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Department of Education, The

University of Newcastle, New
South Wales, Australia 2308.
a b
Melissa M. Monfries & Norman F. Kafer
a
Department of Education , The University of
Newcastle , Australia
b
Department of Psychology , The University of
Newcastle , Australia
Published online: 02 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: Melissa M. Monfries & Norman F. Kafer (1994) Department
of Education, The University of Newcastle, New South Wales, Australia 2308.,
The Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 128:4, 447-454, DOI:
10.1080/00223980.1994.9712751

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 The Journal of Psychology 128(4),441-454

Private Self-Consciousness and Fear of

Negative Evaluation

MELISSA M. MONFRIES
Department of Education
The University of Newcastle, Australia
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NORMAN F. KAFER
Department of Psychology
The University of Newcastle, Australia

ABSTRACT.We examined the loci of social anxiety in a sample of 385 Australian adult
subjects (186 men and 199 women, mean age 30.63 years). Responses to the Social Avoid-
ance and Distress Scale, the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969),
and the Public and Private Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975)
were intercorrelated. The results suggested that for some socially anxious people who are
privately shy, the locus of their anxiety is cognitive, whereas for others who are more
concerned with performance, the locus is behavioral.

SOCIAL ANXIETY has been extensively studied in the context of Western cul-
ture. In these studies there has been a tendency to focus on individuals who mani-
fest social deficits (Gough & Thorne, 1983, although some researchers (e.g.,
Edelman, 1985; Pilkonis, 1977; Zimbardo, 1985) have commented on the paradox
that some socially anxious people may be inwardly in turmoil while behaving in
a socially skilled manner; or they are perhaps “privately shy” (Pilkonis). The con-
cept of private shyness suggests that a cognitive rather than a behavioral compo-
nent may be responsible for this type of social anxiety and that the cognitive com-
ponent of social anxiety may be differentiated from the more severe behavioral
component of social anxiety.
Researchers have consistently documented the relationship between cogni-
tive deficits or aberrations and social anxiety. Such deficits, or negative cognitions,
have included a selective memory for negative interactions, an underestimation of

Address correspondence to Melissa M. Monffies, Department of Education, The University

of Newcastle, New South Wales, Australia 2308.

441
 448 The Journal of Psychology

social skills (Halford & Foddy, 1982), external attributions to favorable evalua-
tions (Pittman, 1981, cited in Elliot, 1984), internal attributions for failure situa-
tions (Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 1985; Halford & Foddy), negative self-
evaluations (Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979; Jones & Briggs, 1984), and a
negative reaction of others (Jones & Briggs).
It also appears that these cognitive deficits lead to physiological correlates of
social anxiety such as high physiological reactivity (Beidel et al., 1985), blushing,
stomach upsets, heart pounding, and dry mouth (Cavart, 1982, cited in Jones &
Briggs, 1984). These manifestations of uncomfortable physical symptoms could
account for the occurrence of some of the behavioral deficits associated with anxi-
ety, such as lack of assertiveness and socially inadequate responses (Dow, Big-
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lan, & Glaser, 1985).

A major concern within the cognitive deficit approach has been the explora-
tion of the negative self-images that socially anxious people tend to have of them-
selves. Schlenker and Leary (1982) and Leary and Atherton (1986) have sug-
gested a model of social anxiety based on factors surrounding an individual’s
presentation; that is, social anxiety stems from people’s concerns with the impres-
sions others are forming of them. Implicit in such an approach is the assumption
that a person’s level of self-esteem influences his or her perceptions of social
events. Thus, research has shown a relationship between low self-esteem and so-
cial anxiety (Crano & Crano, 1984; Elliot, 1984; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, &
Larsen, 1982; Nichols, 1974; Smail, 1984).
It also appears that perceived self-discrepancies are important: Socially anx-
ious individuals tend to have an unrealistic schemata for the ideal self while hold-
ing underevaluations of their real self (Elliot, 1984; Gough, Fioravanti, & Lazzari,
1983; Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Jones & Briggs,
1984). Some researchers (i.e., Burgio, Merluzzi, & Pryor, 1986; Jones & Briggs)
have posited that self-focus or self-attentiveness is the underlying mechanism re-
sponsible for these processes.
As Carver and Scheier (1982) pointed out, attention determines the degree
to which a person processes a stimulus and is influenced by it. They also sug-
gested that, just as people are able to selectively attend to environmental cues, so
too are they capable of differentiating the self from the environment and selec-
tively attend to various aspects of themselves. The habitual disposition to be self-
attentive has been labeled self-consciousness. Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss
(1975) proposed two types of self-consciousness that can be assessed by using
their self-consciousness scale. Public self-consciousness refers to the habitual at-
tentiveness to overt aspects of the self that others can observe as well as evaluate;
private self-consciousness denotes habitual attentiveness to covert aspects of the
self that only the individual can observe (Buss, 1980; Fenigstein et al., 1975).
Both facets of self-consciousness refer to separate dimensions of cognitive styles
that correlate moderately with each other (Fenigstein et al.).
 Monfries & Kafer 449

Most researchers have acknowledged that self-consciousness is not only an

important aspect of self (Burgio et al., 1986; Elliot, 1984) but is also an important
component of social anxiety (Buss, 1980; Edelman, 1985; Fenigstein et al., 1975;
Jones & Briggs, 1984). It is generally conceded that public self-consciousnessis
positively related to social anxiety, whereas private self-consciousness is not
(Buss; Cheek & Buss, 1981; Fenigstein et al., 1975).
Public self-consciousnessmakes people susceptible to what happens in so-
cial situations, especially where there is scrutiny or confrontation (Buss, 1980).
Consequently, public self-consciousnessis related to the magnitude of egocentric
bias in social interaction (Sandelands & Stablein, 1986) and is more likely to
lead to self-presentational doubts (Leary, 1983; Schlenker & Leary, 1982; 1985).
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Conversely, privately self-conscious people are presumed to know themselves

better, which makes them resistant to being fooled or coerced (Buss). Therefore,
private self-consciousnesshas not been linked with social anxiety because it has
been referred to as a dispositional set toward asocial and nonsocial aspects of the
self (Sandelands & Stablein).
Consequently, private self-consciousness has a more positive connotation
than public self-consciousness, although a healthy balance of both is desirable. In
keeping with this supposition, private self-consciousnesstempers the debilitating
aspects of social anxiety, such as creative inhibitions (Cheek & Stahl, 1986) and
low self-esteem (Elliot, 1984). In addition, social anxiety and private self-
consciousness work together to mediate the degree of congruence between self-
ratings and ratings by others (i.e., reducing self-discrepancies) (Jones & Briggs,
1984).
Thus it would appear that the privately self-conscious person would not be
likely to suffer from social anxiety. However, Fenigstein et al. (1975) noted the
similarity between private self-consciousnessand the Jungian concept of introver-
sion. Moreover, despite the moderate correlation between public and private self-
consciousness, it seems anomalous that no correlations have been reported for
social anxietyhhyness measures and private self-consciousness.One study, how-
ever, reports a peripheral association.
Elliot ( 1984) examined the effects of self-consciousness and social anxiety
on self-esteem. He found a relationship between social anxiety and low self-
esteem: private self-consciousnessand low self-esteem were mediated by vulner-
ability to criticism. These findings suggest that a person high in private self-
consciousness and vulnerability to criticism may also be high in feelings of social
anxiety that are cognitively related rather than behaviorally manifested. Such a
person might experience a certain amount of cognitive distress when interacting
in social situations but continue to function effectively in these situations.
Two scales developed by Watson and Friend (1969), the Social Avoidance
and Distress Scale (SAD) and the Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE) have been
used extensively as measures of social anxiety. The SAD assesses social anxiety
that stems from participation in social interactions and measures social avoidance
 450 The Journal of Psychology

and social distress. The FNE measures social anxiety that may arise in potentially
evaluative social situations-apprehension about others’ evaluations and expec-
tancies of negative evaluation in a social climate. Watson and Friend suggested
that the scale may be synonymous with fear of revealing one’s inferiority. In par-
ticular, fear of negative evaluation is a cognitive concept similar to Elliot’s (1984)
measure of vulnerability to criticism. Consequently, fear of negative evaluation
may be an articulated vulnerability, an acknowledgment that evaluations of others
can affect the individual.
Consistent with the notion of cognitive shyness, we hypothesized that private
self-consciousness would correlate positively with the FNE but would have no
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relationship with the SAD. We also hypothesized that public self-consciousness

would correlate positively with the FNE and the SAD, arguing that vulnerability
to criticism directs attention to deficiencies in self-focus. Private self-
consciousness tempers the effects of negative evaluations, whereas public self-
consciousness facilitates the effects of fear of public scrutiny.

Method

Participants were volunteer clerical workers (186 men and 199 women, mean
age = 30.63 years) from a number of institutions in the Australian community of
Newcastle. They were told that we were interested in the way people think about
themselves and how they feel about their own behavior in social situations. The
subjects completed three questionnaires: the FNE and SAD scales (Watson &
Friend, 1969) and the Public and Private Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et
al., 1975). All responses were anonymous, and data remained confidential to the
researchers. No time limit was set for the completion of the scales.

In an earlier study of 354 first-year psychology undergraduates (Monfries &

Kafer, 1988), a principal-components factor analysis showed that the FNE and
SAD scales contain five factors. The FNE differentiates two factors: Negative
Expectations (NE),defined as anticipatory self-perceived negative evaluation
(e.g., “When I am talking to someone, I worry what they may think of me”; and
Negative Public Evaluation (NPE), defined as distress felt by perceived negative
evaluations by others (e.g., “The opinions that important people have of me cause
me little concern.” The SAD differentiates three factors: Avoidance of Groups
(AVOID), for example, “I try to avoid situations which force me to be sociable”;
Ease in Unfamiliar Groups (UNFAM), for example, “It is easy for me to relax
when I am with strangers”; and Distress in Familiar Groups (FAM), for example,
“I often feel nervous or tense in casual get-togethers.” Responses were scored for
total scores on the two scales (FNET and SADT) and scores on the five subfactors
(NE, PE, AVOID, UNFAM, FAM).
 Monfries & Kafer 45 1

TABLE 1
Scores on Social Anxiety and Self-Consciousness, Using Pearson r Correlations

Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Total FNE 1
2. Negative evaluation .89** 1
3. Public evaluation .85** .66** 1
4. Total SAD .49** .48** .33** 1
5. Familiar groups .50** .52** .37** .82** I
6. Avoidance of groups .35** .36** .21** .66** .65** 1
7. Unfamiliar groups .45** .44** .37** .67** .69** .42** 1
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8. Public self-consciousness .41** .33** .39** .23** .23** .08 .26** 1

9. Private self-consciousness .29** .25** .26** .08 .08 .04 .09 .12*

* p < .05. **p < .01.

Results
The scores from the FNE and SAD were examined for their relationship with
public and private self-consciousness by using Pearson r correlation analyses
(Table 1). The results showed that public self-consciousnesswas positively corre-
lated with total scores on both the FNE ( r = .41) and the SAD ( r = .23). Private
self-consciousness, on the other hand, was positively correlated with the total
scores on the FNE ( I = .29), but there was no significant relationship with the
total score on the SAD. These relationships were upheld among the subfactors of
the SAD and FNE with one interesting exception. Public self-consciousness did
not significantly correlate with the Avoidance of Groups factor from the SAD.

Discussion

The results were consistent with results in a number of studies that show a rela-
tionship between public self-consciousness and social anxiety and also suggest
that public self-consciousness is an antecedent of social anxiety (Buss, 1980; Fen-
igstein et al., 1975). In contrast to other studies (Buss, 1980; Carver & Scheier,
1983), however, the hypothesis that private self-consciousnesswould have a sig-
nificant relationship with the FNE and not with the SAD was supported. This
finding supports Elliot’s (1984) research, if a fear of negative evaluation and vul-
nerability to criticism are considered to be synonymous constructs.
Previous studies have assessed the relationship between private self-
consciousness and social anxiety using the seven-item social anxiety component
of the self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975), which, because of its
small number of items, may obscure more subtle relationships. Of interest is that
all of the subfactors (with the exception of avoidance) followed the predicted rela-
 452 The Journal of Psychology

tionships. The failure to find a relationship between avoidance of groups and self-
consciousness could be indicative of the nonclinical sample used. Such a supposi-
tion is congruent with the suggestion (Pilkonis, 1977) that avoidance is an extreme
result of shyness representative of severe pathology.
As noted earlier, Scheier and Carver (1983) proposed that self-focusing leads
to the selection of concrete information that results in mental comparisons at an
abstract level between an actual performance and salient performance standards.
As a consequence, highly self-attentive individuals seek out normative informa-
tion more often than less self-attentivepeople. However, directing the focus to the
self leads to a self-preoccupation that may impair performance as a result of the
egocentric focus (Schwarzer, 1984).
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This process has been used to explain the relationship between public self-
consciousness and social anxiety. However, the same explanation may apply to
the relationship found between private self-consciousness and the FNE. Carver
and Scheier (1985) reported that self-focus facilitates performance for people low
in anxiety but impairs performance for those high in anxiety. Perhaps a private
self-focus alleviates the effects of a fear of negative evaluation, whereas a public
self-focus enhances anxiety related to it.
One possible explanation for this effect is that the fantasy component of
private self-consciousness provides a cognitive outlet for resolutions. For ex-
ample, in Elliot’s (1984) study, vulnerability to criticism and a proclivity to fanta-
size had an indirect effect on a tentative association between private self-
consciousness and low self-esteem. Conversely, the strong association between
social anxiety and low self-esteem was explained by the direct effect of vulnera-
bility to criticism. Thus, fantasy and vulnerability to criticism combined with
private self-consciousness may have an effect on self-esteem and subsequently
bypass the condition of social anxiety.
In cybernetic terms, we are essentially geared to register discrepancies and
subsequently engage to reduce error feedback. If the comparator, after the exami-
nation of present actions (i.e,, input function), registers a discrepancy, then a per-
son attempts to bring one into line with the other (Carver & Scheier, 1985). In the
case of the publicly self-conscious person, public appearance and approval (i.e.,
external features) become the focus of attention for monitoring his or her behav-
ior. On the other hand, private self-consciousness, which is primarily concerned
with internal states, monitors behavior to maintain internal harmony.
Research has suggested that an internal focus is discordant for a concern
about self-presentation. The present results suggest, however, that an internal fo-
cus, as indicated by private self-consciousness, results in a specific self-
presentational concern (i.e., fear of negative evaluation) that is not manifested in
internal distress or avoidance. In conclusion, it should be stressed that the theoreti-
cal explanations for the results of the present study are speculative and may be
applicable only to the study of those who have been socialized in a Western cul-
tural environment.
 Monfries & Kafer 453

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Received October 12, 1993