Acosta v. Flor Case No. 5 G. R. No.

2122 (September 13, 1905) Chapter V,

Page 224, Footnote No. 187
FACTS:
The Plaintiff (Acosta) and the Defendant (Flor) were candidates for the Office of the
Municipal President of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected
to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same.
However, not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter’s
allegations that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Nor
can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he, as a result of
said election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of Municipal
President of Laoag, now held by Defendant.
ISSUE:
Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from
the exercise of said office?
HELD:
No.
Art. 199(“the Attorney-General of the Islands, or the fiscal of any province, when directed by the Chief
Executive of the Islands, must commence any such action; and when upon complaint or otherwise he has
good reason to believe that any case specified in the two preceding sections can be established by proof, he
must commence such action”),

200("the Attorney-General of the Islands or the fiscal for a province, may, at his own instance, bring such
an action, or he may, on leave of the court in which the action is to be commenced, or a judge thereof in
vacation, bring the action upon the relation of and at the request of another person; but, if the action is
brought at the request of and upon the relation of another person, the officer bringing it may require an
indemnity for expenses and costs of the action, to be given to him by the party at whose request and upon
whose relation the same is brought, before commencing it.") and
201 ("A person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another, may
bring an action therefor”) of the Code of Civil Procedure
has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the case may
be, the right to bring such action. If the legislative had intended to give all citizens
alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of public office, it would have
plainly said so in the law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching
importance.
the legislator has on the contrary especially and specifically provided in sections
199, 200, and 201 who must and who may bring such actions; and it is very clear
that it was his intention to give such right to those expressly mentioned in the
above-cited sections and to no other.
Aisporna v. CA [GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)]

Facts: A Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its
authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as
Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna
participated actively with the aforementioned policy.

For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife,
with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act, or acting as
an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of
the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she
naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued
because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was
absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. The trial court found
Mapalad guilty. On appeal the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court.

Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the
Insurance Act

Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of
Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or
procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to
act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance
agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be
imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under
the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the
definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189,
which is “any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this
section.” Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance
policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
FACTS:
Nissin Universal Robina Corporation’s (NURC’s)
van figured an accident with Green Star, Inc.’s
(Green Star’s) bus, which was at the time driven
by Fruto Sayson Jr. The accident resulted to the
death of NURC’s driver. Consequently, Sayson
was charged with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide, which was
subsequently dismissed without prejudice due
to insufficiency of evidence. Thereafter, Sayson
and Green Star filed a complaint for damages
against NURC before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio,
NURC’s cost accountant, was the one who
received the summons. Then, NURC filed a
Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction
due to improper service. Nonetheless, the RTC
issued a resolution denying NURC’s Motion to
Dismiss. It ruled that there was substantial
compliance because there was actual receipt of
the summons by NURC. Thereafter, NURC filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied by the trial court. This
prompted NURC to elevate the case to the Court
of Appeals (CA).
At the CA level, NURC maintains that the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the
summons was received by its cost accountant,
Francis Tinio. It argues that under Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which
provides the rule on service of summons upon a
juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is
a domestic corporation like NURC, summons
may be served only through its officers. For
their part, Green Star and Sayson argues that
Tinio received the summons upon the
instruction of NURC’s general manager,
Junadette Avedillo. Green Star then presented
an affidavit allegedly executed by the sheriff
who served the summons upon NURC. In said
affidavit, it was alleged that NURC’s general
manager, Avedillo, instructed Francis Tinio to
receive the summons in her behalf. However,
such affidavit was never presented as evidence
during the hearing of NURC’s Motion to Dismiss.
Neither was the sheriff who executed the same
presented as witness therein. In turn, the
appellate court reversed the RTC’s resolution.
Undaunted, Green Star and Sayson filed their
Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the appellate court.
Aggrieved, they filed a Petition for Review
(under Rule 45) before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Was the summons properly served upon NURC
sufficient for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over it?
RULING:
No. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over NURC because the summons that was
served upon it was received by a cost
accountant, an ordinary employee of the NURC,
which is not among those specifically mentioned
by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides, thus:
“Section 11. Service upon domestic private
juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with
a juridical personality, service may be made on
the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel.” (Emphasis supplied by herein
writer.)
The Supreme Court ruled, to wit:
In the past, the Court upheld service of
summons upon a construction project manager,
a corporation’s assistant manager, and ordinary
clerk of a corporation, private secretary of
corporate executives, retained counsel, and
officials who had control over the operations of
the corporation like the assistant general
manager or the corporation’s Chief Finance and
Administrative Officer. The Court then
considered said persons as “agent” within the
contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under
the new Rules, service of summons upon an
agent of the corporation is no longer authorized.
The rule now likewise states “general manager”
instead of “manager”; “corporate secretary”
instead of merely “secretary”; and “treasure”
instead of “cashier.” It has now become
restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the
persons enumerated in the aforementioned
provision, following the rule in statutory
construction that the express mention of one
person excludes all others. Service must,
therefore, be made only on the person expressly
listed in the rules. If the revision committee
intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, it could have easily done so by clear
and concise language.
Lopez vs. CTA
GR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur
Facts:
Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila
Collector
of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the
basis of consular
and supplier invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were
released. Subsequently,
however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight of said
wire netting and as a
result of the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59
were levied and
imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment
and levy of additional
customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a
motion to dismiss
the appeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
Tax Court, by its
resolution of 23 May 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground hat it had no
jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating
said tax court.
From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme Court,
seeking reversal of
said resolution of dismissal.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs is directly appealable to the Court
of Tax
Appeal.
Held:
Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) has
appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. On the
other hand, section
11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may
appeal mentions
among others, those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Customs,
and fails to mention
the Commissioner of Customs. While there is really a discrepancy between the two
sections, it is more
reasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant
and intended to say,
the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of Customs. If persons affected
by a decision of
the Collector of Customs may appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals, then the
supervision and
control of the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, under the
Customs Law found
in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative Code, and his right to review
their decisions
upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said decision would, not only be
gravely affected but
even destroyed. The Courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation but
merely endeavoring to
rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give
due course and
carry out the evident intention of the legislature.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, holding that under the Customs
Law and RA 1125,
the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs;
with costs.
 CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)

March 31, 1971

FACTS:

In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only
in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September
13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only
sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of
a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and
paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the
donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet
spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship.

HELD:

Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law
is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations
between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and
improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this
prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.The court, however, said that
the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean
that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship
between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage
FACTS:

Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special
civil action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that
his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his
mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to
be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the
premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC
contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a
tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the
COMELEC.

HELD:

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of
the same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a
candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not
merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in
consonance to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition
may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR),
petitioner, vs. THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 215427 dated December 10, 2014
FACTS:
 On April 17, 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
and Prohibition seeking the declaration of nullity of Section 1 of RA
9337 insofar as it amends Section 27(c) of RA 8424, otherwise
known as the NIRC by excluding petitioner from the enumeration of
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) exempted
from liability for corporate income tax.
 On March 15, 2011, SC partly granted the petition insofar as it held
that the BIR Revenue Regulation No. 16-2005 which subjects
PAGCOR to 10% VAT is null and void for being contrary to the
NIRC. It also held that Section 1 of RA 9337 is valid and
constitutional.
 BIR issued RMC No. 33-2013 on April 17, 2013 pursuant to the
decision which clarifies the “Income Tax and Franchise Tax Due
from PAGCOR, its Contractees and Licensees.” It now subjects the
income from PAGCOR’s operations and licensing of gambling
casinos, gaming clubs and other similar recreation or amusement
places, gaming pools, and other related operations, to corporate
income tax under the NIRC.
 PAGCOR filed a Motion for Clarification in the case entitled
PAGCOR vs The Bureau of Internal Revenue, et al., which was
promulgated on March 15, 2011 which also prays for the issuance
of a TRO and/or writ of Preliminary Injunction against BIR in the
implementation of BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 33-2013
dated April 17, 2013. PAGCOR alleges that said RMC is an
erroneous interpretation and application of the aforesaid decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether PAGCOR’s gaming income is subject to both 5% franchise
tax and income tax?
2. Whether PAGCOR’s income from operation of related services is
subject to both income tax and 5% franchise tax.
HELD:
1. Gaming Income: Franchise Tax – YES; Income Tax - NO
Under PD 1869, as amended, petitioner is subject to income tax only with
respect to its operations of related services. Accordingly, the income tax
exemption ordained under Section 27(c) of RA 8424 clearly pertains only to
petitioner’s income from operation of related services. Such income tax
exemption could not have been applicable to petitioner’s income from
gaming operations as it is already exempt therefrom under PD 1869.
There was no need for Congress to grant tax exemption to petitioner with
respect to its income from gaming operating as the same is already
exempted from all taxes of any kind or form, income or otherwise, whether
national or local, under its Charter, save only for the five percent (5%)
franchise tax. The exemption attached to the income from gaming
operations exists independently would be downright ridiculous, if not
deleterious, since petitioner would be in a worse position if the exemption
was granted (then withdrawn) then when it was not granted at all in the first
place.
2. Income from Operation of related services: Franchise tax – NO;
Income tax - YES
Petitioner’s Charter is not deemed repealed or amended by RA 9337;
petitioner’s income derived from gaming operation is subject only to the five
percent (5%) franchise tax, in accordance with PD 1869, as amended. With
respect to petitioner’s income from operation of other related services, the
same is subject to income tax only. The five percent (5%) franchise tax
finds no application with respect to petitioner’s income from other related
services, in view of the express provision of Section 14(5) of PD 1869, as
amended.
Thus, it would be the height of injustice to impose franchise tax upon
petitioner for its income from other related services without basis therefor.
SC granted the petition and ordered the respondent to cease and desist
the implementation of RMC No. 33-2013 insofar as it imposes corporate
income tax on petitioner’s income derived from its gaming operations; and
franchise tax on petitioner’s income from other related services.
Concepcion Parayno vs. Jose Jovellanos

FACTS:

Respondent Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao,

Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan
(SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another
location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police,
Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon
their advice, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or
transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station. Resolution 50 stipulated the
alleged violations of the gasoline station in question. Petitioner sought for
reconsideration, which was then denied. She then filed a special civil action for
prohibition and mandamus in the RTC, contending that her gasoline station was not
covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, which prohibits
gasoline service stations which are within 100meters away from any public or
private school, public library, playground, church, and hospital based on the straight
line method measured from the nearest side of the building nearest the lot if there
are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of the gasoline station. Petitioner
contended that hers was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling
station" governed by Section 21 (A retail station servicing automobiles and other
motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only.). Moreover, the decision of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in a previous case filed by the same
respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) should bar the
grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50. The RTC ruled
against petitioner by applying the virtue of ejusdem generis, saying that a “gasoline
filling station” fell within the ambit of Section 44. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was, again, only denied by the RTC. The same fate was met by
the petition in the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s gasoline filling station could be likened to that of a
gasoline service station as provided for in Section 44 of the Official zoning Code by
virtue of Ejusdem Generis.

HELD:
The Court held that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear
distinction between a gasoline service station and a gasoline filling station as found
in Section 21 and Section 42 of the said ordinance. It was made clear that the two
terms were intended to be distinguished from the other, which the respondent
further admitted. Respondent municipality cannot invoke the principle of Ejusdem
generis which means "of the same kind, class or nature” but rather should apply the
legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others.

With the distinction clearly provided, respondents could not insist that "gasoline
service station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling station"
under Section 21.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959

FACTS:
Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of fire arms in
the CFI of Lanao. The defendant have in his custody and control one Riot
Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-942131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions,
without first having obtained the proper license or permit from competent
authority. Macarandang invokes his legal authority to possess such as
being appointed as a secret agent by Governor Dimakuta.

ISSUE:
Wether or not the defendant should be acquitted

HELD:
YES. It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no
authority to issue any firearm license or permit; but section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides, as shown at least by the subject
matter thereof, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of
the accused as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police expressly covered by section 879. The decision was
reversed.
People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)

Facts:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of
First Instance (CFI)
of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section
54 of the Revised
Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted
in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by
the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant’s plea of not
guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as
justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion
to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section
54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support
thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg,
where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and
pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused
upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the
appeal by the Solicitor General.

Issue:
Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section
54 of the Revised
Election Code

Held:
Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or
thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The
maxim “casus omisus” can operate and apply only if and when the omission
has been clearly established. The application of the rule of “casus omisus”
does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but
rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing
has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not
omission. For in its most extensive sense the term “judge” includes all
officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity,
including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of
facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace
from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice
of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more
generic and broader term “judge,” including therein all kinds of judges, like
judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian
Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the
peace. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial
court and remanded the case for trial on the merits.
PEOPLE VS. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG

G.R. NO. L-22301, AUGUST 30, 1967

FACT:

Defendant Mario Mapa Y Mapulong was charged and convicted of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition by the Court of the First Instance of Manila. That on or about August 13, 1962, the said
accused did and then wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-
made revolver, without a serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities.

The accused defended (with proper documentation) that he is duly appointed is duly appointed secret agent
of then Governor of Batangas dated June 2, 1962 and at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, he had a
confidential mission to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City.

On November 27, 1963, the lower court convicted the accused of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs.

ISSUE:

WON the appointment and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

RULING:

Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code states that:

"it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition.”

Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code states:

“firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such
officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."

The law is clear that there is no exemption for a secret agent in the above mentioned provisions.

Thus, the accused defense in the case of People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was acquitted on the
appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order puts him under the category of a “peace officer” who’s covered in the Sec. 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code. It is not within the power of the Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory
provision. To the extent therefor that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no
longer speaks with authority.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Topic: Rulings of the Supreme Court in construing an statue, generally has no retroactive effect
Case: People vs. Santayana, GR L-22291, November 15, 1976

Facts:
 On February 19, 1962, Jesus Santayana was appointed as “Special Agent” by then Colonel Jose C.
Maristela, Chief of the CIS.
 On March 9, 1962, a pistol was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that
he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his
personal protection.
 It appeared that Jesus Santayana was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him
to apply for a license or to register the said firearm because it was government property and
therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in his name. Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from
whom Jesus received the firearm also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was
necessary “because he was already appointed as CIS agent”.
 On October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above-described
pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal .25, without a license to possess them.
 An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes
him to carry and possess firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto.

Ruling:
There is no question that Jesus Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry
and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal
protection. Following the Macarandang rule, Jesus incurred no criminal liability for the possession of the
pistol in question.

Jesus’ apprehension happened during 1962 wherein the prevailing doctrine is the one enunciated in
People vs Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist
in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the
category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
Section 879”.

The case of People vs Mapa revoked the above doctrine only on August 30, 1967.

In relation to the topic:

According to the basic principles of Statutory Construction, the ruling of the Supreme Court generally has
no retroactive effect. In this case, the apprehension happened in 1962, therefore following the
prevailing doctrine at the time, which was the doctrine enunciated in People vs Macarandang. Although
this was subsequently revoked in 1967 by People vs Mapa, the revocation will only apply to cases
onwards it because such revocation has no retroactive effect to the case at hand.
.

Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)

FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children without
the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows
a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as
natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father
or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against
Art. 335.

ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother.

HELD:
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow
adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. The rights of an
acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is
unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. The trend when it
comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not prohibit the adoption of
an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable. An acknowledged
natural child is a natural child also and following the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption.

1
Sanciangco vs. Rono
GR No. L-68709 July 19, 1985
Facts:
 Sanciangco was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta.
Cruz, Ozamiz City in the May 1982 elections. Later, he was
elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils
(ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of ABC, and
as president, he was appointed by the President of the
Philippines as a member of the City's Sangguniang
Panlungsod.
 Sanciangco filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May
1984 Batasan pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental
under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance, he was not
successful.
 Sanciangco informed Vice-Mayor Fuentes, the Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniance Panlungsod, that he was
resuming his duties as member of that body. The matter was
elevated to respondent Minister of Local Government Jose A.
Rono who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official,
he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive position
upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Issue:
Whether an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the May 14,
1984 elections, should be considered as resigned or on forced leave
of absence upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy
for a seat in the Batasan Pambansa. The consequence that
followed his unsuccessful attempt at the elections arose
from law.
 Although he ceased to be an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, he remains an elective Barangay
Captain from which position he may be considered as having
been on "forced leave of absence." He also continues as
President of the Association of Barangay Councils but will
need a reappointment by the President, as member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as the law speaks
of "members who may be appointed by the President."
Separate Opinion (Teehankee):
 He has correctly submitted that the law makes no distinction
between elective or appointive sanggunian members. He
should also have been deemed to have been on forced
leave of absence and not forced resigned from the
Sanggunian. The basic position of barangay captain and ABC
president held by him are essentially elective. He cannot fall
under Section 13(l) of the Act which refers to purely
appointive officials, including active officers and members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and officials and
employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations, under the statutory construction rule of
noscitur a sociis.

Held:
Sanciangco is deemed to have resigned from his position.
 Section 13(2) of BP 697 states that upon filing a certificate
of candidacy, governors, mayors, and members of various
sanggunians or barangay officials shal be considered on
forced leave of absence from office. Section 13(1) refers to
people holding public appointive positions, who shall cease
to hold office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
 There is no question that Sanciangco holds a public
appointive position. Since Sanciangco is unquestionably an
appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Ozamiz City, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be
such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.
 He cannot be deemed to be removed from office without
due process of law since it was of his own choice that he ran
U.S. VS. STO. NINO

ISSUE:

WETHER IRON BAR WHICH IS DESIGNED IN FIGHTING BE CONSIDERED AS A DEADLY

WEAPON ENUMERATED IN ACT NO. 1780 SEC. 26

FACTS:

On or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said Victor Santo Niño, voluntarily, unlawfully, and criminally, had in his
possession and concealed about his person a deadly weapon, to wit: One (1) iron
bar, about 15 inches in length provided with an iron ball on one end and a string on
the other to tie the wrist, which weapon had been designed and made for use in
fighting, as a deadly weapon violating

Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows:

"An Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of
firearms, and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the
provisions of this Act."

Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie
knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: Provided, That this prohibition shall
not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a license
therefor or who are entitled to carry same under the provisions of this Act.

RULING:

The words "or other deadly weapon" only signify a kind of weapon included within
the preceding classification. In other words, the rule of ejusdem generis must be
applied in the interpretation of this law, which rule is as follows:

"The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific and generic terms
of the same nature are employed in the same act, the latter following the former.
While in the abstract, general terms are to be given their natural and full
signification, yet where they follow specific words of a like nature they take their
meaning from the latter, and are presumed to embrace only things or persons of
the kind designated by them."

The rule of construction above referred to is resorted to only for the purpose of
determining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent
clearly appears from one parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is
contrary to the result which would be reached by application of the rule of ejusdem
generis, the latter must give way.