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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 – Case Doctrines – Brondial Syllabus 2021

Alisa Marie

Sandiganbayan

1. Hannah Serana vs. Sandiganbayan, 653 SCRA (2011)

DOCTRINES:
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Jurisdictions; It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.—We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of
the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. She repeats the reference in the
instant petition for certiorari and in her memorandum of authorities. We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical
error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan. Her claim has no basis in law. It is
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history
of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at
all times accountable to the people.

Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The rule is wellestablished in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion—the intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is
to be taken into view.—The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or
an absurd conclusion. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging
mahirap at katawa-tawa. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be
taken into view. In other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the
principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na
bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Same; Same; Same; Estafa; Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that
(a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.—The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

Same; Same; Same; Public Office; University of the Philippines (U.P.); Words and Phrases; A University of the Philippines (UP) Student Regent is a
public officer; A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercise by him for the benefit of the public.—Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v.
Office of the Ombudsman, 495 SCRA 452 (2006), We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer. The 1987 Constitution
does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence. In Aparri v.
Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231 (1984), the Court held that: A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a
public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly
or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to
have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan—the Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.—Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is,
in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, 451 SCRA 187
(2005), We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes
other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law. Section
4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of
law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.—It is well established
that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign functions
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is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The administration of the University of the Philippines (UP) is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV
of the Constitution.—The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical
training. Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.

Criminal Procedure; Jurisdictions; Pleadings and Practice; It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.—It is
axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost
entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying
petitioner’s motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

Facts:

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a
government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term
starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000,
petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI).

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to
the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.

Ombudsman: the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her
person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II,
Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes
Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount
came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she
merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a simple
student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a
whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in
connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.

SB: denied Serana’s motion to quash for lack of merit

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a government scholar for swindling its funds.

Ruling:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. Estafa is one of those
other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
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It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, 451 SCRA 187 (2005), We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only
officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade
27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
It is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by
providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training. Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.

2. Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan, 762 SCRA (2015)

DOCTRINE:

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Sandiganbayan; The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution.—The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested
in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No.
1486. The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No. 1861. With the advent
of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-
a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and
just this year, R.A. No. 10660.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch
with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades.—Those that
fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials
specifically enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials of the
executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary
Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-
called “big fishes” in the government rather than those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for “petty crimes,” the so-called “small fry,”
which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.—The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-
time cases involving the so-called “big fishes” in the government rather than those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for “petty
crimes,” the so-called “small fry,” which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets. Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below
may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the
general qualification relating to “officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”

Facts:
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with
Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989). the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) allegedly failed to disclose in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of
which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son.

Petitioner filed a MTD, alleging that the SD had no jurisdiction to hear and try the case because he is an official of the executive branch
occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27. The O the OSP argued that a
reading of Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to
officials of the executive branch other than the Re gional Director and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term “Regional Director”
and “higher” are separated by the conjunction “and,” which signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined
together “relating one to the other” to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned
without indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. gional Director and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term
“Regional Director” and “higher” are separated by the conjunction “and,” which signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct,
words but are conjoined together “relating one to the other” to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director
was specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position,
regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
Whether the SD has jurisdiction over a Regional Director with SG 26.
Ruling:
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NO. Petitioner, Duncano is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position particularly
enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours with Cuyco.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public
officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly
occupied the position of Director II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.

Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director
II with Salary Grade 26.

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner.

3. De Lima vs. Guerrero, 843 SCRA (2017)

DOCTRINE:

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; The Supreme Court (SC) has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important component
of the orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons; Exceptions.—Trifling with the rule on hierarchy
of courts is looked upon with disfavor by this Court. It will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important component of the orderly administration of justice and not
imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons. In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court
explained the reason for the doctrine thusly: The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the
policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes
that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential
tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only
when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. x  x x Nonetheless, there are recognized
exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this Court were allowed in some instances. These exceptions were summarized in a case of recent vintage,
Aala v. Uy, 814 SCRA 41 (2017), as follows: In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are
raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a
constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions
that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity;
and (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.

Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; Drug-related Cases; A plain reading of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, as of RA No. 6425, will
reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and no other.—Now the question that
irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the Sandiganbayan or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 17-
165, i.e., violation of RA 9165. It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law. It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that Congress may also, by law, provide that a certain class of cases
should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such would be a special law that is construed as an exception to the general law on
jurisdiction of courts. The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No other trial court was mentioned in Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of
drug-related cases. Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 282 (1997), the Supreme Court (SC) categorically named the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) as the court with jurisdiction over drug-related cases.—Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority
to take cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 282 (1997), this Court categorically named the RTC as
the court with jurisdiction over drug-related cases, as follows: Applying by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon, People v. De Lara, People v.
Santos, and Ordoñez v. Vinarao, the imposable penalty in this case which involves 0.4587 grams of shabu should not exceed prisión correccional.
We say by analogy because these cases involved marijuana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). In Section 20 of RA No. 6425, as amended
by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the maximum quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride for purposes of imposing the maximum
penalties are not the same. For the latter, if the quantity involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000 to P10 million shall be imposed. Accordingly, if the quantity involved is below 200 grams, the imposable penalties should be as
follows: x x x x Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 would at most be only prisión
correccional duration is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Does it follow then that, as the petitioner insists, the RTC has no
jurisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties? This Section 32 as thus
amended now reads: x x x x The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. x x x The aforementioned
exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases, but also to other
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laws which specifically lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal cases, e.g., (a) Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A Nos. 1289 and 4363 on written defamation or libel; (b) Decree on Intellectual Property (P.D. No. 49, as amended), which
vests upon Courts of First Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned regardless of the imposable penalty and (c) more
appropriately for the case at bar, Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44, which vests on Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal
Courts, and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving violations of said Act.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as
committed in relation to office.—The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the Sandiganbayan whenever the
accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office. The
power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is
circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660, which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606. As it now
stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: x  x x x (2) Members of Congress and
officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the
same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One Million pesos (P1,000,000.00). The foregoing immediately betrays that
the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a special anti-graft court pursuant to a specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution. Its characterization and
continuation as such was expressly given a constitutional fiat under Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states: SECTION 4. The
present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear drug-related cases. Even Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 10660, touted by the petitioner and the dissents as a catch-all provision, does not operate to
strip the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA No. 9165.—It should occasion no surprise,
therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear drug-related cases. Even Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted
by the petitioner and the dissents as a catch-all provision, does not operate to strip the RTCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of
RA 9165. As pointed out by Justices Tijam and Martires, a perusal of the drugs law will reveal that public officials were never considered excluded
from its scope. Hence, Section 27 of RA 9165 punishes government officials found to have benefited from the trafficking of dangerous drugs, while
Section 28 of the law imposes the maximum penalty on such government officials and employees.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 specifies the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as the court with the jurisdiction to
“exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA No. 9165].” This is an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the
general rule under Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, as amended by RA No. 10660.—In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as
the court with the jurisdiction to “exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165].” This is an exception, couched in the special law
on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special
law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered as an exception to the general. Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660
has repealed Section 90 of RA 9165. However, a closer look at the repealing clause of RA 10660 will show that there is no express repeal of Section
90 of RA 9165 and well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. It is only accepted upon the clearest proof of inconsistency so
repugnant that the two laws cannot be enforced. The presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two laws involved one is special and the
other general. The mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law applies regardless of the laws’ respective
dates of passage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 10660, is the general
law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their office; Section 90,
RA No. 9165 is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction violations of RA No. 9165 committed by such public officers.—
Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by
high-ranking public officers in relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction
violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as
drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public officials’ office. The exceptional rule provided
under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the
technical aspect of drug-related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation of RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and
untechnical. However, narcotic substances possess unique characteristics that render them not readily identifiable. In fact, they must first be subjected
to scientific analysis by forensic chemists to determine their composition and nature. Thus, judges presiding over designated drugs courts are
specially trained by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given scientific instructions to equip them with the proper tools to appreciate
pharmacological evidence and give analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary consideration of RA 9165 is the fact that the
substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs, their plant sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals. Without a doubt, not one
of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and technical expertise on matters relating to prohibited substances.
 Page 6 of 69

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by Republic Act (RA) No. 10660 is to streamline the cases
handled by the Sandiganbayan by delegating to the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) some cases involving high-ranking public officials.—Likewise of
special significance is the proviso introduced by RA 10660 which, to reiterate for emphasis, states: Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to
the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00). The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by RA 10660 is to streamline the cases handled by the Sandiganbayan by
delegating to the RTCs some cases involving high-ranking public officials. With the dissents’ proposition, opening the Sandiganbayan to the influx
of drug-related cases, RA 10660 which was intended to unclog the dockets of the Sandiganbayan would all be for naught. Hence, sustaining the
RTC’s jurisdiction over drug-related cases despite the accused’s high-ranking position, as in this case, is all the more proper.

Same; Same; Motion to Quash; Even granting arguendo that the Supreme Court (SC) declares the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165, still it will not automatically result in the release from detention and restore the liberty and freedom
of petitioner. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) has several options if it dismisses the criminal case based on the grounds raised by petitioner in her
Motion to Quash.—Even granting arguendo that the Court declares the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the information subject of Criminal Case
No. 17-165, still it will not automatically result in the release from detention and restore the liberty and freedom of petitioner. The RTC has several
options if it dismisses the criminal case based on the grounds raised by petitioner in her Motion to Quash. Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the
trial court has three (3) possible alternative actions when confronted with a Motion to Quash: 1. Order the amendment of the Information; 2. Sustain
the Motion to Quash; or 3. Deny the Motion to Quash. The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion to quash is meritorious.
Specifically, as to the first option, this court had held that should the Information be deficient or lacking in any material allegation, the trial court can
order the amendment of the Information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Motion to Quash; An order sustaining the motion to quash the information would neither bar another prosecution or require the release
of the accused from custody. Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court can simply order that another complaint or
information be filed without discharging the accused from custody.—Should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the quashal of the
Information, the prosecution is not precluded from filing another information. An order sustaining the motion to quash the information would neither
bar another prosecution or require the release of the accused from custody. Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
can simply order that another complaint or information be filed without discharging the accused from custody. Section 5, Rule 117 states, thus:
Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash.—If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information
be filed except as provided in Section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If
no order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court
may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another charge.

Same; Same; Same; Even granting, for the nonce, the petitioner’s position that the trial court’s issuance of the warrant for her arrest is an implied
denial of her Motion to Quash, the proper remedy against this court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present petition for certiorari.—Even
granting, for the nonce, the petitioner’s position that the trial court’s issuance of the warrant for her arrest is an implied denial of her Motion to
Quash, the proper remedy against this court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present petition for certiorari. This Court in Galzote v. Briones,
657 SCRA 535 (2011), reiterated this established doctrine: A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the chosen legal
remedies availed of by the petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a
motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a
judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to
quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter’s ruling. In this case, the petitioner did not
proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not
allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the
absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to
proceed to trial as discussed above.

Same; Same; Same; The respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest.—Grave abuse
of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in
contemplation of the law. In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant
of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner’s claim. Rather, Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor’s resolution and its supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days, viz.:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue.—(a) By the Regional Trial Court.—Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint or information.

Same; Same; Same; There is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of
jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest.—Undoubtedly, contrary to petitioner’s postulation, there is no rule or basic principle requiring a
trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest. As such, respondent
judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed February 23, 2017 Order even before resolving petitioner’s Motion to Quash.
There is certainly no indication that respondent judge deviated from the usual procedure in finding probable cause to issue the petitioner’s arrest.

Facts
 Page 7 of 69

The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New
Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies. The several complaints filed with the DOJ were
consolidated. The petitioner filed an omnibus motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the
Panel of Prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice (“Omnibus Motion”).8 In the main, the petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has the
exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her. Alleging evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner
contended that the DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Four complaints, which were later consolidated, were filed against petitioner concerning her involvement on the illegal drug trade at the
New Bilibid Prison. These 4 cases were later consolidated and the DOJ Panel, headed by Senior Assistant State Prosecutor Peter Ong was directed to
conduct preliminary investigation.

In the preliminary hearings conducted by the DOJ Panel, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to have the consolidated cases endorsed to the
Ombudsman. Petitioner alleges that Ombudsman has exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the complaints against her. The complainants filed
an Opposition against this Omnibus Motion to which petitioner filed a Reply thereto. Petitioner also submitted a Manifestation with Motion to First
Resolve Pending Incident and to Defer Further
Proceedings.

During the next hearing, petitioner submitted that she has decided to not yet submit her counter affidavits considering the pendency of her two
motions. This was denied by the DOJ Panel and declared all pending incidents and cases submitted for resolution.
Petitioner thereafter filed before the CA a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints
against her. At the time of the promulgation of this decision, these petitions were still pending before the CA. The DOJ Panel, in the absence of any
restraining order issued by the CA recommended the filing of informations against petitioner.

Accordingly, 3 informations were filed against her. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Quash these informations. Respondent judge thereafter
issued the assailed Order finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioner. Accordingly, the warrant was issued and
served on petitioner who was committed to the PNP Custodial Center.

Petitioner thereafter filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court praying that the court grant a writ of certiorari to annul the Order by
respondent judge which issued that warrant of arrest, grant a writ of prohibition to enjoin respondent judge from further proceeding with the case
until petitioner’s Motion to Quash has been resolved, and the issuance of a status quo pro ante order to restore petitioner to her liberty and freedom.

Issue:
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 aka the Dangerous Drugs Act.

2. Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the rule on the hierarchy of courts.

Held
1. No. In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to “exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA
9165].” This is an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA
10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered as an exception to the
general. Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section 90 of RA 9165. Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA
10660, is the general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their
office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such public
officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation
of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public officials’ office.

No other trial court was mentioned in Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus,
in Morales v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 282 (1997), the Supreme Court (SC) categorically named the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as the court
with jurisdiction over drug-related cases.

The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the Supreme
Court logically follows given the technical aspect of drug-related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation of RA 9165, it is easy to
dismiss them as common and untechnical. However, narcotic substances possess unique characteristics that render them not readily identifiable.42 In
fact, they must first be subjected to scientific analysis by forensic chemists to determine their composition and nature.43 Thus, judges presiding over
designated drugs courts are specially trained by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given scientific instructions to equip them with the
proper tools to appreciate pharmacological evidence and give analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary consideration of RA
9165 is the fact that the substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs, their plant sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals.
Without a doubt, not one of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and technical expertise on matters relating to prohibited
substances.

The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 is not transferred to the Sandiganbayan whenever the
accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office. The
power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is
circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660, which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606. As it now
 Page 8 of 69

stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: x x x x (2) Members of Congress and
officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the
same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One Million pesos (P1,000,000.00). The foregoing immediately betrays that
the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a special anti-graft courtpursuant to a specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution. Its characterization and
continuation as such was expressly given a constitutional fiat under Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states: SECTION 4. The
present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law.

The Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear drug-related cases. Even Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 10660, touted by the petitioner and the dissents as a catch-all provision, does not operate to strip the Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs) of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA No. 9165. A perusal of the drugs law will reveal that public officials were never
considered excluded from its scope.

(For the prosecution of Illegal Trading of drugs to prosper, proof that the accused “act[ed] as a broker” or brought together the buyer and
seller of illegal drugs “using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two (2)-way radios, internet,
instant messengers and chat rooms” is sufficient.)

2. NO. The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this
Court were allowed in some instances. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present:
(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance;
(3) when the case is novel;
(4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court;
(5) when time is of the essence;
(6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
(8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice;
(9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the rules on the
hierarchy of courts. Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is obviously not covered by the exceptions to
the rules on hierarchy of courts. That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of her case. The right to equal
treatment before the law accorded to every Filipino also forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her position and status in the
government.

Court of Tax-Appeals

4. City of Manila vs. Judge Cuerdo, February 4, 2014

Facts
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against private
respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal
Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from
private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business
taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the
issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed A complaint for refund of illegally or erroneously collected local business tax. They said that certain
sections of the RRCM were violative of the LGC on double taxation. The RTC granted a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed and rules that the appellate
jurisdiction over the respondent’s complaint for tax refund was with the CTA, so a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutor order
should be filed with the CTA.
 Page 9 of 69

ISSUE: Whether the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax
case.

HELD
Yes. While it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local
tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA
1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing
interlocutory orders issued by the Regional Trial Court in local tax cases filed before it. The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of
certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from
the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.

While there is no express grant of the power to issue writ of certiorari, with respect to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

It can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these
cases.
(On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction
of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction.)

5. CE Casecnan Water & Energy Co. vs. Prov. Of Nueva Ecija 759 CRA 180

DOCTRINE:

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy.—Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy. It is conferred by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court. As such, if a
court lacks jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide the case on the merits and must dismiss it.

Same; Same; Same; Court of Tax Appeals; This expanded jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) includes its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.—With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank
elevated to that of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282. This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182 (2014), the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) likewise has the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the
CTA’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.—In the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182 (2014), the Court ruled that the CTA
likewise has the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the CTA’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is settled that it is the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a local tax case.—It is settled that it is the CTA which has
exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

Interlocutory Orders; Certiorari; Local Taxation; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; A certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued in
a local tax case falls under the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).—No doubt, the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case.
And as earlier discussed, a certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued in a local tax case falls under the jurisdiction of the CTA.
Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari before it for lack of jurisdiction.

Facts
Petitioner and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) entered into a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract known as the “Amended
and Restated Casec¬nan Project Agreement”5 (Casecnan Contract) relative to the construction and development of the Casecnan Multi-Purpose
Irrigation and Power Project (Casecnan Project). Article 2.2 of said agreement states that NIA must reimburse petitioner for real property taxes (RPT)
provided the same was paid upon NIA’s directive and with the concurrence of the Department of Finance.

Petitioner received from the Office of the Provincial Assessor a Notice of Assessment of Real Property dated August 2, 2005, which
indicates that for the years 2002 to 2005, its RPT due was P248,676,349.60. Petitioner paid said RPT under protest, and initiated proceedings the
validity of the collection. It then filed with the RTC of San Jose city, Nuevo ecija a complaint for injunction and damages with application for TRO
and PI, praying to restrain the collection of the rpt assessment. RTC denied petitioner’s application.
 Page 10 of 69

The CA denied the petition for certiorirari holding that jurisdiction over the case lies within the CTA. Petitioner maintains that the petition
relates to an ordinary civil action for injunction and not a local tax case.

Issue: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter of its petition for certiorari.

Held
It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition for Certiorari assailing an interlocutory order of the RTC relating to a local tax case.
With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of
Republic Act No. 9282. This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders
or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

In the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182 (2014), the Court ruled that the CTA likewise has the jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the CTA’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

It is settled that it is the CTA which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued
by the RTC in a local tax case. And as earlier discussed, a certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued in a local tax case falls under
the jurisdiction of the CTA.

Sharia’h Courts: appellate, district, circuit

6. Lomondot vs. Balindong, 762 SCRA 494

DOCTRINE:

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Shari’a Appellate Courts; The Shari’a Appellate Court (SAC) shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District Courts (SDCs).—Under Republic Act No. 9054, An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled, “An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended,” the Shari’a Appellate Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
of decisions of the Shari’a District Courts.

Same; Same; Judgments; Execution of Judgments; It is settled that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment, and one (1) of which is a supervening event.—It is settled that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of
right of a final and immutable judgment, and one of which is a supervening event. In Abrigo v. Flores, 698 SCRA 559 (2013), we said: We deem it
highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only
if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the
execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of
new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial
because such matters were not yet in existence at that time. In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal
of the writ of execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event.
The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would
become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment. In this case, the matter of whether respondents’ houses
intruded petitioners’ land is the issue in the recovery of possession complaint filed by petitioners in the SDC which was already ruled upon, thus
cannot be considered a supervening event that would stay the execution of a final and immutable judgment. To allow a survey as ordered by the SDC
to determine whether respondents’ houses are within petitioners’ land is tantamount to modifying a decision which had already attained finality.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.—We find that the SDC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion for the issuance a writ of demolition. The issuance of a special order of
demolition would certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and immutable decision. Section 10(d) of Rule 39,
Rules of Court provides: Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.—x x x x (d) Removal of improvements on property subject of
execution.—When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee
after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. Notably, this case was decided in
2005 and its execution has already been delayed for years now. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of
law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.

Facts
Petitioners Omaira and Saripa Lomondot filed with the SDC, Marawi City, a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with
prayer for mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order against respondents Ambog Pangandamun (Pangandamun) and Simbanatao Diaca
(Diaca). Petitioners claimed that they are the owners by succession of a parcel of land located at Bangon, Marawi City, and that respondent
Pangandamun illegally entered and encroached a certain portion of theur land. The respondents argued that they were the owners of the land. The
SDC ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The respondents filed an appeal with the SC. The court previously dismissed the petition for failure to show that
there was grave abuse of dissection committed by the SDC.

The SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005 ordered respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had illegally encroached and to remove
whatever improvements thereat introduced.
 Page 11 of 69

Petitioners after receipt of the SDC Order denying their second motion for reconsideration of the Order denying their motion for the issuance of a
writ of demolition, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction saying that, under RA 9054, it is
the Shari’a Appellate Court (SAC) which shall exercise jurisdiction over petition for certiorari.

Issue
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not CA has jurisdiction over decisions of SDC.
2. Whether or not the fact that the defendants claimed they have not encroached as they have already complied with the Writ of Execution and their
buildings are not within the area claimed by the plaintiffs is a supervening event that can hold the writ of execution in abeyance.

HELD:
1. YES. In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong, we stated that: x x x [t]he Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a
Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized, however, appeals or
petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations
preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices. Notably, Tomawis case was decided on March 5, 2010, while the CA decision was rendered on April
27, 2010. The CA's reason for dismissing the petition, i.e., the decision came from SDC which the CA has no appellate jurisdiction is erroneous for
failure to follow the Tomawis ruling.

2. NO. The SDC Decision dated January31, 2005 ordered respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had illegally encroached had become final
and executory after we affirmed the same and an entry of judgment was made. Such decision can no longer be modified or amended. In Dacanay v.
Yrastorza, Sr., Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. This is the doctrine of finality of judgment. In Abrigo v.
Flores,33 we said: x x x a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it
directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution
unjust, impossible or inequitable. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the FACTS by
competent
evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment. In this case, the matter of
whether respondents' houses intruded petitioners' land is the issue in the recovery of possession complaint filed by petitioners in the SDC which was
already ruled upon, thus cannot be considered a supervening event that would stay the execution of a final and immutable judgment.

7. Municipality of Tangkal vs. Balindong, 814 SCRA (2017)

DOCTRINES:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion to Dismiss; Courts; Shari’a District Courts; Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts
prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this procedural rule may be relaxed when the ground relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent on the
face of the complaint.—Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this procedural rule
may be relaxed when the ground relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent on the face of the complaint. As we held in Rulona-Al Awadhi v.
Astih, 165 SCRA 771 (1988): Instead of invoking a procedural technicality, the respondent court should have recognized its lack of jurisdiction over
the parties and promptly dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be, as they were, a futile and invalid exercise. A
summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss should not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction when the
jurisdictional infirmity is patent on the face of the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental procedural doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court may
be challenged at anytime and at any stage of the action.

Same; Same; Same; Interlocutory Orders; An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.—An order denying a motion to
dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case
is finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari
which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. As exceptions, however, the defendant may avail of a petition
for certiorari if the ground raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject matter, or when
the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Same; Same; Courts; Shari’a District Courts; Jurisdiction; Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an effective administration and
enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting Shari’a district courts’ original jurisdiction over personal
and real actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer; There is, however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari’a district courts
over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim,
the action must be filed before the regular courts.—The matters over which Shari’a district courts have jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an effective administration and enforcement
of Muslim personal laws among Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting Shari’a district courts’ original jurisdiction over personal and real
actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The Shari’a district courts’ jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with regular
civil courts, i.e., municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. There is, however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari’a district courts over
matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the
action must be filed before the regular courts.

Same; Same; Parties; When an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not — and neither does he become — a real party-in-
interest. The person represented is deemed the real party-in-interest; the representative remains to be a third party to the action.—It is clear from the
title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local
government of Tangkal. When an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not — and neither does he become — a real party-in-
interest. The person represented is deemed the real party-in-interest; the representative remains to be a third party to the action. That Mayor Batingolo
 Page 12 of 69

is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirement under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be
Muslims. To satisfy the requirement, it is the real party-defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however,
is a legal impossibility.

Muslim; Words and Phrases; The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a “Muslim” as “a person who testifies to the oneness of God and the
Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam.”—The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a “Muslim” as “a person who testifies to the
oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam.” Although the definition does not explicitly distinguish between natural and
juridical persons, it nonetheless connotes the exercise of religion, which is a fundamental personal right. The ability to testify to the “oneness of God
and the Prophethood of Muhammad” and to profess Islam is, by its nature, restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are artificial
beings with “no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.” They are considered persons only by virtue of legal fiction. The
Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category. Under the Local Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate that exercises
powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.

Constitutional Law; Local Government Units; Non-establishment Clause; Courts; Shari’a District Courts; Jurisdiction; As a government
instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects — consistent with the
nonestablishment clause; The Shari’a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded that the Municipality of
Tangkal “is neither a Muslim nor a Christian”; The Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private respondents’ complaint
because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.—As a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for
secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects — consistent with the nonestablishment clause. Hence, even if it is assumed that
juridical persons are capable of practicing religion, the Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally proscribed from adopting, much less exercising,
any religion, including Islam. The Shari’a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded that the Municipality of
Tangkal “is neither a Muslim nor a Christian.” Yet it still proceeded to attribute the religious affiliation of the mayor to the municipality. This is
manifest error on the part of the Shari’a District Court. It is an elementary principle that a municipality has a personality that is separate and distinct
from its mayor, vice mayor, sanggunian, and other officers composing it. And under no circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on purely
religious considerations — as the Shari’a District Court has done — without running afoul the inviolability of the separation of Church and State
enshrined in the Constitution. In view of the foregoing, the Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private respondents’
complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Since it was clear from the complaint that the real party-defendant was
the Municipality of Tangkal, the Shari’a District Court should have simply applied the basic doctrine of separate juridical personality and motu
proprio dismissed the case.

Facts
The private respondents filed a Complaint2 with the Shari’a District Court of Marawi City (Shari’a District Court) against the petitioner,
Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. They alleged that Macalabo was the owner and that in entered
in an agreement with the Municiaplity, allowing it to borrow the land to pave the way for the construction of the municipal hall and a health center
building, on the condition that the Municipality pay to him the value of the land within 35 years otherwise ownership would revert to Macalbo. The
municipality failed to pay hence it asked for the return of the land.

The Municpality filed a motion to dismiss arguing that it has no religious affiliation so it cannot be considered a Muslim and that the
complaint should’ve been filed with the RTC. The SDC denied the MTD, holding that it had jurisdiction since the mayor of Tangkal was Muslim.

Municipality elevated the case to the SC via petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining
order.

Issue: Whether the Sharia District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed by Muslim individuals against a
municipality whose mayor is a Muslim.

Held
No. Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this procedural rule may be
relaxed when the ground relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent on the face of the complaint.

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither
terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a
general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy

Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among
Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting Shari’a district courts’ original jurisdiction over personal and real actions except those for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer; There is, however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari’a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular
courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular
courts

As a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects — consistent with the nonestablishment clause; The Shari’a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded
that the Municipality of Tangkal “is neither a Muslim nor a Christian”. Yet it still proceeded to attribute the religious affiliation of the mayor to the
municipality. This is manifest error on the part of the Shari’a District Court. It is an elementary principle that a municipality has a personality that is
separate and distinct from its mayor, vice mayor, sanggunian, and other officers composing it. And under no circumstances can this corporate veil be
 Page 13 of 69

pierced on purely religious considerations — as the Shari’a District Court has done — without running afoul the inviolability of the separation of
Church and State enshrined in the Constitution. The Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private respondents’ complaint
because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.

Military Courts. Articles of War

8. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mislang, 883 SCRA, Oct. 15, 2018

DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute.  The
exceptions include instances when there is a violation of due process, as well as when the issue involved is purely a legal question.—The argument
that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not filing a motion for reconsideration prior to appealing his case before the CA also
fails to persuade. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. The exceptions include instances when there is a violation of
due process, as well as when the issue involved is purely a legal question. Recall that respondent alleged that he was not furnished copies of the
complaints despite repeated manifestations and motions lodged before the petitioner, requesting that he be furnished so that he could file his counter-
affidavits and position paper. Due process concerns had been put in issue before the CA. Also raised on appeal was the legal effect of respondent’s
“acquittal” before the General Court Martial on the pending complaints before the Ombudsman, undoubtedly a legal question. There was thus
sufficient basis to dispense with a prior motion for reconsideration.

Ombudsman; Court-Martial; Jurisdiction; Administrative Cases; It is beyond dispute that the Ombudsman (OMB) and the General Court Martial
(GCM) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have concurring or coordinate jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary cases involving
erring military personnel, particularly over violations of the Articles of War that are service-connected.—On the question of jurisdiction, it is beyond
dispute that the Ombudsman and the General Court Martial of the AFP have concurring or coordinate jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary
cases involving erring military personnel, particularly over violations of the Articles of War that are service-connected. We briefly revisit the nature
of court-martial proceedings for context.

Remedial Law; Courts; Court-Martial; The Supreme Court (SC) had clarified that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before
it is a criminal and not an administrative case.—In discussing the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to court-martial proceedings
insofar as those not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, this Court had clarified that a court-martial is a court, and the
prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an administrative case. Nonetheless, in threshing out the court-martial’s jurisdiction and the
nature of offenses committed by military personnel under the Articles of War, this Court also emphasized its administrative disciplinary character.

Same; Court-Martial Proceedings; A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his reassignment by
asking a temporary restraining order (TRO) or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or
injunction if his military commander reassigns him to another area of military operations.—The peculiarity and import of court-martial proceedings
was explained thus: Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military personnel because the military
constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]).
Military personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military
organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed
government personnel. A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his reassignment by asking a
temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his
military commander reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.

Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Concurrent Jurisdiction; Administrative Cases; In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two (2) or
more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.—Being sui generis, court-martial proceedings contemplate both the penal and
administrative disciplinary nature of military justice. In view of its administrative disciplinary aspect which court-martial proceedings share with the
petitioner, both have the concurrent authority to dismiss respondent from the service. “In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of
two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Procedure; The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties.—It bears stressing that the January 28, 2004 MOA was not, and could not have been, an abrogation
of the Ombudsman’s plenary jurisdiction over complaints against public officials or employees for illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient acts or
omissions. “[T]he jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of
the parties.” A plain reading of the MOA would indicate that it was executed to avoid conflicting decisions and wastage of government resources
through proper coordination. The MOA itself expressly recognizes petitioner’s primary jurisdiction, even as it foresaw the need for jointly
conducting inquiries and/or fact-finding investigations between the petitioner and the AFP, assisted by the Commission on Audit if need be, with
respect to graft and corruption cases. It even reserved petitioner’s authority to determine what law was violated in cases directly lodged before it,
including the provisions of the Articles of War. What it does provide is that, should a case be filed before it and it finds that it is non-graft or
corruption-related, then it is to be endorsed to the AFP. The purpose of the proviso is coordination and avoidance of conflicting parallel
investigations.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Concurrence of jurisdiction does not allow concurrent exercise of jurisdiction.—When the January 28, 2004 MOA
provided that non-graft cases against military personnel shall be endorsed by petitioner to the disciplinary authority of the AFP, it had done so as a
matter of efficiency and in recognition of the latter’s concurrent jurisdiction over the same offenses and its vast resources for the conduct of
investigations, including military intelligence. [C]oncurrence of jurisdiction does not allow concurrent exercise of jurisdiction. This is the reason why
 Page 14 of 69

we have the rule that excludes any other concurrently authorized body from the body first exercising jurisdiction. This is the reason why forum
shopping is malpractice of law.

Facts
Mislang, the commanding officer of the 41st infantry battalion, Valera, the then Governor of the Province of Abra, and agents Durwin and
Baharin of the Military Intelligence Group were all charged with Grave Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman for allegedly hatching a
plot to kill the former Mayor of Lagayan, Abra, Cecilia S. Luna (Luna) and her family.

When respondent appealed to the CA via Rule 43, it set aside the decision. It found that respondent had been subjected to a General Court
Martial at the Philippine Army Headquarters, whereby respondent was adjudged not guilty of the charges for the very same acts alleged in the
complaints and on the same evidence. The two Corporals Barcelona and Rosqueta whom Masilang ordered to carry out the assignation attempt filed a
complaint with the Intelligence Security Group in Fort Bonifacio against respondent.

The CA also found that the General Court Martial, PA, had jurisdiction over the complaints against the respondent, citing the
Memorandum of Agreement23(MOA) dated January 28, 2004 between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Office of the Ombudsman
delineating the lines of disciplinary authority between them. The appellate court thus ruled that the decision of the General Court Martial finding
respondent “Not Guilty” became res judicata to the effect that the petitioner was precluded from further acting on the same complaints investigated,
tried, and deliberated upon by the military court.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the complaints against respondents despite the General Court Martial’s exercise of its
concurrent jurisdiction over the same acts subject of the complaints.

Held
Yes. On the question of jurisdiction, the Ombudsman and the General Court Martial of the AFP have concurring or coordinate jurisdiction
over administrative disciplinary cases involving erring military personnel, particularly over violations of the Articles of War that are service-
connected. We briefly revisit the nature of court-martial proceedings for context.

Being sui generis, court-martial proceedings contemplate both the penal and administrative disciplinary nature of military justice. In view
of its administrative disciplinary aspect which court-martial proceedings share with the petitioner, both have the concurrent authority to dismiss
respondent from the service. “In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which
the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising
concurrent jurisdiction.” In this case, the AFP had first acquired jurisdiction and the petitioner ombudsman should have taken notice of such fact after
having been apprised of it on June 16, 2009.

The Supreme Court (SC) had clarified that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an
administrative case.

Military law is sui generis, applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system
of discipline separate from that of civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be
subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel. A civilian government employee
reassigned to another place by his superior may question his reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order (TRO) or injunction from a civil
court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him to another area of
military operations.

Primary jurisdiction
9. Unduran vs. Aberasturi, 823 SCRA (2017)
DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question.—Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by
the “real parties-in-interest” rule found in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such concept of real party-in-interest is adapted in Section 2, Rule
VI of the 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the NCIP. That petitioners are the real parties-in-interest can be gleaned from the Entry of
Appearance with Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing Office of the NCIP filed by the NCIP Special Transition Team-Quick Response
Unit (STRAT-QRU). The STRAT-QRU counsels alleged therein that the respondents’ complaint for recovery of ownership (accion reinvidicatoria)
sought to recover an unregistered real property situated in Miarayon, Bukidnon, from petitioners, all of whom are, with the exception of Nestor
Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member-beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in the name of the Talaandig Indigenous
Peoples, located at Talakag, Province of Bukidnon. In support of their allegation, petitioners presented a certification that the disputed land is within
the area covered by the same CADT, and the NCIP List of Beneficiaries of Talaandig Ancestral Domain of Miarayon, Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel,
Talakag, Bukidnon. In contrast, respondents failed to submit any evidence to dispute petitioners’ claim that they are members of the Talaandig Tribe.
Hence, respondents’ contention that petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition, is without merit.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.—In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the respondents’ amended complaint, foremost
in the Court’s mind is the principle in “that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
 Page 15 of 69

sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.”

Same; Same; Same; Parties; Regional Trial Courts; Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980), the Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).—Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and in all civil
actions which involve title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein exceeds
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

Indigenous Cultural Communities; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples; Jurisdiction; The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs).—The NCIP’s jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the IPRA as follows: Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of
the NCIP.—The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided,
however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For
this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not
been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. On the matter of NCIP’s jurisdiction and of
procedures for enforcement of rights, NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, 1998, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR) of the IPRA,
Rule IX, Section 1 states: Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law.—All conflicts related to the ancestral domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such
as but not limited to the conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of customary
laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located. All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties
is non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on
Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for
Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or Decision.

Same; Same; Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act; A careful review of Section 66 shows that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) only when they
arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.—A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered
from the qualifying provision that “no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute
that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.” The qualifying
provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of
the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the
rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and
other customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally
recognized human rights.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Section 3(f) of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) defines customary laws as a body of written
and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples  (ICCs/IPs).—Section 3(f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten
rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive
definition, it can be gleaned that it is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the above said two conditions can be complied
with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of
Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the above said two conditions. The same holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is
neither bound by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be violative of the principles of fair
play and due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same Indigenous Cultural
Community/Indigenous People (ICC/IP), i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall
under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).—Pursuant to Section 66 of
the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties
belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice,
instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even
if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the
RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and decide this case. There are, however, exceptional cases where the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction
over such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act-Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IPRA-IRR), Rule III, Section 5 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Rules as
null and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such disputes where the parties do not
belong to the same Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).—Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP
under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes and claims between and among members of the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the
IPRA, as well as the basic administrative law principle that an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict the provisions of the
 Page 16 of 69

enabling law, the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR, Rule III, Section 5 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules as null
and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such disputes where the parties do not belong to
the same ICC/IP. As the Court held in Padunan v. DARAB, 396 SCRA 196 (2003), “[j]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the
Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. Only a statute can
confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot.” In the above said exceptional cases where one of the parties is a
non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules validly dispenses with the requirement of
certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the failed attempt to settle the dispute according to the customary laws of the
concerned ICC/IP.

FACTS:
Petitioners except for Brazil and Macapayag are members of Talaandig tribe who claimed to have been living since birth on the land in Bukidnon,
which they inherited from their forefathers. Respondents claimed to be the lawful owners and possessor of an unregistered parcel of a ricultural land
which appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe. Respondents filed an original complaint for accion reivindicatoria
against petitioners with the RTC. The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Respondents filed
a Motion to Amend the complaint to one for injunction. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case and to issue a writ of injunction therein.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint. (YES)

RULING:
In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction, the Court considers the principle “that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint. In their original complaint for accion reivindicatoria,
respondents traced the provenance of their title to a Chieftain of Talaandig tribe, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. Together with their predecessor-in-
interest, they have religiously paid the real estate taxes and that they have been in possession of said land in the concept of owners for more than 50
years, even prior to June 12, 1945. They claimed that by means of fraud and stealth, petitioners entered the said land, caused damages and harassed
respondents by indiscriminately firing upon their farm workers. In their amended complaint for injunction and damages, respondents further alleged
that petitioners harassed, intimidated, threatened, and fired highpowered rifles upon respondents' farm workers to drive them away from the land,
without legal or justifiable reason. After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints, the Court notes that
respondents neither alleged that the parties are members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral lands/domains
of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in respondents' original complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an interest
in a real property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil
action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not enough to
for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP. Pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise
between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of
the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, the RTC has
jurisdiction.

Beatriz Isabel
10. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Dalauta, 835 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017

DOCTRINES:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and
decide a case.—Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law. The courts, as well as administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions, have their respective
jurisdiction as may be granted by law. In connection with the courts’ jurisdiction vis-à-vis jurisdiction of administrative bodies, the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction takes into play.

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.—The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Agrarian Reform; In agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as provided for in Section 50 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.
—In agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, more specifically, in the DARAB as provided for in Section 50 of R.A. No.
6657 which reads: SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.––The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
[Emphasis supplied] Meanwhile, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 also vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
 Page 17 of 69

Same; Same; Courts; Special Agrarian Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; Just Compensation; The Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) are
the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) expressly granted by law with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners.—The Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) are the Regional Trial Courts expressly granted by law with original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 provides: SEC. 57.
Special Jurisdiction.––The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.

FACTS:

Eugenio Dalauta was the registered owner of agricultural land in Florida, Butuan City. The land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as reflected in the Notice of Coverage, which
Dalauta received on February 7, 1994. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected
such valuation for being too low. The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of Butuan City. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted where the valuation made by LBP was affirmed in the
PARAD Resolution.

Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC). He alleged that LBP's
valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules and regulations prescribed in DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 06, series of 1992, for
determining the just compensation of lands covered by CARP's compulsory acquisition scheme.

The SAC rendered a decision fixing the just compensation to ₱2,639,557.00 as value of the land and ₱100,000.00 for the farmhouse. When LBP’s
MR was denied, LBP filed a petition for review before the CA arguing, among others, that the SAC erred in taking cognizance of the case when the
DARAB decision sustaining the LBP valuation had long attained finality. The CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case. It
reiterated that the SAC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The appellate court stated
that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials the original
jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the SAC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.

Hence, this petition by LBP reiterating its position that the SAC should not have taken cognizance of Dalauta’s petition because the PARAD’s
Resolution has long attained finality.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the finality of the PARAD Resolution.

RULING:

YES.
Primary Jurisdiction of the DARAB and Original Jurisdiction of the SAC
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In both voluntary and compulsory acquisitions, wherein the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the landowner and
conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the RTC, acting as a
special agrarian court. But as with the DAR-awarded compensation, LBP's valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as an initial
determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination of just
compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. xxx.28
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]

The DARAB Rules and Subsequent Rulings

As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals,32 this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for
the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, §n, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction.
It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency
to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.

The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the
judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is
final and unappealable.

Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.

Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, §u of the Rules of Procedure of
the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal. xxx33 [Emphases and
underscoring supplied; Citations omitted]
 Page 18 of 69

Jurisdiction of the SAC is Original and Exclusive; The Courts Ruling in Veterans Bank and Martinez should be Abandoned

It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would
vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is
clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void.
Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.

It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under R.A. No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The
valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the
courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of just
compensation. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

Since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, the Court must abandon its ruling in Veterans Bank, Martinez and Soriano that a
petition for determination of just compensation before the SAC shall be proscribed and adjudged dismissible if not filed within the 15-day period
prescribed under the DARAB Rules.

Residual jurisdiction

11. Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Carpio, 816 SCRA 473, G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017

DOCTRINES:
Same; Same; Same; Same; Before the trial court can be said to have residual jurisdiction over a case, a trial on the merits must have been
conducted; the court rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party appealed therefrom.—Before the trial court can be said to have residual
jurisdiction over a case, a trial on the merits must have been conducted; the court rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party appealed therefrom. In
this case, there was no trial on the merits as the case was dismissed due to improper venue and respondents could not have appealed the order of
dismissal as the same was a dismissal, without prejudice. Section 1(h), Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that no appeal may be taken
from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. Indeed, there is no residual jurisdiction to speak of where no appeal has even been filed. In
Strongworld Construction Corporation, et al. v. Hon. Perello, et al., 496 SCRA 700 (2006), the Court elucidated on the difference between a
dismissal with prejudice and one without prejudice: We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal without prejudice. The former
disallows and bars the refiling of the complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of a dismissal without prejudice. Likewise, where the law permits,
a dismissal with prejudice is subject to the right of appeal. x x x Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates the
grounds for which a motion to dismiss may be filed, viz.: Section 1. Grounds.— Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person
of the defending party; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; (c) That venue is improperly laid; (d) That the
plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action
is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; (h) That the claim or
demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action is
founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied
with.

FACTS:
On August 21, 2001, a complaint for delivery of certificates of title, damages, and attorney’s fees was filed against the petitioner before the RTC.
Complainants. Prayed for the issuance of a writ of seizure, pending hearing of the case, for delivery of their certificates of title they claimed to be
unlawfully detained by DBP and GFSME. They alleged that their certificates of title were submitted to DBP for safekeeping pursuant to the loan
agreement they entered into with DBP. The same certificates of title were turned over by DBP to GFSME because of its call on GFSME's guarantee
on their loan, which became due and demandable, and pursuant to the guarantee agreement between DBP and GFSME. As prayed for, the RTC
issued the Writ of Seizure accompanied by Plaintiff's Bond for Manual Delivery of Personal Property.

On September 5, 2001, DBP filed its Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash Writ of Seizure on the ground of improper venue, among
others. Abad, et al. filed their Opposition and later, their Supplemental Opposition, to which they attached the Delivery Receipt showing that the
court sheriff took possession of 228 certificates of title from GFSME. The RTC granted DBP's omnibus motion and dismissed the case for improper
venue. After opposition by the complainants, the RTC issued an order directing them to return the 228 certificates of title.

Abad, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court for the nullification and reversal of the January 27, 2003 Order of the RTC.
The same was dismissed by the Court. On September 18, 2003, DBP filed its Motion for Writ of Execution of the January 27, 2003 Order before the
RTC. On December 16, 2003, the RTC issued the corresponding Writ of Execution. The Sheriff's Return of Service, however, indicated that Abad, et
al. failed to deliver the certificates of title.
 Page 19 of 69

In its Order, dated May 17, 2004, the RTC denied the subject motion explaining that the resolution of the motion was no longer part of its residual
power. It pointed out that although there was indeed an order to return the 228 certificates of title to DBP, it was not made as a result of a trial of the
case, but as a consequence of the order of dismissal based on improper venue.

DBP filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA which dismissed the same. It noted that DBP did not move for reconsideration of the
September 25, 2001 Order of dismissal. It considered the RTC decision as final and executory. It added that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
provided that the claim for damages against the bond must be filed before trial or before appeal was perfected or before the judgment became
executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court reached the residual jurisdiction stage

RULING:
Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do
not involve any matter litigated by the appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by indigent litigants; to order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are done prior to the transmittal of the original record
or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has already been perfected or despite the approval of the record on appeal or in case of a petition for
review under Rule 42, before the CA gives due course to the petition.

The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on
appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.

Requisites: trial, judgment, appeal

12. Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz, 781 SCRA 607, G.R. No. 198172 January 25, 2016

DOCTRINE:
Pleadings and Practice; Verification; A defect in the verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective .—The lack of notarial seal
in the notarial certificate is a defect in a document that is required to be executed under oath. Nevertheless, a defect in the verification does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.

Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Noncompliance or a defect in a certification against forum shopping, unlike in the case of a
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction, unless the covering Rule is relaxed on the ground of “substantial
compliance” or based on the presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.”—Noncompliance or a defect in a certification against
forum shopping, unlike in the case of a verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction, unless the covering Rule is
relaxed on the ground of Pleadings and Practice; Verification; A defect in the verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
—The lack of notarial seal in the notarial certificate is a defect in a document that is required to be executed under oath. Nevertheless, a defect in the
verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.

Same; Jurisdiction; Execution of Judgments; Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court.—Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The court of origin with
respect to the assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these orders. The RTC is the court with jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued
RTC orders. Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the respondent’s real property before the RTC
as the court of origin.

Moot and Academic; A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening
events, rendering the adjudication of the case or the resolution of the issue without any practical use or value.—A case or issue is considered moot
and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events, rendering the adjudication of the case or the
resolution of the issue without any practical use or value. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness
except when, among others, the case is capable of repetition yet evades judicial review.

FACTS:

Dela Cruz leased two units of petitioner’s apartment. The contract of lease provides for a period of one-month subject to automatic renewals.
Petitioner sent respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two subject units. Due to the respondent’s refusal to vacate the units, the petitioner
filed a complaint for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City. The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor and
ordered the respondent to vacate the premises, and pay the rentals due. The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Pending appeal,
the respondent consigned the monthly rentals to the RTC due to the petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals. The RTC affirmed the decision of the
MTC. The CA reversed the two lower courts and dismissed the ejectment case. This decision became final and executory. Petitioner then filed a
motion praying for the withdrawal of the rentals consigned with the RTC.
 Page 20 of 69

The RTC granted the motion. The CA also upheld the RTC’s order and held that they were issued pursuant to its equity jurisdiction. The CA ruling
became final and executory as the SC denied respondent’s petition for insufficiency in form. The petitioner then returned to the RTC for the issuance
of the lease payments deposited by respondent. However, the withdrawn deposits were insufficient to cover the rentals due from 2001 to 2004.
Hence, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying that the RTC to levy upon the respondent’s property to satisfy the judgment credit.
The RTC granted the motion. Respondent went to the CA. The CA initially denied the petition on MR, the CA reversed and set aside the orders of
the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The CA held that while the approval of the petitioner’s motion to withdraw the consigned
rentals and the posted supersedeas bond was within the RTC’s jurisdiction, the RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property. The
CA explained that the approval of the levy on the respondent’s real property could not be considered as a case pending appeal, because the decision
of the MTC had already become final and executory. As such, the matter of execution of the judgment lies with the MTC where the complaint for
ejectment was originally filed and presented.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property

RULING:

YES. RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.

The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties when an appeal
is perfected. On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to
the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise
of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution.

The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and occupation of the subject units were issued pursuant to the
RTC’s equity jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81277. The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct
from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there
was nothing more to execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and
completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not
on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.

Epistolary jurisdiction

13. Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes, 756 SCRA (2015)

DOCTRINE: Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be
injured from the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-
forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations." They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce
international and domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour autrui. As the representatives of
Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait
as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public
trust. Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court will have the opportunity to lower the
threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction." The term epistolary jurisdiction means acting on letter written by or on behalf
of the oppressed people.

FACTS:
This case arose when DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX) entered into an agreement for the exploration, development and
production of petroleum resources at the offshore of Tanon Strait. Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal
capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in a
representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations," using Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. as
basis for their claim in asserting their right to enforce international and domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of
stipulation pour autrui. As representatives, the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected residents
of Tañon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the
doctrine of public trust.
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court will have the opportunity to lower the threshold for
locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction." Public respondents argued that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because
Section 1, Rule 3of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons. They also contested the applicability of
Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn. As regards the Stewards, the public
respondents likewise challenged their claim of legal standing on the ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action.
Moreover, the public respondents argued that the Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited
or injured by the decision in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petition

RULING:
YES. For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have
stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment
since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.
 Page 21 of 69

Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary
jurisdiction. In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may
be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about animals. While we, as humans, may feel the need to nurture and
protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As humans, we
cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we know what remedy they need in the face of an injury. There is no
valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign representation on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very
anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let alone present that they would
wish to use our court system, which is designed to ensure that humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for
themselves, which of course includes compassion for all living things.

Split jurisdiction

14. City of Manila vs. Grecia-Cuerdo, 715 SCRA 182, G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014

DOCTRINE:
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to issue a writ of certiorari in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and
decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter .—It would be somewhat
incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a
local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC
but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic
and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it
the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by
appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.

FACTS:
The City of Manila, through its treasurer, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 private respondents. In addition to
the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said
assessment covered the local business taxes. Private respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest. They
later filed before the RTC of Pasay City a complaint denominated as one for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected
Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The RTC granted. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners’
petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued
in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a
local tax case

RULING:
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their
original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order
in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer
also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer
should only be considered as partial, not total.

Expanded/Extended jurisdiction
 Page 22 of 69

15. Edcel Lagman vs. Pimentel III, 854 SCRA (2018)

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018. On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a
period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). On May 25,
2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of
Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted
P.S. Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full support to the Proclamation and
finding no cause to revoke the same. On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a
Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until December 31,
2017. In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of Staff General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018 “for
compelling reasons based on current security assessment.” On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar
recommendation to the President “primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other
like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers,
supporters and financiers, and to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace,
stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao.”
Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to
further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year,
from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine. On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216
2. Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial
review.
3. Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

RULING:

First Issue: NO.

The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized that the Court’s jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII is special and specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It was further stressed therein that the standard
of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers.

Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will emasculate the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18,
Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief.

Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.

Second Issue: NO.

The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown
that the above-quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the Constitution.

Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, et al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and
publication. It should be added that there must be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained.

In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or publication. Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law
certainly cannot be equated to the consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may consider such matter as urgent as to necessitate
swift action, or it may take its time investigating the factual situation. This Court cannot engage in undue speculation that members of Congress did
not review and study the President’s request based on a bare allegation that the time allotted for deliberation was too short.
 Page 23 of 69

Third Issue: YES.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may
extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.

What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are (1) that the
extension should be upon the President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the
demands of public safety; and (3) that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.
Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the
authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.”

Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was not adopted by the majority of the Commission’s members. The
framers evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to determine the duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18,
Article VII and the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and duration of
the extension, the determinative factor is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires” such extension.

Equity jurisdiction
16. Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz, 781 SCRA 607, G.R. No. 198172 January 25, 2016

DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived
by the parties.—It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. “Even on appeal
and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over the case.” Even assuming that the case has been rendered moot due to the respondent’s redemption of the property, the CA may still
entertain the jurisdictional issue since it poses a situation capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.

Same; Same; Same; “Appellate Jurisdiction” and “Equity Jurisdiction,” Distinguished.—The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law.
The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected. On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims
to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting
legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution. The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and occupation of the subject
units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition docketed as C.A. -G.R. S.P. No. 81277. The RTC’s equity
jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the
ejectment case effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the
RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.

Jurisdictional estoppel
17. Duero vs. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 11, G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002

DOCTRINE:
Actions; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction, the Court notes that estoppel has become an
equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement; For
estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
—Was private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC? In this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that he
was not. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction, we note that estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both
substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement. Hence, estoppel ought to be applied
with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a
tool of injustice.

Same; Same; Same; The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured
by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent; Even if a party actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court, the
doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any
stage of the action.—Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private
respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the
court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party
may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying
that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively participated in the proceedings
before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
anytime and at any stage of the action. Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter
of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances.
 Page 24 of 69

FACTS:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradel entered and occupied petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302,
located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. Petitioner informed
respondent that the land was his, and requested the latter to vacate the land. However, despite repeated demands, private respondent remained
steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.

On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against
private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.

Petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12,
1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private respondent
Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.

Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was
ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the lot.

On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr.,
since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right
to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial

Private respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. The
RTC again denied the Petition. Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he alleged that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case since the value of the land is only P5,240, which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, the RTC denied the MR. Private respondent
filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari which the latter granted.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2) Whether or not the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC after he has successfully sought affirmative
relief therefrom

RULING:
1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129.
2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of
injustice.
Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave
the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the
complaint, private respondent was declared in default.

He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the
same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the
RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied.

Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the
RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for
reconsideration

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings
and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action
Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court)

18. Gonzaga vs. Court of Appeals, 394 SCRA 472, G.R. No. 144025 December 27, 2002

DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Estoppel; While an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active
participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction.— Petitioners
claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In countless
decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any
stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.—Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit from
their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent. This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case
for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.
 Page 25 of 69

FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 and
was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as security for their housing loan. Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on
Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent,
through its general manager, informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus,
petitioners continued with the construction of their house. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS.
Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded
from private respondent that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their
house was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file an action for reformation of contract and damages
with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint. A writ of execution was then issued by the RTC. Petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of
execution, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private
respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment premised on the ground that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The CA denied the petition relyin mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were estopped in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC.

RULING:

YES. While an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active participation in the
proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. held in the leading case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy:

“A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais,
or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

“It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining
or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy.”

Here, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private
respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once
did petitioners ever raise the issue of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court
rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction—and it was only because
said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s jurisdiction over the case they themselves
filed.

Julia Anne Mari

19. Manila Bankers vs. Ng Kok Wei, 418 SCRA

DOCTRINE: We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

FACTS
Manila Banker Life Insurance Corporation entered into a contract to sale of a Condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces with respondent, Eddy Ng
Kok wei. Complete payment was made by respondent, and subsequently a Contract to sell in in favor of Ng Kok Wei was executed by plaintiff.
Plaintiff failed to perform its obligation to deliver the condominium unit, upon demand of respondent hence the latter filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City a complaint for specific performance and damages. During the pendency of the case, the respondent receives the condominium
unit, hence the case was only for damages. Regional Trial Court, rendered a decision in favor of respondent and order plaintiff to pay for damages.
Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which the CA affirmed in toto the trial court decision.

Plaintiff then filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is estopped to assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court?

HELD:
Yes. While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner's active participation in the proceedings estopped it from
assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. Here, petitioner failed to raise the question
of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court's jurisdiction over this case.
Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial court's jurisdiction.

20. Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. CA, 699 SCRA

 Page 26 of 69

DOCTRINE: The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

FACTS
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
spouses Toledo. Herein respondent filed an Answer 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in
which she alleged, among others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel, is already dead. The death certificate of Manuel states "13 July 1995"
as the date of death. As a result, petitioner filed a motion to require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. After compliance of respondent,
Petitioner filed a Motion for Substitution praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-defendants which appears to be granted by the
trial court.

The trial of the case then proceeded. Herein petitioner, as plaintiff, presented its evidence and its exhibits were thereafter admitted. Thereafter, the
reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 7 October 2004, respondent, instead of filing a
Demurrer, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or
a real party in interest; hence, the case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action; (2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution of the
deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time. Respondent's motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was
likewise denied on the ground that "defendants' attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by estoppel by laches" since respondent failed to
raise the issue despite several chances to do so.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its
discretion in denying her motion to dismiss despite discovery, during the trial of the case, of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal of
the case. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, and denied petitioner’s MR.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

HELD
NO. Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondent's motion to dismiss questioning the trial court's jurisdiction was filed more than six years
after her amended answer was filed, thus barring her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated in the proceedings conducted
by the trial court.

Petitioner's argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects. The aspect of jurisdiction which
may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. In many cases, the Supreme Court barred
the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties
cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily.

Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court's jurisdiction over the person of
defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over
the person of the parties are pertinent herein. Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses
which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to
prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case against him when he
receives summons. "Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by
which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.” In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since
there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was
filed in the trial court.

Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party defendant is the dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the
trial court err when it ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only where the party to be substituted died during the
pendency of the case

Hierarchy of Courts
21. Agan vs. Piatco, 420 SCRA

DOCTRINE:
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PARTIES; INTEREST OF PERSON ASSAILING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE
MUST BE DIRECT AND PERSONAL. — The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able, to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in
 Page 27 of 69

imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; HIERARCHY OF COURTS MAY BE RELAXED WHEN THE REDRESS DESIRED CANNOT BE OBTAINED IN
THE APPROPRIATE COURTS. — The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the cases at bar.
The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction.

FACTS
In 1989, The DOTC conducted studies on NAIA’s capability to cope with the traffic development up to 2010. In 1993, business tycoons Gokongwei,
Gotianun, Sy, Tan, Ty, and Yuchengco formed the Asia’s Emerging Dragon Group (AEDC) and submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA Terminal III under a Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement (BOT) under BOT
Law (RA6957, amended by RA 7718). DOTC began the bidding process for the NAIA Terminal III project by forming the PBAC (Prequalification
Bids and Awards Committee). AEDC’s primary competitor was the PAIRCARGO consortium (composed of Pair Cargo, PAGS, and Security Bank)
filed their bid, which AEDC questioned since the former allegedly lacked financial capability. The Government, through then DOTC Secretary
Arturo T. Enrile, and PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” (1997 Concession Agreement).

Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with
various service providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support,
aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA. Consequently,
the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of the
questioned agreements, filed before this Court a petition for prohibition. During the pendency of the case before this Court, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, on November 29, 2002, in her speech at the 2002 Golden Shell Export Awards at Malacañang Palace, stated that she will not
“honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch’s legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.” Several petitions of prohibition filed by
NAIA Terminal I & II’s int’l service providers, their employees, and congressmen alleging that the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA, & its
supplements are contrary to the Constitution, BOT Law, & its IRR.

ISSUE
Whether or not the arbitration step taken by PIATCO will not oust this Court of its jurisdiction over the cases.

HELD
The rule on hierarchy of courts in cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the trial courts and appellate courts generally applies to cases
involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or
falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depends on disputed facts for decision cannot be
brought immediately before the appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. It goes without saying that when cases brought before the appellate
courts do not involve factual but legal questions, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary.
22. Liga Ng Mga Barangay vs. Atienza, 420 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this
Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable
and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as
the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.

FACTS
Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to the LGC, constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-
urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.

The said law provides that the Liga shall elect its own officers. All other matters not provided for in the LGC affecting the internal organization of
the leagues of LGUs shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws, which must always conform to the provisions of the Constitution
and existing laws. Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal organization. Liga adopted and ratified its own
Election Code and came out with its Calendar of Activities, setting the synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga
Chapter of Manila, together with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters.

Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing for the election of representatives of the District Chapters
in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days after the barangay elections. Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a
letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through
legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council. Mayor signed and approved the city ordinance. Hence,
on 27 August 2002, the Liga filed this instant petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case directly with the Supreme Court.

HELD
No. Although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or
illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has
 Page 28 of 69

only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not
have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.

Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of
courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct
recourse to this Court should be allowed.

We have held that this Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. As we have said in Santiago
v. Vasquez , the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this
Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable
and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as
the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.

Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

23. St. Mary Crusade Fndtn vs. Riel, 745 SCRA

DOCTRINE: Although the [SC] has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only
when there are special, extra-ordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same.

FACTS
On October 28, 2004, the petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the
fire that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late 80's. Initially, respondent Judge gave due course to the petition, but after the preliminary
hearing, he dismissed the petition. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but it was denied.
Hence, on February 22, 2007, the petitioner came directly to the Court alleging that respondent Judge had "unfairly abused his discretion and
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which is specifically enjoined upon him as a duly [ sic] under Rule 7, Section 8, of the Revised Rules
of Court;" 5 that "in finally dismissing the herein subject Petition for Reconsideration, respondent Honorable Acting Presiding Judge has acted
without and in excess of his authority and with grave abuse of discretion to the further damage and prejudice of the herein petitioner;" 6 and that it
had no other remedy in the course of law except through the present petition for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE
Whether or not the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus is proper in the Supreme Court

HELD
NO. The filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extra-ordinary
or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary,
frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. There being no special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts,
warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.

24. Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction And Development Co., 857 SCRA (2017)
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these
exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated.

FACTS
In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which it administered, to Offshore Construction. 3 properties were
subjects of Contracts of Lease for 5 years, from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003. All their lease contracts also made reference to an August 20,
1998 memorandum of stipulations, which included a provision for lease renewals every 5 years upon the parties' mutual agreement.

Offshore Construction occupied and introduced improvements in the leased premises. However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted
the projects due to Offshore Construction's nonconformity with Presidential Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th centuries' Philippine
Spanish architecture in the area. Consequently, Offshore Construction filed a complaint against Intramuros and the Department of Tourism before the
Manila Regional Trial Court.

Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement which the Manila Regional Trial Court approved. In the Compromise Agreement, the
parties affirmed the validity of the 2 lease contracts but terminated the one over one property. It retained the 5-year period of the existing lease
contracts and stated the areas that may be occupied by Offshore Construction.

During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite several demand letters. Intramuros tolerated the
continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore Construction would pay its arrears. To settle its arrears, Offshore Construction proposed to pay the
Department of Tourism's monthly operational expenses for lights and sound equipment, electricity, and performers at the Baluarte Plano Luneta de
 Page 29 of 69

Sta. Isabel. Intramuros and the Department of Tourism accepted the offer, and the parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement covering the period
of August 15, 2004 to August 25, 2005. However, Offshore Construction still failed to pay its arrears. Offshore Construction received Intramuros'
latest demand letter.

Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court. Offshore Construction filed a Motion to dismiss. The MTC
granted Offshore’s motion and dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. First, it pointed out that there were two (2) pending cases at the
time Intramuros filed its complaint: one for specific performance filed by Offshore Construction against Intramuros, and another for interpleader
against Offshore Construction and Intramuros filed by 4H Intramuros, Inc. (4H Intramuros), which claimed to be a group of respondent's tenants. The
Metropolitan Trial Court found that the cause of action in Intramuros' complaint was similar with those in the specific performance and interpleader
cases. Intramuros appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the MTC. Thus, Intramuros filed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner's resort to the Supreme Court is proper and warranted under the circumstances.

HELD
YES. At the outset, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to assail the Regional Trial Court's ruling
upholding the MTC Order instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.

Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy from an adverse decision rendered by a Regional Trial Court exercising its appellate
jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the findings of the
Metropolitan Trial Court that it has no jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and that petitioner committed forum shopping when it failed to
disclose two (2) pending cases, one filed by respondent Offshore Construction and the other filed by respondent's group of tenants, 4H Intramuros.
Both of these cases raise questions of law, which are cognizable by the Court of Appeals in a petition for review under Rule 42.

"A question of law exists when the law applicable to a particular set of facts is not settled, whereas a question of fact arises when the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts is in doubt." This Court has ruled that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a complaint and the existence of
forum shopping are questions of law. A petition for review under Rule 42 may include questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
This Court has recognized that the power to hear cases on appeal in which only questions of law are raised is not vested exclusively in this Court. As
provided in Rule 42, Section 2, errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court in its decision must be specified in the
petition for review.

Petitioner's direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review as sanctioned by the rules, violates the principle of
hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine.
One of these exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated. Here, the controversy between the parties has been dragging on since 2010,
which should not be the case when the initial dispute — an ejectment case — is, by nature and design, a summary procedure and should have been
resolved with expediency. Moreover, this Court's rules of procedure permit the direct resort to this Court from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
upon questions of law, such as those which petitioner raises in this case.

Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC Decision affirming the MTC (1) to this Court on questions of law only; or (2) if there are
factual questions involved, to the CA — as they in fact did. Thus, petitioner's resort to this Court is proper and warranted under the circumstances.

25. Bureau of Customs vs. Gallegos, 857 SCRA 57 (2017)

DOCTRINE: Although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the RTC in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only
when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same.

FACTS
On December 20, 2006, the ASEAN member-countries, including the Philippines, signed the Protocol to Establish and Implement the ASW Protocol,
under which the member-countries agreed to develop and implement their National Single Windows (NSW) based on international standards and
best practices. The announcement of the shortlist of eligible consultants and of the Highest Rated Bid was delayed, due among others, to the
interview of private respondent's Project Team Members, requested by former Deputy Commissioner Primo Aguas. The said interview, however, was
neither required by law nor regulation.

On April 23, 2015, Commissioner Lina was appointed as BOC Commissioner. He wrote a Letter dated May 6, 2015 addressed to petitioner DBM-PS
Executive Director Syquia requesting for the discontinuance of the procurement process of the PNSW 2 project, in line with the Government
Procurement Reform Act which grants to the head of the procuring agency the right to reject bids for justifiable and reasonable grounds where the
award of the contract will not redound to the benefit of the government. Acting upon Commissioner Lina's letter, Director Syquia issued on May 7,
2015, a Notice of Cancellation, aborting the bidding process for PNSW 2 project.

Private respondent, through a Letter dated May 22, 2015, moved for a reconsideration of the Notice of Cancellation, but the same was denied in
petitioner BOC's Resolution dated July 31, 2015. This prompted the private respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, before the RTC against the
petitioners. The petition prayed that a judgment be rendered annulling the decision of Director Syquia embodied in his Notice of Cancellation, and,
instead to continue the last remaining process of the competitive bidding for the PNSW 2 project, which is the signing of the contract and issuance of
the Notice to Proceed. Pending such proceedings, the private respondent likewise prayed that the RTC restrain the petitioners from withholding or
 Page 30 of 69

reducing the appropriation, or returning the appropriation for the project to the Bureau of Treasury, so as not to render ineffectual any judgment that
may be issued by the RTC.
RTC issued a TRO in favor of the private respondent, and consequently, an injunctive writ.
Petitioners, dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration or any form of redress in the court a quo, filed this instant petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the direct resort to the SC from the RTC order is proper.

HELD
NO. Certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is the tangible representation of the opportunity
given to the office to correct itself.

Here, petitioners maintain that since the petition raises purely questions of law, their failure to file a motion for reconsideration is not fatal. Except for
this bare allegation, however, petitioners failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior motion for
reconsideration. Indeed, "petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not.”

Likewise, the direct filing of this petition in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction among
the Supreme Court, CA and the RTC to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give
petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Stated differently, although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the
RTC in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same.
30 The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus
afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. 31 Absent any showing of any
special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition will cause the dismissal of the recourse, as in this case.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that this petition is procedurally infirm, and thus, dismissible.

Residual Prerogatives
26. Katon vs. Palanca, 437 SCRA 565

DOCTRINE: Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from
the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.

FACTS
On August 2, 1963, petitioner Katon filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry for the re-classification of a piece of real
property known as Sombrero Island in Palawan for the purpose of eventual conversion or reclassification from forest to agricultural land, and
thereafter for Katon to apply for homestead patent. In 1965, the land was certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public
Land Act.
Two of the respondents filed a homestead patent application for portions of the island. Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and
original certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained
through fraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an
application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land.
Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes
and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years; and that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is
concerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of
estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dimiss. RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner filed a Mortion for Reconsideration which was denied. In his
Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his
first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking residual
prerogative. Thus, this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was filed with the SC.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals properly exercised its power of Residual Prerogative

HELD
Petitioner submits that the CA erroneously invoked its "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio
dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an
appellate court.

Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the "residual
jurisdiction" of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3)
res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio
dismiss the claim or action.
 Page 31 of 69

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court: “XXX the court may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals
of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal."

The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on
appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. 13 In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called
residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow
the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA's motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably,
such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal.
What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds
mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 14 of the same rules.

Concurrent Jurisdiction

27. Pat-og vs. CSC, 697 SCRA (2013)

DOCTRINE: See underlined in HELD.

FACTS
Bang-on alleged that when he attended his class at the basketball court of the school, Pat-og instructed them to form two lines. Thinking that three
lines were to be formed, he stayed in between the two lines, so Pat-og then punched his stomach without warning for failing to follow instructions.
As a result, he suffered stomach pain for several days and was confined in a hospital from September 10-12, 2003.

Regarding the same incident, Bang-on filed an affidavit-complaint with the CSR-CAR and a criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less
Serious Physical Injury with the RTC.

The CSC-CAR found the existence of a prima facie case for misconduct and formally charged Pat-og. While the proceedings of the administrative
case were ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment in the criminal case and found Pat-og guilty of the offense of slight physical injury. Following his
application for probation, the decision became final and executory and judgment was entered. Meanwhile, in the administrative case, a pre-hearing
conference was conducted after repeated postponement by Pat-og.

The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by Pat-og was sufficient to find him guilty of Grave Misconduct. The motion for reconsideration filed
by Pat-og was denied for lack of merit. It was raised to the CSC which dismissed Pat-og's appeal and affirmed decision of the CSC-CAR. It also
denied its MR.

In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that Pat-og was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC
as the records clearly showed that he actively participated in the proceedings. It was of the view that Pat-og was not denied due process when he
failed to cross-examine Bang-on and his witnesses because he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence before the CSC-CAR
and the CSC. The CA also held that the CSC committed no error in taking into account the conviction of Pat-og in the criminal case. It stated that his
conviction was not the sole basis of the CSC for his dismissal from the service because there was substantial evidence proving that Pat-og had indeed
hit Bang-on.

Thus, he filed this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Pat-og contends that Section 9 of the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers, provides that administrative charges against a public school teacher shall be heard initially by a committee constituted
under said section. As no committee was ever formed, the petitioner posits that he was denied due process and that the CSC did not have the
jurisdiction to hear and decide his administrative case. He further argues that notwithstanding the fact that the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the
first time on appeal, the rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the cause of action or subject
matter of the case.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over an administrative case involving a public-school teacher.

HELD
In Puse v. Santos-Puse, it was held that the CSC, the DepEd, and the Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC)
have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When
the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had
the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.
 Page 32 of 69

In CSC v. Alfonso, it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all
members of the civil service, including public school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first and foremost, a civil servant accountable to
the people and answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged against him as a public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670 divests the CSC of its power
to discipline public school teachers would negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established and would impliedly amend the Constitution
itself.

At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from raising the issue. Although the rule states that a
jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. Here, instead of
opposing the CSC's exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by
even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his
appeal. This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

Jojee Rose

Actions incapable of pecuniary estimation:

28. First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. vs. Phil Bank of Communications, June 19, 2018, Justice Leonen, en banc

DOCTRINE:

Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 129, as amended, provides Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs) with exclusive, original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.”—
Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides Regional Trial Courts with exclusive, original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.” Lapitan v. Scandia, 24 SCRA 479 (1968), instructed that to determine
whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
established. This finds support in this Court’s repeated pronouncement that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by examining the
material allegations of the complaint and the relief sought.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Capable of Pecuniary Estimation; If the principal relief sought is the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the
action is capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of money or real property and the money
claim is only a consequence of the principal relief, then the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.—Whatever confusion there might have been
regarding the nature of actions for nullity of contracts or legality of conveyances, which would also involve recovery of sum of money or real
property, was directly addressed by Lu v. Lu Ym, 563 SCRA 254 (2008). Lu underscored that “where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.” This finds support in numerous decisions where this Court proclaimed that the test to determine whether an
action is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is to ascertain the nature of the principal action or relief sought. Thus, if the principal relief
sought is the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the action is capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief sought
is not for the recovery of money or real property and the money claim is only a consequence of the principal relief, then the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

FACTS:

First Sarmiento obtained from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM) a P40,000,000.00 loan, which was secured by a real estate mortgage
over 1,076 parcels of land. Thereafter, the loan agreement was amended with the increase of the loan amount to P51,200,000.00, then increased to
P100,000,000.00.

PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. It claimed in its Petition that it sent First Sarmiento several demand
letters, yet First Sarmiento still failed to pay the principal amount and accrued interest on the loan. This prompted PBCOM to resort to extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, a recourse granted to it under the loan agreement.

On December 29, 2011, the mortgaged properties were auctioned and sold to PBCOM as the highest bidder.

First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and its amendments, with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction. It paid a filing fee of P5,545.00. First Sarmiento claimed in its Complaint that it never received the loan proceeds of
P100,000,000.00 from PBCOM, yet the latter still sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. It prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the Ex Officio Sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage or registering the certificate of sale in PBCOM’s favor with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.

RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating to the effect that an action for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to
efface the true objective and nature of the action which is to recover real property, hence, the court lacks of jurisdiction over the subject matter for
plaintiff having failed to pay the appropriate filing fees (based on the FMV of the mortgaged properties) Thereafter, RTC dismissed its Motion for
Reconsideration. On August 17, 2012, First Sarmiento sought direct recourse to this Court with its Petition for Review under Rule 45. It insists that
its Complaint for the annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE: Whether the Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage incapable of pecuniary estimation.
 Page 33 of 69

RULING: YES. A careful reading of petitioner’s Complaint convinces this Court that petitioner never prayed for the reconveyance of the properties
foreclosed during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over them. Rather, it assailed the validity of the loan contract
with real estate mortgage that it entered into with respondent because it supposedly never received the proceeds of the P100,000,000.00 loan
agreement.

Considering that petitioner paid the docket fees as computed by the clerk of court, upon the direction of the Executive Judge, this Court is convinced
that the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage.

Furthermore, even if it is assumed that the instant case were a real action and the correct docket fees were not paid by petitioner, the case should not
have been dismissed; instead, the payment of additional docket fees should have been made a lien on the judgment award. The records attest that in
filing its complaint, petitioner readily paid the docket fees assessed by the clerk of court; hence, there was no evidence of bad faith or intention to
defraud the government that would have rightfully merited the dismissal of the Complaint.

Commencement (Sections 3 and 5, R-1)

29. Alday vs. FGU Insurance– 350 SCRA

FACTS:

Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati alleging that petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed
it P114,650.76, representing unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges incurred by petitioner in the course of her
work as an insurance agent for respondent. Respondent also prayed for exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right for the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit
commissions and contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated premium reserves amounting to
P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the allegedly
unfounded action filed by respondent.

Respondent filed a “Motion to Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default” because petitioner’s
answer was allegedly filed out of time. However, the trial court denied the motion and similarly rejected respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

A few weeks later respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim, contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
same because of the non-payment of docket fees by petitioner. In response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from
payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having failed to answer such counterclaim.

The trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim and consequently, denied petitioner’s motion. The court found
petitioner’s counterclaim to be merely permissive in nature and held that petitioner’s failure to pay docket fees prevented the court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the same. The trial court similarly denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. CA sustained RTC’s decision and subsequently
denied petitioner’s motion of reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the respondent is estopped from questioning petitioner’s non-payment of docket fees because it did not raise this particular issue
when it filed its first motion—the “Motion to Strike out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default”
2. Whether or not the counterclaim of the petitioner is compulsory or permissive in nature. (In consideration of the payment of the docket
fees); (Whether the case should be dismissed)

RULING:
1. NO. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. In the case at bar, respondent cannot be considered as estopped from
assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaim since this issue was raised by respondent with the trial court itself—the
body where the action is pending—even before the presentation of any evidence by the parties and definitely, way before any judgment
could be rendered by the trial court.

2. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

In Valencia v. Court of Appeal, this Court capsulized the criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
a. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
b. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
c. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim?
d. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
 Page 34 of 69

Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the “compelling test of compulsoriness” which requires
“a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.”

Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioner’s counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is
merely permissive. The evidence required to prove petitioner’s claims differs from that needed to establish respondent’s demands for the
recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondent’s claims is not
contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioner’s counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial
duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a logical connection between the
parties’ claims. This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner’s own admissions since she declared in her answer that respondent’s
cause of action, unlike her own, was not based upon the Special Agent’s Contract.

However, petitioner’s claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.

There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.

In Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does
not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has
attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its
motion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial
court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to declare that
respondent was in default for its failure to answer her counterclaim. However, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s counterclaim. Pursuant
to this Court’s ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.

Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared respondent in default for having failed to answer her counterclaim. Insofar as the
permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned, there is obviously no need to file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed
docket fees for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for
damages based on the filing by respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is inseparable from
the claims of respondent. If respondent were to answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former
pleading the same facts raised in its complaint.

30. Mercado vs. CA, 569 SCRA

FACTS:

Leonides Mercado had been distributing respondent San Miguel Corporation’s (SMC’s) beer products in Quiapo, Manila since 1967. In 1991, SMC
extended to him a P7.5 million credit line allowing him to withdraw goods on credit. To secure his purchases, Mercado assigned three China Banking
Corporation (CBC) certificates of deposit amounting to P5 million to SMC and executed a continuing hold-out agreement stating that in case of
default on his part, by virtue of demand by SMC, CBC shall encash said certificates in favor of SMC.

SMC notified CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the items he withdrew on credit. Citing the continuing hold-out agreement, it asked CBC to release
the proceeds of the assigned certificates of deposit. CBC approved SMB’s request and informed Mercado.

Mercado filed an action to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), claiming that the
continuing hold-out agreement allowed forfeiture without the benefit of foreclosure, hence void. Moreover, Mercado argued that he had already
settled his recent purchases on credit but SMC erroneously applied the said payments to his old accounts not covered by the continuing hold-out
agreement (i.e., purchases made prior to the extension of the credit line).

SMC filed its answer with counterclaim against Mercado. It contended that Mercado delivered only two CBC certificates of deposit amounting to
P4.5 million and asserted that the execution of the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment was a recognized business practice.
Furthermore, because Mercado admitted his outstanding liabilities, SMC sought payment of the lees products he withdrew (or purchased on credit)
worth P7,468,153.75.

During trial, Mercado acknowledged the accuracy of SMC’s computation of his outstanding liability as of August 15, 1991. Thus, the RTC dismissed
the complaint and ordered Mercado and EASCO (to the extent of P2.6 million or the value of its bonds) to jointly and severally pay SMC the amount
of P7,468,153.75.9

Aggrieved, Mercado and EASCO appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insisting that Mercado did not default in the payment of his obligations to
SMC. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Mercado and EASCO both moved for reconsideration but their respective motions were denied.

Meanwhile, Mercado passed away and was substituted by his heirs. Petitioners subsequently filed this petition asserting that the CA erred in
affirming the RTC decision in toto. The said decision (insofar as it ordered Mercado to pay SMC P7,468,153.75) was void. SMC’s counterclaim was
permissive in nature. Inasmuch as SMC did not pay docket fees, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
 Page 35 of 69

ISSUE: Whether the action is compulsory or permissive in nature; if in the latter, does not require the payment of the docket fees for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction

RULING: COMPULSORY

A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have against any party)16 may be compulsory17 or permissive. A counterclaim that (1)
arises out of (or is necessarily connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (2) falls within
the jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction,
is compulsory. Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.

When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment (which he executed as security for his credit purchases),
he in effect sought to be freed from them. While he admitted having outstanding obligations, he nevertheless asserted that those were not covered by
the assailed accessory contracts. For its part, aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC therefore sought to collect the payment for
the value of goods Mercado purchased on credit. Thus, Mercado’s complaint and SMC’s counterclaim both touched the issues of whether the
continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment were valid and whether Mercado had outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same evidence
would essentially support or refute Mercado’s claim and SMC’s counterclaim.

Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the efforts of the RTC and the parties would have had to be duplicated. Clearly,
SMC’s counterclaim, being logically related to Mercado’s claim, was compulsory in nature. Consequently, the payment of docket fees was not
necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.

31. Proton Pilipinas vs. Banque Nationale de Paris, 460 SCRA

DOCTRINE: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period; 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered
filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no
case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

FACTS:

Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit facilities of herein respondent, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). To guarantee
the payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners Automotive Corporation Philippines (Automotive), Asea One Corporation (Asea) and Autocorp
Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee to the extent of US$2,000,000.00. BNP and Proton subsequently entered into three trust receipt
agreements. Under the terms of the trust receipt agreements, Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold them in trust for
BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its
obligations to it. In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, together with all the accompanying documents of title.

Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale and return the unsold motor vehicles. Pursuant to the corporate guarantee, BNP demanded
the guarantors for the payment of the amount representing Proton’s total outstanding obligations. These guarantors refused to pay, however.

Hence, BNP filed before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against petitioners praying that they be ordered to pay. The Makati RTC
Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees which BNP paid.

To the complaint, the defendants-herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees to thus
prevent the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. RTC denied the Motion and the Motion for Consideration. CA also denied.

ISSUE: Whether Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction due to the alleged insufficient payment of docket fees by BNP.

RULING: NO.

True, in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees, hence, it concluded that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. It bears emphasis, however,
that the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court held that in the former there was clearly
an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide
by paying the additional fees as required.

In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances,
the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits
dismissal.

Hence, the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is ordered to reassess and determine the docket fees that should be paid by
respondent, BNP.
 Page 36 of 69

32. Ruby Shelter Builders vs. Formaran, 578 SCRA 283

DOCTRINES: Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee; Payment of docket fees is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional. The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair market value of
the same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees due. In contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of
docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of
relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the
Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.

FACTS:

Petitioner obtained a loan in the total amount of P95,700,620.00 from respondents Romeo Y. Tan (Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo), secured by
real estate mortgages over five parcels of land, in the name of petitioner. When petitioner was unable to pay the loan when it became due and
demandable, respondents Tan and Obiedo agreed to an extension of the same.

In a Memorandum of Agreement, respondents Tan and Obiedo granted petitioner until 31 December 2005 to settle its indebtedness, and condoned
the interests, penalties and surcharges accruing thereon. The Memorandum of Agreement required, in turn, that petitioner execute simultaneously
with the said Memorandum, “by way of dacion en pago,” Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents Tan and Obiedo, covering the same parcels
of land subject of the mortgages. The Deed state that petitioner sold to respondents Tan and Obiedo the parcels of land. Petitioner could choose to
pay off its indebtedness with individual or all five parcels of land; or it could redeem said properties by paying respondents Tan and Obiedo the
prices for the same. In the event that petitioner is able to redeem any of the afore-mentioned parcels of land, the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the
said property shall be nullified and have no force and effect; and respondents Tan and Obiedo shall then return the owner’s duplicate of the
corresponding TCT to petitioner and also execute a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage. However, if petitioner is unable to redeem the parcels of land
within the period agreed upon, respondents Tan and Obiedo could already present the Deeds of Absolute Sale covering the same to the Office of the
Register of Deeds for Naga City so respondents Tan and Obiedo could acquire TCTs to the said properties in their names.

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, petitioner, represented by Mr. Sia, executed separate Deeds of Absolute Sale, over the five parcels of
land, in favor of respondents Tan and Obiedo. On the blank spaces provided for in the said Deeds, somebody wrote the 3rd of January 2006 as the
date of their execution. The Deeds were again notarized by respondent Atty. Reyes also on 3 January 2006.

Without payment having been made by petitioner, respondents Tan and Obiedo presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the Register of Deeds of
Naga City, as a result of which, they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of land in their names.

Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint against respondents Tan, Obiedo, and Atty. Reyes, for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and
damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO), asserting that the Deeds of
Absolute Sale over the five parcels of land were executed merely as security for the payment of its loan to respondents Tan and Obiedo; that the
Deeds of Absolute Sale, executed in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement, constituted pactum commisorium and as such, were null and
void; and that the acknowledgment in the Deeds of Absolute Sale were falsified.

Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC, petitioner paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk
of Court. The Clerk of Court initially considered Civil Case No. 2006-0030 as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the docket
and other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent Tan, thus, sought not just the dismissal of the Complaint of petitioner, but also the grant of his counterclaim (principal loan and
corresponding damages). Respondent Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 involved
real properties, the docket fees for which should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. Since petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring petitioner to pay the correct and accurate docket fees
pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended; and should petitioner fail to do so, to deny and dismiss the prayer of petitioner
for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale for having been executed in contravention of the law or of the Memorandum of Agreement as
pactum commisorium.

RTC: the [herein petitioner] is hereby ordered to pay additional filing fee and the [herein respondent], Romeo Tan is also ordered to pay docket and
filing fees on his counterclaim, both computed based on Section 7(a) of the Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004. RTC
thereafter denied the Motion for Recon.

CA: denied

ISSUE: Whether petitioner paid the correct amount of docket fees

RULING: NO. In determining and assessing the correct value of docket fees, it must be determined based on the nature of the complaint based on
the allegations in the body. No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in its Complaint in
Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by petitioner of its title to and possession of the
five parcels of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo. A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property; or, as indicated
in what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.
 Page 37 of 69

A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real
property involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real
properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated
in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of
the same.

In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is the recovery of title to and possession of real
property. It is a real action necessarily involving real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not commit any error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay
additional docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.

33. St. Louis University vs. Cobarrubias, 626 SCRA 649 *

DOCTRINE: Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by
law; Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.

FACTS:

Respondent Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate professor of the petitioner’s College of Human Sciences. She is an active member of the
Union of Faculty and Employees of Saint Louis University (UFESLU). The 2001-20065 and 2006-20116 Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs)
between SLU and UFESLU contain a common provision on forced leave, which states that teaching employees who are retained for three (3)
cumulative years in five (5) years in college who fail the yearly evaluation, shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period
all benefits due them shall be suspended.”

SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the first semester of School Year (SY) 2007-2008 when she failed the evaluation for SY 2002-2003, SY
2005-2006, and SY 2006-2007.

Respondent resorted to: CBA’s grievance machinery (failed) ----> Conciliation and Mediation Board of DOLE (failed) ------> Voluntary Arbitration
(dismissed)

Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, but failed to pay the required filing fees. CA dismissed. On
motion for consideration, CA reinstated the petition finding that Cobarrubias substantially complied with the rules by paying the appeal fee in full
and attaching the proper documents in her motion for reconsideration. SLU insisted that the VA decision had already attained finality for
Cobarrubias’ failure to pay the docket fees on time. Thus, the CA ordered SLU to pay all the benefits due Cobarrubias for the first semester of SY
2007-2008, when she was placed on forced leave.

When the CA denied the motion for reconsideration that followed, SLU filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition despite her failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period
2. Whether the Exceptions to the Rule on Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees applicable

RULING:

1. YES. Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by
law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for
review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall
pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient
ground for the petition’s dismissal.

Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential
requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.

In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December 5, 2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of the VA decision on
November 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees in full only after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her motion for reconsideration on
February 15, 2008 and attached the postal money orders for P4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of
the full docket fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.

2. NO. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s substantive
rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed. However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10)
peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of
the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant circumstances.
 Page 38 of 69

Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules. In Cobarrubias’ case, no such explanation has been advanced. Other than insisting that the ends of justice
and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits, Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket fees in full
when she filed her petition for review. To us, Cobarrubias’ omission is fatal to her cause.

34. Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute, 726 SCRA, June 18, 2014 *

DOCTRINE: Payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure but a
jurisdictional requirement.

FACTS:
Respondent Southern Luzon Institute (SLI), an educational institution in Bulan, Sorsogon, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and
Possession with Damages against petitioners.

SLI alleged that it is the absolute owner of a 7,516-square meter parcel of land situated in Brgy. Poblacion, Bulan, Sorsogon covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28928. However, petitioners and their co-defendants who had been informally occupying a portion of the said
property refused to vacate the same despite demand. Hence, SLI sought that they be ordered to immediately vacate the premises, turn over the same
to SLI, and pay compensatory damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners and their co-defendants asserted that they did not heed SLI’s demand to vacate as they believed that
they have the right to stay on the said property. They relied on their occupation thereof and that of their predecessors-in-interest which, according to
them, dates back to as early as 1950. Impugning SLI’s claims, petitioners and their co-defendants averred that SLI had not even for a single moment
taken possession of the subject property and was merely able to procure a title over the same thru fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation. By way of
counterclaim, they prayed that they be declared the lawful possessors of the property; that OCT No. P-28928 be declared null and void; and, that SLI
be ordered to pay them moral damages and litigation expenses.

RTC declared SLI the absolute owner of the said lot and ordering herein petitioners to vacate the same. Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a
Notice of Appeal to the CA.

The CA, however, dismissed the appeal in its Resolution since it was not shown that the appellate court docket fees and other lawful fees were paid.
Petitioners and their co-defendants promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a Certification from the RTC that they paid
the appeal fee in the amount of P3,000.00 under Official Receipt No. 18091130 dated January 25, 2005. In view of this, the CA granted the said
motion and consequently reinstated the appeal through a Resolution. Subsequently, however, the CA further required petitioners and their co -
defendants, through a Minute Resolution dated March 1, 2006, to remit within ten days from notice the amount of P30.00 for legal research fund,
which apparently was not included in the P3,000.00 appeal fee previously paid by them. Copy of the said resolution was received on March 13, 2006
by petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Jose G. Gojar of the Public Attorney’s Office. Despite the lapse of nine months from their counsel’s receipt of the said
resolution, petitioners and their co-defendants, however, failed to comply with the CA’s directive. Hence, the said court dismissed the appeal through
its Resolution stating that the nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41
of the Revised Rules of [C]ourt is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONERS FOR
FAILURE TO REMIT THE MEAGER AMOUNT OF THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) AFTER HAVING ADVANCED A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION
OF THE DOCKET FEES

RULING: NO. Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful fees is mandatory and jurisdictional; Relaxation of the rule on
payment of appeal fee is unwarranted in this case.

Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees.—Within the period for taking an appeal,
the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket
and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on
appeal.

The liberality which petitioners pray for has already been granted to them by the CA at the outset. It may be recalled that while petitioners paid a
substantial part of the docket fees, they still failed to pay the full amount thereof since their payment was short of P30.00. Based on the premise that
the questioned Decision of the RTC has already become final and executory due to non-perfection, the CA could have dismissed the appeal outright.
But owing to the fact that only the meager amount of P30.00 was lacking and considering that the CA may opt not to proceed with the case until the
docket fees are paid, it still required petitioners, even if it was already beyond the reglementary period, to complete their payment of the appeal fee
within 10 days from notice.

The CA’s leniency over petitioners’ cause did not end there. Although they were given only 10 days to remit the P30.00 deficiency, the said court
allowed an even longer period of nine months to lapse, apparently in the hope that petitioners’ compliance would be on its way. But as no payment
was remitted, it was constrained to finally dismiss the appeal for non-perfection. Surprisingly, petitioners were again heard of when they filed a
Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a postal money order of P30.00. Nevertheless, they did not offer any plausible explanation either
as to why they, at the start, failed to pay the correct docket fees or why they failed to comply with the CA’s directive for them to remit the P30.00
deficiency. Instead, they focused on begging the CA for leniency, arguing that the meager amount of the deficiency involved justifies relaxation of
the rules. What is worse is that even if the CA already took note of the lack of such explanation in its Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for
 Page 39 of 69

reconsideration, petitioners, up to now, have not attempted to tender one in this Petition and instead continue to capitalize on substantial justice, fair
play and equity to secure a reversal of the dismissal of their appeal. The Court cannot, therefore, help but conclude that there is really no plausible
reason behind the said omission.

Suffice it to say that “[c]oncomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.” Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of
proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure. Petitioners’ failure to advance any explanation as to why they
failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the same within the period allowed by the CA is thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a
departure from the rule on the payment of the appeal fee is unwarranted.

As may be recalled, petitioners in this case did not immediately remit the deficient amount of P30.00 when required by the CA and only did so after
the lapse of more than nine months when their appeal was already dismissed.

35. Sy-Vargas vs. Estate of Ogsos, 805 SCRA (2016)

DOCTRINE: The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter. The counterclaim should not be dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees. Instead, the docket
fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the monetary awards in respondents’ favor.

FACTS:

Ogsos, Sr. and the Heirs of Fermina Pepico (Fermina), represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, Catalino V. Noel, entered into a Contract of Lease
(lease contract) covering five (5) parcels of agricultural land owned by the latter. Based on the contract, Ogsos, Sr. agreed to pay the Heirs of Fermina
230 piculs or 290.95 liquid-kilogram (lkg.) of centrifugal sugar every crop year, starting from crop year 1994-1995 to crop year 2000-2001, as lease
rental.

On June 5, 1996, the term of the lease contract was extended for three (3) years, or until the end of crop year 2004, due to Ogsos, Sr.’s introduction of
improvements on the leased premises. Thereafter, or on December 30, 1996, the said contract was amended, modifying the lease rental from 230
piculs or 290.95 lkg. of centrifugal sugar every crop year to P150,000.00 cash, beginning the crop year 1996-1997.

Petitioner and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, claimed that the lease rentals from crop year 1994-1995 to crop year 1998-1999 were
not paid. Thus, they filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents, before the RTC, to recover the unpaid lease
rentals. Pertinently, they did not include in their claim the lease rental for crop year 1999-2000 because respondents had already abandoned the leased
premises since the said crop year.

Respondent Ogsos, Jr. only filed a motion to admit answer and answer to the complaint after more than two (2) years. Thus, petitioner and Kathryn
filed an opposition thereto, and moved to declare respondents in default, which the RTC granted.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the RTC, respondents, then, elevated the matter via a petition for certiorari to the CA,
wherein the CA granted respondents petition and remanded the case to the RTC. The CA ordered the RTC to admit respondents’ answer so as to give
them the opportunity to be heard and to present their side on the merits of the case. In their answer, respondents alleged that they had faithfully
complied with their obligations as embodied in the lease contract and its subsequent amendments. Respondents also averred that since crop years
1994 to 1997-1998, the average production of sugarcane is 1,308.68 lkg. of sugar and 30.409 tons of molasses per year, as computed on the basis of
the Planter’s Production Reports. Thus, when petitioner and Kathryn took possession of the leased premises, respondents lost their profits equivalent
to the aforesaid production starting from crop year 1999-2000 until the termination of the lease contract on crop year 2003-2004.24 Accordingly,
respondents filed a counterclaim for these lost profits plus damages.

Petitioner and Kathryn filed a motion to dismiss respondents’ counterclaim arguing that the same were permissive and that respondents had not paid
the appropriate docket fees. However, the RTC, denied the said motion, declaring respondents’ counterclaim as compulsory; thus, holding that the
payment of the required docket fees was no longer necessary. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether respondents’ counterclaim for damages is compulsory and not permissive in nature, and thus, no payment of docket fees is
required;

RULING: NO, IT IS PERMISSIVE.

Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive
counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the
prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being
cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A
compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action. On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not
 Page 40 of 69

necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in
another case.

Based on the above mentioned standards, the Court finds that the counterclaim of respondents is permissive in nature. This is because: (a) the issue in
the main case, i.e., whether or not respondents are liable to pay lease rentals, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether or
not petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for taking over the possession of the leased premises and harvesting and appropriating respondents’
crops planted therein; (b) since petitioner and respondents’ respective causes of action arose from completely different occurrences, the latter would
not be barred by res judicata had they opted to litigate its counterclaim in a separate proceeding; (c) the evidence required to prove petitioner’s claim
that respondents failed to pay lease rentals is likewise different from the evidence required to prove respondents’ counterclaim that petitioner and
Kathryn are liable for damages for performing acts in bad faith; and (d) the recovery of petitioner’s claim is not contingent or dependent upon proof
of respondents’ counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and
the parties.

In view of the finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket
fees. However, it must be clarified that respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of
their counterclaim. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fees, its nonpayment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid
within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

Here, respondents cannot be faulted for nonpayment of docket fees in connection with their counterclaim, primarily because as early as November
16, 2006, the RTC had already found such counterclaim to be compulsory in nature.56 Such finding was then upheld in the July 2, 2007 RTC
Decision and affirmed on appeal by the CA in its assailed Decision. As such, the lower courts did not require respondents to pay docket fees and even
proceeded to rule on their entitlement thereto. Verily, respondents’ reliance on the findings of the courts a quo, albeit erroneous, exhibits their good
faith in not paying the docket fees, much more their intention not to defraud the government. Thus, the counterclaim should not be dismissed for non -
payment of docket fees. Instead, the docket fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the monetary awards in respondents’ favor. The Court
held that in instances where a litigant’s nonpayment of docket fees was made in good faith and without any intention of defrauding the government,
the clerk of court of the court a quo should be ordered to assess the amount of deficient docket fees due from such litigant, which will constitute a
judgment lien on the amount awarded to him, and enforce such lien, as in this case.

36. Camaso vs. TSM Shipping Inc., 807 SCRA (2016)

DOCTRINE: Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), such as a petition for
certiorari, the payment of the corresponding docket fees is required, and that the failure to comply with the same shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of such action. While the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its nonpayment at
the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period;
and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

FACTS:

Camaso alleged he signed a contract of employment with respondents TSM Shipping (Phils.), Inc., Utkilen, and Jones Tulod (respondents) to work as
a Second Mate onboard the vessel “M/V Golfstraum,”. Prior to said contract, Camaso claimed to have been working for respondents for almost five
(5) years and boarded eight (8) of their vessels.

Sometime in November 2013, Camaso complained of a noticeable obstruction in his throat which he described as akin to a “fishbone coupled [with]
coughing.” His situation worsened as he developed lymph nodules on his jawline, prompting him to request for a medical checkup while in
Amsterdam. As Camaso was initially diagnosed with tonsillar cancer, he was recommended for medical repatriation to undergo extensive treatment.
Upon repatriation to the Philippines, and after a series of tests, it was confirmed that Camaso was indeed suffering from tonsillar cancer.
Consequently, he underwent eight (8) chemotherapy sessions and radiation therapy for 35 cycles which were all paid for by respondents. He likewise
received sickwage allowances from the latter. Thereafter, respondents refused to shoulder Camaso’s medical expenses, thus, forcing the latter to pay
for his treatment. Believing that his sickness was work-related and that respondents remained silent on their obligation, Camaso filed the instant
complaint for disability benefits, sickwage allowance, reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses, and other consequential damages before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). After efforts for an amicable settlement between the parties failed, they were ordered to file their
respective position papers.

LA and NLRC’s ruling: ruled in favor of Camaso and ordered respondents to pay his total and permanent disability benefits.

On appeal, the NLRC promulgated a Decision reversing the LA ruling and, consequently, dismissed Camaso’s complaint for lack of merit. Camaso
moved for its reconsideration, but was denied. Aggrieved, he filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed Camaso’s petition “for
nonpayment of the required docketing fees as required under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court.” Motion for Recon also denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Camaso’s petition for certiorari before it for nonpayment of docket fees.

RULING: NO. Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed before the CA, such as a petition for certiorari, the
payment of the corresponding docket fees is required, and that the failure to comply with the same shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of such
action.
 Page 41 of 69

The rule is that a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, unless the docket fees are paid. And where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fees, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its nonpayment at the time of filing of the initiatory
pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on
the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and via mail, a Metrobank check dated July 6, 2015 under the
account name of Pedro L. Linsangan was attached thereto to serve as payment of docket fees. Although this was not an authorized mode of payment
under Section 6, Rule VIII of the 2009 IRCA, the at Camaso exerted earnest efforts to pay the required docket fees. Clearly, this exhibits good faith
and evinces his intention not to defraud the government. In this relation, the assertion of the Officer-in-Charge of the CA Receiving Section that there
was no check attached to Camaso’s certiorari petition is clearly belied by the fact that when it was examined at the Office of the Division Clerk of
Court, the check was found to be still stapled thereto.

In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice
and, hence, remands the instant case to the CA for the resolution of its substantial merits. Upon remand, the CA is directed to order Camaso to pay
the required docket fees within a reasonable period of thirty (30) days from notice of such order.

Sec. 6. Payment of Docket and Other Lawful Fees and Deposit for Costs.—Payment of docket and other lawful fees and deposit for costs may be
made in cash, postal money order, certified checks or manager’s or cashier’s checks payable to the Court [of Appeals]. Personal checks shall be
returned to the payor.

Mary Cathleen

Joinder of Causes of action (S-5. R-2)

37. Dynamic Builders vs. Presbitero, 755 SCRA 90 (2015)

Doctrine:
Republic Act No. 8975 “Government Procurement Reform Act” does not sanction splitting a cause of action in order for a party to avail
itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from this court. Also, this law covers only national government infrastructure projects.
This case involves a local government infrastructure project.

Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.” Moreover,
Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of action in that “if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the
filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.” The splitting of a cause of action
“violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective [is] to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts.”

Facts:

● The Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Ocddental through its Bids and Awards Committee, published an invitation to bid for the
construction of a 1,050-linealmeter rubble concrete seawall along the municipality's "Construction Shoreline Protection Project."
● The Bids and Awards Committee conducted a pre-bid conference attended by 7 prospective contractors including Dynamic Builders.
● Only the remaining 4 bidders "were considered during the opening of
the bids."
● The Bids and Awards Committee issued a Resolution recommending the award in favor of HLJ Construction and Enterprise.
● The Municipality of Valladolid received its "NO OBJECTION" so it advised the Bids and Awards Committee to proceed with the issuance
of the notice of award, letter of and notice to proceed. acceptance, signing of contract,
● The Bids and Awards Committee issued Resolution affirming the award of contract to HLJ Construction and Enterprise.
● The Bids and Awards Committee Chairperson wrote the Engineer of Dynamic Builders and the other participating losing bidders, ADP
Construction and Mig-Wells Construction to inform them of the Bids and Awards Committee's findings and decision.
● Dynamic Builders was informed that "its bid proposal had been found to be 'not substantially responsive. Dynamic Builders
received this decision on May 11, 2006.
● Dynamic Builders alleged that on May 5, 2006, it submitted the letter dated April 7, 2006 containing a request for the Bids and Awards
Committee to furnish it with all submitted bid documents and relevant Bids and Awards Committee resolutions, but this was denied by the
letter dated May 5, 2006 invoking confidentiality under Section 2.46 of the LOGOFIND guidelines.
● The Bids and Awards Committee received the letter from Dynamic Builders seeking reconsideration of the April 25, 2006 decision
declaring Dynamic Builders' bid as not substantially responsive.

● The Bids and Awards Committee Decision: denied the request for reconsideration.
● The post-evaluation examination results showed Dynamic Builders' failure in its Financial Contracting Capability.
● Dynamic Builders filed a formal protest with the head of the procuring entity, Mayor Presbitero, to set aside the Bids and Awards
Committee decision
● Mayor Presbitero Decision: dismissed the protest
● Dynamic Builders filed a motion for reconsideration.
 Page 42 of 69

● Mayor Presbitero: denied the MR.

● On Sept 4 2006 Dynamic Builders filed a Petition for Certiorari before RTC of Bago City Negras Occidental assailing Mayor Presbitero
Decision and Resolution pursuant to RA 8975.
● And, Simultaneously, Dynamic Builders filed this Petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction before this court, received on Sept 6 2006

Petitioner’s Allegation:
Dynamic Builders submits that Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act 8975, implicitly allowed it to simultaneously file a Petition for
Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court assailing the protest case on the merits, AND another petition before this court for injunctive remedies.

Respondent’s Allegation:
Public respondents counter that Petitioner "grossly violated the rules against:
1. splitting a single cause of action,
2. multiplicity of suits, and
3. forum shopping
4. and availed of an improper remedy and
5. disregarded the rule on 'hierarchy of courts
The project undertaken by HLJ Construction 'and Enterprise was almost near completion, and prohibition was] not intended to provide a
remedy for acts already executed or accomplished.
● Petitioner should have asked for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. 1459 filed before the trial court.

Issues:
1. Whether Article XVIl, Section 58 of Republic Act No.8975 contemplates simultaneous filing of a petition for prohibition seeking
injunctive reliefs from this court and a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court; consequently:
a. splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping, and;
b. Whether petitioner violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts; and
c. Whether the petitioner resorted to an improper remedy when it filed a petition for prohibition with this court.

Ruling:
1a. YES.
RA 8975, even when read with PD 1818, does not sanction the splitting of a cause of action in order for a party to avail itself of the
ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from this court Petitioner's reading of RA 8975's repealing clause, such that only this court can
issue injunctive relief, fails to persuade.
This court has set the limit on the prohibition found in PD 1818 by explaining that lower courts are not prohibited from enjoining
administrative acts when questions of law exist and the acts do not involve administrative discretion in technical cases.
The splitting of a cause of action "violates the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening
the dockets of the courts.

Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that:

"A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action." Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of
action in that "if two or more suts are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others."

The splitting of a cause of action "violates the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening
the dockets of the courts."

Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of action in that “if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others."

In determining whether forum shopping exists, it is important to consider the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by a
person who asks appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same
relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the different courts or fora on the same issues.
We have ruled that forum shopping is present when, in two or more cases pending, there is identity of:
(1) parties
(2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for and
(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that

Section 58 could not have envisioned a simultaneous resort to this court by one that had already filed an action before the Regional Trial
Court without violating shopping. the basic rules on proscription against the splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.

1.b YES.
The hierarchy of courts must be respected.
The doctrine with respect to hierarchy of courts was designed so that this court will have more time to focus on its constitutional tasks
without the need to deal with causes that also fall within the lower courts competence.
The court ads on petitions for extraordinary writs under Rule 65 "only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons
exist to justify an exception to the policy."
 Page 43 of 69

Consistent with these rules and doctrines, the remedy contemplated by Article XVI, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 is either an
action under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court or the proper action filed present.
before this court. However, direct resort to this court can prosper only when the requisites for direct invocatocation of the court’s original jurisdiction
are present.

1.c YES
Prohibition is a preventive remedy. This court has held that injunctive remedies will not lie for acts already accomplished.
The acts sought to be enjoined in this case included the implementation of the Construction Shoreline Protection Project awarded to private
respondent HLJ Construction and Enterprise. The project had already commenced and had been ongoing at the time the petitioner filed this case.
Moreover, the issue of whether these acts infringed on petitioner's rights is a matter interrelated with the issues raised in the Petition before
the trial court, emphasizing the existence of the splitting of a cause of action.
In any case, this court has stressed that extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are "prerogative writs of equity" It is
within the court's sound discretion whether these writs should be granted, and it will need to ensure that there is a cear right to the relief.

Class Suit (S-12, R-3)

38. Juana Complex Homeowners Asso. Vs. Fil-Estate, 667 SCRA 440, March, 5 2012

DOCTRINE:
Sec 12, Rule 3, Sec. 12. Class suit. – When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons
so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have
the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the
parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

FACTS:
The petitioners, JCHA, together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (JCHA et al) instituted a
complaint with the RTC for damages in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists who were deprived of the
use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate et al.

The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba and that they used the entry and
exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through a right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road for more than 10 years.

It also alleged that Fil-Estate excavated and deliberately ruined La Paz Road so JCHA et al would not be able to pass thru that road. Also
alleged is that the act of Fil-estate caused damage, loss of precious hours, etc. to JCHA and commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed to
narrow streets that caused terrible traffic and hazard. Finally, that its permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and unhampered
use of the property but would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.

JCHA prayed for an issuance of a TRO or a WPI to enjoin Fil-estate from stopping and intimidating JCHA in their use of La Paz. TRO was
issued for a period of 20 days.

Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a
class suit.

RTC issued an Order granting the WPI and required JCHA, et al. to post a bond.

Fil-estate filed MR arguing, among others, that JCHA, et al. failed to satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a WPI.

RTC then issued its June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order, denying both the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by Fil-Estate, et al.

Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to annul:
1. Order of RTC granting WPI
2. Omnibus order of RTC denying the motion to dismiss and MR
They contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.

CA annulled the Order granting WPI and upheld the denial of motion to dismiss.
The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using
La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC ruling
that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of common interest and that the individuals sought to be
represented were so numerous that it was impractical to include all of them as parties. The CA, however, annulled the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al.
to prove their clear and present right over La Paz Road. The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for a full-blown trial on the merits.
Hence the petition.

ISSUE:
(1) whether or not the complaint states a cause of action;
 Page 44 of 69

(2) whether or not the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit.

RULING:

(1)YES - the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action.

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.’s
averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their
allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over
the said roads. There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route
towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by
FilEstate, et al. when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al.
consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought therein.

(2) YES the Court finds that the complaint was properly instituted as a class suit.

Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. – When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the
interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual
interest.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:

1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all
concerned
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. Following the statement of CA:

The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general
interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to
join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of
petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so
numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED. The case should be further heard
by the RTC so that the parties can fully prove their respective positions on the issues.

Contractual Money Claims (S-20, R-3)

39. Relucio vs. Lopez, 373 SCRA 578

Doctrine:
A petitioner who is not a real party in interest, cannot be an indispensable party nor a necessary party. An indispensable party is one without whom
there can be no final determination of an action.

Elements of a cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages.

Sufficiency of a cause of action; Requirement of a motion to dismiss. A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if
the alleged facts were admitted or proved. In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim
for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain
 Page 45 of 69

Facts:
Angelina Mejia Lopez (legal wife) filed a petition for “APPOINTMENT AS SIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.,” Alberto Lopez (husband) and Imelda Relucio, in the RTC of Makati.

In the petition, Angelina alleged that Alberto, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and
exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the
private respondent and their four children. It was further alleged that Alberto and Relucio, during their period of cohabitation since 1976, have
amassed a fortune. And, that Alberto placed substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name of Relucio.

A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by Relucio on the ground that Angelina has no cause of action against her. Respondent Judge
denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are
registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. The Motion for reconsideration was also denied. CA denied her Petition for
Certiorari.

Issue:
1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto
J. Lopez established a cause of action against the petitioner?
2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication of the controversy?

Ruling:
1. "A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other." The elements of a cause of
action are:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respector not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or proved.

In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather
than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous,indefinite or uncertain.

Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in Special Proceedings M-3630, we assay its allegations.

In Part Two on the "Nature of [the] Complaint," respondent AngelinaMejia Lopez summarized the causes of action alleged in the complaint below.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against the petitioner.

Respondent's causes of action were all against her husband.The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez.

Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Coderefers only to spouses, to wit:"If a spouse without just
cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx" The administration of the
property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges thatAlberto J. Lopez is her husband.
Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between

2. No.

Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against the petitioner. Respondent’s causes of action were all against her
husband.

The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property
arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez.
● Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the
exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against
Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact,
none of the three elements of a cause of action exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting “by respondent husband.”
● The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between
respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against the petitioner on this ground.

The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez’ share in property co-owned by him and petitioner.
 Page 46 of 69

● It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in
law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him with the petitioner.
● Respondent’s asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez’ share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share,
assuming the trial court finds in respondent’s favor, results in a breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to a cause of action.
Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be
compelled from a stranger.
● The action in Special Proceedings is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez’ own words, one by “an aggrieved wife against her husband.”
References to petitioner in the common and specific allegations of fact in the complaint are merely incidental, to set forth facts and
circumstances that prove the causes of action alleged against Alberto J. Lopez.

Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent’s claim for moral damages is against Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.
● A real party in interest is one who stands “to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.” In this case, the petitioner would not be
affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings.
● If the petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can
be no final determination of an action.
● Petitioner’s participation in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering
Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and
dissolve Alberto J. Lopez’ conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share in property co-owned by him and
petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
● Nor can petitioners be a necessary party in Special Proceedings.
● A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already
parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
● In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account
for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-
ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with respondent.

Wherefore, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court DISMISSES Special Proceedings M-
3630 of the RTC, Makati, Branch 141 as against petitioner.

40. De Castro vs CA 386 SCRA 301 *

Doctrine:
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their presence. Whenever
it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and
order the inclusion of such party
Rule on solidarity of co-owners does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Operators
Incorporated vs. American Biscuit Co., Inc. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor `may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors
or some or all of them simultaneously.

Facts:
Petitioners De Castro were co-owners of 4 lots. In a letter, Antigo was authorized by the De Castros to act as real estate broker in the sale
of these properties for the amount of P23m, 5% of which will be given to him as commission. Antigo found Times Transit Corporation, its president
Mr. Rondaris, as a prospective buyer which desired to buy 2 lots only, specifically lots 14 and 15. Eventually, the sale of lots 14 and 15 was
consummated.

Antigo however received only P48k as commission. He asserted that his total commission should be P352k which is 5% of the agreed price
of P7m for the 2 lots. Artigo then sued Constante and Corazon De Castro to collect the unpaid balance of his broker’s commission from the De
Castros. One of the defenses advanced by De Castro is that the complaint failed to implead their other siblings who were co-owners as well.

CA affirmed RTC that Artigo’s complaint is not dismissible for failure to implead as indispensable parties the other co-owners of the two
lots. It is not necessary to implead the other co-owners since the action is exclusively based on a contract of agency between Artigo and Constante.

Issue: WON the complaint should be dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties.?

Ruling: No.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their presence. Whenever
it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and
order the inclusion of such party.

However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant case. Under the note/letter sent by De Castro to
Antigo, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between Constante and Artigo. Whether Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in Constante’s
individual or representative capacity, or both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of the case for failure to implead the other co-owners as
indispensable parties.

41. Orquiola vs CA – 389 SCRA 461

 Page 47 of 69

Doctrine:
No person shall be deprived of property without due process of the law. Failure to implead proper parties-in-interest, they cannot be
reached by decision as no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in
interest in an action are bound by the judgment.

Facts:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma (DEFENDANT) was the registered owner of Lot 689, covered by TCT Nos. 111267 and 111266, in Tandang Sora,
Quezon City. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, namely, Lot 707-A and 707-B, registered in the
name of Herminigilda Pedro under TCT Nos. 16951 and 16952, respectively. On October 29, 1964, Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to
Mariano Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots.

Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, who
purchased a portion of Lot 707-A-2, Lot 5, Block 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC), Psd-42965. x x x The other portions were registered in the name
of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third persons.

Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora
Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said
corporation.

On August 21, 1991, the TRIAL COURT finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching on
plaintiffs land and ordered them:
(a) to solidarity pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. Corp. actual damages in the amount of P20,000 with interest from date of filing of the
complaint;
(b) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally constructed by defendants on plaintiffs property at defendants’
expense;
(c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their own expense;
(d) to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with interest computed from the date of filing of the
complaint;
(e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners’ Report, particularly, Annexes “A” and “B” thereof, at the expense of the
defendants.3

As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners, through an alias writ of execution, to remove the
house they constructed on the land they were occupying.

On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order dated March 30, 1998, from the trial court stating as follows:
“Before the Court for resolution is the “Ex-Parte Motion For The Issuance of A Writ of Demolition,” filed by plaintiff, through counsel,
praying for the issuance of an Order directing the Deputy Sheriff to cause the removal and/or demolition of the structures on the plaintiffs property
constructed by defendants and/or the present occupants. The defendants-heirs of Herminigilda Pedro filed their comment on the said Motion.

Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and executory, the Court, in its Order of November 14, 1997,
directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution for the enforcement of the said decision. However, despite the service of the said writ to all the
defendants and the present occupants of the subject property, they failed to comply therewith, as per the Partial Sheriffs Return, dated February 9,
1998, issued by the Deputy Sheriff of this branch of the Court. Thus, there is now a need to demolish the structures in order to implement the said
decision.

WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby directed to remove, at their expense, all constructions, including barbed wires and fences, which
defendants constructed on plaintiffs property, within fifteen (15) days from notice of this Order; otherwise, this Court will issue a writ of demolition
against them.
SO ORDERED.”

To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City from issuing a writ of demolition and the Quezon City
sheriff from implementing the alias writ of execution, PETITIONERS FILED WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS A PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION WITH PRAYER FOR A RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON APRIL 17, 1998. Petitioners alleged
that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, THEY WERE PARTIES IN INTEREST. Since they were not
impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so would
amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28, 1999. It held that as buyers and successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising,
petitioners were considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order in Civil
Case No. Q-12918. Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was ordered dismissed.6

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition

Issue: WON the decision in the Civil Case can be enforced against petitioners even though they were not impleaded thereto?
 Page 48 of 69

Ruling: NO, petitioners are not privies (interested in the outcome of the action) and cannot be bound by the judgment against Lising and his
predecessors-in-interests.

SC made distinction between de Medina case and the present case, thus:

FIRST, the petitioner in medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original action was commenced and became
final and executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of civil case no. Q-12918.

SECOND, the right over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in medina was based on a title of doubtful authenticity,
allegedly a titulo de composicion con el estado issued by the spanish government in favor of one don mariano san pedro y esteban, while the right
over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized torrens title.

THIRD, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title (Torrens system) in their own names, while the petitioner in medina merely relied on the
title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the land.

SC also held that the petitioners were innocent purchaser for value and builders in good faith. As found by the Court of Appeals and not refuted by
private respondent, petitioners purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising.12 Civil Case No. Q-12918 was commenced sometime in
1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of the land took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918. In other
words, the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. (ORQUIOLA) could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising’s
Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party claim.)

AS BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH AND INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE, PETITIONERS HAVE RIGHTS OVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND HENCE THEY ARE PROPER PARTIES IN INTEREST IN ANY CASE THEREON(Rule 3, Section 2, Rules of Court: Parties
in interest.—A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.).
Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached
by the decision in said case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any
judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his
day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant
thereto.16 In our view, the spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their house on their
own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

42. China Banking Corp., vs Oliver – 390 SCRA 263 *

Doctrine:
Parties; Indispensable Party; An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an action.

Same; Same; A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the
other parties.

Same; Same; Non-joinder of Parties; Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action - Section 11, Rule 3, that applies. Non-joinder
of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court, either on its own initiative or on motion of the parties

A party is also not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or will
simply avoid multiple litigation.

Facts:
In 1995, Lim and Oliver opened a joint account in Chinabank. They applied for a P17m loan, offering as collateral a 7,782 sqm lot in the
name of Oliver. The bank approved the application. They executed in favor of Chinabank a promissory note for P16.6k, as well as a Real Estate
Mortgage on the property. The mortgage was duly registered and annotated on the original title under the custody of the Registry of Deeds and on the
owners duplicate copy in the bank’s possession. The mortgage document showed Oliver’s address. For brevity, she is hereafter referred to as
OLIVER ONE.

1996, respondent claiming that she is Oliver, filed an action for annulment of mortgage and cancellation of title with damages against Chinabank,
Register of Deeds, and Deputy Register of Deeds. Respondent, whom we shall call as OLIVER TWO, claimed that she was the registered and lawful
owner of the land subject of the real estate mortgage; that the owners duplicate copy of the title had always been in her possession; and that she did
not apply for a loan or surrender her title to Chinabank.

1997, Chinabank moved to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action and non-joinder of an indispensable party, the mortgagor. RTC dismissed.

Issue: WON the mortgagor Oliver, referred to as OLIVER ONE, is an indispensable party to the case without whom no final determination could be
had of an action?

Ruling: No.
 Page 49 of 69

An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an action. However, mortgagor Oliver
One’s absence from the case does not hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. A perusal of
Oliver Twos allegations in the complaint below shows that it was for annulment of mortgage due to petitioners’ negligence in not determining the
actual ownership of the property, resulting in the mortgages.
To support said allegations, respondent Oliver Two had to prove (1) that she is the real Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT, and (2)
that she is not the same person using that name who entered into a deed of mortgage with the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver Two can do in her
complaint without necessarily impleading the mortgagor Oliver One.

Thus, it was the bank who should have filed a third-party complaint or other action versus the mortgagor Oliver One.

43. David vs. Paragas, Jr. 751 SCRA 648 *

Doctrine: An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either
as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even to those present.

Facts:
David, Paragas and Lobrin agreed to venture into a business in Hong Kong. They created Olympia International, Ltd. (Olympia) under HK laws.
Olympia had offices in HK and the Philippines. David handled the marketing aspect of the business while Lobrin and Datoy were in charge of
operations. Olympia became the exclusive general agent in HK of PPI’s pre-need plans through the General Agency Agreement. Olympia launched
the Pares-Pares program by which planholders would earn points with cash equivalents for successfully enlisting new subscribers. David was tasked
to personally remit said amounts to PPI as he was the only signatory authorized to transact on behalf of Olympia regarding the RCBC accounts. The
state of affairs among the partners went sour upon Lobrin’s discovery that David failed to remit to PPI the 30% cash equivalent of the bonus points.
The BOD stripped David of his position as a director. It then informed RCBC of his removal. Constrained by these circumstances, David filed a
complaint for Declaratory Relief, Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC.

He insisted on his entitlement to the commissions due under the regular and Pares-Pares programs in his capacity as Principal Agent under
the General Agency Agreement with PPI. David filed the supplemental complaint, with a manifestation that an amicable settlement was struck with
Lobrin and Datoy whereby they agreed to withdraw the complaint and counterclaims against each other. Lobrin and Olympia through their counsel,
confirmed that they had arrived at a compromise. Paragas questioned the existence of the cited BOD resolution granting Lobrin the authority to settle
the case, as well as the validity of the agreement through an affidavit duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul, Domingo Lucinario, Jr. He pointed
to the fact that Olympia, as an entity, was never a party in the controversy.

Issue:
Whether Olympia is considered as an indispensable party?

Ruling: YES
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either
as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction.

Considering that David was asking for judicial determination of his rights in Olympia, it is without a doubt, an indispensable party as it
stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the main proceeding. It has such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect its rights. Not having been impleaded, Olympia cannot be prejudiced by any judgment where its interests and properties are
adjudicated in favor of another even if the latter is a beneficial owner. It cannot be said either to have consented to the judicial approval of the
compromise, much less waived substantial rights, because it was never a party in the proceedings.

Moreover, Olympia’s absence did not confer upon the RTC the jurisdiction or authority to hear and resolve the whole controversy. This lack of
authority on the part of the RTC which flows from the absence of Olympia, being an indispensable party, necessarily negates any binding effect of
the subject judicially-approved compromise agreement.

Time and again, the Court has held that the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.

44. Land Bank vs. Cacayuran, 757 SCRA, April 22, 2015 *

Doctrine:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.

Facts:
 Page 50 of 69

Municipality of Agoo entered into 2 loans with LBP in order to finance a Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza. The Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality authorized the Mayor Eriguel to enter into a P4M loan with LBP for the Public Plaza and again for the amount of P28M
to construct a commercial center. The Municipality used as collateral a 2,323.75 sqm lot at the south-eastern portion of the Plaza. Cacayuran and
other residents opposed the redevelopment of the Plaza as well as the means of the funding. They claim that these are highly irregular, violative of the
law, and detrimental to public interest resulting in the desecration of the public plaza. Cacayuran’s request for the documents relating to the plaza’s
redevelopment was not granted. Cacayuran invokes his taxpayer right and files a complaint against LBP and officers of the municipality but does not
include the municipality itself as party-defendant. He questioned the validity of the loan agreements and prays that the redevelopment is enjoined.

LBP asserted that Cacayuran did not have any cause of action because he was not privy to the loan agreements.

RTC held the Subject loans are null and void. Resolutions approving the loan were passed irregularly and are thus ultra vires. Plaza lot is property for
public use and not valid as collateral.

CA affirmed RTC with modification. Cacayuran has locus standi as resident and the issue is of transcendental importance to public interest.

Issue: WON the Municipality of Agoo should be deemed an indispensable party to the case?

Ruling: YES, it is an indispensable party under Sec 7, Rule 3 which mandates that all indispensable parties are to be joined in a suit as it is the party
whose interest will be affected by the court’s action and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. His legal presence is an
absolute necessity. Absence of the indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act.

"An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the
case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that
his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before
the court which is effective, complete, or equitable."37 Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as
are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy
is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

The decision of the RTC, CA, and SC is not binding upon the Municipality as it was not impleaded as a defendant in the case. Case is REMANDED
to the RTC and Cacayuran is DIRECTED to implead all indispensable parties.

WHEREFORE, the subject motions are PARTLY GRANTED.

45. Lotte Phils. Co. Inc. vs. De la Cruz – 464 SCRA 591

Doctrine:
Rule on indispensable party; Joinder in an action. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is 'the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case.
Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.

Non-joinder of indispensable party; Not a ground for dismissal. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and
the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff's failure to comply therefore. Domingo v. Scheer.

Facts:

Lotte Phils., Inc. is a domestic corporation. RESPONDENTS were hired and assigned to the confectionery facility operated by Lotte.

1995-2000, 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services entered into a contract with Lotte to provide manpower and to accommodate the needs
of Lotte for workers to do and perform “piece works,” RESPONDENTS, among others, were hired and assigned to Lotte as repackers or sealers.

Feb. 2000, Lotte dispensed with their services allegedly due to the expiration of the service contract.
● Lotte told the respondent “huwag muna kayong pumasok at tatawagan na lang kung may gawa”.
● Unfortunately, RESPONDENTS were never called back to work.
- RESPONDENTS filed a labor complaint against Lotte and 7J for illegal dismissal.
 Page 51 of 69

LA: ruled that 7J was the employer of the RESPONDENTS and ordered 7J to reinstate the respondents.
- RESPONDENTS appealed to the NLRC praying that Lotte be declared as their direct employer because 7J is merely a labor-only
contractor.

NLRC: affirmed the decision of the LA

- RESPONDENTS filed a petition for certiorari in the CA against the NLRC and Lotte ONLY, insisting that their employer is
Lotte and not 7J.
- Lotte, however, denied that respondents were its employees. It prayed that the petition be dismissed for failure to implead 7J who
is a party interested in sustaining the proceedings in court, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

CA: reversed and set aside the decision of LA and NLRC. Thus, CA declared Lotte as the real employer of the respondents and that 7J who
engaged in the labor-only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON 7J is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded in respondent’s petition?

Ruling: YES.

An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is “the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case.

Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

In Domingo v. Scheer,
“The nonjoinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to
be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such
times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition
for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor.”

Although 7J was a coparty in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, respondents failed to include it in their petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED.

Patricia Rachelle

46. Carabeo vs. Dingco, 647 SCRA 200

DOMINGO CARABEO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO and SUSAN DINGCO, respondents. Carabeo vs. Dingco,
G.R. No. 190823 April 4, 2011

DOCTRINE:
Civil Law; Property; Sales; The requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing is satisfied as long as, at the time the contract is
entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties.—
That the kasunduan did not specify the technical boundaries of the property did not render the sale a nullity. The requirement that a sale must have for
its object a determinate thing is satisfied as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate
without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties. As the above-quoted portion of the kasunduan shows, there is no doubt that
the object of the sale is determinate.

Remedial Law; Actions; Death of a Party; The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage
sued for.—Respecting the argument that petitioner’s death rendered respondents’ complaint against him dismissible, Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA
491 (1976), enlightens: The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the
causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person
being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental.

Same; Same; Same; Since the trial court was not informed of petitioner’s death, it may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without
ordering his substitution.—It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court was not informed
of petitioner’s death, it may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding
upon petitioner’s legal representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned.

Same; Same; Same; The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority.—In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the
counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased
 Page 52 of 69

client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial court’s decision had thereby become final and executory,
no appeal having been perfected.

FACTS:
On July 10, 1990, Domingo Carabeo (petitioner) entered into a contract denominated as “Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa”1 (kasunduan)
with Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to sell his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of unregistered
land situated in Purok III, Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for P38,000.

Respondents tendered their initial payment of P10,000 upon signing of the contract, the remaining balance to be paid on September 1990.

Respondents were later to claim that when they were about to hand in the balance of the purchase price, petitioner requested them to keep it first as
he was yet to settle an on-going “squabble” over the land.

Nevertheless, respondents gave petitioner small sums of money from time to time which totaled P9,100, on petitioner’s request according to them;
due to respondents’ inability to pay the amount of the remaining balance in full, according to petitioner.

By respondents’ claim, despite the alleged problem over the land, they insisted on petitioner’s acceptance of the remaining balance of P18,900 but
petitioner remained firm in his refusal, proffering as reason therefor that he would register the land first.

Sometime in 1994, respondents learned that the alleged problem over the land had been settled and that petitioner had caused its registration in his
name on December 21, 1993 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 161806. They thereupon offered to pay the balance but petitioner declined,
drawing them to file a complaint before the Katarungan Pambarangay. No settlement was reached, however, hence, respondent filed a complaint for
specific performance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan.

Petitioner countered in his Answer to the Complaint that the sale was void for lack of object certain, the kasunduan not having specified the metes
and bounds of the land. In any event, petitioner alleged that if the validity of the kasunduan is upheld, respondents’ failure to comply with their
reciprocal obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price would render the action premature. For, contrary to respondents’ claim, petitioner
maintained that they failed to pay the balance of P28, 000 on September 1990 to thus constrain him to accept installment payments totaling P9, 100.

After the case was submitted for decision or on January 31, 2001, petitioner passed away. The records do not show that petitioner’s counsel informed
Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper substitution was effected in accordance with Section 16,
Rule 3, Rules of Court.

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.—Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the
court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased
and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

RTC: rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered the defendant to sell his right over 648 square meters of land pursuant to the contract
dated July 10, 1990 by executing a Deed of Sale thereof after the payment of P18,900 by the plaintiffs.

CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE:
Whether the death of herein petitioner causes the dismissal of the action filed by respondents; respondents’ cause of action being an action in
personam.

RULING:
NO.
Bonilla v. Barcena enlightens:
“The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which
survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental,
while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental.”
 Page 53 of 69

In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to
protect his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return
the money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property rights, it survives.

It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court was not informed of petitioner’s death, it
may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner’s legal
representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned.

In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record
had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial
court’s decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.

Note.—Failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not
invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party. (Napere vs. Barbarona, 543 SCRA 376
[2008])

47. De la Cruz vs, Joaquin – 464 SCRA 576

SPOUSES JULITA DE LA CRUZ and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. PEDRO JOAQUIN, respondent.
464 SCRA 576, G.R. No. 162788 July 28, 2005

DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Parties; Substitution of Party; When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a
substitution of the deceased.—When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of
the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3.

Same; Same; Same; The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process.—The rule on the substitution of
parties was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process. The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right
to a day in court is denied.

Same; Same; Same; Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased, but
also the resulting judgments.—The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the legal representatives of the
deceased, but also the resulting judgments. In those instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or the
heirs upon whom no judgment was binding.

Same; Same; Same; Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present
evidence in defense of the deceased.—This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves
voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due
process was violated.
Same; Same; Same; Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process; Mere
failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision; Alleging party must prove that there was an
undeniable violation of due process.—Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due
process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated
formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a
sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.

Same; Actions; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition; Willful and
deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for the summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt of court.—Forum
shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by a party
against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by an
appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice,
and congests court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for the summary dismissal of the case; it may also
constitute direct contempt of court.

Same; Same; Res Judicata; Under res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights
of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit.— Under res judicata, a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and
matters determined in the previous suit. The term literally means a “matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment.” The principle
bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. Public policy requires that controversies must be settled with
finality at a given point in time.

Same; Same; Same; Elements of.—The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered on the merits of the controversy; (3) the court that rendered it must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4)
there must have been—between the first and the second actions—an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
 Page 54 of 69

Same; Same; Same; Mere mention of other civil cases without showing the identity of rights asserted and reliefs sought is not enough basis to claim
that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, or that res judicata exists.—The onus of proving allegations rests upon the party raising them. As to the
matter of forum shopping and res judicata, petitioners have failed to provide this Court with relevant and clear specifications that would show the
presence of an identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the present and the earlier suits. They have also failed to show whether
the other case was decided on the merits. Instead, they have made only bare assertions involving its existence without reference to its facts. In other
words, they have alleged conclusions of law without stating any factual or legal basis. Mere mention of other civil cases without showing the identity
of rights asserted and reliefs sought is not enough basis to claim that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, or that res judicata exists.

FACTS:
The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership, the cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin
against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.6 Respondent alleged that he had obtained a loan from them in
the amount of P9,000 on June 29, 1974, payable after five (5) years; that is, on June 29, 1979. To secure the payment of the obligation, he supposedly
executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners. The Deed was for a parcel of land in Pinagpanaan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by TCT No. T-
111802. The parties also executed another document entitled “Kasunduan.”

Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan showed the Deed of Sale to be actually an equitable mortgage. Spouses De la Cruz contended that this
document was merely an accommodation to allow the repurchase of the property until June 29, 1979, a right that he failed to exercise.

RTC: ruled in favor of respondent. The parties had entered into a sale with a right of repurchase. It further held that respondent had made a valid
tender of payment on two separate occasions to exercise his right of repurchase. Accordingly, petitioners were required to reconvey the property upon
his payment.

CA: affirmed RTC. In the March 9, 2004 Resolution, the CA denied reconsideration and ordered a substitution by legal representatives, in view of
respondent’s death on December 24, 1988.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro Joaquin

RULING:
NO. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure
is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3, which reads thus:

“Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel.—Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

“The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

“The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
notice.

“If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the
court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased,
and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs.”

The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process. The estate of the deceased party will continue to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the successor of the
deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied.

The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting
judgments. In those instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or the heirs upon whom no judgment
was binding.

This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case,
and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.

The Court is not unaware of Chittick v. Court of Appeals, in which the failure of the heirs to substitute for the original plaintiff upon her death led to
the nullification of the trial court’s Decision. The latter had sought to recover support in arrears and her share in the conjugal partnership. The
children who allegedly substituted for her refused to continue the case against their father and vehemently objected to their inclusion as parties.
Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the case, they were bound to substitute for the defendant also. The substitution effectively merged
the persons of the plaintiff and the defendant and thus extinguished the obligation being sued upon.

Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not
violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules
 Page 55 of 69

cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
court’s decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.

The onus of proving allegations rests upon the party raising them. As to the matter of forum shopping and res judicata, petitioners have failed to
provide this Court with relevant and clear specifications that would show the presence of an identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action
between the present and the earlier suits. They have also failed to show whether the other case was decided on the merits. Instead, they have made
only bare assertions involving its existence without reference to its facts. In other words, they have alleged conclusions of law without stating any
factual or legal basis. Mere mention of other civil cases without showing the identity of rights asserted and reliefs sought is not enough basis to claim
that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, or that res judicata exists.

Note.—Non-compliance with the rule on substitution of a deceased party renders the proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the
court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs of whom the trial court and the judgment would be binding.
(Brioso vs. Rili-Mariano, 396 SCRA 549 [2003])

48. Navarro vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA 1

ROGER V. NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO,
doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, respondents.
606 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009

DOCTRINE:
Civil Procedure; Parties; The 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.—The 1977
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

This is a petition for review on certiorari that seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated October 16, 2001 and Resolution dated
May 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64701. These CA rulings affirmed the July 26, 2000 and March 7, 2001 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, denying petitioner Roger V. Navarro’s (Navarro) motion to dismiss.

FACTS:
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against
Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s
possession.’

ROGER NAVARRO, on August 8, 1997, leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle (FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE) as evidenced by a
LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE entered into by and between KARGO ENTERPRISES, then represented by its Manager,
the aforementioned GLENN O. GO, and defendant ROGER NAVARRO xxx; that in accordance with the provisions of the above LEASE
AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE, defendant ROGER NAVARRO delivered unto plaintiff six (6) post-dated checks each in the
amount of P66,333.33 which were supposedly in payment of the agreed rentals; that when the fifth and sixth checks, i.e. PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS—CAGAYAN DE ORO BRANCH CHECKS NOS. 017112 and 017113, respectively dated January 8, 1998 and February 8,
1998, were presented for payment and/or credit, the same were dishonored and/or returned by the drawee bank for the common reason that the
current deposit account against which the said checks were issued did not have sufficient funds to cover the amounts thereof; that the total amount of
the two (2) checks, i.e. the sum of P132,666.66 therefore represents the principal liability of defendant ROGER NAVARRO unto plaintiff on the
basis of the provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO PURCHASE;

The second complaint contained essentially the same allegations as the first complaint, except that the Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase
involved is dated October 1, 1997. The second complaint also alleged that Navarro delivered three post-dated checks, each for the amount of
P100,000.00, to Karen Go in payment of the agreed rentals; however, the third check was dishonored when presented for payment.

On October 12, 1998 and October 14, 1998, the RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result, the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and
delivered them to the possession of Karen Go.

In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to
the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements)—the actionable documents on which the complaints were based.

RTC: dismissed the complaints on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. but set aside the dismissal on the presumption that Glenn Go’s
(husband) leasing business is a conjugal property and thus ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule
4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. According to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause
of action could not be converted into one with a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading.
CA: denied petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Karen Go is a real party in interest.

RULING:
YES. Karen Go is the real party-in-interest
 Page 56 of 69

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Interestingly, although Navarro admits that Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, he still insists that Karen Go is
not a real party-in-interest in the case. According to Navarro, while the lease contracts were in Kargo Enterprises’ name, this was merely a trade
name without a juridical personality, so the actual parties to the lease agreements were Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go.

The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in the title of the
Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as “KAREN T. GO doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES,” and this identification
was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint. Paragraph 2 defined the business KARGO ENTERPRISES undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued
with the allegation that the defendant “leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle” that was thereafter described. Significantly, the Complaint
specifies and attaches as its integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. Again, the name
KARGO ENTERPRISES entered the picture as this Lease Agreement provides:

“This agreement, made and entered into by and between:

GLENN O. GO, of legal age, married, with post office address at xxx, herein referred to as the LESSOR-SELLER; representing KARGO
ENTERPRISES as its Manager, xxx”

thus, expressly pointing to KARGO ENTERPRISES as the principal that Glenn O. Go represented. In other words, by the express terms of this Lease
Agreement, Glenn Go did sign the agreement only as the manager of Kargo Enterprises and the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements.

As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, as defined by
Article 44 of the Civil Code:

“Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2)  Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law;
(3)  Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct
from that of each shareholder, partner or member.”

Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules, Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action.
Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza: “Finally, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The law merely
recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the
proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest
juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court.

Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in the body of the
complaint would show that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business conducted under the name and style Juasing
Hardware. The descriptive words “doing business as Juasing Hardware” may be added to the title of the case, as is customarily done.”

This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules, which states:
“SEC. 2. Parties in interest.—A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.”

As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus,
contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of
action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can
legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a
matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits.

Thus, for purposes solely of this case and of resolving the issue of whether Kargo Enterprises as a sole proprietorship is conjugal or paraphernal
property, we hold that it is conjugal property.

Article 124 of the Family Code, on the administration of the conjugal property, provides:
“Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision. xxx”

This provision, by its terms, allows either Karen or Glenn Go to speak and act with authority in managing their conjugal property, i.e., Kargo
Enterprises. No need exists, therefore, for one to obtain the consent of the other before performing an act of administration or any act that does not
dispose of or encumber their conjugal property.

Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict
with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations of the
 Page 57 of 69

husband and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses’
marriage settlement and by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In the absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement between the
spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance.

A rule on partnership applicable to the spouses’ circumstances is Article 1811 of the Civil Code, which states:
“Art. 1811. A partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property.
The incidents of this co-ownership are such that:
(1)“A partner, subject to the provisions of this Title and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his partners to possess
specific partnership property for partnership purposes; xxx”

Under this provision, Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under this name; hence, both
have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Applying Article 484 of the Civil Code, which states that “in default of contracts, or
special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title,” we find further support in Article 487 of the Civil Code that
allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment with respect to the co-owned property.”

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-
owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are
not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since
the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.”

Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which
they co-own. This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act on
behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or encumber the property in question without the other spouse’s consent.

On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only
needs to be impleaded as a pro forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:

“Section 4. Spouses as parties.—Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.”
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a number of cases26 that the misjoinder or non-joinder of
indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action. As we stated in Macababbad v. Masirag:

“Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.—Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any
claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.

In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action.
The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to
amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses
to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion. Only upon
unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.”

For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
“Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or
preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.

The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for
the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover
from the applicant in the action.”

We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action
for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

Note.—If the defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within five days from such
taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof, both requirements—as well as
compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned—being mandatory. (Bautista vs. Sula, 530 SCRA 406 [2007]).

49. Divinagracia vs. Parilla, 753 SCRA 87

 Page 58 of 69

MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF THE LATE SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, petitioner, vs.
CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, and MAUDE NOBLEZA, respondents.
753 SCRA 87, G.R. No. 196750 March 11, 2015

DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Words and Phrases; An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by
the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.—An indispensable party is one whose interest
will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Co-Heirs; All the coheirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.—With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires
that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.: SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.—A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his
title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the
property. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, all the coheirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such,
an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Non-Joinder of Indispensable Parties; The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not
a ground for the dismissal of an action; The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.—The CA erred in ordering the dismissal
of the complaint on account of Santiago’s failure to implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr.,
695 SCRA 345 (2013), the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead
them and not to dismiss the case, to wit: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a
judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to
comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.

FACTS:
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-square-meter parcel of land located at Cor. Fuentes-Delgado Streets, Iloilo City. During his
lifetime, he contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2) children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.;
and (b) the second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio,
Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3) illegitimate children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo, Sr. predeceased
Conrado, Sr. and was survived by his children Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord. Cebeleo, Sr. also predeceased his
father and was survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.

According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation of his father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings),
Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective interests over the subject land to Santiago for a consideration of
P447,695.66, which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in
representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children).

However, Santiago was not able to have the TCT cancelled and the subject document registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal
to surrender the said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the subject land, prompted Santiago to file a
Complaint dated January 3, 1990 for judicial partition and for receivership.

For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude maintained that Santiago had no legal right to file an action for judicial partition nor compel them to
surrender the TCT because, inter alia: (a) Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a conjugal
asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may validly inherit the same.

RTC: ordered, among others, the partition of the subject land between Santiago on the one hand, and Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of
Mateo, Sr. (i.e., Felcon, et al.) on the other hand and, consequently, the cancellation of TCT No. T-12255 and the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate certificate in favor of Santiago and the group of Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. TC found that through the subject
document, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. However, the RTC held
that Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over the subject land, considering that Felcon admitted the lack of authority to bind his
siblings with regard to Mateo, Sr.’s share thereon, further ordering Santiago to comply with the provisions of the Supplemental Contract dated
December 22, 1989 by paying the amount of P337,887.73 upon the partition of the subject land.

CA: set aside the RTC Rulings and, consequently, dismissed Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition. It held that Felcon’s siblings, as well as
Maude’s children, are indispensable parties to the judicial partition of the subject land and, thus, their noninclusion as defendants in Santiago’s
complaint would necessarily result in its dismissal

ISSUES:
1. Whether failure to plead indispensable parties in an action renders all actions of the court null and void;
2. Whether Santiago’s complaint should be dismissed for his failure to implead said omitted heirs.
 Page 59 of 69

RULING:
1. YES. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other
parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the
parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as
defendants, viz.:

SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.—A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in
this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded
and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.

Thus, all the coheirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the
joinder of the said parties.

In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro indiviso share in the
subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and
Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. predeceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules on representation under the Civil Code,
their respective interests shall be represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and
Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.

The aforementioned heirs — whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant — have vested rights over the subject land
and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that
as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to
Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the proper
representatives to his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his
complaint for partition defective.

In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the
RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present. Therefore, the CA correctly set aside the
November 29, 2002 Decision and the April 4, 2003 Order of the RTC.

2. NO. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such
times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable. x x x

In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable
parties who were not impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the merits.

Notes.—A Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant to a will that was not probated can not be given effect. (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 532
SCRA 642 [2007])

In an action for partition, all other persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants — not only the coheirs but also all persons
claiming interests or rights in the property subject of partition are indispensable parties. (Heirs of Panfilo F. Abalos vs. Bucal, 546 SCRA 252 [2008])

50. Enrique vda de Santiago vs. Vilar, 857 SCRA (2017)

ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO, petitioner –versus- ANTONIO T. VILAR, respondent.

G.R. No. 225309, FIRST DIVISION, March 6, 2018, TIJAM, J

DOCTRINE:
The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the
authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding,
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.

Verily, Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before the CA as she is the widow of the original party-plaintiff Eduardo. The determination
of the propriety of the action of the trial court in merely noting and not granting his motion would necessarily affect her interest in the subject matter
of litigation as the party-plaintiff.

FACTS:
Spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos (Spouses Zulueta), registered owners of several parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50356, obtained various loans secured by the mother titles from the GSIS. The amount of loans, with the accumulated
value of P3,117,000.00 were obtained from September 1956 to October 1957. From the records, the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 26105 was divided into 199 lots. Under the first mortgage contract, 78 of these lots were excluded from the mortgage.
 Page 60 of 69

When Spouses Zulueta defaulted in their payment, GSIS extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgages in August 1974 wherein the latter emerged as the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was then issued. GSIS, however, consolidated its title on all of the three mother titles, including the 78 lots which
were expressly excluded from the mortgage contract.

Later, GSIS began to dispose the foreclosed lots, including those not covered by the foreclosure sale. Thereafter, Spouses Zulueta were succeeded by
Antonio Zulueta (Antonio), who transferred all his rights and interests in the excluded lots to Eduardo Santiago (Eduardo). Claiming his rights and
interests over the excluded lots, Eduardo, through his counsel, sent a letter to GSIS for the return of the same.

In May 1990, Antonio, as represented by Eduardo, filed an Action for Reconveyance of the excluded lots against the GSIS. Subsequently, Antonio
was substituted by Eduardo. Upon Eduardo's demise, however, he was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Rosario.

In a Decision dated December 17, 1997, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, ordered GSIS to reconvey to Rosario the excluded
lots or to pay the market value of said lots in case reconveyance is not possible. The Registry of Deeds of Pasig City was likewise ordered to cancel
the titles covering the excluded lots issued in the name of GSIS.

In the interim, herein respondent Antonio Vilar (Vilar) filed a Verified Omnibus Motion (for Substitution of Party-Plaintiff with Authority to
Implement Writ of Execution until Full Satisfaction of the Final Judgment of the Court) before the RTC. In his motion, Vilar alleged that after
Antonio transferred his rights and interests to Eduardo, the latter assigned to Vilar 90% of his interest in the judgment proceeds of the reconveyance
case. Further, Vilar averred that he and Eduardo agreed that the Deed of Assignment shall still take effect despite the fact of substitution.

In resolving Vilar's motion, the RTC merely noted the same without action in its Order dated December 8, 2010.

Hence, Vilar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in merely noting and not
granting Vilar's motion. In a Decision dated February 10, 2014, the CA granted Vilar's petition.

On June 17, 2016, the CA issued its assailed Amended Decision, which in essence, denied the motion for intervention filed by Atty. Gilberto Alfafara
(Atty. Alfafara), former counsel of Vilar and denied GSIS' partial motion for reconsideration and Rosario's motion to intervene and to admit motion
for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Vilar should be impleaded as party-plaintiff in substitution of Rosario.

RULING:
NO. The case stemmed from the action for reconveyance filed by Eduardo, husband of Rosario. To recall, Eduardo was the successor-in-interest of
Antonio, who is actually the successor-in-interest of Spouses Zulueta. Spouses Zulueta are the original owners of the subject parcels of land. Upon
the death of the party-plaintiff Eduardo, Rosario was substituted in his stead. The case was subsequently decided on December 17, 1997 and affirmed
by this Court in October 28, 2003. An Entry of Judgment was issued in 2004. In all these incidents, Rosario was considered as the party-plaintiff.

By definition, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants. It is a party whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation.

In the Matter of the Heirship (Intestate Estates) of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, et al. v. Robles, the Court held that:

The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the
authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding,
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.
Verily, Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before the CA as she is the widow of the original party-plaintiff Eduardo. The determination
of the propriety of the action of the trial court in merely noting and not granting his motion would necessarily affect her interest in the subject matter
of litigation as the party-plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Court differs with the CA in ruling that the petition for certiorari filed before it merely delves into the issue of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court. Guilty of repetition, the final determination of the case would pry into the right of Rosario as party-plaintiff
before the lower court who is entitled to the proceeds of the judgment award. As it is, the CA did not actually rule on the issue of grave abuse of
discretion alone as its corollary ruling inquired into the right of Rosario. In ruling for Vilar's substitution, the right of Rosario as to the proceeds of the
judgment award was thwarted as the CA effectively ordered that the proceeds pertaining to Rosario be awarded instead to Vilar.

Likewise, the Court finds merit in Rosario's contention that her failure to participate in the proceedings before the CA constitutes a denial of her
constitutional right to due process.

Hence, failure to implead Rosario as an indispensable party rendered all the proceedings before the CA null and void for want of authority to act.

Moreover, even the basis for the substitution of Vilar as pronounced by the CA was unfounded. In ruling so, the CA merely relied on the purported
Deeds of Assignment of Rights executed between Eduardo and Vilar in considering that the latter is a transferee pendente lite, who can rightfully and
legally substitute Rosario as party-plaintiff in the implementation of a writ of execution
 Page 61 of 69

Yet, it is significant to note that the Court already brushed aside said Deeds of Assignment for being belatedly filed in its Decision dated October 21,
2015 in G.R. Nos. 194814 and 194825. The Court did not discuss any further the validity and due execution of said Deeds as the same were brought
to the attention of the trial court more than 20 years after the same were allegedly executed.

As a final note, it must be considered that this case was extant since 1990. The decision of the trial court in 1997 which ruled that Spouses Zulueta,
who were substituted by Rosario as party-plaintiff are entitled to the excluded lots or its amount equivalent, has become final and executory when
this Court affirmed the same in 2003 in G.R. No. 155206. Subsequently, an Entry of Judgment was issued by this Court in 2004. However, despite
the issuance of a writ of execution in 2004, the case had several pending incidents which prohibit Rosario, to recover what is rightfully hers. To
warrant the unjustified delay of these proceedings would tantamount to denial of the fruits of the judgment in her favor.

A. Venue of Actions: real actions, personal actions

51. Pacific Consultants International Asia vs. Schonfeld - 516 SCRA

PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER HENRICHSEN, petitioners, vs. KLAUS K. SCHONFELD,
respondent.
516 SCRA 209, G.R. No. 166920 February 19, 2007

DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Appeals; Under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, the Court of Appeals is empowered to pass
upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.—It must be stressed that in resolving a petition for certiorari, the CA is not
proscribed from reviewing the evidence on record. Under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, the CA is
empowered to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. If it appears that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
misappreciated the evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly appreciated, the factual findings
of such tribunals cannot be given great respect and finality.

Venue; Venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words.—The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking
Corporation v. Tensuan, 230 SCRA 413 (1994), is that while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a
rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be
considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If
the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design
that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them.

FACTS:
Respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a resident of New Westminster, British Columbia, Canada. He had been a consultant in the field of
environmental engineering and water supply and sanitation. Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is a corporation duly established and incorporated in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The primary purpose of PPI was to engage in the business of providing specialty and technical services
both in and out of the Philippines.2 It is a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ). The president of PPI, Jens Peter
Henrichsen, who was also the director of PCIJ, was based in Tokyo, Japan. Henrichsen commuted from Japan to Manila and vice versa, as well as in
other countries where PCIJ had business.

In 1997, PCIJ decided to engage in consultancy services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. In October 1997, respondent was employed by
PCIJ, through Henrichsen, as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation Department. However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI sector manager in
the Philippines. His salary was to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ.

Respondent was employed by PCIJ, through Henrichsen, as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation Department. However, PCIJ assigned
him as PPI sector manager in the Philippines. His salary was to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ. Henrichsen transmitted a letter of employment to
respondent in Canada, requesting him to accept the same and affix his conformity thereto. Respondent made some revisions in the letter of
employment and signed the contract. He then sent a copy to Henrichsen.

Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his position as PPI Sector Manager. He was accorded the status of a resident alien. Respondent
received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that his employment had been terminated effective August 4, 1999 for the reason that PCIJ and PPI
had not been successful in the water and sanitation sector in the Philippines. However, on July 24, 1999, Henrichsen, by electronic mail, requested
respondent to stay put in his job after August 5, 1999, until such time that he would be able to report on certain projects and discuss all the
opportunities he had developed.

Respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against petitioners PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter found, among
others, that the January 7, 1998 contract of employment between respondent and PCIJ was controlling; the Philippines was only the "duty station"
where Schonfeld was required to work under the General Conditions of Employment. PCIJ remained respondent’s employer despite his having been
sent to the Philippines. Since the parties had agreed that any differences regarding employer-employee relationship should be submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court of arbitration in London, this agreement is controlling.

On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the disquisitions of the Labor Arbiter and affirmed the latter’s decision in toto.

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. On the issue of venue, the appellate court declared that, even under the
January 7, 1998 contract of employment, the parties were not precluded from bringing a case related thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed,
 Page 62 of 69

an agreement that issues between the parties were to be resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since there is no
stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other than in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over respondent’s claim despite the fact that respondent, a foreign national, was hired abroad by a foreign
corporation, executed his employment contract abroad, and had agreed that any dispute between them "shall be finally settled by the court of
arbitration in
London.

RULING:
YES. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that
while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not
as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must
be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place
named by them.

In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court save —," "particularly," "nowhere else
but/except —," or words of equal import were stated in the contract. It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to
bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment contract.

Petitioners contend that respondent should have filed his Complaint in his place of permanent residence, or where the PCIJ holds its principal office,
at the place where the contract of employment was signed, in London as stated in their contract. By enumerating possible venues where respondent
could have filed his complaint, however, petitioners themselves admitted that the provision on venue in the employment contract is indeed merely
permissive.

Petitioners’ insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens must be rejected. The bare fact that respondent is a Canadian
citizen and was a repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle for the following reasons:

First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include forum non conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.

Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, it is properly considered as defense.

Third. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:
x x x [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the
Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the FACTS; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to
have power to enforce its decision. x x x

Admittedly, all the foregoing requisites are present in this case.

52. Biaco vs. Counbtryside Rural bank – 515 SCRA 106

MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, respondent.
515 SCRA 106, G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007

DOCTRINE:
Actions; Judgments; Annulment of Judgments; Words and Phrases; Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.—Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed
only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Jurisprudence and Sec. 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rules of Court) provide that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process.

Same; Same; Same; Fraud; Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.—
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was
prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Extrinsic fraud is present where
the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him
away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney
regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side. The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Forgeries; The use of forged instruments during trial is not extrinsic fraud because such evidence does not preclude the
participation of any party in the proceedings.—Petitioner’s allegation that her signature on the promissory notes was forged does not evince extrinsic
 Page 63 of 69

fraud. It is well-settled that the use of forged instruments during trial is not extrinsic fraud because such evidence does not preclude the participation
of any party in the proceedings.

Jurisdictions; Words and Phrases; “Action in Personam,” “Action in Rem,” and “Action Quasi in Rem,” Explained. —The question of whether the
trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of the action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem,orquasi in rem. The rules on service of
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court likewise apply according to the nature of the action. An action in personam is an action against a
person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem
is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
burdening the property.

Same; In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case, while in a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.—In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which
the power of the court is recognized and made effective. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the
court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.

Foreclosure of Mortgage; A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem.—In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by
respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As
such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Annulment of Judgment; Violation of a party’s constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of summons on her warrants the
annulment of the judgment of the trial court.—Without ruling on petitioner’s allegation that her husband and the sheriff connived to prevent
summons from being served upon her personally, we can see that petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in the judicial
foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of
summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court.

Same; Where the trial court only acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res—it cannot extend
its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing a party’s personal liability.—Significantly, the Court went on to rule, citing De
Midgely v. Ferandos, et al., 64 SCRA 23 (1975), and Perkins v. Dizon, et al., 69 Phil. 186 (1939), that in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, the
only relief that may be granted by the court against a defendant over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of summons
or by voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to the res. Similarly, in this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its
jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioner’s
personal liability. In doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her
constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case.

FACTS:
Biaco vs Countryside Rural Bank Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. Ernesto obtained several loans from the
respondent bank as evidenced by promissory notes. As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of
the bank covering the parcel of land described in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14423. The real estate mortgages bore the signatures of
the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written
demand. The written demand, however, proved futile prompting respondent bank to file a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses
Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office. Ernesto
received the summons but for unknown reasons, he failed to file an answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in default upon motion of the
respondent bank. The respondent bank was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court who was then appointed by the
court as Commissioner.

RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent. In case of non-payment within the period, the Sheriff of this Court is ordered to sell at public auction
the mortgaged Lot, a parcel of registered land to satisfy the mortgage debt, and the surplus if there be any should be delivered to the defendants
spouses ERNESTO and MA. THERESA [CHAVES] BIACO. In the event however[,] that the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgage[d]
property is not enough to pay the outstanding obligation, the defendants are ordered to pay any deficiency of the judgment as their personal liability.
Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial
foreclosure proceedings.

According to her, she came to know about the judgment in the case only after the lapse of more than six (6) months after its finality. . She moreover
asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why
personal service could not be made. Petitioner further argues that the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment which should be deemed void for
lack of jurisdiction over her person.

CA ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long
as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

Noting that the spouses Biaco were not opposing parties in the case, the Court of Appeals further ruled that the fraud committed by one against the
other cannot be considered extrinsic fraud.
 Page 64 of 69

ISSUE:
1. Whether the sheriff perpetrated extrinsic fraud in the service of summons
2. Whether the substituted service made by the sheriff at her husband’s office can be deemed proper service absent any explanation that
efforts had been made to personally serve summons upon her but that such efforts failed.

RULING:
1. NO. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Extrinsic fraud is
present where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as
by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance
by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where
the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side. The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.

With these considerations, the appellate court acted well in ruling that there was no fraud perpetrated by respondent bank upon petitioner, noting that
the spouses Biaco were codefendants in the case and shared the same interest. Whatever fact or circumstance concealed by the husband from the wife
cannot be attributed to respondent bank.

Moreover, petitioner’s allegation that her signature on the promissory notes was forged does not evince extrinsic fraud. It is well-settled that the use
of forged instruments during trial is not extrinsic fraud because such evidence does not preclude the participation of any party in the proceedings.

2. NO. The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of the action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in
rem,orquasi in rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court likewise apply according to the nature of the action.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead
of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective.

Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due
process requirements.

A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner in this case, must be personally served with summons as provided
under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If she cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
effected (1) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(2) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof in accordance with Sec. 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A
judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the
trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

There is a dimension to this case though that needs to be delved into. Petitioner avers that she was not personally served summons. Instead, summons
was served to her through her husband at his office without any explanation as to why the particular surrogate service was resorted to.

Without ruling on petitioner’s allegation that her husband and the sheriff connived to prevent summons from being served upon her personally, we
can see that petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in the judicial foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation
of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the
trial court.

There is more. The trial court granted respondent PCRB’s ex parte motion for deficiency judgment and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution
against the spouses Biaco to satisfy the remaining balance of the award. In short, the trial court went beyond its jurisdiction over the res and rendered
a personal judgment against the spouses Biaco. This cannot be countenanced.

The Court explained, citing El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, that foreclosure and attachment proceedings are both actions quasi in rem. As
such, jurisdiction over the person of the (non-resident) defendant is not essential. Service of summons on a non-resident defendant who is not found
in the country is required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair
play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property belonging to him or in which he has an
interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, should he
be so minded.
 Page 65 of 69

Significantly, the Court went on to rule, citing De Midgely v. Ferandos, et al. and Perkins v. Dizon, et al. that in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
the only relief that may be granted by the court against a defendant over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of
summons or by voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to the res.

Similarly, in this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot
extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioner’s personal liability. In doing so without first having acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the
judgment rendered in the case.

Notes.—Any misconduct or violation of judicial responsibility allegedly committed by a judge is not a proper subject of intervention in an action for
annulment of final judgment. (Pascual vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 214 [1998])

An action whereby a party seeks to recover damages from another for the alleged commission of an injury to his person or property caused by such
person’s being a nuisance defendant is an action in personam. (Banco do Brasil vs. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 545 [2000])

53. BPI Savings Bank vs. Sps. Yujuico – 763 SCRA 486 (7/2015)

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA YUJUICO, respondents.
763 SCRA 486, G.R. No. 175796 July 22, 2015

DOCTRINE:
Actions; Real Actions; According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or
an interest therein.—It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The determinants of whether an action
is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In
contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal
property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an
injury to the person or property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff,
for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.

Same; Personal Actions; An action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for
it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.—Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action
to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; Personal Actions; In civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the
defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.—We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts. In other
words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court despite its being the improper venue.

An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property mortgage is a personal action because it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein.

FACTS:
On August 22, 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five parcels of land located in Tondo,
Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land were previously mortgaged to City trust Banking
Corporation, the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract. On June 30, 2000, the Regional Trial Court in
Manila (Manila RTC) rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The judgment became final and executory
on January 28, 2001 and was entered in the book of entries of judgment on March 23, 2001. The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene
in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant’s Request to Release, but the RTC denied the motion for having been “filed out of time.” Hence,
the petiioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents’ loan. After holding
the public auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at P10,000,000.00.

Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18,522,155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC. The
respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint stated no cause
of action; and that the plaintiff’s claim had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished.

Makati RTC: denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss, ruling that there was no res judicata; that the complaint stated a sufficient cause of action to
recover the deficiency; and that there was nothing to support the claim that the obligation had been abandoned or extinguished apart from the
respondents’ contention that the properties had been subjected to expropriation by the City of Manila.
 Page 66 of 69

The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, while in CA, it granted the petition,
opining “Thus, a suit for recovery of the deficiency after the foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is
precisely to enforce the mortgage contract; it is upon a written contract and upon an obligation of the mortgage-debtor to pay the deficiency which is
created by law. As such, the venue of an action for recovery of deficiency must necessarily be the same venue as that of the extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage.”

ISSUE:
Whether it is proper to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue

RULING:
NO. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a
personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action
is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of
Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the
action is considered a transitory one.

Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property
mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.

It is true that the Court has said in Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court that “a suit for the recovery of the deficiency after the
foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is precisely to enforce the mortgage contract.” However, the CA
erred in holding, upon the authority of Caltex Philippines, Inc., that the venue of Civil Case No. 03-450 must necessarily be Manila, the same venue
as that of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. An examination of Caltex Philippines, Inc. reveals that the Court was thereby only interpreting
the prescriptive period within which to bring the suit for the recovery of the deficiency after the foreclosure of the mortgage, and was not at all ruling
therein on the venue of such suit or on the nature of such suit being either a real or a personal action.

Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought Civil Case No. 03-450 in the Makati RTC because Makati was the place where the main office
of the petitioner was located.

Moreover, the Makati RTC observed, and the observation is correct in our view, that it would be improper to dismiss Civil Case No. 03-450 on the
ground of improper venue, assuming that the venue had been improperly laid, considering that the respondents had not raised such ground in their
Motion to Dismiss. As earlier indicated, they came to raise the objection of improper venue for the first time only in their reply to the petitioner’s
comment on their Motion for Reconsideration. They did so belatedly.

We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to the
parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts. In other words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court
despite its being the improper venue.

Notes.—The venue of real actions affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions
involving said parcels of land. (United Overseas Bank Phils. vs. Rosemoore Mining & Development Corp., 518 SCRA 123 [2007])

Under Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. These
include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. (Cabrera vs. Francisco, 704 SCRA 103 [2013])

54. Planters Dev. Bank vs. Ramos, 840 SCRA (2017)

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICTORIANO and MELANIE RAMOS, respondents.

DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place
agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law.—The
general rules on venue admit of exceptions in Section 4 thereof, i.e., where a specific rule or law provides otherwise, or when the parties agreed in
writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. Stipulations on venue, however, may either be permissive or restrictive.
“Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that
the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.”

Same; Same; Same; In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.—In view of the predilection to view a stipulation on venue as merely permissive, the parties must
therefore employ words in the contract that would clearly evince a contrary intention. In Spouses Lantin v. Judge Lantion, 499 SCRA 718 (2006), the
 Page 67 of 69

Court emphasized that “the mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The
parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as
merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.”

Same; Same; Same; Not being contrary to law or public policy, the stipulation on venue, which Planters Development Bank (PDB) and Spouses
Ramos freely and willingly agreed upon, has the force of law between them, and thus, should be complied with in good faith.—In view of the
foregoing, the RTC should have granted the Urgent Motion to Dismiss filed by PDB on the ground that the venue was improperly laid. The
complaint being one for annulment of real estate mortgages and promissory notes is in the nature of a personal action, the venue of which may be
fixed by the parties to the contract. In this case, it was agreed that any suit or action that may arise from the mortgage contracts or the promissory
notes must be filed and tried in Makati only. Not being contrary to law or public policy, the stipulation on venue, which PDB and Spouses Ramos
freely and willingly agreed upon, has the force of law between them, and thus, should be complied with in good faith.

Same; Same; Same; The stipulation on the venue was couched in a language showing the intention of the parties to restrict the filing of any suit or
action to the designated place only. It is crystal clear that the intention was not just to make the said place an additional forum or venue but the only
jurisdiction where any suit or action pertaining to the mortgage contracts may be filed.—In the present case, Spouses Ramos had validly waived their
right to choose the venue for any suit or action arising from the mortgages or promissory notes when they agreed to limit the same to Makati City
only and nowhere else. True enough, the stipulation on the venue was couched in a language showing the intention of the parties to restrict the filing
of any suit or action to the designated place only. It is crystal clear that the intention was not just to make the said place an additional forum or venue
but the only jurisdiction where any suit or action pertaining to the mortgage contracts may be filed. There being no showing that such waiver was
invalid or that the stipulation on venue was against public policy, the agreement of the parties should be upheld. It is therefore a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC to deny the motion to dismiss filed by PDB on the ground of improper venue, especially when the said issue had
been raised at the most opportune time, that is, within the time for but before the filing of an answer. The CA should have given this matter a more
serious consideration and not simply brushed it aside.

FACTS:
In 2012, Spouses Victoriano and Melanie Ramos (Spouses Ramos) applied for several credit lines with Planters Development Bank (PDB) for the
construction of a warehouse in Barangay Santo Tomas, Nueva Ecija. The said application was approved and was secured by Real Estate Mortgage
over properties owned by the spouses. Due to financial woes, Spouses Ramos were not able to pay their obligations as they fell due. They appealed to
PDB for the deferment of debt servicing and requested for a restructuring scheme but the parties failed to reach an agreement.

PDB filed a Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage under Act 3135, as amended, before the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva
Ecija.

The Spouses Ramos filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgages against PDB and its officers also before the RTC of San Jose City,
Nueva Ecija. Instead of filing an Answer, PDB filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the venue of the action was improperly laid
considering that the real estate mortgages signed by the parties contained a stipulation that any suit arising therefrom shall be filed in Makati City
only.

The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that pursuant to autonomy of contract, Venue can be waived. Rule 5, Section 4(d) of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure allows parties to validly agree in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. Indeed, on the defendants
they have the contract where the venue allegedly agreed upon by them with the plaintiffs is Makati City. However, one of the contentions of the
plaintiffs is that the contracts between them and the defendants take the form of an adhesion contract. As such, this Court has to apply Section 1, Rule
4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the venue of real actions to avoid ruling on the merits without any evidence that would sufficiently
support the same.

Unyielding, PDB filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order, instead of filing an answer to the complaint. This prompted Spouses Ramos to file a
motion to declare PDB in default. Aggrieved, PDB filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC for
denying its motion to dismiss, despite the fact that the venue was clearly improperly laid.
The CA denied the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the stipulation on venue should govern the parties.

RULING:
YES. Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the rules on venue in filing an action, to wit:

Section 1.Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. Forcible entry and detainer
actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated.

Section 2.Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff.

Section 4.When Rule not applicable. — This Rule shall not apply.
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
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(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof
Based on the foregoing, the general rules on venue admit of exceptions in Section 4 thereof, i.e., where a specific rule or law provides otherwise, or
when the parties agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.

Stipulations on venue, however, may either be permissive or restrictive. "Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit
may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by law…”

Further, in Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court elaborated, thus:
Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept the proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be deemed
permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties' convenience. In other words, stipulations designating
venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as designed to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising
from or in relation to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the venues indicated in said Rule 4.

On the other hand, because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this general policy, the language of the parties must be so clear and categorical
as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places, or to fix places other than those indicated in Rule 4, for their actions. x x x.

In view of the predilection to view a stipulation on venue as merely permissive, the parties must therefore employ words in the contract that would
clearly evince a contrary intention. In Spouses Lantin v. Judge Lantion, the Court emphasized that "the mere stipulation on the venue of an action is
not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to
the specified place."

In the instant case, there is an identical stipulation in the real estate mortgages executed by the parties, pertaining to venue. It reads as follows:
18. In the event of suit arising from out of or in connection with this mortgage and/or the promissory note/s secured by this mortgage, the parties
hereto agree to bring their causes of action exclusively in the proper court/s of Makati, Metro Manila, the MORTGAGOR waiving for this purpose
any other venue.

In Spouses Lantin, the Court ruled that "the words exclusively and waiving for this purpose any other venue are restrictive." Therefore, the
employment of the same language in the subject mortgages signifies the clear intention of the parties to restrict the venue of any action or suit that
may arise out of the mortgage to a particular place, to the exclusion of all other jurisdictions.

B. Summary Procedure vs. Small Claims Suit

55. A.L. Ang Network Inc. vs. Mondejar, 714 SCRA (1/28/14)

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., petitioner, vs. EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, respondent.
DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Small Claims Cases; The proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available
remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.—Considering the final nature
of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately
move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available
remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction
and not of judgment.—Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of
judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC,
in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy.

Same; Same; Same; Small Claims Cases; Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be
filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts.—Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing
its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for
certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the
ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint5 for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from
respondent the amount of ₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills. Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and
collect payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent. Respondent assailed that she religiously
paid the monthly charges of P75.00. She claimed that the increased rate of P113.00 for every 10 cubic meter of water plus an additional P11.60 for
every cubic meter thereafter was not valid because the petitioner unilaterally made the increase without informing the residents therein. The MTCC
ruled in favour of the respondent.

The petitioner can only charge the respondent the agreed flat rate for the period 1 June 2002 to 7
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August 2003 since the Certificate of Public Convenience was only issued on the latter date. Respondent should be considered to have fully paid.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC. RTC issued a Decision dismissing the
petition for certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the
subject small claims case

RULING:
YES. Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:

SEC. 23. Decision.—After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form
13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on
the parties.

The decision shall be final and unappealable.

Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party
may, thus, immediately move for its execution] Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where
appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This
general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation, wherein it was held that:

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that “the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:

x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when “there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law,” this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of
appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy — not the mere absence — of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.

Conti v. Court of Appeals:

Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any “plain, speedy and
adequate remedy” in the ordinary course of law, one which has been so defined as a “remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and
sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari
proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or
tribunal” concerned. x x x

In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s apprehension that respondent’s recourse before it (was only filed to circumvent the non-
appealable nature of [small claims cases], because it asks [the court] to supplant the decision of the lower [c]ourt with another decision directing the
private respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been awarded.” Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original
action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment.

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC
Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling.

Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the RTC). To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a
party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for
judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court. This procedure is also in consonance with Section
4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding
Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has
jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC
Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.