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Contents
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Chapter 1 (Part 1) - Summary Judgment Under Order 14
Consequence => This whole process, however, may take a long time. This leads to the problematic
consequence — if a PF has a clear-cut case against a DF i.e. PF has a case against DF and DF does not
have an arguable defence to PF’s claim, then it would be unfair for PF to go through the entire process of
civil trial.
1
but sometimes, even if the Df has defence but the defence is bullshit, you can struck out the defence under O18,
then apply for SJ again.
1 | Page
[UNP Plywood v HSBC Bank Malaysia]
Held : Summary judgment procedure is a procedural device available for prompt and expeditious
disposition of an action by a PF or a counterclaim by a DF, without a trial when there is no
dispute as to the fact and law.
- Thus, if PF’s claim involves any of these 7 matters, PF cannot apply for SJ. If PF still apply for
SJ, PF’s application will be dismissed with cost.
- Rationale: SJ is not available for these 7 instances because of historical reason — ours Rules of
Courts were inherited from England, and in England (those days under their old ROC), for these
7 instances, DF had the choice to elect for a jury trial. Since such choice was available, there
cannot be a SJ, and there must be a trial.
- Rationale: These provisions have their own procedure for SJ which are provided in that rule
itself. Thus, if a claim falls under these provisions, a PF must apply for SJ under these provisions
and not under O.14. In other words, O.14 is an order for SJ generally, but if there is a specific
rule providing for SJ procedure for a particular claim, that rule applies.
4.1.1) Burden
[Cempaka Finance Bhd v Ho Lai Ying]
Held : PF does not need to prove his case in an application for SJ. Instead, he only needs to
satisfy the conditions:
1. DF has entered appearance,
2. SOC has been served on DF,
3. affidavit in support complies with O.14 r.2.
Once these conditions are fulfilled, then the burden shifts to DF to raise triable issues.
Example of situations:
[CGIR v Weng Lok Mining]
Fact : PF applied for SJ against DF for a claim of income tax and penalty due and payable
by DF under the Income Tax Ordinance. However, the application was made 3
months after DF filed his defence – a clear-cut delay. PF explained that the
Department of Inland Revenue is a very large department, heavily loaded with work
and shorthanded, and the situation was aggravated by the intervening Puasa hours,
court vacation and festivities, namely Hari Raya Puasa, Christmas and the New Year
holidays.
Held : The court accepted the reason, and held that the delay of 3 months in the
circumstances of the case is not inordinate and does not warrant a dismissal of the
application.
3 | Page
[British American etc Insurance Bhd v Pembinaan Fal Bhd]
Fact : PF explained that the reason of their delay in application for SJ was due to a change
of solicitor.
Held :but the court did not accept the explanation.
p/s:
- [MBSB v Ghazi bin Hasbollah]
Held : there is no hard and fast rule that PF’s delay for a certain period is fatal to its
application for SJ. Whether a delay is to be regarded as fatal must depend on the
circumstances of each case, and it is absolutely up to the court’s discretion as to
whether the reasons of the delay are acceptable or not.
a) Notice of application
Mode of service a notice of application (O.62 r.6)
● The mode of service will be governed by O.62 r.6.
- Although O.14 is the governing rule for SJ, it does not prescribe a mode of service
for the application of SJ. O.14 is silent on the mode of service.
- So, where the specific rule is silent on the mode of service, the rule of general
application should be referred to.
- In ROC, there is a general rule on how documents should be served i.e. O.62 r.6
(rule of general application which prescribes a mode of service where a specific rule
does not prescribe the mode).
● Under O.62 r.6, there are 5 ways in which a document can be served:
i. By leaving the document at DF’s proper address2
ii. By sending the document by way of pre- paid registered post to DF’s proper
address (note: it is not A.R. Registered Post)
iii. By fax (and this will be governed with O.62 r.6(3)- only if you are applying with
solicitor)
iv. In any manner agreed by the parties (usually by contract)
v. In such manner as the court may direct
b) Affidavit requirements
● Affidavit is the heart and core of a SJ application. It is the main thing the court will look at in
deciding whether or not a PF is entitled to SJ. PF can only raise arguments which is stated in
the affidavit. Thus, an affidavit must comply with the procedural requirements, which is
found in O.14 r.2(1).
● There are two requirements under O.14 r.2(1):
1. Affidavit must comply with Form 13.
2. The affidavit must state/contain 2 matters:
2
Cn u serve a doc on the def’s address on the wife? Cn . This falls under this. If it says serve on the shop, on the
shop staff, it may be unclear whether it is the D's proper address
4 | Page
i. The affidavit must verify PF’s claim
- It must clearly state what is the nature of PF’s claim against DF, must
explain fully what give rise to PF’s claim to DF, what happen, what PF is
claiming from DF etc.
- To do such verification, the rule of thumb is to draft affidavit in the way that
it states the same thing as the SOC.3
ii. The affidavit must contain a statement that, in the deponant’s belief, DF does not
have a defence to PF’s claim.
- A ‘deponant’ is the person who is making/signing the affidavit. An example
of such statement is ‘I verily believe that DF has no defence to this action’.
- A “deponent” can be the plaintiff or other person signing the affidavit.4
ii. The court may adjourn the O.14 hearing (SJ hearing) to allow PF to amend and
file a fresh affidavit which complies with the rules.
- Today, this is the most likely consequence, as the court regard technical
incompliance as fatal only when it results in a miscarriage of justice.
● The time limit for serving notice of application and affidavit is governed by O14 r2(3) which
are 14 days after the receipt of the sealed copy of the application from the court.
● The purpose if serving these is to inform DF that PF is making an application for SJ.
5) Hearing
● Once P applied for SJ, that application will now come up for hearing at court
● Who hears SJ application?
o Previously all SJ (interlocutory application) were heard by Senior Assistant Registrar (SAR) or
Deputy Assistant Registrar
o Today summary judgement applications are heard by judge (mostly) in chambers (not in open
court, which is usually for trial). It is done in chambers because it is an interlocutory application
o The reason for this is to save time. If SAR heard it, if either party is unsatisfied, they will appeal to
the judge and judge will hear it.
● This heading will talk about possible matters that may occur at a hearing for SJ? And how will the court
deal with it if these things happen?
● What are the possible things that may occur in SJ hearing?
3
ie "I verily believe the D has no defence to this claim"
4
Who should be the deponent of the affidavit (making and signing the affidavit)? In most cases, it will be PF himself.
However, the deponent of O.14 affidavit does not need to be PF himself. Some other person may affirm the affidavit
on behalf of PF. This is because of the wordings in O.14 r.2(2) – “may contain statements of information and belief” –
these words point to the fact that O.14 affidavit does not have to be the deponent’s personal information (cf O.81 –
must contain personal statement).
5 | Page
(a) Technical objections
(b) D shows that there is a triable issue
(c) D raises set-off or counterclaim
(d) D’s defence arouses suspicion
5
O14r1(2): Subject to paragraph (3), this rule applies to every action begun by writ other than-
(a) a claim by the plaintiff for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction or breach of
promise of marriage; or
(b) a claim by the plaintiff based on an allegation of fraud.
6
O1A: Court or judge shall have regard to justice
7
O2: Effect of non-compliance
8
(1) An application under rule 1 must be supported by an affidavit in Form 13 verifying the facts on which the claim,
or the part of a claim, to which the application relates is based and stating that in the deponent's belief there is no
defence to that claim or part or no defence except as to the amount of damages claimed.
6 | Page
defence to the damages to allow P to amend and file a
claimed. fresh affidavit to cure the
defect. (if the court not
following Chai Cheon Kam)
4 Defective ● SOC filed by P is defective 2 likely outcomes:
Statement of ● D may raise such objection i. Court may dismiss SJ
Claim where P’s SOC is defective application with cost
because it does not disclose a ii. Court may adjourn SJ hearing
complete cause of action (COA) to allow P to amend SOC to
- If no complete COA cure the defect
disclosed in SOC, it can be
struck off P/s: Technical objection usually
● Because COA is incomplete, the will not be upheld unless it
SJ should also fail occasions miscarriage of justice
5 Delay ● This may happen when P applies ● If P filed SJ application after D
for SJ after D has filed his filed his defence, there is the rule
defence. that P has delayed his application
● However, Affidavit only assume and this delay must be explained
legal effect when it is sealed by P and it is up to the court to
decide whether P’s reason is
[Perbadanan Nasional acceptable.
Insurans Sdn Bhd v Pua Lai - Court may require P to give
Ong] [1996] 3 MLJ 85. reason as to why he delayed
Facts: The P served his affidavit - If reasons are unacceptable,
in reply against the Defendant 2 court may dismiss SJ
days later than the 14 days limit application
as prescribed by O 32 r 13 (2)(b).
Issue: Whether the time start to ● In practice, it is usually unlikely
run from the day it receives the court will dismiss SJ application
unsealed copy of affidavit or on ground of delay, unless the
sealed copy? delay is inordinate (e.g. SJ
Held: The affidavit had no legal application put in 6 months after
effect until it is sealed. Thus, the defence has been filed)
neither party has the obligation - If SJ application was put in 2
to reply if it is unsealed. weeks, 1 month, 6 weeks
after the defence, court will
still allow the SJ application
● However, raising a technical objection in most cases is only to buy time / a delay tactic by D
- In most cases, technical objection will not allow D to escape SJ; he will still have to face the SJ,
it will only buy him some time.
- The only technical objection that is most likely to succeed is the first one (exclusion under O14
r1(2)) – this will allow D to escape SJ, the matter has to face the trial
- In other cases, the court will merely adjourn the hearing – the hearing for SJ will come up again
after P has cured the defect
9
(1) Unless on the hearing of an application under rule 1 either the Court dismisses the application or the defendant
satisfies the Court that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried, the Court may give such
judgment for the plaintiff against that defendant.
7 | Page
Unless on the hearing of an application under rule 1 either the Court dismisses the application or
the defendant satisfies the Court that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be
tried, the Court may give such judgment for the plaintiff against that defendant.
Triable issue : an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried (an issue that can only be
resolved at a trial)
● Cases explaining what amounts to a triable issue:
[Appaduray v Ananda]10
Fact : Case involving boundary dispute whereby P alleged D had encroached on P’s land. P sued
D and applied for SJ. One of the things P relied on was a surveyor’s report which confirmed
D had encroached on P’s land. D disputed the surveyor’s report. D said that the report was
wrong as it did not take into account certain matters concerning some boundary stones
Issue : Has D raised a triable issue and thus the matter has to go for trial
Held : There was a triable issue. The surveyor needs to be called, cross-examined and another
surveyor report needs to be obtained.
: Hence, there must be a trial for this action. P’s SJ application was dismissed, D escaped SJ
and the matter now has to go for trial
Other examples of how court decide what’s “triable issue”: (R = Respondent, A = Appellant)
● If the issue raised, even if existed, is not legal, then it is not a triable issue:
[Voo Min En v Leong Chung Fatt]12
Fact : The As applied for SJ but R alleged there was an oral agreement with the A to
renew lease. But the law shows that oral agreements to renew an existing lease are
inadmissible. Thus, the said oral agreement, if existed cannot be effective as it is
against the renewal clause in the written agreement. Therefore, the oral agreement
was valueless b/c not in writing nor registered.
Held : A triable issue must be an arguable issue. Where the issue raised is irrelevant,
ineffective or unarguable, SJ should be granted.
: In this case, the existence of an oral agreement (to renew the lease of the ground
floor of the demised premises) is really not an arguable issue as even if it existed, it is
neither effective nor admissible. Therefore, it does not constitute a triable issue. The
As are therefore entitled to the SJ.
9 | Page
cost of SJ hearing.
- This means the SJ application failed BUT nobody needs to pay
the cost yet (here P is not penalized because he did not know
about the triable issue)
5.2.1) Whether triable issues raised by D are restricted to the issues stated in Statement of Defence
● At the time of SJ hearing, D has already filed his statement of defence. Thus, the question is, is D
restricted to only raising the issues raised in SOD or D Can raise issues which are over and
above those stated in the defence?
● The position for this has been changing:
Year Court Position Case
1989 High D can raise as [Lin Securities v Noon Sdn Bhd]15
Court O14 says “… H : D is not restricted to the issues and matters
otherwise..” that he raised in his defence. D can raise any
matter over and above those which are stated in
his defence.
: One of the reasons the Court arrived at this
decision was because of O 14 r 4(1) states that:
▪ In raising a triable issue, D can raise it “by
affidavit or otherwise”
▪ The word “otherwise” is deemed to be
quite wide. The order says nothing about D
being restricted to his SOD
2007 Court of D cannot raise [Ribaru Bina Sdn Bhd v Bakti Kausar Development
Appeal something that Sdn Bhd]16
he didn’t plead. Fact : This case concerns a building contract where
To allow it the D raised the defence of “no privity of
would be contract” which was not pleaded in the Ds’
procedurally defence nor was it raised in the affidavits filed
unfair. on their behalf.
Held : On a summons for judgment, a triable issue
must be raised by a D either by an affidavit filed
in opposition to the summons or in a statement
of defence.
: To raise triable issues by way of submission on
a point not raised in a defence or an affidavit
would not meet the requirements of procedural
fairness which is the essence of any litigation.
15
[1989] 1 MLJ 321.
16
[2007] 2 MLJ 221 at 225
10 | Page
● Compare Singapore position:
[Lim Leong Huat v Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte Ltd]: 17 D can’t raise
[PMA Credit Opportunities Fund v Tantono Tiny]: 18 D can raise
18
[2011] 3 SLR 1021.
Held : The D is not bound by the four corners of his pleading.
:A defendant is bound by the four corners of his pleadings ONLY at the trial of the action, but not in a
SJ proceedings.
(The same judge, which heard the Lim Leong Huat’s case, suggested that his decision would have
been different if his attention had been drawn to the other High Court cases.)
19
[1985] 1 MLJ 157 (FC)
20
[2014] 6 CLJ 269 (FC)
21
you claim against me and I claim against you, our claims are crossing
11 | Page
o Significant differences between the 2 were and their effects explained in [Permodalan
Plantations Sdn Bhd v Rachuta Sdn Bhd]22
ii. If P did not know about the set-off or could not have
reasonably anticipated the set-off, the court will grant
unconditional leave to defend with costs in the cause.
- Because D has been able to raise a valid defence (set-
off) .
- Since P did not know about it, P will not be asked to
pay cost although SJ application is dismissed.
22
[1985] 1 MLJ 157
12 | Page
Counterclaim If D raises a counterclaim (which is not a defence, unlike a set-
off) at SJ hearing:
▪ Whether P knew or did not know about the counterclaim is
irrelevant (because a counterclaim is not a defence).
▪ If D only raises a counterclaim and no other triable issue – SJ
will be granted to P, but with a stay of execution until the
counterclaim is disposed of under O14 r3(2).23
- i.e. P cannot execute his SJ against D until CC has been
resolved by court.
- P just does not get his money immediately, the
counterclaim has to be disposed of by the court first.
23
O14 r3(2): The Court may stay the execution of any judgment given against a defendant until after the trial of any
counterclaim made or raised by the defendant in the action.
24
[Ronald Quay Sdn Bhd v Maheswary Sdn Bhd] [1987] 1 MLJ 322 (counterclaim)
Fact: P claims sum from D as payment for services rendered. D admitted P rendered the services, but denied being
indebted. D also made a counterclaim for damages, alleging P breached its contractual obligations.
Held : Where there was a plausible counterclaim upon the hearing of an Order 14 application, even if judgment was
given for the plaintiff on his claim, there should be stay of execution pending the trial of the counterclaim.
13 | Page
● In Malaysia, our legal position on set-off and counterclaim is governed by Permodalan Plantation.
- In Singapore, they have a different approach in dealing with set-off and CC (mainly CC) their
framework is found in Kim Seng Orchid Pte Ltd v Lim Kah Hin [2017] SGHC 425
- See also J Pinsler, “A New Framework for Counterclaims in Summary Judgment Cases” at
https://lawgazette.com.sg/feature/new-framework-counterclaims-summary-judgment-cases/ 26
● Likewise, if the D makes an counterclaim, he can also apply for SJ under O14 r5 if the plaintiff has
no defence. All the rules governing SJ will apply analogously.
26
Impact of Kim Seng:
“Kim Seng is particularly significant for clarifying the approach of the Court towards counterclaims in summary
judgment proceedings, which had previously been plagued by unnecessary confusion and conceptual
uncertainty. This unhappy state of affairs had stemmed from the judgment of Bingham LJ in United Overseas
Ltd v Peter Robinson (trading as Top Shop), in which the learned Judge introduced a four-fold classification of
outcomes where the applicant for summary judgment is faced with a counterclaim.
First, where the defendant is able to show an arguable set-off, he would obtain unconditional leave to defend.
Secondly, where the defendant could set up “a bona fide counterclaim arising out of the same subject-matter
as the action and connected with the grounds of defence”, he would also be entitled to unconditional leave to
defend.
14 | Page
(1) When a defendant to an action begun by writ has served a counterclaim on the plaintiff, the
defendant may, on the ground that the plaintiff has no defence to the counterclaim, apply for SJ.
(2) Rule 2,3, 4 would apply analogously.
(3) This rule doesn’t apply to counterclaim specified in rule 1(2)
5.4.1) Meaning of “conditional leave to defend….. in default, judgment to the PF with costs”
● This means that the DF is allowed to defend himself but with the condition of paying a security
to court.
● The amount of security is either the whole or a part of the PF’s claim which id up to the court’s
discretion.
● The payment has to be made in “x number of days” which is also up to the court’s discretion.
Thirdly, where the defendant is unable to mount a defence to the claim but puts forward “a plausible
counterclaim” for an amount not less than the claim, judgment is to be given against him subject to a stay of
execution.
Fourthly, in the absence of any connection between the counterclaim and claim, no stay would be granted
against the execution of summary judgment.”
Other cases (merely illustrate why the Court doubted the DF’s defence with no importance
principles)27
● Also, if there is a counterclaim, the Court can grant SJ to plaintiff but stay its execution:
27
[Alliance (Malaya) Engineering Co Sdn Bhd v San Development Sdn Bhd.] [1974] 2 MLJ 94
Held : There was considerable suspicion as to its bona fide as there was clearly very little substance in the
DF' claim to a right of set-off and counterclaim in respect of the alleged damages for the delay in the
completion of the works.
[QBE Supreme Insurance v Syarikat Chemas Pemborong Sdn Bhd] [1986] 1 MLJ 56
Held : the 2nd DF was given leave to defend on condition that he deposits the sum claimed within a month
into the court on reason that the learned judge doubted the bona fide of his defence, i.e. did in fact
sign the indemnity in his personal capacity.
16 | Page
O14 r3(2) : The Court may stay the execution of any judgment given against a defendant until
after the trial of any counterclaim made or raised by the defendant in the action.
5.6) “There ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim” under Order 14 rule 3(1)28
● Under O14 r3(1), there are 3 situations which the Court may not give SJ, which is when:
i. the Court dismisses the SJ application, or
ii. there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or
iii. that there ought for some other reason to be a trial,
● So, as mentioned earlier, the P would generally get awarded for the SJ if the Df can’t raise a triable
issue, a set off or a valid technical objection etc.
● However, under O.14 r.3(1), the court has the discretion to disallow a SJ to a PF even if the DF is
unable to raise a triable issue/set off/valid technical objection.
● This is because of the words “there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim” under
O14 r3(1). These words give the court the discretion to disallow a SJ.
● Usually, the “some other reason” would be the interest of justice.
[Miles v Bull] [1969] 1 QB 258 (The leading English case on this issue.)
Facts : Case concerning the sale of a house. This house belonged to Mr A (registered owner of the
house). Mr A sold the house to Mr B. At all times, the house was occupied by Mrs A’s wife
(Mrs A), and Mrs A was separated from Mr A. Mrs A claimed that she didn’t know that the
house was sold. After the conclusion of the sale, Mr B asked Mrs A to move out from the
house as he is the owner of the house. Mrs A refused to leave the house. Mr B sued Mrs A for
possession of the house. He applied for SJ against Mrs A. At the SJ application, Mrs A was
unable to raise any triable issue as a defence because all she kept saying was the sale of the
house was a sham. This whole transaction was to evict her from the house. Whatever she
could say did not amount to triable issues.
Held : Even though Mrs A failed to raise a triable issue, she nevertheless satisfied the court that
there were circumstances which ought to be investigated. So, there were some “other
reasons for there to be a trial” and the reason was just.
: The whole case was concerning the sale of a house, all the facts concerning the sale of
house were controlled by Mr A. Mrs A had no idea about the sale of the house. Since she had
no knowledge of the facts, she was unable to raise any triable issue. Therefore, she should be
given an unconditional leave to defend the action with costs so as to allow her to ask for
discovery and cross-examine the witnesses. 29
● In reality, this discretion is barely exercised, the court must satisfy that there is some other reason.
28
O. 14, r. 3(1):Unless
- the Court dismisses the SJ application, or
- there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or
- that there ought for some other reason to be a trial,
the Court may give such judgment for the plaintiff against that defendant on that claim or part as may be just
having regard to the nature of the remedy or relief claimed.
29
Quote mentioned by Megary J: “if a DF cannot point to a specific issue which ought to be tried, but nevertheless satisfies the
court that there are circumstances which ought to be investigated, then I think those concluding words (ought to be some other
reason) are invoked.”
17 | Page
Facts : The PFs sued the DFs (bank) for honouring its cheques which were stolen and the
signatures were forged. The PFs applied for SJ. The DFs resisted PFs’ application on the
ground that police investigations were still going on.
Held: Unconditional leave to defend with costs in the cause was granted to the DFs as the
circumstances called for further investigations. The circumstances and audacity with which
the fraud was carried out and the absence of an explanation by the directors of the PFs
constitute 'some other reason' for a trial under O.14 r.3(1).
: Whatever the outcome of the main action, greater injustice would be done to the DFs if they
were not given leave to defend. If judgment is entered against them, there is a real likelihood
of the PFs terminating their overdraft facility with the DFs and withdrawing their fixed
deposit so that even if the DFs were able to prove fraud on the part of the PFs at some future
time, they might not be able to recover their loss.
[Kiwi Brands (M) Sdn Bhd v Multiview Enterprises Sdn Bhd [1998] 6 MLJ 38]
Facts : PF applied for SJ against the DF for infringement of the PF’s copyright in respect of artistic
and literary works under the Copyright Act . The DF contended that there were “triable
issues” that could not be dismissed summarily by questioning the PF’s ownership of the
copyright in the label and the eligibility of the label for copyright protection.
30
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd ('BBMB') and Safire Pharmaceuticals (M) Sdn Bhd ('the borrower')
18 | Page
Held : O.14 r.3(1) provides that SJ is to be refused when there is “an issue or question in dispute
which ought to be tried or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim.”
In the present case, there were “triable issues” because PFs’s contention that the artistic and
literary works concerned are original are mere assertions unsupported by evidence. Hence,
this is a trial issue which if SJ was granted, the PFs’ evidences would not be assessed when
they should have been tried by interrogatories, discovery and cross-examination.
[Esso Standard Malayan Berhad v Southern Cross Airways (M) Bhd [1972] 1 MLJ 168]
Facts : This case involved interpreting the content of 3 letters. The trial court interpreted the 3
letters and found there was indeed a contract.
Held : An order under Order 14 should be made only if the court thinks it is a plain case and ought
not to go to trial. If one simply has a short matter of construction with a few documents,
the court on summary application should decide what in its judgment the true
construction is. There should be no reason to go formally to trial where no further facts
could emerge which would throw any light upon the letters that have to be construed.
[Carlsberg Brewery Malaysia Bhd v Soon Heng Aw &. Sons Sdn Bhd [1989] 1 MLJ 104]
Facts : This case concerned question of interpretation of the instrument of guarantee.
Held : This was a case where the document of guarantee was the foundation of the claim by the PF
and the rights and liabilities of the parties depend upon the true construction of the guarantee.
However, the court proceeded to grant SJ based on the construction of the terms of the
document.
[Fadzil bin Mohamed Noor v Universiti Teknologi Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 196]
Facts : Appellant (lecturer) was terminated from Universiti Teknologi Malaysia by
University Council. The appellant filed a specially indorsed writ for a declaration that
the purported dismissal by the respondents was ultra vires, illegal and void. He then
applied for SJ.
Held : In an Order 14 case on construction of a few documents, the court was only
concerned with what was the true construction. There was no need for trial when there
were no further facts that could emerge which would throw light on the documents
that had to be construed.
: In light of the construction of the Universities and University Colleges Act, 1971
and the Constitution of the University, the University had a hopeless case and the
application for SJ should be granted, as no useful purpose could be served by going
formally to trial as no further facts would emerge that would shed light on the true
construction of the legislation and document.
19 | Page
[Ng Chin Swee v Koperasi Belia Bersatu Bhd [1987] 2 MLJ 510]
Facts : PF deposited money with DF. Subsequently, PF filed an action against DF when
they did not receive their money as promised by DF. The DF‘s defence was a bare
denial coupled with a plea in the Bar. The Senior Assistant Registrar found in favour
of the PF. DF appealed.
Held : Appeal dismissed with costs. There is nothing in the Essential (Protection of
Depositors) Order 1986 or in the Regulations which precludes third parties from filing
claims against DF. The action was properly filed. On the material before him, the
Registrar very properly gave judgment against DF. In the absence of an appeal, merits
and special reasons, no stay of execution could be ordered.
5.8) Can the court determine questions of law? Yes
[European Asian Bank A.G. v. Punjab and Sind Bank [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 611]
Held :Even if the case involves a difficult question of law, it is not a bar from applying for SJ. If the
case goes on to trial, the same arguments will be “rehearsed” again at trial, which offends the very
purpose of O14 – to speedily dispose of a clear-cut case.
[Malayan Insurance (M) Sdn. Bhd. v Asia Hotel Sdn. Bhd. (1987) 2 MLJ 183]
Held : If the issue raised is solely a question of law but the facts are clear and undisputed, the court
should exercise its duty under Order 14 (grant SJ) and decide on the question of law. This is so
even if the issue of law raised is a difficult one. If the court after considering the argument is
satisfied that it is really unarguable, then the court should grant summary judgment.
5.9) Can the PF apply for SJ if the PF is claiming for injunctive relief? Can
20 | Page
● If a PF is claiming for injunction (one of the remedies), can he apply for SJ? In other words, is SJ
available where the PF is applying for an injunction?
● In order for a PF to apply for an injunction, one of the requirements is that there must be a serious
question to be tried.
● However, one of the requirement for applying for SJ is there is no triable issue. So, there is a
contradiction here.
● However, case law has held that the PF can still apply for SJ so long as the 4 requirements are
fulfilled:
31
[2000] 3 AMR 3198 (CA)
21 | Page
cause [O14r4(3)] could not have been anticipated by the PF
ii. D raises a set off which was not known to the PF or could not
have been anticipated by the PF
iii. Court exercises its discretion under O.14 r.3 and says that
there ought to be some other reason to be a trial of the claim
6 Defendant to pay into This happens when the Court granted conditional leave to defend to
court the defendant:
7 Setting aside SJ against D ● If the DF or his lawyer does not attend a SJ hearing, usually the
who does not appear at a court will enter SJ against the DF.
SJ hearing ● If a DF fails to attend a SJ hearing, the court can give SJ in
favour of PF.
● If a SJ is entered against a DF who failed to attend a hearing, can
that judgment be set aside? Yes
O.14 r.11 : the judgment entered against the DF can be set aside if
it thinks fit.
32
[1982] 1 All ER 1024
22 | Page
● However, DF must produce very good reasons as to why he did
not attend the hearing
7) Appeals
● Once, the Court decided whether to award SJ to the plaintiff or not. The party which isn’t happy with the
decision can always appeal against the decision.
● If the SJ application was heard by the Senior Assistant Registrar or the Deputy Registrar, the party can
appeal to the Judge in Chambers (aka High Court, without having to ask for leave of court). This is
governed by O.56.
● If the party is not satisfied with the High Court’s decision, he can again appeal to the Court of Appeal.
This is governed by Section 68(1) of the Court of Judicature Act 1964. Leave of court may be
required depending on Section 68.
● Again, from the COA, there will be a final right of appeal to the Federal court, governed by Section 96
of the Court of Judicature Act 1964 and leave of court must be obtained.
23 | Page
Chapter 1 (Part 2) - Summary Judgment Under Order 81
the plaintiff may, on the ground that the defendant has no defence to the action, apply to the Court for judgment.
24 | Page
● Hence, to fall under Order 81, there must be an agreement, with the subject matter mentioned above
and in respect of that agreement, the plaintiff must be claiming either specific performance, rescission
or return/ forfeiture of deposit.
● If the plaintiff’s claim falls within this ambit and he wants to apply for summary judgment, he would
need to apply under Order 81 and not Order 14.
2 A entered into a contract with B. Under B’s claim falls within the subject matter of
the terms in the contract, A has agreed to Order 81. But B’s remedy does not fall within
sell his house to B. A has now breached the remedy of Order 81. Thus, B’s claim does
the contract and he refuses to sell the not fall within Order 81 as B is not claiming any
house to B. B has sued A for breach of of the remedy provided in Order 81. B should
contract and wishes to claim for apply for summary judgment under Order 14, an
damages only. B now wishes to apply SJ order of general application.
against A. Should B apply for summary
judgment under Order 14 or Order 81?
3 A entered into a contract with B. Under B’s claim falls within the subject matter of
the terms in the contract, A has agreed to Order 81 and he is claiming remedy which falls
sell his house to B. A has now breached within Order 81 too. Order 81 Rule 1(1)(a)
the contract and he refuses to sell the mentioned the words “with or without an
house to B. B has sued A for breach of alternative claim for damages”, which means if
contract and wishes to claim for the plaintiff is claiming any of the remedies
damages and specific performance. B provided in Order 81 Rule 1(1), the plaintiff
now wishes to apply SJ against A. may add a claim for damages as well. In this
Should B apply for summary judgment scenario, Order 81 will still apply.
under Order 14 or Order 81?
4 A entered into a contract with B, where A is claiming for remedy provided in Order 81.
25 | Page
A agreed to perform certain services for But A’s claim does not fall within the subject
B. A wants to rescind the contract and he matter of Order 81. In this scenario, Order 14
is claiming for rescission of this applies. A should apply for summary judgment
contract. A want to apply for summary under Order 14.
judgment against B. Should A apply for
summary judgment under Order 14 or
Order 81?
2) Procedure
2.3) Service
34
O. 81, r. 2 (1) : Manner in which application under rule 1 shall be made
An application under rule 1 shall be made by notice of application supported by an affidavit made by some person who
can swear positively to the facts verifying the cause of action and stating that in his belief there is no defence to the
action.
35
O. 81, r. 2 (2)
: The notice of application shall set out or have attached thereto minutes of the judgment sought by the plaintiff.
26 | Page
● Once the plaintiff has applied for summary judgment under Order 81 by filing the notice of
application supported by an affidavit and minute of judgment, it must be served on the defendant to
notify the defendant.
● Service has 2 aspects:
a) Mode of Service
- Order 81 does not prescribe a specific mode of service for application of summary
judgment under this order.
- As Order 81 is silent, the rule of general application, Order 62 Rule 6 applies.
- Under Order 62 Rule 6(1),36 there are 5 ways of service of document:
(a) By leaving the document at DF’s proper address
(b) By sending the document by way of pre- paid registered post to DF’s proper address
(c) By fax, and further complying with O.62 r.6(3)- only if you are applying with solicitor
(d) In any manner agreed by the parties
(e) In such manner as the court may direct
37
O. 81, r. 2 (3):
The notice of application, a copy of the affidavit in support and of any exhibit referred to therein shall be served on the
defendant within fourteen days from the date of issue of the notice of application.
38
Refers to the copy which has been signed, dated and there is the stamp of the court.
39
[1988] 2 MLJ 268
27 | Page
Facts : The plaintiff sued the defendant for breaching a sale and purchase agreement. The plaintiff
sought for SJ under Order 81 Rule 1(b). The defendant prayed to dismiss the application as it
did not comply with Order 81 Rule 2(2) since the minutes of judgment was not attached with
the notice of application.
Held : It is not mandatory that an application for Order 81 must in all cases have the minutes of
the judgment sought for attached to the summons although in practice minutes of the
judgment are normally attached to the summons. In any event, the failure to attach the said
minutes to the summons is not fatal. It is curable under Order 2 Rule 1. 40
2.5) Hearing
● After application is filed, hearing date will be fixed.
● If the defendant is unable to raise any triable issue, summary judgment will be granted to the
plaintiff with costs.
● The principle or the issue for Order 81 is the same as the principle or issue for Order 14.
3) Differences
Differences Order 14 Order 81
Scope of General application O 81 r 1(1). :
Application
Specific type of cases, i.e. the plaintiff’s
claim must fall within a specific subject
matter and the plaintiff must be claiming
for a specific remedy.
Preliminary 2 Preliminary requirements;41 1 Preliminary requirement [O 81 r 1(2)] :
Requirements
a) writ and statement of claim must be - Writ and statement of claim must have
served; been served,42 regardless of whether
b) the defendant must have entered an the defendant has entered into an
appearance. appearance for the action.
40
41
[National Company for Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd]
42
As provided in Order 81 Rule 1(2).
28 | Page
Affidavit O 14 r 2 (2) : The affidavit can be made O 81 r 2(1): The affidavit must be made by
by a person other than the plaintiff. a person who can swear positively as to the
facts.44
- This is because O 14 r 2 (2) 43 has
stated that the affidavit “may - This means that the affidavit can only be
contain statements of information or made by a person who has personal
belief”. knowledge of the facts.
- This shows us that the affidavit may - In other words, only the plaintiff himself
be affirmed by someone who does can make the affidavit.
not have personal knowledge but he
is giving information from what has
been communicated to him or from
his belief.
- In other words, it can be affirmed by
a person other than the plaintiff.
It can be said that an Order 14 affidavit can contain hearsay statements [statement of
info and belief], while an Order 81 affidavit cannot contain hearsay statement [swear
positively].
1) What is Order 89
● Summary proceeding under Order 89 is a very specific order. It specifically deals with summary
procedure for the recovery of possession of land.
● The procedure under Order 89 enables a plaintiff to recover possession of land without having to proof
his claim at a trial.
43
Order 14 Rule 2(2): Unless the Court otherwise directs, an affidavit for the purposes of this rule may contain statements of
information or belief with the sources and grounds thereof.
44
Order 81 Rule 2(1)- “swear positively as to facts”.
29 | Page
o Recovering possession of land may be a highly contentious matter. It may involve substantial
dispute as to facts.
o Usually for this kind of claims, it needs to have a trial to determine who’s the owner of the land and
entitled to possession of the land. But Order 89 provides a mechanism for a plaintiff to recover the
land without having to go through trial.
● Order 89 is specifically targeted to cases involving recovering possession of land from squatters.45
● Order 89 provides a very unique summary process because the procedure under Order 89 can be
brought/ commenced against people whose name are not known.
● Order 89 provides a fast-economical procedure for the plaintiff to get back his land from the squatters/
people occupying his land without his permission.
2) Scope
● Order 89 Rule 1(1)46 provides that a person who claims possession of a land who is occupied by a
person who doesn’t have right over the land (ie “entered into the land without his licence, consent or that
of any predecessor in title”) can apply for SJ by originating summons.
● However, since Order 89 is only limited to people who “don’t have right over the land”, it cannot be
used against certain categories of people:
i. Tenants; [person renting the property]
ii. Tenant holding over; [tenant who stays on the property after the tenancy period has expired]
iii. Licensee; [person who are occupying the land because they have a license to occupy the land,
can either be express or implied license]
iv. Persons who are occupying the plaintiff’s land / entered the plaintiff’s land with his consent.
● Based on the scope of Order 89, we can infer that Order 89 is specifically targeted to squatters [people
on the land without plaintiff’s consent or authorization].
3) Procedure
45
Refers to people occupying a land without the permission of the owner.
46
O. 89, r. 1 : Proceedings to be brought by originating summons
(1) Where a person claims possession of land which he alleges is occupied solely by a person or persons (not being a tenant or
tenants holding over after the termination of the tenancy) who entered into or remained in occupation without his licence
or consent or that of any predecessor in title of his, the proceedings may be brought by originating summons in
accordance with the provisions of this Order.
47
mode of commencing an action in the court
30 | Page
(1) The originating summon must be in Form 8A and an acknowledgement of service is not required.
The originating summons must also include a note at the end.48
● As oppose to the normal originating summons in Form 7, a special one (Form 8A) must be used
for an SJ application under Order 89.
● O 89 r3(2): 51
If there are too many people who occupy the land the plaintiff doesn’t know all of them, the
plaintiff must state in his affidavit that he has taken reasonable steps to identify every squatters in
the land who are not named in the summons.
49
O. 89, r. 3: Affidavit in support
(1) The plaintiff shall file in support of the originating summons an affidavit stating—
(a) his interest in the land;
(b) the circumstances in which the land has been occupied without licence or consent and in which his claim to
possession arises; and
(c) that he does not know the name of any person occupying the land who is not named in the summons.
50
Usually the plaintiff will say he is the registered proprietor of the land.
51
O 89 r3(2): Where the plaintiff is unable, after taking reasonable steps, to identify every person occupying the land
for the purpose of making him a defendant, the plaintiff shall state in his affidavit that he has taken reasonable steps
(describing them) to identify the persons occupying the land who are not named in the summons.
52
O. 89, r. 4 : Service of originating summons
(1): Where any person in occupation of the land is named in the originating summons, the summons together with a copy of the
affidavit in support shall be served on him—
(a) personally or in accordance with Order 10, rule 5;
(b) by leaving a copy of the summons and of the affidavit or sending them to him, at the premises; or
(c) in such other manner as the Court may direct.
31 | Page
ii. O 89 r 4(2): If the defendant is not named, there are 2 ways of service:53
(a) Affix a copy of originating summons and affidavit on the main door or on
some conspicuous part [obvious, clearly seen] of the premises; and
(b) If possible/ practicable to insert the originating summons and affidavit in a
sealed envelope and the sealed envelope must be addressed to “the occupier”
and the sealed envelope must be put into a letter box at the premises.
● After the OS and affidavit are served, the hearing date will be fixed.
4) Hearing
● Summary proceeding under Order 89 will be heard before a judge.
● At the hearing, if the plaintiff is able to prove his claim, the judge will give an order in Form 195,54
which is an order for immediate possession that can be enforced straight away.
● Below are relevant cases of Order 8955:
● Same as other SJ applications, Order 89 can only be used when there is no triable issue:
[Bohari bin Taib v PTG Selangor]56 [COA]
53
Order 89 Rule 4(2): The originating summons shall, in addition to being served on the named defendants, if any, in accordance
with paragraph (1) be served, unless the Court otherwise directs, by—
(a) affixing a copy of the summons and a copy of the affidavit to the main door or other conspicuous part of the premises;
and
(b) if practicable, inserting through the letter-box at the premises a copy of the summons and a copy of the affidavit enclosed
in a sealed envelope addressed to “the occupiers”.
54
O. 89, r. 6(2): An order for possession in proceedings under this Order shall be in Form 195.
55
Other cases:
[Bitromax Corp Sdn Bhd v Amil bin Salleh [2005] 1 MLJ 780.]
Facts: The plaintiff entered into a sub-tenancy with the third defendant who subsequently terminated the sub-tenancy with
termination notice. The third defendant then granted the first defendant the right to manage and maintain the premises.
While the second defendant was the owner o the premises. The first defendant filed an originating summon under Order
89, claiming for the recovery of possession of the premises from the first defendant.
Held : An O 89 proceedings could not be brought by a person who claims possession of land against a person who enters or
occupies that land if such person enters or occupies with the license or consent of the predecessor in title of the person
who claims possession. Here, the third defendant was a predecessor in title since it was the third defendant who sublet the
premises to the plaintiff. The second defendant was also a predecessor in title as it was the registered owner of the
premises. Since second and third defendants has authorized the first defendant to enter and occupy the premises, this
meant the second and third defendants, as the predecessors in title of the plaintiff, had given consent or a license to the
first defendant to enter and occupy the premises. It was not open to the plaintiff to invoke Order 89 against the first
defendant. The plaintiff should have taken a writ action against him if it felt aggrieved by the first defendant's entry or
occupation of the premises.
56
[1991] 1 MLJ 343
32 | Page
Facts : The respondent wanted to alienate some parcels of land to the appellants (landless farmers)
but subsequently the respondent changed its mind and wanted to hand the lands over to
FELCRA. The respondent contended that the appellants were in occupation of the lands
without license or consent so it applied for summarily under Order 89 for possession of the
land. On the other hand, the appellants claimed that they were not squatters of the land, but
were either licensees holding over or lawful occupiers of the land under the approved
alienation. Hence, Order 89 was not the proper procedure to be adopted.
Held : There were issues to be tried in this case which were not suitable to be decided by affidavit
evidence. Thus, this case should not be dealt with summarily under Order 89.
: For the purpose of summary procedure, a distinction must be made between a squatter
simpliciter who has no rights whatsoever and occupiers with license or consent, as well as
tenants and licensees holding over. It may be impossible to establish the existence of any
triable issue in the case of bare squatters, but the case will be different for tenants, licensees
holding over and those who occupied the land with consent. Where the entry to the land is
lawful, and there are triable issues, it is improper to adopt the procedure in Order 89 to evict
the occupiers.
[Zaibar Auto (M) Sdn Bhd v Shell Trading Sdn Bhd]58 [COA]
Facts : The respondent purchased a land from Metro Murni Sdn Bhd (MM) and was registered as
the owner. Subsequently the respondent found out that the appellant had occupied the land.
The respondent contended that the appellant was trespasser and took out a summon under
Order 89. However, the appellant contended that it occupied the land with the consent of MM
and hence Order 89 could not be invoked against it.
Held : Order 89 Rule 1 only applies to squatters. It does not apply to tenants holding over, one who
enters upon or occupies the land with the consent of the applicant under the order or any
predecessor in title of such an applicant, or persons who are in occupation under a legitimate
57
[1994] 3 MLJ 4
58
[1996] 2 MLJ 221
33 | Page
expectation of receiving, from the state authority, issue documents of title to the portions they
occupy.
: However, the appellant only obtained the consent from MM, the predecessor of the land
after MM divested itself all rights on the land to the respondent. As MM was not the
registered proprietor of the land anymore, it did not have power to give such consent or to
grant such license to the appellant. The appellant was trespasser who was in unlawful
possession of the land. Hence, the order of vacant possession was affirmed.
● As long as you have a right over the land, you can apply for SJ. You don’t have to be the registered
owner:
[Shaheen bte Abu Bakar v PKNS]61 [COA]
Facts : The state authority has approved the alienation of land to the respondents subject to 2
conditions. Subsequently the respondents found out that the land were occupied. Unknown of
the occupiers’ identities, the respondents applied for possession of land under Order 89 . The
appellants refused to vacant the land and occupied the land continuously. The appellants
contended that the respondents have no locus standi to seek for relief under Order 89 as they
were not the registered proprietor of the land. They also alleged that the respondents failed to
comply with the requirements set out in Order 89 Rule 3.62
Held : Order 89 does not stipulate that only a registered proprietor may invoke its provisions. The
order is silent on the issue of standing. Therefore, it is for the court to determine, according to
the facts of each case, whether a particular plaintiff has standing to make an application. The
59
[2004] MLJU 187.
60
The proceedings should have been commenced by a writ as opposed to an originating summons, and that the application cannot
be resolved by way of affidavit evidence. At the same time, the court also cited the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in
Chiu Wing Wa & Ors v Ong Beng Cheng [1994] 1 MLJ 89, as produced below:
Principles governing an O89 application:
(1) The summary procedure under 0.89 should not be allowed to apply where the entry to the land in the first instance is lawful,
for in such a situation, there must necessarily be the facts and the law for determination by evidence viva voce;
(2) the summary procedure under O89 is governed by the same principles as those under O14;
(3) to entitle a defendant to a trial, all the defendant needs to do is show that there is a triable issue of law or fact;
(4) it is only in clear cases of trespass that a summary order can be made under O89;
(5) an application under O89 should be dismissed if there are triable issues of fact and law, as such an application for vacant
possession ought to have been commenced by writ; and
(6) for the purpose of the summary procedure under O89, a distinction should be made between squatters simpliciter who have no
rights whatsoever and occupiers with license or consent, as well as tenants and licensees holding over.
61
[1996] 1 MLJ 825
62
In that the respondents had failed to describe the nature of their interest, to set out the circumstances in which the land had been
occupied, and to state that they did not know the names of the occupants of the land.
34 | Page
test of standing to be applied in cases under O 89 is one based upon a right to possession.
Although neither respondent was the registered proprietor of the land, each had standing to
apply under Order 89 by reason of the letter of approval from the state authority.
: The two elements that oust the operation of Order 89 are as follows:
i. the initial entry upon the land was lawful; and
ii. the existence of any express or implied consent or licence on the part of the owner
pursuant to which the occupation continued.
: The appellants were squatters with no occupational right. The court affirmed the order for
possession against the appellants.
1) Introduction
Consider this scenario:
There is a collision between Tom’s car and Dan’s car. Pam was a passenger in Tom’s car and Pam was
injured in the collision. Pam decides to sue Dan for her injuries. Thus, Pam is the Plaintiff and Dan is the
Defendant in the civil proceedings.
However, Dan wants to Tom to join as a party in the proceedings because Dan contends that Tom was
responsible for the collision which resulted in Pam’s injuries.
35 | Page
What options are available to Dan? Dan has two options to join Tom into the proceedings.
Option 1: Dan (Defendant) may include Tom as a co-defendant. (this was learnt in Civil Procedure 1)
● Dan may apply under Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) to include Tom into the proceeding
Order 15 rule 6
(2) At any stage of the proceedings, the Court may either of its own motion or on application-
(b) order any of the following persons to be added as a party, namely-
(i) any person who ought to have been joined as a party, or whose presence before the
Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in the suit may be effectually and
completely determined; or
(ii) any person which the Court think, if added him in, would be just and convenient to
determine any issue related or arising out from the relief claimed in the suit. 63
● To add a party under this option, (Dan) must apply to the court by way of notice of application.
● Order 15 rule 6(3):64
Also, to add a party under Order 15 rule 6(2), the application must be supported by an affidavit
showing the party’s interest in the dispute or the issue to be determined between him and the parties
of the suit.
Leave of court is required to join a party as a co-defendant.
● Further, the Plaintiff (Pam) may object to Dan’s application to add Tom as a co-Defendant. [Tajjul
Ariffin bin Mustafa v Heng Cheng Hong]
Option 2 : Dan may include Tom as a third party (instead of co-defendant) under Order 16 Rules of Court.
(focus of this chapter)
● Generally, to join a third party, leave of court is not required, except in 2 circumstances.
● Further, the plaintiff’s consent is irrelevant. In other words, the plaintiff (Pam) may not object to Dan
for adding a third party into the proceeding.
Question: In considering the 2 options available to Dan as a defendant, which is a better option?
Option 2 (add Tom as a third party) is better as
i. leave of court is not required (unless 2 circumstances apply) AND
ii. the plaintiff may not object to the application.
63
O. 15, r. 6(2)(b)(ii):
Any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising
out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter which, in the opinion
of the Court, would be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as between the
parties to the cause or matter.
64
O. 15, r. 6(3):
An application by any person for an order under paragraph (2) adding him as a party shall, except with the
leave of the Court, be supported by an affidavit showing his interest in the matters in dispute in the cause or
matter or, as the case may be, the question or issue to be determined as between him and any party to the
cause or matter.
36 | Page
● The purpose of the third party proceedings is to bring in or add in that “person” into the civil suit.
This person would be known as the “third party” in the civil suit against the Plaintiff and the
Defendant.
● As in the scenario above, Dan (the Defendant) will bring third party proceedings against Tom, who is
not a party to the civil suit commenced by Pam (the Plaintiff). The purpose of the third party
proceedings is to bring in Tom into the civil suit. Tom will be known as the third party in the civil
suit between Pam and Dan.
(a) claims against a person not already a party to the action any contribution or indemnity;
(b) claims against such a person any relief or remedy relating to or connected with the original subject
matter of the action and substantially the same as some relief or remedy claimed by the plaintiff;
or
(c) requires that any question or issue relating to or connected with the original subject matter of the
action should be determined not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant but also as
between either or both of them and a person not already a party to the action,
37 | Page
2 the Defendant ● This is where the Defendant is asserting that if he is
claims for indemnity made liable to pay any damages to the Plaintiff, the
from the third party third party is liable to pay the whole of it.
● When serving the third party notice, take note of the form of the Third Party notice –
- If the Defendant is seeking contribution, indemnity or same relief , use Form 18
- If the Defendant is seeking common relief, use Form 19.
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Order 16, a third party notice, including a notice issuable in accordance with
Order 16, rule 9, for service on the Government shall not be issued without the leave of the Court, and the
application for the grant of such leave must be made by notice of application, and the notice of application
must be served on the plaintiff and the Government.
(2) Leave to issue such a notice for service on the Government shall not be granted unless the Court is satisfied
that the Government is in possession of all such information as it reasonably requires as to the circumstances
in which it is alleged that the liability of the Government has arisen and as to the departments and officers of
the Government concerned.
39 | Page
● Order 16 rule 3(3): Service of a Third Party Notice is in accordance with Order 10 r 1, ie the
same as service of a writ. (This means that the mode of service can be done by the mode of
service of a writ like personal service etc)
enter judgment against the third party in respect of any contribution or indemnity
claimed in the notice. For other relief or remedy claimed, leave of the Court must be
obtained before filing the judgment in default.
(2) If a third party or the defendant by whom a third party notice was issued makes default
in serving any pleading which he is ordered to serve, the Court may, on an application
by a notice of application of that defendant or the third party, as the case may be, order
such judgment to be entered for the applicant as he is entitled to on the pleadings or
may make such other order as may appear to the Court necessary to do justice
between the parties.
(3) The Court may set aside or vary a judgment entered under subparagraph (1)(b) or
paragraph (2) on such terms, if any, as it thinks just.
67
Time limited for appearing (O. 12, r. 4)
References in these Rules to the time limited for appearing are references-
(a) in the case of a writ served, whether within the local jurisdiction of each High Court of Malaya or
outside such local jurisdiction but within the jurisdiction of Malaya, to fourteen days after service of the
writ or, where that time has been extended by or by virtue of these Rules, to that time as so extended;
and
(b) in the case of a writ served within Sabah and Sarawak, to fourteen days after service of the writ or in
the case of a defendant whose place of residence or if an incorporated society whose registered office
of business is not within the Division or Residency in which is situated the Registry out of which the
writ of summons was issued, twenty days after the service of the writ or where that time has been
extended by or by virtue of these Rules, to that time as so extended; and
(c) in the case of a writ served out of the jurisdiction, to fourteen days after service of the writ as
provided for in Order 10, rule 2 or Order 11, rule 2 or to such extended time as the Court may
otherwise allow.
68
O. 16, r. 4: Third party directions
(1) If the third party enters an appearance in Form 21, the defendant who issued the third party notice shall apply to
the Court for directions, by a notice of application to be served on all other parties in the suit.
40 | Page
● Order 16 rule 4(1) and (2):
Once the third party has entered appearance, the Defendant is under a duty to issue and serve
on all parties a notice of application for third party directions in Form 22.
- The Defendant must apply for directions within 7 days after third party has entered
appearance.
- This notice of application for third party directions must be served on all parties to the
action ie the Plaintiff(s), the other defendants (if any) and the third party.
- The purpose of the application for third party directions is to bring all parties before the
court so that the court can now make necessary directions for the smooth flowing of the
trial.
● What if the Defendant fails to apply for third party directions? There are two possible
consequences mentioned in Order 16 rule 4(2) –
i. the third party himself may apply for third party directions or
ii. the third party may apply to have the third party notice issued against him to be set
aside.
● Once an application for the directions is made, the Court may made order pursuant to Order
16 rule 4(3) – (5).
and may do so either before or after any judgment in the action has been signed by the plaintiff against the
defendant.
(4) On an application for directions under this rule, the Court may give the third party
- leave to defend the action, or
- to appear at the trial and to take such part therein as may be just, and
generally may make such orders/ give such directions as the Court deemed proper for having the rights and
liabilities of the parties most conveniently determined and enforced and as to the extent to which the third
party is to be bound by any judgment or decision in the action.
(5) Any order made or direction given under this rule shall be in Form 23 and may be varied or rescinded by the
Court at any time.
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ii. The court may order the third party to serve a Statement of Defence on the Defendant
within a certain number of days.
- Note: If the third party is ordered to serve a Defence on the Defendant, and the
third party fails to do so, the third party is deemed to admit to the Defendant’s
claim against and the third party will be bound by any decision made by the court
(Order 16 rule 5(1)).
iii. Order judgment in favor of the defendant against the third party if the liability of the
third party to the defendant is established at the hearing (Order 16 rule 4(3)(a))
iv. Order any claim, question or issue to be tried as the Court may direct (Order 16 rule
4(3)(b));
v. Give the third party leave to defend alone or jointly with any defendant and appear at
the trial (Order 16 rule 4(4))
Kayla Beverly Hills (M) Sdn Bhd v Quantum Far East Ltd69
Fact : In this case, the plaintiff’s lawyer was acting for the plaintiff and for the third
party. So the defendant applied to the court to disqualify the lawyer from
acting for the third party as they and the plaintiff are technically in an opposite
position, hence there will be conflict of interest if the same lawyer was to
represent them in the court.
Held : Since there is conflict of interest, the Court ordered the third party to defend
the suit whether alone or jointly with any defendant under Order 16 r 4(4).
Having said that, the necessary consequence of O 16 r 4(4) is that the third
party can cross-examine the plaintiffs and seek discovery against and
interrogate the plaintiffs at the trial.
vi. determine the extent to which the third party is to be bound by any judgment.
Mat Abu bin Man v Medical Superintendent, General Hospital, Taiping, Perak [1989] 1 MLJ 226.
Fact : The defendant was sued for injuring the deceased in an motor accident. The deceased later died at
the a hospital. Sometime later, the defendant took out a third party notice against the third parties
which are the Superintendent, District Hospital of Taiping and the Government of Malaysia claiming
for contribution and indemnity. The third parties objected by saying that the third party notice should
not be allowed as it is already time-barred under s 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act.
Held : Third-party proceedings for contribution an indemnity under Order 16 should be regarded as
independent of and separate from proceedings by a plaintiff against a defendant. A third-party
proceeding s not intended to be treated in the same way as an action between the plaintiff and a
defendant.
: When a defendant is made liable to the plaintiff, he then has a right open against a third party to
establish that he possesses a right to contribution or indemnity from the third party. Hence, time for
limitation should also begin to run from the date the defendant is liable. (so, in this case, the notice is
not time-barred)
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A.1) Meaning of Interpleader Proceedings under O17 r(1)(a)
O. 17, r. 1: Entitlement to relief by way of interpleader
(1) Where—
(a) a person is under a liability in respect of a debt, money, goods or chattels and he
is sued or expects to be sued for that debt, money, goods or chattels by two or more
persons making adverse claims,
the person under liability may apply to the Court for relief by way of interpleader.
● Interpleader proceedings under O17 r(1)(a) are proceedings commenced by a person who is in
possession of property to which he himself has no claim, but the property is being claimed by
two or more persons and he is unsure as to who is the proper claimant. So, the persons holding
the property may apply to court and asks the court to decide who is the proper claimant.70
● The one who applies is called the interpleader and the proceedings are called interpleader
proceedings.
Hong Leong Bank Bhd v Manducekap Hi-Tec Sdn Bhd [2009] 7 MLJ 124
Facts : The case concerns the control and/or management of an account (subject matter)
involving several claimants. The Applicant Bank maintains the account for Claimant
1 Company. The Applicant faced several threats of litigation and competing claims
concerning the control and management of the account. To clarify the issue, the
Applicant applied to for interpleader relief.
Held : Application dismissed with costs as O.17 r.1 is not fulfilled.
: The court laid down the law regarding interpleader proceeding:
- In seeking for interpleader relief under O.17 r.1 RHC, an applicant must
genuinely face a potential suit by one or more persons. There must exist a real
conflict between the claimants. Mere anticipation of a legal suit is not
sufficient.
- The application did not meet the first requirement under O.17 r.1 of the RHC
since the Applicant was not faced with two or more competing claims. The
money in the account belongs to Claimant 1. Therefore, there could not be
any competing claim to the account between the Claimants.
- Also, once you applied for interpleading proceeding, you as the pleader doesn’t
have to bear the cost unless:
i. There is an unreasonable delay (in this case, the application was taken
only after 4 months)
ii. When the interpleading application is unnecessary or inappropriate. (in
this case, there is no competing claims or threat to a legal suit faced by
the Applicant. Also, the the Applicant having filed this application before
consent orders were obtained with CCM, has been given a chance by all
parties to withdraw the Application but had refused to do so and
proceeded with this unnecessary Application)
70
Example: Ali found a pen but both Aminah and Bakar claims to be the owner of the pen. Ali doesn’t know who the proper
claimant and owner of the pen is, make an application to court to let the court decide who is the owner. Ali is known as
“interpleader” and the proceedings are called “interpleader proceedings”.
44 | Page
: The court orders determined the rightful authority to operate and manage the
account. If there is any ambiguity, the applicant should have applied to clarify such
ambiguity instead of applying for relief under O.17 of the RHC. Interpleader
application is not an appropriate remedy to determine the alleged ambiguity. Hence,
the Applicant was ordered to pay cost.71
Lee Heng Moy v John Hancock Life Insurance (M) Bhd [2010] 1 MLJ 624, CA
Facts :This case concerns an insurance policy. Two parties (Respondent 2 and Appellant)
claimed to be beneficiary of the policy. The Appellant claimed she was entitled to the
sum as she was the lawful wife of the deceased while Respondent 2 was named by the
deceased as the wife in the insurance policy. Respondent 1 (Insurance Company)
sought interpleader relief. The trial judge held that Respondent 2 is the lawful
beneficiary since the Insurance Act does not limit beneficiary to a wife and the
deceased nominated Respondent 2 as lawful beneficiary.
Held : Respondent 1 could have decided on their own and release the insured sum to the
Respondent 2 but they decided to take a safer course by filing an interpleader
summons under O.17 requesting both claimants to come to court and state the
circumstances and particulars of their respective claims to the insured sum and that
they be bound by whatever order that the court may make.
: After looking into Insurance Act and Civil Law Act, the appellate judge agreed with
the trial judge and dismiss the appeal with costs.
72
[2013] 4 MLJ 313
73
Facts :
This case concerns disputes involving a law firm, a developer and a construction company. The Appellant (the
plaintiff) in this case was the stakeholder for 18 document of titles when the first defendant and the second
defendant entered into a joint venture agreement and subdivided the land. Disputes arose between the
defendants and the 2nd DF asked the plaintiff to return the documents of title. So, the plaintiff filed an
interpleader summons under O.17 RHC and the High Court High Court allowed. This case was later appealed
all the way to Federal Court.
45 | Page
warning’ was not sufficient foundation of expectation to be sued. So, the interpleading
proceeding application is dismissed.
B.2) Affidavit
● Either by OS or NOA, both ways must be supported by an affidavit.
● The affidavit in support must comply with requirements under O.17 r.3(2):
O.17 r.3(2):
The applicant must emphasise or state in the affidavit that the applicant:
i. claims no interest in the subject matter in dispute;
ii. does not collude with any of the claimants to that subject matter; and
iii. is willing to pay or transfer that subject matter into Court or to dispose of it as the Court
may direct.
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Time O. 17 r.4(1): OS or NOA must be served at least 7 days before the return
day
“Return day” refers to hearing date fixed by the court for the interpleader
proceedings. The date is stated on the sealed copy of OS or NOA.
Who to serve to Parties claiming an interest in the property or subject matter in question.
76
Example: Aminah and Bakar both claim the ownership of a pen. Aminah does not appear in court during the interpleader
proceeding, then under the Rule, she is deemed to have waived her claim to the ownership of the pen and she would be barred
from prosecuting her claim in the future.
77
O. 17, r. 5 : Powers of Court hearing originating summons or notice of application
Where on the hearing of the originating summons or a notice of application under this Order all persons making
the adverse claims to the subject matter in dispute (“claimants”) appear, the Court may order
(a) that any claimant be made a defendant in any action pending with respect to the subject matter in dispute in
substitution for or in addition to the applicant for relief under this Order; or
(b) that an issue between the claimants be stated and tried and may direct which of the claimants is to be plaintiff
and which is to be defendant.
78
There is no need for the interpleader anymore and the interpleader may step out of this proceeding.
47 | Page
iv. Determine the issue to be tried at the trial
D) End of Trial
● If any of the claimants does not appear, he is barred from
prosecuting his claim.
● If any party does not comply with any direction which
was made at the previous hearing, he will also be barred
from prosecuting his claim.
● If all the parties are present at the trial, the court will go
through the trial process and at the end of the trial, the
court will deliver its judgement accordingly.
● Also, the trial is governed by O.17 r.1179
E) Costs
● After everything, who will bear the costs of paying for the interpleader proceedings?
o Costs of the interpleader proceedings will usually be borne by the losing party who will pay the costs
of the interpleader as well as the costs of the other successful parties.
Interpleader proceedings is quite an examinable topic. Usually there will be a question which might give
you a scenario and then you would have to identify that scenario relates to an interpleader proceeding and
then you would have to explain the procedures and the process of what takes place during interpleader
proceedings from the commencement stage to the trial stage.
1) Definition
An injunction is a remedy in the form of a court order directed to a specific party to do an act or to refrain
from doing an act. The remedy of injunction is based on principles of equity.
2) Classification
79
O. 17, r. 11: Trial of interpleader issue
(1) Order 35 shall, with the necessary modifications, apply to the trial of an interpleader issue as it applies to the
trial of an action.
(2) The Court may give such judgment or make such order as to finally dispose of all questions arising in the
interpleader proceedings.
(3) The judgment shall be in one of the forms in Form 30
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● There are various classifications of injunctions.
● On the subject of classifications of injunctions, the following passage from Meagher, Gummow &
Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines & Remedies is instructive,
“Injunctions may be variously classified. If the purpose of the injunction is to distinguish between
injunctions which forbid and injunctions which command some positive act, they are called
prohibitory or mandatory respectively. If classified according to the point of the trial at which they
are granted, they are classified as interim or interlocutory on the one hand (being limited in their
terms to last until either further order; or until the final hearing of the case; or until the final hearing
or the final order), or final on the other hand. If the purpose is to distinguish those granted against a
defendant who has not been served or will not be heard from those granted against a defendant who
has been served and will be heard, they are called ex parte and inter partes injunctions respectively.
Again, quia timet injunctions, being injunctions granted against apprehended or threatened wrongs
which have not yet been committed, are often distinguished from injunctions directed against the
continuance or repetition of a wrong.”
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(3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of,
property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely:
(a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff;
(b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be
caused, by the invasion;
(c) where the invasion is such that pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief;
(d) where it is probable that pecuniary compensation cannot be got for the invasion; and
(e) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.
ILLUSTRATIONS81
- This case laid down the criteria for granting interlocutory mandatory injunction BEFORE trial:
Gibb & Co v Malaysia Building Society [1982] 1 MLJ 271 [FC]
Facts : (not important)82
(t) A improperly uses the trade mark of B. B may obtain an injunction to restrain the user, provided that B’s use of the trade
mark is honest.
(u) A, a tradesman, holds out B as his partner against the wish and without the authority of B. B may sue for an injunction to
restrain A from so doing.
(v) A, a very eminent man, writes letters on family topics to B. After the death of A and B, C, who is B’s residuary legatee,
proposes to make money by publishing A’s letters. D, who is A’s executor, has a property in the letters, and may sue for an
injunction to restrain C from publishing them.
(w) A carries on a manufactory and B is his assistant. In the course of his business, A imparts to B a secret process of value, B
afterwards demands money of A, threatening, in case of refusal, to disclose the process to C, a rival manufacturer. A may
sue for an injunction to restrain B from disclosing the process.
81
ILLUSTRATIONS
(a) A, by new buildings, obstructs lights to the access and use of which B has acquired a right by prescription. B may obtain an
injunction, not only to restrain A from going on with the buildings, but also to pull down so much of them as obstructs B’s
lights.
(b) A builds a house with eaves projecting over B’s land. B may sue for an injunction to pull down so much of the eaves as so
project.
(c) In the case put as illustration (i) to section 52, the court may also order all written communications made by B, as patient, to
A, as medical adviser, to be destroyed.
(d) In the case put as illustration (v) to section 52 the court may also order A’s letters to be destroyed.
(e) A threatens to publish statements concerning B which would be punishable under Chapter XXI of the Penal Code [Act 574].
The court may grant an injunction to restrain the publication, even though it may be shown not to be injurious to B’s
property.
(f) A, being B’s medical adviser, threatens to publish B’s written communications with him, showing that B has led an immoral
life. B may obtain an injunction to restrain the publication.
(g) In the cases put as illustrations (s) and (t) to section 52, and as illustrations (e) and (f) to this section, the court may also
order the copies produced by piracy, and the trade marks, statements, and communications, therein respectively
mentioned, to be given up or destroyed.
82
In this case, the respondent was a company providing finance for housing development. The developers applied to
the respondent for end-finance for its housing project, and the respondent approved the loan of $1,457,100 for 85
units of houses. Then, the individual purchasers of the several units also applied to the respondent for loans. The
appellant acted as solicitors for all parties (the respondent, the developer and the appellants themselves). Since the
land concerned was charged, the respondents paid some amount to the chargees so that separate titles could be
issued to the purchasers to be free from incumbrances.
On obtaining the issue documents of title for the 85 units and other relevant documents the respondent handed them
to the appellant for the requisite documentation. At this stage, a dispute developed between the appellant and the
developer who appointed new solicitors to act for it and also between the purchasers and the developer.
The purchasers alleged that the developer had collected extra money from them and thus the price of the units was
increased.
51 | Page
Held : An interim mandatory injunction before trial may be granted if the case is
“unusually sharp and clear”. This means that the court must feel a high degree of
assurance that at the trial, a similar injunction would probably be granted and such
“degree” would then subject to certain considerations including, inter alia:
i. the hardship of the parties.
This means that the court will have to consider the extend of hardship the
mandatory injunction will cause to the defendant if the injunction was issued
and on the other hand, the extend of hardship the applicant may suffer if the
injunction was not given.
: Generally, the stronger the case of the applicant that the matters complained of are
unlawful, the more likely that the court will grant such an injunction to protect the
interest of the applicant. If there is plainly no defence to the action, and the defendant
solely raise a defence to delay the case, an injunction should be issued even if it gives
the applicant his whole remedy before trial. (in this case, the injunction was given)
Held : The court allowed the application for injunction. Mandatory injunction should not
be granted except in exceptional and extremely rare cases. In this case, the
injunction the plaintiff sought for is in line with the agreement, ie the defendant must
sell all the timber logs to plaintiff. Therefore, the facts and circumstances of this case
are exceptional and would constitute one of the extremely rare cases which would
warrant the intervention of the court by granting the injunction.
C) Perpetual injunction
- Perpetual injunction is an order made after hearing both sides to bind the parties finally.
- Perpetual injunction is also known as a final injunction; it binds the parties forever unless lifted.
- A perpetual injunction will only be granted by the court after a full trial has been held.
D) Interlocutory, interim or temporary injunction (until full hearing – see Form 58).
- This is injunction which is temporary, ie lasts during the period while the trial is pending.
- It can be granted at any time/various stages when the case is pending in court. It will last from
the date it is granted in court until the conclusion of the trial.
The appellant caused the transfers in favour of the purchasers to be registered but despite repeated requests by the
respondent, the appellant failed to register the charges in favour of the respondent in respect of the 82 units. The
respondent appointed other solicitors to protect its interests. The respondent then lodged caveats against the land.
The respondent then issued a writ to claim that it was entitled to the custody of the documents of title and instruments
of charge and made an order to the appellant to deliver the documents to them. It then applied for an injunction for the
appellant to forthwith deliver to it the issue documents of title and the instruments of charge. The High Court granted
an order accordingly.
52 | Page
- Purpose: to maintain the status quo between the parties during trial
Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v Tinta Press [1986] 1 MLJ 256 [OCJ]
Facts : In this case the plaintiffs had leased certain printing equipment to the first defendant. The
first defendant defaulted in payment of the lease rent, so the plaintiffs brought an action to
recover possession of the equipment and to recover the arrears of rent. The plaintiffs also
made an ex parte application for a mandatory injunction to enable the plaintiffs to recover
possession of the equipment. The first defendant applied to set aside the mandatory
injunction.
Held : the court has jurisdiction to grant a mandatory injunction on in urgent and exceptional cases
: In this case, the plaintiff-bank had an unusually strong and clear case again the first
defendant and if the injunction had not been granted earlier, the plaintiff bank would suffer
grave damage and greater hardship. The balance of convenience was very much in favour of
the plaintiff.
: This was clearly an exceptional case where the court was justified in granting a
mandatory injunction on an ex parte application.
: Considering the circumstances of the case (the rights of the parties, the balance of
convenience & the urgency of the matter), this is proper and appropriate to grant the
mandatory injunction.
E) Ex parte injunction
- This is a type/subset of interlocutory/interim/temporary injunction, where the court would hear
the application only with the applicant’s presence. (the defendant won’t be present)
- It is granted by the court only after the court hears the applicant/plaintiff, who has applied for
the injunction but ex parte injunction should only be allowed in very urgent cases.
- An ex parte injunction only lasts for 21 days. Upon the expiry of the 21 days, the ex parte
injunction would automatically expire. O 29 r 1(2B)
Cf: Sabil Mulia (M) Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Hospital Tengku Ampuan Rahimah [2005] 3 MLJ 325 [CoA]
Facts :The appellant carried on the business of a canteen operator at the first respondent's government
hospital. The appellant's case was that in reliance of the assurance of the first respondent, the
appellant borrowed money and incurred expenses for the canteen but the first respondent had instead
breached its promise by terminating the appellant's contract. The first respondent subsequently
granted the contract for operating the canteen to the fourth respondent. The appellant complained that
the first respondent acted in breach of contract and constructive trust. The appellant's applied for
urgent injunction against the first and fourth respondents from evicting it from the canteen premises
of the first respondent.
Held :Injunction was granted. An injunction can be obtained against particular servants and officers of the
government, though not the government as a whole.
: S.29(2) GPA does not prohibit interlocutory/temporary injunction against the government. (imply
that only perpetual injunction cannot be granted against the government)
Paul and Dennis own neighbouring lands. Dennis had been doing some earthing and excavation works to
build a resort on his land. Paul, his neighbour, had recently discovered that in the course of Dennis’s
construction work, Dennis had encroached into Paul’s property. A small part of Paul’s property had been
damaged/excavated. Paul was unhappy and asked Dennis to stop the works on his land. Dennis refused to
stop. Paul needs a prohibitory injunction to stop Dennis from doing further works and also a
mandatory injunction to compel the Dennis to repair the damage done to Paul’s land. However, the
question is how long would Paul want the injunction to last?
Paul would also want a perpetual injunction to prevent Dennis from encroaching into Paul’s land
permanently. However, this can only be granted after a full trial. Hence, to protect Paul’s interest, Paul
should apply for a temporary/interim/ interlocutory injunction. It’ll last while the case is pending in
court.
Paul’s case is considered a very urgent case, unless Dennis is stopped, there is a huge risk that any further
construction will damage Paul’s land. Hence. Paul can apply for an ex parte injunction, which lasts for
21 days, as an immediate preventive measure. In that 21 days, he can take further steps to apply for
interlocutory injunction or to initiate a proceeding in Court.
Scenario:
4) Temporary/Interlocutory/Interim Injunction
This part will discuss Temporary/Interlocutory/Interim Injunction in detail.
54 | Page
CASE NOT URGENT (O 29 r 1(2)) CASE URGENT (O 29 r 1 (2A) – (3))
1. Plaintiff commences main action in court by 1. Plaintiff does not need to commence main
issuing the originating process (writ) and serving action in court.
it (writ & SoC) on the Defendant. Usually, there 2. Plaintiff can immediately apply for an ex parte
is dispute of facts. interlocutory injunction by filing an ex parte
- O. 29 r(3): an interim injunction can’t be notice of application supported by an affidavit.
issues before the writ is sent out unless in (O. 29 r. 1(2))
cases of urgency. 3. The affidavit in support must comply with O 29 r
2. After commencing action, Plaintiff applies for an 1 2A.
interlocutory injunction by a notice of - There are 7 requirements that must be
application supported by an affidavit (O 29 r complied with.
1(2)). - Non-compliance with O 29 r 1 2A will result
3. Notice of application (sealed copy) will fix a in the application for an ex parte injunction
hearing date for the application. being dismissed. (stringent requirement)
4. On the hearing date, the Plaintiff and the 4. A hearing date will be fixed for the application.
Defendant will attend court. Upon submissions 5. Only the Plaintiff attends court on the hearing
by the parties, the court will decide whether to date and will be heard by the court. After
grant an interlocutory injunction to last until the hearing the Plaintiff, the court may grant an ex
conclusion of the trial. parte injunction or may dismiss the application.
5. The interlocutory injunction will maintain the (hence no need to serve anything on the D in
status quo between the parties until the end of advance)
the trial. 6. O 29 r 1(2B) :
6. At the conclusion of the trial, the court will If the court grants an ex parte injunction, the ex
decide whether to grant a perpetual injunction parte injunction will last for max 21 days from
the date it is granted. At the expiry of 21 days,
O29 r1: Application for interlocutory injunction the ex parte injunction will automatically lapse.
Application for interlocutory injunction may be made 7. O 29 r 1 (2BA):
by a notice of application supported by an affidavit
and where the case is one of urgency, may be made ex
- If the ex parte injunction is granted, the
parte. Plaintiff must serve the ex parte injunction
on the Defendant within seven (7) days of
the date of the order.
- Further, the Court when granting the ex
parte injunction, must fix a hearing date to
hear the application inter partes
interlocutory injunction within fourteen
days (14) from the date of the order.
- Further read the case of RIH Services etc v
Tanjung Tuan Hotel Sdn Bhd below.
8. The purpose of the inter partes hearing is to
bring both the Plaintiff and Defendant to court
55 | Page
and for the court to decide whether to
i. dismiss the ex parte injunction or
ii. grant an interlocutory injunction to last
until the end of the trial. (subject to O.
29 r. 1(2C) & (3).
Provisions
Case Not Urgent Case Urgent
O. 29 r. 1(2) i. 29 r. 1(2)
ii. O. 29 r. 1(2A)84
O29 r1: Application for interlocutory iii. O. 29 r. 1(2B)85
injunction Note: Setting aside of ex parte
(2) Application for interlocutory injunction injunction does not have any
may be made by a notice of application retrospective effect; if D defaulted
supported by an affidavit and where the before the setting aside, then D is liable
case is one of urgency, may be made ex for contempt of court.
parte. iv. O.29 r. 1(2BA)86
v. O. 29 r. 1(2C)87
vi. O. 29 r. 1(3)88
84
(2A) The affidavit in support of an application made ex parte must contain a clear and concise statement of—
(a) the facts giving rise to the claim;
(b) the facts giving rise to the application for interim injunction;
(c) the facts relied on to justify the application ex parte, including details of any notice given to the other party or, if
notice has not been given, the reason for not giving notice;
(d) any answer by the other party (or which he is likely to assert) to the claim or application;
(e) any facts which may lead the Court not to grant the application ex parte or at all;
(f) any similar application made to another Judge, and the order made on that application; and
(g) the precise relief sought.
85
(2B) Unless earlier revoked or set aside, an interim injunction obtained on an ex parte application shall automatically lapse
twenty-one days from the date it was granted.
86
(2BA) An ex parte interim injunction must be served within seven days of the date of the order, and the Court when granting
the order must fix a date to hear the application inter partes within fourteen days from the date of the order.
87
(2C) A Court shall not grant an injunction on an ex parte application if the effect is to stop the holding or progress of a
meeting of a body corporate, a society, an association, a union, an organization, a club or any other body of persons however
constituted or named.
88
(3) The plaintiff may not make such an application before the issue of the originating process except where the case is one of
urgency, and in that case—
(a) the injunction applied for may be granted on such terms, if any, as the Court thinks fit; and
(b) if the originating process is not issued within two days of the granting of the injunction, or such other period as the
Court thinks fit, the Court shall, on application by a defendant, discharge the injunction.
56 | Page
O. 29 r.4:
In either case, an interim injunction shall be in Form 53
RIH Services etc v Tanjung Tuan Hotel Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 MLJ 1 [CoA]
Held : Order 29 r(1)(2B) of the RHC mentioned about 'at the end of 21 days from the date on
which it is granted'. Both O 3 r 2(2) of the RHC and s 54(1)(a) of the Interpretation Acts 1948
and 1967 required that the day the order was made to be excluded in reckoning the 21 days.
So, the ex parte injunction granted on 6 December 2001 expired on 27 December 2001. The
day the order was made should be excluded in computing the 21 days.
: Also, an ex parte injunction could not be extended beyond the 21 days. The order
automatically lapsed after 21 days.89
: However, an ex parte application, which for some reason could not be heard or was heard
but no decision was given within 21 days from its filing, did not expire after 21 days from
its filing. It would still subsist until it was heard and decided upon, even well after 21 days of
its filing.
Evercrisp Snack Products v Sweeties Food Industries [1980] 2 MLJ 297 [OCJ]91
90
Facts:
On 16 October 1991, the 1st respondent entered into an agreement with the appellant to sell all the paid-up shares of the 2nd
respondent to the appellant. The 2nd respondent owned four pieces of land in the Federal Territory ('the land') and was a wholly
owned subsidiary of the 1st respondent. It was agreed that the 1st respondent intended to build schools on the land and was to
submit an application for a development order for the same within three months from the date of the agreement. It was in
evidence that such an application was submitted on 16 January 1992. It was also agreed that the agreement was conditional
upon the development order not being obtained within 15 months from the date of its application. It was in evidence that no
development order was obtained by the cut-off date, i.e., 16 April 1993.
On 13 April 1993, ie, three days before the cut-off date, the 1st respondent purported to terminate the agreement by returning
the appellant's deposit and part payment. Dissatisfied, the appellant filed an action claiming, inter alia, a declaration that the 1st
respondent had committed an anticipatory breach of the agreement, specific performance, and an injunction restraining the 1st
respondent from disposing of the shares of the 2nd respondent. The appellant also applied for an interlocutory injunction to
restrain the 1st respondent from dealing with the land. The trial Judge refused the appellant's application for the interlocutory
injunction, holding that the 1st respondent had no right to deal with the land, that the interlocutory injunction even if granted
would not prevent the 2nd respondent from disposing of the land, and that there was no evidence showing that the 2nd
respondent intended to pass any resolution to deal with the land. The appellant appealed. The main issue before the instant
Court was whether the interlocutory injunction sought could be issued against the 1st respondent in respect of the land owned
by the 2nd respondent.
91
Facts:
The plaintiffs had sought an action alleging that the defendants had used a get up of their product which was calculated to lead
to deception and to the belief that the defendants' snack foods were the snack foods of the plaintiffs and to cause the snack
foods of the defendants to be passed off as that of the plaintiffs. Subsequently the plaintiffs applied for an interlocutory
injunction to restrain the defendants from passing off or attempting to pass off the goods.
58 | Page
Held : Application was dismissed because of delay. There was unreasonable delay in
applying for the interim relief and the delay had not been satisfactorily explained.
Elias bin Mooin v Dato Zainal Abidin [1997] 3 CLJ 455 [HC]
Facts :The defendant won the case in an injunction application and claim damages. The
plaintiffs, opposing the claim, contended that there was no question of damages
arising as the ex parte injunction order did not specify their undertaking to pay any
damages to the defendant.
Held :The non-insertion of the plaintiffs' undertaking to pay damages in the order for the ex
parte injunction is not fatal to the defendant's claim for damages. Such failure does
not prevent the defendant from claiming on an express undertaking affirmed on the
plaintiffs' affidavit.
59 | Page
to project a favourable image of their public and private lives. He toured with them
and saw all their activities. However, he left their employment man years later.
: When the left, he wrote a series of articles for a daily newspaper which purported 'to
put straight the fallacies and half-truths of the lives and careers' of the plaintiffs. The
articles contained much hitherto undisclosed information about their lives. The first
three articles were published. They gave an account of a number of discreditable
incidents involving the plaintiffs including details about the relationship between one
of them and a woman who was not his wife.
: The plaintiffs claimed that the articles were libellous and written in breach of
confidence. They brought an action against the defendant claiming, inter alia,
i. an injunction to restrain the defendants from publishing any similar libel,
ii. an injunction to restrain them from publishing any confidential information
about the group's private lives acquired by the defendant during the course of
his employment with the group, and
iii. damages for libel.
: On the afternoon of the day before the fourth article in the series was to be
published, the plaintiffs applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the
publication of any further confidential information obtained by the defendant during
the course of his employment with them. The defendants intimated at the hearing of
the application that so far as the libel claim was concerned they would plead
justification at the trial.
Held :Since the plaintiffs had sought publicity which was to their advantage, they could not
complain if publicity were given to matters which revealed them in a less favourable
light. In the circumstances, the public interest in giving publicity to the truth
outweighed the public interest in protecting confidential information obtained by an
employee about his employers during the course of his employment.
: The balance of convenience was on the side of allowing the remaining articles to be
published and leaving the plaintiffs to pursue their claim for damages for
i. the fourth article was just about to go to press, and
ii. the allegation that there had been a breach of confidence was interwoven with
the claim for damages for libel and the court would not grant an injunction
to restrain the publication of an alleged libel if a defendant indicated that
he was going to plead justification.
60 | Page
Hence, the court can order ad- interim injunction to protect the interest of the plaintiff until the
interim injunction is decided. It's most likely derived from ad-hoc interim, which means for the
'specific purpose of giving protection during the intervening period only '. In other words, an ad
interim injunction is like an “interim injunction made out of an interim injunction proceeding.
ii. the matter (that ex parte injunction) is now pending the hearing on an inter partes basis.
▪ Theoretically, it is very important to hold the inter partes hearing during the duration of the ex
parte injunction (21 days).
- This is why O.29 r.1(2BA) says the hearing date for inter partes hearing must be fixed within
14 days from the date of the ex parte injunction. This is to ensure that the inter partes hearing
will be held during the duration of the ex parte injunction i.e. within 21 days.
▪ However, sometimes the court may unable to hold the inter partes hearing within the 21 days of
the ex parte injunction. This means the inter partes hearing will be fixed after the 21 days period
but this also means that the ex parte injunction had lapsed.
- This may cause prejudice to the Plaintiff as the ex parte injunction has lapsed and the
Plaintiff’s rights may be unprotected. This is because, while the ex parte injunction is in
92
At this stage, the court has fixed the hearing for inter partes i.e. both parties have to come to court on this date and
on this date the court will now hear both the Plaintiff and the Defendant at the inter partes hearing
61 | Page
place, the Plaintiff is protected by the injunction and the Defendant is stopped from doing
whatever damage he was doing.
- However, if the ex aprte injunction has lapsed (ie after 21 days), there is no longer injunction
on the Defendant and the Defendant can now continue whatever activity he was doing to hurt
the Plaintiff.
- In this situation, to protect the Plaintiff in such a situation, the Plaintiff may ask the
court for an ad interim injunction.
- If the court grants the ad interim injunction, it will take effect from the date the ex parte
injunction lapses up to the date of the inter partes hearing, so that the Plaintiff will be further
protected under the ad interim injunction although the interim injunction has lapsed.
- Note: The ad interim injunction is not an extension of the ex parte injunction but a fresh
order made by the court.
Ad interim injunction
1/3/2020 14/3/2020
Ex parte injunction 21/3/2020 28/3/2020
inter partes hearing
granted to the Ex parte Date fixed for
supposed to be held within
Plaintiff injunction expires inter partes
14 days from the date of
hearing
the ex parte injunction but
NOT HELD.
Inter partes hearing date
not fixed within the 21
days of the ex parte
Jakob Renner v Scott King Chairman of the Board of Directors of International School KL93
93
Jakob Renner (an infant suing by his father and next friend, Gilbert Renner) v Scott King Chairman of the
Board of Directors of International School KL [2000] 3 CLJ 569. (First Malaysian case which granted ad interim
injunction)
62 | Page
Facts : 1st Pf suffered from moderate spastic diplegia. After completing his elementary school at the
Melawati campus of the defendants’ school, he was expected to be transferred to the Ampang
campus for his middle school. However, he was denied entry to the Ampang campus due to
his physical disability. The plaintiffs appealed to the defendants' board but it was rejected.
The plaintiffs then filed an application for an interlocutory injunction restraining the
defendant from excluding, preventing, precluding or hindering the 1 st plaintiff from attending
and commencing middle school at the Ampang campus. Immediately after filing this
application, counsel for the plaintiffs applied for an ad interim injunction.
Held : The High Court granted the ad interim injunction based on the decision of the Indian Court
94
which explained there are two stages of a temporary injunction.
1) One is granted without finally disposing of the application for injunction to operate
immediately till the disposal of the said application. This is generally classed as ad
interim injunction.
2) The other one is granted while finally disposing of the main application to endure
generally till the disposal of the suit. This is generally called temporary injunction.
: The court is allowed to grant an ad interim injunction till the disposal of the
application for the temporary injunction, in line with the powers of the High Court under
S.25 COJA 1964 and the additional powers under para 6 of the Schedule to the same Act, it is
within the jurisdiction of the superior courts to grant an ad interim injunction pending the
disposal of an application for an interlocutory injunction.
RIH Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Tanjung Tuan Hotel [2002] 3 CLJ 83
Facts :The appellant is the company that manages a hotel belonging to the respondent. On
6/12/2001, the appellant filed an ex parte summons in chambers to restrain the defendant
from interfering with or obstructing or hampering the appellant continued management and
operation of the hotel. The judge heard the application and granted the ex parte injunction.
The judge also fixed the inter partes hearing on 24/12/2001. The inter partes hearing was
adjourned to 26/12/2001. On 26/12/2001, the appellant’s counsel sought an adjournment. He
also prayed that in the interim period, the ex parte injunction that was granted on 6/12/2001
be extended.
Held : The ex parte injunction granted on 6/12/2001 expired on 27/12/2001. Since an ex parte
injunction cannot be extended beyond the 21 days, the order automatically lapses after 21
days.
: Then, a date of hearing inter partes must be fixed before the expiry of 21 days. The purpose
is to require the parties to appear before the judge before the ex parte injunction expires.
However, when the court is unable to hear the application inter partes before the expiry of 21
days and the ex parte injunction was expiring, the judge has the jurisdiction to consider
whether or not to grant an ad interim injunction pending the hearing inter partes of the
application.
The status quo is preserved after the expiry of the ex parte order until the inter partes hearing
of the application.
: The ad interim injunction is not an extension of the ex parte order which expires after 21
days. It is a fresh order made on the converted inter partes application now before the court.
94
in Jagjit Singh Khanna v Dr Rakhal Das Mullick AIR [1988] Calcutta 95
63 | Page
: When the court finally hears the application inter partes, the court will then decide whether
or not to grant an injunction inter partes which will be a fresh order again.
Erinford injunction
7/4/2020:
2/4/2020: 30/4/2020:
At the hearing, P’s
P applies to High Hearing of the appeal at
application for injunction
Court for an CA on dismissal of
dismissed by High Court.
injunction. Hearing injunction by HC
P appeals to Court of
date fixed on
Appeal against the
7/4/2020
dismissal of the
injunction.
● As mentioned, Erinford injunction originates from the case of Erinford Properties Ltd :
95
[1974] 2 All ER 448
64 | Page
: The principle of granting an Erinford injunction is :
i. that appeal, if successful, is not nugatory and
ii. the dispute is not a case which damages are a suitable alternative in lieu of the
Erinford injunction.
(this is my personal simplified interpretation of the judgment, for original judgement, refer to
the footnote96)
● An Erinford injunction will not be granted if the damages awarded would be an adequate remedy
for the temporary damage suffered by the applicant from the date of the dismissal of the
injunction to the date of the appeal being dicided.
The plaintiff had obtained an ex parte injunction restraining the defendants from disposing,
selling and dealing with its assets pending trial of his action to claim for damages for
wrongful appointment of the receivers and managers. This ex parte injunction was
subsequently set aside. The plaintiffs appeal to the Supreme Court against the setting aside of
the injunction had yet to be heard. Pending the appeal, the plaintiff applied to the court for the
Erinford injunction. The defendants argued that the Erinford injunction should not be granted
if damages is a suitable alternative.
Held :Based on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the court found that the balance of
convenience lay in favour of the injunction pending appeal being refused. This is because
damages seemed to be a suitable and adequate remedy as the plaintiff would be adequately
compensated in damages for the temporary damage between now and the date when its
appeal is heard if the court’s decision is reversed by the Supreme Court.
Held : Where an applicant has failed in his interlocutory application for an interim injunction, he
may appeal against the said decision and at the same time apply for an Erinford injunction to
restrain the other party from dealing with the subject matter of the action pending the appeal.
: The principle governing this form of injunction is to preserve the status quo pending the
determination of an appeal so that the appeal will not be rendered nugatory.
: An Erinford injunction is not necessary when suitable statutory remedy is available.
96
“A judge who feels no doubt in dismissing a claim to an interlocutor injunction may, perfectly consistently with this
decision, recognised that his decision might be reversed, and that the comparative effects of granting or refusing an
injunction pending an appeal are such that it would be right to preserve the status quo pending the appeal.”
“The principle is to be found in the leading judgment of Cotton LJ in Wilson v Church… ‘when a party is appealing,
exercising his undoubted right of appeal, this Court ought to see that the appeal, if successful, is not
nugatory’… it was on that principle… that I granted counsel for the plaintiffs the limited injunction pending appeal that
he sought. This is not a case in which damages seem to me to be a suitable alternative.”
65 | Page
- The nature of Erinford injunction is one which the court always have powers to grant
under its inherent jurisdiction.
- However, this power is exercised by the courts on its own motion itself to protect the
justice of the case when the judge is not sure of his judgment or feels the
plaintiff’s argument may have some prospect of success.
Scope:
1. What is a Mareva Injunction (MI)?
2. The Nature, Origin and Development of MI
3. Jurisdiction to Grant a MI in Malaysia
4. Procedure to Apply and Obtain a MI
5. Other Issues
6. Grounds to Set Aside a MI (Dissolution or Discharge of a MI)
The Aim/Objective of a MI
66 | Page
● It has a very specific purpose. The purpose of an MI is to freeze the D's assets so that the D is
unable to remove, dispose or conceal his assets.
Example Scenario:
Let's say Paul is suing Dennis in the High Court. Paul is claiming RM 2,000,000.00. Paul has a very good
and strong case against Dennis. Dennis is aware that Paul has a strong case and that Dennis, the D, has a
weak case. Dennis knows that there is a very high chance that Paul is going to win this case against him.
So, Dennis has some assets and Dennis knows that if Paul wins the case and gets a judgment of RM
2,000,000.00 against him, Dennis will have to sell off some of his assets to pay the judgment sum to Paul.
Therefore, Dennis decides to sell off some of his assets e.g. Dennis has a car, so he decides to sell off the
car or transfer off the car to his wife/child's name. Say if Dennis has some money in his bank account,
Dennis decides to transfer his money to some foreign bank account. He starts doing all these things to
remove/dispose/conceal his assets.
This kind of activity is what a MI aims to prevent. Look at the definition of a MI again. It is a type of
injunction which restrains or prevents a D from removing, disposing or concealing those assets which
would be necessary to satisfy the P's claims. It is a freezing order to freeze the D's assets so that the D is
unable to deal with those assets.
Nippon Yusen Kaisha v Karageorgis [1975] 1 WLR 1093; [1975] 3 All ER 282 (CA)
Facts : Three ships were chartered to the Defendants (Karageorgis) but the Defendants defaulted on the
charterparty hire. Defendants alleged that they have transmitted the outstanding amount to the
Plaintiff’s New York account, but the money was never received. There were also failed attempts
to find and track down the Defendants.
: The Plaintiff was aware that the Defendants have funds with banks in London. Fearing that the
funds in those banks may be transmitted out of jurisdiction, they applied for an interim injunction
to restrain the Defendants from disposing of/removing any of their assets from the jurisdiction
(UK).
Held :The court noted that an injunction of this kind has never been done before. It has never been the
practice of the English courts to seize assets of a defendant in advance of judgment, or to restrain
the disposal of them. However, the court noted that the time has come from the courts to revise
its practice.
: There is a strong prima facie case that the hire is owing and unpaid. If an injunction is not
granted, these monies may be removed out of the jurisdiction and the shipowners will have the
greatest difficulty in recovering anything.
67 | Page
: The court derived power from s 45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation)
Act 192597 and granted the MI.
: The MI should be continued until after judgment of this proceeding. If the Defendants
wish to challenge this order, they can apply to discharge it if they have grounds for doing
so.
Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA; The Mareva [1980] 1 All ER 213
(CA)
Facts : (It’s similar to the facts of Nippon Yusen Kaisha)
The Plaintiff Shipowners (Mareva) sued the Defendants for unpaid hire and damages for
repudiation of a charterparty. Plaintiff applied for an injunction to restrain the disposal of the
Defendants’ funds in the bank in London.
Issue : Whether the court has jurisdiction to protect a creditor before he gets judgment.
Held : MI granted.
: If it appears that the debt is due and owing, and there is a danger that the debtor may
dispose of his assets so as to defeat it before judgment, the court has jurisdiction in a
proper case to grant an interlocutory judgment so as to prevent him disposing of those
assets. It seems that this is a proper case for the exercise of this jurisdiction. There is money
in a bank in London which stands in the name of these charterers.
: The injunction shall be in force until the trial or judgment in this action. If the Defendants
have any grievance about it when they hear of it, they can apply to discharge it. But
meanwhile the shipowners should be protected.
Third Chandris Corporation v Unimarine S.A. [1979] 2 All E.R. 972 (CA)98
Fact : The facts are similar to the cases above where the charterers defaulted on the hire for the
charterparty.
Held : Lord Denning in delivering his judgment expressed that MI is now a well-
entrenched/established feature in English law.
: Guidelines for the application for MI:
i. The plaintiff should make full and frank disclosure of all matters in his knowledge
which are material for the judge to know;
ii. The Plaintiff should state the particulars of his claim against the defendant, the
ground of his claim, the amount thereof, and fairly stating the points made against it
by the defendant;
iii. The plaintiff should give some grounds for believing that the defendants have assets
in the jurisdiction. (In most cases the Plaintiff will not know the extent of the assets.
He will only have indications of them. The existence of a bank account in England is
enough, whether it is overdraft or not)
iv. The plaintiff should give some grounds for believing that there is a risk of the assets
being removed before the judgment or award is satisfied. (The mere fact that the
Defendant is abroad is not by itself sufficient)
v. The plaintiffs must give an undertaking in damages, in case they fail in their claim or
the injunction turns out to be unjustified. In a suitable case this should be supported
by a bond or security: and the injunction only granted on it being given, or undertaken
to be given.
97
S 45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 provides that the High Court may grant a
mandamus or injunction or appoint a receiver by an interlocutory order in all cases in which it appears the courts to be
just and convenient to do so.
98
Note: Dr Sujata said that this is the third case that granted a Mareva Injunction but that isn’t really true. There are
other reported cases including House of Lords cases on Mareva Injunction in the time period between Nippon Yusen
and Third Chandris.
68 | Page
● In Malaysia, the concept of MI was incorporated by this case through paragraph 6 of Schedule of the
Courts of Judicature Act. (though the Court did not grant it)
Zainal Abidin v Century Hotel Sdn Bhd [1982] 1 MLJ 260 (FC)
Facts :There was a hotel in a 9-storey building. The Defendant owns both the building and the hotel
business. The Plaintiff is a tenant of third-floor of the building where the Plaintiff runs a
recreation centre as one of the amenities provided in the hotel.
: As the Defendant’s hotel business was running at a loss, the Defendant decided to close the
hotel business and informed the Defendant of the formal closure of the hotel. The Plaintiff sued
the Defendant for wrongful repudiation of the rental agreement between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant.
: The Plaintiff believes that the Defendant intends to dispose of the said building, and therefore
applied for an injunction to restrain the Plaintiff.
:Paragraph 6 of the Schedule of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 is equivalent to the
English’s s 45 of the English Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925.
: However, in thin case, there is no real risk of dissipating assets. The danger envisaged is that
if the hotel building is sold, the proceeds thereof will simply disappear in discharging its
liabilities and any surplus will go to the Defendant’s holding company. If an injunction were to
be granted in this case it would be entirely ineffective to benefit the Plaintiff, because the money
would be held for the benefit of creditors generally.
: The disappearance which the Plaintiff fears in this case of the proceeds of sale does not come
within the concept of disposing of assets with the intention or with the effect of defeating a claim.
: Thus, the application for MI is rejected.
99
so named after the case of Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA decided in June, 1975 and
the second case in which the English Court of Appeal granted this form of relief
69 | Page
4) Procedure to Apply and Obtain a MI in Malaysia
The heading will lay out the procedure and necessary steps to be taken for applying for MI:
i. The P must act quickly and quietly (Speed and secrecy are of the essence)
● Speed = The P have to move very quickly
● Secrecy = The P have to move very quietly
● Speed and secrecy are very important because once a D finds out that the P might apply an MI
against him, the D will quickly take steps to dispose/conceal/transfer his assets out of the
country. Nobody wants a MI to be imposed against him. A MI is terribly inconvenient. It will
freeze all your assets.
Motor Sports etc Ltd v Delcont (M) Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 605
Facts : Dispute arose between the Plaintiff who is a overseas producer of a Motor Trucks Show
who entered into a contract with the Defendant who is a Malaysian event management
company to organise a Motor Trucks show. Plaintiff applied for a MI to prevent the
Defendant from dealing with the vehicles that were currently in the possession of the
Defendant and the ticket monies that the Defendant has received for the show.
100
this means that only the applicant will be heard by the court.
70 | Page
Held :The provisions of O 29 r 2A were introduced by amendment in order to ensure that ex parte
injunctions of any sort were not granted willy-nilly, but only in cases where they were truly
called for.
: In order to ensure that the policy behind the introduction of r 2A is not defeated, high courts
must demand strict compliance with its terms. More so, when the relief applied for is in the
nature of a Mareva or an Anton Piller type of injunction because of the incalculable harm and
damage that may be caused to a defendant by the grant of either of these orders.
: In this case, the Plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of r2A. So, the MI should be
dismissed.
: In a case such as the present, where the amount of the claim has been quantified, it is
necessary for the order of court to sufficiently identify the upper limit of the sum that is
sought to be protected by the injunction. If it does not, then the order is liable to be
condemned as being too wide and therefore oppressive.
iii. Legal Requirements that the P must prove to the satisfaction of the court
● There are legal requirements that must be proven at the ex parte hearing before the court grants a
MI.
Requirement 1:
The Plaintiff must show that he has a "good arguable case"
o The P have to show that he has a good case, a strong case regardless of whether the D has a
valid defence or not.
o If the court feels that the P does not have a very good case against the D, then most likely the
court will not grant an MI. in most cases, the court must be very satisfied that the P will have
a good chance of winning the case against the D.
Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers (M) Bhd [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 319, HC
Held : A good arguable case for the purpose of a MI is one which is more than barely
capable of serious argument, but not necessarily one which the judge considers
would have a better than 50% chance of success.
Requirement 2
● The P must make a full and frank disclosure of all matters within the P’s knowledge
which are material for the judge to know.
● This will be stated in the affidavit. The P must make sure that he informs the courts about
everything that court needs to know about the case.
Held : Every material representation must not be misleading, and there must not be
any suppression of material facts. Failure to do so at the crucial time of making
the ex parte application would invariably be fatal.
Requirement 3
● The P must clearly set out the grounds of his claim with particularity. This include:
- the points that the D may make against the P and
- what are the possible points and defences that the D may raise against the P.
● This is to allow the court to assess the strength of the P's case.
Requirement 4
● The P must show that the D has assets within the jurisdiction.
- The P must show that the D has assets within the jurisdiction.
- Normally, the P will identify and give a list of all the assets which the D has.
Requirement 5
● Most important & difficult requirement: The P must show that there is a real risk that
the D will remove/conceal/dispose his assets which will frustrate the P’s attempt to
recover the fruit of judgment.
- This is not something that is easy to do. There must be some special circumstances
that will lead the P to convince the court of this.
Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers (Malaysia) Bhd [1984] 2 M.L.J. 143
Held : In many cases, there will be a practical difficulty of proving the requisite intent.
Thus, it would be sufficient for the plaintiff to merely show a risk of disposal of
assets which has the effect of frustrating the plaintiff in his attempt to recover
the fruits of a judgment he is likely to obtain against the defendant.
: it will be open to the defendants or any creditor of the defendants (third parties)
to apply for a variation of the MI
a. Disposal of assets must frustrating the P’s attempt to recover the fruit of judgment.
The disposal of assets must have the effect of frustrating the P’s attempt to recover
the fruit of judgment. You cannot simply freeze the D’s asset just for the fake of
feeling secured. Cases have held certain examples where disposal of asset would not
“frustrating the P’s attempt to recover the fruit of judgment.”
72 | Page
danger that the available assets of the defendants would be dissipated to
prejudice the plaintiff’s claim.
b. Situations where the disposal of assets must have the effect of frustrating the P’s attempt
to recover the fruit of judgment.
● When you conduct tells that you may transfer the asset out of the jurisdiction:
Bank Bumiputra v Lorrain Osman [1985] 2 M.L.J. 236
Facts : This case concerns an action against Lorrain (director of bank) for breach of
fiduciary duty and receipt of secret profits. The Defendant, Lorrain is not a person
who keeps all his assets in Malaysia. From his previous conduct, it can be inferred
that he can transfer his assets from this country to another country. There is
evidence that Lorrain was planning to sell or dispose of his shares and securities
through a firm of stock-brokers in Kuala Lumpur. Plaintiff also had great
difficulty in trying to locate him to serve the cause papers. Even when the writ and
MI order was served upon him, he did not bother to enter appearance.
Held : There is sufficient evidence before the court to conclude that there is a risk that
Lorrain's assets would be disposed of thus frustrating or nullifying any judgment
that the plaintiffs may obtain against him.
● When you are a foreigner and you don’t have much asset
S & F International Limited v Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62
Fact : This case involved a D who was a Thai Company, a foreign company who
had an office in Malaysia. All of the D's shareholders were foreigners and
they did not reside in Malaysia. The D had only one asset in Malaysia and it
was money being held by a 3rd party. The D also had an office in Kota
Bharu but that office was closed.
Issue : Is there a real risk that the D will remove/conceal/dispose his assets before
the court gives a judgment? Is there a real risk that the D will remove this one
asset from the jurisdiction?
Held : There was a real risk here. The moment the P sues and serves a writ against
the D, the D will most probably remove and take this asset here out of the
jurisdiction. Therefore a MI is granted.
73 | Page
: The Defendants have no other assets in Malaysia and the Defendants are
also all foreigners. Once the Defendants leave and the assets are moved out
of Malaysia, the Plaintiff will not be able to realise those assets.
● If the D is giving inconsistent statement, the Court may conclude that the D is being
dishonest and rule that there is a risk the assets being disposed.
c. Real Risk
● Under this requirement, the P must prove/establish is that there is a real risk that
the D will remove/conceal/dispose of his assets before the court gives a judgment.
● Only if the P can demonstrate to the court that there is a REAL RISK, only then the
court will grant a MI.
● If there is no real risk that the D will remove/conceal his assets, the court will not
grant an MI. This particular element is difficult to prove.
● In each case, the facts are different. So, tt really depends on the circumstances
surrounding the case whether there's a real risk of dissipation of assets.
Requirement 6
The plaintiffs must give an undertaking in damages, in case they fail in their claim or the
injunction turns out to be unjustified. In a suitable case this should be supported by a bond or
security: and the injunction only granted on it being given, or undertaken to be given.
Dr Sujata: The court has to be convinced of the presence of all these 6 requirements, then the court will
grant an MI.
5. Other Issues
74 | Page
● That is why when a court grants a MI, the court will also normally make allowances/provisions to
allow the D to have some money for the D's living expenses and also to allow the D to make
payment for his ordinary debts e.g. utility debts etc.
5.3) Plaintiff doesn’t own the frozen asset until he got the judgement.
The plaintiff has no right over the frozen asset until he got the judgement
Cretanor Maritime Co. Ltd. v Irish Marine Management Ltd (“The Cretan Harmony”)102
Held : A MI cannot be regarded as a pretrial attachment. No rights in the nature of a lien arise
when a MI is made. Under a MI, the P has no rights against the assets. He may later
acquire such rights if he obtains judgment and can thereafter successfully levy
execution upon them, but until that event his only rights are against the D personally.
102
[1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 425
75 | Page
Because the MI froze the coal, this prevented the ship from sailing because the coal was there
and the coal was frozen under the MI. Since the ship was compelled to remain in one place, it
could not move, this caused interference/hardship to C, who was the owner of the ship.
Held : The court will not allow a MI to unreasonably cause hardship to 3rd parties. In this case, the
MI was set aside so that the ship could move out of the port.
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that, in so far as the order purported to have extra-territorial effect, no person, whether
natural or juridical, should be affected by it or concerned with its terms until it was
declared enforceable or recognised or enforced by an appropriate foreign court.
Rossell NV v Oriental Commercial & Shipping Ltd [1990] 3 All E.R. 545 (CA) (unusual measure;
should rarely be granted)
Held : Only in very exceptional circumstances will the court grant a worldwide MI in
support of a foreign judgment or arbitration award which the court is being asked to
enforce. Normally, any MI granted in such cases will be limited to assets within the
jurisdiction.
Note: Worldwide MI was not granted in this case. Court held that there were no sufficiently
exceptional features.
ii. Where the D can show that the case is unsuitable for Mareva relief
This normally means that the D can convince the court that there is no real risk that he will
remove/conceal/dispose his assets.
1) INTRODUCTION
ii. Trial by judge with assessors (Order 33 rule 4) - read whole order, too long to be included here
● An assessor is a person with skill and expertise in a specialised area or field.
● Sometimes, an issue at a trial may involve a highly specialised or technical area and the judge
may not have knowledge on this area
● A person with skills, expertise and experience in this area may be able to assist the judge in
dealing with the matter. This person is known as the assessor
● In simpler terms, a preliminary point is a point which, if raised by a party, the Court may conclude the
whole the suit.
● Any party can raise a preliminary point before the trial, at the trial or after the trial (Order 33 rule 2)
● Examples of preliminary points
o Limitation
o Illegality
2) ABSENCE OF PARTIES
● When a trial commences, the parties are supposed to be present in court
● However, there are situations where the parties may not present during the trail. The consequences will
be explained below:
103
O. 35, r. 1: Failure to appear by both parties or one of them
(1) If, when the trial of an action is called on, neither party appears, the Judge may dismiss the action or make any
other order as he thinks fit.
104
Under Order 35 rule 2(1), if the judge makes an order in the absence of the Plaintiff, that order made may be set
aside upon application by the Plaintiff. This action itself is the reinstatement, because by applying to set aside that
judgment made by that judge without the Plaintiff being there, the Plaintiff is saying "not fair you made that order
without me, so I want to apply to have that order set aside and continue with my case as usual". So in effect the
Plaintiff is reinstating his case sebab he wants the judge to retract the order made without him being there.
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(b) Whether the absence of the applicant or counsel was deliberate, or due to an accident or
mistake.
(c) The prospects of success of the applicant at trial
(d) Whether there is any delay in making the application
(e) Whether the conduct of the applicant has caused prejudice to the other party which
cannot be compensated by an order of costs
● If the application for reinstatement is unsuccessful, the Plaintiff may appeal to a higher court.
● If the appeal to the higher court is unsuccessful, the Plaintiff can file a fresh action provided the
limitation period has not set in.
● When either party is absent, the governing sections are the same, it is just that the application is
different:
105
O. 35, r. 1: Failure to appear by both parties or one of them
(2) If, when the trial of an action is called on, one party does not appear, the Judge may proceed with the trial of the
action or any counterclaim in the absence of that party, or without trial give judgment or dismiss the action, or make
any other order as he thinks fit.
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When the action came up, the Plaintiff, its counsel, and the Defendant's counsel were
present. However, the Defendant (Managing Director of the Company) was absent,
but produced a medical certificate. The trial judge allowed the Plaintiff to adduce
evidence and gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Defendant appealed
Held : (Allowing the appeal) If the trial judge was in doubt as to the real reason behind the
inability of the Defendant to attend court, he should have allowed an adjournment to
enable both parties to be given an opportunity to be heard instead of proceeding with
the suit. Any delay occasioned by what appears to be an inadequate reason for
absence can be compensated by costs.
● Order 35 rule 2
(1) :
- The Plaintiff can apply to re-instate the action.
- If the judgment on the counterclaim has been entered against the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff
may apply to set aside the counterclaim under
▪ Such an application must be made within 14 days from the date of dismissal (Order 35 rule
2(2))
▪ In considering the application for the re-instatement, the court will have to consider the
matters stated in Order 35 rule 2(3)
● If the application for reinstatement is unsuccessful, the Plaintiff may appeal to a higher court
▪ If the appeal to the higher court is unsuccessful, the Plaintiff can file a fresh action provided
that the limitation period has not set in.
● In practice, the party’s and their counsels’ attendance will affect the outcome of the claim. The
possible scenario will be explained in detailed below:
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Plaintiff's counsel's absence.
If there is no valid reason, the court
will direct the Plaintiff to start the
case.
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allowed to cross-
examine the
Defendant
Count will decide on
the counterclaim
(whether it is proven
or otherwise)
Present Absent Present Present Court will ask Court will ask
Plaintiff to Defendant to proceed
proceed to prove to prove its
its case by counterclaim by
adducing adducing evidence.
evidence.
Plaintiff allowed to
Defendant's cross-examine
counsel may Defendant
cross-examine
Plaintiff Having heard both the
Plaintiff's claim and
the Defendant's
counterclaim, the
court will decide on
both matters.
Present Present Absent Absent Court may Dismissed
proceed with or
without trial and
give judgment
106
a matter that has been adjudicated by a competent court and therefore may not be pursued further by the same
parties.
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hearing. The president then dismissed the plaintiff's application to set aside the order of
dismission of the action on the ground that no good reason had been shown for the plaintiff's
absence on the day of the hearing.
While the learned president did not dismiss the action brought by the plaintiff on the view
that the principles of res judicata does or does not apply, he was of the view that filing a fresh
suit in the same court of the same jurisdiction, subsequent to the order of dismissal is not a
correct procedure or remedy for the plaintiffs. In the operative part of the formal order, the
reason stated for the dismissal of the action is that the court was functus officio.
Held : Functus officio means a person who has discharged his duty, or whose office of authority is
at an end. Thus, once a president has tried a civil action and made an order on the final
determination of the dispute between the parties, he is functus officio and cannot rescind his
final order and re-try the case, or try a subsequent action between the same parties on the
same subject matter.
: In the present case, the learned president became functus officio as regards the earlier action
on his refusing the plaintiff's application for its reinstatement, but he certainly did not become
functus officio as regards the real dispute between the parties which he never tried (whether
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the money paid to the defendant under a mistake of
fact). Therefore, he was wrong in dismissing the action.
: He was also wrong in taking the view that filing a fresh suit in the same court of the same
jurisdiction subsequent to the order of dismissal of the earlier action was not a correct
procedure or remedy for the plaintiff.
: Res judicata signifies that the court has, after argument and consideration, come to a
decision on a contested matter. For the doctrine to apply, a defendant has to show that there
was a former suit between the same parties for the same matter and upon the same cause of
action, and also that the matter directly and substantially in issue has been heard and finally
decided by the court which heard it. In this case, the plea of res judicata is not available to
the defendant in the present action, so it cannot be said that the plaintiffs cannot in law
maintain their present action based on the same subject matter as in the earlier action.
● If the case is struck out under Order 35 rule 2(1) ROC, the matter can be reinstated but if it is
dismissed, then the only avenue open to the aggrieved part is to appeal.
Order 35 rule 3
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A judge may adjourn a trial if he thinks it expedient in the interests of justice, such time and upon such
terms as the court thinks fit.
● Thus, it can be seen that the court has a wide discretion on whether or not to grant an adjournment of a
trial.
Dick v Piller
Held : If an important witness cannot attend the court due to illness and his evidence is
directly and seriously material, the court ought to allow the adjournment
● If the party requesting is unable to produce a good reason for the adjournment, the court will refuse
to adjourn the trial.
Maxwell v Keun
Held : Judge should not make an order "as would defeat the rights of a party and destroy
them altogether unless he is satisfied that the absent party has been guilty of such
conduct that justice can only be properly done to the other party by coming to the
conclusion".
● If the judge dismisses the application, the decision is still appealable. However, the appellate court
will be slow to interfere with the judge's discretion.
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Go Pak Hoong Tractor v Syarikat Pasir Perdana (FC)
Held : If an appellate court interferred with the discretion of the trial court in refusing to allow an
adjournment, it must be shown that the discretion was improperly exercised. Otherwise, it
should not be disturbed.
MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun (CA)
Held : the granting or refusing an adjournment was a matter within the discretion of a judge and an
appellate court ought not to interfere with such a decision unless it could be demonstrated
that the refusal resulted in the deprivation of essential justice from the appellant.
Mariya Stephen @ Fredolin Milis v Lee Guat Toh [2014] 1 MLJ 809 CA
Facts : Plaintiff/Respondent claimed that her land was fraudulently or wrongly transferred by the
Defendant/Appellant. On the date of the hearing, the Defendant sought an adjournment on the
ground of appointment of new solicitors.
The trial judge refused the adjournment and proceeded with the trial. At the end of the
respondent's case, the Defendant submitted no case to answer, the judge found in favour of
the Plaintiff. The Defendant appealed.
Held : It is well settled that the matter of adjournment is within the discretion of the trial judge and
an appellate court will not interfere with a refusal of adjournment unless it appears that the
result of such a refusal has been to defeat the rights of an applicant altogether or it is an
injustice to such an applicant.
4) COURSE OF TRIAL
● Governed by Order 35 rule 4.
● When the trial has begun and all counsels are present, who has the right to begin at the trial?
o The Judge has discretion to decide
Order 35 rule 4(1)
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The Judge may give directions as to the party to begin and the order of speeches at the trial ,
and, subject to any such directions, the party to begin and the order of speeches shall be that
provided by this rule.
o Normally, it is the Plaintiff who will begin by opening his case, unless the burden of proof of all the
issues in the action lies on the Defendant.
Order 35 rule 4
(2) Subject to paragraph (6), the plaintiff shall begin by opening his case.
(6) Where the burden of proof of all the issues in the action lies on the Defendant, the Defendant
shall begin first.
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- After the Plaintiff opens, the Plaintiff calls his evidence (witnesses), each of the Plaintiff's
witness will be examined in chief, cross examined by the Defendant and re-examined by
Plaintiff (if necessary)
▪ Even though the Defendant has elected not to give evidence, the Defendant may cross
examine the Plaintiff's witnesses and may even adduce documents
- After the Plaintiff has called all his witnesses, the Plaintiff makes his closing speech
- The Defendant makes his closing speech. (compared to above, the defendant no need to
open his case and call evidence)
- Trial ends. (compared to above, the plaintiff doesn’t reply to the defendant’s closing speech)
- What if the Plaintiff wishes to reply to the Defendant's closing speech?
▪ Generally, this is not allowed.
▪ Exception:
Order 38 rule 15
More than one name may be included in one subpoena to testify
Order 38 rule 23
An affidavit filed for the purpose of proving the service of a subpoena shall state
107
a writ ordering a person to attend a court.
108
an order requesting a writ or other legal document.
88 | Page
when, where, how and by whom the service was effected.
Court records:
Order 38 rule 20
(1) Generally, a subpoena cannot require an officer of the High Court or
Subordinate Court to produce court records
(2) However, if there is a special reason required, the original copy of a court
record or documents filed in court may be requested to be produced by
application
(3) However, no mark shall be place on such court records or court documents
Order 38 rule 22
A witness shall not be compelled to attend on subpoena unless reasonable sum to
cover expenses is offered to him
5.2) Evidence by Deposition (the giving of sworn evidence.)
Deposition Order 39 rule 1
(1) The Court may make an order in Form 69 for the examination on oath
before a Judge or the Registrar or some other person of any person at any
place where it appears necessary for the purposes of justice
(2) Such an order may be made on such terms (including, in particular as to
the giving of discovery before the examination takes place) as the court
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thinks fit.
90 | Page
enforced:
(a) the examination of any person before the Registrar or some other person
(which is referred to as “the examiner” in this rule and rules 5 to 14); or
(b) the cross-examination before the examiner of any person who has made an
affidavit which is to be used in any cause or matter
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Examination of Order 39 rule 9
additional witnesses The examiner may, with the written consent of all the parties to the cause or
matter, take the examination of any person in addition to those named or provided
for in the order for examination, and shall annex such consent to the original
deposition of that person.
and the affidavit shall not be used in evidence without such a certificate unless
the Court is otherwise satisfied that it was read to and appeared to be perfectly
understood by the deponent.
95 | Page
● May be made by the Defendant either if no case has been established in law or the evidence led is
unsatisfactory or unreliable
o Yuill v Yuill [1945] P. 15
● Judge should generally refuse to rule on such a submission unless the Defendant makes it clear that he
does not intend to call evidence
o Laurie v Raglan Co. [1942] 1 K.B. 152 CA
● Judge is not bound so to refuse and if does not put the Defendant to his election whether to call
evidence or not, the Defendant retains his right to call it if his submission fails
o Young v Rank [1950] 2 KB 510
o Storey v Storey [1961] P. 63 CA
● Mariya Stephen @ Fredolin Milis v Lee Guat Toh [2014] 1 MLJ 809
Facts :Plaintiff/Respondent claimed that her land was fraudulently or wrongly transferred by the
Defendant/Appellant. On the date of the hearing, the Defendant sought an adjournment on the
ground of appointment of new solicitors.
: The trial judge refused the adjournment and proceeded with the trial. At the end of the
respondent's case the Defendant submitted no case to answer, the judge found in favour of the
Plaintiff. Defendant appealed.
Held :It is well settled that the matter of adjournment is within the discretion of the trial judge and an
appellate court will not interfere with a refusal of adjournment unless it appears that the result
of such a refusal has been to defeat the rights of an applicant altogether or it is an injustice to
such an applicant
● The reasons behind these rules
o Alexander v Rayson [1936] 1 KB 169
o UN Pandey v Hotel Marco Polo [1980] 1 MLJ 4
o Tan Song Gou v Goh Ya Tian [1983] 1 MLJ 60
o Ng Neoh Ha v Maniam [1994] 1 MLJ 434
▪ Made by two out of six defendants
▪ Is cross-examination calling of evidence?
7) JUDGMENT AND ORDERS
Governed by Order 42
7.1) Judgment after a Trial
● At the end of a trial, the judge will deliver the judgment of the court.
● Generally, a judgment has two stages
i. In the first stage, the judgment will be pronounced
▪ A judgment after a trial is pronounced (orally delivered) in open court
ii. In the second stage, the judgment will be perfected
▪ A judgment is perfected when it is printed, signed and sealed by the court
● If a judgment is pronounced but not yet perfected, can the judge change his mind? Yes, the judge may
recall the counsel and ask to hear further arguments
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: Thus, as the counsel informed the court that there was no correspondence between the
parties highly materila to the fourth issue, the court in exercising their discretion under
Section 8 of the Maritime Convention Act, heard the counsel out. Accordingly, the court
recalled its earlier judgment, stating that such order is not without precedent by
referring to The Supreme Court Practice 1988
: A judgment takes effect from the time when the judge pronounces it and the subsequent
entry of it is a mere form in obedience to the direction of the court… but it is within the
powers of a judge to alter his judgment at any time before it is entered and perfected.
▪ Followed Lim Yam Tech v Lim Swee Chiang110 where the judge after dismissing the
Plaintiff's claim, recalled the parties and heard further arguments, as a result of which
judgment was entered for the Plaintiff. The case went on appeal and the appeal was
dismissed.
7.2) Consent Judgments and Orders
● A consent judgment is a judgment upon a compromise
Lagenda Kencana Sdn Bhd v Peter’s Holdings [2012] 3 CLJ 824 CA
Held : A consent order is an order of the court carrying out an agreement between the parties.
● In either case (whether the order is perfected or not), a consent judgment can only be set aside
under the grounds to rescind a contract. (contract law applies)
Lau Ming Hing Richard v Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 323
Held : since a consent judgment arises from a consent or a compromise, setting aside a consent
judgment is akin to rescinding a contract. If a person wants to rescind a contract for lack of
consent, the person would have to show that there were vitiating factors such as fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion or undue influence. To set aside a consent judgment, the
same principles would apply.
i. Illegality
Lian Mong Yee v Abdul Rashid [2001] 4 MLJ 38
Held : The parties to a consent order is entitled to go to the Court for a declaration that the
consent order was void and unenforceable by reason of its illegality. It is well within
the jurisdiction of the Court to grant such a declaration.
: Equity, in order to give complete justice, has always asserted jurisdiction to grant
consequential relief by setting aside void transactions either on terms or sans any
110
[1979] 1 MLJ 162
97 | Page
terms.111In the present instance, if the respondents are right in their argument, the
consent order is void for illegality. It may, therefore, be set aside like any other
agreement.
ii. Mistake, fraud misrepresentation, coercion, total failure of consideration, undue influence etc
Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin v Arab Malaysia Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 FC
Held : The grounds referred to for setting aside a consent order of a judgment by consent
are grounds which basically relate to consensus ad idem or the free consent of parties
to a binding agreement or contract. If there are grounds which vitiate such free
consent, the agreement is not binding.
: A consent order or a judgment by consent is based on an agreement of both parties
where consent to the agreement must or should have been free in the first place. If the
agreement upon which a consent order or judgment by consent is based is vitiated by
any ground recognized in equity as vitiating such free consent, such as fraud, mistake,
total failure of consideration,112 such a perfected consent order or judgment by consent
could be set aside in a fresh action filed for the purpose.
: Grounds which would vitiate such free consent should also include
misrepresentation, coercion, and undue influence and other grounds in equity.
In a situation of grave injustice, the appellant can make an application to set the
consent order aside at the same court which recorded the consent judgment. There is
no necessity to file a fresh separate proceeding for that purpose. The court may in
appropriate circumstances set aside the consent order even though it has been sealed
and perfected. In such a situation the court has the power to interfere with and set
aside such a consent order even if the lack of consent on the part of the appellant or
the limitation of counsel's authority was unknown to the other side. The said consent
order should not be allowed to remain.113
● Gai Hin Refrigeration Sdn Bhd v Kamanis Holdings Sdn Bhd [2005] 1 MLJ 293
● Norshuime bin Baharudin (sole administrator for the estate of Baharudin bin Mahmud, deceased) v
Leong Yee Heng [2019] 5 MLJ 62
● Chief Registrar’s Circular No 4 of 2010
111
(see p 44B-C); Cooper v Phibbs (1867) LR 2 HL 149 (folld)
112
see Huddersfield Banking Co Ltd v Henry Lister & Sons [1895] 2 Ch 273
113
This principle was adopted by the Federal Court in the Khaw Poh Chhuan case following the decision of the Court
of Appeal in England, in Marsden v. Marsden [1972] 2 All ER 1162.
98 | Page
8) Interest
o Order 42 rule 12
Subject to rule 12A, except when it has been otherwise agreed between the parties, every judgment
debt shall carry interest at such rate as the Chief Justice may determine from time to time or at
such other rate not exceeding the rate aforesaid as the Court determines, such interest to be
calculated from the date of judgment until the judgment is satisfied.
o Section 11 Civil Law Act: Power of Courts to award interest on debts and damages
In any proceeding for the recovery of any debt or damages, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that
interest shall be included in the judgment sum, at such rate as it thinks fit on the whole or any part of the
debt or damages for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose
and the date of the judgment:
New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd v Ong Choon Lin [1992] 1 MLJ 185
Held: the court has a discretion under s. 11 CLA 1956 to award pre-judgment interest
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Chapter 6: Costs
1) Introduction
There are majorly 2 types of costs in a civil action:
1) solicitor and client” costs. This is the remuneration a litigant pays to his counsel.
- In simple term, it is the legal fees.
- It is the sum of money a party pays to his lawyer or a sum of
money a lawyer receives from his client for the legal services
rendered.
- It is contractually agreed between the parties.
2) “party and party” costs. This is the sum one litigant pays to another litigant to compensate
the latter for expenses that he has incurred in the litigation.
- To be entitled to “party and party” costs, an order as to costs
must be given by the court.
- If no order as to costs was made by court, a litigant cannot
claim “party and party” costs.
E.g.:
At the end of a trial, the court decided and found the P won
the case. When the court found P has won at the end of trial,
the court will deliver judgment or make order which will
sound like “Plaintiff’s claim is allowed with costs”.
The “with costs” refer to “party and party” costs. This order is
saying that D has to pay costs to the P for the expenses the P
has incurred in the whole litigation.
2) Meaning of costs
● As explained, there are two definitions as to costs:
i. Solicitor and client cost : Remuneration that a litigant pays to his counsel.
ii. Party and party costs : The sum one litigant pays to another litigant to compensate the latter
for expenses that he has incurred in the litigation.
● At the end of interlocutory hearing/proceeding,114 if the P applied for interlocutory injunction, the court
may order that “Plaintiff’s application is allowed with costs.”
- This means that the court allowed the Plaintiff’s application and made an order as to costs
directing the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff the costs of the application.
- If at the end of the interlocutory hearing/trial, the court only orders “Plaintiff’s claim is
allowed”, there is nothing as to costs, so in this situation, the winning party may not obtain
costs from other party that has lost.
- It is important to ensure that the court makes an order as to costs and this is called “party and
party” costs.
● Dr. Sujata: In this topic for “Costs”, we will only deal with “party and party” costs.
114
a proceeding that takes place before trial e.g. :
- application to amend pleadings or
- application for interlocutory injunction where this interlocutory proceedings are commenced by NOA supported
by affidavit
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2.1) An order for costs is essential
● No party is entitled to decide as to costs.
● To be entitled to party and party costs, the court must make an order as to costs. This is expressly
stated in O 59 r 3(1) as follows:
Subject to the following provisions of this Order, no party shall be entitled to recover any costs of or
incidental to any proceedings from any other party to the proceedings except under an order of the
Court. (emphasis added)
- This means there is no “party and party” costs unless an order of the court is made to this effect.
- No party can assume that he will be paid costs incurred in the entire litigation from the losing
party. He must ENSURE an order is made by the court entitling him to “party and party” costs.
O 59 r 2(2) :
Subject to other Rules in the ROC, the costs of and incidental to proceedings in the Court, shall be in
the discretion of the Court, and the Court shall have full power to determine by whom and to what
extent the costs are to be paid.
● As a general rule, when making an order for costs at the end of a trial or proceedings, the courts follow
the rule “costs shall follow the event”.
- The general rule “costs shall follow the event” means –
o the losing party pays winning party’s costs; and
o the losing party bears his own costs.
- Example:
Scenario 1:
At the end of a trial, the court found the Plaintiff has won the case. So, the court’s decision is that
Plaintiff’s claim should be allowed. If that is so and the court follows the general rule of “costs shall
follow the event”, the court will say:“P’s claim is allowed with costs.”/ “Tuntutan P dibenarkan
dengan kos.”
▪ This means the Plaintiff (winning party) can get his costs from the Defendant (losing party). The
Defendant has to pay the Plaintiff all the expenses the P has incurred in the litigation and the D
will also have to bear his own costs.
Scenario 2:
At the end of a trial, if the Plaintiff has lost, the court following the general rule of “costs shall
follow the event”, may order: “P’s claim is disallowed with costs.”/ “Tuntutan P ditolak dengan
kos.”
▪ This means that Plaintiff (losing party) has to pay Defendant’s (winning party) costs and
Plaintiff has to pay his own costs.
● However, in certain circumstances, the court will depart from this general rule. These are known as
exceptions to the rule “costs shall follow the event”.
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O 59 r 3(2):
If the Court in exercising its discretion, sees fit to make any order as to the costs of or incidental to
any proceedings, the Court shall order the costs to follow the event, except when it appears to the
Court that in the circumstances of the case, some other order should be made as to the whole or
any part of the costs.
● Therefore,
O 59 r 2(2) :
General rule – if the court makes an order as to costs, the court will order the costs to follow the
event.
O 59 r 3(2):
Exception – circumstances where the court will depart from the general rule and the court may make
some other order as to costs.
the plaintiff is entitled to costs to the date the offer was served and the
defendant is entitled to costs from that date.
ii. The court orders no order as to costs (each party bears his own costs)
▪ This happens when at the end of a trial, P won the case. When the court delivers its
judgment and says “P’s claim is allowed. No order as to costs.” This is an exception
to the rule “costs shall follow the event”.
▪ This means each party is to pay his own costs. The court is making an order for each
party to bear their own costs NOT the losing party paying costs to the winning party.
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▪ The reason for making such order is when the court has found that the winning party
has committed some sort of misconduct (delay) or neglect.
O 59 r 5:
(1) Where in any cause or matter any thing is done or omission is made improperly
or unnecessarily by or on behalf of a party, the Court may direct that any costs
to that party in respect of it shall not be allowed to him and that any costs
occasioned by it to other parties shall be paid by him to them.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1) the Court shall, for the
purpose of that paragraph, have regard in particular to the following matters:
(a) the omission to do any thing the doing of which would have been
calculated to save costs;
(b) the doing of any thing calculated to occasion, or in a manner or at a time
calculated to occasion unnecessary costs; and
(c) any unnecessary delay in the proceedings.
(2) An order under this rule shall not be made against a solicitor unless he has been
given a reasonable opportunity to appear before the Court and show cause why the
order should not be made, except where any proceeding in Court or in Chambers
cannot conveniently proceed, and fails or is adjourned without useful progress being
made—
(a) because of the failure of the solicitor to attend in person or by a proper
representative; or
(b) because of the failure of the solicitor to deliver any document for the use of
the Court which ought to have been delivered or to be prepared with any
proper evidence or account or otherwise to proceed.
▪ Para (2) is basically saying that the court must give opportunity to solicitor to
explain himself before making such an order.
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● Example scenarios where the courts departed from the rule costs shall follow the event.
Held :It is clear from the Residential Property Act that the agreement, is prohibited
by statute and void ab initio, hence unenforceable by either party. As the
whole of this transaction is already an illegal one and as both parties to the
transaction have contravened the Act, the court can be called upon to assist
either of the parties with regard to the agreement in question. Therefore the P’s
claim under the contract is disallowed. The P lost the case and the D won.
: If the Plaintiff claims under an illegal contract and at the trial, illegality is
established, the Plaintiff will lose the case. Technically, the Defendant is the
“winning party”. If the general rule “costs shall follow the event” is
adhered to, the Defendant should be awarded costs of the trial/proceedings.
However, it may not be proper to award costs the Defendant (even though
he has won technically), because he was also a party to the illegal contract.
Therefore, in this scenario, the court may depart from the rule “costs shall
follow the event” and make “no order as to costs”. This means each party
bears his own costs.
See Chen Chow Lek v Tan Yew Lai [1983] 1 MLJ 170 (FC)
Facts :This case concerned the sale of a terrace house from the respondent to the
appellant. The respondent wanted to settle the issue but he appellant was
showing attitude.
Held : If the appellant was co-operative in this case, he would not have come to
court. The respondent would probably not have started the civil suit. This
litigation has been completely unnecessary and could have been avoided but
for the appellant's attitude.
: We also observe that even during the pendency of the suit, the respondent
was still trying to persuade the appellant to come to terms by writing a polite
104 | Page
letter explaining to the appellant why a fresh memorandum of lease was
needed. But unfortunately this was rebuffed by the appellant.
: Thus, in view of the appellant’s conduct, we cannot fully acquit him of the
blame and he must pay the costs of the proceedings both in the Court
below and before the current court despite winning the case. We also like
to express the hope that the appellant should sign a fresh memorandum of
lease if this document is still needed by the respondent, or should take steps to
convert his leasehold to freehold in order to avoid future troubles.
P/s: The court here did the direct the opposite of “costs shall follow the event”
where the court ordered the winning party to pay the losing party’s costs.
In such a situation, the court may make “no order as to costs” in relation to the costs of
the appeal. This is because if the winning party had raised the new point at the lower
court, the appeal would have been unnecessary. Therefore, the winning party does not get
costs of the appeal, and each party bears his own costs.
105 | Page
court made the order “no order as to costs” because if winning party had raised
the new authority at lower court, the whole appeal would’ve been
unnecessary. The court departed from the general rule costs shall follow the
event.
4) Costs against advocate and solicitor personally or a non-party (Dr. Sujata skipped this)
Provision: O. 59 r. 6 (see above)
6) Several Parties
Sometimes a Plaintiff is compelled to sue 2 Defendants. Where 2 Defendants are sued, a possible outcome
may be that the Plaintiff obtain judgment against one Defendant and the Plaintiff’s claim against the other
Defendant may be dismissed. In other words, the Plaintiff wins against one defendant and loses against the
other Defendant.
106 | Page
o When the Plaintiff is forced to sue 2 Defendants, the court may slightly vary the rule that
“costs shall follow event” instead of strictly following it.
o The variations are found in two types of orders namely Bullock order or Sanderson order.
- For example:
▪ Assuming that P is a passenger in a vehicle driven by D which collides with a vehicle driven
by E. P is injured. P wants to claim for his injuries but does not know who is responsible for
the collision.
▪ D and E blame each other for the collision and refuse to admit liability. So P, sues both D and
E.
▪ At the trial, only D is held to be solely liable. Therefore, P has won against D (the losing
defendant) and P has lost against E (the winning defendant).
▪ In such cases, the court may make either a Bullock order or a Sanderson order.
- However, before such orders can be made, it must be determine if it is reasonable to join other co-
defendants in an action. The test to determine this is laid down in :
a. Bullock order
● A Bullock order means that the Plaintiff gets costs from the losing Defendant (D1). At the
same time, the Plaintiff pays the costs of the winning Defendant (D2). Then, the Plaintiff
then claims reimbursement of costs paid to winning Defendant (D2), from the losing
Defendant (D1).
● Example of Bullock order can be seen in Federal Flour Mills Ltd. v “Ta Tung” 116
Held : “In this case, in view of the circumstances of this particular case, I am quite satisfied
that the plaintiffs were justified in bringing in the second defendants as co-defendants.
: Nevertheless, if the costs of the second defendants are ordered to be paid directly by
the first defendants, it might amount to completely depriving the second defendants
of their costs. The only asset of the first defendants prior to instituting the action was
the ship which was arrested by the plaintiffs. It was later released on a bank guarantee
to the extent of $190,000 which sum in actual fact represented the only sum available to
satisfy the claim including interest and costs. The plaintiffs’ claim excluding interest at
115
as stated by Vaughan Williams L.J.
116
[1971] 2 MLJ 201 Per Abdul Hamid J as he was then)
107 | Page
6% and costs amounts to $169,291.34. The amount guaranteed is therefore quite
insufficient to cover even the plaintiffs’ claim.
: In view of these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the proper order as to costs of
the second defendants is to order the plaintiffs to pay the second defendants’ costs.
The costs of the second defendants paid by the plaintiffs shall be included in the
costs to be paid by this first defendants to the plaintiffs.”
b. Sanderson order
● Same as a Bullock order, in Sanderson order, the court is ordering the losing Defendant to pay
for both winning Plaintiff and winning Defendant’s costs, either directly or add the cost that the P
has to pay to the winning D to the losing D’s cost.
● Assuming that D1 is losing defendant and D2 is winning defendant. In a Sanderson order, the
losing Defendant (D1) is ordered to pay for the winning Defendant’s (D2) costs. The order
will be like this:
i. Judgment for P against D1 with costs
ii. Plaintiff’s claim against D2 is dismissed; D1 to pay D2’s costs
● Under a Sanderson order, there are 2 types of order:
6.1) Reasons for the 2 different orders (Bullock and Sanderson order)
● The reason is to protect the winning Defendant so that the winning Defendant gets his costs.
108 | Page
● If the losing defendant is insolvent (bankrupt/lack funds), the court should make a Bullock
order and not the Sanderson order.
- Under Bullock order, the Plaintiff has to pay the winning Defendant’s costs and the Plaintiff
can seek reimbursement from losing Defendant. This is to make sure the winning Defendant
gets his costs.
- Subsequently whether the Plaintiff can get the reimbursement from the losing Defendant or
not, it is the Plaintiff’s disadvantage if he cannot.
● If the plaintiff is insolvent (bankrupt/lack funds), the court should make the Sanderson order
and not the Bullock order.
- Under Sanderson order, the court is directly ordering losing Defendant to pay the winning
Defendant’s costs.
● In a situation where both losing defendant and the plaintiff is insolvent, it is too bad for the
winning defendant, he will not get any costs.
7) Costs of interlocutory proceedings
● There are many ways in which a court may deal with costs of the many interlocutory stages of action.
● In that regard, Table in O 59 r1(3) of ROC 2012 had laid down all the terms and their effect used in an
order for costs
i. Reserved costs
Table in O 59 r 1(3) – “costs reserved”
The party in whose favour an order for costs is made at the conclusion of the cause or matter in
which the proceedings arise shall be entitled to his costs of the proceedings in respect of which
this order is made unless the Court orders otherwise.
● Under this order, the question of the incidence and amount of costs is postponed to the end of
the trial.
● So, the questions as to which party is to pay costs and the amount of costs to be paid is
postponed to the end of the trial.
ii. Costs in cause: Plaintiff’s costs in the cause, Plaintiff’s costs in any event, Plaintiff’s costs
- O 59 r 1(3) – “costs in any event”
This order has the same effect as an order for “costs” except that the costs shall be
determined only after the conclusion of the cause or matter in which the proceedings
arise.
109 | Page
Where this order is made in interlocutory proceedings, the party in whose favour it is made
shall be entitled to his costs in respect of those proceedings whatever the outcome of the
cause or matter in which the proceedings arise.
Lord Denning M.R. in J.T. Stratford & Son Ltd. v Lindley No. 2 [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1547
described these orders:
Held : “There is no definition in any law book of the words `costs in the cause.’ But every
pupil on his first day in chambers is told what it means. `Costs in the cause’ means
that the costs of those interlocutory proceedings are to be awarded according to the
final award of costs in the action. If the plaintiff wins and gets an order for his
costs, he gets those interlocutory costs as part of his costs of the action against the
defendant. Vice-versa, if the defendant wins and gets an order for his costs, he gets
those interlocutory costs as part of his costs of the action against the plaintiff .
.
`Plaintiff’s costs in the cause’ means that if the plaintiff wins, he gets the costs of
the interlocutory proceedings: but, if he loses, he does not have to pay the other
side’s costs of them.
`Plaintiff’s costs in any event’ means that, no matter who wins or loses, when the
case is decided, or settled, the plaintiff is to have the costs of those interlocutory
proceedings.
`Plaintiff’s costs’ means that the plaintiff is to have the costs of the interlocutory
proceedings without waiting for a decision.”
iii. Defendants costs in the cause, defendants costs in any event, defendants costs
These have corresponding meanings to (b).
● Costs thrown away are costs awarded to a non-blameworthy party to compensate him for
effort put in and expenses incurred which turn out to be “wasted” because of the
blameworthy party’s conduct.
● The order “costs thrown away” is often made on a successful application to set aside a
judgment obtained in default of the defendant’s appearance or defence, and indicates that
the defendant must pay all the plaintiff’s costs which have been reasonably incurred ...
● If, however, the judgment to set aside was obtained irregularly (by the plaintiff), so that
the defendant was entitled to have it set aside, the defendant will be awarded the “costs
thrown away.”
110 | Page
The plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, shall be entitled to his costs of that part of the
proceedings in respect of which such an order is made, notwithstanding that the cause or matter
has yet to be tried.
then, if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court thinks it just to do, it may order
the plaintiff to give such security for the defendant’s costs of the action or other proceedings as it
thinks just.
Basically, there are 4 grounds under O 23 r 1(1) where the defendant can APPLY for the security:
(a) the plaintiff is ordinarily resident out of Malaysia.
(b) the plaintiff is a nominal plaintiff who is suing for other people and he may not be able to pay the
costs of the defendant if ordered to do so.
(c) the plaintiff’s address is not stated or not correctly stated in the writ or originating summons.
(d) the plaintiff has changed his address during the course of the proceedings with a view to evading
the consequences of the litigation,
Purpose: Where a Plaintiff files an action against a Defendant, the Defendant may be of the view
that:
i. the Plaintiff does not have a strong case and
ii. if the Defendant wins the case, the Plaintiff will be unable to pay the Defendant’s costs.
In such a situation, the Defendant may apply for security for costs against the Plaintiff.*117
- Essentially, the Defendant is requesting for the Plaintiff to pay some money as a security for
the Defendant’s costs (which will be payable in the event the Defendant wins the case).
111 | Page
Where, on the application of a defendant to an action or other proceedings in the Court, it appears
to the Court that—
(a) a party, who is not a party to the action or proceedings (which is referred to as a “non-party”),
has assigned the right to the claim to the plaintiff with a view to avoid his liability for costs; or
(b) the non-party has contributed or agreed to contribute to the plaintiff’s costs in return for a
share of any money or property which the plaintiff may recover in the action or proceedings,
and the non-party is a person against whom a costs order may be made, then, if, having regard to
all the circumstances of the case, the Court thinks it just to do so, it may order the non-party to give
such security for the defendant’s costs of the action or other proceedings as the Court thinks just.
This order is also a ground for the defendant to apply for security of costs but only applicable to non-
parties:
(a) when the non-party has assigned the right to sue to the plaintiff to avoid his liability for costs
(b) the non-party has contributed or agreed to contribute to the plaintiff’s costs in return for a share
of the reward obtained, if the plaintiff succeeded in recovering them in the proceeding.
8.2.1) Procedure
O 23 r 1(2B):
An application for an order under paragraph (2A) shall be made by a notice of application,
which shall be served on the non-party personally and on every party to the proceedings.
O 23 r 1(2C):
A copy of the supporting affidavit shall be served with the notice of application on every
person on whom the notice of application is required to be served.
8.3) Cases
These cases apply to both O 23 r 1(1) & (2A)
Kasturi Palm Products v Palmex Industries Sdn Bhd [1986] 2 MLJ 310
Facts :The plaintiff firm carries on business in Bangalore, India. Its managing partner, an Indian
national, also resides there. The plaintiff seeks to enforce the award of Arbitration
adjudicated by the Arbitrators in London. The defendants are contesting the legality of the
Arbitration award and are applying for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security for
costs before the main application is heard. The question is whether it is just to order security
for costs.
Held :Under Order 23 rule 1, security for costs cannot be ordered as of right from a plaintiff
but only if the Court thinks it just to order depending on the circumstances of the case.
: Secondly, it is material to consider one of the grounds of the defendants in disputing the
plaintiff's main application. It is deposed by the defendant that the enforcement of the
award is contrary to public policy and the laws of Malaysia. The inference here is that the
plaintiff may not have complied with Order 69 rule 6 of the Rules of the High Court, 1980
: In this case, the Judge ordered the plaintiff to deposit $10,000 in Court as security for
costs before the next hearing date.
Badrul Zaman bin P.S. Md. Zakariah v Mohd Aris bin Chonin [2006] MLJU 340
Facts :The defendants' applied for security for costs against the plaintiff pursuant to Order 23 of the
Rules of the High Court 1980 and pursuant to section 351 of the Companies Act 1965. It was
contended that in the event that this Court ordered the plaintiff to pay costs to the defendants,
the plaintiff may not be able to comply with the said order because the plaintiff has no source
of income and for this reason the defendants' application for security for costs should be
acceded to by this Court.
Held :Order 23 vests the Court with a wide discretionary power to order security for the
defendant's costs if the Court thinks it is just to do so. The discretionary power of the Court
to order security for costs reign supreme.
: In deciding whether it is just to order security for cost, relevant circumstances are to be
taken into account before deciding whether to order security for costs were catalogued. The
relevant circumstances may be stated as follows:
i. whether it appears that the application is made in order to stifle a genuine claim;
ii. whether the order will have the effect of stifling a genuine claim even if that is not the
motive for the defendant's application for security for costs;
iii. whether the application is made at a late stage; and
iv. whether the impecuniosity on the part of the plaintiff has been caused by the
defendant.
: The Court will also have to take into account the likely outcome of the case before
deciding whether to make an order for security for costs. 118In this case, it is just to order
security for costs in favour of the defendants for the following reasons:
i. there was reason to believe that the plaintiff will not be able to pay the
defendants' costs when directed by this Court in the event the plaintiff's case was
dismissed with costs
ii. the address of the plaintiff in his writ of summons and the Amended Statement of
Claim showed the address of a dormant company with no source of income; and,
consequently,
iii. the plaintiff himself has no source of income to flout around
iv. there were 12 civil suits against the Gov of Malaysia that were pending. If the
plaintiff were to lose his case and this Court awards costs to the defendants, the
defendants will find it difficult to enforce the award for costs given the fact that
the address of the plaintiff that was given was not his place of residence but rather the
registered office of his company.
118
cited Porzelack K G v Porzelack (UK) Ltd [1987] 1 All E.R. 1074
113 | Page
Haidakota (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Tiam Chai [2009] 1 CLJ 699
Facts :This was the appellant’s appeals against the orders of the High Court directing the appellant
to provide security for costs in actions brought by it against the respondents.
Held : Section 351 of the Companies Act 1965 (‘the Act’) confers a very wide discretion on the
High Court to order a company to provide security for costs in an action brought by it or
against it.
: There are settled guidelines upon which the discretion falls to be exercised:
i. Firstly, the application for security for costs must be made with reasonable
promptitude after the issue of the writ. Delay is a good reason for the court to
exercise discretion against the parties applying for security.
ii. Secondly, an order under s. 351 of the said Act should generally not be made where
the making of it would be oppressive. This is particularly so in a case where the
company has an arguable case.
iii. Thirdly, security for costs should not be ordered where there is absence of any
mala fide on the part of the plaintiff company in bringing its claim. Special
attention should be paid to the balance that should be drawn between exposing an
innocent defendant to the expense of defending a claim against the risk of shutting out
a plaintiff from ventilating a genuine grievance.
: The appellant’s claim against the first set of respondents was based on their alleged breach
of fiduciary duties and against the second set of respondents for their voluntarily assisting in
such breach. The appellant’s claim could not by any stretch of imagination be described as
frivolous and vexatious.
- Its answer to the application for security for costs was that, it found itself in a
financially strained position because of the respondents’ acts and omissions. In
the circumstances, it would be oppressive to require the alleged victim of serious
wrongs committed upon it to be required to furnish security for costs in favour of
those accused of having put the victim in the position in which the victim found
itself.
: Thus, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of High Court.
Summary on the matters to be considered in the exercise of court’s discretion on whether to grant
security for costs:
a) Is P’s claim bona fide? Does he has reasonably good prospects of success?
b) Is there an admission by D?
c) Is the application oppressive e.g. to stifle a genuine claim?
d) Has P’s want of means been brought about by D?
e) Stage of the proceedings at which application is made (should be made as early as possible)
114 | Page
ii. whether that evidence, when found to be credible, supports the belief that the company
will be unable to pay the costs of a successful defendant.
115 | Page
Chapter 7: Enforcement of Judgment (Money Judgment)
1) Introduction
● Scenario:
o In 2018, P sued D in the High Court. In 2019, P obtained a judgment in the sum of RM500,000
against D. To date, D has not paid the judgment to P and the judgment sum remain unsettled. What
steps can P take?
o P can commence execution proceedings against D to enforce the judgement. This is called
enforcement of judgment.
● There are various modes/methods of enforcement of a judgment such as writ of seizure and sale,
garnishee proceedings etc.
● The method used to enforce the judgment depends on the asset claimed.
● Enforcement/execution proceedings are separate proceedings from the main action between the Plaintiff
and the Defendant. In enforcement/execution proceedings, the parties are not known as Plaintiff and
Defendant. They are known as Judgment Creditor (JC) and Judgment Debtor (JD).
- The JC (Pemiutang Penghakiman) is usually the Plaintiff cause the JC is a person who is seeking to
enforce the judgment.
- The JD (Penghutang Penghakiman) is the person against whom the judgment was obtained or the
person who has to pay the judgment sum, normally the Defendant.
● Basically, enforcement of judgment is where the judgment sum has not been paid and the P enforce a
judgment against the D to pay the sum.
2) Time Limit
● There is a limitation period for enforcement/execution proceedings.
S.6(3) of Limitation Act
The limitation period for actions to enforce a judgment is 12 years from the date of the judgment.119
Exp: if the P obtained a judgment against the D in January 2000 and after the judgment is obtained in
January 2000, the D failed to pay the judgment sum. Now, the P wants to enforce the judgment, the P
has to take note that there is a limitation of 12 years from the date of the judgment. Since the judgment is
obtained in January 2000, any enforcement of the proceedings must be commenced before January 2012.
● Thus, for all enforcement/execution proceedings, there is a limitation period of 12 years. Any
enforcement proceeding commenced after 12 years will be time barred.
● For a certain type of enforcement proceedings which is by writs of execution, then a leave of court is
necessary before you want to commence the proceedings if 6 years has passed after the date of judgment.
119
same goes to Sabah Limitation Ordinance and Sarawak Limitation Ordinance - 12 years from the date of the
judgment. Prof Chong: “I think the limitation for both Acts are not absolute, ie the debtor has to raise it as defence”
116 | Page
s. 33(4) Government Proceedings Act 1956
No Court shall enforce a judgment against the Government to make any payment, and no person shall be
individually liable under any such order. 120
3.1) Exception
● The first exception is garnishee proceeding. Under s.35 of the Government Proceedings Act,121
garnishee proceedings is allowed against the govt to execute a judgment but this is subject to
conditions.
- Garnishee proceedings a process of enforcing a money judgment by the seizure or
attachment of debts due or accruing to the judgment debtor that form part of his property
available in execution. As such, it is a species of execution upon debts, for which the ordinary
methods of execution are unavailable.
● The second exception is judicial review for a judgment sum under S33(1).
Minister of Finance, Government of Sabah v. Petrojasa Sdn Bhd
Fact : The respondent had obtained a certificate of judgment sum and order for costs pursuant to s
33(1)122 of the Government Proceedings Act (GPA) against the State Government of Sabah
for breach of an agreement but the gov did not make payment as required by the certificate.
So, the respondent filed a judicial review for an order of mandamus pursuant to O 53 of the
Rules of the High Court 1980 against the state gov. The issue was whether judicial review
proceedings may be taken against the gov to compel payment of a judgment sum.
Held : Under s 33(4) of the GPA, there cannot be any enforcement of money judgment against the
government except as provided in s33(1). Under s 33(1) of the GPA, once a certificate is
issued and duly served on the government, the government is obligated to make the necessary
payment. This is because the Government had a statutory duty under s 33(3) of the GPA to
pay the amount as certified.
So, the only method to recover a sum from the gov is by the issue of the certificate under
s33(1), as ordinary execution proceedings are not available against the government.
Furthermore O 73 r 12(1) of the RHC provided the general policy that proceeding for
enforcements do not lie against the government.
120
S35(4): Save as aforesaid no execution or attachment or process in the nature thereof shall be issued out of any
court for enforcing payment by the Government of any such money or costs as aforesaid, and no person shall be
individually liable under any order for the payment by the Government or any officer of the Government as such, of
any such money or costs.
121
S35(1): Where any money is payable by the Government to some person who, under any order of any court, is
liable to pay any money to any other person, and that other person would, if the money so payable by the Government
were money payable by a subject, be entitled under rules of court to obtain an order for the attachment thereof as a
debt due or accruing due, or an order for the appointment of a sequestrator or receiver to receive the money on his
behalf, the High Court may, subject to this Act and in accordance with rules of court, make an order restraining the
firstmentioned person from receiving that money and directing payment thereof to that other person, or to the
sequestrator or receiver.
122
S33(1): Where in any civil proceedings by or against the Government or in any proceedings under Chapter VIII of
the Specific Relief Act 1950, or in any such proceedings as would in England be brought on the Crown side of the
Queen’s Bench Division, or in connection with any arbitration to which the Government is a party, any order (including
an order for costs) is made by any court in favour of any person against the Government or against an officer of the
Government as such, the proper officer of the court shall, on an application in that behalf made by or on behalf of that
person at any time after the expiration of twenty-one days from the date of the order or, in case the order provides for
the payment of costs and the costs require to be taxed, at any time after the costs have been taxed, whichever is the
later, issue to that person a certificate in the prescribed form containing particulars of the order: Provided that, if the
court so directs, a separate certificate shall be issued with respect to the costs (if any) ordered to be paid to the
applicant.
117 | Page
: However, although ordinary execution proceedings are not available against the
government under s 33(4) of the GPA, these execution proceedings are only limited to
the type of 'execution or attachment' as set out in O 45 to O 52 of the RHC and do not
include judicial review proceedings. Since judicial review could lie against a Minister, the
appellant in this case being the Minister in charge of financial matters is naturally responsible
for the payment of the judgment sum.
118 | Page
sold, and the proceeds of the shares will
be paid to the JC to settle the judgment
sum.
5.2) JDS under s.4 Debtors Act 1957 read together with O74r11A
119 | Page
● After the JD discloses his assets, the court can make an order compelling the JD to pay the judgment
sum, either in a lump sum or in a number of instalments. See s.4(6), (7) and (8) of Debtors Act
1957:
S.4
(6) : Upon the examination of JD or non-appearance on such examination, the court may order the
judgment debtor to pay the judgment debt either
(a) in one sum whether forthwith or within such period as the court may fix; or
(b) by such instalments payable at such times as the court may fix
(7) : If the judgment debtor makes default in payment according to any such order, a notice in the
form prescribed by rules of court may be issued, on the request of the judgment creditor, calling
upon the judgment debtor to attend before the court at a time therein stated and show cause why
he should not be committed to prison for such default.
(8) : Any such notice shall be personally served upon the judgment debtor; and if, on the day so
named, or on any subsequent day to which the matter may be adjourned, no sufficient cause is
shown by the judgment debtor, the court may commit him to the civil prison for a term which
may extend to six weeks or until earlier payment of any instalment or instalments or other sum
due.
6.1) Procedures
● Governed by O46 r1-6
● When a JC wants to enforce his judgment by writ of seizure and sale, the first thing to ask is “Is
leave required?”
O46r2(1):
A writ of execution to enforce a judgment or order may not be issued without the leave of the
Court in the following cases:
(a) when the date of the judgment has lapsed for 6 years or more;
(b) when any change has taken place to the JC or JD, whether by death or otherwise,
(c) when the judgment is against the assets of a deceased person coming to the hand of his
executors/ administrators after the date of the judgment or order, and it is sought to issue
execution against such assets;
(d) when under the judgment, any person is entitled to relief subject to the fulfilment of any
condition which it is alleged has been fulfilled; and
(e) when any movable property sought to be seized under a writ of execution is in the hands
of a receiver appointed by the Court.
120 | Page
● If a case falls under any of these 5 circumstances applied, then leave will be required if the JC
wants to issue a writ of seizure and sale.
● In such a case, the JC must apply for leave to issue a writ by filing an ex parte notice of
application in Form 88 supported by an affidavit (refer to O46r3(2) for Requirements of
affidavit)
● After leave is obtained, writ of seizure and sale can be issued (but the JC must still fill up
Form 89 and comply with O 46 r 4, which will be explained more below)
i. Movable Property
When the JC has obtained a writ of seizure and sale against the movable property, how is the
enforcement done?
1. The execution is to be conducted by the Sheriff. The Sheriff here is known as the Court
Bailiffs. – (O46 r14-21: Duties of Sheriff or bailiff)
- In practice, the execution is done by the Court Bailiffs not the JC. The Bailiffs will
go to the JD’s premises, and start to seize and sale the JD’s assets.
- There are certain items that cannot be seized to satisfy the judgment sum (proviso of
S.3 of Debtors Act provides a long list of unseizable items)
- O46 r15 : the execution (seizing of assets) must take place between 9.00 am and
4.00pm., unless the Sheriff thinks otherwise.
2. After seizure, Sheriff will sell the items at a value to be determined by the Registrar.
O46 r24 : Where the value of the items exceeds RM10,000, the sale must be conducted
by a licensed auctioneer.
3. After the items has been sold, the proceeds of the sale will be paid to the JC to satisfy the
judgment sum.
1. when the court issues a writ of seizure and sale in Form 85, the JC will also have to apply
to obtain a prohibitory order (PO) from the Court.
123
praecipe for writ of execution
124
too long to be included the whole provision here.
121 | Page
- To successfully enforce a judgment under writ of seizure and sale for immovable
property, JC needs 2 things:
a) Form 85; and
b) A prohibitory order from the court. (to avoid the JD from dealing with the
property)
2. the prohibitory order must be registered with the appropriate land authority.
3. after the prohibitory order is registered, then the prohibitory order must be served on the
JD. Prohibitory order has a lifespan of 6 months only.
4. During these 6 months, the JC must register the PO and served the PO on the JD and the
JC must apply to court for an order for sales of land.
- To apply for an order for sale of land, the Registrar will draw up particulars for the
sale of the land and these particulars will be submitted to the Judge for approval.
- a hearing date will be fixed and the purpose of the hearing date is to decide whether a
court should grant an order for sale of the land.
- At least 2 days before the hearing, a notice should be given to all the parties about
the hearing before the judge.
5. On the day of the hearing, the JC and JD will attend court. On the hearing, the court will
decide whether it should make an order for sale of the land.
- Once the court is satisfied, the court will order for sale of the land.
6. Once the court has made an order for sale of the land, after that the Registrar will carry
out the sale in accordance with the particulars that were approved by the judge.
7. Once the land has been sold, the proceeds of the land will be given to the JC to settle the
judgment sum.
● Scenario:
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First scenario:
▪ The judgment sum is for RM200K. This JD has money in a fixed deposit account in a bank. The FD
account has money in an amount of RM100k. This is the money which is due or accruing due to the
JD.
▪ This money is in the hand of third party, the bank.
▪ This is the kind of asset which the JD had. For this kind of asset, the JC has to commence GP to
enforce the judgment against this asset.
Second scenario:
▪ Judgment sum of RM250k. this is not settled. The JD has an insurance policy under an insurance
company, and the amount is RM100k.
▪ This RM100k is the money which is due to the JD. And this money is in the hand of third party, the
insurance company.
▪ If the JC wants to enforce judgment against this asset, GP has to be commenced to enforce the
judgment against this money.
Third scenario:
▪ Judgment sum of RM150k. The JC has found out that there is a person, X. And X owes the JD
money in the amount of RM100k. This debt which is owing by X to the JD, this is money which is
due/accruing due to the JD. This money is in the hand of third party, X.
▪ Again, if the JC wants to enforce judgment against this asset, GP has to be commenced.
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b. The purpose of the hearing is for court to consider whether an order absolute should be
made.
- An order absolute means the money in the hands of the garnishee must be paid to
the garnisher/JC immediately.
c. Possibilities that may take place in the hearing:
Scenario Outcome
If the garnishee does not attend or the court will make an order absolute to the
attends but does not dispute the debt garnisher. – O49 r4(1)
If the garnishee attends and objects the court must decide whether the objection can be
the debt disposed off summarily or the matter needs to be
resolved at a trial – O49 r5
A third party may also attend and In such a case, the court must also decide whether
object by claiming he has an interest the objection can be disposed of summarily or the
in the money to be garnished. matter needs to be resolved at a trial - O 49 r 6.
O. 50, r. 6:
(1) On the further consideration of the matter the Court shall, unless it appears that there is
sufficient cause to the contrary, make the order absolute with or without modifications.
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(2) Where on the further consideration of the matter it appears to the Court that the order
should not be made absolute it shall discharge the order.
8.2) Sale of Securities Charged
● Once the shares are charged in favor of the JC, if the JC wants to sell the shares, another order of the
court is required.
O50 r6(3) : Such proceedings to sell the securities shall not be taken until the date of the order to
show cause has been made for more than 6 months.
1st situation : The JD’s income must be a future income and it must be received in uncertain
amounts and over uncertain periods. So, a receiver is appointed only in a situation
like this.
9.2) Procedures
O30 r 1: Application is made by notice of application either ex parte or inter partes
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Chapter 8: Enforcement of Judgment (Non-Money Judgment)
1) Introduction
There are 2 modes of enforcement of non-money judgment:
i) For Immovable property: Writ of Possession (O. 45 r. 3)
This is used for immovable property and the Plaintiff has obtained a judgment or order giving him
possession of immovable property.
O. 45, r. 4(2):
A judgment for the delivery of any movable property or payment of their assessed
value may be enforced by one or more of the following means:
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(a) a writ of delivery to recover the property or its assessed value;
(b) with the leave of the Court, a writ of specific delivery;
(c) in a case in which rule 5 applies, an order of committal.
a) Writ of delivery
- For writ of delivery, the Plaintiff may issue a writ of delivery in Form 86 or 86A
(command for the Sheriff to seize the movable property concerned and to deliver it to
the Plaintiff).
- For this option, leave is not necessary and the execution creditor may proceed to
issue a writ of specific delivery without first obtaining the assessed value of the
movable property. Hymas v Ogden [1905] 1 KB 246 CoA
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made through both OS and writ. However, if by writ, then an application for
summary judgment may be applied as in happened in See Hua Daily.125
2.2) Enforcement under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act 1958 (REJA)
● Money judgments granted by courts of some foreign jurisdictions are enforceable in Malaysia under
REJA.
● REJA provides for the enforcement of the foreign judgment by way of registration of the foreign
judgement in the Malaysian High Court. Once the foreign judgement is registered in the Malaysian
High Court, it may be enforced in Malaysia as if the judgment had originally been given in a
Malaysian Court.126
Standard Chartered Bank (SG) v Pioneer Smith [2015] 7 CLJ 677
Held : The raison d’ etre127 of the reciprocity arrangements on foreign judgments is
precisely to deal with situations where the debtors/defendants seek to evade
enforcement of judgments in the jurisdiction of the original court.
● Currently, REJA applies only to judgments obtained from the UK, Hong Kong, Singapore, New
Zealand, Sri Lanka, India and Brunei.
126
REJA 1958 recognises strict reciprocity, which means the registration is only permitted to a foreign judgment if that
foreign country concerned also allows a Malaysian judgment to be registered in the same manner in that country.
Hence there must be a ‘reciprocal’ arrangement between Malaysia and the country concerned.
127
the most important reason or purpose for someone or something's existence.
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(c) It is a foreign judgment from countries found in Schedule 1 REJA (UK, Hong Kong etc)
s. 4(1): The application must be made to the HC in M’sia within 6 years from the time the
judgment was issued by the foreign court.
b. Circumstances when the registration of the foreign judgment will not be allowed:
Section 4(1) REJA: Registration of the foreign judgment will not be allowed when:
(a) if the said judgment has not been wholly satisfied;
(b) if the said judgment cannot be enforced by execution in the country of the original
court.
i. Ground one
128
Section 3(4) REJA: a judgment shall be deemed to be final and conclusive notwithstanding that an appeal is
pending against it or even if it is appealable, but no appeal has been lodged in the country of the original court
which issued the judgment.
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S. 5(1)(a) REJA
: a registered foreign judgment may be set aside in these circumstances:
(i) The judgment is in contravention of REJA;
(ii) The court of original country had no jurisdiction; (refer to S5(3) when the
Court is considered having no jurisdiction)
(iii) The JD did not receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable
him to defend the proceedings and did not appear;
(iv) The judgment was obtained by fraud;
(v) The enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in
Malaysia; and
▪ Section 5(3) REJA130: circumstances when the courts of the country which had
issued the judgment shall not be deemed to have jurisdiction
129
Ritz Carlton Casino Ltd v Datuk Seri Osu Haji Sukam [2005] 6 MLJ 760:
Held: It is universally recognised that gambling is evil and against the teaching of religion. 'Belief in God', one
of the principles in the Rukun Negara must mean believing and following the teachings of the religion.
Although gambling was allowed under license in Malaysia but it was to prevent it from being run by the
underworld and it was not that it was something that was good. Anything that seeks to go against the Rukun
Negara must surely be regarded as against public policy.
130
Section 5(3) REJA:
Notwithstanding anything in subsection (2), the courts of the country of the original court shall not be deemed to have
had jurisdiction—
(a) if the subject matter of the proceedings was immovable property outside the country of the original court;
(b) except in the cases mentioned in subparagraph (2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii) and paragraph (c), if the bringing of the
proceedings in the original court was contrary to an agreement under which the dispute in question was to be
settled otherwise than by proceedings in the courts of the country of that court; or
(c) if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original proceedings, was a person who under the rules of
public international law was entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the country of the original
court and did not submit to the jurisdiction of that court.
131
original court = the court which issued the judgment which the plaintiff wishes to register in Malaysia. For exp, if a
case had been decided by UK and the plaintiff is not satisfied with the decision, the Plaintiff sued the defendant in
Hong Kong for the same subject matter. In this case, if the Hong Kong Court (the original court) decided in favour of
the plaintiff, the plaintiff can’t register the judgment in Malaysia (the registering Court) because another court from
other jurisdiction (the UK Court) had decided on the matter.
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case had decided and had a final & conclusive judgment on the same subject matter of
the case (refer to 5(2) on when a Court is deemed having jurisdiction on the case)
▪ Section 5(2) REJA132: Circumstances when the original court of the country
which had issued the judgment is deemed to have jurisdiction.
Commerzbank (South East Asia) Ltd v Tow Kong Liang [2002] CLJ 95
Held : When considering an application to set aside the registration of a foreign
judgment, the court will not review the decision of the foreign court in arriving
at its judgment.
132
Section 5(2) REJA:
For the purposes of this section the courts of the country of the original court shall, subject to subsection (3), be
deemed to have had jurisdiction—
(a) in the case of a judgment given in an action in personam—
i. if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, submitted to the jurisdiction of that court by
voluntarily appearing in the proceedings otherwise than for the purpose of protecting, or obtaining the
release of, property seized, or threatened with seizure, in the proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction
of that court;
ii. if the judgment debtor was plaintiff in, or counterclaimed in, the proceedings in the original court;
iii. if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, had before the commencement of the
proceedings agreed, in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings to submit to the jurisdiction of that
court or of the courts of the country of that court;
iv. if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, was at the time when the proceedings were
instituted resident in, or being a body corporate had its principal place of business in, the country of that
court; or
v. if the judgment debtor, being a defendant in the original court, had an office or place of business in the
country of that court and the proceedings in that court were in respect of a transaction effected through or
at that office or place;
vi.
(b) in the case of a judgment given in an action of which the subject matter was immovable property or in an action
in rem of which the subject matter was movable property, if the property in question was at the time of the
proceedings in the original court situate in the country of that court; and
(c) in the case of a judgment given in an action other than any such action as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or
(b), if the jurisdiction of the original court is recognized by the law of Malaysia.
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