Hi M12,
so long as it serves the class
May 09, 2021
This is the last digest friends. Leggo!
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<Date>
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Ponente
Facts
Issue
Ruling
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acronyms:
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purpose: understandable cases
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Beadle’s phone number is
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reference. Also communicate
with Bidz if ever challenged na.
8) Laban lang jud.
Yours Truly,
Madam Bidz
MOM - 2/22/21
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With thanks and appreciation,
VB
XVI.D RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(against self-incrimination)
U.S. v. Tan Teng, G.R. No. 7081,
September 7, 1912 (ZAMBRANO)
Topic: Self-incrimination: Using
substance emitted by body of accused
for laboratory examination.
Ponente: Johnson, J.
Facts:
The defendant on this case was charged
with the crime of rape (abusos deshonestos
against a certain Oliva Pacomio - 7 yrs of
age)
Based on the records of the case, the
victim's sister found that the victim was
suffering from gonorrhea. It was then the
victim recounted what happened days
earlier; that the defendant had entered her
room and placed his private parts upon
hers.
After the victim had identified Tan Teng as
the perpetrator, the latter was arrested, and
examined. The arresting policeman took a
portion of the substance emitting from the
body of the defendant, and turned it over to
the Bureau of Science. Results showed that
the defendant was suffering from
gonorrhea.
Defendant challenged the admissibility of
the victim’s testimony and attempted to
show that the victim contacted the disease
through other ways. Accused also
challenged the result of the scientific
examination made by the Bureau of Science
of the substance taken from his body. To
admit such a result would tantamount to
compelling him to testify against himself.
Issue/s:
W/n admitting as evidence the result of the
scientific examination of the substance
taken from the defendant’s body was to
compel him to testify against himself. No
Ruling:
No. Admitting of the result was not to
compel the defendant to testify against
himself.
The prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when
it may be material.
In this case, the accused was not compelled
to make any admissions or answer any
questions. The mere fact that an object
found in his person was examined did not
infringe the right to self incrimination.
The substance was taken from his body
without his objection, the examination was
made by a competent medical authority,
and the result showed that the defendant
was suffering from said disease. These
corroborate with the truth of the victim’s
declaration.
Thus, the admission of the result was not to
compel the defendant to testify against
himself.
s/n: Main purpose of the provision of the
Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral
examination of prisoners before, or upon
trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling
confessions or declarations implicating then
in the commission of a crime.
Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025,
September 23, 1929
Topic: Right against self-incrimination
Facts: The petitioner complains that the
respondent judge is compelling him to
appear before the provincial fiscal to take
dictation in his own handwriting for the
purpose of comparing the petitioner’s
handwriting and determining whether or not
it is he who wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified.
The Administrative Code provides that the
judge upon motion of the fiscal, may compel
witnesses to present at the investigation of
any crime or misdemeanor. But this power
must be exercised without prejudice to the
constitutional rights of persons cited to
appear.
Issue: WON compelling the petitioner to
appear before the fiscal to take dictation is a
violation against the petitioners right to self-
incrimination.
Held: Yes. The writing here means that the
petitioner herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier.
The constitutional privilege of right against
self-incrimination covers both one who is
compelled to produce a document, and one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of
his handwriting because in both cases the
witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself.
It is clear that the petitioner did not give his
permission. Considering the circumstance
that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer it
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal
to obtain genuine specimens of his
handwriting. Even if supposing that it
impossible to obtain specimens without
resorting to the means complained herein, it
must not resort to trampling upon a personal
right guaranteed by the constitution.
Add: the court here used villaflor vs.
summers.
In Villafor it ruled that it was the case of the
examination of the body by physicians,
which could be and doubtless was
interpreted by the court as being no
compulsion of the petitioner therein to
furnish evidence by means of testimonial
act. Where in comparison to this present
case, Beltran is compelled to perform a
positive, testimonial act, to write and give a
specimen of his handwriting for the purpose
of comparison. Besides, in the case of
Villamor, it was sought to exhibit something
that is already in existence, while in the
case of Beltran it deals with something not
yet in existence.
Chavez v. CA, G.R. No. L-29169, August
19, 1968 (SEVILLA)
Topic: Compelling the Accused to
Testify as witness for the Prosecution)
FACTS: Accused were the following:
Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo
Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo
P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro
Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias
"Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses
alias"Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie
Doe and Paul Doe. An information was filed
that on or about the 14th day of November,
1962, in Quezon City, the accused
conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of
confidence and without the consent of the
owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in
asporting the motor vehicle above-
described. Upon arraignment, all the
accused, except the three Does who have
not been identified nor apprehended,
pleaded not guilty. Trial Court On July 23,
1963, trial commenced before the judge
presiding Branch IX of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Quezon City During the
trial, the Fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked
Roger Chavez to be the first witness.
Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal
Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez)
will only be an ordinary witness not an state
witness. Counsel of accused answer that it
will only incriminate his client. But the jugde
ruled in favor of the fiscal on the grounds
that (1) the right of the prosecution to ask
anybody to act as witness on the witness
stand including the accused (2) If there
should be any question that is incriminating
then that is the time for counsel to interpose
his objection and the court will sustain him if
and when the court feels that the answer of
this witness to the question would
incriminate him. (3) Counsel has all the
assurance that the court will not require the
witness to answer questions which would
incriminate him. Version of the prosecution
of what happened: Chavez saw Lee driving
the thunderbird (car) and asked if it is for
sale. Lee answered yes. On November 12,
Chavez met Sumilang and informed about
the car. The two went to Asistio and made a
plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez'
reputation as a wealthy movie star,
introduce him as a buyer to someone who
was selling a car and, after the deed of sale
is signed, by trickery to run away with the
car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a
third person for a profit. Chavez known to
be a car agent was included in the plan. He
furnished the name of Johnson Lee who
was selling his Thunderbird. Chavez
arranged the meeting with Lee on
November 14. They agreed on the price and
went to Binondo to meet Dy Sun Hiok Lim
which is the registered owner of the car.
Deed of sale was drawn and signed by
Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man approached
Sumilang with a note which stated that the
money was ready at the Dalisay Theater.
Sumilang then wrote on the same note that
the money should be brought to the
restaurant. At the same time he requested
Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to
the note bearer. The two Chinese were left
alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese
could not locate Sumilang and Chavez.
They went out to the place where the
Thunderbird was parked, found that it was
gone. They then immediately reported its
loss to the police. Much later, the NBI
recovered the already repainted car and
impounded it. Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio
converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a
restaurant at Highway 54 near the
Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There,
Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash
and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's
share in the transaction. On the 14th of
November, the registration of the car was
transferred in the name of Sumilang in
Cavite City, and three days later, in the
name of Asistio in Caloocan. Version of
Romeo Sumilang: In the last week of
September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger
Chavez at a gas station. The latter informed
him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark
Field for sale for a price between
P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said
that it could be held for him with a down
payment of P10,000.00.
On November 14, Chavez appeared at
Sumilang's house with the news that the car
was ready if Sumilang was ready with the
rest of the money. So Sumilang got
P9,000.00 from his mother and another
P4,000.00 from his aparador. He
immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez,
intending to pay out the balance upon the
car's delivery. It was then that Chavez told
Sumilang that the car was already bought
by a Chinese who would be the vendor. At
Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the
balance. Sumilang accommodated. There,
Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual
who warned that Chavez was a "smart"
agent and advised that Sumilang should
have a receipt for his money. A certain
Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make
out a receipt for Chavez to sign. After
Sumilang returned from posing for some
photographs with some of his fans, Bimbo
showed him the receipt already signed by
Chavez and also by Pascual and Bimbo to
sign the receipt as witnesses. This receipt
was offered as an exhibit by the prosecution
and by Sumilang. Johnson Lee turned over
to Sumilang the deed of sale, the
registration papers and the keys to the car.
Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang
dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a
film shooting he saw Asistio who liked his
Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered
to buy it from him for P22,500.00 and
Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio
tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the
balance he promised to pay the next day
after negotiating with some financing
company. Before said balance could be
paid, the car was impounded.
Ruling of the trial court and CA: The trial
court gave evidence to Sumilang's
averment, he was thus cleared. So was
Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a
mere buyer of the car. And so, the
prosecution's theory of conspiracy was
discounted. As to the other accused, the
court found no case against Pedro Rebullo
alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias
"Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was
also acquitted for in the first place he was
not identified by Johnson Lee in court. As to
Roger Chavez, however, the court had this
to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any
defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony
as witness for the prosecution establishes
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The trial
court branded him "a selfconfessed culprit"
Chavez filed an appeal. The counsel of
Chavez Atty. Marquez was ordered to file
brief but she failed. Instead she sent filed a
written detailed information and also stating
that if she were allowed to file appellant's
brief she would go along with the factual
findings of the court below but will show
however that its conclusion is erroneous.
CA dismissed said appeal. On June 21,
1968, the Court of Appeals, directed the
City Warden of Manila where Chavez is
confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest
issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him
over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons pending
execution of the judgment below, and
ordered remand of the case to the Quezon
City court for execution of judgment. Hence
the petition for habeas corpus. Issue: I. II.
WOR the constitutional right of the accused
against self incrimination was violated.
Held: I. Petitioner claims that there was a
violation of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. He asks that the hand of
this Court be made to bear down upon his
conviction; that he be relieved of the effects
thereof. He asks us to consider the
constitutional injunction that "No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself, fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115,
Rules of Court where, in all criminal
prosecutions, the defendant shall be
entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a
witness against himself. The Court held that
such right is "not merely a formal technical
rule the enforcement of which is left to the
discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it
secures to every defendant a valuable and
substantive right. Therefore, the court may
not extract from a defendant's own lips and
against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor
may a court as much as resort to
compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly,
of facts usable against him as a confession
of the crime or the tendency of which is to
prove the commission of a crime. Because,
it is his right to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does
not necessarily connote the use of violence;
it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to
overbear his will, disable him from making a
free and rational choice, or impair his
capacity for rational judgment would in our
opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion
"tending to force testimony from the
unwilling lips of the defendant. In the case,
petitioner was called by the prosecution as
the first witness in that case to testify for the
People during the first day of trial thereof.
Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege
of self-incrimination. This he broadened by
the clear cut statement that he will not
testify. But petitioner's protestations were
met with the judge's emphatic statement
that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask
anybody to act as witness on the witness
stand including the accused," and that
defense counsel "could not object to have
the accused called on the witness stand."
The cumulative impact of all these is that
accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He
was thus peremptorily asked to create
evidence against himself. For, in reality, the
purpose of calling an accused as a witness
for the People would be to incriminate him.
With all these, we have no hesitancy in
saying that petitioner was forced to testify to
incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot
be said now that he has waived his right. He
did not volunteer to take the stand and in his
own defense; he did not offer himself as a
witness; on the contrary, he claimed the
right upon being called to testify. If petitioner
nevertheless answered the questions
inspite of his fear of being accused of
perjury or being put under contempt, this
circumstance cannot be counted against
him. His testimony is not of his own choice.
To him it was a case of compelled
submission. He was a cowed participant in
proceedings before a judge who possessed
the power to put him under contempt had he
chosen to remain silent. Nor could he
escape testifying. The court made it
abundantly clear that his testimony at least
on direct examination would be taken right
then and thereon the first day of the trial.
There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be
effective, a waiver must be certain and
unequivocal, and intelligently,
understandably, and willingly made; such
waiver following only where liberty of choice
has been fully accorded. After a claim a
witness cannot properly be held to have
waived his privilege on vague and uncertain
evidence II. The course which petitioner
takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high
prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered
as an exceptional remedy to release a
person whose liberty is illegally restrained
such as when the accused's constitutional
rights are disregarded. Such defect results
in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and
therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused
whose fundamental right was violated. That
void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which
precisely is the function of habeas corpus.
This writ may issue even if another remedy
which is less effective may be availed of by
the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused
to perfect his appeal before the Court of
Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the
writ. The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final. Under our own
Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the
accused Roger Chavez whose case
presents a clear picture of disregard of a
constitutional right is absolutely proper.
Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ,
unless otherwise expressly provided by law,
"to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto. The Court stated that: "A
void judgment is in legal effect no judgment.
By it no rights are divested. From it no rights
can be obtained. Being worthless in itself,
all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one.
All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. The parties
attempting to enforce it may be responsible
as trespassers. ... " Supreme Court
decision: Petition granted. The Court
rendered judgment directing the respondent
Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the
Director of Prisons or any other officer or
person in custody of petitioner to discharge
him from custody.
People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687,
December 9, 1999 (PADUL)
Topic: Taking of accused’s hair strands for
laboratory examination/DNA test
s/n: The constitutional provisions against
the use of evidence against the accused
obtained by virtue of his testimony or
admission without the assistance of counsel
while under custodial investigation are an
affirmation that “coercion can be mental as
well as physical and that the blood of the
accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition.”; Hair samples
may be admitted in evidence against the
accused, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.
Also guysss, the accused is the kagawad’s
son.
FACTS:
This is a case where Delfin Rondero was
convicted of special complex crime of rape
with homicide for killing the 9yo Mylene
Doria.
It was on March 24, 1995 when Mardy Doria
came home late from a barrio fiesta and
noticed that his sister Mylene was nowhere
to be found. When they couldn’t find her,
Maximo Doria (his father) and family sought
assistance from their Kagawad Andong
Rondero and neighbors in Dagupan to look
for her.
On his way home, Maximo (carrying his
flashlight) saw the accused Rondero
washing his bloodied hands with an ice pick
clenched in his mouth. Maximo told
Kagawad Andong about what he saw, but
did not reveal that it was his own son.
Later, they discovered Mylene’s body in
Pugaro Elementary School. She was found
naked, with fractured bones and had
several contusions and abrasions. There
were hair strands tightly gripped in her right
hand.
Police found the well splashed with blood,
and Maximo disclosed that he saw the man
who washed his hand. Hence, the police
went to Delfin Rendora’s house to arrest
him.
The hair specimen found from Mylene’s
right hand and that of the accused was
submitted to the NBI for examination.
However NBI could not get the result unless
the comparative hair strand of Delfin was
pulled out from the root to tip. Thereupon,
Delfin was allegedly convinced by a certain
Major wendy Ocampo to provide the sample
needed. Another police officer went to the
residence of Mylene to get the hair strand.
(on the other end, witnesses were gathered
and the wife of Delfin - Christine - was
asked to testify. Christine said she washed
blood stained clothes, and the police went
to their house to retrieve the same without
her permission / knowledge. Leonardo
(delfin’s father) said he mauled his own son
because of a heated convo between him
and is wife, which was why Delfin had
bruises - this was incredulous and
unbelievable)
However, Delfin alleged that while in
custody of the Police Officers, some hair
strands were taken from him without his
consent and was thereby submitted to the
NBI for investigation. He says this was a
violation against self-incrimination.
It was important to note that he executed a
waiver of the provisions of Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution regarding the rights of
an accused during custodial investigation. It
appears, however, that the waivers were
executed by the accused without the
assistance of a counsel of his own choice.
ISSUE: w/n the taking of the hair strands
without his consent violated his right against
self-incrimination.
RULING:
No, it does not violate the right against self-
incrimination. Although Rondero insisted
that there was force in taking a sample of
his hair, the hair samples were still
admissible as evidence for what is only
proscribed by the Constitution is the use
of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature.
(s/n: What about the blood stained
undershirt and short pants? Inadmissible,
as those were taken without warrant.)
Communicative in nature. The use of the
accused’s testimony against him is
proscribed under Sections 12 and 17 of the
Constitution. The constitution recognizes
the fact that the psychological atmosphere
of custodial investigations are coercive if
done without the presence of the counsel.
After all, pressure does not necessarily
require violence, it could be the mere force
of testimony from a defendant’s unwilling
lips.
However, what is actually proscribed is the
use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from the accused-
appellant and not the inclusion of his
body in evidence when it may be
material. For instance, substance emitted
from the body of the accused may be
received as evidence in prosecution for acts
of lasciviousness and morphine forced out
of the mouth of the accused may also be
used as evidence against him.
Consequently, although the accused-
appellant insists that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the
NBI for forensic examination, the hair
samples may still be admitted in evidence
against him.
Hence, Delfin was still convicted of the
crime and sentenced to death.
People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, Feb
17, 2000 (ORTEGA)
Topic: Right against self-incrimination –
taking of pictures of accused without the
assistance of counsel immediately after
the alleged rape-slay of the victim
(same facts from Mag-aso’s digest, added
just a few)
Facts:
Gallarde was charged with special complex
crime of rape with homicide in an
information filed.
During arraignment, Gallarde pleaded not
guilty.
The relevant facts established by the
testimonies of the witnesses are
summarized in the Appellee’s Brief as
follows:
In the evening of May 26, 1997 the accused
together with some other neighbors had a
drinking session at the house of spouses
Eduardo and Elena Talan. In the house,
Editha, 10 year old daughter of the
spouses, was also there. Gallerde was was
invited to dine in the kitchen. As they
partook of the meal, Gallerde suddenly left.
Jaime stepped out of the kitchen to urinate,
saw Gallerde and Editha talking to each
other. Jaime whistled at Gallerde but
instead of minding him, the latter sprinted
towards the road leading to his house.
Editha went out to look for Gallerde. By
10:00 the drinking buddies dispersed and
transferred at Renato’s place. Moments
later Editha was declared missing. All the
people therein looked for Editha. They saw
the slippers of Editha first near Gallerde’s
residence.
After a while they so Gallerde at the toilet, 6
meters away from his residence squatting
and his knees were covered with soil.
He denied about Editha’s whereabouts and
said he was with Kiko however the
statement of Gallerde cannot be true
because Kiko was with the drinking
buddies. After a while they saw another
slippers of Editha and 3 meters away found
1 slipper of Gallerde. After that they noticed
a soft soil spot and upon surprise it was
Editha.
Gallarde was brought to the barangay
captain and later he was turned over to the
PNP at Camp Narciso Ramos. The police
informed him that he was a suspect in the
rape and killing of Editha Talan, and he told
them that he did not commit the crime.
At the Talan residence he was wearing
short pants and rubber slippers. He was
asked at the police headquarters to pull
down his shorts and he complied. He was
then wearing briefs with a hemline that was
a little loose. He was informed that a
cadaver was recovered near his house.
When he was asked questions while in
police custody, he was not represented
by any lawyer.
Apparently, there were photographs taken
against Gallarde immediately after the
incident on the ground that "the same were
taken while he was already under the mercy
of the police."
The trial court rendered a decision
convicting Gallarde of the crime murder only
because of the lack of proof of carnal
knowledge.
(there was no proof on the insertion of penis
because although there was laceration of
the lower part of the vagina, and a ruptured
hymen, there was no presence of semen
found)
Issue:
Whether or not the right against self-
incrimination of Gallarde based on the
photographs taken was violated.
Ruling:
NO, there was no violation of Gallarde’s
right against self-incrimination.
The taking of pictures of an accused even
without the assistance of counsel, being a
purely mechanical act, is not a violation of
his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The constitutional right of an
accused against self-incrimination
proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from
the accused and not the inclusion of his
body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in
the prohibition as the accused does not
thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is
not required. The essence of the right
against self-incrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act.
Miranda v. Arizona, supra
Facts
The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v.
Arizona addressed four different cases
involving custodial interrogations. In each of
these cases, the defendant was questioned
by police officers, detectives, or a
prosecuting attorney in a room in which he
was cut off from the outside world. In none
of these cases was the defendant given a
full and effective warning of his rights at the
outset of the interrogation process. In all the
cases, the questioning elicited oral
admissions and, in three of them, signed
statements that were admitted at trial.
Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at
his home and taken in custody to a police
station where he was identified by the
complaining witness. He was then
interrogated by two police officers for two
hours, which resulted in a signed, written
confession. At trial, the oral and written
confessions were presented to the jury.
Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and
rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years
imprisonment on each count. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Arizona held that
Miranda’s constitutional rights were not
violated in obtaining the confession.
Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked
up by New York police in connection with
the robbery of a dress shop that had
occurred three days prior. He was first taken
to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters.
He was then taken to the 66th Detective
Squad, where he orally admitted the
robbery and was placed under formal arrest.
He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for
detention, where he was questioned by an
assistant district attorney in the presence of
a hearing reporter who transcribed the
questions and answers. At trial, the oral
confession and the transcript were
presented to the jury. Vignera was found
guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced
to 30-60 years imprisonment. The
conviction was affirmed without opinion by
the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals.
Westover v. United States: Westover was
arrested by local police in Kansas City as a
suspect in two Kansas City robberies and
taken to a local police station. A report was
also received from the FBI that Westover
was wanted on a felony charge in California.
Westover was interrogated the night of the
arrest and the next morning by local police.
Then, FBI agents continued the
interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-
half hours of interrogation by the FBI,
Westover signed separate confessions,
which had been prepared by one of the
agents during the interrogation, to each of
the two robberies in California. These
statements were introduced at trial.
Westover was convicted of the California
robberies and sentenced to 15 years’
imprisonment on each count. The conviction
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
California v. Stewart: In the course of
investigating a series of purse-snatch
robberies in which one of the victims died of
injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart
was identified as the endorser of checks
stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was
arrested at his home. Police also arrested
Stewart’s wife and three other people who
were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a
cell, and, over the next five days, was
interrogated on nine different occasions.
During the ninth interrogation session,
Stewart stated that he had robbed the
deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At
that time, police released the four other
people arrested with Stewart because there
was no evidence to connect any of them
with the crime. At trial, Stewart’s statements
were introduced. Stewart was convicted of
robbery and first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of
California reversed, holding that Stewart
should have been advised of his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel.
Issues
Whether “statements obtained from an
individual who is subjected to custodial
police interrogation” are admissible against
him in a criminal trial and whether
“procedures which assure that the individual
is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not to be
compelled to incriminate himself” are
necessary.
Ruling
The Court held that “there can be no doubt
that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court
proceedings and serves to protect persons
in all settings in which their freedom of
action is curtailed in any significant way
from being compelled to incriminate
themselves.” As such, “the prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.”
The Court further held that “without proper
safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or
accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist and
to compel him to speak where he would
otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a
defendant “must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.”
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda,
reversed the judgment of the New York
Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the
judgment of the Supreme Court of California
in Stewart.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board, supra (Mag-aso)
Topic: Right against self incrimination
Facts: The constitutionality of Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office
with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section
reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized
drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by
the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. x x x The drug testing shall employ,
among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years
and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory
drug test;
Issue: WON there is valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused
of crimes.
Ruling: No. The Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for
persons accused of crimes.
To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this
case would violate a persons' right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When
persons suspected of committing a crime
are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons
thus charged, by the bare fact of being
haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to
drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy.
XVI.E RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(against prohibited punishments)
People v. Dionisio, G.R. No. L-25513,
March 27, 1968 (fine or imprisonment or
both for illegal gambling) (MADERAZO)
FACTS :
1. Rosario Dionisio , appellant was
charge with having violated RA, 3063
before the court of first instance.
2. Appellant was sentence to
imprisonment for 1 month
ISSUE :
WON the penalty imposed in RA 3063
infringes the constitutional provision against
cruel and harsh punishment.
HELD:
No. Mere severity does not constitute cruel
or unusual punishment. The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statue is
severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
To come under the ban, the punishment
must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive”,
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offence as to shock the moral sense of the
community.
(Thus to be cruel and unusual or excessive
within the meaning of the constitution, the
penalty must be flagrantly disproportionate
to the offense no matter under what
circumstances the offense may be
committed; but to be clearly excessive
under art 5 , it need only be disproportionate
to the circumstances of the offense and of
the offender. )
People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 132601,
October 12, 1998
DIGESTED BY: GARCIA
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: People of the
Philippines
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: Leo Echegaray
DOCTRINES:
(1) The Constitutional Amendment did NOT
ABSOLUTELY ABOLISH THE DEATH
PENALTY. The amendment merely says
that the death penalty shall not be imposed
unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it, and if already imposed, shall
be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) RA 7659 correctly identified crimes
warranting the mandatory penalty of death.
As to the other crimes punished by
reclusion perpetua to death- the proper time
to determine their heinousness in
contemplation of law is on automatic review.
BUT! Aggravating circumstances under the
RPC need not be additionally alleged in
order for the TC to validly impose the death
penalty for crimes under RA 7659, which
are punished with the flexible penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.
(3) Death penalty is imposed because the
heinous crimes have so deeply
dehumanized a person or the criminal acts
have severely destructive effects on the
national efforts to lift the abject masses from
poverty (public interest). Their acts have
caused irreparable injury to both the victim
and society, and repetition of the acts would
pose an actual threat to the individual and
the government, so they must permanently
be prevented from doing so.
FACTS:
1. The RPC, enacted in 1932, included
death penalty as a punishment.
2. 1986 Constitution: Article III, Sec 19(1)
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless,for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed may be reduced to
recluscion perpetua”
3. December 1993-Death Penalty law
came into effect, R.A. 7659 (“An Act to
Impose the Death Penalty on Certain
Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose
the RPC as Amended, Other Special Penal
Laws, and for other Purposes”)
4. April 1994-Accused-appellant
Echegaray allegedly raped his 10-year old
daughter. Upon his conviction of guilty, his
case was automatically elevated to the SC.
5. June 25,1996- Court rendered
decision, affirming conviction of Echegaray.
Death penalty ordered.
6. Echegaray filed a Motion for
Reconsideration- no findings to disturb
verdict
7. Echegaray filed the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration (with FLAG as
the new defense counsel) with 3 main
grounds for reversal of death sentence:
- Mixed factual and legal matters
relating to the trial proceedings and
findings
- Included the affidavit of desistance
which defense claimed would act as
a bar on the criminal prosecution à
No bearing; an affidavit of
desistance is merely an additional
ground to buttress the accused’s
defenses- not the sole consideration
that can result in acquittal. During
the trial proceedings, the victim
admitted that she signed the
Affidavit of Desistance, yet the was
not withdrawing the charge against
the accused because he might do
the same sexual assaults to other
women. The denial of the crime and
the alibi presented by Echegaray
cannot outweigh the positive
identification and convincing
testimonies given by the prosecution
- Alleged incompetence of
Echegaray's former counsel à court
 found that there was no gross
incompetence and the alleged errors
committed by the previous counsel
could not have overturned the
judgment of conviction
- Purely legal question of the
constitutionality of RA 7659: R.A.
[No.] 7659, Defnese argues that
reimposing the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se:
ISSUE: Whether or not the death penalty
imposed in rape is violative of the
constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment?
RULING:
NO, the death penalty imposed in rape is
not violative of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
Death penalty is imposed because the
heinous crimes have so deeply
dehumanized a person or the criminal acts
have severely destructive effects on the
national efforts to lift the abject masses from
poverty (public interest). Their acts have
caused irreparable injury to both the victim
and society, and repetition of the acts would
pose an actual threat to the individual and
the government, so they must permanently
be prevented from doing so.
In this case, Echegaray argues that rape
does not involve the taking of life, the rape
victim may still repair life-it is not completely
taken away and thus should not be
punished with death. Here, the SC
disagrees, short of homicide, rape is the
ultimate violation of self. It is violent crime
because it normally involves force, or the
threat of force and intimidation to overcome
the will or capacity to resist. Rape inflicts
mental and psychological damage, it
undermines the community’s sense of
security, so there is public injury as well.
Therefore, ….
Definition: Rape is the forcible violation of
the sexual intimacy of another person. It
does injury to justice and charity. Rape
deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and
physical and moral integrity to which every
person has a right. It causes grave damage
that can mark the victim for life. It is always
an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon
decency and dignity that hurts not only the
victim but the society itself
Maturan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 227155,
March 28, 2017 (FLORES)
(perpetual disqualification from public office
as penalty for repeated failure to file SOCE)
Topic: Rights against prohibited
punishments
Ponente: Bersamin
Facts:
On October 16, 2015, Maturan filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of
Provincial Governor of Basilan for the 2016
National and Local Elections. Patiño,
claiming to be a registered voter of Basilan,
filed a petition for the disqualification of
Maturan on the ground that based on the list
issued by the COMELEC Maturan had
failed to file his SOCE corresponding to the
2010 and 2013 elections.
Maturan opposed the petition for his
disqualification by arguing that the petition
had been rendered moot on account of his
withdrawal from the mayoralty race during
the 2013 elections; and that, consequently,
he could only be held accountable for the
failure to file his SOCE corresponding to the
2010 elections when he ran for Provincial
Governor of Basilan
On June 6, 2016, the COMELEC First
Division issued the first assailed resolution
finding merit in the petition for his
disqualification, and declaring the petitioner
disqualified to hold public office.
Macturan contends that the penalty of
perpetual disqualification as excessive,
harsh and cruel, and, consequently,
unconstitutional pursuant to Section 19(1).
Issue: WON the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it declared
Maturan to be perpetually disqualified to
hold public office.
Ruling:
No, Maturan's disqualification is proper.
Petitioner failed to submit his SOCE for the
2010 and 2013 elections and COMELEC
clearly acted within the bounds of its
jurisdiction in view of the clear language of
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166:
Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File
Statement. - Every candidate and
treasurer of the political party SHALL,
within thirty (30) days after the day of
the election, file in duplicate with the
offices of the Commission the full, true
and itemized statement of all
contributions and expenditures in
connection with the election.
Congress has deemed fit to impose the
penalty of perpetual disqualification on
candidates who repeatedly failed to file their
SOCEs cannot be the subject of judicial
inquiry. We have always deferred to the
wisdom of Congress in enacting a law. We
can only enforce a statute like R.A. No.7166
unless there is a clear showing that it
contravenes the Constitution.
Settled is the rule that a punishment
authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading
or disproportionate to the nature of the
offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly
oppressive and wholly disproportionate to
the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community. It takes
more than merely being harsh, excessive,
out of proportion or severe for a penalty to
be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on
this principle, the Court has consistently
overruled contentions of the defense that
the penalty of fine or imprisonment
authorized by the statute involved is cruel
and degrading.
The prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is generally aimed at the form
or character of the punishment rather than
its severity in respect of its duration or
amount. The fact that the penalty is severe
provides insufficient basis to declare a law
unconstitutional and does not, by that
circumstance alone, make it cruel and
inhuman.
XVI.F RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(against double jeopardy)
People v. City Court of Manila, G.R. No.
L-36342 April 27, 1983 (DINAMPO)
Topic: Meaning of “same offense”
Facts:
On October 17, 1972, Francisco Gapa
Mallares, a truck driver, accidentally run
over Diolito de la Cruz. The next day,
Mallares was accused of serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence for
which he pleaded guilty. He was penalized
with 1 month and 1 day of aresto mayor.
The very same day the judgement was
finalized, Diolito de la Cruz died. On
October 24, another case was filed against
Mallares for homicide through reckless
imprudence. On November 17, 1972 the
City Court of Manila ordered the dismissal
of the homicide through reckless
imprudence case on the grounds of double
jeopardy.
Issue: W/N there is double jeopardy in the
cases filed against Mallares.
Held:
Yes.
In Melo vs. People, the Court held that “here
after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of
the offense and, together with the facts
existing at a time, constitutes a new and
distinct offense, the accused cannot be said
to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
second offense.” However, in this case, this
doctrine does not apply because the Penal
Code punishes the negligent act or the
negligent state of mind and not the resulting
injuries. The accused cannot be punished
twice for the same negligence although it
had a different resulting injury (this is the
trial court’s decision on why double
jeopardy).
The Supreme court also held that although
Melo vs. People also states that when a
new information supervenes the case and
this information was non-existent at that
time and this information will produce a new
offense all together, there is no double
jeopardy for the accused but for this case,
the victim died on October 18, On October
20, the accused was arraigned and pleaded
guilty. The case for homicide was filed on
October 24 which now puts the accused in
double jeopardy.
Also note that although the solicitor general
filed an Urgent Motion to hold in Abeyance
the hearing as there is new information on
the case, the fact still stands that the
information for homicide through reckless
imprudence was filed on October 24, 6 days
after the death of the victim.
Perez v. CA, G.R. No. L-80838, November
29, 1988
Topic: Meaning of “same offense”
Facts:
On 21 October 1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed
a criminal complaint against Eleuterio Perez
for Consented Abduction.
Accused pleaded not guilty and trial on the
merits ensued. On 28 June 1980 a
judgment of conviction was rendered
against Perez. On appeal, and on 29
October 1982, the Court of Appeals
reversed, and acquitted Perez of the crime
of Consented Abduction. Subsequent to
Perez's acquittal, Yolanda Mendoza filed
another criminal complaint against Perez
on 22 July 1983, this time for Qualified
Seduction (as was intimated by the Court
of Appeals in Criminal Case 618) with the
MTC of Pampanga.
Perez filed a motion to quash invoking
double jeopardy and waiver and/or estoppel
on the part of Mendoza. However, this
motion and Perez's motion for
reconsideration were denied. Perez filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the denial of his motions to
quash and for reconsideration filed with the
MTC. In a resolution of the Second Division
dated 8 August 1984, the Supreme Court
referred the case to the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
On 16 December 1985 the Intermediate
Appellate Court dismissed the petition,
without prejudice to its refiling in the proper
Regional Trial Court. Complying with this,
Perez filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga (Special Civil Case 7623). Upon
evaluation of the case, the court dismissed
the petition and Perez' motion for
reconsideration. Perez filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the filing of an information for
Qualified Seduction against Perez after he
was acquitted for Consented Abduction
constitutes double jeopardy.
Held:
No. The rule on double jeopardy is that, "No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" [Article
III, Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution.] The
term "same offense" means identical
offense or any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof or any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information. The rule on
double jeopardy under the Rules of Court is
explicit, i.e. "When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information."
Herein, there is no question that Perez was
validly charged with the crime of Consented
Abduction before a court of competent
jurisdiction. That he had been arraigned and
had pleaded not guilty to the charge for
which he was subsequently acquitted is
likewise undisputed. Although it is true
that the two offenses for which Perez
was charged arose from the same facts,
this does not preclude the filing of
another information against him if from
those facts, two distinct offenses, each
requiring different elements, arose. The
plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be
accorded merit, as the two indictments are
perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever
closely they may appear to be connected in
fact.
It is a cardinal rule that the protection
against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical
offense. A single act may offend against two
(or more) entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. Phrased
elsewise, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) define two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is
no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same
facts, if each crime involves some important
act which is not an essential element of the
other. Consented Abduction and
Qualified Seduction are not identical
offenses as would make applicable the
rule on double jeopardy. Moreover, the
very nature of these two offenses would
negate any identity between them.
Ivler v. Judge Modesto-San Pedro, G.R.
No. 172716, November 17, 2010
Summary:
The petition seeks the review of the Orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling
finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property. This, despite the
accused’s previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August
2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2)
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle.
Crimes charged:
1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries; and
2) reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property
On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty
to the charge in reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries and was
meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to
quash the Information of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.
MeTC: denied the motion to quash
RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in
dismissing his Motion to Quash
Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his
prosecution in reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to
property having been previously convicted
in reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries for injuries for the same
offense. Ivler submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material
only to determine his penalty.
ISSUE:
WON Ivler’s conviction in the case of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries bars his prosecution in
criminal reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property?
HELD:
Yes, conviction in the case of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries bars his prosecution in criminal
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property.
The accused’s negative constitutional
right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense"
protects him from, among others, post-
conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.
In the case here, there are 2 cases filed
against the accused for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.
1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single
Crime; its Consequences on Persons
and Property are Material Only to
Determine the Penalty
Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude
or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses
which punish the intentional criminal act.
These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the
mass of intentional crimes.
2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent
Prosecution for the Same Quasi-offense
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act
of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi-offense of
criminal negligence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of
an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent
or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty,
it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect
one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different
crimes and prosecutions.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should
proceed from a single charge regardless of
the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the
judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short,
there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall
be filed in the same first level court.
Thus, conviction in the case of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries bars his prosecution in criminal
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property.
People v. Saley, G.R. No. 121179, July 2,
1998
Facts
Appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B.
Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding
her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
eleven counts of estafa punishable under
the Revised Penal Code and six counts of
illegal recruitment, one committed in large
scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.
The defense posited the theory that
appellant merely assisted the complainants
in applying for overseas employment with
duly accredited travel agencies for and
from which she derived a commission.
When the licensed agency closed in 1986,
she went to Baguio where she engaged in
the purchase and sale of vegetables and
flowers. Even then, however, she would not
hesitate extending help to applicants for
overseas employment by recommending
licensed agencies which could assist said
applicants in going abroad. She named the
Dynasty Travel and Tours and the
Mannings International as such licensed
agencies. She had, in the process, been
able to help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay,
Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan and
Francisco Labadchan to name some, sent
abroad.
Issue
Whether the case is one of double jeopardy.
Ruling
NO.
Illegal recruitment is committed in large
scale if it is perpetrated against three or
more persons "individually or as a group."
Its requisites are that: (1) the person
charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities as so
defined by law, (2) the same person does
not have a license or authority to do that,
and (3) the questioned act is committed
against three or more persons.
Conviction for these various offenses under
the Labor Code does not bar the
punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal
recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense
where criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction while estafa is
malum in se which requires criminal intent
to warrant conviction. Under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code,
the elements of the offense (estafa ) are
that (1) the accused has defrauded another
by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable
of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
Of the 7 complainants for illegal recruitment
in large scale, only five of them filed
separate charges of estafa against
appellant. Accordingly, appellant was only
and could only be held liable for five counts
of estafa arising from the charge of illegal
recruitment in large scale. Since appellant
collected the amount of P25,000.00 from
each of the five (5) victims, she must be
held subject to the penalty in its maximum
period or prision mayor in its minimum
period (not any higher on account of the fact
that the amount in excess of P22,000.00
provided for by Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code is less than P10,000.00).
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and there being no attending
circumstances, appellant shall bear, the
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional medium as minimum
penalty to six (6) years, eight (8) months
and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor
minimum as maximum penalty for each
offense. In addition, appellant should pay
the five (5) victims the amount of
P25,000.00 each as actual damages.
People v. Tac-an, G.R. No. 76338-39,
February 26, 1990
Topic: Same act may be separately
punishable by 2 statutes
Facts:
1. Renato Tac-an and Francis Escano
III were friends and classmates
a. They were even members of
the same gang (Bronx gang)
2. The mother of Francis advised her
son to stay away from Renato
because she saw him with a
handgun when Renato visited their
home.
3. Francis withdrew from the gang and
his relationship with Renato turned
sour.
a. They quarrelled with each
other and soon became
enemies.
4. In their English class, Renato placed
his scrapbook on the chair and went
to talk to the teacher, when he
returned he saw Francis sitting on
his scrapbook.
a. Francis explained that it was
not intentional
b. They had a fistfight which
was stopped by the teachers.
5. During the class Renato went home
to take his gun and went back to
school
6. It was then Math class when he
arrived where he locked the door of
the classroom and shot Francis
a. He went out of the room after
that and one teacher who did
not know he was the
perpetrator asked him to help
Francis saying that he was
still alive
b. So Renato went back inside
the room and shot him again
7. Everyone else was in the faculty
room, Renato went there and made
everyone a hostage
8. The police came, Renato’s brother
and Father came and made him
surrender.
9. Francis died before reaching the
hospital.
10. Two cases were filed against him
and he was convicted by RTC
a. Criminal Case 4007- Illegal
Possession of Firearms
qualified with murder
 b. Criminal Case 4012- Murder
with Special Aggravating
Circumstances of Use of an
unlicensed firearm.
11. They appealed and contended that
Renato was placed twice in jeopardy
for having been prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearm and
Murder in an information which
alleges the use of an unlicensed
firearm.
Issue: WON There was double jeopardy
Ruling: No
the constitutional right against double
jeopardy protects one against a second or
later prosecution for the same offense, and
that when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense,
although arising from the same act or set of
acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy
In this case, There are two crimes, one
punishing UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF
AN UNLICENSED FIREARM which is under
a special statute and another punishing
MURDER under the Revised Penal Code.
These are two separate and different
offenses,
Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging
appellant with unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm and ammunition, went on
to state that said firearm and ammunition
had been used to shoot to death Francis
Ernest Escaño III.
Criminal Case No. 4012 after charging
appellant with the unlawful killing of Francis
Ernest Escaño III, stated that the killing had
been done with the use of an unlicensed
firearm.
The two (2) information did not have the
effect of charging appellant with having
committed the same offense more than
once.
Note:
1. Special Aggravating circumstance
unlicense firearm in Murder- There is
no law which renders unlicensed
firearm as an aggravating
circumstance
2. Unlicensed Firearm qualified with
murder- under PD 1866 authorizes
the increase of the imposable
penalty for unlawful possession or
manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed
firearm where such firearm was
used to destroy human life.
People v. Relova, G.R. No. L-45129,
March 6, 1987 (Aure)
Topic: Right against double jeopardy:
Same act is punished by a law and an
ordinance
FACTS:
Members of the Batangas City Police
together with personnel of the Batangas
Electric Light System, equipped with a
search warrant issued by a city judge of
Batangas City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice
Plant and Cold Storage owned and
operated by the private respondent Manuel
Opulencia. The police discovered that
electric wiring, devices and contraptions had
been installed, without the necessary
authority from the city government, and
"architecturally concealed inside the walls of
the building" owned by the private
respondent. These electric devices and
contraptions were, in allegation of the
petitioner, “designed purposely to lower or
decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the electric meter of private
respondent.
Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed
before the City Court of Batangas City an
information against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of
1974, Batangas City. The information reads
as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February,
1975… the above-named accused, with
intent to defraud the City Government of
Batangas, without proper authorization from
any lawful and/or permit from the proper
authorities, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make
unauthorized installations of electric wirings
and devices to lower or decrease the
consumption of electric fluid …XXX
The City Court dismissed the petition of the
petitioner on the grounds of prescription,
where the offense charged was a light
felony which prescribes two months from
the time of discovery thereof, in which the
prosecutor filed the information nine months
after the discovery of the said offense.
Fourteen days later, the Acting City Fiscal of
Batangas filed before the Court of First
Instance, another information against the
private respondent, this time for theft of
electric power under Article 308 in relation
to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Private respondent filed a motion to quash
on the grounds of double jeopardy which
the judge of the Court of First Instance
granted. Hence the instant case.
Petitioner alleged that the principal purpose
for the city ordinance was to ensure that
electrical installations on residences or
buildings be done by persons duly
authorized or adept in the matter, to avoid
fires and accidents due to faulty electrical
wirings. It is primarily a regulatory measure
and not intended to punish or curb theft of
electric fluid which is already covered by the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
w/n the information filed by the petitioner
under the Revised Penal Code constitutes
double jeopardy.
RULING:
Yes, the information filed by the petitioner
under the Revised Penal Code constitutes
double jeopardy.
The Constitution provides that “No person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.”
Where the offenses charged are penalized
either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charge: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an
Identity is shown to exist between the earlier
and the subsequent offenses charged. In
contrast, where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance while the other
is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry
is to the identity of the acts which the
accused is said to have committed and
which are alleged to have given rise to the
two offenses: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available so long
as the acts which constitute or have given
rise to the first offense under a municipal
ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense
charged under a statute.
In this case, although it may seem to be that
the offenses charged herein are not the
same, but are prosecuted for the same act.
The relevant acts took place within the
same time frame: from November 1974 to
February 1975. During this period, the
accused Manuel Opulencia installed or
permitted the installation of electrical wiring
and devices in his ice plant without
obtaining the necessary permit or
authorization from the municipal authorities.
The accused conceded that he effected or
permitted such unauthorized installation for
the very purpose of reducing electric power
bill. This corrupt intent was thus present
from the very moment that such
unauthorized installation began. The
immediate physical effect of the
unauthorized installation was the inward
flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice
plant without the corresponding recording
thereof in his electric meter. In other words,
the "taking" of electric current was integral
with the unauthorized installation of electric
wiring and devices.
s/n: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense is not to
be understood with absolute literalness.
The Identity of offenses that must be shown
need not be absolute Identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the
"same offense" where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or
where the second offense is an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof.
People v. Webb, G.R. No. 176389,
January 18, 2011 (judgement of acquittal
cannot be reconsidered) ABALOS
Topic: GR: acquittal immediately final and
executory: no MR or appeal by the state
Facts:
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the CA and acquitted the accused,
namely: Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano,
Michael Atchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and
Gerardo Biong on the ground of lack of
proof of their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Thereafter, complaint Lauro Vizconde,
asked the Court to reconsider its decision,
claiming that it "denied the prosecution due
process of law; seriously mis appreciated
the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as
lacking credibility; issued a tainted and
erroneous decision; decided the case in a
manner that resulted in the miscarriage of
justice; or committed grave abuse in its
treatment of the evidence and prosecution
witnesses."
Issue:
Whether or not a judgment of acquittal may
be reconsidered.
Ruling:
No, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal
cannot be reconsidered because it
places the accused under double
jeopardy. The Constitution provides in
Section 21, Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. x x x
On occasions, a motion for reconsideration
after an acquittal is possible, but the
grounds are exceptional and narrow as
when the court that absolved the accused
gravely abused its discretion, resulting in
loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has
occurred. In any of such cases, the State
may assail the decision by special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Although complainant Vizconde invoked the
exceptions, he has been unable to bring
pleas for reconsideration under such
exceptions. He did not specify that
violations of due process and acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion that
the Court supposedly committed. What the
complainant actually questions is the
Court's appreciation of the evidence and
assessment of the prosecution witnesses'
credibility. That the court committed grave
error in finding Alfaro as not a credible
witness. The complaint wants the court to
review the evidence anew and render
another judgment based on such
evaluation which is not constitutionally
allowed and therefore, the judgment of
acquittal can no longer be disturbed.
Manantan v. CA, G.R. No. 107125,
January 29, 2001 (ZAMBRANO)
Topic: Against Double Jeopardy:
Appeals: Appeal by complainant of civil
aspect after acquittal of accused.
Ponente: Quisumbing,J.
Facts:
Petition for review of the appellate court’s
decision.
An information was charged against the
petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide.
Petitioner was driving an automobile in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner
which resulted in the automobile
sideswiping a passenger jeep, and
eventually turning down resulting in the
death of Ruben Nicolas, a passenger of the
automobile.
However, RTC found the accused not guilty
of the crime.
Private respondents (deceased’s parents)
filed a notice of appeal on the civil aspect to
order Manantan to pay indemnity and
damages. The appeal was granted by the
CA.
Manantan filed for a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
instant petition.
Issue/s:
W/n the appeal to have the petitioner liable
for indemnity and damages after his
acquittal of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide
constituted a double jeopardy. NO
W/n the acquittal of the petitioner on the
criminal case filed against him did not
extinguish his civil liability. YES.
Ruling:
1.No. The appeal to have the petitioner
liable for indemnity and damages after his
acquittal of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide did not
constitute a double jeopardy.
There is double jeopardy when a person
is charged with an offense and the case
is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any manner without the
consent of the accused, and then he was
charged again with the same or identical
offence.
In this case, though, the petitioner had been
placed in jeopardy by the filing of a Criminal
Case which was terminated; the same
offense was not charged under the appeal
or civil case. The records show that no
criminal offense was being imputed to the
petitioner on appeal. The Ca did not modify
the judgment of acquittal.
Thus, finding the petitioner liable for
indemnity and damages after his acquittal of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide did not constitute a double
jeopardy.
2.Yes. The acquittal of the petitioner on the
criminal case filed against him did not
extinguish his civil liability.
The law recognizes two kinds of acquittal
with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First instance is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not an
author of the crime complained of. The first
instance closes the door of civil liability. The
second instance is an acquittal based on a
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this instance, though guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily
established, civil liability can still be
demanded with preponderance of evidence.
In this case, the acquittal of the criminal
case was based on reasonable doubt. Civil
liability was not extinguished. The SC noted
the trial court’s declaration that did not
discount the possibility of the accused being
negligent. The Court’s mind could not rest
on a verdict of conviction or that his guilt be
established with moral certainty.
Thus, the acquittal of the petitioner on the
criminal case filed against him did not
extinguish his civil liability.
s/n: Manchester Doctrine (procedural but in
case mag-ask si Atty)
Manchester vs. C.A., 149 SCRA 562 (1987),
Manchester laid down the doctrine the specific
amounts of claims of damages must be
alleged both in the body and the prayer of the
complaint, and the filing fees corresponding
thereto paid at the time of the filing of the
complaint; that if these requisites were not
fulfilled, jurisdiction could not be acquired by
the trial court; and that amendment of the
complaint could not "thereby vest jurisdiction
upon the Court."
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v.
People, G.R. No. 147703, April 14,
2004
Topic: Appeals
Facts: Napoleon a driver of Philippine
Bus Lines was found guilty and
convicted with Reckless Imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiples
physical injuries and damage property
and was sentence to suffer the penalty
of 4 to 6 years and to pay damages
caused by the act of the driver.
The judgement against accused had
become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail
and remained at-large. Section 8, rule
123 of the Rules of Court authorizes the
dismissal of appeal when appellant
jumps bail (failed to appear during trial
while during the temporary liberty).
The court further ruled that, In the event
of insolvency of the accused, the
employer shall be liable for civil liabilities
of the accused.
Counsel of the accused, provided by the
petitioner, filed a notice to appeal but
was denied by the trial court.
Issue: WON an employer may appeal
the judgement of the convicted
employee independently.
Held: No. Any party may appeal from a
judgement or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double
jeopardy.
In the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure it provides that the CA may
also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison, jumps
bail or flees to a foreign country during
the pendency of the appeal.
This rule is based on the rationale that
appellants lose their standing in court
when they abscond.
Such doctrine was explained by Justice
Florenz that when the accused escaped
after his arraignment and during trial,
but trial in absentia proceeded resulting
in the promulgation of a judgement
against him and his counsel appealed,
since he nonetheless remained at large
his appeal must be dismissed.
Since the accused-employee has
escaped and refused to surrender, he
deemed to have abandoned his appeal.
Consequently, the judgement against
him has become final and executory.
On the aspect of the employer’s
subsidiary liability. It is provided in the
Revised Penal Code that in case of
insolvency of his employee who
committed a felony on the occasion of
his duty, the employer must be
subsidiary liable.
In this case, the company wanted to
appeal in behalf of the accused-
employee who jump bail and remained
at large. The petitioner aims to have the
accused employee absolved of his
criminal responsibility and the
judgement reviewed as a whole. They
intended to appeal that the trial
court’s finding of guilt is not
supported by competent evidence.
This appeal implies double jeopardy and
throws the whole case open to a review
by the appellate court.
The petitioner also has no right to
appeal the criminal case against the
accused-employee; that by jumping bail,
he has waived his right to appeal; and
that the judgement in the criminal case
against him is now final.
S/n: to allow employers to dispute the
civil liability fixed in criminal cases would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat
a final judgement rendered by the court.
Requisites for employer’s subsidiary
liability:
(1) they are indeed the employers of the
convicted employees; (2) that the former
are engaged in some kind of industry;
(3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their
duties; and (4) that the execution
against the latter has not been satisfied
due to insolvency.
No violation of due process – the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process. It is merely a
procedural remedy of statutory origin, a
remedy that may exercise only in the
manner prescribed by law authorizing
such exercise.
Infact, the petitioner was not denied its
day in court. It can be said that the
jumping of bail, not the court deprived
petitioner of the right to appeal.
People v. Rondero, supra (SEVILLA)
Topic:Appeal of Accused from
judgement of conviction, waiver of right
against double jeopardy, opens whole
case for review)
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
ART III SECTION 3. (2) Any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS: The accused was seen by the
victim’s father with an ice pick and
washing his bloodied hands at the well.
The 9 year old victim was later found
dead and half naked with lacerations in
her vagina but no sperm. He was
convicted of homicide only. For his
conviction, several circumstantial pieces
of evidence were submitted including
strands of his hair for comparison with
the strands of hair found in the victim’s
right hand at the scene of the crime as
well as blood-stained undershirt and
short pants taken from his house. The
accused-appellant avers the acquisition
of his hair strands without his express
written consent and without the
presence of his counsel, which, he
contends is a violation of his
Constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Sections 12 and 17,
Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself.
ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered,
particularly accused-appellant’s hair
strands can be admitted as evidence
against him?
HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted
provisions, what is actually proscribed is
the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communication from the
accused-appellant and not the inclusion
of his body in evidence when it may be
material. For instance, substance
emitted from the body of the accused
may be received as evidence in
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness
and morphine forced out of the mouth of
the accused may also be used as
evidence against him. Consequently,
although accused-appellant insists that
hair samples were forcibly taken from
him and submitted to the NBI for
forensic examination, the hair samples
may be admitted in evidence against
him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from
the accused under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained
undershirt and short pants taken from
the accused are inadmissible in
evidence. They were taken without the
proper search warrant from the police
officers. Accused-appellant’s wife
testified that the police officers, after
arresting her husband in their house,
took the garments from the clothesline
without proper authority. This was never
rebutted by the prosecution. Under the
libertarian exclusionary rule known as
the “fruit of the poisonous tree,”
evidence illegally obtained by the state
should not be used to gain other
evidence because the illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained. Simply put,
accused-appellant’s garments, having
been seized in violation of his
constitutional right against illegal
searches and seizure, are inadmissible
in court as evidence
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, supra
(PADUL)
Topic: Retrial: when DJ applies; (no DJ
where prosecution was denied due
process)
Facts:
The Agrava Board, an investigating
committee, was created to determine the
facts on the case involving the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. Majority and
minority reports showed that they are
unconvinced on the participation of Galman
as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and
branded him instead as the fall guy as
opposed to the military reports. Majority
reports recommended that military
respondents as indictable for the
premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman
which the Sandiganbayan did not give due
consideration.
The office of the Tanod Bayan was
originally preparing a resolution charging
the 26 military accused as principal to the
crime against Aquino but was recalled upon
the intervention of President Marcos who
insist on the innocence of the accused.
Marcos however recommended the filing
of murder charge and to implement the
acquittal as planned so that double
jeopardy may be invoked later on.
The Galman group filed an action for
miscarriage of justice against the
Sandiganbayan and gross violation of
constitutional rights of the petitioners for
failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing
the prosecution to present vital
documentary evidence and prayed for
nullifying the bias proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial
before an impartial tribunal. As expected,
they raised the issue of double jeopardy,
and invoked that the issues had become
moot and academic because of the
rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment
of acquittal of all respondents- accused on
December 2, 1985, with counsels for
respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as
Olivas, further arguing that assuming that
the judgment of acquittal is void for any
reason, the remedy is a direct action to
annul the judgment where the burden of
proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by
clear, competent and convincing evidence
the cause of the nullity.
In this case however, the prosecution was
not given a chance to properly present their
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy
could indeed be raised as a defense.
RULING:
No. It is settled doctrine that double
jeopardy cannot be invoked against the
Court's setting aside of the trial courts'
judgment of dismissal or acquittal where
the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process.
The Supreme Court held that the
prosecution was deprived of due process
and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
their case which grossly violates the due
process clause. There could be no double
jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a
valid plea having been entered; and (e) the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused
(People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
The lower court that rendered the judgment
of acquittal was not competent as it was
ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the
right of the prosecution to due process. In
effect the first jeopardy was never
terminated, and the remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before
the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does
not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous
trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian
President ordered the Sandiganbayan and
Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the
trial which was undertaken with due
pressure to the judiciary.
The court’s decision of acquittal is one void
of jurisdiction owing to its failure in
observing due process during the trial
therefore the judgment was also deemed
void and double jeopardy cannot be
invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated
with lack of due process on the account of
collusion between the lower court and
Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-
determined verdict of the accused.
The denial of the motion for reconsideration
of the petitioners by the court was set aside
and rendered the decision of acquittal of the
accused null and void. An order for a re-trial
was granted.
Tan v. Barrios, G.R. No. 85481-82,
October 18, 1990 (ORTEGA)
Topic: when double jeopardy applies
Ponente: J. Griño-Aquino
S/n: 3 petitioners are – WILLIAM TAN,
JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN -
Acquitted in the case before the Military
Court but a case was refiled against them in
Civil Court
Context: Marcos administration –
establishment of Military Commission and
Tribunals which trampled Civil Courts
Facts:
On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with
twelve (12) others, were arrested and
charged in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67
before the Military Commission No. 1, for
the crimes of murder through the use of an
unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm for
the killing of Florentino Lim of tile wealthy
Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City
and unlawful possession, control, and
custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521
with ammunition, in violation of General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 9.
Because the case was a "cause celebre" (a
controversial issue that attracts a great deal
of public attention) in Cagayan de Oro City,
President Marcos, pursuant to the
recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan
Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order to
transfer the case to the civil courts, hence,
the same was retained in the military court.
All the accused were detained without bail
in the P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame.
They pleaded guilty during arraignment and
followed by daily trials for more than thirteen
(13) months. On June 10, 1976, a decision
entitled "Findings and Sentence," was
promulgated by the Military Commission
acquitting the herein petitioners.
Proclamation No. 2045 ended martial rule
and abolished the military tribunals and
commissions. Then, several months after
the EDSA revolution, habeas corpus
petitions were filed in this Court by some
217 prisoners in the national penitentiary,
who had been tried for common crimes and
convicted by the military commissions
during the nine-year span of official martial
rule. The Court —
(1) granted the petition for habeas corpus
and ordered the release of those of some
who had fully served their sentences, or had
been acquitted, or had been granted
amnesty;
(2) dismissed the petitions of those who
were military personnel; and
(3) nullified the proceedings against those
who were convicted and still serving the
sentences meted to them by the military
courts, but, without ordering their release,
directed the Department of Justice to file
the necessary informations against them
in the proper civil courts.
State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios was
designated "to collaborate with the City
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the
investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal
Case No. MC-1-67 and, if the evidence
warrants, to prosecute the case in the
court of competent jurisdiction."
Thereafter, without conducting an
investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios
filed on December informations for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Murder.
In effect, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and
Vicente Tan filed this petition for certiorari
and prohibition praying that the informations
in Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825,
and the order of respondent Judge dated
October 26, 1988 be annulled, and that the
public respondents or any other prosecution
officer "be permanently enjoined from
indicting, prosecuting and trying them anew
for the offenses charged therein because
they had already been acquitted of the
same by Military Commission No. 1 in Crim.
Case No. MC-1-67". They argued, among
others, that reprosecution of the petitioners
would violate their right to protection against
double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not reprosecution would result in
double jeopardy.
Ruling:
YES.
The trial of thousands of civilians for
common crimes before military tribunals and
commissions during the ten-year period of
martial rule (1971-1981) which were created
under general orders issued by President
Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
powers, is an operative fact that may not be
justly ignored.
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to
the proceedings against the petitioners and
their co-accused before Military
Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute
invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military
courts over civilians should not be allowed
to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the
particular case of the petitioners, the
proceedings were fair, that there were no
serious violations of their constitutional right
to due process, and that the jurisdiction of
the military commission that heard and
decided the charges against them during
the period of martial law. Because of these
established operative facts, the refiling of
the information against the petitioners would
place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if
not in constitutional logic.
Not everybody who was convicted by a
military court, much less those who were
acquitted and released, desires to undergo
the ordeal of a second trial for the same
offense, albeit in a civil court. Even if there
is a chance of being acquitted the second
time around, it would be small comfort for
the accused if he is held without bail
pending the completion of his second trial
which may take as long as, if not longer
than, the sentence he has been serving or
already served.
[“Indeed, why should one who has accepted the
justness of the verdict of a military court, who is
satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is
willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged
through the harrow of another hearing in a civil
court to risk being convicted a second time
perchance to serve a heavier penalty?”]
PART III CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Re Application for Admission to the Phil.
Bar of Vicente Ching, Bar Matter No. 914
Facts
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate son of the
spouses Tat Ching, a chinese citizen, and
Priscila Dulay, a Filipina, was born in
Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964. Since
birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On July 17, 1998, Ching, after graduated of
Bachelor of Laws course at St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an
application to take the 1998 bar exam. The
Supreme Court allowed him to take the Bar
Examinations, provided that he can produce
proof of his Philippine Citizenship. In
compliance with said requirements, Ching
submitted the following documents: A.)
Certification from board of accountancy of
the PRC showing that he is a certified public
accountant. B.) Voter certification from
COMELC Tubao La Union. C.) Certification
that showing that Ching was elected as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union. On April 5, 1999 Ching
was included as one of the successful bar
examinee and the schedule of their oath
taking was on May 5, 1999 but he was not
allowed to take his oath due the
questionable citizenship issue. The OSG
filed its comment stating that Ching, being
the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother born under the 1935
Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon reaching
the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship.
Issues
1. WON Ching is a filipino citizen?
2. WON his election to Philippine citizenship
within the reasonable time prescribed by the
law?
Ruling
1. No. Since the applicant was born on
1964, the governing charter with regards to
citizenship issue is the 1935 constitution.
Therefore as what is provided by the said
constitution, which said that the citizenship
of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
with an alien father followed the citizenship
of the father unless upon reaching the age
of majority which is 21 years of age elected
Philippine citizenship
2. In the case at bar, Ching did not elect
his citizenship when he reach 21 years old
but instead in 1999 which is 14 years after
reaching the age of majority which the court
considered as not within the reasonable
period of time considering the length of 14
years after he reaches 21 years old. In
addition to that, the court said that
Philippine citizenship can never be treated
like commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient.
In view of the foregoing, the court denies
Vicente D. Ching’s application for admission
to the Philippine bar. The Supreme Court
Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's
application for admission to the Philippine
Bar.
Republic v. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567,
February 15, 2012 (Mag-aso)
Topic: Filipino citizenship under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions
Facts: Respondent is the legitimate child
of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national,
and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen.
She did not elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. In
1992, at the age of 33 and after getting
married, she executed an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Said document was notarized
but was not recorded and registered with
the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent
applied for a Philippine passport. Her
application was denied due to the
citizenship of her father and there being
no annotation on her birth certificate that
she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to
annotate the same on her birth certificate.
Respondent averred that she was raised as
a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog
fluently and attended local schools in
Baguio City. Respondent claimed that
despite her part-Chinese ancestry, she
always thought of herself as a Filipino. She
is a registered voter in Baguio City and had
voted in local and national elections as
shown in the Voter Certification issued by
the Commission on Elections of Baguio
City.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive
acts, she has effectively elected Philippine
citizenship and such should be annotated
on her record of birth so as to entitle her to
the issuance of a Philippine passport.
Issue: WON she has complied with the
procedural requirements in the election of
Philippine citizenship
Ruling: No. Respondent has not complied
with the procedural requirements in the
election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8,
1959, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship
was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that “[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five” are citizens of the
Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution
which states that “[t]hose born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority” are
Philippine citizens.
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s
citizenship followed that of her father who is
Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of
majority, she elects Philippine citizenship.
Illegitimate children of Filipina mothers
automatically follow the mother’s
citizenship. But since Nora is a legitimate
child, she should follow the father’s
citizenship – she has to elect Filipino
citizenship by the age of majority to be a
Filipino
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant
to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in
order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article
IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.
The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory
formalities of electing Philippine citizenship
are: (1) a statement of election under oath;
(2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and
of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
It should be stressed that there is no
specific statutory or procedural rule which
authorizes the direct filing of a petition for
declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship before the courts
Even if we set aside this procedural
infirmity, the trial court’s conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine
citizenship is erroneous since the records
undisputably show that respondent failed to
comply with the legal requirements for a
valid election. Specifically, respondent
had not executed a sworn statement of
her election of Philippine citizenship. The
only documentary evidence submitted by
respondent in support of her claim of
alleged election was her oath of allegiance,
executed 12 years after she reached the
age of majority, which was unregistered.
Still, even assuming that respondent’s oath
of allegiance suffices, its execution was
not within a reasonable time after
respondent attained the age of majority
and was not registered with the nearest
civil registry as required under Section 1
of C.A. No. 625.
The phrase “reasonable time” has been
interpreted to mean that the election
should be made generally within three
(3) years from reaching the age of
majority. Moreover, there was no
satisfactory explanation proffered by
respondent for the delay and the failure
to register with the nearest local civil
registry.
Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434,
March 3, 2004 (the FPJ citizenship case)
TOPIC: Filipino citizenship under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions
(MADERAZO)
Facts:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a
petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that
FPJ made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be
a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an
alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two
assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born
Filipino citizen.
Held:
It is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen, which, in turn, depended on
whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after
the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84
years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and
that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code.
In Re: Florencio Mallare, A.M. No. 533,
September 12, 1974
Digested by: Vicky Belo
FACTS:
1. On complaint of then
Acting Immigration
Commissioner, Martiniano P.
Vivo, this Court ordered the
investigation of the matter of
citizenship of Florencio Mallare,
who was admitted to the
Philippine Bar on March 5, 1962,
for the purpose of determining
whether his name should be
stricken from the roll of persons
authorized to practice law in the
Philippines.
2. After an investigation
conducted by this Court's Legal
Officer Investigator, a decision
was rendered by this Court on
April 29, 1968, holding that by
preponderance of evidence, it
appeared that respondent
Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare,
was a Chinese up to his death;
and his mother admittedly being
a Chinese, respondent is likewise
a Chinese national. Consequently
respondent Florencio Mallare
was declared excluded from the
practice of law; his admission to
the bar was revoked, and he was
ordered to return to this Court,
the lawyer's diploma previously
issued to him.
3. Respondent moved for
reconsideration of the decision,
which was denied by the Court.
Respondent petitioned the Court
for the reopening of the case and
for new trial on the ground, inter
alia, of newly discovered
evidence, the introduction of
which could alter the decision
previously promulgated.
4. The Court Resolved to set
aside the decision of April 29,
1968 and to grant the re-opening
and new trial prayed for.
Respondent's petition is premised
upon three basic arguments, to
wit: (a) Respondent's father,
Esteban Mallare, being the
natural son of Ana Mallare, a
Filipino, was a Filipino citizen; (b)
Esteben Mallare, the son of a
Filipino mother, by his own overt
acts, had chosen Philippine
citizenship; and (c) respondent, a
legitimate son of Esteban
Mallare, is a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is a Filipino
citizen and is hereby granted to continue
his practice of law?
RULING:
Thesis: Yes. respondent is a Filipino
citizen and is hereby granted to continue
his practice of law
Reason:
Analysis: In this case, the witnesses, all
natives of Macalelon, who had personal
knowledge of the person, birth and
residency of both Ana Mallare and her
son Esteban, were one in their
declaration that Ana Mallare is a
Tagalog who had continuously resided
in the place, and that Esteban, her son,
was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such
declarations constitute admissible
evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of
Esteban Mallare. And even assuming
arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally
married to an alien, Esteban's exercise
of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constitutes a positive act of election
of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare was a
registered voter and that as early as
1925 Esteban was already participating
in the elections and campaigning for
certain candidate. These acts are
sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. Indeed, it would
be unfair to expect the presentation of a
formal deed to that effect considering
that prior to the enactment of
Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7,
1941, no particular proceeding was
required to exercise the option to elect
Philippine citizenship, granted to the
proper party by Section 1, subsection 4,
Article IV of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution. Esteban Mallare, natural
child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other
act would be necessary to confer on him
all the rights and privileges attached to
Philippine citizenship. Neither could any
act taken on the erroneous belief that he
is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is
rightfully entitled
Conclusion: Therefore…
Co v. Electoral Commission, G.R. Nos.
92191-92, July 30, 1991 (FLORES)
Topic: Filipino citizenship under the 1987
Constitution
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
Ponente: Gutierrez
Facts:
Respondent's father (Ong Chua) was born
in China in 1905, and was brought to Samar
in 1915. He grew old and established
enduring relationships with his neighbors.
He married a natural born-Filipino (Lao) and
bore 8 children one of which is respondent
Ong. Ong Chua took his oath of allegiance
and became a naturalized Filipino citizen. At
the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the
respondent was a minor finishing his
elementary education in the province of
Samar.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional
election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held. Balinquit, Co, and Ong
sought for the position of second legislative
district of Northern Samar. Respondent Ong
was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
Balinquit and Co filed election protests
against the respondent Ong premised on
the following grounds:
1. Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines; and
2. Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) declared that Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.
Issue: WON Ong is a citizen of the
Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes, Ong is a Filipino citizen.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution
found in Article IV read:
 SECTION 1, the following are citizens
of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are
those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect
their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3
above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2,
1987 but also to those who, having been
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship
before that date. The provision in Paragraph
3 was intended to correct an unfair position
which discriminates against Filipino women.
There is no dispute that the respondent's
mother was a natural born Filipina at the
time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is
the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
To expect the respondent to have formally
or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen
but his father had been naturalized when
the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of
age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution
would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship in spite of his already having
been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines
"election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare, the
Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the
exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage
when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship. The
private respondent did more than merely
exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
The filing of sworn statement or formal
declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect
came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time,
running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations of choice
for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship
presupposes that the person electing is an
alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is
a national of two countries. There is no
doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a
Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
On the citizenship of Ong's father:
The Court cannot go into the collateral
procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of
his citizenship after his death and at this
very late date just so we can go after the
son. An attack on a person's citizenship
may only be done through a direct action for
its nullity.
To ask the Court to declare the grant of
Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chua as
null and void would run against the principle
of due process. Jose Ong Chua has already
been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair
opportunity to defend himself. A dead man
cannot speak.
Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November
27, 2008 (DINAMPO)
TOPIC: Loss and Reacquisition of
Citizenship
FACTS:
Nestor A. Jacot filed a suit against the
COMELEC Second Division for disqualifying
him from running for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May
2007 National and Local Elections, on the
ground that he failed to make a personal
renouncement of his US citizenship.
Jacot was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, who became a naturalized
citizen of the US. He sought to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act.
He filed a request for the administration of
his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate
General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California.
The Los Angeles PCG issued an Order of
Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the
same day, petitioner took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo.
On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of
Immigration issued an Identification
Certificate, recognizing Jacot as a citizen of
the Philippines.
Six months later, Jacot filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor
of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.
Jacot garnered the highest number of votes
for the position of Vice Mayor.
After the elections, the COMELEC Second
Division finally issued its Resolution,
disqualifying Jacot from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite
renunciation of his US citizenship
ISSUE/S:
W/N Jacot has validly complied with the
citizenship requirement as required by law
for persons seeking public office.
HELD:
Contrary to the assertions made by
petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines made before the
Los Angeles PCG   and   his   Certificate   of
Candidacy do not   substantially   comply  
with   the requirement of a   personal   and  
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship,
because these are distinct requirements to
be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires
that natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
who are already naturalized citizens of a
foreign country, must take the following oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines to reacquire or retain their
Philippine citizenship.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted
provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to
the Philippines, but there is nothing therein
on his renunciation of foreign citizenship.
The law categorically requires persons
seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or
those who reacquired it, to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before a
public officer authorized to administer
an oath simultaneous with or before the
filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship: (1) to
take the oath of allegiance under Section 3
of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those
seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines to additionally execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before an authorized
public officer prior or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy to
qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649,
April 16, 2013
Topic: Loss and Reacquisition of
Citizenship
FACTS:
Rommel Arnado was a natural born Filipino
citizen, who underwent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America.
Arnado applied for repatriation before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
by virtue of RA 9225. By taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship,
Arnado renounced his American citizenship
by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation,
thus completing the requirements for
eligibility to run for public office. Afterwards,
Arnado ran for the position of municipal
mayor in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado contending that he is a foreigner
and not a resident of the area. He indicated
that Arnado has been using his US
Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines. Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes.
Meanwhile, Casan Macode Maquiling,
another candidate for mayoralty who
garnered the second number of highest
votes, intervened in the case.
Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling,
as the legitimate candidate who obtained
the highest number of lawful votes, should
be proclaimed as the winner.
ISSUE:
Will Arnado’s continued use of US Passport
constitute his loss of Philippine citizenship?
RULING:
The use of foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation
as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it
does not divest Filipino citizenship regained
by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run
for an elective position.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he
renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions
that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. While
the act of using a foreign passport is not
one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation
he took.
Such an act of using a foreign passport
does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. By the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy
on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a
dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and American
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, he was not qualified to run for a
local elective position. Popular vote does
not cure this ineligibility of the candidate.
Otherwise, substantive requirements set
by the Constitution are nugatory.
Furthermore, there is no second-placer to
speak of because as reiterated in the case
ofJalosjos v. COMELEC, when the
ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no
legal effect is produced. Hence among the
qualified candidates for position, Maquiling
who garnered the highest votes should be
declared as winner.
Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264,
June 25, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for the position of Representative of
the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent,
a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed
before the COMELEC a petition for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On
October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the
amended petition on the ground that the
petitioner’s COC contained material
misrepresentations regarding the
petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of
birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged
that the petitioner is an American citizen
and filed in February 8, 2013 a
manifestation with motion to admit newly
discovered evidence and amended last
exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First
Division issued a Resolution cancelling the
petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner
is not a citizen of the Philippines because of
her failure to comply with the requirements
of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on
May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a Resolution denying the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed
winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on
June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before
the Speaker of House of Representatives.
She has yet to assume office at noon of
June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc
issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the
May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC
en banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante
Order.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is eligible to run for
office on the basis of citizenship?
RULING:
No, petitioner is not eligible to run.
In R.A 9925, for a respondent to
reacquire Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, the law
requires that she must have
accomplished the following:
1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the
consul-general of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA, and
2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship
before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that
the petitioner complied with the
requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as
Provincial Administrator cannot be
considered as the oath of allegiance in
compliance with RA 9225.
As to the issue of residency, the court
approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a
Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile
of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship, he must still show that he chose
to establish his domicile in the Philippines
through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he
made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing that the
petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that
the petitioner renounced her American
citizenship, it follows that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA. Petitioner claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July
13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-
year residency for she has never
recognized her domicile in Marinduque as
she remains to be an American citizen. No
amount of her stay in the said locality can
substitute the fact that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA.
Thus, the petitioner is not eligible to run.
CASE: Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No.
135083, May 26, 1999
Facts
Petitioner Mercado and private respondent
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. The proclamation of private
respondent was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
Issue
Whether respondent should be disqualified
for running for the vice-mayor position.
Ruling
NO.
Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to
posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of
Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus
soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of
Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers' country such children
are citizens of that country; (3) Those who
marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's
country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are
deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship. There may be other situations in
which a citizen of the Philippines may,
without performing any act, be also a citizen
of another state; but the above cases are
possible given the constitutional provisions
on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to
the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual's volition. With
respect to dual allegiance, Article IV,
Section 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
In including Section 5 in Article IV on
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per
se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization.
The record shows that private respondent
was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents.
Since the Philippines adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis, while the United
States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the
parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a
national both of the Philippines and of the
United States. However, the COMELEC en
banc held that, by participating in Philippine
elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private
respondent "effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law," so that
now he is solely a Philippine national.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he
ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship.