID-SOTG conducted the operation with the coordination of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. The trial court expounded that
35

Jagdon was also guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as 45
more sticks of suspected marijuana were recovered from him after he
was searched as an incident of a lawful arrest.
6. The RTC upheld the integrity of the drugs seized on account of the
observance of the procedure in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The trial
court noted that the seized drugs were marked in front of Jagdon and the
two barangay officials. It added that the chain of custody was unbroken
as all the links of the chain, from the time the drugs were seized until its
presentation in court, were satisfactorily proven. The RTC disregarded
Jagdon's unsubstantiated claim of frame-up especially since the
legitimacy and regularity of the buy bust operation had been established.
Aggrieved, Jagdon appealed before the CA.
7. The CA upheld Jagdon's conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The appellate court posited that Jagdon was
lawfully arrested and subsequently searched by virtue of a legitimate buy
bust operation. It noted that PO2 Piano consistently identified Jagdon as
the one who sold him 12 sticks of marijuana and from whom 45
additional sticks were recovered. The CA explained that the evidence of
the prosecution sufficiently established that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized marijuana were preserved. The appellate court
expounded that PO2 Piano detailed how he had marked the seized drugs
in Jagdon's presence and how he handled the same before he turned it
over to the crime laboratory for examination. It elaborated that the
integrity of the evidence is presumed unless there is a showing of bad
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence had been tampered with.
8. Further, the CA postulated that Jagdon never questioned the chain of
custody before the trial court and was raised only for the first time on
appeal. The appellate court pointed out that he never assailed the police's
non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Thus, the
CA surmised that it was too late for Jagdon to question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items.
ISSUES:
1. WON Jagdon can raise the issue of compliance with Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. - YES.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
RATIO:
1. The appeal is meritorious. In the present case, Jagdon laments that the
police did not comply with the requirements or procedure set forth in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Particularly, he notes that the witnesses
required by law were not present during the marking and inventory of the
drugs allegedly recovered from him. Thus, Jagdon believes that the
identity and integrity of the drugs in question had been tainted.
Meanwhile, the CA points out that there was substantial compliance with
the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The CA likewise
opined that Jagdon can no longer assail the police's alleged failure to
comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 because he did not challenge the same during trial. The appellate
court explained that he is precluded from questioning it for the first time
on appeal.
2. When an accused appeals his conviction, he waives his constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy as the entire case is open for
review. The Court then renders judgment as law and justice dictate in the
exercise of its concomitant authority to review and sift through the whole
case and correct any error, even if unassigned. Thus, in People v.
Miranda, the Court elucidated that an accused may challenge the
non-compliance of the procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
even for the first time on appeal, to wit:
a. It is axiomatic that an appeal in criminal cases confers upon the
court full jurisdiction and renders it competent to examine the
record and revise the judgment appealed from. Accordingly,
“errors in an appealed judgment [of a criminal case], even if
not specifically assigned, may be corrected motu proprio by
the court if the consideration of these errors is necessary to
arrive at a just resolution of the case.”
b. The rationale behind this rule stems from the recognition that an
accused waives the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy once he appeals from the sentence of the trial
court. As such, it is incumbent upon the appellate court to
render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether it be
favorable or unfavorable to him.
36
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

c. Thus, in People v. Gatlabayan, this Court considered every 3. Jagdon can challenge the police's compliance with Section 21 of R.A.
glaring deficiency in each link of the custody, even if the same No. 9165 even if he merely raised it for the first time on appeal. The
was not raised as an error on appeal, and reversed the judgment issue whether the procedure under the law was observed is relevant as it
of conviction, given that what was at stake was no less than the touches upon the corpus delicti itself or the drugs seized from Jagdon as
liberty of the accused. a result of the buy bust operation and his subsequent arrest. Matters
d. In Villareal v. People, this Court clarified that unlike in civil which relate to the sufficiency of evidence to convict an accused may be
cases, the assignment of errors in criminal cases is not raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal.
essential to invoke the court's appellate review, considering 4. Having settled that Jagdon can raise the issue of compliance with Section
that it will nevertheless review the record, and accordingly, 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the first time on appeal, the Court finds that the
reverse or modify the appealed judgment if it finds that police had unduly deviated from the prescribed procedure warranting the
errors which are prejudicial to the rights of the accused acquittal of the accused.
have been committed, including those errors “which go to
the sufficiency of evidence to convict.”
i. The rule means that, notwithstanding the absence of an
assignment of errors, the appellate court will review
the record and reverse or modify the appealed
judgment, not only on grounds that the court had no
jurisdiction or that the acts proved do not constitute the
offense charged, but also on prejudicial errors to the
right of accused which are plain, fundamental, vital, or
serious, or on errors which go to the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict.
e. Considering the nature of appeals in criminal cases as
above-discussed, it is then only proper to review the said errors
even if not specifically assigned. Verily, these errors, which go
to the sufficiency of the evidence of the corpus delicti itself,
would indeed affect the court's judgment in ultimately
ascertaining whether or not the accused should be convicted and
hence, languish in prison for possibly a significant portion of his
life. In the final analysis, a conviction must prudently rest on the
moral certainty that guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Therefore, if doubt surfaces on the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict, regardless that it does only at the stage of
an appeal, our courts of justice should nonetheless rule in favor
of the accused, lest it betray its duty to protect individual
liberties within the bounds of law.

37

5. Office of the Ombudsman v.Vitriolo (¥)
June 3, 2019 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.:| Rule 122 - Appeal (Ombudsman)
PETITIONER: Office of the Ombudsman
RESPONDENT: Julito D. Vitriolo
SUMMARY: A Complaint-Affidavit against Vitriolo was filed with the
Ombudsman by Felix, a former faculty member of PLM, after the former failed
time and time again, to deal with the diploma mill and other illegal academic
programs of PLM.
Vitriolo was the Executive Director of CHED at the time material to this case.
Felix had sent two letter-requests in 2010 apprising Vitriolo of the anomalies in
PLM and asking for the issuance of a certification that PLM was not authorized
by CHED to implement the Expanded Tertiary Education Equivalent
Accreditation Program. Instead of issuing this, however, Vitriolo prevented its
issuance by forming a deal with PLM’s Acting Legal Counsel. Vitriolo was also
alleged to have colluded with PLM officials for the issuance of diplomas and
transcripts of records to bogus students of PLM.
The first Complaint-Affidavit against Vitriolo gave birth to an Agreement on 9
August 2011 wherein Vitriolo endeavoured to act on Felix’s 2010 letters and
issue the necessary citation and sanctions to PLM and cease and desist all
illegal academic programs of PLM. Nothing changed, however, so 3 years later,
Felix again filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Vitriolo for violations of RA
3019 and RA 6713. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Vitriolo
for violation of RA 3019 and found him administratively liable and dismissed
him for service. A Petition for Review under Rule 43 was then filed with the
CA without filing an MR and without impleading the Ombudsman. The CA
took cognisance of the administrative aspect and while it ruled that Vitriolo was
indeed administratively liable, it only found him liable for not replying to
Felix’s letters and not providing updates for the same. These were characterised
as light offenses, hence, his penalty was changed from dismissal to suspension
and his reinstatement was ordered. The Ombudsman then filed an minibus
Motion seeking to intervene in the case and consequently, the reversal of the
CA ruling since it was not impleaded as respondent. CA denied this for being
filed out of time.
Issue: W/N the CA erred in denying the Ombudsman’s Omnibus Motion - No.
Based on the Rules of Court, intervention may be allowed when the
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
movant has legal interest in the matter in controversy. Legal interest is
defined as such interest that is actual and material, direct and immediate
such that the party seeking intervention will either gain or lose by the
direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Likewise, the movant
must file the motion to intervene before rendition of the judgment,
intervention not being an independent action but merely ancillary and
supplemental to an existing litigation. In the present case, the Ombudsman
filed its Motion a month after CA promulgated its Decision, thus, the same was
filed out of time. The records show that none of the exempting circumstances
are present. Hence, the general rule applies. While the Ombudsman had legal
interest to intervene, therefore, the CA correctly denied the intervention as
records show that the Omnibus Motion was filed a month after the
promulgation of the CA’s Decision.
DOCTRINE:
The Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene in appeals from its rulings in
administrative cases, provided that the Ombudsman moves for intervention
before rendition of judgment. This rule, however, is not inflexible. The rules
may be relaxed and intervention may be allowed subject to the court’s
discretion after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. (Ration No. 4
for examples)
FACTS:
1. Vitriolo was the Executive Director of the COmmission on Higher
Education (CHED) at the time material to this case.
a. In September 1996, the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila
(PLM) and the National College of Physical Education (NCPE)
entered into a MOA stipulating that programs for Bachelor of
Science and Master’s degrees in PE shall be offered by NCPE
using the facilities of PLM without compensation. This was
under the condition that PLM shall select the faculty members
for the programs and issue the diplomas of the graduates.
b. In September 2003, however, the SEC revoked the registration
of NCPE for non-compliance with reportorial requirements.
Despite this, the MOA was renewed in September 2005.
c. Subsequently, in February 2007, the Commission on Audit
(COA) issued a memorandum finding the MOA to be
38

prejudicial to the interest of PLM. The PLM President then
suspended the effectivity of the MOA effective September 2008.
2. In May 2011, Oliver Felix, a former faculty member of the College of PE
at PLM, filed a Complaint-Affidavit (First Complaint) against Vitriolo
before the Ombudsman for grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
incompetence, and inefficiency in the performance of official duties.
a. It was alleged that he submitted a letter-request to Vitriolo in 21
May 2010 requesting for a certification that PLM was not
authorized by the CHED to implement the Expanded Tertiary
Education Equivalent Accreditation Program (ETEEAP) under
EO No. 330. However, Vitriolo prevented the issuance of this
certification.
b. Felix later discovered that Vitriolo made a deal with PLM’s
Acting Legal Counsel for the non-issuance of a citation against
PLM’s infractions.
c. Another letter on 29 June 2010 was alleged to have been
written, following up Felix’s concerns but such was again not
acted upon. Felix asserted that Vitriolo colluded with officials of
PLM and the ALumni Association for the issuance of diplomas
and transcripts of records to bogus students of PLM.
3. The Ombudsman held mediation conferences where the parties reach an
agreement (9 August 2011 Agreement) wherebyVitriol endeavoured to
act on Felix’s May and June submissions as well as issue the necessary
citations and sanctions to PLM, for it to cease and desist either all illegal
academic programs.
4. Three years later, because the diploma mill was still tolerated by Vitriolo
and CHED failed to conduct any investigation or hearing regarding the
same, Felix sent Vitriolo a letter of “Notice of Impending Legal Action.”
Vitriolo replied to this letter by reasoning that the person in charge of
looking into Felix’s concerns already retired but a memorandum had
already been issued directing the officials concerned to give updates in
regard to the diploma mill.
5. Felix was dissatisfied with this so he filed the present complaint charging
Vitriolo with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, and violations of RA
6713 and RA 3019 for not complying with the 9 August 2011
Agreement.
6. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Vitriolo for violations of
RA 3019, and held him guilty of the administrative charges against him
and meted upon him the penalty of dismissal from service. (This was his
second violation. He had an earlier violation regarding the signing of a
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
MOA without authority)
7. Without filing a MR and without impleading the Ombudsman, Vitriolo
filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA. CA only took
cognisance of the administrative aspect of the case and upheld the
Ombudsman’s ruling as to the administrative liability but modified the
penalty. Instead of dismissal, the CA meted suspension for 30 days
because Vitriolo’s infractions were classified as light offense only.
a. The charges of gross neglect of duty, etc. were dismissed.
Vitriolo’s offense, according to the CA was his failure to reply
to Felix’s May and June 2010 letters.
b. His reinstatement was ordered without loss or diminution in
salaries and benefits.
8. As the Ombudsman was not impleaded as respondent in the CA
proceedings, it filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to intervene in the case
and consequently, the reversal of the CA ruling. CA denied this, ruling
that:
a. the Ombudsman, being the administrative agency that
rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a party in the
said appeal, and
b. its Omnibus Motion was filed out of time, having been
filed only on September 28, 2017 while the CA's Decision
was promulgated on August 17, 2017.
9. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari insisting that the Omnibus
Motion be granted.
ISSUES:
1. W/N CA erred in denying the Ombudsman’s Omnibus Motion – NO.
RULING: Petition DENIED for lack of merit. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Jurisprudence defines intervention as a remedy by which a third
party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein to enable him to protect or preserve a right or
interest which may be affected by such proceedings. It is, however,
settled that intervention is not a matter of right, but one that is
instead addressed to the sound discretion of the courts and can be
secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable statute
or rule.
a. Based on the Rules of Court, intervention may be allowed
when the movant has legal interest in the matter in
39
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

controversy. Legal interest is defined as such interest that is

actual and material, direct and immediate such that the
party seeking intervention will either gain or lose by the
direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Likewise,
the movant must file the motion to intervene before
rendition of the judgment, intervention not being an
independent action but merely ancillary and supplemental
to an existing litigation.
2. In Ombudsman v. Bongais, the Court has already clarified that the
Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene on appeal in
administrative cases resolved by it. Even if not impleaded as a party in
the proceedings, its interest proceeds from its duty to act as a champion
of the people and to preserve the integrity of public service.
3. As it stands, therefore, the Ombudsman's legal standing to
intervene in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases has
been settled and is the prevailing rule, in accordance with the
Court's pronouncement in Bongais, provided, that the Ombudsman
moves for intervention before rendition of judgment, pursuant to
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.
4. The rule requiring intervention before rendition of judgment,
however, is not inflexible. Jurisprudence is replete with instances wher
intervention was allowed even beyond the period prescribed, namely:
a. when demanded by the higher interest of justice;
b. to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard;
c. to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and
for all the substantive issues raised by the parties; or,
d. because of the grave legal issues raised.
5. Stated otherwise, the rule may be relaxed and intervention may be
allowed subject to the court's discretion after consideration of the
appropriate circumstances, for after all, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers
of the court fully and completely available for justice; its purpose
is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.
6. HERE, none of the exempting circumstances are present. Hence, the
general rule applies. While the Ombudsman had legal interest to
intervene, therefore, the CA correctly denied the intervention as records
show that the Omnibus Motion was filed a month after the promulgation
of the CA’s Decision.

40
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

6. People v. Pagal (Jen)

which expressly provides that "[e]xcept as provided in the last paragraph of
September 29, 2020 | Gesmundo, J | Appeal
Sec. 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45." It is an oft-repeated rule that appeals of
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines criminal cases shall be brought to the Court by filing a petition for review on
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: Brendo P. Pagal a.k.a. “DINDO” certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court except when the CA imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, in which case the appeal
SUMMARY: shall be made by a mere notice of appeal before the CA.
(summary facts ℅ Myling)
FACTS:
Pagal pleaded guilty to the crime of murder during his arraignment. The RTC
1. Dindo was indicted under an Information dated July 10, 2009, the
found the plea to be voluntary and with full understanding of its consequences.
delictual allegations of which reads:
Thus, it directed the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of
a. ...the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there,
accused-appellant and to determine the exact degree of his culpability in
[willfully], unlawfully, feloniously, with treachery and taking
accordance with Section 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
advantage of superior strength, without any justifiable reason
Procedure (2000 Revised Rules). None of the prosecution witnesses appeared
whatsoever, slabbed Selma Pagal, with a sharp bladed weapon,
and testified on the four scheduled hearing dates for the presentation of the
wounding her at the back penetrating the chest, thereby causing
prosecution's evidence despite repeat subpoenas duly issued and received by
[her] direct and immediate death.
them. The defense chose not to present any evidence in view of the
2. During his arraignment, Dindo pleaded "guilty" to the crime charged.
prosecution's non-presentation. Both the prosecution and the defense moved for
The RTC found the plea to be voluntary and with full understanding of
the submission of the case for decision. RTC found Pagal guilty beyond
its consequences. Thus, it directed the prosecution to present evidence to
reasonable doubt. CA annulled the RTC Order and remanded the case for
prove his guilt and to determine the exact degree of his culpability in
further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines to be observed in the
accordance with Section 3,Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
proper conduct of a searching inquiry as required by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of
Criminal Procedure (2000 Revised Rules).
the 2000 Revised Rules. 
3. RTC, in specific recognition of the duties imposed by Sec. 3 of Rule 116,
stated that "premise considered and in consonance to the rules as to the
Whether the accused availed of the wrong remedy - Yes
plea of guilty to the capital offense, let the trial and presentation of first
prosecution witness to determine the culpability of the accused on”
The accused availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the CA decision
4. It issued a subpoena to Angelito Pagal, Cesar Jarden,and Emelita
before this court. He filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Sec. 13(c) Rule 124 of
Calupas to appear and testify before it on the said date.
the 2000 Revised Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC. CA
5. The RTC issued another subpoena directed to Angelito Pagal to appear
Decision annulled and set aside the RTC conviction and ordered the remand of
before it on February 22, 2011 at 8:30 in the morning.This was received
the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Notably, the assailed CA Decision
by a certain Malima Pagal and Angelito Pagal on December 15, 2010.
did not affirm the conviction or the penalty imposed by the RTC. Thus, Sec.
Subpoena/Warrant Server SPO1 Antonino R. Cabal PNP certified that
13(c), Rule 124 is not applicable to the case at bench. The accused should have
the subpoena was duly served and received.
filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to
6. RTC noted that "[s]upposed witness is Angelito P. Pagal who was
assail the CA Decision Nonetheless, this Court, in the interest of substantial
subpoenaed by this court and properly served upon his person. However,
justice, shall treat the instant ordinary appeal as an appeal by certiorari so as to
his absence is very conspicuous to this court. The prosecution is so
resolve the substantive issues with finality.
desirous to present prosecution witnesses to determine the culpability of
the accused who readily pleaded guilty to the crime charged, requested
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules,

41

that other witnesses be subpoenaed for them to testify in court in the
event that Angelito Pagal could not come to court on the next setting."
7. It then set the trial and presentation of any prosecution witness. It ordered
a repeat subpoena be issued to Angelito Pagal, Cesar G. Jarden and
Jaimelito Calupas.
8. The repeat subpoena was issued to said prosecution witnesses on March
4, 2011. Included in the subpoena was Dr. Radegunda Uy, RHU, LGU,
Matalom, Leyte. This was duly received by all four (4) subpoenaed
witnesses as indicated in the receiving copy.On April 11, 2011,
Subpoena/Warrant Server SPO1 Antonino R. Cabal PNP certified that
the subpoena was duly served and received by all four subpoenaed
witnesses.
9. In its May 11, 2011 Order, the RTC once more noted that "[t]he
prosecution is serious enough to prove the degree of culpability of the
accused Brendo Pagal who pleaded guilty to the crime charged of murder
but for several times there were absences made by the prosecution
witness despite proper service of subpoena or notices. The prosecution
on this situation requested for a resetting and in the event no prosecution
witness would appear and testify, this case is submitted to the x x x
discretion of this court inviting the degree of culpability." The RTC then
set the trial and presentation of prosecution witnesses on July 20, 2011 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning. It sent another repeat subpoena to Angelito
Pagal, Cesar Jarden, and Dr. Radegunda Uy. the RTC issued the repeat
subpoena to said three witnesses and also included Jaimelito Calupas
therein.This was received by Angelito Pagal, Elesia Jarden on behalf of
Cesar Jarden, "Teresita" Calopay on behalf of Jaimelito Calupas, and by
Dr. Radegunda Uy as shown by the receiving copy.
10. In its July 20, 2011 Order, the RTC stated that "[t]he prosecution after
having exerted its effort to present any prosecution witness in
determining the degree of culpability of the accused who pleaded guilty
to the crime charged, has no one to be presented. On this matter, the
prosecution now submitted the case for decision and as joined by the
defense who has also no witness to be presented."
11. As detailed above, none of the prosecution witnesses appeared and
testified on the scheduled hearing dates of November 17, 2010; February
22, 2011; May 11, 2011; and July 20, 2011 for the presentation of the
prosecution's evidence despite repeat subpoenas duly issued and received
by them. The defense chose not to present any evidence in view of the
prosecution's non-presentation. Both the prosecution and the defense
moved for the submission of the case for decision.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
12. In its October 5, 2011 Order, RTC found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt based solely on his plea of guilty.Ꮮαwρhi৷ It stated
that accused-appellant maintained his plea despite being apprised that he
will be sentenced and imprisoned on the basis thereof.
13. Dindo appealed the RTC Order to the CA alleging that the Trial Court
erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged solely on
the basis of the latter’s plea of guilt and despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
14. The CA annulled and set aside the October 5, 2011 Order of the RTC and
remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with the
guidelines to be observed in the proper conduct of a searching inquiry as
required by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules.
15. CA held that the RTC failed to comply with the requirements of Sec. 3,
Rule 116 regarding the treatment of a plea of guilty to a capital offense,
particularly the conduct of a searching inquiry into accused- appellant's
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea.
Also, the CA observed that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction independent of the plea of guilty. In
fact, the CA noted that the prosecution did not present any evidence;
thus, it remanded the case to the RTC with a directive that it follow the
mandate of Sec. 3, Rule 116.
16. Dindo maintains that the RTC erred in convicting him on the sole basis
of his guilty plea despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He points to the fact that the prosecution was
given numerous opportunities to present its evidence yet still failed to do
so. He emphasizes that there is no evidence in support of his conviction
except for his guilty plea. Considering that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt, the RTC should have dismissed motu proprio the action
on the basis of insufficiency of evidence. He cites the case of People v.
Janjalani (Janjalani), where the Court stated that "[c]onvictions based on
an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole
basis of the judgment." He concludes that since his conviction was based
solely on his improvident plea of guilt, the RTC should have acquitted
him. Lastly, he also invokes the equipoise rule;
ISSUE:
1. Whether the RTC erred in convicting the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt solely on the basis of the accused’s plea of guilt - Yes
2. Whether the accused availed of the wrong remedy - Yes
42

RATIO:
Accused-appellant availed of the wrong remedy [IMPORTANT]
1. accused-appellant availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the May 8,
2018 CA Decision before this Court.
2. He filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, which
provides2
3. Here, the CA Decision annulled and set aside the RTC conviction and
ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
Notably, the assailed CA Decision did not affirm the conviction or the
penalty imposed by the RTC. Thus, Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 is not applicable
to the case at bench.
4. Instead, accused-appellant should have filed an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to assail the CA Decision
pursuant to Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules, which
expressly provides that "[e]xcept as provided in the last paragraph of Sec.
13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45."
5. Accordingly, the remedy available to accused-appellant to question the
CA Decision is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. It is an oft-repeated rule that appeals of criminal cases
shall be brought to the Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court except when the CA imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, in which case the
appeal shall be made by a mere notice of appeal before the CA.
accused-appellant availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a notice of
appeal to question the May 8, 2018 CA Decision.
6. Nonetheless, this Court, in the interest of substantial justice, shall treat
the instant ordinary appeal as an appeal by certiorari so as to resolve the
substantive issues with finality.
The evolution of the duty of trial courts in instances where the accused
pleaded guilty to a capital offense
2
SECTION 13. Certification or Appeal of Cases to Supreme Court. —
a. xxxx
b. (c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment
imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
7. Accused-appellant was charged with murder, Murder is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death, making said crime a capital offense.
8. It must be noted that murder remains a capital offense despite the
proscription against the imposition of death as a punishment.
9. Thus, when accused-appellant pleaded guilty during his arraignment, he
pleaded to a capital offense. Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules
is relevant, viz.:3
10. Even prior to the adoption of the 1940 Rules of Court, jurisprudence has
had to grapple with instances where an accused pleaded guilty to a
capital offense. In such instances, the Court maintained a policy of
restraint in rendering judgment on the sole basis of such plea.
11. Again, in the 1917 case of U.S. v. Jamad (Jamad), this Court noted that
"[notwithstanding the plea of 'guilty,' several witnesses were examined,
under the well-settled practice in this jurisdiction which contemplates the
taking of additional evidence in cases wherein pleas of 'guilty' are
entered to complaints or information charging grave crimes, and more
especially crimes for which the prescribed penalty is death." Hence, the
following guidelines were adopted:4
3
SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and [shall] require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present
evidence in his behalf.
4
We may say then, in response to the request for a ruling on this subject by the
Attorney-General:
i. (1) The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that
the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily,
and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of
his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of
the crime or crimes charged in the complaint or information.
ii. (2) Such a plea of guilty, when formally entered on
arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense
charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the
introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself
supplied the necessary proof.
iii. (3) There is nothing in the law in this jurisdiction which forbids
the introduction of evidence as to the guilt of the accused, and
the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the
crime, after the entry of a plea of "guilty."
iv. (4) Having in mind the danger of the entry of improvident
pleas of "guilty" in criminal cases, the prudent and advisable
course, especially in cases wherein grave crimes are charged,
is to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and
43

12. From the foregoing, it is evident that this jurisdiction places a premium
on ensuring that an accused pleading guilty to a grave crime understands
his plea and the possible consequences thereof. Further, this Court
expressly recognized the wisdom in receiving evidence in such cases
despite the fact that Sec. 31 of General Order No. 58 contemplated the
reception of evidence only in cases where a plea of not guilty has been
entered.
13. The Jamad guidelines became the standard for trial courts when
confronted with similar circumstances. It must be noted, however, that
the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty
remained discretionary on the part of the trial court. In fact, convictions
solely on the basis of a plea of guilty were upheld by this Court.
14. The 1940 Rules of Court, the earliest progenitor of the 2000 Revised
Rules, extended the same level of protection. Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the
1940 Rules of Court reads:5
15. The 1964 version of the Rules of Court reproduced this section verbatim.
Thus, when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court may
hear witnesses for purposes of determining the punishment to be
imposed; the guilt of the accused was a forgone conclusion. The rule
the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the
crime.
v. (5) The better practice would indicate that, when practicable,
such additional evidence should be sufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty, or at
least to leave no room for reasonable doubt in the mind of
either the trial or the appellate court as to the possibility of a
misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the precise
nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.
vi. (6) Notwithstanding what has been said, it lies in the sound
judicial discretion of the trial judge whether he will take
evidence or not in any case wherein he is satisfied that a plea
of "guilty" has been entered by the accused, with full
knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act.
vii. (7) But in the event that no evidence is taken, this court, if
called upon to review the proceedings had in the court below,
may reverse and send back for a new trial, if, on the whole
record, a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the accused
did in fact enter the plea of "guilty" with full knowledge of the
meaning and consequences of the act.
5
SECTION 5. Plea of Guilty — Determination of Punishment. — Where the defendant
pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the court accepts the plea and has discretion as
to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall
be imposed.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
seemed to institutionalize Jamad as shown by the discretionary nature of
the hearing.
16. However, the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules) introduced
a paradigm shift to the formerly discretionary role of trial courts when an
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The 1985 version of the rule,
as amended, reads:6
17. The 2000 Revised Rules retained the salient points of the 1985
amendment. Hence, at present, the three (3)-fold duty of the trial
court in instances where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense
is as follows: (1) conduct a searching inquiry, (2) require the
prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and precise degree of
culpability, and (3) allow the accused to present evidence on his
behalf.
18. The present rules formalized the requirement of the conduct of a
searching inquiry as to the accused's voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea. Further, it made
mandatory the reception of evidence in cases where the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense. Most importantly, the present rules
require that the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of the accused. Evidently, starting with the 1985 Rules, the accused
may no longer be convicted for a capital offense on the sole basis of
his plea of guilty.
19. It is equally important to note that the 1985 Rules retained the directive
that the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty to
a non-capital offense is discretionary on the part of the trial court. This is
encapsulated in Sec. 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules. The 2000 Revised
Rules adopted Sec. 4, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules verbatim.
20. Considering the mandatory nature of Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000
Revised Rules, this Court, in People v. Gambao ,restated the duties of the
trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense as follows:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt, (2) to require
the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability, and (3) to inquire whether or not the accused
wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.
6
SECTION 3. Plea of Guilty to Capital Offense; Reception of Evidence. — When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.
44

21. Gambao also explained the rationale for these duties, thus: Courts must
proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence
is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of
guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he
might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life
and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance
and consequence of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further
evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the
propriety or impropriety of the plea.
22. For a better understanding of these duties, a closer look is in order.
The essence of the requirement of the conduct of a searching inquiry is the
ascertainment of the accused’s voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea
23. The searching inquiry requirement means more than informing cursorily
the accused that he faces a jail term but also, the exact length of
imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at
the national penitentiary or a penal colony. The searching inquiry of the
trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2)
the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.
24. Not infrequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of lenient
treatment, or upon bad advice, or because of promises of the authorities
or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It
is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under
these mistaken impressions.''
25. A searching inquiry likewise compels the judge to content himself
reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state
of duress — and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given
improvidently — either by actual threats of physical harm from
malevolent quarters or simply because of his, the judge's, intimidating
robes.
26. Further, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the requirements
of Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 but must also expound on the events that
actually took place during the arraignment, the words spoken and the
warnings given, with special attention to the age of the accused, his
educational attainment and socio-economic status as well as the manner
of his arrest and detention, the provision of counsel in his behalf during
the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the opportunity of his
defense counsel to confer with him. These matters are relevant since they
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
serve as trustworthy indices of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilt. Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential elements of
the crime he was charged with and its respective penalties and civil
liabilities, and also direct a series of questions to defense counsel to
determine whether he has conferred with the accused and has completely
explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilty. This formula is
mandatory and absent any showing that it was followed, a searching
inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken.
27. Simply, the requirement ensures that the plea of guilty was voluntarily
made and that the accused comprehends the severe consequences of his
plea. This means asking a myriad of questions which would solicit any
indication of coercion, misunderstanding, error, or fraud that may have
influenced the decision of the accused to plead guilty to a capital offense.
28. Thus, in every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital
offense, especially when he is ignorant with little or no education, the
proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are
available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the
information, including the aggravating circumstances therein
enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the
Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance, and
consequences of his plea. In particular, trial courts are mandated to
conduct the searching inquiry, thus:
29. Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge
must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the following
guidelines should be observed:7
7
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
a. how he was brought into the custody of the law;
b. whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and
c. under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been
coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm
coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating
robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred
with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of
guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index
of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an
45

30. Corollary to this duty, a plea of guilty to a capital offense without the
benefit of a searching inquiry or an ineffectual inquiry, as required
by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules, results to an
improvident plea of guilty. It has even been held that the failure of the
court to inquire into whether the accused knows the crime with which he
is charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime
constitutes a violation of the accused's fundamental right to be informed
of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his
right to due process.
The plea of guilt made by the accused does not relieve the prosecution of the
duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
31. On account of the amendment of the 1964 Rules of the Court, the second
duty of the trial court, to require the prosecution to present evidence of
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, has become mandatory.
Hence, it is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of
evidence from the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise
participation and the degree of culpability of the accused in the
perpetration of the capital offense charged.
32. The reason behind this requirement is that the plea of guilt alone can
never be sufficient to produce guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It must
be remembered that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or
secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital
offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of
promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these
mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of
authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain
to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do
so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of
the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and
understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly
guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
same as if no such plea was entered. The court cannot, and should not,
relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability by the requisite quantum of
evidence. The reason for such rule is to preclude any room for reasonable
doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to
the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of
the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances
attendant to the commission of the crime which may justify or require
either a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the
prescribed penalties.
33. Thus, as it stands, the conviction of the accused no longer depends solely
on his plea of guilty but rather on the strength of the prosecution's
evidence.
The accused must be given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
34. The third duty imposed on the trial court by the 2000 Revised Rules
is to allow the accused to present exculpatory or mitigating evidence
on his behalf in order to properly calibrate the correct imposable
penalty. This duty, however, does not mean that the trial court can
compel the accused to present evidence. Of course, the court cannot force
the accused to present evidence when there is none. The accused is free
to waive his right to present evidence if he so desires.
35. Consistent with the policy of the law, the Court has issued guidelines
regarding the waiver of the accused of his right to present evidence under
this rule, thus:8
8
Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital
offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court
comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his client's right to
present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe,
as a prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a "searching inquiry" as
specified in People v. Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty, particularly —
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the
accused with their respective counsel on the desire or manifestation of
the accused to waive the right to present evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the
prosecution and especially the accused with their respective counsel in
the hearing which must be recorded. Their presence must be duly
entered in the minutes of the proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to —
a. ask the defense counsel a series of question to determine
whether he had conferred with and completely explained to the accused
46

36. In passing, trial courts may also abide by the foregoing procedure even
when the waiver of the right to be present and be heard is made in
criminal cases involving non-capital offenses. After all, in whatever
action or forum the accused is situated, the waiver that he makes if it is to
be binding and effective must still be exhibited in the case records to
have been validly undertaken, that is, it was done voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences. As a matter of good court practice, the trial
court would have to rely upon the most convenient, if not primary,
evidence of the validity of the waiver which would amount to the same
thing as showing its adherence to the step-by-step process outlined
above.
37. Clearly, the rationale behind the foregoing requirements is that courts
must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence in irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons
have at times thrown caution to the wind and given up defending
themselves out of ignorance or desperation. Moreover, the necessity of
that he had the right to present evidence and be heard as well as its
meaning and consequences, together with the significance and outcome
of the waiver of such right. If the lawyer for the accused has not done so,
the trial court shall give the latter enough time to fulfill this professional
obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the
accused whether he wants to present evidence or submit a
memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence, if any, or in default theory, file a demurrer to
evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution
evidence is so weak that it need not even be rebutted. If there is a desire
to do so, the trial court shall give the defense enough time to this
purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to
give a free and informed waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known
and understood by the latter, hence, the record must state the language used for
this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding translation thereof in English.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
taking further evidence would aid this Court in determining on appellate
review the proprietary or impropriety of the waiver.
The RTC failed to comply with the mandate of Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
38. it is evident that the trial court failed miserably to comply with the duties
imposed by the 2000 Revised Rules. As regards the first duty, the trial
court failed to conduct a searching inquiry to determine the voluntariness
and full comprehension by accused-appellant of his plea of guilty. The
records are barren of any proceeding where the trial court gauged the
mindset of the accused when he pleaded guilty.
39. RTC merely stated in its August 20, 2009 Order that "[a]ll the contents of
the Information as well as the particular crime charged was personally
read to accused-appellant in a Cebuano-Visayan dialect." The RTC
further stated that the court and his counsel explained to
accused-appellant the consequences of his plea of guilt and that he will
be sentenced and imprisoned. Despite this, accused-appellant maintained
his plea of guilty.
40. Simply, there is no proof whatsoever that the herein judge conducted the
searching inquiry required. No other conclusion can be made other than
that the RTC failed to discharge its duties. Accused-appellant's plea of
guilt is improvident.
41. What compounded the RTC's strenuous oversight is the fact that the trial
court penalized accused-appellant of the crime charged despite failure of
the prosecution to present evidence of his guilt. This is in direct
contravention of the mandate of the second duty stated in Sec. 3, Rule
116 of the 2000 Revised Rules.
42. In this regard, the Court agrees with the CA that accused-appellant's guilt
for the crime of murder was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is
beyond cavil that the prosecution did not present any witness, despite
being given four (4) separate hearing dates to do so. Thus, the RTC's
conviction of accused-appellant relied solely on his improvident plea of
guilty.
43. Lastly, as regard the third requisite, the October 5, 2011 Order of the
RTC stated that "[a]ccused[-appellant,] despite the non-reception of
prosecution's evidence,] opted not to present any evidence in [sic] his
behalf." It would appear that accused-appellant waived his right to
present evidence. However, the same Order and the records of the case
are bereft of any showing that the trial court complied with the guidelines
promulgated by the Court in People v. Bodoso.
47

44. The acquittal of accused-appellant is in order.
Jurisprudence dictates that the correct course of action depends on whether
the prosecution has presented evidence to establish the guilt of the accused
45. The State insists that the case must be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings so that the trial court may comply with the
requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 116.
46. For his part, accused-appellant insists that he should be acquitted because
his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. In support thereof, he
cited Janjalani which ruled that "[c]onvictions based on an improvident
plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment."
47. Unfortunately, accused-appellant's quote is misleading. While it is true
that convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are indeed set
aside if the plea is the sole basis of the judgment, it does not
automatically result in the acquittal of the accused. Rather, the case is
remanded to the lower court for compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the
2000 Revised Rules.
48. To emphasize its importance this Court held in People vs. Dayot that the
rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory, and issued the warning that any
judge who fails to observe its command commits a grave abuse of
discretion.
49. Thus, the plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in place of the
evidence that must be presented and is called for by Sec. 3 of Rule 116.
Trial courts should no longer assume that a plea of guilty includes an
admission of the attending circumstances alleged in the information
as they are now required to demand that the prosecution prove the
exact liability of the accused.
50. As it stands, the conviction of the accused shall be based principally
on the evidence presented by the prosecution. The improvident plea
of guilty by the accused becomes secondary.
51. Accordingly, convictions involving improvident pleas are affirmed if the
same are supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the
conviction is set aside and the case remanded for re-trial when the
conviction is predicated solely on the basis of the improvident plea of
guilt, meaning that the prosecution was unable to prove the accused's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus:
a. As in the case of an improvident plea of guilty, an invalid
waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard per se does
not work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case and
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
enforce an automatic remand thereof to the trial court. In People
v. Molina, to warrant the remand of the case it must also be
proved that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate
representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense
during the trial —
b. In People v. Abapo we found that undue reliance upon an
invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully
presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for
further proceedings.
c. I n People v. Abapo we found that undue reliance upon an
invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully
presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for
further proceedings. Similarly in People v. Durango where an
improvident plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated
proceeding with practically no role at all being played by the
defense, we ruled that this procedure was "just too meager to
accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work
enough to forfeit a human life" and so threw back the criminal
case to the trial court for appropriate action. Verily the relevant
matter that justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial
court is the procedural unfairness or complete miscarriage of
justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned
by x x x the "attendant circumstances."
d. Conversely, where facts are adequately represented in the
criminal case and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has
prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the
invalid waiver, the rule is that the guilty verdict may
nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is supported beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. Verily, in such a
case, it would be a useless ritual to return the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
52. Accordingly, this Court has sustained convictions involving impro­vident
pleas of guilt because, in any case, the sentence of conviction is
supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt independent of the
accused's plea of guilty.
53. However, where the conviction is predicated solely on the basis of an
improvident plea of guilty, this Court has consistently chosen to set aside
said conviction and, instead, remand the case to the lower court for
further proceedings. This was the ruling in an unbroken line of
jurisprudence. "Further proceedings" usually entails re-arraignment and
48
 REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

reception of evidence from both the prosecution and the defense in Separate Opinions: Peralta, C.J. , Hernando, Carandang and Inting, JJ., concur.
compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116. Perlas-Bernabe, J., see dissenting opinion. Leonen, J., concur. Caguioa, J., left his
54. Jurisprudence has developed in such a way that cases are remanded back vote, see concurring opinion. Lazaro-Javier, J., see dissenting opinion. Zalameda,
to the trial court for re-arraignment and re-trial when undue prejudice J., see dissenting opinion. Lopez, J., pee dissenting opinion. Delos Santos, J., left
was brought about by the improvident plea of guilty. his vote, see dissenting opinion. Gaerlan, J., see dissenting opinion.
55. Here, the Court cannot sustain the conviction as there is nothing in the Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.
records that would show the guilt of accused-appellant. Neither is it just
to remand the case. This is not a situation where the prosecution was
wholly deprived of the opportunity to perform its duties under the 2000
Revised Rules to warrant a remand. In this case, the prosecution was
already given reasonable opportunity to prove its case against
accused-appellant. Regrettably, the State squandered its chances to the
detriment of accused-appellant.
56. The records also do not disclose that the improvident plea of guilty
jeopardized the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, to the
prejudice of either the prosecution or accused-appellant.
57. Therefore, in instances where an improvident plea of guilt has been
entered and the prosecution was given reasonable opportunity to present
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused but failed to do so, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal, if only to give rise to the
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and the presumption of
innocence.
58. Since the prosecution was given four (4) separate hearing dates to present
evidence against accused-appellant and, despite these chances, the
prosecution was unable to prove his guilt, the Court acquits accused-
appellant for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of murder.

The Refutation of the Dissents Remand of the case to the trial court is
unreasonable under the circumstances of the case (Will not include this part
in the digest. Just check the origs)

59. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the May 8, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01521; ACQUITS accused-appellant Brendo P. Pagal a.k.a.
"Dindo" of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, for failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and ORDERS his IMMEDIATE RELEASE from
detention unless he is confined for another lawful cause.

49

7. Torres v. AAA (Feli)
November 10, 2020 | J. Carandang | Rule 121 - DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PETITIONER: Erwin Torres
RESPONDENT: AAA
SUMMARY: On October 14, 2012 at around 12:00 p.m., Torres asked AAA to
go to his room and give him a massage. AAA complied to Torres' request. When
inside the room, Torres suddenly locked the door and turned off the lights. Torres
asked AAA to take off her bra and shirt. He touched AAA's breasts and kissed
her from her neck down to her breasts. AAA also claimed that Torres told her to,
"hawakan ko po iyong titi niya para po lumabas iyong tamod niya," but AAA
refused to do so. AAA averred that Torres only stopped mashing her breasts
when he heard the gate being opened. The RTC of Quezon City acquitted Torres
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
CA rendered a Decision annulling the ruling of the RTC and found Torres guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610.
Whether the CA violated Torres' right against double jeopardy when it convicted
him for lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 even if he was
previously acquitted by the RTC. - YES
[See Doctrine] Here, the CA concluded that the RTC erred in acquitting Torres
because of misappreciation of evidence. It is a settled rule that misappreciation
of the evidence is a mere error of judgment that does not qualify as an
exception to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine. The petition of AAA before the
CA is bereft of any allegation, much less, evidence that the prosecution's right to
due process was violated or that the proceedings before the RTC were a mockery
such that Torres' acquittal was a foregone conclusion.
DOCTRINE: A judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the
appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its
promulgation.
This iron clad rule has only one exception: grave abuse of discretion that is
strictly limited whenever there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due
process such as when it is denied the opportunity to present evidence or where
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
the trial is sham or when there is a mistrial, rendering the judgment of acquittal
void. AAA and the prosecution must have clearly demonstrated that the RTC
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power
to dispense justice.
Mere error of judgment that does not qualify as an exception to the
finality-of-acquittal doctrine. An error of judgment is not correctable by a writ
of certiorari.
FACTS:
1. Torres was charged with violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 (child
abuse).
2. AAA was 12 years old when the incident happened at their house located
in Quezon City. Torres was AAA's stepfather being her mother's
husband.
3. On October 14, 2012 at around 12:00 p.m., Torres asked AAA to go to
his room and give him a massage. AAA complied to Torres' request.
When inside the room, Torres suddenly locked the door and turned off
the lights. Torres asked AAA to take off her bra and shirt. He touched
AAA's breasts and kissed her from her neck down to her breasts. AAA
also claimed that Torres told her to, "hawakan ko po iyong titi niya para
po lumabas iyong tamod niya," but AAA refused to do so. AAA averred
that Torres only stopped mashing her breasts when he heard the gate
being opened. He asked AAA to get out of the room. AAA informed her
grandmother about what happened. AAA also narrated that Torres has
been molesting her since 2011 by pressing his penis against her butt
whenever he would chance upon her standing in front of the kitchen sink
and washing the dishes.
4. BBB, AAA’s mother, testified that she evicted Torres from their house
when she found out about the incidents. She claimed that Torres sent her
text messages asking for their forgiveness.
5. According to Torres, on October 14, 2012, he was at the house with AAA
and the other members of the family. They were busy preparing the
house for the birthday after-party of Andrea's two-year old half sibling.
At 2:00 p.m. of the same day, they left the house for Andrea's two-year
old half sibling's 3:00 p.m. party at Max's restaurant. Torres added that he
50

never asked AAA for a massage and that AAA is against his marriage to
BBB.
6. The RTC of Quezon City acquitted Torres for failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC noted that AAA's
testimony is replete with inconsistencies and lacks specific details on
how the acts of sexual abuse was committed by Torres. The RTC,
likewise, found conflicting statements between AAA's affidavit and her
direct testimony in court.
7. The CA rendered a Decision annulling the ruling of the RTC. The CA
found Torres guilty beyond reasonable doubt of lascivious conduct under
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. Contrary to the ruling of the RTC, the CA
held that there were no inconsistencies between the affidavit of AAA and
her direct testimony in court. The CA faulted the RTC for not
considering the complete affidavit of AAA in ruling for the acquittal of
Torres.
ISSUES: Whether the CA violated Torres' right against double jeopardy when it
convicted him for lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 even if he
was previously acquitted by the RTC. - YES
RATIO:
1. A judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate
court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its
promulgation.
a. This iron clad rule has only one exception: grave abuse of
discretion that is strictly limited whenever there is a violation of
the prosecution's right to due process such as when it is denied
the opportunity to present evidence or where the trial is sham or
when there is a mistrial, rendering the judgment of acquittal
void.
b. In order for the CA to take cognizance of the certiorari petition,
AAA and the prosecution must have clearly demonstrated that
the RTC blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
c. Example [People v. Galman]: The Court found that the then
President had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace a
scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of
the case, and that the prosecution and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure
which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which
not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position
and to offer all the evidence which it could have otherwise
presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case
of total absolution of all the accused of all criminal and civil
liability.
2. Here, in setting aside Torres' acquittal, the CA reviewed the evidence
presented by the parties before the RTC. The CA held that the RTC
mistakenly ruled that there were inconsistencies between the affidavit
and direct testimony of AAA. In other words, the CA concluded that the
RTC erred in acquitting Torres because of misappreciation of evidence.
a. It is a settled rule that misappreciation of the evidence is a mere
error of judgment that does not qualify as an exception to
the finality-of-acquittal doctrine. An error of judgment is not
correctible by a writ of certiorari.
3. The petition of AAA before the CA is bereft of any allegation, much less,
evidence that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or that
the proceedings before the RTC were a mockery such that Torres'
acquittal was a foregone conclusion. It is immaterial whether the RTC
was correct in its assessment of the evidence leading to the acquittal of
Torres. The fact remains that Torres' right against double jeopardy
already attached when the RTC acquitted him. Hence, no amount of error
of judgment will ripen into an error of jurisdiction that would have
allowed the CA to review the same through a petition for certiorari.
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REMREV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

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