RIVERA v.
ESPIRITU, 347 SCRA 351 RULING: YES
FACTS:
PAL’s financial situation faced bankruptcy. PAL then adopted a rehabilitation plan
and downsized its labor force by more than 1/3. PAL Employees Association
(PALEA) went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures adopted by the
airline, which later ended when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematic
reduction in PAL’s work force.
Thereafter, then President Estrada issued an admin order creating an Inter-Agency
Task Force to address the problems of the ailing flag carrier. Conciliation meetings
were then held between PAL management and the three unions representing the
airlines employees, with the Task Force as mediator.
PAL submitted to the Task Force an offer of a plan to transfer shares of stock to its
employees, which was subsequently rejected by the union directors. Thus, PAL
informed the Task Force that it was shutting down its operations; claimed that
given its labor problems, rehabilitation was no longer feasible, and hence, it had
no alternative but to close shop. – PAL ceased its operations and sent notices of
termination to its employees.
PALEA wrote to the President; it proposed for the suspension of the PAL-PALEA
CBA for a period of 10 years, subject to certain conditions. PAL management
accepted the PALEA proposal and was consequently accepted by PALEA members
thru a referendum.
PAL resumed domestic operations. On the same date, seven officers and members
of PALEA filed this instant petition to annul the agreement entered into between
PAL and PALEA.
- petitioners contend that the controverted PAL-PALEA agreement is void
because it abrogated the right of workers to self-organization and their
right to collective bargaining.
ISSUE: WON negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.
A CBA is a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive
bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations
with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of
employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising
under such agreement. 
The SC finds no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor
Code. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability
and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace
at PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfies the first purpose of Article
253-A. The other is to assign specific timetables wherein negotiations become a
matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A, prohibits the parties
from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and agreeing on the
remedies to enforce the same.
In this case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PALs ground
employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that
voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case was the
unions exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right to free collective
bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.
The acts of public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year suspension of the PAL-
PALEA CBA did not contravene the protection to labor policy of the Constitution.
The agreement afforded full protection to labor; promoted the shared
responsibility between workers and employers; and the exercised voluntary modes
in settling disputes, including conciliation to foster industrial peace."
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION V. BORROMEO AND ANTONIO LUA
FACTS:
Petitioner Associated Labor Union (ALU) and Superior Gas and Equipment
Company of Cebu, Inc (SUGECO) were negotiation for the renewal of collective
bargaining contract. While negotiations are going on, 12 SUGECO employees
resigned from ALU and thereupon, such negotiation stopped. ALU wrote SUGECO
charging that the latter was bargaining in bad faith and that its supervisors had
campaigned for the resignation of ALU members and served notice that unless
these unfair labor practice acts were stopped immediately and a collective
bargaining contract between SUGECO and ALU forthwith entered into, the latter
would declare a strike and establish the corresponding picket lines "in any place
where your business may be found." ALU, aside from picketing in SUGECO, it
began to picket the house of Mrs. Lua, SUGECO's general manager, and her
husband Antonio Lua and the store of the Cebu Home and Industrial Supply.
Respondent Cebu Home and Mr. Lua filed a complaint against ALU, to restrain the
latter from picketing the store and residence and to recover damages. They
further averred that no employer-employee relationship and no labor dispute
between the ALU members and Cebu Home exists.
ISSUE: WON, Cebu Home & Mr. Lua have indirect over the labor dispute between
ALU and SUGECO?
HELD:
Yes. Issue partaking the nature of a labor dispute, it is not necessary that the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of Er-Ee. Sec 9 of RA 875 governs cases
involving persons:
1) "who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation"; or
2) "who have direct or indirect interests therein", or
3) "who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or
employees"; or
4) "when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a "labor
dispute or "persons participating or interested" therein (as hereinafter defined)".
Furthermore, "a person or association shall be held to be a person participating or
interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it" and "he or it is
engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute
occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent
of any association composed in whole or in part of employees or employers
engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute regarding the existence of a labor dispute
between the ALU and SUGECO-Cebu; that SUGECO's general manager, Mrs. Lua,
is the wife of the owner and manager of Cebu Home, Antonio Lua; and that Cebu
Home is engaged in the marketing of SUGECO products. It is, likewise, clear that
as managing member of the conjugal partnership between him and his wife, Mr.
Lua has an interest in the management by Mrs. Lua of the business of SUGECO
and in the success or failure of her controversy with the ALU, considering that the
result thereof may affect the condition of said conjugal partnership. Similarly, as a
distributor of SUGECO products, the Cebu Home has, at least, an indirect interest
in the labor dispute between SUGECO and the ALU. In other words, respondents
herein have an indirect interest in said labor dispute, for which reason, we find
that Section 9 of Republic Act No. 875 squarely applies to the case.
Besides, the ALU introduced evidence to the effect that the SUGECO products had
been brought to Cebu Home and were being distributed in the latter, as a means
to circumvent, defeat or minimize the adverse effects of the picketing conducted in
the SUGECO plant. The picketing of the Cebu Home was not beyond the pale of
the Section 9 of Republic Act No. 875 because, as distributor of SUGECO products,
Cebu Home was engaged in the same trade as SUGECO.
BELYCA CORPORATION VS. CALLEJA
FACTS:
ALU seeks direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
rank-and-file workers of the livestock and agro division of petitioner BELYCA
Corporation,engaged in piggery, poultry raising and the planting of agricultural
crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables, employing approximately 205
rank and file employees/workers. Petitioner claims that more than a majority of
respondent employer's rank-and-file employees/workers in the proposed
bargaining unit or one hundred thirty-eight (138) as of the date of the filing of the
petition, have signed membership with the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their
written consent and authorization to the filing of the petition
But petitioner contends that the bargaining unit must include all the workers in its
integrated business concerns ranging from piggery, poultry, to supermarts and
cinemas so as not to split an otherwise single bargaining unit into fragmented
bargaining units. Belyca Corporation contends that due to the nature of its
business, very few of its employees are permanent, the overwhelming majority of
which are seasonal and casual and regular employees. As such, the 138 rank-and-
file employees who authorized, signed and supported the filing of the petition (a)
14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986.
The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by respondent ALU.
Petitioner-employer Belyca Corporation, appealed the order of the Labor Arbiter to
the Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila which denied the appeal) and the motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statutory requirement of 30% (now 20%) of the
employees in the proposed bargaining unit, asking for a certification election had
been strictly complied with.
RULING: YES.
The SC ruled that the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit shall have
the following factors: (1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity
of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or
similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary
employees.
Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of the
fourth factor and sustained the trial court's conclusion that two separate
bargaining units should be formed in dealing with respondent company, one
consisting of regular and permanent employees and another consisting of casual
laborers or stevedores. Otherwise stated, temporary employees should be treated
separately from permanent employees. But more importantly, this Court laid down
the test of proper grouping, which is community and mutuality of interest.
It is beyond question that the employees of the livestock and agro division of
petitioner corporation perform work entirely different from those performed by
employees in the supermarts and cinema. Among others, the noted difference are:
their working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the categories of
their positions and employment status.
Undeniably, the rank and file employees of the livestock-agro division fully
constitute a bargaining unit that satisfies both requirements of classification
according to employment status and of the substantial similarity of work and
duties which will ultimately assure its members the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.
It is significant to note that 124 employees out of the 205 employees of the Belyca
Corporation have expressed their written consent to the certification election or
more than a majority of the rank and file employees and workers; much more
than the required 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20% by
Executive Order No. 111 and applicable only to unorganized establishments under
Art. 257, of the Labor Code, to which the BELYCA Corporation belong. More than
that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for holding a
certification election cannot be a bar to its being granted.
In fact, once the required percentage requirement has been reached, the
employees' withdrawal from union membership taking place after the filing of the
petition for certification election will not affect said petition.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY,
petitioner, vs. YARD CREW UNION, STATION EMPLOYEES UNION,
RAILROAD ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT UNION, MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY, and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, MANILA RAILROAD CREW UNION, STATION EMPLOYEES
UNION and KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-16292-94, L-16309 and L-16317-18 | October 31, 1960
FACTS:
A decision was promulgated in 1956, affirmed by the SC en banc in 1957, in which
the respondent Court found 3 unions appropriate for purposes of collective
bargaining, to wit: (1) The unit of locomotive drivers, firemen, assistant firemen
and motormen-otherwise known as the engine crew unit: (2) the unit of
conductors, assistant conductors, unit agents, assistant route agents and train
posters, otherwise known as the train crew unit, and (3) the unit of all the rest of
the company personnel, except the supervisors, temporary employees, the
members of the Auditing Department, the members of the security guard and
professional and technical employees.
To these 3 units, the following unions were respectively certified as the exclusive
bargaining agents: (1) The Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudantes y
Motormen; (2) Union de Empleados de Trenes (conductors); and (3) the
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company. These are
legitimate labor organizations with certificates of registration in the Department of
Labor.
After the decision had become final, Case No. 491-MC was filed by the Manila
Railroad Yard Crew Union, praying that it be defined as a separate unit; Case No.
494-MC, by the Station Employees' Union, praying that it be constituted as a
separate bargaining unit, and Case No. 507- MC, by the Railroad Engineering
Department Union, praying that it be defined as a separate bargaining unit. All
asked that they be certified in the units sought to be separated. The respondent
unions are legitimate labor organizations with certificates of registration in the
Department of Labor.
The Kapisanan and the Company opposed the separation of the said three units on
the grounds among others:
(1) That the Kapisanan had been duly certified as the collective bargaining agent
in the unit of all of the rest of the employees and it had entered into a collective
bargaining agreement on November 4, 1957, and this agreement bars certification
of a unit at least during the first 12 months after the finality of Case No. 237-MC
(contract bar rule).
After due hearing, the respondent Court ordered a plebiscite to be conducted
among the employees in the three proposed groups, namely: the Engineering
Department, the Station Employees and the Yard Crew Personnel. It also declared
that the collective bargaining agreement could not be a bar to another certification
election because one of its signatories, the Kapisanan President, Vicente K. Olazo,
was a supervisor.
A MR of the said Order was filed by the Kapisanan, and same was denied.
Hence, Appeals by certiorari were filed by the Kapisanan and the Company before
the SC.
ISSUE: W/N the Court erred in ordering a plebiscite, considering that Kapisanan
was already the duly certified representative of the employees and that it had
already entered into a CBA with the Company.
HELD: The petitions or appeals for review by certiorari are dismissed, without
costs.
No. “The desires of the employees" is one of the factors in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit and as such, a plebiscite, not another certification of
election may be rightfully conducted.
The respondent Court was simply interested "in the verification of the evidence
already placed on record and submitted wherein the workers have signed
manifestations and resolutions of their desire to be separated from Kapisanan."
And one way of determining the will or desire of the employees is what the
respondent court had suggested: a plebiscite — carried by secret ballot. "the votes
of workers one way or the other, in these cases will not by any chance choose the
agent or unit which will represent them anew, for precisely that is a matter that is
within the issues raised in these petitions for certification".
Jurisprudence has established that because of the modern complexity of the
relation between both employer and union structure, it becomes difficult to
determine from the evidence alone which of the several claimant groups forms a
proper bargaining unit; that it becomes necessary to give consideration to the
express will or desire of the employees — a practice designated as the "Globe
doctrine," which sanctions the holding of a series of elections, not for the purpose
of allowing the group receiving an over all majority of votes to represent all
employees, but for the specific purpose of permitting the employees in each of the
several categories to select the group which each chooses as a bargaining unit;
that the factors which may be considered and weighed in fixing appropriate units
are: the history, of their collective bargaining; the history, extent and type of
organization of employees in other plants of the same employer, or other
employers in the same industry; the skill, wages, work and working conditions of
the employees; the desires of the employees; the eligibility of the employees for
membership in the union or unions involved; and the relationship between the unit
or units proposed and the employer's organization, management and operation,
and the test in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit must
effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages,
hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.
Further, herein petitioners contend that the collective bargaining agreement, is a
bar to the certification proceedings under consideration. The respondents counter
that it is not so, because one of the signatories in the said agreement for the
Kapisanan, Vicente K. Olazo, was found to be a supervisor. Having, however,
reached the conclusion that the orders in question are not appealable and that the
respondent court has not as yet decided on whether the said collective bargaining
agreement is a bar or not to the petitions for separate units and for certification
election, which could properly be determined after the result of the plebiscite shall
have been known by the respondent court, the consideration of this issue is
premature.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE BIENVENIDO
E. LAGUESMA and NORTH LUZON MAGNOLIA SALES LABOR UNION-
INDEPENDENT, respondents.
FACTS:
On June 4, 1990, the North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union (respondent union
for brevity) filed with the Department of Labor a petition for certification election
among all the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North
Luzon Sales Area.
SMC opposed the petition and questioned the appropriateness of the bargaining
unit sought to be represented by respondent union. It claimed that its bargaining
history in its sales offices, plants and warehouses is to have a separate bargaining
unit for each sales office.
However, when the petition was heard SMC withdrew its opposition to a
certification election and agreed to consider all the sales offices in northern Luzon
as one bargaining unit. At the pre-election conference respondent union won the
election.
In an Order, the Mediator- Arbiter certified respondent union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular sales personnel in all the sales offices
of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales Area.
SMC appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It claimed that, it only agree to the
holding of certification elections subject to the following conditions: (1) there
would only be one general election; (2) in this general election, the individual sales
offices shall still comprise separate bargaining units.
In a resolution, public respondent, by authority of the Secretary of Labor, denied
SMC's appeal and affirmed the Order of the Med- Arbiter.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent union represents an appropriate bargaining
unit.
HELD: YES.
As explained by the SC, a bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law."
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit
are:
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of
work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial
Mutual Interests Rule);
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) similarity of employment status.
In view of the foregoing factors in determining the appropriate CBU, SC ruled that
the existence of a prior collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor
conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit
as asserted by SMC.
The test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees
sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have substantial
mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the
type of work they perform.
Here, the respondent union sought to represent the sales personnel in the various
Magnolia sales offices in northern Luzon.
(1) There is similarity of employment status for only the regular sales personnel in
the north Luzon area are covered.
(2) They have the same duties and responsibilities and substantially similar
compensation and working conditions.
Thus, the commonality of interest among the sales personnel in the north Luzon
sales area cannot be gainsaid. In fact, in the certification election held on
November 24, 1990, the employees concerned accepted respondent union as their
exclusive bargaining agent. Clearly, they have expressed their desire to be one.
Petitioner cannot insist that each of the sales office of Magnolia should constitute
only one bargaining unit. What greatly militates against this position is the meager
number of sales personnel in each of the Magnolia sales office in northern Luzon.
Even the bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent union in the
entire north Luzon sales area consists only of approximately fifty-five (55)
employees.
Surely, it would not be for the best interest of these employees if they would
further be fractionalized. The adage "there is strength in number" is the very
rationale underlying the formation of a labor union.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged Resolution and
Order of public respondent are hereby AFFIRMED in toto, there being no showing
of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS. TRAJANO AND CAPITOL MEDICAL
CENTER EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
Petitioner Capitol Medical Center is a hospital located in Quezon City while the
Respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association is a duly registered
labor union acting as the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of petitioner hospital.
In this case, respondent association sent petitioner hospital a letter requesting a
negotiation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). However, petitioner
challenged the union’s legitimacy and refused to bargain with respondent.
Subsequently they filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of
Labor and Employment, a petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificate of
registration.
For its part, respondent filed with the (NCMB), National Capital Region, a notice of
strike.
It was alleged that petitioner’s refusal to bargain constitutes unfair labor practice.
Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-mediator, the
parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Respondent staged a strike.
Later, former Labor Secretary Quisumbing issued an order assuming jurisdiction
over the said dispute and ordered the striking workers to return work. He also
ordered the hospital and the union for proposal and counter-proposal leading for
the collective bargaining agreement between them.
LABOR SECRETARY – petitioner filed for recon but was denied.
REGIONAL DIRECTOR – deny the petition to cancel respondent union’s
certificate of registration.
CA – affirmed the order of the Labor Secretary. And also denied petitioner’s
motion for recon.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for cancellation of respondent union’s
certificate of registration should be settled first before the Secretary of Labor and
Employment could order the parties to bargain collectively.
HELD: NO.
The Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Labor correctly ruled that the
pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude
collective bargaining. As cited in National Union of Bank Employees v. Minister of
Labor, in which states that considering there is a pending cancellation proceedings
against the respondent Union, it is not a bar to set in motion the mechanics of
collective bargaining. If a certification election may still be ordered despite the
pendency of a petition to cancel the union's registration certificate more so should
the collective bargaining process continue despite its pendency.
Moreover, the order also emphasized that majority status of the respondent Union
is not affected by the pendency of the Petition for Cancellation pending against it.
Unless its certificate of registration and its status as the certified bargaining agent
are revoked, the Hospital is, by express provision of the law, duty bound to
collectively bargain with the Union.
To further support the claim and as earlier mentioned, while the case is pending
before the CA, the regional director issued an order denying the petition for
cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration in which became final and
executory.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
September 20, 2001 and the Resolution dated October 18, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53479 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
NAFTU vs. MAINIT LUMBER (MALDECOWU-ULGWP)
DOCTRINE: The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interests. This is
so because "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether
or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees
the exercise of their collective bargaining rights."
FACTS:
Respondent Mainit Lumber (MALDECOWU-ULGWP) a legitimate labor organization,
filed with Regional Office Ministry of Labor and Employment a petition for
certification election to determine the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative among the rank and file workers/employees of the MALDECO
(company engaged in logging and sawmill operations).
ULGWP, private respondent herein, alleged that there was no certification election
conducted within 12 months prior to the filing of the petition.
The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election. NAFTU appealed the
decision on the ground that MALDECO was composed of 2 bargaining units, the
Sawmill Division and the Logging Division, but both the petition and decision
treated these separate and distinct units only as one.
BLR affirmed the decision. Thus, certification election was held on separate dates
and in said election, MALDECO-ULGWP garnered 146 votes and NAFTU 2 votes.
NAFTU filed an election protest alleging massive vote buying accompanied with
grave and serious threat force and intimidation on the lives of 25 applicants. Med-
arbiter dismissed the election protest.
NAFTU appealed the order of the Med-arbiter with the BLR which denied the
appeal and 2 motions for reconsideration. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: WON there must be two separate bargaining units (sawmill and logging
diivison)?
RULING: NO

Even if for several years, the sawmill and the logging division have always been
treated as separate units in the company (MALDECO), a single unit can still be
created in the basis of “community of interests” rule.
Moreover, while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be
reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not
decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is
community or mutuality of interests. This is so because "the basic test of an
asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights."
Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the Sawmill
Division and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one another. One
group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both. There
may be difference as to the nature of their individual assignments, but the
distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.
STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. SEC. OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT
FACTS:
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union filed a petition for certification
election for the regular rank-and-file employees of petitioner (SLECC) and its 7
Affiliates. Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition due to inappropriateness of the
bargaining unit. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union appealed the order
of dismissal to the SC but later moved for the withdrawal of the appeal. SC
granted the motion and affirmed the dismissal of the petition.
In the meantime, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union reorganized itself
and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers
Association (private respondent CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the
rank-and-file employees of petitioner. It was issued a Certificate of Creation of a
Local Chapter.
On the same date, CLUP-SLECCWA filed a petition for direct certification alleging
that petitioner employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of
employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members. It claimed
that no certification election has been held among them within the last 12 months
prior to the filing of the petition, and while there is another union registered with
DOLE Regional Office covering the same employees, namely Samahang
Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial (SMSLEC), it has not been recognized
as the exclusive bargaining agent of SLECC’s employees.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition averring that it has voluntarily
recognized SMSLEC as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file
employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced
between them. It also argued that the petition should be dismissed for violating
the one year and negotiation bar rules.
Meanwhile, a CBA between SMSLEC and petitioner was ratified by its rank-and-file
employees and registered with DOLE Regional Office.
CLUP-SLECCWA filed its Opposition and Comment to petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss. It assailed the validity of the voluntary recognition of SMSLEC by
petitioner and their consequent negotiations and execution of a CBA, claiming that
it was tainted with malice, collusion and conspiracy involving some officials of the
Regional Office.
Med-Arbiter dismissed CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for direct certification on the
ground of contract bar rule. The prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the
CBA between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for
direct certification. He held that SMSLEC is entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges,
and obligations of an exclusive bargaining representative from the time of the
recording of the voluntary recognition. Moreover, the duly registered CBA bars the
filing of the petition for direct certification.
CLUP-SLECCWA appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment which
reversed Med-Arbiter’s dismissal. The Secretary said that the workers sought to be
represented by CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union included the same
workers in the bargaining unit represented by SMSLEC. SMSLEC was not the only
legitimate labor organization operating in the subject bargaining unit at the time of
SMSLEC’s voluntary recognition. Thus, SMSLEC’s voluntary recognition was void
and could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for certification election. He ordered
for the cancellation of the recording of voluntary recognition in favor of SMSLEC.
SLECC then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which affirmed the ruling of
the Secretary.
ISSUE: WON CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union (predecessor of CLUP-
SLECCWA) is a Legitimate Labor Organization that has juridical personality to
represent the petitioner’s rank and file employees for purposes of collective
bargaining.
RULING: YES.
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from,
but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit. The fundamental factors in
determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such
as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and
working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, the Court has ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining
history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes
an appropriate bargaining unit.
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union’s initial problem was that they
constituted a legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate
bargaining unit. However, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its members to the rank-
and-file of petitioner. Petitioner cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates
Workers Union was a legitimate labor organization at the time of its voluntary
recognition of SMSLEC. Petitioner and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide
whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate
bargaining unit.
The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of
Article 239 of the Labor Code. Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union,
having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as
having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The
proper procedure for SLECC is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of
registration of CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union and not to immediately
commence voluntary recognition proceedings with SMSLEC.
Moreover, an employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a
union in unorganized establishments. Petitioner was not an unorganized
establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining
representative. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union filed a petition for
certification election which remained pending as of the date of voluntary
recognition of SMSLEC. Thus, SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC, the
subsequent negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA executed by SLECC
and SMSLEC are void and cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s present petition for
certification election.
SC also found it strange that the employer itself filed a motion to oppose CLUP-
SLECCWA’s petition for certification election. In petitions for certification election,
the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the
Med-Arbiter’s decision. The exception to this rule, which happens when the
employer is requested to bargain collectively, is not present in this case.
CA decision affirmed.
 PAL v. PALEA, 548 SCRA 117
FACTS:
Petitioner PAL and respondent PALEA entered into a CBA covering the period of
1986-1989. Part of said agreement required petitioner PAL to pay its rank-and-file
employees of their 13th month pay (or mid-year bonus) and Christmas bonus.
However, prior to the payment of the 13 th month pay, PAL released a
guideline implementing said provision in the agreement, which includes the
eligibility of employees (ground employees in the general payroll who are regular),
amount to be paid, and payment date thereof.
PALEA then assailed the implementation of the guideline on the ground that all
employees of PAL, regular or non-regular, must be paid their 13th month pay.
PAL informed PALEA that rank-and-file employees who were regularized after April
30, 1988 were not entitled to the 13 th month pay as they were already given their
Christmas bonuses.
Aggrieved, PALEA filed a labor complaint for ULP against PAL before the NLRC;
argued that "the cut-off period for regularization should not be used as the
parameter for granting the 13th month pay considering that the law does not
distinguish the status of employment, but the law covers all employees."
PAL countered that those rank-and-file employees who were not regularized by
April 30 are, in principle, not denied their 13 th month pay considering they receive
said mandatory bonus in the form of the Christmas Bonus.
LA – dismissed PALEA’s complaint; ruled that PAL was not guilty of ULP in
withholding the grant of the 13th Month Pay, the giving of it was said to be merely
an additional practice made in the past.
NLRC – reversed LA’s decision; the 13th month pay is distinct from the Christmas
Bonus, and although PAL already paid its employees the latter, it must likewise
pay them the former. – CA affirmed NLRC.
Before the SC, PAL argues that the CBA does not apply to non-regular employees
such that any benefits arising from said agreement cannot be made to apply to
them, including the mid-year bonus.
PALEA, maintains that "all employees in PAL are entitled to the same benefit as
they are within the same collective bargaining unit and the entitlement to such
benefit spills over to even non-union members."
ISSUE: WON the CBA apply to non-regular employees such that any benefits
arising from said agreement be made to apply to them, including the mid-year
bonus.
RULING: YES
A reading of the 1986-1989 CBA of the parties show that said agreement made its
provision applicable to all employees in the bargaining unit, without distinguishing
between regular and non-regular employees.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA extend to the laborers and
employees in the collective bargaining unit, including those who do not belong to
the chosen bargaining labor organization. Otherwise, it would be a clear case of
discrimination.
Hence, to be entitled to the benefits under the CBA, the employees must be
members of the bargaining unit, but not necessarily of the labor organization
designated as the bargaining agent. A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a
group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicates to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law. 
At this point, the allegation of PAL that the non-regular employees do not belong
to the collective bargaining unit and are thus not covered by the CBA is unjustified
and unsubstantiated. There is no showing that the non-regular status of the
concerned employees by said cut-off date sufficiently distinguishes their interests
from those of the regular employees so as to exclude them from the collective
bargaining unit and the benefits of the CBA.

Moreover, the argument of PAL which equates the 13 th month pay, also referred to
as the mid-year bonus in the CBA, to the Christmas bonus, is untenable. It is
crystal clear that petitioner PAL is claiming an exemption from payment of the 13 th
month pay provided in the CBA under the guise of paying the Christmas bonus
which it claims to be the equivalent of the 13 th month pay under PD 851. It must
be stressed that in the 1986-1989 CBA, PAL agreed to pay its employees 1) the
13th month pay or the mid-year bonus, and 2) the Christmas bonus.  clear and unambiguous.
A collective bargaining agreement refers to a negotiated contract between a
legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work
and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all
other contracts, the parties to a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where
the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties, and
compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN V. UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN
EMPLOYEES UNION – FFW
FACTS:
Petitioner entered with the University of San Agustin Employees Union-FFW
(respondent) a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective for five (5) years.
The parties agreed to include a provision on salary increases based on the
incremental tuition fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) and
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6728, The Tuition Fee Law. It appears that for the
School Year 2001-2002, the parties disagreed on the computation of the salary
increases. Respondent refused to accept petitioner's proposed across-the-board
salary increase of P1,500 per month and its subtraction from the computation of
the TIP of the scholarships and tuition fee discounts it grants to deserving
students and its employees and their dependents. Respondent likewise rejected
petitioner's interpretation of the term "salary increases" as referring not only to the
increase in salary but also to corresponding increases in other benefits.
Respondent argued that the provision in question referred to "salary increases"
alone, hence, the phrase "P1,500.00 or 80% of the TIP, whichever is higher,"
should apply only to salary increases and should not include the other increases in
benefits received by employees.
Voluntary Arbitrator held that the salary increases shall be paid out of 80% of the
TIP should the same be higher than P1,500. The VA ratiocinated that the existing
CBA is the law between the parties, and as it is not contrary to law, morals and
public policy and it having been shown that the parties entered into it voluntarily,
it should be respected. appellate court held that the questioned CBA provision is
ISSUE: WON, the CBA provisions shall be applied?
HELD: YES.
It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law
between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions.8 If the
terms of a contract, in this case the CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall
control. A reading of the CBA shows that the parties agreed that 80% of the TIP
or at the least the amount of P1,500 is to be allocated for individual salary
increases. The CBA does not speak of any other benefits or increases which would
be covered by the employees' share in the TIP, except salary increases.
In the present case, petitioner could have, during the CBA negotiations, opposed
the inclusion of or renegotiated the provision allotting 80% of the TIP to salary
increases alone, as it was and is not under any obligation to accept respondent's
demands hook, line and sinker. The records are thus bereft of any showing that
petitioner had made it clear during the CBA negotiations that it intended to source
not only the salary increases but also the increases in other employee benefits
from the 80% of the TIP. Absent any proof that petitioner's consent was vitiated
by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed that it entered into the CBA voluntarily,
had full knowledge of the contents thereof, and was aware of its commitments
under the contract.