Global Diplomacy: Art of Negotiation 20th August 2014

Introduction

This essay sets out to discuss the key attributes of prenegotiation. In the context of diplomacy
and international relations, negotiation is defined as the process through which the state and
other actors communicate and exchange proposals in an attempt to agree on the dimensions of
conflict termination and their future relationship1.

Negotiation in international relations is a complex undertaking and usually a challenge as it is

applied in moments when usually relations would have been destroyed, trust broken and getting
conflicting parties to talk under such circumstances requires much preparation. Prenegotiation is
viewed as the initial phase or stage of a negotiation as conceived by Zartman and Berman, Stein
and Saunders- an argument that is discussed throughout the essay as a fundamental part of
international relations, politics and even economics.

The essay will begin by analyzing certain characteristics of prenegotiation in the ploys of
diplomacy and why it is an essential aspect of the larger negotiation concept. The place of
prenegotiation in the trajectory of conflict resolution and the pursuit for negotiated settlements is
discussed by addressing its “phases” with a further analysis of the process that prenegotiation
must undergo if parties are to be brought to an agreement to sit at a negotiating table.

The essay further converses what triggers prenegotiation by assessing “ripe moments” and
unravelling the role of “channel factors” in negotiation. Case studies on the Israel/Palestine,
South Africa, South Sudan conflicts among others are examined to reinforce the hypothesis that
prenegotiation is integral in the pursuit of negotiated settlements.

Understanding Prenegotiation

Pre-negotiation in diplomacy is a critical stage that is required before actual negotiations can get
tabled. It is vital in reaching a consensus between different parties who have to see and agree that
getting to the table will be of value to their interests, and without which getting to the table may
be unattainable (Zartman, 1989).

1
Bercovitch, J & Jackson, R 1997 International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and their
Management 1945-1995 Washington Quarterly

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Prenegotiation can determine whether or not talks get to the table. Several historical negotiations
have informed literature on the critical role prenegotiations play and the factors around it that
influence the process to take effect and have a meaningful impact. Prenegotiation is vital for the
following: identifying key players, handling information confidentially (secrecy) and shuttle
diplomacy between parties (Greig, 2001). Using case studies in history, Greig asserts that it is
evident the pre-negotiation phase draws the road map to the final agreement and maximizes
events that present ripe moments for pushing processes ahead for mediation and managing
relationships from deteriorating between rival groups (Greig, 2001).

Various complex dynamics influence the prenegotiation stage. Prenegotiation is event driven and
targeted at specific objectives within the broader negotiation theory influenced by foreign-policy
bureaucracy in the individual negotiating countries, the personal peculiarities of the very
negotiators, the international-political environment of the ongoing negotiations and the different
pressures it creates for the negotiating parties’ foreign policy influenced by the political
environment and characters of negotiators (Pantev, 2000).

Harold Saunders argues that in fact, prenegotiation phase could be the most difficult and time
consuming part, as convincing conflicting parties to agree to talk to each can be daunting
(Saunders, 1985). Gewurz adds in concurrence with Saunders that the process of transforming a
conflictual relationship to one involving negotiation is not a simple one, and that prenegotiation
was identified as central to bringing about that shift based on historical, psychological, political
approaches to dealing with conflict and the recognition that the commencement and/or
continuation of negotiations poses challenges (Gewurz, 2000).

When does prenegotiation take place?

In defining when prenegotiation takes place, Zartman is cautious about describing at what point
prenegotiation occurs in his discussion on the phases and functions of prenegotiation, stating that
while it is acknowledged that there is indeed a process that happens before a negotiation, he
wonders whether it (prenegotiation) is a prelude or a part of the negotiation and questions
whether there is a difference (Zartman, 1989).

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Zartman further ponders on the reference to the phase of prenegotiation, arguing that there is a
time factor alluded to this ‘phase’, and if that is the case he speculates on whether this time factor
is something that is a one way street, allows for backtracking or can be leapfrogged. Zartman
however provides more clarity on his view of prenegotiation stating that “prenegotiation begins
when one or more parties considers negotiation as a policy option and communicates this
intention to other parties. It ends when the parties agree to formal negotiations ... or when one
party abandons the consideration of negotiation as an option... In essential terms, prenegotiation
is the span of time and activity in which the parties move from conflicting unilateral solutions for
a mutual problem to a joint search for cooperative multilateral or joint solutions” (Zartman,
1989: 4).

Saunders asserts in his Identifying Substantive Obstacles to Negotiation: A Five-Part Process in

that in fact the “stages” or “parts” do not allude to a process of distinct succession “where one
starts and ends before the next begins”, even though the chronological order presented is rational
to follow (Saunders, 1985: 254). The prenegotiation phase shapes the agenda of negotiations,
agreeing on participants/representation, the venue and charting the direction in which the
discussions at the table will be conducted. Stein postulates on the role of prenegotiation in
Balkan peace process in the 1990s that “it set broad boundaries, identified the
participants..specified the agenda for negotiation. Even in those cases where it produced only a
rough outline of the agenda, Stein argues that it nevertheless reduced uncertainty and complexity
by establishing what would be kept off the table”(Stein, 1989:257).

Berridge observes that the venue selection can signify domestic security for leaders and be
perceived to signal alliances to political power or weakness; in the US/Vietnam talks in 1965, US
President Lyndon Johnson backed down on his word to “go anywhere at any time whenever there
is promise of progress towards an honourable peace ”, a statement which led Hanoi to demand for
talks to take place in communist Warsaw or Phnom Penh (Berridge, 2014:37).

Washington later resisted the venues demanded by Hanoi for fear of being seen as knuckling
under to the communists and an agreement was later reached for Paris to host the talks, being
seen as neutral under de Gaulle’s leadership who had become decidedly anti-American at the

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time. The agreement on Paris could have been strategic for the Americans who could have
calculated long-term benefits in engaging Paris for their other interests in its relationship with
France, including re-engaging it in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), from which
France had withdrawn.

The Process of Prenegotiation

Zartman and Berman present a three phase model on prenegotiation and argue that through
Diagnostic, Formula and Detail phases, the process of negotiation is eased upon negotiators
when some steps are followed through (Zartman & Berman, 1982). In the Diagnostic phase,
efforts are made about agreeing on bringing about negotiations, a process that involves political
decision-making for parties involved as this process may or may not bring about actual
negotiations; the Formula phase focuses on defining solutions and means through which to arrive
at those solutions; and Detail phase delves into working out the details of the negotiation
including what compromises are to be made. This three-stage model mirrors an elaborate five
parts model by Harold Saunders. Using the Middle East crisis, particularly the Isreali/Palestinian
peace process in the 1970s, Saunders foregrounds the following five parts or stages in identifying
obstacles to negotiation (Saunders, 1985:260-261), which can also be viewed as opportunities:-

1). Identifying the problem-this step is described as key in dispute resolution as the process of
negotiation cannot effectively start before the parties have a common understanding of what the
problem is. A divergent view on what the problem is may break down communication, breed
mistrust in the process and can lead to failure to launch negotiations.

2). Producing a Commitment to a Negotiated Agreement: This stage is crucial and a backbone to
prenegotiation processes including determining whether parties to the conflict see value in
changing the status quo; a judgment that a fair settlement is possible, a realization that each
side’s ideal solution is unattainable and that negotiated settlements through compromises may
have to be reached; leaders on each side will have to make estimates on whether the other side
can compromise- a situation that can be difficult. Lieberman cites the African National Congress
(ANC) as being frustrated with the National Party (NP) when they called for military and other
means of pressure to be exerted on the enemy because they felt that there could be no meaningful

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negotiation when the enemy was feeling strong (Lieberfeld, 1999). The forth element leading to
a negotiated agreement is the judgment of the balance of forces permitting a fair settlement (for
example, military and political power in favor of one party as the case may be for Israel that
enjoys military might and US support against the Occupied Territory of Palestine can influence
the acceptability or judgment of a fair settlement).

3). Arranging a negotiation: Having made judgments on whether negotiation works to the
advantage of the parties, a general approach and more detailed plan for negotiation are worked
out completing the prenegotiation phase before moving to the full negotiations.

4). The Actual Negotiation: This comes at the end of a long political process and can be the most
visible of the process after a lengthy and usually difficult prenegotiation phase.

5). Implementation: An important part of negotiation as success of agreements is gauged on how

far they are implemented. Saunders underscores that in diplomacy, the successful
implementation of one agreement can be the jumping off place for another negotiation. Perhaps
this suggestion corresponds closely with Richelieu’s postulation that important negotiations
should never be interrupted at any time (Hill, 1965).

What triggers negotiation?

In crisis management or conflict management, certain events trigger the option of leaders
considering getting to the table to explore ways of managing that crisis (Stein, 1989). Stein
posits that events that help parties avoid crisis or a deterioration of relationships can trigger a
consideration for talks. These triggers present “ripe moments” through milestone events that
necessitate actions on negotiation (Greig, 2001; Hopmann) 2. Examples of events or “triggers” on
crisis avoidance include the many processes that preceded the negotiation at Camp David Camp
for the Middle East in 1978.

It is these events that appear separate from the main negotiations that support Stein’s view that in
fact prenegotiation is a separate process that structures the actual process of negotiation (Stein,
1989). To demonstrate prenegotiation as a separate process, Quandt suggests that there are
2
Greig, 2001 “ Such ripe moments create opportunities for conflict management”, in reference to Bosnia mass
causalities that led to negotiations; Hopmann, 2010 references Zartmans’ case studies on “ripenness”

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indications that point to the fact that Israel and Egypt were way ahead on their peace-making trip
in 1977, and that the American intervention would not have been needed (Quandt, 1986). With
prenegotiation efforts implicitly implied, Quandt writes that information has emerged about the
many secret meetings between Egypt and Israel and of which the US knew nothing of nor
participated in. This does point to the critical role again that prenegotiation plays in the run-up to
the public displays of agreements, if the skepticism expressed on the American role in the Camp
David negotiations is anything to go by.

It is of course worth noting that Quandt also takes note of the supporting view of the American
role, as an intermediary, as being critical through participation of senior US officials in
agreements reached between Egypt and Israel from 1974 to 1979 (Quandt, 1986). To this senior
representation in talks, Berridge suggests that this tends to bind agreements as participating
parties can sometimes oblige themselves to decisions that they do not see as intemperate or
impulsive commitments – a risk that can be associated with junior officials whose positions can
be seen as lacking seriousness (Berridge, 1989).

Saunders posits about the value of representation- usually decided upon during the
prenegotiation phase, that part of the substantive reason for reluctance of why parties fail to get
to the negotiating table is bacause “the absence on one side or the other of representatives with a
clear mandate to speak for their side” (Saunders,1985:254). The right representation of parties to
the negotiation and intermediaries requires attention during preparatory stages of negotiations as
this can influence the willingness and acceptability of conditions for agreeing to negotiate by
parties involved.

The influence of intermediaries is analyzed by Berridge through his discourse on the Angola
peace process of 1988 where the American influence is asserted to have contributed significantly
by pressure that was expected to be exerted on Angola and South Africa through economic and
political threats (Berridge, 2001). The intermediatory role can also be associated with strategic
and tactical interests that the intermediary states or individuals may have, and which can
influence the willingness of disputants to accept the mediation role (Kleiboer, 1996).

In the study on intermediary influence in international relations and negotiation, Princen

underscores that intermediaries certainly do more than convene meetings and carry messages,

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but, they find ways to convince parties to come to an agreement (Princen, 1992). Perhaps the
argument on the relevance of an intermediary weaves in to the thinking of Watkins and
Lundberg who introduce the concept of “forces” that are constantly changing (Watkins &
Lundberg, 1998). These forces are inherently the triggers discussed earlier. Watkins and
Lundberg opine that through forces the ripe moment must be identified through “channel
factors” in leadership and opportune events. In the Oslo process for example, the change in the
balance of forces in the Middle East between 1988 and 1992 reinforce the need to understand the
changing forces in the prenegotiation phase that can influence parties to agree to move towards a
settlement.

Case Studies: Prenegotiation in conflict management, crisis avoidance and economic pacts

The notion of ripeness is important only if parties think conditions will favour them, otherwise
some conflicts enter stalemates or negotiations hit deadlocks (Zartman, 2006). In conflict
management, the 1993 Oslo Peace agreement demonstrates an example of how some events
shifted to work to both parties’ advantage for them to consider getting to the table, with all these
‘triggers’ for change being diagnosed in the prenegotiation phase (Watkins & Lunberg, 1998).

The case study of the 1993 Oslo agreement presents the intricate behind the scenes processes that
were conducted by various players, which eventually led to the signing of the agreement by
Israeli and Palestinian leaders in Washington. History also shows that where pre-negotiation
efforts have faltered, getting to the table becomes even more complicated or unattainable if
conditions are not set right. In Zartman and Berman’s three stage model of Diagnosis, Formula
and Detail- perspectives on how prenegotiation can timely point to barriers through detailed
analysis and tactical ways of resolving those are suggested.

Robles (2008) cites the example of failed Free Trade Area (FTA) negotiations between the EU
and Mercosur; Robles notes that while a consensual base for negotiations had been laid between
1998 and the 1999 Rio Summit, several factors post the summit emerged as persistent factors
that led to the suspension of the negotiation as being disagreements between the EU
protectionist’ stance on agriculture and Mercosur’s protectionist stance on foreign direct
investment and services.

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Furthermore, Geoffrey Martin reflects on the dichotomous practitioner-scholar schism which

draws on the art and science of negotiation anchored on systematic analysis for problem solving
and art as being the human side involving interpersonal relationships, the ability to convince and
be convinced (Martin, 1988). Suffice to conclude that the failure in the EU-Mercosur
negotiations lay in the inability of practitioners to translate into analysis ways of resolving the
known divergent positions the parties held ahead of formal talks, which is what Martin discusses
in his article.

The economic advantages of prenegotiation for states is delved into by Rudin who contrasts on
the perspectives of international affairs within Europe between 1815 and 1915 –a period that saw
peaceful times with localized conflict which did not require countries to mass up military and
arms response (Rudin, 1956). United by the common economic interests founded in European
colonization of Africa, Rudin espouses that this peace steered relations among European
countries that encouraged free people movement, and democracy reigned- even though fragile
and false as other people’s security and freedoms where infringed upon in colonies.

Rudin notes that the colonies contributed to the emergence of friendly international relations in
Europe over ‘agreements’ on country interests (for example, the Anglo-French Entente reached
in 1904 saw France and Britain agree on interests in Egypt and Morroco). While not explicitly
referred to in Rudin’s literature, prenegotiation in these agreements was critical to reach
negotiated settlements.

Various examples in recent conflict management such as South Sudan, demonstrate the fact that
a major trigger, as the widespread violence of 15 December 2013 in Juba, led to leaders of the
disconcerting parties to consider getting to the table to negotiate a cessation of hostilities.
According to the United Nations, the ethnically motivated conflict that broke out on 15
December 2013 displaced in the immediate aftermath some 81,000 people; hundreds were
targeted and killed and gender-based violence was reportedly high3.

This major event Stein describes as offering a turning point in the relationship between the
parties and being a trigger to reassess alternatives by adding negotiation to the strategies of
conflict management. With the leadership in the presidency and in the opposition keen not to be
3
OCHA SS Crisis Report _23 December 2013

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seen as fuelling ethnic killings, there seemed value in what Stein called the paired perception of
threat and opportunity that presented the moment to enter negotiations for the South Sudanese
leaders.

The role of pre-negotiation on some long standing conflicts like the Israeli/Palestinian and long
rival relationships like the US/Russia, among others cannot be overruled in the various stages of
those conflicts and opportunities that present themselves for full negotiations. In the recent
Isreali/Palestinian conflict several elements that advance the comparative advantage of
prenegotiation according to Lieberfeld’s theory have manifested since early June 2014 as
follows:-
 The failure of coercion where unrelenting shelling on Gaza has not seen Hamas recoil; an
untenable status quo with fatalities/serious losses incurred by both sides;
 enhanced possibilities for negotiation (three humanitarian ceasefire agreements were
reached in July and August 2014 following massive casualties suffered by the
Palestinians and political pressure on the two sides4); Pantev underscores that “a principal
function of prenegotiation is to build bridges from conflict to conciliation, to provide
change in the perception, mentality, tactics, definitions, acceptability levels and partners.
Prenegotiation in the context of this function, for example, may lead to temporarily
suspending the conflict activities, as well as to other forms of building trust” (Pantev,
2000:62).
 leadership change in mediators: for example the inclusion of US Secretary of State John
Kerry in the Egyptian-led process resulted in a US backed ceasefire at one point; and
 the failure to cultivate alternatives to the primary adversary in the case of Hamas,
disputed as a credible political player by Israel and its allies, but gaining more support
and legitimacy amongst the Palestinians (Lieberfeld, 1999).

Lieberfeld further discusses prenegotiation in the South African negotiations between the
African National Congress (ANC) and the apartheid regime’s National Party (NP), that
“assurances exchanged during the prenegotiation contacts established a level of possibility and
trust sufficient to initiate mutual recognition, and direct official negotiations, even though both

4
OCHA oPt: Gaza Emergency_8 August 2014; BBC News_ 10 August_18 19 GMT

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sides sought to expand their coercive capabilities (Lieberfeld, 1999:77), again similar to the case
as witnessed in the June to August 2014 Gaza conflict.
Conclusion
The concept of pre-negotiation in diplomacy is central in bringing about negotiations and should
be triggered by key events that emerge at certain stages of relationships or conflicts that present
themselves as opportunities or ripe moments. Prenegotiation can form part of the continuous
cycle in the continuum of conflict management and the concept of continuous negotiation. It is
plausible from the various literature reviewed that pre-negotiation is a vital element in conflict
management and prevention, crisis avoidance and crisis management and a key tool to build
relations and break down mistrust to get parties to the negotiating table. The case studies looked
at demonstrate that prenegotiation must be kept alive on a conflict trajectory that is interjected by
short periods of peace which present parties with opportunities to negotiate on the next
settlement, be it a short-lived ceasefire. The observation that agreements in diplomacy are
usually a jumping off place for another negotiation underpins the critical role prenegotiation
plays throughout the discourse of diplomacy, negotiation, politics, economics and international
relations. Pre-negotiation is negotiation in itself as it can determine how parties proceed or not to
a settlement. And if a settlement is achieved, its implementation may be a spring board for new
negotiations to be launched, wherein prenegotiation will have a central role all over again. As
well captured by Saunders, in international relations, one agreement is a prelude to others rather
than the end of a problem, hence the role of prenegotiation is that of a continuous one at various
stages or life lines of a conflict or economic agreements.

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