[G.R. No. 166337. March 7, 2005.

BAYANIHAN MUSIC PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,vs. BMG

RECORDS (PILIPINAS) AND JOSE MARI CHAN, ET
AL., respondent.

Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Third Division of
this Court dated March 7, 2005.
Subject of this petition for review oncertiorari is the Decision dated December
14, 2004 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69626, upholding the Order
dated August 24, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 90, which
found no merit in petitioner's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, along with the Order dated January 10, 2002, which denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
On July 16, 1973, private respondent Jose Mari Chan (Chan) entered into a
contract with petitioner Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. (Bayanihan), whereunder
the former assigned to the latter all his rights, interests and participation over his
musical composition "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While". On March 11, 1976, the
parties entered into a similar contract over Chan's other musical composition entitled
"Afraid For Love To Fade".
On the strength of the abovementioned contracts, Bayanihan applied for and
was granted by the National Library a Certificate of Copyright Registration for each of
the two musical compositions, thus: November 19, 1973, for the song "Can We Just
Stop and Talk A While" and on May 21, 1980, for the song "Afraid for Love To Fade."
Apparently, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner Bayanihan, Chan
authorized his co-respondent BMG Records (Pilipinas) [BMG] to record and distribute
the aforementioned musical compositions in a then recently released album of singer
Lea Salonga.
In separate letters both dated December 7, 1999, petitioner Bayanihan
informed respondents Chan and BMG of its existing copyrights over the subject
musical compositions and the alleged violation of such right by the two. Demands
were made on both to settle the matter with Bayanihan. However no settlement was
reached by the parties.
Hence, on August 8, 2000, Bayanihan filed with the Regional Trial Court at
Quezon City a complaint against Chan and BMG for violation of Section 216
of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as theIntellectual Property Code of the
Philippines, with a prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent BMG from further recording
and distributing the subject musical compositions in whatever form of musical
products, and Chan from further granting any authority to record and distribute the
same musical compositions.
In its answer, BMG contended, among others, that: (1) the acts of recording
and publication sought to be enjoined had already been consummated, thereby
rendering moot Bayanihan's prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction; and (2)
there is no clear showing that petitioner Bayanihan would be greatly damaged by the
refusal of the prayed for TRO and/or preliminary injunction. BMG also pleaded a
cross-claim against its co-respondent Chan for violation of his warrantythat his
musical compositions are free from claims of third persons, and a counterclaim for
damages against petitioner Bayanihan.
Chan, for his part, filed his own answer to the complaint, thereunder alleging
that: (1) it was never his intention to divest himself of all his rights and interest over
the musical compositions in question; (2) the contracts he entered into with
Bayanihan are mere music publication agreements giving Bayanihan, as assignee,
the power to administer his copyright over his two songs and to act as the exclusive
publisher thereof; (3) he was not cognizant of the application made by and the
subsequent grant of copyrights to Bayanihan; and (4) Bayanihan was remissed in its
obligations under the contracts because it failed to effectively advertise his musical
compositions for almost twenty (20) years, hence, he caused the rescission of said
contracts in 1997. Chan also included in his answer a counterclaim for damages
against Bayanihan.
After hearing the parties, the lower court came out with an order denying
Bayanihan's prayer for TRO, saying, thus:
After carefully considering the arguments and evaluating the evidence
presented by counsels, this Court finds that the plaintiff has not been able to
show its entitlement to the relief of TRO as prayed for in its verified complaint
(see Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended),
hence, this Court is of the considered and humble view that the ends of
justice shall be served better if the aforecited application is denied.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the aforecited application or prayer
for the issuance of a TRO is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, the same court, in its subsequent Order dated August 24,
2001, 2likewise denied Bayanihan's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:
After carefully going over the pleadings and the pertinent portions of
the records insofar as they are pertinent to the issue under consideration, this
Court finds that the plaintiff has not been able to show its entitlement to the
relief of preliminary injunction as prayed for in its verified complaint (see
Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended),
 hence, this Court is of the considered and humble view that the ends of
justice shall be served better if the aforecited application is denied. (see
alsoOrder dated July 16, 2001).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application or prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Its motion for a reconsideration of the same order having been likewise denied
by the trial court in its next Order of January 10, 2002,3 petitioner Bayanihan then
went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, thereat docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 69626, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
issuing the Orders of August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2001, denying its prayers for
a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration, respectively.
In the herein assailed Decision dated December 14, 2004, the Court of
Appeals upheld the challenged orders of the trial court and accordingly dismissed
Bayanihan petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding neither flaw of jurisdiction nor taint of grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed Orders of the respondent
court dated August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2002, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
Hence, Bayanihan's present recourse.
It is petitioner's submission that the appellate court committed reversible error
when it dismissed its petition for certiorari and upheld the trial court's denial of its
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner insists that as assignee of the
copyrights over the musical compositions in question, it has a clear legal right to a
writ of preliminary injunction; that respondents BMG and Chan violated its copyrights
over the same musical compositions; that despite knowledge by respondent BMG of
petitioner's copyrights over the said musical compositions, BMG continues to record
and distribute the same, to petitioner's great and irreparable injury.
We DENY.
We have constantly reminded courts that there is no power, the exercise of
which is more delicate and requires greater caution, deliberation and sound
discretion, or which is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an
injunction. A court should, as much as possible, avoid issuing the writ which would
effectively dispose of the main case without trial.
Here, nothing is more evident than the trial court's abiding awareness of the
extremely difficult balancing act it had to perform in dealing with petitioner's prayer for
injunctive reliefs. Conscious, as evidently it is, of the fact that there is manifest abuse
of discretion in the issuance of an injunctive writ if the following requisites provided for
by law are not present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to
be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a
violation of such right, 5 the trial court threaded the correct path in denying petitioner's
prayer therefor. For, such a writ should only be granted if a party is clearly entitled
thereto. 6
Of course, while a clear showing of the right to an injunctive writ is necessary
albeit its existence need not be conclusively established, 7 as the evidence required
therefor need not be conclusive or complete, still, for an applicant, like petitioner
Bayanihan, to be entitled to the writ, he is required to show that he has the ostensible
right to the final, relief prayed for in its complaint. 8 Here, the trial court did not find
ample justifications for the issuance of the writ prayed for by petitioner.
Unquestionably, respondent Chan, being undeniably the composer and author
of the lyrics of the two (2) songs, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is the
creator thereof, conformably with Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as
theIntellectual Property Code, Section 172.2 of which reads:
172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation,
irrespective of their mode or form of expression, as well as of their content,
quality and purpose.
An examination of petitioner's verified complaint in light of the two (2) contracts
sued upon and the evidence it adduced during the hearing on the application for
preliminary injunction, yields not the existence of the requisite right protectable by the
provisional relief but rather a lingering doubt on whether there is or there is no such
right. The two contracts between petitioner and Chan relative to the musical
compositions subject of the suit contain the following identical stipulations:
7. It is also hereby agreed to by the parties herein that in the event
the PUBLISHER [petitioner herein] fails to use in any manner whatsoever
within two (2) years any of the compositions covered by this contract, then
such composition may be released in favor of the WRITER and excluded
from this contract and the PUBLISHER shall execute the necessary release
in writing in favor of the WRITER upon request of the WRITER;

xxx xxx xxx

9. This contract may be renewed for a period of two-and-one-half
(2 1/2) years at the option of the PUBLISHER. Renewal may be made by the
PUBLISHER by advising the WRITER of such renewal in writing at least five
(5) days before the expiration of this contract. 9
It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1,
1975 andMarch 11, 1978, respectively, there being neither an allegation, much less
proof, that petitioner Bayanihan ever made use of the compositions within the two-
year period agreed upon by the parties.
 Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the selfsame two (2)
contracts, suffice it to say that such purported copyrights are not presumed to subsist
in accordance with Section 218[a] and [b], of theIntellectual Property
Code, 10because respondent Chan had put in issue the existence thereof.
It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along with others,
on July 30, 1997, or almost two years before petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort of
complaint/demand letter dated December 7, 1999 regarding the recent
"use/recording of the songs 'Can We Just Stop and Talk A While' and 'Afraid for Love
to Fade,"' or almost three (3) years before petitioner filed its complaint on August 8,
2000, therein praying, inter alia, for injunctive relief. By then, it would appear that
petitioner had no more right that is protectable by injunction.
Lastly, petitioner's insinuation that the trial court indulged in generalizations and
was rather skimpy in dishing out its reasons for denying its prayer for provisional
injunctive relief, the same deserves scant consideration. For sure, the manner by
which the trial court crafted its challenged orders is quite understandable, lest it be
subjected to a plausible suspicion of having prejudged the merits of the main case.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO

Clerk of Court

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas; Rollo, pp. 49-62.
2. Rollo, p. 148.
3. Rollo, p. 162.
4. Rollo, pp. 49-63.
5. Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 106043, March 4, 1996 citing Sales v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
169 SCRA 109 [1989].
6. Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 686, [2000].
7. Developers Group of Companies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 715, March
8, 1993.
8. Ibid.
9. Rollo, pp. 58-59.
10. Section 218. 2. In an action under this Chapter:
(a) Copyright shall be presumed to subsist in the work or other subject
matter to which the action relates if the defendant does not put in issue the question
whether copyright subsist in the work or subject matter; and
(b) Where the subsistence of the copyright is established, the plaintiff shall
be presumed to be the owner of the copyright if he claims to be the owner of the
copyright and the defendant does not put in issue the question of his ownership;