Daf Ditty Yoma 36: Confessional Priorites

"He . . . is charmed from moving"1

Shakespeare, The Tempest Act 1, scene 2

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Nate Dendy (Ariel), Joby Earle (Ferdinand), Tom Nelis (Prospero), and Charlotte Graham (Miranda). Directed by Aaron Posner
and Teller. 2014.

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My foot my tutor? i.e., You are out of place, as though my foot were trying to teach me how to
behave.

Prospero, the former duke of Milan, who has been stranded on a barren island for twelve years
with his daughter, Miranda, explains to her that he used his magic to raise the storm and that he
ensured that no one on the ship was harmed. He then tells her how, twelve years before, his brother
Antonio conspired with Alonso, king of Naples, to usurp Prospero’s dukedom and put him and
Miranda to sea, where they happened upon the barren island that is now their home. Having
charmed Miranda asleep, Prospero summons the spirit Ariel, hears Ariel’s report of the tempest,
and gives him further orders. Prospero wakes Miranda, and they visit Caliban, whom Prospero
threatens with torture if he will not continue his labors. Ariel, invisible, entices Ferdinand, son
and heir to Alonso, into the presence of Prospero and Miranda. Prospero, delighted that
Ferdinand and Miranda fall instantly in love, puts false obstacles in their way by accusing
Ferdinand of treason and by using charms to enslave him.

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MISHNA: The High Priest comes and stands next to his bull, and his bull was standing between
the Entrance Hall and the altar with its head facing to the south and its face to the west. And
the priest stands to the east of the bull, and his face points to the west. And the priest places
his two hands on the bull and confesses.

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And this is what he would say in his confession: Please, God, I have sinned, I have done wrong,
and I have rebelled before You, I and my family. Please, God, grant atonement, please, for
the sins, and for the wrongs, and for the rebellions that I have sinned, and done wrong, and
rebelled before You, I and my family, as it is written in the Torah of Moses your servant:

‫ ְלַטֵהר‬,‫ַביּוֹם ַהֶזּה ְיַכֵפּר ֲﬠֵליֶכם‬-‫ל ִכּי‬ 30 For on this day shall atonement be made for you, to
,‫ ִלְפֵני ְיהָוה‬,‫ ַחטּ ֹאֵתיֶכם‬,‫ ִמֹכּל‬:‫ֶאְתֶכם‬ cleanse you; from all your sins shall ye be clean before
.‫ִתְּטָהרוּ‬ the LORD.
Lev 16:30

“For on this day atonement shall be made for you to cleanse you of all your sins; you shall be
clean before the Lord” And the priests and the people who were in the courtyard respond after
he recites the name of God: Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom forever and all time.

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§ The Sages taught in the Tosefta: How does he confess? What is the formula of the confession?
It is: I have done wrong, I have rebelled, and I have sinned. And likewise, with regard to the
scapegoat, it says that the confession is in that order: “And he shall confess over it all of the
children of Israel’s wrongdoings and all their rebellions and all their sins” (Leviticus
16:21). And likewise, when God revealed Himself to Moses it says: “Forgiving wrongdoing
and rebellion and sin”(Exodus 34:7). This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis
say that the meaning of these terms is: Wrongdoings are intentional transgressions, and likewise
it says: “That soul shall be cut off, it bears its guilt” (Numbers 15:31). This refers to sins
committed intentionally.

Rebellions are rebellious transgressions, when one not only intends to violate a prohibition but
does so as an act of defiance against God. And likewise, it says:

-}‫ ְיהוָֹשָׁפט ֶמֶל‬-‫ז ַוֵיֶּל} ַו ִיְּשַׁלח ֶאל‬ 7 And he went and sent to Jehoshaphat the king of
--‫שׁע ִבּי‬ ַ ‫ ֶמֶל} מוָֹאב ָפּ‬,‫ְיהוָּדה ֵלאֹמר‬ Judah, saying: 'The king of Moab hath rebelled against
;‫ ַלִמְּלָחָמה‬,‫מוָֹאב‬-‫ֲהֵתֵל} ִאִתּי ֶאל‬ me; wilt thou go with me against Moab to battle?' And
‫ ָכּמוֹ ִני ָכמוֹ„ ְכַּﬠִמּי‬,‫ַויּ ֹאֶמר ֶאֱﬠֶלה‬ he said: 'I will go up; I am as thou art, my people as thy
.„‫ְכַﬠֶמּ„ ְכּסוַּסי ְכּסוֶּסי‬ people, my horses as thy horses.'
II Kings 3:7

“The king of Moab rebelled [pasha] against me” And it is said:

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 ,‫ ַﬠד‬,‫ ְיהוָּדה‬-‫ ִמַתַּחת ַיד‬,‫כב ַו ִיְּפַשׁע ֱאדוֹם‬ 22 Yet Edom revolted from under the hand of
.‫ ָבֵּﬠת ַהִהיא‬,‫ַהיּוֹם ַהֶזּה; ָאז ִתְּפַשׁע ִלְבָנה‬ Judah, unto this day. Then did Libnah revolt at the
same time.
II Kings 8:22

“Then Livna rebelled at that time”. With regard to the phrase: All of their sins, these are
unwitting sins. And it says:

‫ֶנֶפשׁ‬--‫ ֵלאֹמר‬,‫ְבֵּני ִיְשׂ ָרֵאל‬-‫ב ַדֵּבּר ֶאל‬
,‫ֶתֱחָטא ִבְשָׁגָגה ִמֹכּל ִמְצות ְיהָוה‬-‫ִכּי‬
‫ ֵמַאַחת‬,‫ֲאֶשׁר ל ֹא ֵתָﬠֶשׂיָנה; ְוָﬠָשׂה‬
.‫ֵמֵהָנּה‬
2 Speak unto the children of Israel, saying: If any one
shall sin through error, in any of the things which the
LORD hath commanded not to be done, and shall do
any one of them:
Lev 4:2

“If a soul should sin unwittingly” In light of these definitions the sequence suggested by Rabbi
Meir is unlikely, as once he confessed the wrongdoings and rebellions, does he then confess
the unwitting sins?

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Rather, this is the manner in which he confesses: I have sinned, I have done wrong, and I have
rebelled before You, I and my household. And likewise, with regard to David it says in this
sequence:

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 ‫ֶהֱﬠ ִוינוּ‬ ;‫ֲאבוֵֹתינוּ‬-‫ו ָחָטאנוּ ִﬠם‬ 6 We have sinned with our fathers, we have done iniquitously,
.‫ִה ְרָשְׁﬠנוּ‬ we have dealt wickedly.
Psalm 106:6

“We have sinned along with our forefathers, we have done wrong, we have performed
evil” And likewise, with regard to Solomon it says:

,‫ ָבָּא ֶרץ‬,‫ִלָבּם‬-‫ ֶאל‬,‫מז ְוֵהִשׁיבוּ‬ 47 yet if they shall bethink themselves in the land whither
‫ָשׁם; ְוָשׁבוּ ְוִהְתַח ְנּנוּ‬-‫ֲאֶשׁר ִנְשׁבּוּ‬ they are carried captive, and turn back, and make
,‫שֵׁביֶהם ֵלאֹמר‬ ֹ ‫ ְבֶּא ֶרץ‬,„‫ֵאֶלי‬ supplication unto Thee in the land of them that carried them
.‫ ָרָשְׁﬠנוּ‬,‫ָחָטאנוּ ְוֶהֱﬠ ִוינוּ‬ captive, saying: We have sinned, and have done iniquitously,
we have dealt wickedly;
I Kings 8:47

“We have sinned, and we have done wrong, we have done evil” And likewise, with regard to
Daniel it says:

‫ והרשענו‬,‫ה ָחָטאנוּ ְוָﬠ ִוינוּ‬ 5 we have sinned, and have dealt iniquitously, and have done
‫ְוסוֹר‬ ;‫שְׁﬠנוּ( וָּמ ָרְדנוּ‬
ַ ‫)ִה ְר‬ wickedly, and have rebelled, and have turned aside from Thy
.„‫ וִּמִמְּשָׁפֶּטי‬,„‫ִמִמְּצוֶת‬ commandments and from Thine ordinances;
Dan 9:5

“We have sinned, and we have done wrong, and we have done evil, and we have rebelled”

However, according to this interpretation, what is the rationale for the sequence of that which
Moses said: Forgiving wrongdoing and rebellion and sin, where sin appears last? Moses said
before the Holy One, blessed be He: Master of the Universe, when the Jewish people sin
before you and repent, render their intentional sins like unwitting ones, forgive wrongdoing
and rebellion as if they were sin.

Summary

Confessing for what?

The Gemora cites a braisa which describes how one leans on a sacrifice. The sacrifice stood in the
north, facing the west, and the one leaning stands in the east, facing west. He leans his hands
between the animal's horns, ensuring that nothing is separating between his hands and the animal,
and confesses the sin for which he is bringing the sacrifice.

Rabbi Yossi Haglili says that for an olah he would confess for the sin of not giving the produce
gifts to the poor: leket – what falls when gathering, shichecha – what one forgets in the field, and
pe'ah – the corner of the field. Rabbi Akiva says an olah is brought for not fulfilling a positive
commandment, and for violating a transgression which triggers another positive commandment.

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The Gemora asks what their dispute is. Rabbi Yirmiya says they differ about the transgression of
eating an unslaughtered carcass, which the verse prohibits, but also says one should instead give
to a non-Jew. Rabbi Akiva says that this positive commandment is not triggered by the violation,
just like the commandment to leaves the gifts for the poor isn't triggered by not giving them, and
therefore an olah is not offered.

Rabbi Yossi Haglili says that one does offer an olah for these transgressions, since the verse also
includes an associated positive commandment. Abaye says they agree that the prohibition of eating
a carcass is a standard prohibition, but they differ about the nature of the commandment to leave
the gifts for the poor.

Rabbi Akiva says that this commandment applies before any transgression, and therefore the
prohibition is a standard one, while Rabbi Yossi Haglili says that it also implies a separate
commandment after one transgressed the prohibition, making it a prohibition triggering a
commandment.

Text of the confession

The Gemora cites a braisa about the text of the kohen gadol's confession. Rabbi Meir says that he
says avisi – I transgressed, pashati – I rebelled, and chatasi – I erred. This follows the order in the
verse about the goat sent off the cliff, which says that he will confess on it all the avonos –
transgressions of Bnai Yisrael, and all pishaihem – their rebellions, for all of chatosam – their
errors. When Moshe davened, he also referred to Hashem as forgiving of avon, pesha, and chata'a.

The Sages say that avon is intentional transgressions, as the verse says that one who transgresses
will be cut off, since its avon is in it, indicating that they are intentional. Pesha is rebellious
transgressions, as the verses refer to rebellions of Moav and Levana with this verb. Chata'im refer
to unintentional transgressions, as indicated in the verse which refers to someone who secheta –
does a chait unintentionally.

Given these definitions, how can he confess on the less severe unintentional sins, after he
confessed on the intentional and rebellious ones?

Rather, he confesses chatasi, avisi, and pashati, going in ascending order of severity. This same
order is used by David, who says that chatanu – we erred with our forefathers, avinu – we
transgressed, and hirshanu – we were evil, by Shlomo, who says chatanu, he'evinu, rashanu – we
were evil, and by Daniel, who says chatanu, avinu, rashanu, and maradnu – we rebelled.

The Sages explain that Moshe's prayer was that when Bnai Yisrael repent, Hashem should consider
the intentional and rebellious transgressions as only unintentional ones.

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Hashem’s Name in the Yom Kippur Service

During the Mussaf Davening of Yom Kippur, we read about the service of the Kohen Gadol on
Yom Kippur. When we reach the portion discussing how he confessed his sins and the sins of the
Jewish people, we recall his words, “Please, Hashem, for I have sinned… - “Ana Hashem, chatasi.”

As we know, it is forbidden to say Hashem’s Name irreverently, outside of the context of davening
or Torah study. Instead of speaking out Hashem’s Name, we simply say “Hashem,” which means
“the Name.”

However, when recalling the Kohen Gadol’s service in Mussaf davening, why do we say “Ana
Hashem”, and not His Real Name?

In davening it should be permitted to speak His Name. The source for the practice of saying ‫אנא‬
‫ השם‬instead of “Ana Hashem” is from R’ Saadia Gaon (cited in Tur O.C. 621). The Beis Yosef
explains that when the Kohen Gadol himself confessed over the korbanos, he did not pronounce
the name ‫י‬-‫נ‬-‫ד‬-‫ א‬as we do during davening.

He pronounced it in a special way that is forbidden for us to say even during davening. (Some say
he uttered Hashem’s Name as it is written. Others say he used the forty-letter name of Hashem).
Since we may not say Hashem’s Name as the Kohen Gadol actually did, there is no point to reciting
it as we do during davening, as ‫י‬-‫נ‬-‫ד‬-‫ א‬.

Therefore, we say simply “Hashem.” The Bach offers a different explanation. We say Hashem’s
Name only when we daven ourselves, not when we describe how someone else davened.
Therefore, when recalling the Kohen Gadol’s prayers in the Beis HaMikdash, we do not use
Hashem’s real Name, but simply say, “Hashem.” Quoting pesukim: In the course of our description
of the Kohen Gadol’s service, we do speak out Hashem’s real Name, when we say, “Before
Hashem you will be made pure” (Vayikra 16:30). This is because we quote here a possuk .

The Maharitz Gaios rules that when quoting a possuk we may say Hashem’s Name (Tur ibid. See
Kad HaKemach by Rabbeinu Bachaye, Kippurim 2, p. 225). Quoting the prayers of the angels:
The Taz adds that with this we can understand why we say, “Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts,”
during the berachos of Shema in the morning. We do not recite this as a prayer, but as a description
of the prayers of the angels. Whey then do we recite Hashem’s Name? According to the Maharitz
this is well understood. “Holy, holy, holy,” is a possuk from Tanach (Yeshaya 6:3). Therefore, we
may say Hashem’s Name when reciting it.

(This is the Taz’s explanation of our practice, based on R’ Saadia Gaon and the Maharitz Gaios.
However, the Taz himself contends that one may recite Hashem’s Name when describing the
Kohen Gadol’s service during Mussaf.)

“Hashem”: Customarily, when it is irreverent to use Hashem’s real Name, we say simply
“Hashem” – the Name. The Chavos Yair (Mekor Chaim on Shulchan Aruch, ibid) writes that
Hashem is the same gematria as the Names " ‫י‬-‫ד‬-‫ל ש‬- ‫ א‬." He adds that one should have this
intention in mind when saying “Hashem.”

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Hashem and not “Adoshem”: Some people have the practice to say “Adoshem” instead of Hashem.
However, the Poskim write that it is better to use the word “Hashem,” which means, “the Name,”
than “Adoshem” which does not really mean anything at all, and is not a respectful way to refer to
Him(Taz, Mekor Chaim ibid).

THE TYPE OF SIN FOR WHICH THE KORBAN OLAH ATONES

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:2

Rebbi Akiva says that the Korban Olah atones for the failure to observe Mitzvos Aseh, and for
transgressions of Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh which are Nitak l'Aseh (transgressions which are correctable
by performing an Aseh).

RASHI says that the source for this is a Tosefta which states that in lieu of any explicit mention
in the Torah of what the Olah atones for, it must be that it atones for Mitzvos Aseh and Mitzvos
Lo Ta'aseh she'Nitak l'Aseh. The Olah cannot atone for transgressions which are Chayav Kares,
Misah bi'Yedei Shamayim, or Misas Beis Din, because the punishments (i.e. atonement) for those
are already known. Likewise, it cannot atone for an ordinary Lo Ta'aseh, because the atonement
for that is Malkus. It must be, therefore, that the Olah atones for transgressions which have none
of those punishments: Mitzvos Aseh and Mitzvos La Ta'aseh she'Nitak l'Aseh. Rashi on the
Chumash (Vayikra 1:4) also cites this Midrash (from Toras Kohanim, Dibura d'Nedavah, Perek
4:8).

RASHASH questions this statement. The Tosefta's process of elimination seems flawed; there
seems to be another type of transgression for which the Olah could atone, besides Mitzvos Aseh
and Mitzvos La Ta'aseh she'Nitak l'Aseh. We know that punishments such as Misas Beis Din and
Malkus are administered only when the transgressor was given Hasra'ah (he was forewarned by
witnesses). If there was no Hasra'ah, these punishments are not administered. Perhaps the Korban
Olah atones for transgressions for which a person is Chayav Misas Beis Din or Malkus (when done
intentionally), when he commits them without Hasra'ah. Why does the Tosefta not suggest that the
Olah atones for such transgressions?

Moreover, perhaps the Korban Olah atones for any type of transgression which was
done b'Shogeg (inadvertently), for which a person is not liable to punishment. Accordingly, it
could atone for transgressions of Misas Beis Din or Malkus when those transgressions were
committed b'Shogeg, for there is no punishment or atonement written with regard to such sins done
b'Shogeg (except for a sin punishable with Kares when committed intentionally, in which case a
Chatas must be brought when it is committed b'Shogeg).
The questions of the Rashash are raised by the Rishonim. The RASH MI'SHANTZ on the Toras
Kohanim writes that it is not logical that the Torah would require that a Korban be brought as

2
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/yoma/insites/yo-dt-036.htm

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atonement for a transgression committed b'Mezid without Hasra'ah, while such a Korban does not
atone for the same transgression committed with Hasra'ah. There is no precedent for this distinction
among all of the other Korbanos, and thus it is unlikely that the Korban Olah atones for such a
transgression.

Why, though, does the Toras Kohanim not consider the possibility that the Olah atones for
transgressions committed b'Shogeg? There is a precedent for Korbanos atoning for Shogeg
transgressions.

RASH answers that "it is not logical that the Olah is brought for a Lo Ta'aseh committed
b'Shogeg."

The Rash's intention is not clear. Perhaps he means to say the same thing as the RAMBAN (in
Vayikra 1:4). The Ramban writes that the Chachamim understood from the fact that the Torah lists
the punishment for a Chiyuv Kares, whether the act is done b'Mezid (in which case one is Chayav
Kares) or b'Shogeg (in which case one is Chayav to bring a Korban Chatas), yet it does not list any
punishment for a Shogeg violation of a Chiyuv Misas Beis Din or of an ordinary Lo Ta'aseh, that
an inadvertent transgression of a Lo Ta'aseh does not need "Ritzuy" (appeasement). That is, more
severe transgressions distance a person from Hash-m even when he transgresses b'Shogeg, and
thus he needs an act of Ritzuy, besides the normal requirement of repentance, to attain atonement.
A Lo Ta'aseh, though, is not considered so severe as to require Ritzuy when one transgresses it
b'Shogeg, and thus it does not need the Olah to atone for it.

For what, then, does the Olah atone? It must be that the Olah atones for a Mitzvas Aseh that one
transgressed b'Mezid, in which case he certainly needs Ritzuy (because he sinned intentionally)
even though the Torah does not mention any specific punishment in such a case.

RAMBAN suggests further that the Torah's usage of the words "v'Nirtzah Lo l'Chaper Alav" with
regard to the Korban Olah implies that the sinner is one who transgressed b'Mezid and
consequently is "Eino Merutzah" to Hash-m, he is presently not in Hash-m's favor (and thus he
needs a Korban in order to be "Nirtzah Lo"). In contrast, a transgression committed b'Shogeg does
not cause a person to be in disfavor in Hash-m's eyes such that he would be called "Eino Merutzah."

MAHARAL (in GUR ARYEH) suggests that the Olah cannot atone for a Lav committed
b'Shogeg, because a Shogeg-violation of a Chiyuv Kares requires only a Korban Chatas. A Chatas
is partially eaten by the Kohanim and is thus a less severe form of atonement than an Olah, which
is completely burned. An Olah, therefore, provides a greater degree of atonement, and thus it is
not logical to assume that it provides atonement for a lesser transgression. It must be that it atones
for an intentional violation of a Mitzvas Aseh.

MAHARAL answers further that the Midrash (Vayikra Rabah 7:3) teaches that the Olah atones
for sinful thoughts ("Hirhurei ha'Lev"), as the verse alludes to when it says, "ha'Olah Al
Ruchachem" (Yechezkel 20:32), which refers to one's thoughts. Accordingly, it must atone only
for a sin committed with intent (thought), and not for a sin committed b'Shogeg.

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 Placing hands on the animal
Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:3

The Mishna (35b) describes how the kohen gadol performed viduy – confession – on the first
sacrifice on his own behalf, asking for forgiveness for his own sins and those of his family. The
Mishna teaches that the animal stands with its head facing southward and its face to the west,
toward the Holy of Holies.

The Gemara on our daf explains that, in order to do this, the animal is forced to turn its head while
the kohen gadol does semikhah (places his hands) on the animal.

The concept of semikhah, where the owner of a korban places both hands on the head of the
sacrifice between its horns and presses down on it with all of his strength, applies to all sacrifices
with the exception of a bekhor (a first born animal) and ma’aser beheimah (the tenth animal from
the flock). It is during semikhah that the owner confesses his sins when the sacrifice comes as part
of the process of repentance (a hatat or an asham), or expresses his thanks and praise when the
sacrifice is a celebratory one, like a korban shelamim or todah (thanksgiving offering).
Immediately after semikhah the korban is slaughtered and sacrificed.

These activities are explained by the Ramban as representing the attitude that the individual should
have with regard to his own self. Given that a sin is made up of thought, speech and activity, the
person who brings a korban hatat will perform a number of actions, each of which will be an
expression of a request for atonement on a separate part of the sin. He will:

• do semikhah on it – representing the activity,

• say viduy on it – representing the speech,
• have the innards of the animal burned on the altar – representing the thoughts and desires
of the individual.

Finally, the blood of the sacrifice will be sprinkled on the mizbe’ah, representing his soul. The idea
is for the sinner to recognize that he has transgressed against God with his body and soul, and that
in order to receive atonement for his actions, what is being done to the sacrifice really should be
done to him.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:4

Our daf (Yoma 36b) informs us about the viduy (confession) which accompanied the Kohen
Gadol’s offering of a bull as a Korban Chatat (sin offering) on behalf of himself, his household
and prior Kohanim on Yom Kippur, and beyond this, the Kohen Gadol also recited a viduy to

3
https://steinsaltz.org/daf/yoma36/
4
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

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accompany the ‘se’ir hamishtaleach’ (the scapegoat) on Yom Kippur to reflect the sins of the
Jewish people.

Significantly, as is clear from our Gemara and the Rambam (Teshuvah 1:1), the viduy which we
individually recite to confess our sins is modelled on the formula used by the Kohen Gadol.
Moreover, as we see in tomorrow’s daf (Yoma 37a), the wording of this viduy is itself based on
the language used by Moshe following the sin of the Egel HaZahav (Golden Calf), and the words
invoked by community leaders in the ritual of the Eglah Arufah (the broken-necked heifer)
following the discovering of a dead body beyond the city limits.

Yet surely there is a difference between a personal viduy for personal sins, and the public
confession of the Kohen Gadol (which, though in this case is recited on behalf of himself, his
household and prior Kohanim, is nevertheless a public confession offered by a public figure), and
the public pleas of Moshe – the leader of the Jewish people, and other community leaders? Given
this, why is the basic formula of our personal viduy drawn from the wording of these confessions
and pleas uttered by these public personalities for sins not just their own?

To my mind, the fact that we have this ‘shared confessional language’ between the leaders of Israel
and each and every one of us speaks volumes about the meaning of confession, because while each
of us can only take full responsibility for our own deeds, we need to recognise that what we do
affects others and that however private we may be, ultimately what we say and what we do affects
other people. Expressed differently, whether or not we think of ourselves as leaders, each of us are
– at least in some measure – a leader of some sort.

Beyond this, it is noteworthy that the two episodes referenced in the wording of the viduy - the
Egel HaZahav (Golden Calf) and the Eglah Arufah (the broken-necked heifer) – involve events
where the leaders confess about incidents that occurred while they were not present.

In terms of the Egel HaZahav, Moshe was atop Mount Sinai, while in terms of the Eglah Arufah,
the leaders attest that they did not witness what had taken place (see Devarim 21:7). Yet the words
used by Moshe and the leaders is still used by the Kohen Gadol and by each of us when we recite
the viduy, which seems to suggest that while we can only be fully responsible for what we
ourselves do, even those events that occur when we are absent require some measure of reflection
by each of us.

Ultimately, though many Jewish teachings draw distinctions between the individual and the
collective, we learn from the wording of the viduy that each of us are leaders. That what we say
and do affects others. And that even events that occur ‘not on our watch’ may be – at least in some
measure – our responsibility as well.

16
Rabbi Ethan Linden writes:5

The mishnah on the bottom of yesterday’s daf details the way the confession of the high priest is
to occur on Yom Kippur. According to the mishnah, the confession begins this way: "Please God!
I have sinned (aniti), I have done wrong (pashati), I have erred (chatati) before you.” Today the
Talmud brings a teaching from the Tosefta, a collection of additional teachings from the mishnaic
period, which makes clear that the issue is a bit more complicated.

The Tosefta tells us that the three words for sin that the mishnah prescribes are the right ones and
in the right order. But it also tells us two additional details. First, the Tosefta informs us that the
source for the ordering of the words is biblical; it follows the appearance of words with those same
roots in two different texts — the confession over the scapegoat as described in Leviticus 16:21,
and the revelation of God to Moses in Exodus 34:7. Second, we learn that this order is not a
universally accepted position. In fact, it is a minority position attributed to Rabbi Meir. The sages
disagree.

The disagreement is predicated on the differences between the types of sin those three words
describe. "Aniti" refers to intentional wrongdoings, "pashati" to rebellious acts against God (that
is, sins one commits to show a willingness to contravene God’s law), and "chatati" to sins
committed unwittingly. According to the sages, these words indicate different levels of sin and the
order they should be recited should reflect an ascending order of seriousness, beginning with
unwitting sins, moving to intentional ones and concluding with rebellious ones. Rabbi Meir
believes the order should follow the way those words appear in the Torah. The sages have biblical
texts to lean on as well, although none of them are from the first five books of the Torah, a fact
which is the subject of some consternation.

Rabba bar Shmuel quotes Rav as saying that the law follows the sages, prompting the Talmud to
ask why Rav would have to say such a thing. After all, we know that we follow the majority in
legal disputes. The answer is revealing: Rav felt the need to make the pronouncement lest we
think that Rabbi Meir’s position, founded as it is on verses in the Torah, would in this case overturn
the general principle given that the sages have only later biblical verses to lean on. Maybe we only
follow the majority in cases where both positions rest on verses of equal authority.

It seems Rav had good reason to be concerned, because the Talmud immediately tells a tale of a
person who led services before Rabba and performed the confession according to Rabbi Meir’s
position.

Rabba said to him: Have you forsaken the opinion of the Rabbis, who are the many, and
performed the confession sequence in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? That person
said to Rabba: I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it is written explicitly in
the Torah of Moses.

Interestingly, the mishnah gives no hint of this dispute, simply reporting Rabbi Meir’s position
without reference either to the verses that support him or to the contrary position of the sages. The

5
Myjewishlearning.com

17
Talmud, not content with this simplicity, reminds us, as it so often does, that there is debate beneath
the placid surface of the mishnah. Rabbi Meir’s position is the minority, but it is based on verses
from the Torah, unlike the sages, who lean on later (and therefore lesser) prooftexts. Rav
nevertheless says the law follows the sages, yet Rabba’s unnamed interlocutor is not refuted when
he asserts the power of Rabbi Meir over the sages, the very claim that Rav wants to forestall with
his pronouncement.

What should carry more weight in deciding the law -- a majority opinion with biblical verses from
the later parts of the Torah, or a minority position that is supported by verses from the Five Books
of Moses? Rav seems certain it’s the former, but the Talmud is decidedly less so. As is often the
case, the debate is unresolved. But the still waters of the Mishnah have been troubled, and as
students, we are left grateful for it.

The Gemara elaborates and explains the order of the confession of the Kohen Gadol on Yom
Kippur.6

Rambam (‫ג הקרבנות מעשה‬:‫ ) ו”ט‬rules that the expressions taught here are the same which were used
whenever an offering was brought for atonement. Meiri learns that this order was used only when
an olah was brought.

The three different categories of sin which are noted here (in the order of the confession in our
Mishnah) are intentional sins (‫ )עונות‬rebellious sins (‫ )פשעים‬and unintentional sins (‫)חטאים‬.

The Mishnah features the opinion of R’ Meir, the minority opinion in this issue, but we rule
according to Rabbanan of the Baraisa, who list the sins in increasingly severe levels (unintentional,
intentional, and rebellious).

HaRav Elyashiv, zt”l, in his notations to our Gemara, points out that the order of the sins in our
Mishnah does not seem to follow any logical order. If we were listing the sins from less severe to
more severe, the unintentional sins should have been first, not last.

The order of R’ Meir is explained by Siach Yitzchok. A person can begin by dealing with the most
obvious and blatant sins he has committed, beginning with those that were intentional and then
facing the fact that some were even “rebellious.”

The teshuvah process is difficult, but a person can admit when he makes a major mistake. It is easy
to realize that these must be corrected. It is finally after confessing these sins that a person can also
face the fact that he has made small mistakes, errors which he might have otherwise wished to
overlook, and either ignore or even deny that they happened.

6
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Yoma%20036.pdf

18
Furthermore, a person can readily deal with intentional sins, as he is fully aware of the times he
succumbed to the yetzer. However, unintentional sin often eludes a person’s awareness. Yet, after
he has confessed the more severe sins, he is willing to honestly consider even areas of doubt which
should be corrected.

The Rabbis taught: How does he [the Kohen Gadol] confess? [He should say] ‫וחטאתי פשעתי עויתי‬
These are the words of R’ Meir. Chachamim say: ‫ ופשעתי ועויתי חטאתי‬.
Rabbah bar Shmuel in the name of Rav ruled in accordance for Chachamim

The order of the confession as expressed by Chachamim is the way it is printed in the Avodah
section of the Machzor.

Accordingly, Acharonim raise a number of questions regarding the language of different tefilos.
For example, in Avinu ‫ אבינו מלכנו מחה והעבר פשעינו וחטאתינו מנגד‬say we Malkeinu ‫ עיניך‬.

The difficulty is that it is clear from our Gemara that a ‫ — פשע‬intention to rebel against Hashem
— is a more severe transgression than a ‫ חטא‬which only constitutes an inadvertent transgression,
and one is supposed to enumerate his sins starting with the less severe transgressions and move
towards those that are more severe.

This, in fact, is the ruling of the Mishnah Berurah and Aruch HaShulchan (1) who change the
language of the prayer to read ‫ חטאינו והעבר מחה עיניך מנגד ופשעינו‬, which is not the way it appears
in siddurim. Similarly (2), one should say ‫ ומחל סלח‬since ‫ מחילה‬is greater than ‫ סליחה‬.A third
example can be found in the ‫ על חטא‬.According to some opinions (3) the correct reading should be
‫ ובגלוי בסתר‬and ‫ ובזדון בשגגה‬in order to move from the less severe to the more severe.

Matah Ephraim (4) , however, maintains that one should not deviate from the way it is printed in
siddurim because it is not worthwhile to remove oneself from the community by reciting the prayer
differently.

19
Why should there be a need for an olah that atones for missed opportunities, when the tamid of the
morning and evening atoned for all the sins of the prior night and day?

The Eretz HaTzvi, Hy”d, explains that sin brings on two simultaneous negative effects. One is its
impact on the collective loving relationship between the Jewish people and Hashem, embodied in
the Beis HaMikdash itself; the second is the personal blemish that affects the soul of the sinner.
Although the tamid had the power to restore perfection to the loving relationship between the
collective soul of the Jewish people and Hashem, only the olah of an individual had the power to
correct the flaw at the personal level.

This cleaning of both “slates” is a removal of any foreign element that could make our avodah
unseemly to the King. Although we can no longer offer sacrifices, we still can achieve this aim
through sincere repentance.

Once, during his meal, the Alter of Kelm, zt”l, discovered a splinter embedded in his portion of
bread. Although Pharoah’s baker suffered severely for a similar oversight, the baker of Kelm was
not even reprimanded by the Rav. “The difference between them is obvious,” explained the Alter.
“The baker described by the Torah caused distress and offense to the king, while ours merely
inconvenienced a regular citizen.

The former’s carelessness is clearly a capital crime—but the latter’s is just an oversight!” The
Alter mused, “Our every act comes before the King of Kings, and the good acts we do are like
sacrifices. What is the bad?

The splinter lodged inside! It may be small, but it still has no place in the King’s meal, so to speak!”

20
Mark Kerzner writes:7

Next the High Priest would come to his bull - the one that he bought with his own money, to atone
for the his sins and for those of his household (his wife). The bull was standing between the Altar
and the Temple's entrance, along the wall of the Altar, with its head turned to the right, in the
direction of the Temple. The High Priest would also stand facing the Temple, put his hands on the
head of the bull, and pronounce the following confession.

He would say, "Please, the Name, I have sinned willfully, rebelliously and inadvertently. Please,
the Name, please grant atonement for the willful, rebellious and inadvertent sins - that I have
committed before you, I and my household." Then he would quote from the Torah where the
promise of forgiveness was given. The people who listened would prostrate and say, "Blessed is
the name of the glory of His kingship, forever and ever."

What was this Name? Some say it is was the four letter name of God, the Tetragrammaton, that
the Torah commanded to conceal and that is commonly pronounced instead as "Adonai", or my
Master. Others say that the name that the High Priest pronounced was completely different from
what we have in our texts, and that it was a secret name of forty-two letters. One of the reasons for
concealment was the power that the name could give to the wrong person.

And where did the Torah command to conceal the Name? - When God told Moses, "This is My
Name forever (leolam)" - read this word as "lealem" - to conceal.

7
http://talmudilluminated.com/yoma/yoma36.html

21
 What Sin Comes First?

Rabbi Jay Kelman writes:8

The kohen gadol performed vidui, confession, three times on Yom Kippur. The first two were done
using his own personal bull offering, asking for forgiveness for the sins of his family and for his
fellow kohanim. The third vidui, for the sins of the people of Israel, was done with the shair
hamistalech, the "scapegoat" that would then be led off to the desert and hurled off a mountain.

In pleading for forgiveness, the kohen gadol asks pardon for three types of sins; chet,
avon, and pesha. A chet is a sin done unwittingly. It needs forgiveness as ultimately, all mistakes
are--to one degree or another--caused by ignorance, negligence, or both (See Rambam Hilchot
Shegagot 5:8). An avon is an intentional sin, where we know something is wrong but do it anyway,
giving in to our desires. Apesha is a rebellious sin, violated not for enjoyment, but as an act of
defiance and rebellion.

8
https://torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/yoma-36-what-sin-comes-first

22
The Gemara (Yoma 36b) records an interesting argument regarding the exact order of this vidui.
Rav Meir claims the order should beavon, pesha, and chet. He bases his argument on biblical
precedent where--after the sin of the golden calf (the reason we have Yom Kippur in the first
place)--G-d reveals to Moshe His 13 attributes, which then serve as the basis for our pleas of
forgiveness (see Rosh Hashannah 17b). G-d tells Moshe that He is a noseh avon vapesha
vechata'ah, forgiver of iniquity, willful sin, and error (Shemot 34:7). Similarly, the Torah tells us
the kohen gadol is to lean on the shair hamistalech and confess for the avonot, peshaim,
and chatatim of the Jewish people.

Yet despite this seemingly solid Biblical precedent, the Sages disagree, arguing that such an order
makes little sense. Rather, they claim, the order should be chet, avon, and pesha. "After having
confessed for intentional sins and for the rebellious sins, he should then confess for sins committed
unwillingly?" Having achieved forgiveness for intentional and rebellious sins, surely there is no
longer a need to mention our inadvertent sins [1].

This debate is more than mere semantics, and reflects a debate as to the nature of Yom Kippur
itself. The Sages argue that we are to first beg for forgiveness for our chataim, relatively minor
sins, those of forgetfulness of carelessness. We then ask for forgiveness for our avonot, our
intentional sins, and then we beseech G-d to forgive us for those sins committed in spite. Yom
Kippur is the day of forgiveness, and we begin with those sins for which forgiveness is easiest to
obtain.

Rav Meir focuses not on forgiveness but on the teshuva, moving from those sins for
which teshuva is relatively easy to those where teshuva is most difficult. When one sins
intentionally, "all" that is required is a decision to repent. It is obviously harder to do teshuva for
sins of a rebellious nature, where we must admit to a flaw in our character. However, when it
comes to an inadvertent sin, teshuva is most difficult. Due to our ignorance or carelessness, we
may not even recognize that we have sinned, making teshuva impossible [2].

Rav Meir and the Sages argue as to whether Yom Kippur is primarily a day of forgiveness or a
day of repentance. Is it G-d centered, focusing on G-d's benevolence, or man centered, focusing
on man's obligation?

23
Jewish tradition has accepted the view of the Sages that we say chatati, aviti, pashati. This, despite
the fact that, as the Gemara itself notes, "the reasoning of Rav Meir is more compelling, as it is
supported by the biblical verses". Compelling or not, Yom Kippur, first and foremost, expresses
the deep love of G-d towards His people as He grants us forgiveness. While we are mandated to
repent, Jewish thought teaches that as long as one identifies as a Jew, the shair hamistaleach can
actually atone for many (but not all) sins, even if we fail to do teshuva. It is no coincidence that
the last Mishnah of Mashechet Yoma ends with Rabbi Akiva's comforting words: "Blessed are
you, Israel; before whom are you purified, and who purifies you? Your father in Heaven....just as
a mikvah purifies the impure, so too does G-d purify the people of Israel".

[1] The Sages, faced with Rav Meir's seemingly unassailable biblical proof, explain that the reason the 13 attributes of G-d are
listed asnoseh avon vapesha vechata'ah is to reflect Moshe's request that our intentional sins should be considered as accidental.
Interestingly, they do onto offer an alternate explanation for the order of the verse by the shair hamistaleach itself.
[2] I thank one of my high school Rebbeim, Rabbi Meyer Berglas, for this insight--which I imagine, with the passage of time, I
may have tweaked somewhat.

24
 Shades of Sin

Reuven Chaim Klein writes:9

Throughout the Yom Kippur services we repeatedly confess our sins and beg for forgiveness. In
doing so, we mimic the confessionals of the Kohen Gadol in the Holy Temple. The
Mishnah (Yoma 4:2) relates that when the Kohen Gadol would confess his sins and the sins of his
household, he would specifically admit to three types of sins: chet, avon, and pesha. These three
words are not synonymous, but rather refer to different degrees of sin. The Talmud our
daf (Yoma 36b) explains that chet refers to an inadvertent sin (the state of mind known
as shogeg), avon refers to wanton/intentional sins (meizid), and pesha refers to sins of rebellion.
Nevertheless, there are other ways of explaining the differences between these three types of sins.
When King David was nearing the end of his life, his oldest surviving son, Adonijah, began to
proclaim himself as king. Batsheba, the mother of Solomon, came before her husband, King David,
and demanded that he fulfill his promise that Solomon would succeed him. She said to him that if
Adonijah succeeds in securing the throne, “…then I and my son Solomon will be chataim” (I
Kings 1:21). What does the word chataim mean in this context? Rashi explains that chet means
“lacking”, and in this case it means that Batsheba and Solomon would be lacking the royal titles
due to them. Probably based on Rashi’s comment, the Vilna Gaon (in his commentary toProv.
1:10; 13:6) writes that chet means a sin through a lacking. In other words, he writes, a chet refers
to the failure to perform a positive commandment.
Rabbi Yechezkel Landau (1713-1793) also understands that chet refers to the lack of fulfilling
a positive commandment, but synthesizes this with the Talmud’s contention that chet refers to an
inadvertent sin by explaining that it refers specifically to the failure to fulfill the commandment of
repenting after one has committed an inadvertent sin.

9
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/shades-of-sin/

25
Rabbi Moshe Shapiro (1935-2017) defends the classic rabbinic definition of chet as an inadvertent
sin, but still draws an important lesson from Rashi associating chet with a “lack”. He explains that
a chet is not simply the lack of something, but represents the failure to achieve a goal. A sin is
therefore called a chet because the sinner deviates from the goal of mankind, and misses his
intended objective. His lack of achievement in that area is called a chet.
Similarly, Rabbi Shlomo Pappenheim of Breslau (1740-1814) writes that chet denotes the
sinner’s lack of intentions/mindfulness when committing his sin. By contrast, an avon denotes the
sin of one who “thinks too much”. He wrongly concludes that sinning is the proper way to go, and
acts accordingly. A pesha refers to the sin of somebody who knows that his forbidden actions are
completely wrong and should not be done, but carries them out anyways in order to rebel
against G-d.
Malbim takes a slightly different approach. He understands that all three words could refer to an
offense committed purposely, but reflect varying motives. Achet refers to a sin committed because
a person was swayed by his physical temptations, and purposely indulged in what he knew to be
wrong. An avon refers to a sin that a person commits because his intellect had been negatively
persuaded, causing him to stray. Finally, a pesha refers to the iniquities of one who shamelessly
sins as a way of rebelling against G-d.
Peirush HaRokeach also slightly disagrees with the Talmud’s way of differentiating
between chet, avon, and pesha. He explains that chet refers to an inadvertent sin, pesha refers to a
willful sin, and avon refers specifically to a sin from which one derived physical pleasure or gained
some other benefit.
The truth is, it’s not so simple. Rabbi Netanel Weil (1687-1769) writes that the differences between
the terms chet and avon are only apparent when those terms are juxtaposed to each other. In such
contexts, chet means whatever chet means, and avon means whatever avon means. However,
when the terms appear on their own, without the other, then each of these terms includes all types
of sins, not just the specific type of sin that it otherwise means.
Moreover, classifying sins is not so black-and-white. In his Laws of Teshuvah (Repentance),
Maimonides codifies the requirement for a penitent to confess his sins by saying, “Chatati (I

26
committed a chet), Aviti (I committed an avon), Pashati (I committed a pesha)” — the same
formula that the Kohen Gadol said in the Temple.
Rabbi Yosef Babad (1801-1874), in his seminal work Minchat Chinuch, writes that one need not
necessarily make all three declarations. Rather, one should confess whatever sins are relevant in
each situation. However, Rabbi Elazar Menachem Mann Shach (1899-2001) disagrees with this
position, and maintains that Maimonides’ wording implies that in all situations a person should
always recite all three declarations. He argues that not only is this because the formula instituted
for the confessional includes all three types of sins, but also for another reason: Even though these
three words represent three different degrees of sin, Rabbi Shach argues that no sin is so clear-cut
that it fully fits into one of these three categories. Rather, every sin has different elements
of chet, avon, and pesha. For example, someone may have sinned inadvertently, but that sin also
contains elements of wantonness and rebelliousness. Or, conversely, somebody may have sinned
rebelliously, but his sin may also have some traces of inadvertency and/or pure wantonness.
A fourth term for a “sin” appears in rabbinic sources, but not in the Bible: aveira. Aveira literally
means “transgression” or “violation”, and although it once specifically referred to crimes of
indecency, it now colloquially serves as a general term for all types of wrongdoings. Rabbi Yaakov
Tzvi Mecklenburg (1785-1865) writes that aveira comes from the root AYIN-BET-REISH, which
means “passes” in a physical sense. He explains that the concept of an aveira is that somebody
morally “passes over” his thoughts in order to not focus on the nefariousness of his deeds. We
might also suggest that he who commits an aveira has crossed a rabbinic red line, and, indeed, the
Talmud (Shabbat 40a) maintains that even a person who violates a rabbinic prohibition can be
called an avaryan.

"Kallot Va-Chamurot": Gradation of Sins in Repentance

27
Harav Aharon Lichtenstein sicha:10

DIFFERENTIATED AND UNDIFFERENTIATED REPENTANCE

Many of our sources note the existence of different levels within the world of mitzva

observance. I wish to examine the extent, if any, to which we are sensitive to these gradations

within the context of teshuva (repentance). Let me open by citing two classic texts relating

to teshuva. The Rambam opens his Hilkhot Teshuva as follows:

With regard to all the precepts in the Torah, positive commands or negative ones,

whenever a person transgresses one of them, either willfully or unknowingly, and

subsequently repents and turns away from his sin, it is his duty to confess before God,

blessed be He, as it is said, "When a man or woman shall commit any sin that men

commit, to do a trespass against the Lord, and that person be guilty, then they shall

confess their sin which they have done"(Bamidbar 5:6-7). This means to confess in

words, and this confession is an affirmative precept.

10
Adapted by Rav Reuven Ziegler Transcribed by Myles Brody, https://www.etzion.org.il/en/philosophy/great-thinkers/harav-

aharon-lichtenstein/alei-etzion-16-kallot-va-chamurot-gradation

28
 How does one confess? One says, "I beseech You, O Lord, I have sinned, I have acted

perversely, I have transgressed before You, and have done thus and thus, and lo, I repent

and am ashamed of my deed and will never do this again." This constitutes the essence

of confession. The more one elaborates and the more detailed the confession one makes,

the more he is praiseworthy.

The Rambam's presentation here is comprehensive and undifferentiated. He makes a

sweeping statement about "all the precepts in the Torah, positive commands or negative

ones." There is no hint of weighing the significance or substance of a particular sin. The process

is more or less uniform, the formulation identical, except for the fact that a person must mention

exactly what he has done – slandered someone, shaved with a razor, lent with interest, etc.

In contrast, the third section of Rabbeinu Yona's Sha'arei Teshuva opens with an

exhortation for penitents to distinguish between the various levels of commandments and

prohibitions:

The penitent is exhorted to search his ways to discover how many transgressions and

sins he is guilty of; and after having performed a diligent examination, he is further

exhorted to determine the severity of each of his sins, as it said, "Let us examine and

scrutinize our ways" (Eikha 3:40). He must do this to appraise himself of the degree of

sin involved in every one of his misdeeds. There are cases of guilt so great that they

29
 approach Heaven, and instances of evil that are as weighty as many great sins. The

magnitude of one's repentance will be commensurate with the magnitude of his soul-

searching. His spirit will be broken to the extent of his awareness of the magnitude and

gravity of his transgression – and then his uncircumcised heart will be humbled and he

will requite his transgression.

According to Rabbeinu Yona, it is important to distinguish between gradations of sin for a

number of reasons. First, this is necessary in order that the requisite repentance be commensurate

with the misdeed. Second, it is required so that the sense of guilt and shame - two different yet

interactive responses - be of the proper dimensions.

Clearly, Rabbeinu Yona's presentation differs substantially from the Rambam's. Although

in Hilkhot Teshuva 1:1, quoted above, the Rambam speaks not of the stages of teshuva, but rather

of the viddui (confession) that comes at its end, his discussion of the stages of teshuva in chapter

2 does not highlight the need for inquiry into the different levels or grades of sin. Rabbeinu Yona,

on the other hand, devotes the third section of his book to a very detailed catalogue of different

levels of sin, listed in ascending order.

In terms of our own experience, goals and directions, ought to assume, like the Rambam,

that there is a uniform sense of teshuva, or, like Rabbeinu Yona, that differentiation is critical in

30
order to undergo teshuva properly? If the latter, what kind of differentiation do we have in mind,

and what kind of categories can we think of?

SINS AGAINST GOD AND AGAINST MAN

Let us start with the familiar distinction between aveirot bein adam la-Makom and aveirot

bein adam le-chavero, sins man commits against God and sins against his fellow man. The mishna

at the end of Yoma (65b) speaks of the need to attain forgiveness from one's fellow in order for

Yom Kippur to atone for an interpersonal sin, whereas with regard to aveirot bein adam la-Makom,

it is sufficient if someone makes his peace, as it were, with the Almighty. This distinction can be

variously understood.

(1) In a pragmatic sense, the Rosh (Yoma 8:17) and others say that interpersonal sins

undermine the solidarity of Klal Yisrael. If this is the case, then interpersonal forgiveness is

valuable in its own right, but is not directly related to the quality of the teshuva involved. Rather,

in addition to the person repenting, something else can be attained – Jewish unity.

(2) The Gemara in Rosh Ha-shana (17b) suggests a different explanation.

Beloria the convert once asked Rabban Gamliel: "It is written in your Torah [that God]

'does not show favor' (Devarim 10:17). Yet it is also written, 'May God show favor to

you' (Bamidbar 6:26)!"

R. Yosi the Kohen joined the conversation and said to her, "I will give you a parable

which will illustrate the matter. A man lent his neighbor an amount of money and fixed

31
 a time for payment in the presence of the king, while the other swore to pay him by the

life of the king. When the time arrived, he did not pay him, and he went to excuse himself

to the king. The king, however, said to him, 'The wrong done to me I excuse you, but go

and obtain forgiveness from you neighbor.' So too here, one verse speaks of offences

committed by man against God, and the other of offences committed by man against his

fellow man."

With regard to bein adam la-Makom, God is willing to shower His grace upon

us. However, forgiveness for aveirot bein adam le-chavero is not up to God. The reason one must

placate his fellow is that God is not the proper address; you have to pay the person from whom

you borrowed, or placate the person against whom you transgressed.

(3) Perhaps the most obvious interpretation is that without placating your fellow, there is a

problem with the quality of your teshuva. The most basic premise of teshuva is azivat ha-chet,

abandoning the sin. If one does not do this, it is like plunging into a mikveh while gripping a

continuous source of impurity. With regard to aveirot she-bein adam la-Makom, one confesses to

God, and that constitutes azivat ha-chet. With regard to bein adam le-chavero, if a person has

offended someone and has not taken pains to placate him, then the offense is continuing; it is a

festering sore. That being the case, the teshuva is inadequate to attain the communal atonement

offered by Yom Kippur, because one has not repented properly.

INTENTION AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

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 Apart from classification of mitzvot, there are additional factors that affect the quality of a

transgression. The Gemara in Yoma (36b) speaks about a multiple confession –

"Chatati, aviti, pashati" – which distinguishes between different levels of rebelliousness. Though

Chakhamim and R. Meir disagree regarding the sequence and the interpretation, they agree that

one should distinguish between sins committed rebelliously, sins committed willfully but not out

of a sense of rebellion, and sins performed out of carelessness.

Other contexts draw a contrast between transgressions done le-hakhis, to spite God, and

those done le-te'avon, to quench a desire. If a person commits a sin in order to anger God or rebel

against Him, then, apart from the particular sin, he also transgresses the prohibition of chillul ha-

Shem, desecration of God's name (see Rambam, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 5:10). However, if

person is impelled by appetite, not rebellion, then, although his sin may be intentional, it is not

committed out of a desire to fight God, but rather out of weakness of the flesh.

In addition to these factors, there is the question of habituation. In certain contexts, if

person commits a sin repeatedly, the punishment is commensurate.

Then there is the matter of mitigating circumstances. Chazal, by and large, did not take

the view of many modern penologists, criminologists, sociologists, and psychologists that

somehow everything can be ascribed to nurture and nature, and that, to a great extent, one can be

divested of personal responsibility. The sense of personal responsibilities and liabilities is central

for us, and is related to our faith in humanity and to our belief in free will, in the ability of a person

to act if he so desires. Nonetheless, there is some recognition of circumstances which can either

33
inhibit or mitigate certain actions. The Gemara in Berakhot (32a) speaks of a father grooming his

son and leaving him with a purse of money in front of a brothel. In such circumstances, the sin is

much harder to avoid than under normal conditions.

SEVERITY OF THE ACT

Beyond all this, we have the distinction, addressed by Rabbeinu Yona, between different

levels of the severity of the act. The differentiation between kalot and chamurot, less and more

severe infractions, is itself dual. The Gemara in Yoma (83a)says that if a person is suddenly seized

on Yom Kippur with a consuming passion to eat, and otherwise his health will be in danger, then

you must feed him. But what do you feed him if no kosher food is available? You feed him

whatever constitutes a lesser degree of aveira (transgression). For instance, if you

have tevel or neveila, untithed produce or an animal that died without proper slaughtering, you

feed him the latter, because eating it is a prohibition punished by lashes, while the former entails

death at the hands of Heaven. The sugya goes on to elaborate what is more chamur and

less chamur, and R. Yona expands upon this.

This kind of kalot and chamurot refers to different gradations along the same

continuum. Within the realm of prohibitions, there are those punished by lashes and those

punished by death. The Rambam (Hilkhot Teshuva 1:2) describes the sin of taking a false oath as

being among the chamurot, even though it is only punished with lashes, because it entails a

desecration of God's name. Within positive precepts, too, there are some that are singled out as

being particularly weighty. "The mitzva of tzitzit is equivalent to the entire

Torah" (Nedarim 25a, Shevuot 29a). To take another example, the Rambam (Hilkhot Matenot

34
Aniyim 10:1) says that a person needs to observe the mitzva of tzedaka, charity, more than any

other positive commandment. The Rambam (Hilkhot Matenot Aniyim 8:10) also describes

redemption of captives as a mitzva rabba, a great mitzva.

Yet there is another kind of distinction between kalot and chamurot. The Mishna

in Yoma (85b) teaches:

The sin-offering and the guilt-offering [for the] undoubted commission of certain

offences procure atonement.

Death and the Day of Atonement procure atonement together with penitence.

Penitence [alone] procures atonement for lighter transgressions (kalot): [the

transgressions of] positive commandments and prohibitions.

In the case of more severe transgressions (chamurot), penitence suspends [the Divine

punishment], until the Day of Atonement comes to procure atonement.

The Gemara (Yoma 86a), the Mekhilta (Yitro, Ba-Chodesh, 7) and the Yerushalmi

(Yoma 8:7 and elsewhere) cite the famous classification of chilukei kappara, levels of atonement:

R. Mattia ben Cheresh asked R. Eleazar ben Azaria in Rome: Have you heard about the

four kinds of sins, concerning which R. Yishmael has lectured?

He answered: They are three, and repentance is connected with each. If one

transgressed a positive commandment, and repented, then he is forgiven on the spot...

If he has transgressed a prohibition and repented, then repentance suspends [the

punishment] and the Day of Atonement procures atonement…

35
 If he has committed [a sin to be punished with] excision or death at the hands of the

court, and repented, then repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend [the

punishment], and suffering finishes the atonement…

But if he has been guilty of the profanation of the Name, then penitence has no power

to suspend punishment, nor the Day of Atonement to procure atonement, nor suffering

to finish it, but all of them together suspend the punishment and only death finishes it…

The Rambam (Hilkhot Teshuva 1:2) cites this Gemara, stating the se'ir ha-

mishtaleach (scapegoat) provides atonement for all sins accompanied by repentance; but if one

does not repent, the se'ir provides atonement only for kalot. He then provides a definition

of kalot and chamurot:

Which are the light sins, and which are the severe ones? The severe sins are those for

which one is liable for execution by the court or for karet (excision). False and

unnecessary oaths are also considered severe sins, even though they are not [punished

by] karet. [The violation of] the other prohibitions, and [the failure to perform] positive

commandments that are not punishable by karet, are considered light [sins].

Rambam explains that kalot are everything short of sins punished by karet or death, as well

as false oaths, which entail a chilul ha-Shem. There is not a continuum of sin, but rather two

groups starkly separated in terms of atonement. The group of kalot achieves atonement by means

36
of the scapegoat alone, even without repentance; and where there is repentance, kalot receive

atonement immediately, while chamurot must wait.

Are we to regard kalot and chamurot as fundamentally different categories, as would seem

implicit in the Mishna and the Rambam, or as different points along a spectrum of severity, along

the lines of the Gemara (Yoma 83a) which distinguishes between the different foods to feed

someone on Yom Kippur? We can get guidance on this from a striking statement of the Ramban.

RAMBAN: TWO ELEMENTS OF ATONEMENT

Regarding a person who brings a korban ola, a freewill offering wholly burnt on the altar,

the verse (Vayikra 1:4) says, "Ve-nirtza lo lechapper alav, It shall be favorably accepted, to atone

for him." Chazal ask: we know what sins a chatat (sin-offering) or asham (guilt-offering) atone

for, but for which sins does an ola atone? Rashi (ad loc.) quotes the answer found in

the Torat Kohanim (4, 5):

For what kind of sins does [the freewill burnt-offering] effect atonement? Should you

say, for sins [where punishment if willfully committed] is excision, or any of the [four]

deaths imposed by a court, or death by the hands of Heaven, or lashes - the punishment

for all these sins is already stated, [and atonement is effected by those punishments, and

not by this offering]! You must conclude that [the freewill burnt-offering] effects

atonement only for transgressions of a positive commandment, and for the violation of

a negative commandment that is juxtaposed to a positive commandment.

37
 Ramban (ad loc.) explains why Chazal were motivated to give this explanation. Regarding

capital crimes and sins entailing karet, the Torah specified the punishments for willful commission

and the sacrifices brought for unwillful commission. Regarding sins punished by lashes or by

death at the hands of Heaven (if committed willfully), the Torah does not mention that any sacrifice

needs to be brought for unwillful commission. Since it does not make sense for the Torah to

mention the punishments for willful and unwillful commission of some sins, and the punishment

only for willful commission of other sins, Ramban concludes that, regarding the latter category,

"there is no burden of sin at all if they are committed unwillfully, and they do not need any

atonement." We are left with a third category - transgressions of a positive commandment and

violation of a negative commandment juxtaposed to a positive one – for which the Torah mentions

no punishment even for willful commission. Since it is impossible that no atonement is needed

for willful commission of these sins, Chazal conclude that the olat nedava, freewill burnt offering,

atones for these.

Ramban himself goes beyond this approach:

It is possible to say that because, in the case of freewill offering, [God] did not use the

expression "to make atonement for him concerning the error which he committed" (as

He said with reference to the offering brought for other sins committed unwillfully), and

instead He said, "it shall be favorably accepted," it appeared to our Rabbis that [the

burnt-offering] effects atonement for those who willfully commit certain sins, seeing that

these persons are not [hitherto] "favorably accepted" by Him. For he who commits a

sin unwillfully is yet, in spite of the sin, considered "favorably accepted" by God. If,

38
 then, [the burnt-offering procures atonement for willful sinners,] it must refer to those

who willfully transgress a positive commandment or a negative commandment that is

juxtaposed to a positive commandment. For regarding these transgressions, no

punishment is mentioned in the Torah; yet, [clearly,] those who violate them are not

pleasing to God, because they have violated His commandment. How, then, shall these

people become favorably accepted by their Master? By bringing this gift [i.e., the olat

nedava].

In other words, if person sins in error (be-shogeg), he is nevertheless favored by God (retzui

Hashem); but if he sins intentionally (be-mezid), he is not favored. Therefore, the verse "ve-nirtza

lo, it shall be favorably accepted" cannot refer to sin committed be-shogeg, for such a person

is retzui Hashem even without bringing an offering. The verse must, then, refer to one who sins

intentionally. Since we already know the punishments meted out to those who sin intentionally, it

must be that the verse refers to an intentional sinner who receives no punishment but is nevertheless

not favored by God, i.e., those who transgress a positive commandment or a negative

commandment that is juxtaposed to a positive commandment.

Ramban's comment is remarkable in two respects. First, it invites the obvious question

which R. Meir Arik asked: Are we to understand that someone who sins be-shogeg is retzui

Hashem, and that he does not require repentance or atonement? Second, we know that one must

offer a chatat (sin-offering) if he unintentionally commits a sin that would be punished

with karet if it were performed intentionally. But if we adopt what seems to be the

Ramban's assumption, that an unintentional sinner does not require atonement because he is retzui

39
Hashem, then why does someone who unintentionally transgresses a sin punishable by karet have

to bring a sin-offering? Isn't he retzui Hashem?

There are two possible explanations of Ramban's comment. One is that the second

question answers the first. The extent to which we would say that negligence is culpable depends

on how serious the infraction is. If it is a relatively minor matter, so that even if done willfully it

isn't much of a sin, then it can be overlooked if it is done through negligence. Yet a graver

infraction entails a greater degree of responsibility and culpability, and one would not be

considered a retzui Hashem if he committed these acts unwillfully.

I believe we can offer another explanation if we take into account a different purpose of

the sacrifice, apart from its function in regaining divine favor for the sinner. Ramban draws a

sharp line between kalot and chamurot. When committed unwillfully, ordinary prohibitions

(chayvei lavin) do not require kappara. However, severe prohibitions (chayvei kritut u-mita),

which would require karet or death if committed intentionally, require kappara even when

committed unintentionally. This distinction has important implications.

With regard to kalot, i.e. chayvei lavin, the seriousness of the aveira has less to do with the

nature of the deed than with the character with person who is sinning. In his willful confrontation

with the Almighty, he chose to prioritize his own desire over God's. Leaving aside certain moral

considerations, it is not the deed that needs to be redeemed, but the person. Consequently, if the

person has not been pervaded by sinful desire and instead committed the deed be-shogeg, in error,

he himself does not require redemption, and remains a retzui Hashem. However, with regard

tochamurot, i.e. chayvei kritot, it is not only the person who requires redemption; the event needs

to be redeemed, and the world within which that sin has been committed needs to be redeemed.

40
 We need, therefore, to consider the nature of teshuva in two separate contexts. There is

the teshuva of kalot, with regard to which what is critical and central is the redemption and

purgation of the self. With regard to chamurot, however, it is not sufficient that a person repent

and thereby regain the status of retzui Hashem; rather, a korban is required to cleanse the social

and metaphysical orders of the consequences of that sin. The quality of an aveira chamura is that

it defiles, not only in the sense that every sin defiles through the sinner's subjective disobedience,

but it also defiles objectively. Therefore, this objective defilement needs to be

confronted. The teshuva of chamurot thus needs to be considered both in terms of one's personal

redemption, and in terms of righting that which a person has defiled.

NULLIFYING MAN'S WILL BEFORE GOD'S

Coming back to our original question of Rambam's approach vs. R. Yona's, are we to think

of sin as a uniform phenomenon, or are we to differentiate and classify both categories and

circumstances of sin? This question applies to avodat Hashem generally

and teshuva particularly. I think the answer is clear: we need both Rambam's formulation and R.

Yona's.

On the one hand, there is a common denominator to all sins, and we need to confront this

if we want to improve ourselves. Every time a person fails in the realm of Torah, Halakha and

morality, he stands before the question of what kind of person he is and what kind of life he

leads. Does he give preference to his own will or to God's? Does he think in egocentric terms or

41
in theocentric terms? Every time a person is confronted by God's will, Prospero's question arises:

"My foot, my tutor?" (The Tempest, Act 1, Scene 2) - will he be led by his head or by his foot?

At this plane, when one considers the question of nullifying his will before God's

(see Avot 2:4), the differentiations of kalot and chamurot fall away. All sins, in this sense, are

severe. In his Life of Solon (XVII, 4), Plutarch writes: "Draco himself, when asked why he had

decreed the death penalty for the great majority of offenses, replied that he considered the minor

ones deserved it, and for the major ones no heavier punishment was left." There is substance to

this approach. The Yerushalmi (Makkot2:6) recounts, "Prophecy was asked: A sinner – what is

his punishment? She answered: 'The soul that sins shall die' (Yechezkel 18:4, 20)." No question

is raised as to which sin it was, whether major or minor, kalot or chamurot. If a person sheds the

role of metzuveh (one who commanded) and instead usurps the role of metzaveh (commander),

that is the ultimate rebellion! Though sometimes the severity is mitigated by circumstances, and

some sins are committed through weakness rather than rebellion, nevertheless, the bottom line is

one gave preference to his own will over that of the Almighty.

In this sense, when a person confronts not just a particular aveira but the critical existential

question of whose will is to prevail, his or God's, the proper confession is simply, "Chatati, aviti,

pashati lefanekha!" I stood before You, I was at that juncture, and I took the wrong turn. This is

one aspect of teshuva.

DETAIL AND RELATIONSHIP

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 But it is not the only one. Teshuva entails a plethora of aspects because sin is

multifaceted. At least five different aspects of sin that can be singled out. One is the wrong per

se, the choice of doing evil. Second is the fact that the evil which a person has done transgresses

the will of God; over and above murder being murder, it is also something which God has

proscribed. Third, one must consider the ramifications of sin, the contamination of the self, the

defilement and impurity. Fourth, defying God's will is a "personal" affront to Him; it is spitting in

His face, so to speak. That being the case, there is a fifth result: one's relationship to God has been

impaired. Sin opens a chasm or sets up a barrier between oneself and the Almighty. "Your

iniquities have separated between you and your God" (Yeshayahu 59:2).

If a person wants to engage in teshuva, he needs to relate to all these elements and effect

a tikkun (repair) in each. There needs to be a tikkun ha-chet (repair of the sin), a tikkun of one's

relationship with God, and a tikkun of the self. Each of these three types of tikkun should be

examined independently, and in order to do so, we need to distinguish between two veins

of teshuva: teshuva from and teshuva to. The former is exemplified by the verses, "Turn, turn

from your evil ways" (Yechezkel33:11), and "Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous

man his thoughts"(Yeshayahu 55:7). The latter is exemplified by verses that discuss not what a

person is leaving, but where he is headed: "Return to Me, and I will return to You" (Hoshea14:2),

and "Israel, return to the Lord Your God" (Malakhi 3:7).

Tikkun ha-chet is a matter of "turn[ing] from your evil ways." As such, one must consider,

along the lines of R. Yona, the gravity and specifics of his sin, and, as Ramban implied, how to

repair the damage which the sin brought upon the world. This requires great attention to detail.

There are religious traditions and schools of thought that not only neglect attention to detail,

but even scorn it. The Lutheran tradition, for example, believes that one is so suffused with sin

43
that the only thing to do is to try to make peace with God, whether actively or passively, waiting

for divine grace or seeking it. But acting to fix minor or major failings is not relevant. Some call

this a "religious," as opposed to a "moral," view of divine service, where "religious" refers to

focusing upon one's relationship with God, and "moral" refers to the righting of wrongs. If one

adopts this focus, then indeed he does not need to differentiate. Neither the quality nor the quantity

of sin is as important as the existence of barrier between God and oneself, and one must focus on

transcending that barrier, pleading for grace, throwing oneself at God's mercy.

There is something to be said for an approach that does not content itself solely with picking

up the pieces, with trying to adjust and repair, but rather seeks rehabilitation by establishing anew

a bridge to the Almighty – a bridge allowing one to find his way to God, and enabling God to come

to him. Yet, though we understand that one cannot focus solely on detail

in avodat Hashem generally, and in teshuva particularly, surely we believe that there is a "moral"

element of teshuva and of avodat Hashem, a need to right the wrong and terminate its

perpetuation. Our whole conception of avodat Hashem rests upon two pillars: an awareness of the

overpowering importance of our relationship with God - "But as for me, the nearness of God is my

good" (Tehillim 73:28); "As the hart yearns for water brooks, so my soul yearns for You, O

God" (Tehillim 42:2) – and, at the same time, attention to a disciplined life and its minute details,

which suffuses the world of Halakha.

We reject totally the view that when one pursues the overarching relationship and the quest

for intimacy and rehabilitation, all of the minutiae simply disappear into insignificance. On the

other hand, we also reject the view that only the specific actions and details - weighted, graded,

comprehended properly - will suffice. We do not - we dare not - focus exclusively on one of these

two pillars. Our world is built in a multi-faceted and multi-planed way by relating to and

44
integrating both aspects. The ability to relate to God is the most fundamental and basic aspect of

human existence, and also its overarching, ultimate, beatific attainment. At the same time, the

attention to detail, to every se’if katan, and the ability to integrate the poetry and the prose of

avodat Hashem, is central to our conception and our experience.

This dual focus is, consequently, central to our view of teshuva. The teshuva of chamurot,

which concentrates on actions and the desire to right them, requires that we weigh, grade,

prioritize, and emphasize. The teshuva of kalot, which concentrates not on what we have done but

on trying to reestablish our relationship with God, allows a focus on overarching goals, expressed

in universal categories and uniform viddui. (I refer to kalot and chamurot not as types of sin, but

rather as signifying different approaches to teshuva.)

While tikkun ha-chet and tikkun of one's damaged relationship with God are characterized

by different approaches to teshuva – the chamurot mode and the kalot mode, respectively - the two

approaches interact and coalesce in the third element of repair, namely, tikkun of the self which

has been contaminated by sin. To repair and purify oneself means to reaffirm and reestablish one's

relationship with God, as well as a spiritual and moral purgation that takes into account actions

and details.

TWO CONFESSIONS

Historically, we encounter two types of confession. The Gemara in Yoma (87b)speaks of

various formulae of viddui stated by a number of Amoraim, and then the Gemara adds,

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 Mar Zutra said: [The preceding confessions are necessary] only when he did not say,

"Aval anachnu chatanu, but we have sinned." But if he had said "Aval anachnu

chatanu," no more is necessary. For Bar Hamdudi said, "Once I stood before

Shemuel, who was sitting, and when the prayer leader came up and said 'Aval anachnu

chatanu,' he rose." We learn from here that those words are the quintessential viddui.

Aval anachnu chatanu: simple, uniform, undifferentiated confession. It is simply an

acknowledgment, with bowed head, with shame and guilt, that we have gone astray. Whether our

sin is minor or major, it is still a sin: "But we have sinned."

Today, however, we have expanded this simple confession into an entire aleph-bet of

sin: Ashamnu, bagadnu, gazalnu, etc. The Geonim added even more: a double aleph-bet of "Al

chet," concluding with a list of sins categorized according to the gravity of their punishment –

"sins punishable by the court, sins punishable by karet, etc." And if that isn't enough, some people

have taken each line of Al Chet and elaborated much further. Rambam's viddui was enough for

the Gemara, but Rabbeinu Yona's viddui entered the mainstream of our life and our experience on

Yom Kippur.

Yet that experience on Yom Kippur is itself differentiated. Broadly speaking, we stand on

Yom Kippur with a dual sense and a dual charge. We stand with the Rambam, trying to eradicate

the roots of sin, to eliminate the desire for sin, to uproot completely the inclination and tendency

for sin. Reciting the viddui of Aval anachnu chatanu, we confront where we are and where

the Almighty is, and try to reach out to Him, hoping that He will reach out to us. On the other

hand, we stand with Rabbeinu Yona in following the advice of Eikha (3:40), "Let us search and

examine our ways." Detailing our sins one after another, we examine what we have done and how

46
we have done it, weighing its severity, so that we know not just whether we are sinners, but exactly

what kind of sinners we are. On Yom Kippur, we engage in a highly religious enterprise and a

highly moral enterprise; that is Yom Kippur as a whole.

But at the end of the day, when we come to Ne'ila, we change our tune a bit. Starting on

Erev Yom Kippur, through the first four prayer services, we say Aval anachnu chatanu and then

we go through the whole list of Al chet. However, as dusk approaches and night begins to fall,

when the conclusion of the day and its atonement is on the horizon, we turn to God and say: Master

of the Universe, we have been working on ourselves all year, and especially since the beginning

the Elul, weighing and measuring our sins, and all of Yom Kippur we have been striving and

groping and hoping. But now, at the end of the day, we have only one thing left, and that is to cast

our hopes and prayers upon You. We look to You after we have gone the extra mile, and maybe

it isn't enough. Now it is too late in the day, and we cannot involve ourselves again in this calculus,

identifying and grading sins, pinning down each one. Now it is our very selves encountering You,

and we implore You, we beg for Your forgiveness, for selicha, mechila, kappara!

At Ne'ila, we do not say Al chet, and content ourselves with saying Aval anachnu

chatanu. We do so in the hope that what we have done over the course of the year, what we have

done during Elul, during Selichot, during Aseret Yemei Teshuva, during the first four prayers of

Yom Kippur - following Rabbeinu Yona, trying to right wrongs as best as we could, trying to

grope and to inquire – makes us worthy and deserving of forgiveness. But now we look for

something more: for tahara, purification – "Lifnei Hashem titharu, Before God you shall be

purified" (Vayikra 16:30).

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 This purification has a dual character. When a person is purified in a mikveh, each part of

him is immersed in the mikveh, and the whole of him is in the mikveh. Similarly, on Yom Kippur

we strive for tahara which comes from moral purgation, from the confrontation with sin, from the

attempt to eradicate and overcome it. This is an aspect of tikkun atzmi and of tikkun ha-chet. We

also strive for the tahara of "Mikveh Yisrael Hashem" (Yirmiyahu 17:13 – translated homiletically

as "God is the mikveh of Israel"). This second type of tahara refers to our rehabilitation, to the

reestablishment of our relationship with God, which springs not solely from below, but from

above.

"Lifnei Hashem titharu," Rabbeinu Yona said, means that there is a special mitzva to repent

on Yom Kippur (Sha'arei Teshuva 4:17). Here we encounter purification as a charge, a mandate,

which entails "Nachpesa derakhenu ve-nachkora," the specific, detailed, calculating aspect

of teshuva. Yet "Lifnei Hashem titharu" is also to be understood not as a charge or a mandate, but

as a hope, aspiration and promise, that if we have confronted "mi-kol chatoteichem," all our sins,

then God, for His part, will proclaim "Titharu" – You shall be purified! 11

11
This Kinus Teshuva lecture was delivered at the Gruss Kollel in Jerusalem in Tishrei 5762 [2001]

48
 Christian Carmargo as Ariel in Sam Mendes’s production of The Tempest at The
Old Vic, 2010.

John Gordon writes:12

Magic and spirits

Act 1, Scene 2 establishes the association of Ariel and Prospero through magic. Through his ‘art’
(ll. 1, 24, 28) Prospero has gained control of the spirit, his own powers symbolised by his ‘magic
garment’ (1.2.24). Magic is the force behind Prospero’s plan, and in his own words is linked with
‘accident most strange, bountiful Fortune’ (1.2.178). He recognises he must ‘court’ the influence
of ‘a most auspicious star’ (1.2.182–83) if things are to work to his advantage; he must judge the
use of his powers according to astrology.

Ariel works with other spirits (‘all his quality’, 1.2.193) to cause the shipwreck. Its elemental
powers are balanced with the capacity to charm others to sleep, as it does with the mariners
(1.2.230), and to charm Ferdinand from movement (1.2.467 s.d.). Ariel describes its own work as
‘spriting gently’ (1.2.298), consistent with the subtlety of something ‘invisible / To every eyeball’
(1.2.302–03) but that of Prospero.

12
https://www.bl.uk/shakespeare/articles/character-analysis-ariel-and-prospero-in-the-tempest#

49
Power and enslavement

Ariel is under Prospero’s power until the tasks he requires are complete. Caliban is unambiguously
Prospero’s slave. Ferdinand is controlled through Ariel’s charm so that by Act 2, Scene 1 he can
be exploited to bear logs for Prospero. By the play’s end all have the ‘liberty’ (1.2.245) that Ariel
demands of Prospero, but which is here denied.

Though Prospero professes care for his daughter, his relationship with her can be manipulative and
brooks no challenge. When she speaks in defence of Ferdinand (1.2.467–69) he is curt with her,
‘What, I say, / My foot my tutor?’ (1.2.469–70), and as she begs for his pity he demands, ‘Silence!
one word more / Shall make me chide thee, if not hate thee’ (1.2.476–77). He seems secure only
when in total control.

Interpretations

The film Forbidden Planet (1956) is a famous adaptation of The Tempest which casts the play as
science fiction. Prospero the magician becomes the archetypal mad scientist Dr Morbius, stranded
on the planet with only his daughter Altaira until the arrival of an expedition team from Earth. The
film dwells on the controlling nature of Morbius, especially in relation to his daughter, and in his
commanding of a robot helper, Robby. Obsessed with his research, Morbius unleashes terrifying
forces he finds difficult to control in the form of the Monster of Id. In this way the film adds
Freudian theories of psychoanalysis to The Tempest’s exploration of human nature.

Since the 1960s literary discussion of The Tempest has explored its representation of colonisation,
following movements for de-colonisation in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America. These post-
colonial interpretations emphasise the claims that characters have to reside on and rule the island,
and the conflicts that ensue. In particular, they challenge Prospero’s claim to authority. Caliban
asserts ‘This island's mine by Sycorax my mother, / Which thou tak’st from me’ (1.2.331–32),
while the scene discussed here makes clear that Ariel also pre-dated Prospero’s arrival. It is ironic
that the action of the play is founded on Prospero’s desire to restore what he considers his
legitimate sovereignty over Milan, while he imposes his rule on the original inhabitants of the
isle.13

13
Dr John Gordon is a Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of East Anglia, Norwich. Previously a teacher of English, he
researches English education and leads teacher training in the subject. His specialisms include literary reading, response to poetry
and arts-based research. His publications include A Pedagogy of Poetry (2014) and Teaching English in Secondary Schools(2015).
His current research includes Literature’s Lasting Impression investigating reading in class and its lifelong impact, and Akenfield
Now in which young people improvise drama and make films in the tradition of Ronald Blythe’s book and Peter Hall’s film.

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