CIVIL REVIEW – 2ND SEMESTER 2020-2021

Art 147- 148

Mercado-Fehr vs. Fehr

For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage
or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at
bar.

Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City

In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property

relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by
the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through

their workand industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still
be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s
“efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.” Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
couple’s separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to

marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other, only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective contributions.

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal.

The applicable law insofar as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership

assets and liability is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family Code in
relation to Article 147 of the Family Code.

The Supreme Court (SC) held that in a void marriage, as in those

declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.

For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage
or their marriage is void, as in the instant case.
A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.

All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless

in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal
unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere
fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is
in the name of one (1) of the spouses only.
Abing vs. Waeyan

In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by

common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in
equal shares.

And under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal
shares.” Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as
correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.

Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr.

The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in

the resolution of an action for partition. - Thus: The first phase of a
partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is
proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment
that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises
and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from
the real estate in question is in order. x x x The second phase
commences when it appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon
the partition” directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be
done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the
parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an
award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just
share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x 

What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the
title itself; Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with
the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.

Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does
not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed—the
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.

BRIONES SEPARATE OPINION:

Co-ownership only arises when there is clear proof showing the

acquisition of the property during the cohabitation of the parties, and
the actual joint contribution of the parties to acquire the same.

Mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family Code, without proof
of contribution, will not result in a co-ownership—proof of actual
contribution must be established by clear evidence showing that the
party either used his or her own money or that he or she actually
contributed his or her own money to purchase the property.

Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, income from a business

cannot automatically be considered as personal earnings, especially in
this case where the income referred to is corporate income.

The phrase, “without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have
filed or may file against him” in the last part of the dispositive portion
of the Decision, is objectionable—for one, no issue exists in this case
between the legitimate spouses regarding the nature of the properties
they commonly or individually hold, and, additionally, the phrase
creates the impression that the Court is giving legal advice to the wife of
the respondent on what course of action to take against her husband.

ART 151
Hontiveros vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 25, Iloilo City

The absence of the verification required in Article 151 of the Family

Code does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter
of the complaint; If the court doubts the veracity of the allegations
regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same
family, it could simply order the petitioners to verify them. - The
verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct. 

The inclusion of parties who are not members of the same family takes
the case out of the ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code; The phrase
“members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents
and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters,
whether full or half-blood, but does not include “brothers-in-law” and
“sisters-in-law.”

Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any

legal effect in this jurisdiction.

Moreno vs. Kahn

It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise

before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and
it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than between strangers. Thus, a party’s failure to comply
with this provision before filing a complaint against a family member
would render such complaint premature; hence, dismissible

For Article 151 of the Family Code to apply, the suit must be exclusively
between or among “members of the same family.” Once a stranger
becomes a party to such suit, the earnest effort requirement is no longer
a condition precedent before the action can prosper.

Any person having a collateral familial relation with the plaintiff other
than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the Family Code is considered
a stranger who, if included in a suit between and among family
members, would render unnecessary the earnest efforts requirement
under Article 151.

Hrs. of Favis Sr. vs. Gonzales

No suit between members from the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made but had failed. - Significantly, the Rule
requires that such a motion should be filed “within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.”
The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based
on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable
from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four
exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to
allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been
made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the
defense is deemed waived.
A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a
complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional
defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.

ART 159
Ramos vs. Pangilinan

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family
Code, or before 3 August 1988, then it must have been constituted either
judicially or extrajudicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231
and 233 of the Civil Code; For family homes constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need to constitute
extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption from execution is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein. - Moreover, the
family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have
been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts
incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art.
155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been
incurred after August 3, 1988.

Arriola vs. Arriola

One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the

automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation
as a family residence without need anymore for the judicial or
extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251
of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court.
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it
stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is
shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family
Code. , viz.: Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the
death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for
a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary,
and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of

the family home regardless of its ownership. The rights of the individual
co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights
granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.

FILIATION
De Jesus vs. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is

established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be provedby (1) the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The
due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other
evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic
writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and

founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of
the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are
living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s
heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born
to his wife—it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged

illegitimate offsprings of the decedent cannot be aptly adjudicated
without an action having first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy
as being the children of some other couple born in lawful wedlock.
Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals

An order for recognition and support may create an

unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family
or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence.

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the

putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of said certificate.

While a baptismal certificate may be considered a public

document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but
not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
paternity.

Certificates issued by the local civil registrar and

baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence
as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly
as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a

declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother—the presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals

The status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised. Article 164
of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of

legitimacy.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in

marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow
this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that
could have enable the husband to father the child.

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the

evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child.

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat

the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary.

An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot

affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid
marriage.

For reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot

say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring
is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption
in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to
lean toward the legitimacy of the children.

Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and

filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those
who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness

Proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is

being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days
following the termination of marriage is sought to be established.

A record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained

therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth
may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive
evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein
by the interested parties.

A person’s surname or family name identifies the family to which he

belongs and is passed on from parent to child.

In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,

Article 49 of the Family Code grants visi-tation rights to a parent who is
deprived of custody of his children.

The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from

abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years.

Angeles vs. Maglaya

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and
lawful marriage; Remove the element of lawful union and there is
strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of
the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.”

The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code

may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor,
i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her
conception of birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage.

Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate to be considered as

validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must
be signed by the father and mother jointly or by the mother alone if the
father refuses.

Estate of Rogelio G. Ong vs. Diaz

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity
but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as
citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of

legitimacy, a presumption which not only flows out of a declaration in
the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother.

With the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether
a man is the biological father of a child, through DNA
(Deoxyribonucleic Acid) testing.
The death of the alleged biological father does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) testing for as long as there
exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. - This includes blood,
saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.

Jao vs. Court of Appeals

Blood grouping test can establish conclusively that the man is not the
father of the child but not necessarily that a man is the father of a
particular child * * * it may have some probative value if the blood type
and the combination in the child is rare, thus, it is now up to the
discretion of the judge whether to admit the results. - the Uniform Act
recognizes that the tests may have some probative value to establish
paternity where the blood type and the combination in the child is shown
to be rare, in which case the judge is given discretion to let it in" (I Jones
on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194). 

Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa vs. Heirs of Marciana  

Rustia Vda. de Damian

Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of

marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place.

Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in

fact married.

Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.

The right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in

favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces); It
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by
means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir of the estate.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary;

Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases: (1) in cases of
rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception; (2) when the child is in
continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family; (3) when the
child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with
the supposed father; (4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or
proof that the defendant is his father. On the other hand, voluntary
recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record or in any authentic writing.

Dual limitation in a judicial action for compulsory acknowledgement:

the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.

An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is

understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent.

Salas vs. Matusalem

Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines,

illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article
172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states: The
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
legitimate filiationin a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the

putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate.

While baptismal certificates may be considered public

documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the
veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s
paternity.

Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with

the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove
paternity.

As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent

showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic
trysts, these are not sufficient to establish Christian
Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by
petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his

claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.

The Supreme Court has ruled that a high standard of proof

is required to establish paternity and filiation.

The action for support having been filed in the trial court
when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under Article
175 (2) of the Family Code. We have also held that the
death of the putative father is not a bar to the action
commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his
illegitimate child. The rule on substitution of parties
provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, thus applies.

Herrera vs. Alba

The burden of proving paternity is on the person who
alleges that the putative father is the biological father of
the child. - There are four significant procedural aspects of
a traditional paternity action which parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and child.

In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry

the burden forward and shift it to the putative father. There
are two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father. The putative father may show incapability of sexual
relations with the mother, because of either physical
absence or impotency. The putative father may also show
that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the
time of conception. A child born to a husband and wife
during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The child’s
legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards
provided by law. Finally, physical resemblance between
the putative father and child may be offered as part of
evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique
unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although
likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical
formula that could quantify how much a child must or must
not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence
appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.
Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary
recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing. - To be effective, the claim of filiation
must be made by the putative father himself and the writing
must be the writing of the putative father.- However, a
student permanent record, a written consent to a father’s
operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father
gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.
Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family
pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,

therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.

The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-
incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial
evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence
taken from his body when it may be material.

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the

investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the
right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is
obtainable through the facilities of modern science and
technology, such evidence should be considered subject to
the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.

Montefalcon vs. Vasquez

Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates

that illegitimate filiation may be established in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.—
Under Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) through record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2)
by admission of filiation in a public document or private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned; or in default of these two, by open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or
by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.

Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is

obliged to support his illegitimate child. The amount is
variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of
the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means
of the person obliged to support. Support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation,
in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Under
the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly support to
Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant.

Lucas vs. Lucas

A petition directed against the “thing” itself or the res,

which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for
adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries
in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.

A petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in

rem—by the simple filing of the petition to establish
illegitimate filiation before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the case; If at all, service of summons or
notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying
the due process requirements.

A party is confronted by the so-called procedural aspects

in a paternity case during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence—they are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of
the proceedings; A prima facie case is built by a party’s
evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.

In some foreign states, a court order for blood testing is

considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions
(as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of
probable cause in order to be valid, hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of
a finding of probable cause; The same condition precedent
should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits—thus, during the
hearing on the motion for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA)
testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
SURNAME

Mossesgeld vs. Court of Appeals

The rule that illegitimate children shall use the surname

and shall be under the parental authority of their mother
applies regardless of whether or not the father admits
paternity.

The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of

Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines giving a
natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to
use the surname of the father.- Consequently, we rule that
mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to
register the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child
using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the
latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of
an act prohibited by law.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Briones vs. Miguel

Illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority
of the mother, regardless of whether the father admits
paternity.

The fine distinctions among the various types of

illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family
Code. Now, there are only two classes of children—
legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have
the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate
status.

The recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could

be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but
not custody of the child.

Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s

unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify
her deprivation of parental authority and the award of
custody to someone else. - Only the most compelling of
reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental
authority and the award of custody to someone else. In the
past, the following grounds have been considered ample
justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental
authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a
communicable disease.

Dolina vs. Vallecera

The petitioner evidently filed the wrong action to obtain

support for her child—the object of R.A. 9262 under which
she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and
children who are victims of abuse or violence.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged; Illegitimate children are entitled to support and
successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.

While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases
involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance
that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the
putative father’s legitimate family.

ADOPTION
Republic vs. Vergara

An alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen cannot adopt his

wife’s relatives by consanguinity.- Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an
American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the
minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the
three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does
he seek to adopt his wife’s legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt
with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to
a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the
time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the
exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to
a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens
may not adopt.

The main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of

children; The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding
and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes,
love, care and education for less fortunate children.- Regrettably, the
Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring
adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
withoutviolating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such
time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain
the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina

P. Lim
Husband and wife must jointly adopt. - Since the petitions for adoption
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband,
Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three
exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are
not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband
Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from
each other.
A foreigner adopting together with his or her Philippine spouse must
meet the qualifications set forth in Republic Act No. 8552, and the
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt cannot be waived.- He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must
have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to
enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate
children of petitioner.

Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still

considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a
legitimate child. - Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all
legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when
the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee
as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to
choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the
adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.

While the Court is not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption

statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children,
regrettably, the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating
the proscription against judicial legislation.

The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between the spouses
is of no moment—it is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of
marriage; Since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, the
petitioner was married, joint adoption with the husband is mandatory.

Cang vs. Court of Appeals

The written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a
requisite for its validity.

Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity “insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.”

The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent

has abandoned the child.

Allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the

written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with
jurisdiction.

The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a

preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront.- Only upon
failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be
considered on its merits.

Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is

not tantamount to abandonment.- While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss
in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and
children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail
and catered to their whims.

Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he

could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
natural parent.

In awarding custody, the court shall take into account “all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.”

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be

transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.—Parental
authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law.- When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in
a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.

Landingin vs. Republic

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is

intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard
the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the

validity of a decree of adoption.- the natural right of a parent to his child
requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and
duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. 

Section 9 of R.A. 8552 provides that if the written consent of the

biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal
guardian of the minors will suffice.

Abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support.

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care
of others is not such an abandonment. - To dispense with the
requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed
at the time of adoption.

It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration

were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive
a person of parental authority over his/her children.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the

child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should
also be carefully evaluated and considered.

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must

have a name.

The name of an individual has two parts—the given or proper name and
the surname or family name; The given name may be freely selected by
the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is
fixed by law.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child; The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to
establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate status. - It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.

An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a

legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother.—Being a legitimate
child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of
any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally

construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.

Article 10 of the Civil Code which presumes in the interpretation of

application of law that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail was intended to strengthen the determination of the courts to
avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law.

Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her

natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court
finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

Bagtas vs. Santos

The purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to the

production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the
petition for habeas corpus is to determine who has the rightful custody
over the child.

Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial

considering that said psychiatric report, which was the court’s primary
basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the
decision; The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the
welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in
resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth.

The Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus
involving minors: (1) the petitioner has the right of custody over the
minor, (2) the respondent is withholding the rightful custody over the
minor, and (3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she be
in custody of the petitioner.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Chua vs. Cabangbang

Cases where parents may be deprived of parental authority.—Parental

authority cannot be renounced or transferred, except in cases of
guardianship or adoption approved by the courts, or emancipation by
concession (Art. 313, Civil Code), it indicates in the next that “the courts
may, in cases specif ied by law, deprive parents of their parental
authority.”

How child acquired by respondents which is a finding of fact may not be

reviewed by Supreme Court.

Abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental

authority over their children.
Silence and inaction of petitioner is deemed abandonment. - Her silence
and inaction have been prolonged ,to such a point that her abandonment
of the child and her total relinquishment of parental claim over her, can
and should be inferred as a matter of law.

Welfare of child should be given prime importance.

Absence of kinship between child and respondents not ground for

disallowing custody of child to the latter.

Court has authority to take away child away from its parent and commit
it to benevolent person.

Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of

parental authority.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be

transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law When a
parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated

children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company.

Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may

substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Private respondents’ demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents.

Dacsin vs. Dacasin

Parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject

to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.

Sole parental custody of a child less than seven years old—The relevant
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law
is that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother; This is mandatory grounded on sound policy of consideration;
Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime
between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years
old contravenes Philippine Law.

The agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or

separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when
spouses live together.
An alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained
abroad.

It should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much

validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the
jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality irrespective of who obtained the
divorce.

Recto vs. Trocino

Article 176 of the Family Code explicitly confers the sole parental
authority of an illegitimate child to the mother. This preference favoring
the mother is reiterated in Article 213 of the Family Code which
provides that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated
from the mother. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the
mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her
deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else. The mother’s fitness is a question of fact to be properly entertained
in the special proceedings before the trial court.

A court is not authorized to issue a provisional order awarding custody

of a minor child until after an answer to the petition has been filed or
when the period to file the same have expired and no such answer was
filed in court.

A protection order is issued to prevent further acts of violence against

women and their children, their family or household members, and to
grant other necessary reliefs. A protection order may be issued ex
parte if the court finds that there is danger of domestic violence to the
offended party. This provisionary protection order, however, may be
issued only if the court finds that the life, limb or property of the
offended party is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe
that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of violence or to prevent such violence, which is about
to recur. If after examining the verified petition and its accompanying
affidavits the court is satisfied that there is, indeed, a reasonable ground
to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the offended
party exists or is about to recur, it may issue a TPO ex parte.

Gamboa-Hirsch vs. Court of Appeals

The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.”

The so-called “tender age presumption” under Article 213 of the Family
Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s
unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a
communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable
or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. 

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos

The special parental authority and responsibility applies to all

authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution.

For a school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or

omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.

The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the
highways or streets. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented
by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident
occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who
shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.

Capili vs. Cardaña

A negligent act is an inadvertent act—it may be merely carelessly done

from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a
situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of
nature; The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree
could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable; A
school principal is tasked to see to the maintenance of the school
grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff
has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered
by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some
other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred.

The fact that a pupil died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within
the school’s premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger
to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res
ipsa loquitur.
The fact that a school principal failed to see the immediate danger
posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the
responsibility demanded by her position.

The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad
faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes
good faith.

RA 8972
Cabales vs. Court
of Appeals

If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left,

the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of
each of the children.

A co-owner who redeems the property in its entirety does not make him
the owner of all of it—the property remains in a condition of co-
ownership as the redemption does not provide for a mode of terminating
a co-ownership. But the one who redeemed had the right to be
reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a lien
upon the subject property for the amount due. 

The legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the
minor’s property—it does not include the power of alienation which
needs judicial authority, and the resulting sale is unenforceable;
Subsequent receipt by the ward when already of age of the proceeds of
the sale effectively ratifies the sale.

Legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or co-owners

who did not part with his or their pro indiviso share in the property held
in common.
Co-owners entitled to redeem must do so within thirty days from notice
in writing of the sale by their coowners vendors.

In the absence of proof of written notice of sale in the instant case, the
30-day redemption commenced when the one seeking redemption sought
the barangay conciliation process to redeem his property—to require
strict proof of written notice of the sale would be to countenance an
obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus commending the
letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners.

TITLE X FUNERALS.

Binay vs. Domingo

“A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING
BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE
OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT
OF UNAPPROPRI FUNDS EXISTING IN MUNICIPAL
TREASURY.”

Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are

bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed
two thounsand pesos (P2,000.00) a month.

The police power is a government function, an inherent attribute of

sovereighty which was born with civilized government.
Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power there must be
a valid delegation of such power by the legislative which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare

clause.

Power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,

morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people.

Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been

purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
allcomprehensiveness.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally

benefits a limited number of persons.
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty, The
support for the poro has long been an accepted exercise of police power
in the promotion of the common good.

USE OF SURNAMES

Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs

A married woman has an option but not a duty, to use the surname of
the husband in any of the ways provided using her maiden name once
she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her
name but only her civil status.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt

her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name.
Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her
passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the
cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1)
death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume
her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a
married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based
only on the severance of the marriage.

Republic vs. Coseteng-Magpayo

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE

OFNAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest. Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be
considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate
are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings.

Republic vs. CFI of Camarines Sur

As to what is meant by “appropriate adversary proceeding,” the Court,
adopting a Black’s Law Dictionary definition, stated: One having
opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it Excludes an adoption proceeding. Amplifying further on the
meaning of an appropriate adversary proceeding, the Court stated: xxx
xxx xxx Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have [sic] been givenopportunity to demolish the opposite
party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered, the suit or proceeding is “appropriate,”

Principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be

corrected and true facts established provided the parties avail
themselves of appropriate adversary proceeding;

PROPERTY
ART 420
Capitol Wireless, Inc. vs. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas

Both electric lines and communications cables, in the strictest sense, are
not directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts, relays or landing
stations, but both may be classified under the term “machinery” as real
property under Article 415(5) of the Civil Code for the simple reason
that such pieces of equipment serve the owner’s business or tend to meet
the needs of his industry or works that are on real estate.

Absent any showing from Capwire of any express grant of an exemption

for its lines and cables from real property taxation, then this
interpretation applies and Capwire’s submarine cable may be held
subject to real property tax.

Under Part VI, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Philippines clearly has jurisdiction with
respect to cables laid in its territory that are utilized in support of other
installations and structures under its jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction or authority over such part of the subject submarine

cable system lying within Philippine jurisdiction includes the authority
to tax the same, for taxation is one (1) of the three (3) basic and
necessary attributes of sovereignty, and such authority has been
delegated by the national legislature to the local governments with
respect to real property taxation.

Manila Electric Company vs. The City Assessor

The last paragraph of Section 234 had unequivocally withdrawn, upon

the effectivity of the Local Government Code, exemptions from payment
of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations, except as provided in the
same section. MERALCO, a private corporation engaged in electric
distribution, and its transformers, electric posts, transmission lines,
insulators, and electric meters used commercially do not qualify under
any of the ownership, character, and usage exemptions enumerated in
Section 234 of the Local Government Code. It is a basic precept of
statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act,
or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 
Not being among the recognized exemptions from real property tax in
Section 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), then the exemption
of the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators, and
electric meters of Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) from real
property tax granted under its franchise was among the exemptions
withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC on January 1, 1998.

PUBLIC DOMINION

Republic vs. Vda. de Castillo

Shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use, and
not registrable. Their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert
the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the
registrant 

Resjudicata does not apply since the lots in litigation are of public
domain.
Consequently, the same were not subject to registration, being outside
the commerce of men; and that since the lots in litigation are of public
domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code) the registration court (of 1951) did
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as private property,
hence, res judicata does not apply.

Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake differentiated from

foreshore land or land adjacent to the sea. Such distinction draws
importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake, like
Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have
been added (Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423) while accretion
on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for
private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no
longer needed for public use.
Mere Possession ofland does not by itselfdivest automatically the land
ofits public character.

Heirs of Arturo Reyes vs. Socco-Beltran

The law specifically requires that the vendor must have ownership of the
property at the time it is delivered.

In San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (185 SCRA 722

[1990]), the Court reiterated the rule that the open, exclusive, and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed
by law creates the legal fiction whereby land ceases to be public land
and is, therefore, private property.

It stressed, however, that the occupation of the land for 30 years must
be conclusivelyestablished. 

By the nature of a contract or agreement to sell, the title over the subject
property is transferred to the vendee upon the full payment of the
stipulated consideration.

Laurel vs. Garcia

Roppongi property is of public dominion.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the

commerce of man and can not be alienated.

Roppongi property correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420

of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for
some public service.
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration
on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.

An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for

public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of
the Civil Code must be definite.

A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not

relinquishment of the Roppongi property’s original purpose.

Republic Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) does not authorize the Executive
Department to sell the Roppongi property.

President can not convey valuable real property of the government on

his or her own sole will; Conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by Congress.

Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989 asking for the
deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does not withdraw the
property from public domain much less authorize its sale.

Republic vs. City of Parañaque

Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an
essential public service pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code. Being an incorporated
government instrumentality, it is exempt from payment of real property
tax.
It is clear from Section 234 of the Local Government Code that real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) is
exempt from real property tax unless the beneficial use thereof has been
granted to a taxable person.

Foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the public

domain and were inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable
lands open to disposition and further declared no longer needed for
public service. The fact that alienable lands of the public domain were
transferred to the Public Estates Authority (PEA) (now Philippine
Reclamation Authority [PRA]) and issued land patents or certificates of
title in PEA’s name did not automatically make such lands private.

COCA-COLA BOOTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. VS,CITY OF

MANILA
Section 252(c) of the Local Government Code of the Philippines is
very clear that “[i]n the event that the protest is finally decided in favor
of the taxpayer, the amount or portion of the tax protested shall be
refunded to the protestant, or applied as tax credit against his existing
or future tax liabiity.

Respondents also argue that the rule that government funds are generally
exempt from execution is based on obvious considerations of public
policy; thus, the primary functions and devolved public welfare services
rendered by the respondent City of Manila cannot be interrupted or
abandoned by the withdrawal of its meager resources from their lawful
and particular purpose based on the appropriation ordinance.

Finding that the issuance of the Writ of Execution was superfluous in

the first place, this Court finds the foregoing issue inapt for discussion.
Nevertheless, this Court disagrees with petitioner’s fifth contention that
the assailed decision of the RTC-Manila granting the Motion to Quash
the Writ of Execution has, in effect, reversed the judgment in the instant
case.
 What is at issue in the instant petition is merely the propriety of the
enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the RTC-Manila. Clearly,
this Court has already ruled upon the validity of the tax refund or the tax
credit due to the petitioner and has rendered the same final and
executory.

ACTION INTERDICTL/PUBLICIANA/REINDIVICATORIA,
RECONVEYANCE AND QUIETING OF TITLE

Heirs of Albina G. Ampil vs. Manahan

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that anyone of the co-owners may
bring an action for ejectment without joining the others.

In an unlawful detainer case, the physical or material possession of

the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of
the parties, is the sole issue for resolution. But where the issue of
ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon said issue in order to
determine who has the right to possess the property. This adjudication,
however, is only an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of
settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably
linked thereto. As such, the lower court’s adjudication of ownership in
the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice
an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

Well-established is the rule that ownership over the land cannot be

acquired by mere occupation. While it is true that tax declarations are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, they, nevertheless, constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. It
strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Heirs of Enrique Diaz vs. Virata

An action for quieting of title is a remedy which may be availed of only

when by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant’s
title to real property or any interest therein.

Quieting of Title; Requisites.—Article 477 of the same Code

mandates that in an action to quiet title, the party bringing the action
must have a legal or, at least, an equitable title to the real property
subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid. Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper,
two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be
in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facieappearance of
validity or legal efficacy.

A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and

incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein—it becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of
land.

An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or

proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment
pursuant to which the title was decreed; The attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it; While
it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the
registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his
registered property by reason of laches.

For laches to apply, it must be shown that there was lack of knowledge
or notice on the part of the defendant that complainant would assert the
right in which he bases his suit; The dismissal without prejudice is
adequate to apprise a party that an action to assert the other party’s
rights is forthcoming.

Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag vs. Gabriel

Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create
or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is

imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property
subject of the acts; The party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear
and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a

possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into
ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted.

Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the
possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim

Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action

to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a
better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land
claimed; and second, his title thereto.

Bishop vs. Court of Appeals

Presumption of regularity covers the finding that the land subject of the
certificate was private in nature and therefore registrable under the
Torrens System.

To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being

void ab initio, it must be shown that the registration court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the case and that there was actual fraud in
securing the Title; A certification from an administrative body cannot
prevail against a court decision declaring the land to be registrable.

An action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud

prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the
decree of registration.

The non-presentation by the private respondents of their tax

declarations on the land is no indication that they have never acquired
ownership thereof or have lost it by such omission.

The lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at
any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated; The right is never barred by laches

It is an elementary principle that the owner of a land registered under

the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription.

A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to
the land at the time he builds on it.
Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr.
The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in
the resolution of an action for partition.

What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not

the title itself; Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused
with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both
are interchangeably used. The certificate referred to is that document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title
referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that document.

Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does
not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed—the
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.

An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his

interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is
inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.

Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law.

A party does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement
she intentionally refused to sign.

Toledo vs. Court of Appeals

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so
exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies
are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution
sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or
through extrinsic fraud. An action for reconveyance, on the other hand,
is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of
another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey
the land to him.

The Court of Appeals has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts whereas actions for
reconveyance of real property may be filed before the Regional Trial
Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts, depending on the assessed value of
the property involved.

While a judicially-approved compromise agreement indeed has the

effect and authority of res judicata, the same is conclusive and binding
only upon the parties and those who are their successors-in-interest by
title after the commencement of the action in court.

Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the real owner of the property; An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the
reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or the
date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.

While the contract to sell indeed provided for the ipso facto cancellation
of the contract “without need of notification or judicial action,”
jurisprudence requires, for cancellation to be effective, that written
notice be sent to the defaulter informing him of said
cancellation/rescission

An action for reconveyance is always available as a remedy for a

rightful owner to retrieve his property for as long as the same has not
passed to an innocent purchaser for value.

Bokingo vs. Court of Appeals

Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an
opportunity to correct its errors, if any. 

There are three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession of real

property and these are distinguished in this wise: What really
distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action
(accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion
reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession
de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with
forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to
recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of
ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of
possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover
ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three
kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.

The respondents, as plaintiffs in the court a quo, to be entitled to the

injunctive relief sought, need to establish the following requirements: (1)
the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) that the acts against
which the injunction is to be directed are violative of the said right.
Pagadora vs. Ilao

In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts

as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1
of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its
face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.
Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one
in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that
possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly
employ the language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up
showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. In other
words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act of
dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been
in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is
jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demonstrate a cause of
action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

Jose vs. Alfuerto

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession

of real property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In
unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal,
as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express
or implied contract between them. However, the defendant’s possession
became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the
subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed such
demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from
the unlawful withholding of possession.

In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession becomes illegal

only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to vacate the property
and the defendant’s subsequent refusal.

A case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must definitely establish

its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible
entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to
be filed beyond the required one-year prescription period from the time
of forcible entry.

A party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on
appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court will not be considered by the reviewing
court.

An action for forcible entry cannot be treated as an accion publiciana;

The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
An action for forcible entry cannot be treated as an accion publiciana;
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

An ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court to recover

physical possession only or possession de facto, not possession de jure.
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are not processes to
determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue
of ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is
therefore inconclusive.

The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful,
speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor
of property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession during
the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of possession
de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and
order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of
possession might take the law in his hands and seize the property by
force and violence.

Corpuz vs. Agustin

In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of  who
is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure.

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties
has the better right to possess the property. The adjudication of the issue
of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property.

A title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of
property ownership, which necessarily includes possession.

In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts

as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently
alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession
became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

A Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.

Suarez vs. Emboy

The registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional

facts must be alleged and
sufficiently established: (1) initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year
from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or

unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or
how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. the jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint. 
Green Acres Holding, Inc. vs. Cabral
No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,
and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the
court.

A Torrens title, as a general rule, is irrevocable and indefeasible, and

the duty of the court is to see to it that this title is maintained and
respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding.

A writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the

decision to be executed, and the execution is void if it is in excess of and
beyond the original judgment or award, for it is a settled general
principle that a writ of execution must conform strictly with every
essential particular of the judgment promulgated.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. For an action
to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy. 

In the case of Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals,

681 SCRA 580 (2012), this Court had the occasion to rule that one of
the proper remedies of a person who was not impleaded in the
proceedings declaring null and void the title from which his title to the
property had been derived, is an action for quieting title.
INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE

Bucton vs. Gonzalo.

While it is true that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor
the presumption of regularity, this presumption, however, is not
absolute.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and
who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before
receiving any notice of another person’s claim.

As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and the
law will no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.

In case the buyer does not deal with the registered owner of the real
property, the law requires that a higher degree of prudence be exercised
by the purchaser; The Court has stressed time and again that every
person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry, and must discover
upon his peril the authority of the agent, and this is especially true
where the act of the agent is of unusual nature.

If a person makes no inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of the

agent’s authority, and his ignorance of that authority will not be any
excuse.

NUISANCE
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner,
Inc.
Bus terminals per se do not impede or help impede the flow of traffic; In
the subject ordinances, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be
able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred
from operating at all.

Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching
upon public roads, they are not obstacles—the buses which
indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are.

The operation of bus terminals is a legitimate business which, by itself,

cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or
comfort of the community; Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it
may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings..

Art 430-433

Aneco Realty and Devt Corp. vs. Landex Development Corp.

Every owner has the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by
means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means—the right to fence
flows from the right of ownership.

Well-settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of law of

the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are accorded
great weight and respect.

Art 434
Hutchison vs. Buscas
In civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact and
substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proving it.

Article 434 of the New Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain
an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who
claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of
the land claimed, and; second, his title thereto. In the case at bar, we
find that respondent failed to establish these two (2) legal requirements

A party can claim a right of ownership only over the parcel of land that
was the object of the deed.

What defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned in the instrument
but the boundaries thereof which enclose the land and indicate its exact
limits.

In an action to recover real property, the settled rule is that the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title, not on the weakness of the
defendant’s title.

VSD Realty & Development Corporation vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc.

In civil cases, the specific rule as to the burden of proof is that the
plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint which are denied by the answer; and the defendant has the
burden of proving the material allegations in his answer, which sets up
new matter as a defense. This rule does not involve a shifting of the
burden of proof, but merely means that each party must establish his
own case.
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an
action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who
claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of
the land claimed, and; second, his title thereto.

Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same
Code, which provides for full reimbursement of useful improvements
and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made only to a
possessor in good faith who builds on land with the belief that he is the
owner thereof. It does nnot apply where one’s only interest is that of a
lessee under a rental contract.

EXPROPRIATION

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila.

When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private property
and an objection is made thereto by the owner, the courts have ample
authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof upon an
-issue properly presented, concerning the question whether or not the
purpose of the appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The right of
expropriation is not inherent power in a municipal corporation and
before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power
upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot expropriate
public property. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the
purpose of the expropriation must be public. If the court, upon trial,
finds that neither of said condition exists, or that either one of them fails,
the right to expropriate does not exist. If the property is taken in' the
ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any
possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's
constitutional rights call for protection by the courts.
Upon the other hand, the Legislature may directly determine the
necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement
for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement.
In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement, the existence of the public necessity for its construction,
the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location
selected, and the consequent necessity of taking the lands selected, are
all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts
have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of
the representatives of the people.

But when the law does not designate the property to be taken, nor how
much may be taken, then the necessity of taking private property is a
question for the courts.
There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a
municipality is given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain
and a decision by the municipality that there exists a necessity for the
exercise of that right in a particular case.

Whether or not it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a

municipality the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a
question with which the courts are not concerned. But whenever that
right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of
their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make
inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in a particular case, and not
the general authority.

In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the

contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent
domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their
character.

The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the
necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of a state, is an
unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain

That government can scarcely be deemed free where the rights of

property are left solely dependent on the legislative body without
restraint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem to require
that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held
sacred. At least no court of justice would be warranted in assuming that
the power to violate and disregard them lurks in any general grant of
legislative authority or ought to be implied from any general expression
of the people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights so
vital to their security and well-being without a very strong and direct
expression of such intention.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation
of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be
strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with
greater tenacity and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more
sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right, the plain meaning of the law should
not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede, and not follow, the taking
of the property. The general power to exercise the right of eminent
domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular
case.
Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of
the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority.
The city of Manila is not authorized to expropriate public property.

Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways vs.

Tecson

Laches; Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to

avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation or in an injustice.

The owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or, if it is
not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for
the land taken. For failure of respondents to question the lack of
expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to
have waived and are estopped from assailing the power of the
government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was
exercise

Just compensation is “the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government.”

Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to
the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

A Local Government Unit (LGU) may exercise the power to expropriate

private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the
latter’s control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the
power or in other legislations.

the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can

exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the
local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The
power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just
compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.

It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot
be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.

In Republic vs. De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or
its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact
that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has
become the law of the case as to the parties.
Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. vs. Municipality (now
City) of Pasig, Metro Manila

The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate

right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its
territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.

The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the

owner and against the condemnor—when the power is granted, the
extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or
clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained; The
condemnor has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to
show the right of condemnation.

requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a

local government unit must be complied with: 1. An ordinance is
enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power
of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3.
There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to

obtain the land it desires by agreement; An offer is a unilateral
proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a
contract; The offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient
clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the
essential conditions of the proposed contract.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first
made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition
of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense
and delay of a court action; A single bona fide offer that is rejected by
the owner will suffice.

A letter offered only to prove the municipality’s desire or intent to

acquire a property for a right-of-way does not prove that the LGU made
a definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an
access road before filing the complaint for expropriation

There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the annotation
of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of the owner’s certificate
of title is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer.

In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the municipality

made a definite and valid offer to all the co-owners of the property, the
declaration in an ordinance that the property owners were already
notified of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal
road is not a compliance with Section19 of R.A. No. 7160.

A property that is intended for the construction of a place of religious

worship and a school for its members may still be expropriated.

Where property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road,

the expropriator is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites
for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code—case law
has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the
power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the
land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly
injurious.
The testimony of witnesses that although there were other ways through
which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire
trucks, could enter the area except through the property sought to be
expropriated is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine
necessity for the construction of a road in the area—absolute necessity
is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice.

An ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received

and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial—where
the property owner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the
property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection
has no probative weight.