EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CASE DIGESTS CONST CASE SET 4

Privileges and Salary – Art. VII, Section 6

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 152154, JULY 15, 2003

FACTS:
Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission of Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379. Declaration of the
aggregate amount of US$ 356M deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by 5
account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks.

In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos
couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes arefrozen at
the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.

Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993 were
executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the
Marcos family.

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets
presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one
of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on
December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic
of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x xx."

Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. In a
resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion for summary judgment.

"The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the
Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from
the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our
judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis."

The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2and 3 of RA
1379.

HELD:
RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or
value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it.

The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected:

1. Ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or
otherwise; and
2. The extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income
of the public officer.
3. That the said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property.

The Republic was able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds pursuant to RA 1379.
•Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officers.
•Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos had acquired and owned properties during their term of office, as evidenced by their
admittance regarding the ownership of the Swiss accounts.
•The Swiss accounts of the Marcoses had balances amounting to US$356 million, a figure beyond the aggregate legitimate
income of $304,372.43.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED.

The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of
petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

RATIO DECIDENDI: (1973 CONST)

• Article VII, Sec. 4(2) – The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office except when
otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the
management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government owned or controlled corporation.
• Article VII, Sec. 11 – No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with
appellate jurisdiction, x xx. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any
government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of
thegovernment for his pecuniary benefit.

• Article IX, Sec. 7 – The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII
hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any
profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.

Succession – In case of temporary disability – Article VII Sections 11-12

ESTRADA VS.DESIERTO, G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001
ESTRADA VS.ARROYO, G.R. NO. 146738, MARCH 2, 2001

FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
elected Vice -President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his
popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from Jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage.

On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more
than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened
the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening
of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name “Jose Velarde.”

The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and
the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries
and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath
to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving
Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the
same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and
duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of
the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in
the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.

HELD:
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Resignation is a factual question. In
order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.
The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show
that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court
had an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in
the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a
peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation,
the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to
be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner
cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement:

(1) He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its
legality;
(2) He emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume
the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;
(3) He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and
(5) He called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties
of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner
sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution
supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination
of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear
in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of
the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue
which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

CRUZ vs. COA, G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001

NAC V. COA, G. R. NO. 156982, September 08, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V.
Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of
seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National
Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.

It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said
responsibility to their representatives who were paid with honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15,
1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to
P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.

ISSUE:
Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members

RULING:
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from
the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such. There is a considerable difference between an
appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the
powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon
a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.

Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary
attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.

Executive Power – Article VII, Section 1 & 17

LAUREL VS. GARCIA
G.R. NO. 92013, July 25, 1990

FACTS:
The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese
government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of
Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or
entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.

RULING:
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance
must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is
indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in
Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and
related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur.
Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must
be faithfully followed.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President, SEC. LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, in his official
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in
her official capacities as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications and as Officer-in-
Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA)

G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010

FACTS:

On October 4, 2006, PGMA appointed respondent, Maria Elena H. Bautista, as Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC). She was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the
department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006.
 On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was
designated as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.

Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the
constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.

On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA vice
Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.

Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. He further contends that even if Bautista’s appointment or designation as OIC
of MARINA was intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition.
Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between the posts of DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA Administrator. The
reason is that with respect to the affairs in the maritime industry, the recommendations of the MARINA may be the subject of
counter or opposing recommendations from the Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. In this case, the DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport and the OIC of MARINA have become one (1) and the same person.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of the respondent falls under the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment
in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the
language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation.

Respondent’s failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required
by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.

The court further ruled that respondents’ submission that her designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an
imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears
that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board.

Ocampo v. Enriquez

Facts: During 2016 presidential campaign, Duterte publicly announced he would allow the burial of Marcos in LNMB. After
winning the elections, through Sec. of National Defense Lorenzana, a Memorandum was issued to Chief of Staff of AFP, Gen.
Visaya, for the interment of Marcos, in compliance with the verbal order of the President to implement his election campaign
promise. AFP rear Admiral Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General to provide services,
honors, and other courtesies for the late Former President Marcos. Dissatisfied with the issuances and directives, various
petitioners filed petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
- Saturnino Ocampo, et. al., in their capacity as human rights advocates and human rights violations victims
- Rene Saguisag and his son, as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers
- Edcel Lagman, as member of Congress
- Loretta Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of CHr, as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during
martial law
- Heherson Alvarez, former Senator, as concerned citizens and taxpayers
- Zaira Baniaga, as concerned citizens and taxpayers
- Algamar Latiph, former chairperson of regional human rights commission ARMM, on behalf of Moros who are
victims during martial law
- Leila De Lima, as Senator
Issues
PROCEDURAL
1. Whether Pres. Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at LNMB poses a justiciable
controversy
NO. The Court agrees with the OSG that Pres. Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a
political question that is not a justiciable controversy. It is also under the Constitution and EO 292 (Admin Code of 1987) to
allow the interment in LNMB which is a land of public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine
purposes. It is based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. It is outside the ambit of judicial
review.
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions
NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct or personal injury as a result of the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB. The interment of Marcos would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of
our national life considering that more than 27 years since his death and 30 years after his ouster have already passed.
Petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights
3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts
YES. Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts. They should seek
reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National Defense and give them the
opportunity to correct themselves, if warranted. If petitioners are still dissatisfied with the Secretary’s decision they could
have elevated it before the Office of the President which has control and supervision of the DND.
Even though there are exceptions that would warrant a direct resort to the Supreme Court under exceptional cases, the
petitioners cannot brush aside the doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper
RTC which are not only trier of facts but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and
injunction when proven necessary.
In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural grounds alone.
SUBSTANTIVE
1. Whether the issuance and implementation of the memorandum violates the Constitution, domestic and international
law
NO. The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Laws and Constitutional provisions cited by petitioner:
Art. II: Sec. 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27, and 28 – not self-executory
Art. VII: Sec. 17 – Faithful execution clause, it is consistent with President Duterte’s mandate, the burial does not contravene RA
289, RA 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by petitioner
Art. XIV: Sec. 3(2) – reliance in this provision is misplaced it refers to duty of educ institutions to teach values of nationalism
and patriotism and respect for human rights
Art. XI: Sec. 1 – not self-executory but RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), RA
7080 (Penalizing Plunder), RA 9485 (Anti-red Tape Act) was enacted pursuant to this
Art. XVIII: Sec. 26 – transitory provision and freeze order to recover ill-gotten wealth
RA 289 –authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as a burial place for Presidents, National Heroes, and Patriots for
the perpetuation of the memory and for the inspiration and emulation of this generation and of generations still unborn.
Petitioners failed to provide legal and historical bases that LNMB and National Pantheon is one and the same. LNMB is distinct
from the burial place envisioned in rA 289. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. Also to apply the standard that
LNMB is reserved only for the decent and brave or hero, it will put into question all the mortal remains therein. The name of
LNMB is a misnomer, interment of Marcos remain does not confer upon him the status of a hero.
RA 10368 – (compensation for Human rights violations victims during Marcos regime) recognizes the human rights violations
committed and gives them reparation. However, the court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s logic that the reparation includes
the prohibition of Marcos’ interment when it is not provided. It is undue to extend the law beyond what it contemplates.
Legislators could have easily inserted a provision prohibiting Marcos internment as reparation but they did not. The law is
silent and should remain to be so. We cannot read into law what is simply not there. That would be tantamount to judicial
legislation.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – these are principles that call for an enactment of legislative measures.
The PH is compliant with its international obligations evident by the various RAs, exec issuances, and even in the Constitution
Our nation’s history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether
petititoners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds
of the present generation of Filipinos.
2. Whether the Sec. of National Defense and AFP rear admiral commited grave abuse of discretion when they issued the
memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of Pres. Duterte to implement his election campaign
promise of Marcos interment in LNMB
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will
or personal bias. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over the petitioners allegation of
Duterte’s utang na loob or bayad utang to the Marcoses. Petitioners should establish such claims but failed to do so. Then
again, the court is not a trier of facts.
3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth of Marcos and his cronies, and pronouncement of
SC, nullifies his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB
National Shrines are governed by NHCP, military shrines are not. They are governed by PVAO of DND. LNMB is a military
shrine.
Magsaysay issued EO 77 – orders remains of war dead interred at Bataan to be reinterred in McKinley to minimize expenses
and accessibility to widows.
Magsaysay issued Proc. 86 – changing the name to LNMB
Garcia issued Proc. 423, Marcos issued Proc and General Orders, Cory issued EOs too. The point is the PVAO manages military
shrines which is under DND which is under the Office of the President
AFP Regulations G 161-375 – who may be interred
a.) Medal of Valor awardee
b.) Presidents or Commander-in-Chief, AFP
c.) Sec. of National Defense
d.) Chief of Staff, AFP
e.) General/Flag Officers, AFP
f.) Active and retired military personnel
g.) Gov dignitaries, statesman,national artists and others as long as approved by the C-i-C, Congress or Sec. of National
defense
h.) Widows of former presidents
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and C-i-C, legislator, Sec. of National Defense, veteran, medal of
valor awardee.
Marcos does not have any disqualification. He was not convicted of moral turpitude nor dishonourably discharged.
Marcos rendered significant active military service and military-related activities.
THOSE WHO Are NOT QUALIFIED:
a.) Personnel who are dishonorably discharged
b.) Convicted of final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude
Moral Turpitude – conduct that is contrary to community standards of justice, honesty, or good morals.
 4. Whether the Marcos family waived the burial of remains of Marcos in LNMB when they entered into agreement with
Gov. of PH as to the condition and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the PH.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the Constitution
nor its exercise be limted by legislature. As the incumbent President, Duterte is not bound by the 1992 Agreement between
ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Ilocos Norte, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind
political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed
judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.

In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was grave abuse of discretion which would justify the
Court to interpose its authority to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. The President
through respondents acted within the bounds of law and jurisprudence. The Court must uphold what is legal and just and that
is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place in LNMB
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are DISMISSED. Necessarily, the Status Quo Ante Order is hereby
LIFTED.

BANDA VS ERMITA
(GR NO. 166620; APRIL 20, 2010)
FACTS: The petitioners filed this action as a class suit on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the
National Printing Office. They challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 issued by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo which amended Sec. 6 of Executive Order No. 285, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing
services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. They perceive it as a threat to their security of tenure as
employees of the NPO contending that it is beyong the executive powers of Pres. Arroyo to amend or repeal EO No. 285 issued
by former Pres. Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers and that EO No. 378 violates petioners’ security of
tenure because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is indeed qualified as a class suit.
Whether or not Pres. Arroyo can amend or repeal EO No. 285 by the mere issuance of another executive order.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that an action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings.
Under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to
be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit
of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. From the foregoing definition, the
requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the
parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are
sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive Order and
who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that
there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees
whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while one
signed a letter denying ever signing the petition, ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note that counsel for
the petitioners challenged the validity of the desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and insinuated that such
desistance was due to pressure from people "close to the seat of power." Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of
desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient, representative number of NPO employees
have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who signed the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in the jurat as having duly
subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case.

As to the merits of the case, it is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the
offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an
agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part
of the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the President (a) to restructure the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred to another
agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of
government forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must
now compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of election paraphernalia which
remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections
may determine. At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing
responsibility to election forms.
Pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive
Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an
inclusive and broad interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by
specific provisions in general appropriations laws.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover
the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the
subsequent provision of Section 62 which evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes
including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in 2004 (the year of the issuance of
Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the President the authority to effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any
department or agency in the Executive Branch. Sections 77 and 78 of said Act recognize the power of the President to
reorganize even executive offices already funded by the said appropriations act, including the power to implement structural,
functional, and operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of
funds as may be necessary under such reorganization. Thus, insofar as petitioners protest the limitation of the NPO’s
appropriations to its own income under Executive Order No. 378, the same is statutorily authorized by the above provisions.
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under
the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and
efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the
appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that
event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation
or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid
"abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is
merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo’s issuance of Executive Order No. 378.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council – Article VIII, Sections 8
SARMIENTO vs. MISON
G.R. No. 79974; December 17, 1987

FACTS:
In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:
W/N the position of Commissioner of Bureau of Customs requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

HELD:
NO. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups are:

o First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;

o Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

o Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

o Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such
officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already
pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. Sec. 601 of
Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows:
"Sec. 601.Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be
known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who
shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines."
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, RA No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with
the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as
an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.

Lansang vs. Garcia 42 SCRA 448

Facts: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown at the miting the avance of the Liberal Party killing 8
persons and injuring many. Thus, on August 23 then President Marcos issued proclamation 889, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus. Herein petitioners were apprehended by members of the Philippine Constabulary having invoked the said
proclamation. In effect the proclamation implies that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension of the writ belongs to the President and it expressly states that such declaration is deemed “final and conclusive
upon the courts and all other persons”
・ August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A, amending the previous proclamation.
・ September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities.
・ September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities.
・ October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on selected areas.
In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18 cities are still under the suspension of writ of habeas corpus

Issue: Whether the court would adhere to its previous decision in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda?

Held: First, Proclamation 889-A superseded the original proclamation and that flaws attributed thereto are formal in nature.
Which actually emphasize the actuality of the intent to rise in arms. Second, The court intervention: In Sterling vs. Constantin,
Chief Justice Hughes declared that “when there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden
private rights secured by the Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial review”. Thus, the grant of power to
suspend the privilege of writ is neither absolute or unqualified
The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not to be a wide-scale event, it may be declared even if it only
involves a small part of the country. The president decision to suspend the writ was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he
has three available courses to suppress rebellion. First, to call out the military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and
lastly to declare martial law.

Petitions DENIED; the CFI is directed to conduct preliminary investigations

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Torres vs. Gonzales [G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987]
FACTS: In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition that
he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman
of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the
pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him
for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were
still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not  conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested
and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original
sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts
which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach,
may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code;
or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order
that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3.  Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already
been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
--
A CONDITION IN THE GRANT OF PARDON THAT THE PARDONEE SHALL NOT VIOLATE ANY OTHER LAW DOES NOT
REQUIRE CONVICTION BEFORE THE PARDON MAY BE WITHDRAWN. It may be emphasized that what is involved in the
instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the
criminal law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would
"not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of
his original sentence. The consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the
conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be
convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a
distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and
is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

G.R. NO. 88211, 178 SCRA 760 (1989)

FACTS:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and
was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar
the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. Failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. Channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. Plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they
can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. Secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. Devastated economy because of: (a) accumulated foreign debt; (b) plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and
prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner
questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was
made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal
protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the
constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.

2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

DECISION: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

RATIO:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define
what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e.,
the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power
to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (Art. VII secs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the
president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which
include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare &
advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that
the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during
times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

For ISSUE NUMBER 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to
conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are
factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES

G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003

FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec. Director of DENR,
directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was
issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.

RULING:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is
corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional
Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego,
is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

CONCEPTION-BAUTSITA vs. SALONGA

G.R. No. 86439; 172 SCRA 160, April 13, 1989

FACTS:
On Aug. 27, 1987, the President DESIGNATED petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR). But she was extended by the President a permanent appointment as Chairman of the CHR. Immediately
after taking her oath of office as Chairman on Dec. 23, 1988, petitioner discharged the functions and duties of the office.
However, on January 9, 1989, petitioner received a letter from the Secretary of the CA requesting her to submit to the
Commission certain information and documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her
appointment. Petitioner refused to comply with the aforesaid letter alleging that the CA has no jurisdiction under the
Constitution to review appointments by the President of Commissioners of the CHR. In a letter of the CA's Secretary addressed
to the Executive Secretary Macaraig, Jr., the CA informed the latter that the CA disapproved petitioner's "ad interim
appointment" in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the CA. After petitioner had elevated her case to the SC and
pending resolution thereof, the President designated Mallillin as "Acting Chairman" of the CHR. The President's action
followed after CA Chairman Salonga declared that petitioner's appointment was not confirmed for the second time. On Jan. 20,
1989, petitioner filed with this Court this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR, an "independent office" created by the 1987
Constitution, is to be made with or without the confirmation of the CA.

HELD:
Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the CHR and the lawful incumbent thereof.

1. Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the 1987 Constitution, appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of the CA, it follows that the appointment by
the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CA.

To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the
Constitution itself, unlike the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission, COMELEC and Commission on Audit,
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of CA.

The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence, that is, without the
confirmation of the CA because they are among the officers of the government "whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint." And Sec. 2(c), EO No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR.

2. When the President converted petitioner's designation as Acting Chairman on Dec. 7, 1988, significantly she advised
Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and enter upon the
performance of the duties of the office. All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment. Obviously,
she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office. Bautista's appointment therefore on Dec. 17, 1988 as Chairman of
the CHR was completed on the part of the President.

3. Appointments that are for the President solely to make, without the participation of the CA cannot be "ad interim"
appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the Constitution, extend only to appointments where the
review of the CA is needed.

Interim or recess appointments – Article VI, Section 19

PIMENTEL v ERMITA
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005

Facts:
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session.

Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.

Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be
no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.

Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO
292 read:

SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the
Constitution and laws.

SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. — (1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment
to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by
reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]

Issue:
WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session.

Held:
Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an
office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied
by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter
ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter
ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very
nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while Congress is in session.

Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are
extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling
important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents
immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the undersecretary?

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive
power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to
appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to
appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an
office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to
appoint any particular person to an office.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

G.R. NO. 149036 , APRIL 2, 2002

FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by then Comelec Chairperson
Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. OnMarch 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together
with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his
capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested
Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and
detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18,
2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo
Circular. Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.
She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the
Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h)of the Omnibus Election Code,
COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim apointments issued by
the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:
We find petitioner’s argument without merit. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself
makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

Article VII, Section 16, par. 2

LARIN VS.EXEC. SECRETARY
G.R. 112745, 280 SCRA 713, OCTOBER 16, 1997
Ponente: Torres, Jr., J.

FACTS:
The President issued E.O. No. 132 which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of InternalRevenue. Under said order,
some positions and functions are either abolished, renamed, decentralized ortransferred to other offices, while other offices
are also created. The Excise Tax Service, of which thepetitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that
was abolished. Petitioner assailedthe legality of EO No. 132 claiming that he was removed as a result of the reorganization
made in the BIRpursuant to E.O. No. 132. He claimed that there is yet no law enacted by Congress which authorizes
thereorganization by the Executive Department of executive agencies, particularly the BIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to reorganize the BIR or to issue the questioned EO No.132.

HELD: YES. Section 48 of R.A. 7645 clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and
does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in
the subsequent provision of Section 62 which shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational charges including
the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned. Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential
Decree No. 1416 expressly grants the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.

Effects of Pardon
IN RE LONTOK
43 PHIL 293 (1923)

FACTS:
Marcelino Lontok, a lawyer, was convicted of bigamy and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment on February 27 1918. This was
confirmed by the Supreme Court on September 18, 1919.

On February 9, 1921, he was pardoned by the Governor General “on the condition that he shall not again be guilty of any
misconduct.” A case was filed by the Attorney General to have him disbarred because he has convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
Lontok however argued that pardon “reaches the offense and blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.”

HELD:
Petition of the Attorney General cannot be granted, and the proceedings must be dismissed.

RATIO:
When proceedings to strike an attorney’s name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact
of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a
bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted.

Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has
culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal
consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may
nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to
retain his license to practice law. Ex parte Garland was cited, in which a lawyer pardoned by the president being a member of
the confederate congress during the secession of the South was allowed to practice law, although lawyers were supposed to
take an oath saying they have never aided any government hostile to the US. It was held that the exclude the petitioner from
the practice of law for the offense would be to enforce a punishment for the offense, when he has already been pardoned for it.
With this, the court had no right to do.
Prosecution of crimes
WEBB V DE LEON
247 SCRA 652

FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert
Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde,
her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF
Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause.
The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her
April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and
respondent Judge AmelitaTolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary
examination. Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial
investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:
1. Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape
and homicide?
2. Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?
3. Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation?
4. Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an
accused?

HELD:
1. NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt

2. NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the
person arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that “upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a
warrant for the accused.” Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have
conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard. The DOJ
Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully.

4. NO. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a
judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the
prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power and responsibility is to see that
our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.

AQUINO et.al v. ENRILE et.al

G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974

FACTS:
The instant case is a consolidation of 9 cases for habeas corpus following the arrests of petitioners in effect of General Order
No. 2 which was pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under martial law issued by then President
Ferdinand Marcos. The said petitioners were held for being participants or conspirators in the forceful siege of political and
state power in the country.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial
inquiry
2. Whether the detention of the petitioners is legal and in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law

RULING:
5 justices ruled that the issue at hand is a political question, thus, not subject to judicial inquiry. On the other hand, 4 justices
also ruled that the same issue is justiciable and that the Court may inquire on the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation
of martial law. However the Court is unanimous that the President’s decision to declare martial law is within the powers
vested unto him under the 1935 Constitution and that a state of rebellion had existed, as it was of common knowledge, when
Proclamation No. 1081 was issued.

The Court ruled on the positive. The Court states that the basic objective of the proclamation of martial law is to suppress
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof and that the suspension of
habeas corpus is of necessary consequence in order to implement arrests or detention of persons of interest. Thus, it finds that
the detention of the petitioners is legal and in accordance to the declaration of martial law as such declaration automatically
suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to and preservation of society and national survival take
precedence over individuals.
Executive Privilege
GUDANI VS. SENGA
G.R. NO. 170165. AUGUST 15, 2006

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello
Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen.
Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two
appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their
assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga
ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying
before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as
a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of
Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies
under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to
do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute.

SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials
summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations
on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of
the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to
judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse
did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is
aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers
before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to
testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.