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Normative theory

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Normative theory

Jurian Edelenbos and Ingmar van Meerkerk

Full reference (in press):

Edelenbos, J. and I. Van Meerkerk (2016). Normative theory. In: Ansell, C. and J. Torfing (eds.),

Handbook on theories of governance (Pp. 402-415). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

1. Introduction

Nowadays in public administration theory it is recognized that complex decision-making takes

place within interdependent sets of actors (e.g. Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Pierre 2000;

Sørensen and Torfing 2007). This has led to a growing body of research on so-called

governance networks. Governance networks emerge around boundary crossing policy

problems which cannot be solved by one actor alone but require collective actions of more

actors from different organizations, sectors and levels (Sørensen and Torfing 2007). The policy

issues cross different governmental, jurisdictional, geographical, societal and/or functional

boundaries and have a multi-value character (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).

This development to governance networks indicates a shift from hierarchical

and well-institutionalized forms of government towards less formalized, bottom-up forms of

governance in which state authority makes way for an appreciation of mutual

interdependence between different stakeholders (Kickert et al. 1997; Hajer and Wagenaar

2003; Edelenbos 2005). Public authorities more and more recognize this interdependence as

a basic governing principle in a continuous process of negotiating (Scharpf 1999).

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Stakeholders are in this view approached as knowledgeable actors in the decision-making

process. Therefore, some authors (e.g. Kooiman 1993; Edelenbos 2005; Sørensen and Torfing

2007) explicitly stress the interactive nature of governance networks. They speak of

interactive governance to emphasize the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making

processes (Edelenbos 2005; Torfing et al. 2012).

Interactive governance is initiated, developed and applied to meet several

goals and ambitions. Interactive governance can enhance legitimacy in public governance,

improve efficiency in decision-making processes and lead to better results and outcomes

(higher impact and effectiveness). In this view interactive governance almost becomes a

normative goal that has to be strived for if we want to conduct and implement proper and

sound public governance.

We have high expectations for how interactive governance can contribute to

the realization of normative goals. But do expectations and normative goals actually meet in

real life governance processes? How does interactive governance work in theory and in

practice? We will deal with these questions in this chapter. We explicitly deal with dilemmas,

trade-offs and tensions between the different objectives of interactive governance.

We have structured this chapter in the following way. We start by positioning

and defining interactive governance. We explain the reasons why interactive governance has

become important in complex decision-making processes. We also elaborate different

viewpoints and normative expectations. We go on to deal with the relationships between

these expectations and objectives. To what extent do we witness certain tensions between

the expectations and objectives? Then we offer a way of handling these tensions so that a

positive interplay between the supposed added values of interactive governance can become

a reality. We aspire to formulate a research agenda and approach for this.

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 2. Expectations and objectives of interactive governance

Defining interactive governance

Governance networks can be defined as more or less stable patterns of social relations

between mutually dependent actors, which form around policy programs, policy decisions or

policy implementation (or service delivery) and which are formed, maintained and changed

through constant interactions between the actors involved (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).

Interactive governance as a concept specifically focuses on the way societal and private actors

are engaged in complex decision-making processes and networks and how this engagement

relates to (inter)governmental processes and procedures (Edelenbos 2005).

Many governments in numerous countries have been under the spell of interactive

governance, often using different labels such as participatory policy-making, interactive

decision-making, community governance and so on (Durning 1993; DeLeon 1994; Renn et al.

1995; Healey 1997; Fischer 2000; Dobbs and Moore 2002; Murray and Greer 2002; Koppenjan

and Klijn 2004; Edelenbos and Klijn 2006; Peters 2010). In the relevant academic literature,

many descriptions of interactive governance can be found (Renn et al. 1995; Healey 1997;

Verweij and Josling 2003; Edelenbos 2005; Torfing et al. 2012). A general element in these

definitions is that government develops policy in consultation and cooperation with

stakeholders, either professional organizations or individual citizens. Interactive governance

can therefore be approached as a way of conducting policies whereby a government involves

its citizens, social organizations, enterprises and other stakeholders in the early stages of

public policy-making (Edelenbos 2005).

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Developments evoking interactive governance and normative objectives

Interactive governance as a remedy for fragmentation: enhancing effectiveness

A number of developments in society and government make interactive governance

necessary in effectively coping with wicked issues (i.e. the effect of policy solutions in terms

of solving problems). First, today it generally accepted that Western societies can be

characterized by individualization and value pluralism (Rittel and Webber 1973; Castells 2000;

Torfing et al. 2012). Moreover, some speak of an increasing fragmentation during the

twentieth century when public organization became more functionally organized in different

layers, sectors and domains, causing problems to the traditional central steering paradigm

(Edelenbos and Teisman 2011; Torfing et al. 2012). The span of control was becoming too big.

Interactive forms of governance are needed to reach effective and integrative policy-making.

Citizens, social and private organizations, and non-governmental organizations can no longer

be seen as passive objects of central steering activities but have to be treated as empowered

actors who have a stake and say in the outcomes of decision-making processes (Kooiman

1993). They have increasing capacities to challenge governmental action (e.g. Dalton 2008).

Achieving interesting outcomes often depends on finding attractive solutions, which

encourage actors to activate their resources and knowledge for the problem and/or policy

process at stake.

Given the increased fragmentation, interactive forms of governance are often justified

to improve the effectiveness of public governance. Theoretically, network approaches of

governance (e.g. Kickert et al. 1997; Rhodes 1997) specifically stress this increased

fragmentation and accompanying interdependency between actors as the driving force of

interactive governance. In contemporary network society, resources (financial means, human

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resources, information, knowledge, competences and support) are increasingly dispersed

among various actors (Pierre and Peters 2000; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). This mutual

interdependency held actors together, and interactive governance has – at least partly – the

potential to meet the goals of different network actors if actors are willing to play the game

of negotiation and compromise and if they are willing to invest in joint learning. When actors

acknowledge their interdependent relationships to other actors in the governance network,

they are more inclined to join forces and to combine and bundle their resources (financial

assets, knowledge, etc.), leading to increased effectiveness and synergies.

Interactive governance as an instrument for reducing costs: striving for efficiency

Other literature, specifically based on the work of Kooiman (1993) and Scharpf (1999),

stresses the potential of interactive governance for improving coordination between

autonomous actors and thereby efficiency in governing society. Sørensen and Torfing (2007)

refer to the authors of this stream of literature as “governability theorists”; in this literature

interactive governance “is seen as a functional response to the increasing societal complexity,

dynamics and diversification that undermine the ability to govern society efficiently through

the traditional means of hierarchy and market” (Sørensen and Torfing 2007: 18). Interactive

governance could stimulate resource pooling and joint action. In this reasoning interactive

governance has the potential to reduce the costs of solutions and the decision-making

process.

The potential of interactive governance for mobilizing societal resources for

contributing to public goals is also stressed by governmental approaches (Foucault 1991)

which take the stance that interactive forms of governance are actually new forms of “state

domination operationalized via discursive practices that shape citizens’ behaviour, drawing

5
them ‘freely’ into responsibilities that they may have previously resisted” (Lowndes and

Sullivan 2008: 55). Recent discourses of the Big Society in the UK and, for instance, the

Participation Society in the Netherlands fuel such a critical stance, as they explicitly stress the

need for interactive forms of governance, partly as a way to deal with budget deficits.

In literature it is stressed that in governance networks many actors are involved and

that these actors not only possess vital resources to realize policy goals and outcomes, but

also have different perceptions of the problem definition and have different information and

ideas on solutions (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Torfing et al. 2012). So stakeholders’ interests

often collide in complex decision-making; there is much danger that stakeholders block

decision-making, because decisions are not in line with their interests. There is substantial

veto power in decision-making processes because of the dependency of many actors who

have the means to influence the outcome of decision-making. By involving these actors at an

early stage, it is hoped that the use of veto power by the involved actors will decrease and

support for decisions will increase. This stimulates ongoing interaction among actors in the

governance network and as a result accelerates the processes of decision-making. It is argued

that the extra (time) investment necessary for interactive decision-making can be

“profitable,” because it will avert lengthy legal and litigation procedures (Edelenbos and Klijn

2006). Furthermore, the development of mutual trust and institutional rules in interactive

governance could decrease transaction costs between actors, enhancing the efficiency of

governance processes.

IG as added value to representative democracy: enhancing legitimacy

A third development is that in Western countries the legitimacy of liberal and representative

democracy is under pressure. Some speak of a widening of the gap between citizens and elected

politicians (Hirst 2000; Young 2000; Lowndes et al. 2001; Sørensen and Torfing 2007). For

6
instance Dalton (2008) argues that there is substantial evidence for an increasing distrust of

citizens in political authorities (politicians, political parties, officeholders) in many Western

democracies. People no longer strongly identify with the existing political system (the regime

and its institutions, norms and principles) based on representative democracy. “Citizens no

longer primarily get their political identity from their identification with political parties”

(Bang 2009: 126). As a consequence they turn away from government and politics. A number

of problems confronting society, such as indifference to rule enforcement, abuse of collective

service, overriding norms and political non-participation, are ascribed to this gap (Klijn and

Koppenjan 2000).

Various scholars argue that interactive forms of governance have democratic potential

because a diversity of (affected) stakeholders, such as citizens, civil society organizations and

businesses, have more room for direct engagement (e.g. Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Sørensen

and Torfing 2007). By involving more actors (and certainly citizens) in a direct manner,

decision-making acquires a less closed character. Interactive governance is therefore often

advocated as providing an opportunity to bridge the gap between governmental actors and

citizens, which could enhance the democratic legitimacy of policy- and decision-making

processes.

We can also see that citizens are becoming more empowered. The education levels,

socio-economic resources, access to political information and other “resources of citizenship”

have increased substantially over the past several decades (Dalton 2008). Because they seem

more reluctant to engage in the “traditional institutions” or “participation procedures” of

representative democracy, they develop new forms of civic engagement in most liberal

democracies, which can be coined as private self-organization in which communities and

private actors are involved (Stolle and Hooghe 2005; Dalton 2008; Edelenbos and van

Meerkerk 2011; van Meerkerk 2014). An additional objective of interactive forms of

7
governance related to this discourse of self-organization is the potential for association, self-

development, learning and local ownership, as is stressed by developmental models of

democracy (see also next section), inspired by the work of John Stuart Mill and de Tocqueville.

Whether these new forms of stakeholder engagement by means of participation and

self-organization conflict with the classical representative institutions or not is a debate

between scholars (Klijn and Skelcher 2007). As will be elaborated in the following section,

interactive governance is also criticized for not being democratic, as it delivers issues of

accountability and inclusion.

The tensions in the last row of Table 33.1 illustrate that there can be tensions and trade-

offs between the three aspects: effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. For example, great

efforts to involve many affected stakeholders (legitimacy) can result in time-consuming

processes (efficiency) and difficulties in realizing decision-making and implementation

(effectiveness). On the other hand a very efficient interactive governance process may lead to

less legitimized results, as not all relevant stakeholders are involved or certain resources are

not mobilized, leading to less problem-solving capacity. In the next section we explore the

normative problems and tensions in more detail.

3. Normative problems and tensions in interactive governance networks

Interactive governance has some potentials but also includes some pitfalls. Expectations and

objectives are not that straightforward. Arguments in favor of interactive governance also

meet some counter-arguments. In this section we discuss some tensions and trade-offs in

reaching the objectives of interactive governance.

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Table 1: overview main aspects and tensions in the three normative aspects

Effectiveness Efficiency Legitimacy

Goals Enhancing problem- Preventing conflicts Creating acceptance,

solving capacity and among actors and support and tolerance

finding durable solutions stagnations in process for output coming from

for wicked problems (minimizing veto-power governance networks

in networks)

Means Generating and Including relevant and Connecting various

connecting various affected stakeholders; actors, creating

resources from different conflict-resolution, openness in the process

stakeholders in the mediation and informing for input and careful

network techniques throughput

Tensions It needs much capacity Danger of symbolic Neglecting valuable

and investments; costly involvement, no real input; imbalanced

and time-consuming dialogue, interaction and involvement; issues with

debate vertical accountability

The issue of accountability

In the research literature attention is paid to the tensions between the horizontal

accountability structure of networks and the vertical accountability structure of

representative democratic institutions (Hirst 2000; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Pierre 2000).

Decision-making processes in governance networks show different patterns of decision-

making and accountability than those which are solely or mainly evolving within the

9
institutions of representative democracy (Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Wagenaar 2007). The latter

are characterized by the primacy of politics: political elected officeholders make decisions

about collective goals, leaving implementation to administrators, to decentralized or

privatized actors or to networks of public and private actors (e.g. Wagenaar 2007). The

primacy of politics is challenged by the network character of implementation, as is shown in

much public administration literature (e.g. Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Because governance

networks are structured and evolve at the boundaries of different public, private and societal

organizations, they have multiple “principals” (Skelcher 2007). In governance networks

various societal actors are involved in the formulation of policy goals, and the primacy of

politics is challenged in one way or another (Klijn and Skelcher 2007). Governance networks

often transcend existing jurisdictional borders of governments. This delivers challenges for

analyzing the democratic legitimacy of these networks, at least in terms of traditional models

of democracy (Dryzek 2007: 262).

Legitimacy generated by electoral democracy does not carry over to (issue-

segmented) governance networks (Warren 2009). Again, in the words of Dryzek (2007: 269),

“Clearly, electoral democracy is in trouble when networked governance dominates. Networks

do not hold elections; they do not have an electorate, an opposition, or any obvious

alternative set of power holders.” This troubles political actors to control interactive

governance processes, and as a result traditional institutions of checks and balances on power

and accountability become less effective in interactive forms of governance (van Kersbergen

and van Waarden 2004). In interactive governance, accountability often gets diffused among

different actors, governmental and non-governmental.

We can, however, measure the democratic legitimacy of networks with different

yardsticks. The way in which elected bodies control the developments that take place within

10
governance networks is only one of the measurements (Klijn and Edelenbos 2013). From a

deliberative democracy point of view (see Dryzek 2000; Hirst 2000; Held 2006; Dryzek 2007),

different democratic values are stressed, such as open debate among involved stakeholders

and due deliberation about the problem perceptions and preferred solutions: “[t]he

transformation of private preferences via a process of deliberation into positions that can

withstand public scrutiny and test” (Held 2006: 237). Models of deliberative democracy stress

that, besides the fact that officeholders are accountable and can be replaced (the core of the

protective models of democracy) and that democracy is about participation in decision-

making (the core of the developmental models of democracy), democratic legitimacy to a

large extent can be created from the characteristics of the process (openness, inclusiveness)

and when it is characterized by genuine deliberation and argumentation processes (Klijn and

Edelenbos 2013; van Meerkerk et al. 2015).

Liberal and competitive models of democracy (Held 2006) emphasize the

accountability of elected officeholders to others. More idealistic models of democracy tend

to emphasize the participation and self-organizing aspects of democracy: decisions are

democratic if they have been achieved in and through processes of active citizen participation

(Dryzek 2007). Deliberative models of democracy add to this the importance of deliberation

and the rules of open and free debate (see Dryzek 2000). In a sense, they are emphasizing

traditional rules, such as openness and fairness (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). However,

deliberative models of democracy are also more pragmatic in that they are concerned with

achieving practical outcomes that are relevant for and supported by the involved

stakeholders (Dryzek 2000; Held 2006).

Thus, interactive governance is often approached as being a tension between on the

one hand political accountability, stressed by liberal and representative models of democracy,

11
and on the other hand fair and open argumentation, emphasized by deliberative models of

democracy. In practice these two models are difficult to reconcile, largely depending on which

normative standpoint one takes in approaching and appreciating democracy ideals (Mayer et

al. 2005; Dryzek 2007). So it is difficult to judge which side of the coin should be preferred.

Some authors stress that serious attempts can be made to reconcile the two by transforming

politicians into metagovernors of interactive governance processes (Edelenbos 2005;

Sørensen and Torfing 2007). Furthermore, the boundary spanning activities of public

managers and community leaders could contribute to the democratic anchorage of

interactive governance both within local governmental institutions linked to representative

democracy and within the local community via community based organizations (van

Meerkerk 2014).

The issue of inclusiveness

Klijn and Skelcher (2007: 588) argue that governance networks offer “new ways of

connecting . . . policy-making to citizens and stakeholders, overcoming the constraints and

limitations of representative democracy and party politics.” An important question, then, is

to what extent interactive governance is inclusive. In liberal models of democracy this is

achieved through regular elections: the people get the opportunity to vote and choose their

representatives, who make and implement important decisions for the people. Braybrooke

(1974) calls this the instrumental view of democracy. Democracy is an efficient means of

reaching decisions, while protecting the individual freedom of the citizen (MacPherson 1979).

Considerable emphasis is placed on the formal procedures for the election of representatives,

who duly translate the preferences of the electorate into policy. The wishes of the public are

expressed by the leaders of organized groups or by elected representatives, who can be

12
removed following elections. The essence of this view is that it sees democracy as converting

the “will of the people” into policy as efficiently as possible.

In the participatory and deliberative view of democracy the open and inclusive

debate is valued. Advocates of these models see more substantial merits and approach

democracy more as a social ideal than a decision-making procedure. Since public involvement

in public policy is integral to this ideal, an active and vocal citizenship is to be encouraged

(Held 2006; Dryzek 2007). This model coincides with the development and utopian models as

distinguished by MacPherson (1979). In these models it is emphasized that democracy is a

value in itself and that active participation enhances democracy and the “education” of

citizens. They stress citizen participation as a good way to organize democracy and to develop

citizens and actively enhance their freedom. These models therefore stress the importance

of openness and accessibility of policy- and decision-making processes (Dryzek 2007).

Ideally, within interactive governance the actors who are activated and

involved are those affected by the governance issue at stake and who have resources,

perspectives and values relevant to the decision-making process (Edelenbos 2005). In this

way, interactive governance can raise the quality of decisions. In governance better-informed

assessment and decision-making are achieved (de Jong 2004). “No single actor, public or

private, has all knowledge and information required to solve complex dynamic and diversified

problems; no actor has sufficient overview to make the application of needed instruments

effective” (Kooiman 1993: 4). Through the mobilization and use of a broad array of values,

knowledge and resources, problem-solving capacity is enlarged. Since with interactive

governance not only different perspectives on and ideas about problems and solutions are

brought to the table but also multiple types of knowledge, information, skill and experience

are employed, a better analysis of the problem area is possible and better solutions can be

13
created. Through interactive governance processes a broader and better assessment can take

place of the different perspectives on the problem at hand and of policy alternatives that may

solve it (Young 2000).

Empirical research shows that accessible and inclusive participation is

important for governance networks. The research results show that stakeholder involvement

in governance networks in the field of environmental projects and programs has positive

significant effects on the perceived process and substantial outcomes of complex decision-

making processes (Edelenbos et al. 2010).

However, there is an important premise for reaping the fruits of interactive

governance, which is that inclusiveness has to be arranged well. In many processes of

interactive governance, inclusiveness is a problematic issue. Mayer et al. (2005) for instance

indicate that interactive governance often leads to the concentration of power in the hands

of those who oppose development (NIMBYs), shout loudest and have the time to campaign.

Ordinary citizens contribute very little. Good solutions may even perish in the process. The

nature of group dynamics is such that some participants are able to overrule others by virtue

of their superior skills or greater assertiveness, leading to the formation of a “democracy of

the loudmouths” (Hartman 2000; Mayer et al. 2005). Under such circumstances, there is a

danger that the silent majority will be ignored. Group dynamics can also lead to a narrowing

of horizons or pressures that result in technically preferable solutions being rejected in favor

of watered-down compromises. In other words, one cannot depend on interactive policy

development to deliver good outcomes. In their research, Uitermark and Duyvendak (2008)

show that participation and self-organizing processes have tendencies of closeness and

homogeneity, leading to exclusion, concentration of power and bureaucracy (see also Dietz

et al. 2003; Sampson et al. 2005). In fact, interactive governance through participation and

14
self-organization may be approached as a counter-movement to highly inaccessible

governmental procedures, but “this cure” can easily get the same diseases (closedness,

inward character). It is therefore important that interactive governance processes are

carefully organized by broadly involving all the relevant actors. Moreover, self-organizing

processes must have reflexive capacity in order to prevent them from becoming new centers

of power that are not accessible to newcomers.

The issue of throughput legitimacy

The previous tension showed us the importance of good inclusive input in interactive

governance processes. This also touches upon the issue of throughput legitimacy. In the

governance literature the legitimacy debate generally focuses on the conflicts between a

democratic (input) focus versus a performance (output) emphasis (Dahl 1994; Scharpf 1999;

Peters and Pierre 2010). Input legitimacy relates to gaining the consent of affected actors

through including their preferences in decision-making via participation channels (Scharpf

1999; Benz and Papadopoulos 2006). In contrast, output legitimacy rests on utilitarian

thought in terms of getting results (Scharpf 1999; Risse and Kleine 2007; Lieberherr 2012). In

fact, two dimensions of output legitimacy can be distinguished in the literature. The first

dimension is about the problem-solving capacity of policy outputs generated by governance

networks. Political choices and public policies are legitimate if they will generally represent

effective solutions to common problems of the governed (Scharpf 1999). The second

dimension of output legitimacy is about the acceptance of decision-making outputs by

citizens and stakeholders (e.g. Edelenbos et al. 2010). Some scholars argue that legitimacy

comes from pragmatic considerations when stakeholders (citizens, etc.) believe that decision-

15
making outcomes are relevant and in their own interests (Kooiman 1993; Dryzek 2000; Held

2006).

In contrast to the input–output debate, a third dimension of legitimacy – namely

throughput – remains largely under-theorized in relation to interactive governance

(Lieberherr 2012; Schmidt 2013). Throughput legitimacy typically relates to the justification

of governance modes based on the quality of procedures (Bekkers and Edwards 2007).

Lieberherr (2012) argues that the throughput dimension has often been subsumed under

input legitimacy (cf. Scharpf 1999; Mayntz 2006). Within the focus on results, the criterion of

efficiency has often been linked with output legitimacy in the political sciences (Scharpf 1999;

Bekkers and Edwards 2007). However, efficiency arguably also relates to processes rather

than outputs.

Throughput legitimacy is about the democratic quality of the decision-making process

(Dryzek 2000; van Meerkerk et al. 2015). Openness, accessibility and transparency are often-

mentioned aspects of this kind of legitimacy (Young 2000; Held 2006). By involving more

actors (and certainly citizens), decision-making acquires a more open character, leading to

more transparency, deliberative quality and mutual understanding (Dryzek 2000; Risse and

Kleine 2007). Thus the issue of legitimacy is about the democratic qualities of the process

unfolding in the governance network itself, which is about the interaction between the actors

in the network and the transparency of the decision-making process (van Meerkerk et al.

2015).

The study by van Meerkerk et al. (2015) on Dutch water governance networks shows that

throughput legitimacy is the link between input and output legitimacy and that this form of

legitimacy is critical for achieving good and legitimate outcomes in interactive governance

processes. A high level of throughput legitimacy reflects a relatively high level of

16
communication, transparency, deliberation and debate among actors in the network in order

to achieve legitimized results. In other words, the quality of the processing of input is

important for reaching output legitimacy in governance networks. Van Meerkerk et al. (2015)

found a strong positive effect of throughput legitimacy on accepted and positively evaluated

outputs. Public managers as metagovernors are important for creating conditions for

throughput legitimacy to develop, and they thereby can play a key role in unleashing the

democratic potential of governance networks (van Meerkerk et al. 2015). Comparable results

are found by Doberstein and Millar (2014: 276) in the Canadian context of homelessness

governance networks. They also found that a high level of throughput legitimacy could

provide an “amplifying quality to a governance network, catalyzing a virtuous cycle that

bolsters existing levels of input and output legitimacy.” They even state that, “whereas input

legitimacy can be exchanged, or traded-off, with output legitimacy to reinforce the overall

legitimacy of a network governance institution, ‘throughput legitimacy’ functions as a

necessary condition that sustains legitimacy over time” (Doberstein and Millar 2014: 262).

Interactive governance approaches, which aim to involve stakeholders at early stages in the

decision-making process, are expected to decrease stakeholders’ use of veto power and to

increase stakeholders’ level of support for decisions (Edelenbos and Klijn 2006). When actors

are included in the process, they are expected to be more willing to accept both the process

and the decisions reached. However, we see that inclusion is not enough to realize support.

Stakeholders want to recognize themselves in the decision reached. Their input must be

traceable in the results (Monnikhof and Edelenbos 2001; Edelenbos 2005).

17
 4. Conclusions and future research agenda

In this chapter we have discussed the potential benefits but also the drawbacks of

interactive governance approaches. In general there are high hopes for interactive

governance, but can it fulfill its expectations? Interactive governance is often approached as

a response to the limitations of representative democracy and hierarchical-instrumental

policy-making. In response to increasing fragmentation, the decreasing legitimacy of

representative systems, the increasing ability of citizens and the pressure of empowered

citizens, interactive governance is seen and used as a proper answer to realize effective,

efficient and legitimate governance and societal developments.

In general many potential benefits can be described, but limitations and problems are also

visible, as discussed in this chapter. An example of a clear trade-off is that striving for

efficiency can easily lead to problems of legitimacy, as for example stakeholders might be

excluded from interactive governance processes. In general interactive governance can be

positioned against or next to existing governmental systems based on representative

democracy and instrumental policy-making. However, interactive governance processes

doesn’t need to imply a zero-sum game with this existing system, but can be complementary

to the system, specifically in dealing with wicked issues. Interactive governance is initiated by

both state actors and societal actors. Interactive governance is increasingly seen as the

legitimate governance mode, thereby increasingly coming out of the shadow of hierarchy.

This development could mean that interactive governance is increasingly taking over (cf. the

transformative stance of Klijn and Skelcher 2007).

According to the literature, the extent to which interactive governance is complementary

to the traditional system strongly depends on how interfaces between the two worlds are

18
organized and managed and how they evolve. In managing these interfaces more attention

needs to be paid to the previously discussed trade-offs of inclusion, accountability and

throughput legitimacy. There is a lack of systematic comparative research (in different fields

and sectors) on the co-existence of different modes of governance (for one of the few

exceptions see Meuleman 2008): How does the co-existence of interactive governance and

formal governmental institutions manifest itself in practice? How do governance processes,

influenced by these different modes of governance, evolve? To what extent do these different

modes conflict, mutually adapt or try to take a dominant position towards the other in actual

governance processes? And how do public managers, political leaders and community leaders

deal with this co-existence and co-evolving processes shaped by these different modes? This

could shed further light on how the trade-offs manifest themselves in practice and when

these trade-offs are dealt with in a more legitimate or effective way than others.

Moreover, more sophisticated research approaches to interactive governance are

needed, considering the different shapes these processes can take. In future research the

differences between government-induced interactive governance (participation) on the one

hand and community-induced interactive governance (self-organization) on the other hand

should be taken into account in exploring and explaining the course and results of interactive

governance processes.

In examining the co-existence and interaction of different governance modes, interactive

governance theory could learn from complexity theory (Teisman et al. 2009). Specifically the

concept of co-evolution is promising for advancing the theoretical toolbox of interactive

governance studies in this respect (cf. Klijn 2008). With its focus on positive and negative

feedback relations between two evolving systems, it could provide a useful lens for describing

and analyzing the interaction between different modes of governance. Next, when focusing

19
on how key actors cope with different modes of governance, boundary spanning theory could

be helpful for examining the way in which public managers, political leaders and community

leaders span the boundaries of these different subsystems (cf. Williams 2002; van Meerkerk

2014) and how they cope with different tensions related to the trade-offs discussed.

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