INTRODUCTION TO SELF-CRITICISM

1
AND SELF-ENHANCEMENT:
VIEWS FROM ANCIENT GREECE
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

TO THE MODERN WORLD

EDWARD C. CHANG

The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a
fool.
—William Shakespeare, As You Like It

I'm bad.
—LLCool], I'm Bad

Most pop psychology books in America focus on ways to foster some

form of self-enhancement (e.g., feeling good about oneself, increasing one's
self-image, obtaining greater personal wealth, living the life one wants to
live). Indeed, a quick search at Amazon.com identified over 39,000 books
that focus on self-help, most of which seem, according to their titles, to focus
on various ways to improve oneself or one's condition. In addition, many
psychological interventions focus on ways to overcome some form of self-
criticism (e.g., expecting too much from oneself, feeling bad about oneself,
having little personal confidence). But is self-enhancement always a good
thing, and is self-criticism always a bad thing? And what are self-enhancement
and self-criticism! The answers to these questions depend on many factors.

SOME EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL NOTIONS OF (FUNCTIONAL)

SELF-CRITICISM AND (DYSFUNCTIONAL) SELF-ENHANCEMENT
If one were to take a historical look at how self-criticism and self-
enhancement were viewed during the times of the ancient Greeks, one would

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/11624-001
Self-Criticism and Self-Enhancement: Theory, Research, and Clinical
Implications, edited by E. C. Chang
Copyright © 2008 American Psychological Association. All rights reserved.
 find that self-criticism was not necessarily attached to notions of vice and
negative functioning, and self-enhancement was not necessarily attached to
notions of virtue and positive functioning.

How Self-Criticism Leads to True Understanding: A Look at Plato's

Allegory of the Cave

Many scholars consider Plato to be the first and greatest philosopher to

have ever lived. Indeed, Alfred Whitehead (1929), the famous philosopher,
logician, and mathematician, argued that much of Western philosophy rep-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

resented merely a series of footnotes to the works of Plato. He said this be-
cause Plato, using the voice of his mentor Socrates, wrote about many di-
verse topics in great style and detail, from complex topics on metaphysics to
fundamental questions about ethics and justice. The value of Plato's works is
so wide-ranging that some have even considered them to represent an im-
portant source of self-therapy (Marinoff, 1999). Indeed, the notion of self-
criticism involving a process of not blindly accepting one's own opinions (or
those of others) as true was central to Plato's use of the Socratic method and
his view that the unexamined life was'not worth living. And perhaps this
notion is no better illustrated than in his famous allegory of the cave
(Heidegger, 1931/2002).
In Plato's Republic, Socrates tried to convey to his colleague Glaucon
the difference between opinions and truth by describing a situation in which
adults, imprisoned since childhood, were living in a cave. For these individu-
als, the world that existed was limited to seeing moving shadows of objects
along the cave walls and never the objects that were the real cause of those
shadows. Hence, these individuals lived in a world of mere opinions and
distortions. Although this situation would normally distress any adult, these
prisoners were not necessarily disturbed by their illusory existence because
they had lived in this underground world of shadows and distortions for most
of their mortal existence. In essence, they had gotten too accustomed to
these distortions and never had reason to question or doubt their under-
standing of the world. Then one day, according to Socrates, these prisoners
were released from the cave. As they ascended to the opening of the cave,
they experienced acute pain as they were struck by the brilliance of the sun-
light. Thus, engaging oneself in the self-critical process of discovering truth
was an act that Plato appreciated as central to living a worthwhile life but
that was also necessarily challenging and even threatening to most. Only as
time passed did these former prisoners begin to realize that they had falsely
perceived shadows as objects, rather than as the reflections of objects. This
self-critical process ultimately involves an emerging sense of enlightenment
and true awareness of the self and world. Although the meaning of this story
has multiple layers and dimensions, one can clearly see how the allegory
represents Plato's great appreciation for the value of self-critique as a way for

4 EDWARD C.CHANG
 rational individuals to obtain true and essential knowledge of themselves
and the world around them. In that regard, self-criticism is a constructive
process, rather than a destructive one.

The Problem of Unbound Self-Enhancement: Aristotle's Theory of the

Golden Mean

Just as for Plato an absence of self-criticism was a major limitation to

truly knowing oneself, an excess of self-enhancement can be said to have
been a similar concern for Aristotle in the search for the good life. Among
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

his contemporaries were Epicurus and his followers, who held the view that
individuals were largely constituted by appetites and passions. According to
Epicurus, the path to the good life was determined by maximizing pleasur-
able experiences over painful experiences. Thus, a key focus was on promot-
ing and garnering positive experiences for the self (Jones, 1989). In contrast
to those who followed Epicurus and emphasized the maximization of plea-
sure or self-enhancing experiences, Aristotle emphasized the importance of
keeping such self-enhancing pursuits and activities in check by emphasizing
balance and right proportion. This focus is most clearly represented in
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle began with the question, What is
the end of man? His answer: an activity of soul that is in conformity with
virtue, with the end being happiness. For Aristotle, living a virtuous life was
central to the pursuit of individual happiness. But, how does one live virtu-
ously? Aristotle began with the notion that there are several identifiable
virtues of man. Among them, he noted the virtues of courage, liberality,
pride, friendliness, wittiness, justice, and temperance.
For Aristotle, not only a lack or deficiency of character but also an
excess of character could prevent one from living a life in accordance with
virtue. Thus, consider the notion of courage as a virtue. On the one hand, if
one runs away or avoids a challenge that one is more than able to handle,
then it may be said that one possesses cowardice. For example, a man who
quickly runs away when he is teased or made a joke of by lesser others may be
said to show cowardice because he does not stand up and respond to such
inappropriate actions even though he is capable of doing so. On the other
hand, if a person stands firm in the face of a challenge he or she does not
have resources to handle, then it may be said that the individual is rash or
foolish. For example, a man who refuses to flee a situation in which he is
about to be physically threatened by a mob of individuals would be said to
exhibit foolishness. Within Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, therefore, the
truly courageous individual is one who demonstrates the ability to engage in
the proper proportion or amount of courageousness as determined by the
context and resources at hand. Thus, the virtue of courage resides between
the vice of cowardice (not having or demonstrating sufficient courage in

INTRODUCTION 5
 appropriate situations) and the vice of foolhardiness (having or demonstrat-
ing too much courage in inappropriate situations). What is important is that
for Aristotle, the pursuit of eudaimonea, in contrast to the Epicurean pursuit
of pleasure, required individuals to keep self-enhancing tendencies bounded
and in check by evaluating the goodness of those characteristics against the
outcomes they produced (Barnes, 1982). Yet, it is worth noting that some
self-critical tendencies were also considered to represent potential virtues.
For example, Aristotle considered shame as a virtue that resided between the
extremes of disgrace (showing too much shame) and shamelessness (showing
too little shame) when bad actions are committed by a good man. In these
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

ways, Aristotle appreciated the possibility that all virtues could easily be-
come vices if the proper amount was not expressed in different situations.

MODERN VIEWS OF (DYSFUNCTIONAL) SELF-CRITICISM

AND (FUNCTIONAL) SELF-ENHANCEMENT

Whereas classical views may have been more open to the idea of self-
criticism and self-enhancement as being adaptive and maladaptive, respec-
tively, modern views have tended to reflect the opposite idea (see Figure
1.1).

From Psychoanalysis to Cognitive Theory: The Tyranny of the Bad and

Negative Self

In modern times, many leading psychological theories of psychopathol-

ogy hold that negative schemas of the self are a major contributor to or cause
of mental illness. Within classical psychoanalytic theory, Freud (1933/1965,
1940/1964) believed the psyche comprised three distinct functions: the id,
the ego, and the superego. When these different functions operate without
extreme conflict, then anxiety is avoided. However, in some cases, intrapsy-
chic conflict arises and anxiety or neurosis can result. Thus, a strict and un-
forgiving superego that quickly squelches individual passions and desires to
attain a desired object can lead to emotional disturbance. Indeed, several
psychodynamic theorists following Freud expanded on this point, arguing
that self-critical behaviors were the root of psychopathology. For example,
Horney (1950) referred to the "tyranny of the should" and argued that indi-
viduals become neurotic when they are driven by critical inner commands to
satisfy some idealized image of the self. Along those lines, humanistic psy-
chologists have also focused on how negative perceptions of the self as defi-
cient, undesirable, or unworthy lead to poor health and an inability to reach
one's maximum potential (Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1951, 1961).
In addition to psychodynamic and humanistic theories, modern cogni-
tive theories have tended to emphasize self-critical behaviors, broadly de-

6 EDWARD C. CHANG
 Popular Ancient Views Popular Modern Views

Adaptive Maladaptive
Self-Criticism

Self-Enhancement Maladaptive Adaptive

Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

Figure 1.1. An example of how views of self-criticism and self-enhancement have

changed across the ages.

fined, as antecedents to mental disturbance. For example, Beck (1976) pro

posed that a pessimistic triad involving negative schemas about the self, fu-
ture, and the world was causally related to emotional disorders. Over the
years, however, cognitive models have tended to focus most of their atten-
tion on negative schemas involving the self. For example, over three de-
cades, works by Seligman and his colleagues (Garber & Seligman, 1980;
Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993; Seligman, 1975) have shown that hold-
ing a pessimistic explanatory style for understanding why events happen to
individuals has an impact on psychological and physical well-being. Beyond
a pessimistic explanatory style, researchers have also found other negative
self-schemas involved in instigating, intensifying, or reinforcing the experi-
ence of various emotional disturbances (e.g., Blatt, 2004; Ellis, 1962, 2001;
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). In all, growing evidence points to self-critical be-
haviors as a cause of or concomitant with maladjustment and negative emo-
tional outcomes.

Thinking Positively and Feeling Good: The Emergence of Positive

Psychology

Just as researchers have found self-criticism to represent a maladaptive

force in modem life, other researchers have found self-enhancement to rep-
resent an adaptive force linked to good health and well-being (Taylor, 1989).
In that regard, Taylor and Brown's (1988) seminal review of the empirical
literature on self-enhancement has become the center of much interest and
discussion over the past two decades. On the basis of their review, these
researchers found that healthy individuals, in contrast to unhealthy or dis-
tressed individuals, often engage in a variety of self-enhancing behaviors (e.g.,

INTRODUCTION 7
 overly positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of personal control,
and unrealistic optimism for the self). As a result, self-enhancement has be-
come a prominent psychological variable for understanding why and how
individuals remain positive and resilient to negative experiences (Hoyle,
Kernis, Leary, & Baldwin, 1999).
The importance of self-enhancement has been underscored in more
recent years with the emergence of a positive focus in psychology (Carr, 2004).
Building on earlier works that focused on trying to understand ways in which
individuals may optimally develop and interact with their changing envi-
ronments (e.g., Antonovsky, 1979; Jahoda, 1958; Maslow, 1954; Rogers,
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

1961), Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) argued for the development of

a positive psychology that had as its aim "to begin to catalyze a change in the
focus of psychology from preoccupation only with repairing the worst things
in life to also building positive qualities" (p. 5). Similar points have also been
raised by other researchers interested in studying positive aspects of human
behavior and functioning (e.g., McCullough & Snyder, 2000; Sheldon &
King, 2001; cf. Chang & Sanna, 2003). From the standpoint of positive psy-
chology, it is crucial not only to study factors that are related to psychologi-
cal dysfunction but also to study self-enhancement variables such as opti-
mism and hope that have been related to positive psychological functioning
and to other character strengths (Aspinwall & Staudinger, 2003; Peterson,
2006; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Snyder & Lopez, 2007). Moreover, there
has been growing interest in positive psychological applications to foster
greater happiness and well-being in individuals, groups, and communities
(Linley& Joseph, 2004).

CULTURE'S MANY LENSES: A DIFFERENT LOOK AT

SELF-CRITICISM AND SELF-ENHANCEMENT

The modem notion of self-criticism as bad and self-enhancement as

good may be more common in the West and less common in the East
(Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997; cf. Takano & Osaka,
1999). Western cultures are typically considered to be individualistic given
their emphasis on attending to the needs of the self over others (Greenwald,
1980; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984). Thus, for most Westerners the
attainment of personal happiness rather than group happiness is highly re-
garded and sought after, as codified and expressed in historical works such as
the Declaration of Independence of the United States. Therefore, it is not
too surprising that in Western cultures, maybe especially in the United States
(Brandt, 1970; Held, 2002), conditions associated with a lack of self-interest,
such as anhedonia, an inability to experience personal pleasures, and depen-
dency, a condition defined by a tendency to subordinate one's needs to those
of others, are seen typically as signs of psychological dysfunction or mental

8 EDWARD C. CHANG
 illness (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Self-enhancement for West-
erners is thus believed to represent a constructive process that allows them to
maintain and support the independent self (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Eastern cultures (i.e., cultures found in many Asian countries) have
been considered collectivist, given their focus on fostering a view of the self
as fundamentally interrelated with significant others (Doi, 1971/1973; Markus
& Kitayama, 1991). Hence, attending to significant others, harmonious in-
terdependence with them, and fitting in not only are valued but also are
often strongly expected among members living within these cultures. Thus,
for example, in contrast to many Western psychological approaches that fo-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

cus largely on treating and strengthening internal attributes of an indepen-

dent self (Prilleltensky, 1989; Sarason, 1981), a key objective of some indig-
enous Japanese therapies is to help clients overcome and transcend a focus
on the immediate and independent self (e.g., Morita, 1928/1998). One finds
that the self fostered in Eastern cultures, as in Japan, is interdependent with
significant others, such that important others "participate actively and con-
tinuously in the definition of the interdependent self (Markus & Kitayama,
1991, p. 227). Therefore, self-criticism for Easterners is believed to represent
a constructive process that allows them to maintain and support the interde-
pendent self or the group. Taken together, these culturally different patterns
indicate a need to consider more inclusive models and a need to situate the
field's understanding of self-criticism and self-enhancement.

OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT VOLUME

What this brief philosophical and historical examination of self-

criticism and self-enhancement shows is that self-criticism and self-enhance-
ment represent patterns of thought found throughout history. In addition, it
also shows that "negative" constructs such as self-criticism may not always be
bad and "positive" constructs such as self-enhancement may not always be
good (Chang, 2001). With that in mind, the contributors to this volume
were asked to reflect on different and complex (sometimes complemen-
tary, sometimes competing) truths regarding the usefulness of self-criticism
and self-enhancement on the basis of their own theoretical approaches,
scientific investigations, and clinical work involving these robust psycho-
logical constructs.
The present volume consists of three main parts. Part I focuses on popular
notions of self-enhancement as good and self-criticism as bad. In chapter 2,
Margaret A. Marshall and Jonathon D. Brown start with a new look at Tay-
lor and Brown's (1988) original contention that self-enhancement behav-
iors, or positive illusions, are psychologically beneficial. They then provide a
careful review and evaluation of recent findings related to the study of posi-
tive illusions and show how these findings are consistent with a causal model

INTRODUCTION 9
 of adaptation, resilience, and growth involving positive affective states, in-
terpersonal relationships, and coping. In chapter 3, Suzanne C. Segerstrom
and Abbey R. Roach focus on the important role of self-enhancement in
physical health. Their review of the literature shows that self-enhancement
variables such as self-esteem, optimism, and control are frequently linked to
a wide range of positive health outcomes, including lower cardiovascular re-
activity, better recovery from surgery, and greater longevity. In chapter 4,
Christian Holle and Rick Ingram focus on the psychological hazards of self-
criticism. On the basis of a review of major clinical models of self-criticism,
these authors discuss how and why self-criticism is so strongly linked to affec-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

tive disorders. These authors specifically examine commonalities between

popular cognitive and psychodynamic models of depression, as well as note
the importance of recent works on perfectionism. In chapter 5, Jill M. Holm-
Denoma, Ainhoa Otamendi, and Thomas E. Joiner Jr. focus on examining
the damaging effects of self-criticism in the interpersonal realm. They dis-
cuss why self-critical individuals often experience struggles in a variety of
social domains, including marital and romantic relationships and parent-
child dyads, and consider possible mechanisms that might account for these
damaging effects.
Complementing the first part, Part II focuses on the less popular but
equally compelling notions of self-criticism as good and self-enhancement as
bad. In chapter 6, Julie K. Norem focuses on the construct of defensive pessi-
mism as a positive self-critical tool. Her review of the literature on defensive
pessimism shows that it is linked to positive outcomes for individuals by help-
ing them to generate the necessary motivation and energy to pursue a variety
of performance goals. In chapter 7, Takeshi Hamamura and Steven J. Heine
focus on an intriguing discussion of the positive functions of self-criticism in
non-Westerners. These authors argue that for Japanese, self-criticism is
strongly and positively tied to self-improvement and face-maintenance pro-
cesses, which are different from the function of self-criticism found in West-
erners. That is, for Japanese, unlike North Americans, self-criticism is often
used to improve themselves to avoid potential negative outcomes, including
critical evaluations from others. In chapter 8, C. Randall Colvin and Robert
Griffo focus on the potential costs of self-enhancement. These authors begin
with a discussion of the different conceptualizations of self-enhancement in
the literature and end with a review of recent findings pointing to various
situations in which self-enhancement has been found to be associated with
narcissism and poor psychological adjustment. In chapter 9, William M. P.
Klein and Katrina L. Cooper focus on the physical health costs of self-en-
hancement. These authors begin with an examination of some of the meth-
odological problems that have existed in past studies on the link between
self-enhancement and health outcomes, review findings regarding the effect
of self-enhancement on health outcomes, and end with a discussion of po-

10 EDWARD C.CHANG
 tential factors that may moderate the link between self-enhancement biases
and negative health outcomes.
To integrate the rich and diverse views represented in the previous two
parts, Part III focuses on an appreciation of self-criticism and self-enhance-
ment as both good and bad. In chapter 10, James A. Shepperd, Patrick J.
Carroll, and Kate Sweeny examine the function of self-enhancement and
self-criticism as it changes across different (temporal) contexts. In chapter
11, Constantine Sedikides and Michelle Luke provide a broad conceptual
framework for understanding the complex conditions around which self-criti-
cism and self-enhancement processes may operate in a constructive or sym-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

biotic fashion, and when they may operate in a destructive—whether para-

sitic or antisymbiotic—fashion.
Part IV addresses some of the clinical implications of self-criticism and
self-enhancement. In chapter 12, James L. Pretzer focuses on ways to help cli-
ents who have little to no self-esteem. He begins with an emphasis on the need
to understand the client's conceptualization of self-esteem-related problems
and then moves on to a careful discussion of how therapists may help their
clients to develop a more healthy perception of themselves. In chapter 13,
Raymond M. Bergner focuses on ways to promote adaptive versus maladaptive
self-criticism. He begins with an examination of self-criticism as represented
within the clinical context and then moves on to a discussion of different
clinical strategies that may be used by therapists to foster more adaptive out-
comes, including concepts and skills related to adaptive forms of self-criticism.
The volume concludes with a look to the future. In chapter 14, myself,
Rita Chang, Lawrence J. Sanna, and Allison M. Kade discuss potential new
directions in the study of self-enhancement and self-criticism. They focus on
the need to incorporate more inclusive and integrative frameworks that may
generate new models of self-criticism and self-enhancement in future research
and practice. As a starting point, they explore recent works related to the
study of perfectionism and contingencies of self-worth.

LEARNING FROM THE PAST AND PRESENT

Before concluding this section, I would like to share two experiences I
had, one involving a patient and the other involving a student, that helped
transform my appreciation of self-criticism and self-enhancement as inter-
esting theoretical constructs into a personal recognition of these processes as
meaningful, embodied, and involving social consequences.

The Patient and the Student

As part of my training in the doctoral clinical psychology program at

the State University of New York at Stony Brook, I had to complete a 1-year

INTRODUCTION 11
 internship at an American Psychological Association-accredited site. I was
fortunate enough and honored to have been selected to do my internship at
Bellevue Hospital Center-New York University Medical Center (the same
place my father had worked at as a forensic chemist during my childhood).
During my year, I had opportunities to work with a wide variety of patients,
from children with severe school problems associated with attention-deficit/
hyperactivity disorder to adults dealing with debilitating depression and
chronic medical illness. But, of all my patients during my clinical training
year, one stood out: Ms. X. Ms. X was the first hospital patient I was assigned
to at Bellevue. She was a young lady of Asian decent, and she was particu-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

larly interested in working with an Asian intern or therapist. What made

this case particularly intriguing for me was that I could not fully understand
why she had been coming to Bellevue for psychological treatment for 4 years.
She was originally admitted with a presentation of depressed mood and anxi-
ety. Later, during the course of her first year of treatment, she was diagnosed
with dysthymic disorder, a condition indicated by chronic depressed mood.
Indeed, Ms. X reported that her self-confidence was always a bit shaky and
that she often found herself dwelling on negative aspects of herself and her
decisions, which in turn led to frequent creative blocks. But, what was so
difficult for me to clinically grasp was that Ms. X was an artist, a very success-
ful one at that. Despite having only recently graduated from art school, she
had already been selected for a number of prestigious awards and fellowships
in the arts, and her works were exhibited with some regularity at major gal-
leries in and outside the United States.
The student, Mr. Y, was in the process of finishing a degree from a
highly selective Ivy League school when he applied for admission into the
clinical program of a leading university, where I was a member of the admis-
sions committee. He had excellent academic marks and showed great prom-
ise of becoming a stellar researcher (e.g., numerous research awards, a few
authored peer-reviewed journal publications, several scientific conference
presentations). The supporting letters for him by well-known and highly re-
garded researchers were among the best I have ever read. I was so impressed
by everything I saw and read about this individual that I was ready to wel-
come him to our program. But some of the other members had very different
perceptions. In describing himself, Mr. Y talked about how he was often "self-
critical," not being very satisfied with his efforts until his goals or objectives
were satisfactorily reached. Some of the members took this personal disclo-
sure of self-criticism as a potential red flag and thought this applicant would
be a liability if we were to accept him. They viewed Mr. Y as a negative
person who would have a potential negative or disruptive influence on peers,
faculty, and the program itself. This perception emerged among some of the
members of the committee despite the fact that there was not a single piece
of evidence to base such predictions on.

12 EDWARD C.CHANG
 What the patient and the student have in common is that they embod-
ied for me the clear and present danger of living in a modern world in which
people (no matter how intelligent) hold singular views about self-criticism as
always maladaptive and self-enhancement as always adaptive. (I return to
Ms. X and Mr. Y in the final chapter of this volume.)

Final Remarks

It is clear from past and present notions of self-criticism and self-

enhancement that these constructs involve complex ideas that are some-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

times competing and sometimes complementary. Because these notions rep-

resent theoretical constructions, caution, if not skepticism, is needed regard-
ing any singular meaning or value of self-criticism and self-enhancement
across different contexts. As a result, this volume's central goal is to make
more explicit some of the complexities and commonalities related to under-
standing how, when, and why self-criticism and self-enhancement play a cen-
tral role in the way people shape and direct their lives each day. All of the
contributors of this volume are to be congratulated for not only providing
clear and compelling discussions of each construct from their particular per-
spective but also appreciating alternative, often competing, views. Indeed,
the works presented in this volume are a testimony to the fact that greater
appreciation for these constructs can be garnered to yield a better under-
standing of them in both future research and practice.

REFERENCES

American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental

disorders (4th ed., text rev.). Washington, DC: Author.
Antonovsky, A. (1979). Health, stress and coping. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Aspinwall, L. G., & Staudinger, U. M. (Eds.). (2003). A psychology of human strengths:
Fundamental questions and future directions for a positive psychology. Washington,
DC: American Psychological Association.
Barnes, ]. (1982). Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press.
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York: Interna-
tional Universities Press.
Blatt, S. J. (2004). Experiences of depression: Theoretical, clinical, and research perspec-
tives. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Brandt, L. W. (1970). American psychology. American Psychologist, 25, 1091-1093.
Carr, A. (2004). Positive f>s;ychoiog)>: The science of happiness and human strengths. New
York: Brunner-Routledge.
Chang, E. C. (Ed.). (2001). Optimism and pessimism: Implications for theory, research,
and practice. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

INTRODUCTION 13
 Chang, E. C., & Sanna, L. J. (Eds.)- (2003). Virtue, vice, and personality: The complex-
ity of behavior. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Doi, T. (1973). The anatonry of dependence (]. Bester, Trans.). Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha.
(Original work published in 1971)
Ellis, A. (1962). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy. Oxford, England: Lyle Stuart.
Ellis, A. (2001). Overcoming destructive beliefs, feelings, and behaviors: New directions
for rational emotive behavior therapy. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Freud, S. (1964). The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund
Freud: Vol. 23. An outline of psychoanalysis. (J. Strachey, Ed. & Trans.). London:
Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1940)
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

Freud, S. (1965). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. New York: Norton. (Origi-
nal work published 1933)
Garber,J.,&Seligman, ME. P. (Eds.). (1980). Human helplessness: Theory and appli-
cations. New York: Academic Press.
Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal
history. American Psychologist, 35, 603-618.
Heidegger, M. (2002). The essence of truth: On Plato's cave allegory and Theaetetus
(T. Sadler, Trans.). New York: Continuum. (Original work published 1931)
Held, B. S. (2002). The tyranny of the positive attitude in America: Observation
and speculation. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 58, 965-991.
Horney, K. (1950). Neurosis and human growth: The struggle toward self-realization.
New York: Norton.
Hoyle, R. H., Kernis, M. H., Leary, M. R., & Baldwin, M. W. (1999). Selfhood: Iden-
tity, esteem, regulation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Jahoda, M. (1958). Current concepts of positive mental health. New York: Basic Books.
Jones, H. (1989). The Epicurean tradition. London: Duckworth.
Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., Matsumoto, H., & Norasakkunkit, V. (1997). Indi-
vidual and collective processes in the construction of the self: Self-enhance-
ment in the United States and self-criticism in Japan, journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 72, 1245-1267.
Linley, P. A., & Joseph, S. (Eds.). (2004). Positive psychology in practice. Hoboken,
NJ: Wiley.
Marinoff, L. (1999). Plato not Prozac! Applying eternal wisdom to everyday problems.
New York: HarperCollins.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cogni-
tion, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253.
Maslow, A. (1954). Motivation and personality. New York: Harper &. Row.
McCullough, M. E., &. Snyder, C. R. (2000). Classical sources of human strength:
Revisiting an old home and building a new one. Journal of Social and Clinical
Psychology, 19, 1-10.
Morita, S. (1998). Morita therapy and the true nature of anxiety-based disorders
(shinkeishitsu) (A. Kondo, Trans.). New York: State University of New York
Press. (Original work published in 1928)

14 EDWARD C.CHANG
 Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2003). Women who think too much: How to break free of
overthinking and reclaim your life. New York: Holt.
Peterson, C. (2006). A primer in positive psychology. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Peterson, C., Maier, S. F., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1993). Learned helpkssness: A theory
for the age of personal control. New York: Oxford University Press.
Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: A hand-
book and classification. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association;
and New York: Oxford University Press.
Prilleltensky, I. (1989). Psychology and the status quo. American Psychologist, 44,
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

795-802.
Rogers, C. (1951). Client-centered therapy: Its current practice, implications, and theory.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Rogers, C. (1961). On becoming a person. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Sarason, S. B. (1981). An asocial psychology and a misdirected clinical psychology.
American Psychologist, 36, 827-836.
Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness: On depression, development, and death. San
Francisco: Freeman.
Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An intro-
duction. American Psychologist, 55, 5-14.
Sheldon, K. M., & King, L. A. (2001). Why positive psychology is necessary. Ameri-
can Psychologist, 56, 216-217.
Snyder, C. R., & Lopez, S. J. (2007). Positive psychology: The scientific and practical
explorations of human strengths. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Takano, Y., & Osaka, E. (1999). An unsupported common view: Comparing Japan
and U.S. on individualism/collectivism. Asian journal of Social Psychology, 2,
311-341.
Taylor, S. E. (1989). Positive illusions: Creative self-deception and the healthy mind. New
York: Basic Books.
Taylor, S. E., &. Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well being: A social psychological
perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210.
Weisz, ]. R., Rothbaum, F. M., & Blackburn, T. C. (1984). Standing out and stand-
ing in: The psychology of control in America and Japan. American Psychologist,
39, 955-969.
Whitehead, A. N. (1929). Process and reality: An essay in cosmology. New York:
Macmillan.

INTRODUCTION 15