: * So DECLASSIFIED Authoriy EO. 12463, 8yTENana dae NSC REVIEW GROUP MEETING Thursday, April 16, 1970 waa Time and Place: 2:45 P,M, - 3:15 P,M,, White House Situation Room Subject: Current Issues of European Security (NSSM 83) Participation: Chairman - Henry A. Kissinger JOS - Gen. F, T. Unger State - Martin Hillenbrand OEP - Haakon Lindjord Donald McHenry William 1. Cargo ACDA - Howard Furnas Defense - Richard Ware NSG Staif - William Hyland Gol, Richard Jennings Helmut Sonnenfelat Richard Kennedy cA ~ Edward Proctor Jeanne W. Davis SUMMARY OF DECISIONS It was agreed: 1, to drop the discussion of mutual balanced force reductions from the IG paper, without prejudice, pending completion of the study requested in NSSM 92; 2, to keep the IG paper as a basic Review Group paper for the NATO Ministerial Meeting and to clear with the President the guidance telegram to Ambassador Ellsworth; 3, to prepare a new paper for an NSC meeting in May, discussing the broader question of European security over a three-to-five year period, including Germaryand Berlin, with a view to: (a) getting Presidential guidance on a US program for the Ministerial Meeting; and (b) getting a Presidential decision on our objectives over the longer term. -|e £00. 12963 _ Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting, saying he saw two issues: (1) the question of the instruction to Ambassador Ellsworth for his participation in preparations for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in May as contained ina State cable to Ellsworth now in the White House for clearance; and (2) the longer-term question of where we are trying to go in the area of European Security, The IG paper does not, nor was it asked to, address the longer term issues, He said the President wants an NSC meeting in early May to shape the program for the Ministerial Meeting and to discuss where we are going in the longer term, but this need not hold up the instruction to Ellsworth. He said the President wants the same sort of analysis of the question of balanced force reductions as that done for SALT. This would not, however, preclude our taking a somewhat forthcoming position on MBFR at the Ministerial Meeting, For the May NSC meeting, we needed a discussion of the general issue of European Security -- what we are trying to do over a three-to-five year period rather than for any one meeting. We did a little of this at the NSC meeting which Prime Minister Wilson attended, and we might bring back some of those issues in the May NSC meeting. He asked if anyone had any problems with the IG paper. Mr, Ware said Defense had no problems except for the sheet of up-dates ‘circulated at the table. He noted one difference of opinion between Defense and JCS on the discussion of various types of reductions on Page 11 of the Precis, General Unger commented that the JCS did not believe this was the proper forum to discuss the various forms of equal and asymmetrical reductions, Dr. Kissinger suggested we drop out MBFR from the present paper without prejudice, pending completion of the analytical study requested in NSSM 92. Mr, Hillenbrand and Mr, Ware agreed. Mr, Sonnenfeldt asked if there was likely to be pressure to include a state- ment on criteria in the communique following the May Ministerial, Mr, Hillenbrand thought this would not be a major problem. He thought the Germans now recognized that model-building was not a profitable approach to the problem and were now talking more about political considerations. SECRET | | | | | | |hoe? DECLASSIFIED | Authoriy £0. 29 Tenia bac cp hd General Unger cited the list of studies which still had to be completed, and thought it was previous to try to develop criteria for Ellsworth at this time, Dr, Kissinger asked if we could not simply say that we were in the process of developing our views on criteria. Mr. Hillenbrand replied that Ellsworth doesn't need guidance’ on criteria now. The issue is with the NATO military people and they will not be ready to discuss it in the May meeting, Mr. Cargo agreed that we could sidetrack discussion of criteria until the NSSM 92 study has been completed. Dr, Kissinger remarked that he was not impressed by the clatity of; expression: by various Europeans on MBFR, Mr. Hillenbrand cited the views of Helmut Schmidt that any US unilateral reduction would be better within the context of MFBR, Dr, Kissinger remarked that Schmidt would rather retain US forces undiminished and take his chances on Soviet forces. ‘Mr. Cargo said he thought the analysis of the issues and the options in the IG paper had produced guidance toward answers to various, questions. He cited several issues in the paper where one of the options was, in fact, now being followed as present policy. He thought that in this paper, more than in most, there are indications of policy trends and decisions throughout. Dr. Kissinger agreed that the paper incorporated a statement of existing policy ae an option under each issue. He commented, however, that the Slternatives were aot always stated in the most persuasive manner-- possibly because the alternatives themselves were not the most persuasive, He agreed that, with regard to the immediate objective of handling the Ministerial mécting, many of the issues have had informal determinations. However, he did want to give the President a 48-hour crack at the cable of instruction to Elisworth, although he anticipated no major problems. He thought the President, and the Government, would profit (rom a more systematic analysis of where we think we are going; what are our objectives; what are the assumptions under which we are operating? He thought we were making certain pat assumptions, listing the best that can happen if we pursue one course, with no clear idea of what we would do if things @id not go as we had predicted, He said the President responds best to SECRETfT - ae a presentation of our objectives, our prospects and why we take the positions we do, and was willing to leave the tactics to the Departments or to various ad hoc groups. He suggested we point the NSC meeting toward our objectives and prospects, with a view to getting an expression of what the President wants to get out of the May Ministeral meeting. He noted that the cable to Ellsworth asks for his comments and does not foreclose anything so far as the Ministerial meeting is concerned. He asked how we should address the question of Germany and Berlin, which the IG paper had indicated were at the heart of the issue of European security. He agreed that we did not need this for the Ministerial meeting, but thought it should be folded in to the broader paper. Mr. Hill \d replied that the issues were partially addressed in the general guidance paper which had been developed for our Ambassador for the Quadripartite Talks which had been approved by the President, He thought this paper would take us through our immediate involvement with the issue. He agreed no coherent paper had been prepared, nor had one been requested, but said various papers had been presented to Secretary Rogers on the subject. Dr. Kissinger asked Colonel Kennedy to get out a request for such a paper. When we do the more general paper, we should include @ discussion of the evolution of Germany and its impact on Berlin. He then turned to the proposals for various NATO institutions, asking if State favored continuation of the ad hoc groups. Mr, Hillenbrand replied that they were proposing two new institutions, oth of which were ad hoc and optical in nature: (1) an Allied Commission to study steps toward MBFR and the question of coordination with the East; and (2) a group to study enhanced East-West cooperation in matters other than those affecting security, The idea was to divert the countries who want an immediate Security Conference and to give them an alternative method of proceeding these problems. Dr. Kissinger asked how this differed from the UK plan. Mr, Hillenbrand replied that the UK was suggesting a permanent Commission with a permanent Secretariat. We are asking only for an ad hoc Western group to explore the issues, not the establishment of a bureaucracy. Dr. Kissinger asked for views on this proposal. General Unger replied that the JCS would opt for the ad hoc approach on the MBFR to develop a program of soundings with the East. SECRETst “oe Dr. Kissinger asked if this would not be a semi-permanent ad hoc group. Mr. Hillenbrand, thought: the group would survive as long as the subject is under active consideration, Dr. Kissinger agreed that it was possible that the question of MBFR might fade away, but ‘thought the problems of East-West relations were with us permanently, Mr, Hillenbrand commented that the Soviets might abort any discussion of East-West relations, in which case the ad hoe group might fold up. Mr, Cargo noted that the idea of an open-ended NATO committee on East-West relations was not a bad idea. Mr, Sonnenfeldt asked what the French attitude would be on committees of this Kind if they assume any coordinating function, Mr. Hillenbrand thought the French would not oppose them, Mr. Sonnenfeldt asked if the French would feel they were bound by the committees’ recommendations. Mr. Cargo replied he was not sure on the MBFR committee, Mr, Hillenbrand said the French would not like the MBFR group since it smacked of bloc discussion rather than unilateral country-to-country exchanges, He thought they might "passively" participate. Dr, Kissinger asked if the committee would encourage each country to explore the possibilities on its own, Mr. Hillenbrand replied no, but noted that some countries were doing it anyway. He thought the group could bring these individual explorations into a conceptual framework. Dr. Kissinger asked if the individual countries would report to the committee on their soundings. Mr, Hillenbrand replied yes, and that the committee could serve as a focal point for the various soundings. Mr. Cargo noted that the paper's recommendations on the MBFR group were a forward step but were within the range we can tolerate since they contain no commitment exceeding what we are already studying. SECRET-6 Dr, Kissinger noted that this was the approach of Option 3 of the paper. ‘The US studies on MBFR could phase into the work of a NATO-MBFR ‘committee. Mr. Hillenbrand added that the other committee on non-security questions could deal with such things as the ECE meeting on the enviornment in Prague. He said we were trying to take the steam out of the Scandinavians, the Dutch and others and dispel the image that the US was negative to approaches to the East. Also, he said, the SALT talks had created a desire on the part of the smaller countries for compensatory moves in areas of interest to them, At the same time, creation-of these institution does not commit us to anything, Dr. Kissinger summed up, saying we should keep the IG paper as a basic Review Group paper for the Ministerial Meeting, with the State cable as interpretation, He wanted to give the President over-night with the cable but did not anticipate problems with it. We should then prepare a new paper for the NSC meeting, keyed to how we see the evolution of the issues, including Germany and Berlin, with a view to getting from that meeting a Presidential statement of his objectives and some decisions to help State after the Ministerial Meeting.