The Motions for Inhibition

FACTS.
Respondent seeks the inhibition of five Justices of the Court, namely,Associate
Justices Lucas P. Bersamin, Diosdado M. Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza, Noel
Gimenez Tijam, and Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro from hearing and deciding the
present petition.
Respondent imputes actual bias on said Justices for having testified before the
House Committee on Justice on the impeachment complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for inhibition is justified.
RULING: No.

1. The laws and rules on inhibition

Jurisprudence recognizes the right of litigants to seek disqualification of judges.
Elementary due process requires hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal. "A judge has both the duty of rendering just decision and the duty of
doing it in manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity."
A judge may decide, "in the exercise of his sound discretion," to recuse himself
from case for just or valid reasons. The phrase just or valid reasons, as the second
requisite for voluntary inhibition, must be taken to mean –causes which, though
not strictly falling within those in the first paragraph, are akin thereto.
The second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1,does not give judges unfettered
discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing case. The inhibition must be for
just and valid causes, and the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for inhibition.
In determining what causes are just, judges must keep in mind that next
importance to the duty of rendering righteous judgment is that of doing it in such
manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. For it
is an accepted axiom that every litigant, including the state, is entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, and the law intends that no judge
shall preside in any case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial,
and independent.
 The best person to determine the propriety of sitting in case rests with the
magistrate sought to be disqualified. Moreover, to compel the remaining members
to decide on the challenged member's fitness to resolve the case is to give them
authority to review the propriety of acts of their colleagues, scenario which can
undermine the independence of each of the members of the High Court.

2. Burden of proof to seek disqualification or inhibition – duty of the

respondent
However, the right of party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of judge
who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in
handling the case must be balanced with the latter's sacred duty to decide cases
without fear of repression. The movant must therefore prove the ground of bias
and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify judge from
participating in particular trial.
3. Inhibition of J. Tijam
A reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the news article reveals that his
manifest intent was only to prod respondent to observe and respect the
constitutional process of impeachment, and to exemplify the ideals of public
accountability.
Tijam believes that the impeachment process against Sereno is not an attack
on the high court or the Judiciary because the Supreme Court does not consist
of the chief justice alone.
Notably, respondent conveniently and casually invoked only portion of the
article which suited her objective of imputing bias against the justice.

4. J. Tijam & J. Bersamin’s wearing of red tie

There is no basis, whether in logic or in law, to establish connection between
piece of clothing and magistrate's performance of adjudicatory functions. Absent
compelling proof to the contrary, the red ties were merely coincidental and should
not be deemed sufficient ground to disqualify them.
5. The Associate Justices who participated in House Committee on Justice
 Their appearance thereat was in deference to the House of Representatives
constitutional duty to investigate the impeachment. Their appearance was with
prior consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the
parameters set for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing, should not be
hastily interpreted as an adverse attack against respondent.
Allowing the magistrates to accept the invite is only because the proceedings
constitute part of the impeachment process under Section 3, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution.
The Justices who appeared during the hearings, refused to form any conclusion
or to answer the uniform query as to whether respondent's acts constitute
impeachable offenses, as it was not theirs to decide but function properly
belonging to the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court. Evidently, no bias and
prejudice could be inferred therein.
6. Inhibition of J. Bersamin
Justice Bersamin's statement is clearly hypothetical statement, an observation
on what would the Court be if any of its Members were to act dictatorially.
The Court cannot ascribe bias in Justice Bersamin's remark that he was
offended by respondent's attitude in ignoring the collegiality of the Supreme Court
when she withdrew the Justices' "privilege" to recommend nominees to fill
vacancies in the Supreme Court. It would be presumptuous to equate his statement
to personal resentment. There has always been high degree of professionalism
among the Members of the Court in their personal and official dealings with each
other.
7. Inhibition J. Peralta
Justice Peralta's testimony before the House Committee on Justice contradicts
the allegation of apparent bias allegedly from his belief that respondent caused the
exclusion of his wife, CA Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, from the list
of applications for the position of CA Presiding Justice. Justice Peralta made it
clear during the hearing that he has already moved on and that the purpose of his
testimony was merely to protect prospective applicants to the Judiciary.
It bears stressing, too, that at the time said statement was made, the petition for
quo warranto has not been filed; thus, such statement cannot amount to
prejudgment of the case.
 Furthermore, Justice Peralta, while he was then the Acting Ex Officio
Chairperson of the JBC at the time of respondent's application for Chief Justice,
had no personal knowledge of the disputed facts concerning the proceedings,
specifically the matters considered by the members of the JBC in preparing the
shortlist of nominees. It was the ORSN of the JBC which was tasked to determine
completeness of the applicants' documentary requirements, including the SALNs.
8. Inhibition of J. Martires
Justice Martires' statements during the Oral Arguments, was not viewed by the
court as indication of actual bias or prejudice against respondent. The record
reveals that Justice Martires' did not refer to her as the object of his statements.
Justice Martires has not suggested that she suffers from some mental or
psychological illness. At most, his questions and statements were merely
hypothetical in nature, which do not even constitute as an opinion against
respondent. Certainly, to impute actual bias based on such brief discourse is
conjectural and highly speculative. "Allegations and perceptions of bias from the
mere tenor and language of judge is insufficient to show prejudgment.
9. The justices prayed to inhibit can participate in deciding the issue of
inhibition
The prevailing rule allows challenged Justices to participate in the deliberations
on the matter of their disqualification.
Moreover, exclusion from the deliberations due to delicadeza or sense of
decency, partakes of ground apt for voluntary inhibition. Voluntary inhibition,
leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned with only their conscience
as guide.
The challenge to the competency of judge may admit two constructions: 1), the
magistrate decides for himself the question of his competency and when he does
so, his decision therein is conclusive and the other Members of the Court have no
voice in it; and 2), the challenged magistrate sits with the Court and decides the
challenge as collegial body. The Court adopted the second view as the proper
approach and the Court sees no reason to deviate from this standing practice.