(In) Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Indian Penal Code, 33e

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1. (IN) Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Indian Penal Code, 33e 2016
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(IN) Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Indian Penal Code, 33e 2016
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Indian Penal Code, 33e 2016
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Indian Penal Code, 33e 2016 > Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Indian Penal
Code, 33e 2016 > CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY
THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)
CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY
OF OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
S. 300. Murder.
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is
caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—
2ndly .—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely
to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—
3rdly .—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—
4thly .—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without
any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
ILLUSTRATIONS
(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.
(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him
with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder,
although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of
a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives
him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health,
here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to
cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.
(c) A, intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary
course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here, A is guilty of murder, although he may not have
intended to cause Z’s death.
(d) A, without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of
murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.
When culpable homicide is not murder.

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Exception 1. —Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-
control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or
causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—
First .—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for
killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly .—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public
servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly .—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of
private defence.
Explanation. —Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from
amounting to murder is a question of fact.
ILLUSTRATIONS
(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z’s child.
This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was
not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.
(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending
nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not
committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.
(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z.
This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the
exercise of his powers.
(d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s
deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z.
This is murder.
(e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent
him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence and kills Z. This is
murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private
defence.
(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander intending to take advantage
of B’s rage, and to cause him kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife.
Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.
Exception 2. —Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right
of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death
of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without
any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
ILLUSTRATIONS
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause a grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z
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persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being
horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.
Exception 3. —Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public
servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and
causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due
discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is
caused.
Exception 4. —Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden

fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation. —It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first
assault.
Exception 5. —Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above
the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
ILLUSTRATIONS
A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under eighteen years of age to commit suicide. Here, on
account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.
COMMENTS
1. General Comments.—
In this Section the definition of culpable homicide appears in an expanded form. Each of the four Clauses
requires that the act which causes death should be done intentionally, or with the knowledge or means of
knowing that death is a natural consequence of the act. An intention to kill is not always necessary to make out
a case of murder. A knowledge that the natural and probable consequence of an act would be death will suffice
for a conviction under Section 302 I.P.C.67
The mental element in culpable homicide, i.e., the mental attitude of the agent towards the consequences of his
conduct, is one of intention or knowledge. Motive is immaterial so far as the offence is concerned, and need not
be established. There are three species of mens rea in culpable homicide : (1) An intention to cause death; (2)
an intention to cause a dangerous injury; (3) knowledge that death is likely to happen. The intention or
knowledge necessary in order to render killing culpable homicide must be clearly proved by the prosecution
which can usually be done by proof of the circumstances which prove the act or omission in question for the
presumption is that a man knows the probable result of his conduct. The fact that such knowledge is
accompanied by indifference whether death or serious injury is caused or not, or even by a wish that it may not
be caused makes no difference. 68 The mental element in culpable homicide is one of the intention or
knowledge. By intention is meant the expectation of the consequence and it does not necessarily involve
premeditation. A man would expect that natural consequences of his act and therefore, in law, is presumed to
intend them. If he performs some act, either expecting that death may be the consequence thereof or expects a
dangerous injury likely to cause death to be the consequence thereof or knows that death is a likely
consequence, his intention in the first two cases and his knowledge in the third would render it culpable
homicide. Guilty intention or knowledge is essential and if this does not exist, the killing of a man may not
amount to culpable homicide. Intention or knowledge necessary to render the killing culpable homicide is to be
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established by the prosecution which can be done by proof of circumstances, which prove the act or omission.
The presumption is that a man knows the probable result of his conduct. When a man is charged with doing an
act of which the probable consequence may be highly injurious the intention is an inference of law resulting
from the doing of the act. Intention is proved by or inferred from the acts of the accused and the circumstances
of the case.69
2. Scope.—
An offence cannot amount to murder unless it falls within the definition of culpable homicide; for this section
merely points out the cases in which culpable homicide is murder. But an offence may amount to culpable
homicide without amounting to murder.
It does not follow that a case of culpable homicide is murder, because it does not fall within any of the
Exceptions to Section 300. To render culpable homicide murder the case must come within the provisions of
Clauses 1, 2, 3, or 4 of Section 300 and must not fall within any one of the five Exceptions attached thereto. An
offence under Section 302 I.P.C. presupposes an offence under Section 299 I.P.C. But an offence under
Section 299 I.P.C. becomes an offence under Section 302 I.P.C ., if it is committed with the intention or
knowledge described in the four Clauses or either of the four Clauses of Section 300 I.P.C. If the requisite
intention or knowledge under the several Clauses of Section 300 I.P.C. is not proved, then the offence is one
under Section 299 I.P.C. provided, of course, the intention or the knowledge mentioned in Clauses (a) to (c) of
that Section are proved. So, when the act of an accused results in death of a human being, one is to consider at
the first instance whether the act of the accused falls under any of the Clauses of Section 300 I.P.C. 70 The right
approach in cases of culpable homicide is to first find out if the offence falls under any of the four Clauses of
Section 300 I.P.C. If it is so found the trial Judge is then to see if the case is covered by one of the Exceptions
to the Section. The offence if proved to fall under one of the Exceptions would be punishable under Section 304
Part I, otherwise it would be murder punishable by Section 302 I.P.C. If, on the other hand, the requirements of
Section 300 are not fulfilled and the offence does not fall under any one of its four Clauses, the Court should
proceed to see whether it was committed with one of the intentions mentioned in Part I or only with the
knowledge described in Part II to Section 304.71
3. Culpable homicide and murder distinguished.—
Two offences involve the killing of a person. They are the offences of culpable homicide and the more henious
offence of murder. What distinguishes these two offences is the presence of a special mens rea which consists
of four mental attitudes in the presence of any of which the lesser offence becomes greater. These four mental
attitudes are stated in Section 300 I.P.C. as distinguishing murder from culpable homicide. Unless the offence
can be said to involve at least one such mental attitude it cannot be murder. The width of the present offence
can cause problems to Judges on sentencing. Lord L ANE CJ remarked in a case, ‘It is a truism to say that of all
the crimes in the calendar, the crime of man slaughter faces the sentencing Judge with the greatest problem,
because manslaughter ranges in its gravity from the borders of murder right down to those of accidental death.
It is never easy to strike exactly the right point at which to pitch the sentence.’ 72
The first Clause says that culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the
intention of causing death. The second Clause deals with acts done with the intention of causing such bodily
injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom harm is caused. The mental
attitude here is two fold. There is first the intention to cause bodily harm and next there is the subjective
knowledge that death will be the likely consequence of the intended injury.
The third Clause discards the test of subjective knowledge. It deals with acts done with the intention of causing
bodily injury to a person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death. In this Clause the result of the intentionally caused injury must be viewed objectively. If the
injury that the offender intends causing and does cause is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
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nature the offence is murder whether the offender intended causing death or not and whether the offender had
a subjective knowledge of the consequence of the act or not.
Fourth Clause comprehends generally the commission of imminently dangerous acts which must in all
probability cause death—when the face of a person is forcibly covered by plaster and his nostrils plugged by
cotton soaked in chloroform, the injury that the offender intends causing and does cause is sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course and the offence is murder—it coming within the third Clause, no matter whether the
offender intended causing death or not or whether the offender had a subjective knowledge of the
consequences or not.73
The factors which reduce murder to culpable homicide are :
(a) it should have been committed without premeditation;

(b) it should have been committed upon a sudden quarrel;
(c) it should have been committed in the heat of passion;
(d) it should have been committed without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel
or unusual manner.74
The distinction between these two offences is very ably set forth by M ELVILLE, J., in Govinda’s case75 and by S
ARKARIA, J., in Punnaya’s case76 the relevant passages from Punnayya’s case are reproduced below.
‘In the scheme of the Indian Penal Code, ‘culpable homicide’ is genus and ‘murder’ its specie. All ‘murder’ is
‘culpable homicide’ but not vice versa. Speaking generally ‘culpable homicide sans ‘special characteristics of
murder’ is culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to
the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first
is, what may be called, culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide
which is defined in Section 300 as ‘murder’. The second may be termed as ‘culpable homicide of the second
degree’. This is punishable under the 1st part of Section 304. Then, there is ‘culpable homicide of the third
degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest
among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under
the Second Part of Section 304 .’
The academic distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ has vexed the
Courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of
the terms used by the legislature in these Sections allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The
safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be, keep in focus the
key words used in the various Clauses of Sections 299 and 300. 77 The following comparative table will be
helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences.
Section 299 Section 300
A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the Subject to certain Exceptions culpable homicide is murder if
death is caused is done....... the act by which the death caused is done....
INTENTION
(a) with the intention of causing death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or
(b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the
to cause death; or offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person
to whom the harm is caused; or
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(3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person

and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death; or
KNOWLEDGE
(c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently
dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any
excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury
as is mentioned above.
Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the
mens rea requisite under Clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim
being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal,
notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a
person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the ‘intention to cause death’ is not an essential
requirement of Clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender’s knowledge
of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim is sufficient to bring the killing within the
ambit of this Clause. This aspect of Clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300.
Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of
cases falling under Clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow
intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased
heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or
spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease
or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was
intentionally given.
In Clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words, ‘likely to cause death’ occurring in the corresponding Clause
(b) of Section 299, the words ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature’ have been used. Obviously, the
distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real, and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice.
The difference between Clause (b) of Section 299 and Clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degrees of
probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of
probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest
degree. The word ‘likely’ in Clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of ‘probable’ as distinguished from a
mere possibility. The words ‘bodily injury.. .. .. . sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ means
that death will be the most probable result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
For cases to fall within Clause (3) it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the
death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature.
Clause (c) of Section 299 and Clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act
causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these
corresponding Clauses. It will be sufficient to say that Clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the
knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person in general as distinguished from a particular
person or persons being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such
knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been
committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
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In Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab ,78 it is held that: ‘In order to hold whether an offence would fall under Section
302 or Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code, the Courts have to be extremely cautious in examining
whether the same falls under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code which states whether a culpable homicide
is murder, or would it fall under its five Exceptions which lay down when culpable homicide is not murder.’ In
other words, Section 300 states both, what is murder and what is not. First finds place in Section 300 in its four
stated categories, while the second finds detailed mention in the stated five Exceptions to Section 300. The
Legislature in its wisdom, thus, covered the entire gamut of culpable homicide ‘amounting to murder’ as well as
that ‘not amounting to murder’ in a composite manner in Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code.79
In a recent judgment80 Supreme Court had admitted that in spite of the death of a person, and a finding in some
of them of an act of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, this Court has not considered the provisions of Section
299 read with Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. In our opinion, such a consideration is important not only
from the jurisprudential point of view but also from the sentencing point of view. From the jurisprudential point of
view it is important because when an act or omission of an accused causes the death of any person, he or she
is either guilty of culpable homicide or guilty of not-culpable homicide. It is for the Court to determine on the
evidence whether, if it is culpable homicide, it amounts to murder as explained in Section 300 of the Indian
Penal Code (along with all its Clauses) or not as explained in Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. If culpable
homicide cannot be proved, then it would fall in the category of ‘not-culpable homicide’. According to the
Supreme Court a five-step inquiry is necessary:
(i) Is there a homicide?

1ii) If yes, is it a culpable homicide or a ‘not-culpable homicide’?
1iii) If it is a culpable homicide, is the offence one of culpable homicide amounting to murder ( Section 300
of the Indian Penal Code ) or is it a culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 of the
Indian Penal Code )?
1iv) If it is a ‘not-culpable homicide’ then a case under Section 304 -A of the Indian Penal Code is made
out.
1v) If it is not possible to identify the person who has committed the homicide, the provisions of Section 72
of the Indian Penal Code may be invoked.
From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a Court is confronted with the question whether the
offence is ‘murder’ or ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ on the facts of a case, it will be convenient
for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be,
whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal
connection between the act of the accused and the death leads to the second stage for considering whether
that act of the accused amounted to ‘culpable homicide’ as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question
is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300, Indian Penal
Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the Court should determine whether the facts proved by the
prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of ‘murder’ contained in
Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be ‘culpable homicide not
amounting to murder’, punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on
whether the second or the third Clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but
the case comes within any of the Exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be ‘culpable
homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the first part of Section 304 Indian Penal Code.
The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will
facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages
so telescoped into each other, that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters
involved in the second and third stages.
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The factual matrix of this Supreme Court case that graphically laid down the distinction between culpable
homicide not amounting to murder and murder may be detailed in brief as it would be conducive to proper
appreciation of the principles laid down in the case. On the fateful day the deceased and his companion on way
to a place N boarded a bus. The accused persons who were to go to a place further from the destination of the
deceased and his companions too boarded that very bus. The two factions were hostile to each other and there
were a lot of criminal litigation going on between them. The deceased and his party men alighted from the bus.
The deceased and P.W.-1 went towards a Choultry run by P.W.-4, while P.W.-2 went to the road-side to ease
himself, A-1 and A-2 went towards the Coffee Hotel situate near the Choultry. From there, they picked up heavy
sticks and went after the deceased into the Choultry. On seeing the accused P.W.-1 ran towards a hut nearby.
The deceased stood up. He was an old man of 55 years. He was not allowed to run. Despite the entreaties
made by the deceased with folded hands, A-1, and A-2 indiscriminately pounded the legs and arms of the
deceased. The accused then threw their sticks at the spot, boarded another vehicle, and went away. The
Supreme Court disagreeing with the view of the High Court where the accused persons had been found guilty
under Section 304 Part-II I.P.C ., held that the offence committed by the accused answers Section 302 I.P.C.
The Supreme Court held : the crux of the matter is whether the facts established bring the case within Clause
Third of Section 300. This question further narrows down into a consideration of the two-fold issue;
(i) whether the bodily injuries found on the deceased were intentionally inflicted by the accused;
1ii) If so, were they sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature? If both these elements are
satisfactorily established, the offence will be murder, irrespective of the fact whether an intention on the
part of the deceased to cause death had or had not been proved.
In the instant case, the existence of both these elements was clearly established by the prosecution. There was
bitter hostility between the warring factions to which the accused and the deceased belonged. Criminal litigation
was going on between the factions since long. Both the factions had been proceeded against under Section
107 Crpc. The accused had therefore a motive to beat the deceased. The attack was pre-meditated and pre-
planned, although the interval between the conception and execution of the plan was not very long. The
accused had purchased tickets for going further to Narasaraopet, but on seeing the deceased alighting at
Nekarikal, they designedly got down there and trailed him. They selected heavy sticks about 3 inches in
diameter each, and with those lethal weapons, despite the entreaties of the deceased, mercilessly pounded his
legs and arms causing no less than 19 or 20 injuries, smashing at least seven bones mostly major bones, and
dislocating two more. The beating was administered in a brutal and reckless manner. There is, therefore, no
escape from the conclusion, that the offence committed by the accused was murder.
The Supreme Court in this case 81 followed an earlier Supreme Court case. 82 There the Supreme Court had to
deal with a very similar situation. In that case, several accused beat the victim with sticks after dragging him into
a house and caused multiple injuries including 16 lacerated wounds on the arms and legs, a haematoma on the
forehead and a bruise on the chest. Under these injuries to the arms and legs lay fractures of the right and left
ulnas, second and third metacarpal bones on the right hand and second metacarpal bone of the left hand,
compound fractures of the right tibia and right fibula. There was loss of blood from the injuries. The medical
officer who conducted the autopsy opined that the cause of the death was shock and syncope due to multiple
injuries that all the injuries collectively could be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, but
individually none of them was so sufficient.
Question arose whether in such a case when no significant injury had been inflicted on a vital part of the body,
and the weapons used were ordinary lathis, and the accused could not be said to have the intention of causing
death, the offence would be ‘murder’ or merely ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. The Supreme
Court speaking through H IDAYATULLAH J. (as he then was), after explaining the comparative scope of and the
distinction between Sections 299 and 300, answered the question in these terms :
‘The injuries were not on a vital part of the body and no weapon was used which can be described as specially
dangerous. Only lathis were used. It cannot, therefore, be said safely that there was an intention to cause the death of
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the victim within the first Clause of Section 300 I.P.C. At the same time, it is obvious that his hands and legs were
smashed and numerous bruises and lacerated wounds were caused. The number of injuries shows that every one
joined in beating him. It is also clear that the assailants aimed at breaking his arms and legs. Looking at the injuries
caused to the victim in furtherance of the common intentions of all it is clear that the injuries intended to be caused
were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, even if it cannot be said that his death was intended.
This is sufficient to bring the case within Clause Thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C .’
Supreme Court did not lay down any law that if there is only a common intention to cause a grievous injury
without any intention to kill, an accused cannot be convicted of murder. This is quite obvious since it would
result in an absurd situation in cases where a person smashes the head of another and pleads that he had no
intention to kill the victim but only cause a grievous injury. The accused must be deemed to know the
consequences of his act, unless it was accidental or unintentional. 83
In an earlier Supreme Court case, 84 where the accused did thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased
which resulted in his death and in the opinion of the doctor, the injury was sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature, it was held that even if the intention of the accused was limited to the infliction of a
bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and did not extend to the intention of
causing death, the offence would be murder.
These decisions85 were followed by the Supreme Court in a subsequent case. 86 In that case the accused
attacked his wife with dagger and caused injuries on her person out of which injury no. 2 which had injured the
liver and caused the perforation of the large colon was sufficient to cause her death in the ordinary course of
nature. Returning the finding that the accused was guilty of murder the Supreme Court held that the appellant
appears to have intended to cause the death of Mrs. Gajri otherwise there was no necessity for him to carry the
dagger with him when he went to the village of his in-laws to fetch his wife. That the appellant intended to cause
the death of the deceased is further clear from the fact that he inflicted a through and through penetrating
wound on the posterior axillary line which seriously injured the vital organs of the deceased viz. the liver and the
large colon leading to internal haemorrhage and shock. The injury in the opinion of the doctor being sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased, the case squarely fell within the ambit of
Clause Third of Section 300 I.P.C. and the offence was murder.
The decision in Virsa Singh’s case,87 and also in Jai Prakash’s case,88 were relied on in an Allahabad case.
There in the noon on the date of occurrence Asa Ram, his wife Jaggo and their son Krishna Pal assaulted
P.W.-1 Mahichand when he demanded back the amount of loan of Rs. 300/- and about this incident Mahichand
lodged a report at the police station. It is alleged that after lodging the report when, Mahichand reached the
village and was talking to his father sitting in front of the hut of his father Jainath, at about 7:00 p.m. the same
day Asa Ram, armed with spear, and his son Krishna Pal, armed with lathi, came there and started beating him
and his father Jainath saying that they would repay the amount of loan and would teach them a lesson for
lodging the report. P.W.-2 Sukhbir Singh and P.W.-7 Jugender Singh, according to prosecution, came to the
spot on hearing the alarm raised by Mahichand and witnessed the incident in question. Jainath according to the
prosecution, died on the spot. On analysis of evidence on record the High Court found that independent of the
evidence of recovery of spear it was established beyond doubt from the circumstances of the case and the
statements of the prosecution witnesses that the appellants came to the spot to teach Mahichand a lesson for
lodging the report of the Marpit, which had taken place in the noon on the question of demand of loan. It was
further established that when Jainath, the father of Mahichand, intervened Asa Ram, appellant, caused the
spear injury to him and he died on the spot instantaneously, while Mahichand received simple injury caused to
him. The High Court held that the offence in question committed by Asa Ram amounted to culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. At best, recourse to Clause Thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. could be made to bring the
offence in the category of culpable homicide amounting to murder. 89
Succinctly bringing out the distinction a Gauhati case held that two offences are involved in the killing of a
person. They are the offences of culpable homicide and the more heinous offence murder. What distinguishes
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these two offences is the presence of a special mens rea which consists of four mental attitudes in the
presence of any of which the lesser offence becomes greater. These four mental attitudes are stated in Section
300 I.P.C. in distinguishing murder from culpable homicide. Unless the offence can be said to involve atleast
one such mental attitude, it cannot be a murder. The first Clause says that culpable homicide is murder if the
act by which the death is caused in done with the intention of causing death. The Second Clause deals with
acts done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of
the person to whom the injury is caused. The mental attitude here is two-fold. There is first the intention to
cause bodily harm and next there is the objective knowledge that death will be the likely consequence of the
intended injury. The third Clause discards the test of subjective knowledge. It deals with acts done with the
intention of causing bodily injury to a person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. In this Clause the result of the intentionally caused injury must be
viewed objectively. If the injury that the offender intends causing and thus causes is sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature, the offence is murder whether the offender intended causing death or not and
whether the offender had a subjective knowledge of the consequences of the act or not. The fourth clause
comprehends dangerous acts which must in all probability cause death. 90
Expressing similar view in a case Kerala High Court held that, Section 300 I.P.C. merely takes the four serious
types of culpable homicide basing on the mens rea and designates them murder; they are an act with the
intention of causing death, an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be
likely to cause death, an act done with the intention of causing such bodily injury which is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death to any person an act which the offender knows is so imminently
dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. In the four types of culpable homicide designated as
murder the mens rea in the first three is constituted by different types of intention and, in the last, knowledge. If
the offence does not fall within one of the four types mentioned in Section 300 I.P.C ., no question of application
of Exception arises.91 Presence of a special mens rea which consists of four mental attitudes, in the presence of
any of which, the lesser offence of culpable homicide becomes the greater offence of murder. 92 An offence
under Section 302 presupposes an offence under Section 299. But an offence under Section 299 becomes an
offence under Section 302 only if it is committed with the intention or knowledge described in the four Clauses
of Section 300 I.P.C. If the requisite intention or knowledge under those Clauses is not proved, then the offence
is one under Section 299, provided the intention or knowledge mentioned in Clauses (a) to (c) of that section is
proved.93 Intention may develop instantaneously and can be gathered from the circumstances. 94 Accused and
others invading the house of G as a sequel to land dispute threw away the 3-1/2 year-old son of G to death on
the cultivable ground with force that did not break any bone of the baby. It was held that the ground was not
cemented, plastered or paved grounds; the baby suffered no fracture of bones; so no great force was used; no
weapon was used; no malice the accused bore to the baby. So, Clauses firstly and thirdly stand ruled out. But
the accused can be attributed with the knowledge that his action is likely to cause death. So, the offence
answers Section 304 Part-II I.P.C.1
In the case of murder the offender has a positive intention or knowledge. He assaults the victim with the
intention of causing death or with the definite knowledge that (1) the bodily injury inflicted by him would cause
death, or (2) the injury would be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or (3) the injury was
so imminently dangerous that it must cause death. In the case of culpable homicide the intention or knowledge
is not so positive or definite. The injury caused may or may not cause death. Even if Exceptions 1 to 4 to
Section 300 I.P.C. are not applicable, the offence can still be culpable homicide. To find out if the offender is
guilty of murder it must be held that the case falls within any of the four Clauses of Section 300 I.P.C .,
otherwise, he will be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 2
Although distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder had been laid down by
apex Court in a number of decisions, it may not be academic to refer to an old case which held Section 300
I.P.C. should be looked into to ascertain the distinction between the two. If on referring to Section 300, the
Judge is of the opinion that the killing does not come within one of the four Clauses he can then refer to Section
299. If the killing comes within the second part of Section 299, which relates to the intention of causing a bodily
injury likely to cause death, it comes under Section 304 Part I, and if there is no intention but only knowledge,
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that is to say, if there is no intention to cause death or a bodily injury likely to cause death, but only knowledge
that death is likely to be caused, the offence is under Section 304, Part-II. Cases under the Exceptions to
Section 300 I.P.C. will fall under Section 304 Part-I. If death is caused by an act done with the intention of
causing death or done with the intention of causing a fatal injury, the offence is murder and is covered by
Clause (1) or Clause (3) of Section 300 I.P.C. Clause (2) of Section 300, is clearly intended to cover what may
conveniently be classified as ‘spleen cases’ such as are referred to in Illus. (b) to Section 300 I.P.C. A case
under Clause (4) of Section 300 is very unusual and Illustration (d) is a sufficient indication to what class of
cases it is intended to apply. Ordinarily, therefore, the Exceptions to Section 300 apart, the test to be applied in
any particular case of culpable homicide is whether the intention specified in Clause (1) or Clause (3) of Section
300 is established on the evidence and circumstances. If it is, the offence is murder if it is not, the offence is
culpable homicide. If the offence is culpable homicide and the offender’s intention was to cause such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death (secondly of definition in Section 299 ) the offence is punishable under part I of
Section 304. If the offender had no such intention but had knowledge that his act was likely to cause death,
(thirdly of definition in Section 299 ), the offence is punishable under Part II of Section 304. 3 A Bhopal case
emphasizing the need of focussing attention to Section 300 I.P.C. and four Clauses thereof held if the act falls
under any one of the four Clauses, it is murder, provided of course, that no Exception applies. Clause (3) to
Section 300 I.P.C. refers to a bodily injury sufficient to cause death and Section 299 I.P.C. refers to the bodily
injury likely to cause death. The distinction between the two is one of degree. ‘Likely to cause death’ connotes
that there is less probability of death but ‘sufficient to cause death’ means that the probability of death is
greater. If, on referring to Section 300 I.P.C ., the Judge is of opinion that the killing does not come within any
one of the four Clauses, he should then refer to Section 299 I.P.C ., and if the act of killing comes within the
second part of Section 299 I.P.C. it falls under Section 304 Part I of the I.P.C. But if there is absence of
intention, and knowledge only is established, it comes under Part II of that Section. Cases under Exceptions to
Section 300 I.P.C. will fall under Part 1 to Section 304 I.P.C. 4
In an old Bombay case,5 the accused kicked his 15-year-old wife and struck her several times after which she
fell down on the ground and then the accused put one knee on her chest, and struck her two or three times on
the face. One or two of these blows have been violent and took effect on the girl’s left eye, producing contusion
(injury without breaking skin) and discoloration. The skull was not fractured, but the blow caused an
extravasations of blood on the brain, and the girl died in consequence either on the spot, or very shortly
afterwards. Bombay High Court was called upon to decide if the offence answers ‘murder’ or ‘culpable homicide
not amounting to murder’. The High Court held that the words ‘with the intention of causing death’ in Section
299 and the words ‘with the intention of causing death’ in Section 300 show thatwhere there is an intention to
cause death, the offence is always murder. The words ‘with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death
in Section 299 and the words ‘with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all
probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death’ in Section 300 appear to be intended to
apply (although not necessary limited) to cases in which there is no intention to cause death or bodily injury.
Furious driving, firing at a mark near a public road, would be cases of this description. Whether the offence is
culpable homicide or murder, depends upon the degree of risk to human life. If death is a likely result, it is
culpable homicide; if it is the most probable result it is murder. The offence is also murder, if the offender knows
that the particular person injured is likely, either from peculiarity of constitution, or immature age, or other
special circumstance, to be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death. The offence is culpable
homicide, if the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death, it is murder, if such injury is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine, but appreciable. Turning to the
factual matrix of the case the High Court held through M ELVILLE J. who observed, ‘I am of the opinion that the
offence is culpable homicide, and not murder. I do not think there was an intention to cause death; nor do I think
that the bodily injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Ordinarily, I think, it would
not cause death. But a violent blow in the eye from a man’s fist, while the person struck is lying with his or her
head on the ground, is certainly likely to cause death, either by producing concussion (violent shock or injury) or
extravasations of blood on the surface or in the substance of the brain.’ Thus the offence was found to be
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.6
Relying on State of A.P. v. R. Punnayya ,7 whenever a Court is called upon to decide as to whether the offence
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committed was that of murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder on the proved facts of a case, the
stress should be to approach the problems in three stages. At the first stage it has to be considered whether the
accused has done an act by doing which he has caused death of another and proof of such causal connection
between the act of the accused and the death of the deceased leads to the second stage for deciding whether
the act proved amounted to culpable homicide as defined in Section 299 I.P.C. If the answer to this question is
prima facie found in the affirmative, third stage for considering the operation of Section 300 I.P.C. is reached. At
this stage the Court has to determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the
ambit of any of the four classes of the definition of ‘murder’ specified in Section 300 I.P.C. and if the answer to
this question is not in the affirmative, but is in the negative, the offence would be culpable homicide not
amounting to murder punishable under the first or second part of Section 304 I.P.C. If the reply to this question
is found in the positive and the case comes within any one of the Exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the
offence would again be culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under the first part of Section
304 I.P.C. It is also admitted that all murders are culpable homicide but all cases of culpable homicide cannot
be termed to be murder. Even though no Exception is pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on
record, the prosecution is required to bring the accused under any of the four Clauses of Section 300 I.P.C. to
sustain the charge of murder and if the prosecution fails, in discharging the onus, the accused would get its
benefit and the charge would be held to have been proved of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The
prosecution, therefore, has to prove in every case of culpable homicide to attract the provisions of Section 300
I.P.C. that the act by which the death was caused was done (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to
whom the harm is caused, or (iii) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or (iv) with the knowledge
that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely
to cause death and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death. 8
Under the category of unlawful homicides fall both cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those
not amounting to murder. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five Exceptions
to Section 300 I.P.C. But even though none of the said five Exceptions is pleaded or prima facie established on
the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the
four Clauses of Section 300 I.P.C. to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this
onus in establishing any one of the four Clauses of Section 300 I.P.C ., namely Firstly to Fourthly, the charge of
murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as
described under Section 299 I.P.C.9
To sum up : ‘Section 299 is divided into three parts. The first part refers to the act by which the death is caused
by being done with the intention of causing death. That part corresponds to the first part of the Section 300
I.P.C. The second part of Section 299 I.P.C. speaks of the intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death. This has corresponding provisions in Clauses ‘Secondly’ and ‘Thirdly’ of Section 300 I.P.C.
Section 304, Part I I.P.C ., covers cases which by reason of the Exceptions under Section 300 I.P.C ., are taken
out of the purview of Clauses (1), (2) and (3) of Section 300 I.P.C ., but otherwise would fall within it and also
cases which fall within the second part of Section 299 but not within Section 300 Clauses (2) and (3). The third
part of Section 299 corresponds to ‘fourthly’ of Section 300. Section 304 Part-II I.P.C ., covers those cases
which fall within the third part of Section 299 but do not fall within the fourth Clause of Section 300 .’ 10Section
300 states both, what is murder and what is not. First finds place in Section 300 in its four stated categories,
while the second finds detailed mention in the stated five Exceptions to Section 300. The Legislature in its
wisdom, thus, covered the entire gamut of culpable homicide ‘amounting to murder’ as well as that ‘not
amounting to murder’ in a composite manner in Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code.11
To determine whether culpable homicide is murder or not the safest mode is to keep in focus key words used in
Sections 299 - 300 and to look into the degree of probability of death resulting from intended bodily injury which
determines whether culpable homicide is of gravest, medium or lowest degree. 12
4. English law.—
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So far as English law is concerned, manslaughter differs from murder only in relation to the mental element
necessary to support the charge. Manslaughter may be classified as voluntary or involuntary, the distinction
being that in cases of voluntary manslaughter a person may be convicted of the offence notwithstanding that he
may have the mens rea of murder. Voluntary manslaughter takes the forms of killing under provocation; killing
by a person who, by reason of abnormality of mind, suffers from diminished responsibility and killing in
pursuance of a suicide pact. Involuntary manslaughter is committed (i) where death results from an unlawful act
which any reasonable person would recognise as likely to expose another to the risk of injury; and ( ii) where
death is caused by gross negligence.13
‘Murder is widely thought to be the gravest of crimes. One could expect a developed system to embody a law of
murder clear enough to yield an unequivocal result on a given set of facts, a result which conforms with
apparent justice and has a sound intellectual base. This is not so in England where the law of homicide is
permeated by anamoly, fiction, misnomer and obsolete reasoning. One suspicious anomaly is the rule which
identifies the malice aforethought (a doubly misleading expression) required for the crime of murder not only
with a conscious intention to kill but also with an intention to cause grievous bodily harm. Many would doubt the
justice of this rule, which is not the popular conception of murder and ... no longer rests on any intellectual
foundation .... It is right to recognise that the grievous bodily harm rule is an outcropping of old law from which
the surrounding strata of rationalistations have weathered away.’ These were observations made by LORD M
USTILL in a reference matter. Despite the criticism the HOUSE OF LORDS recognised that there was no ground
upon which the HOUSE OF LORDS could abolish so established a rule.14
As stated in K ENNY : No clear-cut definition of manslaughter is to be found in any of the old authorities. They
all dealt with this crime in a negative way, as being a homicide which for one reason or another (e.g.
provocation) did not amount to murder. Throughout its history the law has not been brought within any precisely
expressed principle, and even at the present day such is the confusion in which the law of homicide stands that
it is not possible to give an authoritative definition of manslaughter in plain terms. Up to the nineteenth century it
was discussed as a residuary category of homicide, into which fell all killings which were not justified,
excusable, or murderous. It has always been a felony, but more than any other kind of homicide its legal nature
was obscured not only by the historical variations of meaning in the concept of mens rea, but also by the relics
of the archaic rule of strict liability which knew no requirement of a mental element in criminal responsibility. For
although, being a crime at common law, manslaughter must be governed by the maxim actus reus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea, yet the mens rea required for manslaughter has not been defined in clear terms, and in
innumerable instances has never even been referred to. 15
The accused alongwith his associate, who had a gun, went for car lifting but owner of car opened fire and
associate was killed and then owner of car was also killed and accused was arrested from near the scene of
murder. The Judge directed the jury in accordance with the principle of constructive malice under felony/murder
rule whereby intention was not an element to be proved. He was however convicted although constructive
malice principle was abolished from 1979 retrospectively by decision given in Mosses v. Trinidad and Tobago ,
16
On appeal Privy Council remitted the case to the Court of appeal for reconsideration as Judge had
misdirected the jury which as a result had not considered the crucial issue of intention. 17 The accused was
alleged to have killed the deceased advocate in the Court room but he was caught hold of on spot by other
advocates and constable on duty. The presence of these eye-witnesses was natural and their evidence was
reliable. It was held that accused had come to the Court with clear intention and plan to commit murder. The
conviction of accused was upheld.18
Two teenagers aged 16 and 17 years were charged with the murder or manslaughter of a 16 year old boy. One
accused was convicted but other pleaded acquittal as he was found unfit to plead by reason of his mental
disability. After hearing the matter the jury found that accused had committed the murder and Judge made a
hospital order with a restriction order without a time limit. The Court of appeal upheld that verdict and an appeal
was filed on the ground that the act of murder included a mental element to which the defence of diminished
responsibility was relevant. Dismissing the appeal it was held that accused was not entitled to raise statutory
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defence of diminished responsibility and prosecution was not required to prove the mental elements of the
offence.19 The defendant gave birth to a child but it was found with a ligature round its neck. Doctor was of the
opinion that the child was breathing but it could not be said that the child was completely born as breathing can
take place during the birth also. In a charge of murder it was held that birth means that the whole body is
brought into the world and it is not sufficient that it should respire in the progress of birth. Conviction for murder
was not approved as medical report did not say that the child was born alive, they only said that it had
breathed.20
As in murder, so also in manslaughter, death may be unexpectedly caused by the infliction of some harm which
can be justified; for example, in the course of the lawful arrest of a criminal, in the carrying out of a lawful
sentence upon a convicted person, in self-defence, in reasonable chastisement of a child by its parent and so
on. It should be remembered that in each of these instances the harm inflicted can only be justified if the
requirements of the law have been observed; thus the punishment inflicted upon a criminal must be in strict
accordance with his sentence, or if upon a child by a master or parent it must be moderate and reasonable in all
the circumstances, while in the case of surgical operations and in games and sports the true consent of the
patient to undergo the operation, or of the player to take part in the game, is an essential condition. 21
Throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the
prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt. In every charge of murder, if the prosecution have proved homicide,
namely, the killing by the accused, the prosecution must prove further that the killing was malicious and murder,
as there is no presumption that the act was malicious, and at no point of time in a criminal trial can a situation
arise in which it is incumbent upon the accused to prove his innocence, subject to the defence of insanity and
subject also to any statutory exception. Where intent is an ingredient of a crime there is no onus on the accused
to prove that the act alleged was accidental. 22 The above principle has been inherited by India and in a case the
prosecution case which rested on the evidence of eye-witnesses was that the accused had fired at the
deceased, (a) two shots, (b) from a gun, and (c) at close range, and had thereby caused his death. Setting
aside the conviction the Supreme Court held that when the prosecution has a definite and positive case, the
burden lies upon it to prove the whole of that case. In a case in which death is due to injuries caused by a lethal
weapon, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove by expert evidence the nature of the weapon by which, and
the manner in which, those injuries were likely or at least possible to have been caused by the weapon, by
which, they are alleged to have been caused. Non-examination of a ballistic expert creates a dent in the
prosecution case and conviction cannot be sustained. 23 For non-examination of ballistic expert the prosecution
also however did not fail in a case as there is no general or universal rule that in every case in which death is
shown to have been caused by the use of a fire-arm it is the duty of the prosecution to examine a ballistic
expert to prove by expert evidence that the injuries on the victim were caused with the weapon used by the
accused person. In a case, in which the prosecution case is that the rifles used by the accused have not been
recovered, there is no occasion to examine any ballistic expert in respect of the injuries. Where the accused
has been arrested after several days and he produces a weapon saying that it was in the hands of the
deceased who was one of the rival party and that he carried it away after it fell down from the hands of the
deceased during the fight, there is no purpose in examining the expert. To do so, would only introduce
complications in the case, because of the possibility that the accused may have deliberately surrendered a
wrong weapon.24
5. Clause 1—’Act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death’.—
When a culpable homicide is accompanied by the mens rea detailed in Clause firstly namely the intention to
cause death, it answers murder unless of course the accused brings the culpable homicide under the
Exceptions 1 to 5 appended to Section 300 I.P.C.
The accused without any provocation or instigation by the deceased repeatedly attacked thrice on vital parts of
body of the deceased with intention to cause his death. Conviction of accused under Section 302 was held
proper.25
Accused abused the deceased and stabbed him with knife resulting into his death. After this incident he went to
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the witness house and concealed weapon and wearing apparels. It was held that intention of the accused to
cause death was evident.26 Accused had caused death of the deceased and evidence showed that there was
intention to kill as injury caused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death. It was held
that offence of murder was made out.27
Whether or not the author of culpable homicide was actuated by the intention to cause death is a subjective
element, but may be deduced from certain objective facts, circumstances and behaviour. In a case the accused
persons caught the deceased a young boy alleged to have stolen their utensils. They tied his hands with a rope
and tried to extort a confession from him. One of the accused poured kerosene on the boy after which the
appellant lighted a match and set fire to his clothes. There was evidence of complicity of the appellant and that
he had taken a leading part in the act. The accused was held guilty of murder. 28 Thus when a person stabs
another person particularly an old unarmed person with a knife or any other sharp edged cutting weapon on the
vital part of the body like the abdomen, he obviously intends to cause death or intends to cause bodily injury
sufficient to cause death. Such a conduct answers the first Clause for Section 300 and is murder. 29 Where
injuries are inflicted by a number of persons with intention of killing a person and death results as a result of
injuries, the conduct answers Clause (1) or at least Clause (3) for at any rate the injuries are sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death.30 Causing of a serious injury on a vital part of the body of the
deceased with dangerous weapon like an axe must necessarily leads to the inference that the accused
intended to cause death of the victim and it answers Clause (1) of Section 300 and it is murder. 31
In a Supreme Court case the accused in a marriage ceremony was going to have his lunch but finding no place
to sit in he asked a boy of 15 years of age to step aside a little so that he may occupy a convenient seat. When
boy refused to oblige he whipped out a pistol and caused his death by shooting him in his abdomen. He was
drunk at that moment. High Court convicted him under Section 302 but on appeal to Supreme Court it was to be
determined whether offence committed by petitioner fell under Section 302 or 304. It was held that he intended
to inflict bodily injury to the deceased and that injury was sufficiently fatal. He was not so much under influence
of intoxication that his mind was so obscured by drink that there was incapacity in him to form the required
intention. As such by virtue of provisions of Section 36 it was a clear case of murder and conviction was
upheld.32
After causing death of the deceased by firing accused pleaded that beating given by wife to him was such that it
deprived him of power of self control and he fired a shot accidentally. Testimony of witness that the accused
had sustained injuries as a result of fall when he was trying to flee from the spot was found reliable and no
witness had stated that there was any quarrel between the deceased and the accused. It was held that act and
conduct of the accused clearly suggested that he intended to kill the deceased and his conviction under Section
302 was proper.33 Accused tried to take water for drinking from bucket of the deceased to which he objected.
This infuriated accused and he fired at the deceased which resulted to her death. There was no previous enmity
and single shot fired was undetermined. Accused was convicted under Section 304 as intention to kill was
missing. Another accused was acquitted as his presence on spot was not established. 34 Accused, a real
nephew of deceased, had given a single knife blow in an altercation ensued about some money transaction. It
was held that intention to commit murder could not be attributed to the accused as he had acted without pre-
meditation and had not behaved in a cruel and unusual manner. Conviction of the accused was altered from
Section 302 to Section 304.35
When the accused set fire to the cottage in which the deceased was sleeping and before doing so took care to
lock the door from outside so that the servants of the deceased who were sleeping outside would be of no help
to the deceased and further took active steps to prevent the villagers also from bringing any succour to the
person who was being burnt alive, it was held that the intention of the accused to cause death was patent and
the offence answer the Clause (1) of Section 300 and the offence was murder. 36 Where the deceased brutally
assaulted the deceased causing 19 injuries and the injuries were caused even after the deceased fell down,
intention to kill was proved.37 Intention to kill can be inferred from the murder and nature of the injuries caused
to the victim (here there were 34 injuries by an axe and sticks resulting in the death of this victim). 38 Where all
the three eye-witnesses spoke that the appellant dealt only one blow with the implement. The Supreme Court
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having regard to the time and the surrounding circumstances held that it was difficult to hold that he intended to
cause the death of the deceased particularly when he was not armed with any deadly weapon as such. The
Supreme Court also held that as an agriculturist he must have been having a tabbal in his hands and if in those
circumstances he dealt a single blow it was difficult to convict him by invoking Clause (1) or (3) of Section 300
I.P.C ., and that it could not be said that he intended to cause that particular injury which unfortunately resulted
in the fracture of bones. The offence committed by him was held to be one amounting to culpable homicide
punishable under Section 304 Part II I.P.C.39
The accused not only gave a single blow but had actually battered his wife as he suspected her fidelity. The son
and daughter of accused were eye witness of the whole incident. It was held that inference could be drawn that
the accused assaulted the wife with intention of causing death and nothing else. Conviction for murder was held
proper and acquittal order of trial Court was set aside. 40 The accused shot dead the deceased and evidence
available showed that it could not be said that he had no intention to kill. It was held that conviction of accused
for murder was proper but conviction of other accused was liable to be set aside as exact role played by them
could not be established.41 In case of manslaughter the act causing death and the necessary mental state to
constitute the offence did not have to coincide in point of time. Where the unlawful application of force and
eventual act causing death were part of same sequence of events, the fact that there was time interval between
the two did not serve to exonerate the person charged from liability. 42
In a Punjab case Dharam Pal & Khazan Singh were two co-tenants. Dharam Pal lived with his wife Maya and
infant child Sonu. Khajan one day along with another entered the room of Dharam Pal and caused injuries on
both Dharam Pal and Maya. Even infant child aged 1-1/2 years was not spared who died of the following
injuries namely—
(1) An incised wound 16 x 4 cm. On the back obliquely placed extending from the right iliac crest to the left
buttock; left hip bone was completely cut;
(2) An incised wound 17 cms. x1 1-1/2 cm. on the right side of the head, 6 cm. above the right ear; bones
underneath i.e., right parietal and occipital were out through and through, underneath brain membrane
and brain matter were cut;
(3) An incised wound 9 cm. x 3 cm. on the right side of the face, just lateral to the outer angle or right eye,
extending from the forehead to the right mandible;
(4) An incised scratch 13 cm. lying obliquely on the back extending from right side of neck to the left renal
angle.
On dissection of injury no. 2, brain membrane were found cut and brain underneath was also cut; there were
clots present over the surface of the brain; all these injuries were ante-mortem and caused by sharp edged
weapon. It was held that the accused intended also to kill the child and it was not a case that a single blow
aimed at the mother accidentally hit the child.43
The quarrel between accused and deceased continued for 10-15 minutes and accused used his weapon for
committing offence and to cause injuries but sudden provocation was not doubtful. The medical report did not
state that injuries inflicted on the deceased by accused were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
the death or likely to cause death. It was held that Section 300, Part I was not attracted and conviction under
Section 302 was altered to one under Section 304 Part II. 44 Where accused dragged the deceased by hair and
then stabbed with knife by giving single blow with such great force that it damaged the lung and vessels of the
deceased, conviction was held proper as assault was made with an intention to cause death. 45
The police officials were attacked by the accused operating a gambling dens. Evidence of eye witnesses clearly
showed that while gun was being taken into custody by police the son of accused snatched the gun from his
father and started firing in which police inspector was killed and other witnesses were injured. Deceased was hit
on chest as he was main target of firing. Merely because there was firing all around it would not bring the
accused within the ambit of Section 304 as it was clear case of murder. Even if, the Court said, the intention of
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the accused was limited to the inflicting of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature, and did not extend to the intention causing death, the offence would be murder. 46 The accused had
some quarrel with deceased in day time and in night he entered his house and assaulted him with Gupti.
Intention and Motive to commit the crime were established and accused was convicted. 47 The nature of injuries
caused showed that accused intentionally committed crime. The injury was on vital part of body and was
sufficient to cause death. It was held that offence of murder and not culpable homicide was established. 48
Intentionally injuries sufficient to cause death were inflicted and accused were convicted. 49
Death caused due to gun shot injury. Ocular evidence, medical report and recovery of empty cartridges at spot
proved the place, time and manner of crime. Since accused had fired in heat of moment, conviction was altered
from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II. 50 Deceased, an old man, raped minor daughter of accused who was so
enraged that he assaulted the deceased and caused his death. He had no intention to cause his death and his
conviction was altered from Section 302 to one under Section 304 Part II. 51
6. Assaulting innocent person.—
The accused was caught running after assaulting and killing a child (20 days old) who was sleeping on cot
covered with blanket. His plea that he did not know that child was lying on cot was not accepted and he was
convicted as he was aware of presence of child inside the blanket and that he had deliberately hit the child with
intention to cause death.52 A child (minor girl) was murdered and circumstances right from arrest of the accused
to recovery of ornaments of child pointed towards the guilt of accused. Conviction was held proper. 53
The accused gave repeated blows of iron rod with sufficient force on head of deceased and then caused
injuries on body with knife. Thus assault was established to have been made with deliberate intention to cause
death due to old existing enmity between them. Conviction for murder was held proper. 54 The accused without
any intention to cause death had gone to take back his buffalo forcibly. They used spears to cause injuries to
deceased on vital part of his body but every thing had happened in heat of passion. Intention to kill was not
established and accused was convicted for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I. 55
Accused was angry to see complainant party siding his opponents in a quarrel with his neighbour. Therefore in
order to teach them a lesson he fired three shots in which the death of deceased was caused. This indicated
intention of the accused to finish the complainant party but wife and brother of the deceased had escaped the
shots by hiding themselves. It was held that the accused was rightly convicted for murder. 56 Where considering
number of injuries, nature of such injuries and medical evidence corroborating ocular evidence, intention of
accused to cause death became clear, it was held that the accused could only be convicted for offence of
murder.57 Deceased watered fields of others ignoring the request of accused, who entered his house at
midnight armed with deadly weapons and gave four stab wounds on body of the deceased. Medical report
showed that injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It was held that case was
covered under Section 302 and not under Section 304. 58 The accused inflicted injury on abdomen of the
deceased with a screw driver and injury being 12 cms deep had damaged liver and spleen. It was intentionally
caused injury as death was caused instantaneously. Accused was held guilty of murder. 59
7. Fake Encounters.—
Fake ‘encounters’ are nothing but cold blooded, brutal murder by persons who are supposed to uphold the law.
The Supreme Court opined that if crimes are committed by ordinary people, ordinary punishment should be
given, but if the offence is committed by policemen much harsher punishment should be given to them because
they do an act totally contrary to their duties. In cases where a fake encounter is proved against policemen in a
trial, they must be given death sentence, treating it as the rarest of rare cases. If a policeman is given an illegal
order by any superior to do a fake ‘encounter’, it is his duty to refuse to carry out such illegal order, otherwise he
will be charged for murder, and if found guilty, sentenced to death. 60 Merely because a person is a dreaded
criminal or a proclaimed offender, he cannot be killed in cold blood. The police must make an effort to arrest
such accused. In a given case if a dreaded criminal launches a murderous attack on the police to prevent them
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from doing their duty, the police may have to retaliate and, in that retaliation, such a criminal may get killed.
That could be a case of genuine encounter. The Supreme Court held that, in the facts of this case, it is unable
to draw such a conclusion. State of Haryana was directed to pay a sum of Rs.20 lakhs to the appellant as
compensation for the pain and suffering undergone by him on account of loss of his son, who died in the fake
encounter.61 The lives lost in the fight against terrorism and insurgency are indeed the most grievous loss. But
to the State it is not open to cite the numbers of policemen and security forces killed to justify custodial death,
fake encounter or what the Court had called ‘Administrative liquidation’. It is simply not permitted by the
Constitution. In this case Supreme Court appointed a high powered commission to inquire into the alleged fake
encounters in Manipur. It was alleged that during the period May, 1979 to May, 2012, 1528 people were killed in
Manipur in extra - judicial execution. 62
8. Honour Killing.—
The words ‘honour killings’ and ‘honour crimes’ are being used loosely as convenient expressions to describe
the incidents of violence and harassment caused to the young couple intending to marry or having married
against the wishes of the community or family members. They are used more as catch phrases and not as apt
and accurate expressions.63 According to Supreme Court ‘we sometimes hear of ‘honour’ killings of such
persons who undergo inter caste or inter religious marriage of their own free will. There is nothing honourable in
such killings, and in fact they are nothing but barbaric and shameful acts of murder committed by brutal, feudal
minded persons who deserve harsh punishment. Only in this way can we stamp out such acts of barbarism.’ 64
In Arumugam Servai v. State of Tamil Nadu ,65 the Supreme Court strongly deprecated the practice of
khap/katta panchayats taking law into their own hands and indulging in offensive activities which endanger the
personal lives of the persons marrying according to their choice. If someone is not happy with the behaviour of
his daughter or other person, who is his relation or of his caste, the maximum he can do is to cut off social
relations with her/him, but he cannot take the law into his own hands by committing violence or giving threats of
violence. Honour killings, for whatever reason, come within the category of rarest of rare cases deserving death
punishment. It is time to stamp out these barbaric, feudal practices which are a slur on our nation. This is
necessary as a deterrent for such outrageous, uncivilized behaviour. All persons who are planning to perpetrate
‘honour’ killings should know that the gallows await them. 66 Law Commission of India studied the matter and
submitted the Report (242) to the Government. Some proposals are being mooted proposing amendments to
Section 300 I.P.C. by way of including what is called ‘Honour Killing’ as murder and shifting the burden of proof
to the accused. But the Commission expressed the view that there is no need for introducing a provision in
Section 300 I.P.C. in order to bring the so called ‘honour killings’within the ambit of this provision. According to
the report, the existing provisions in I.P.C. are adequate enough to take care of the situations leading to overt
acts of killing or causing bodily harm to the targeted person who allegedly undermined the honour of the caste
or community. The commission suggested a new law (instead of amending I.P.C .) to tackle the problem
namely, ‘Prohibition of Interference with the Freedom of Matrimonial Alliances Bill 2011’. 67
9. Intention : inference of, from proved circumstances.—
Intention is a subjective element which is not ex-facie present in any conduct. In all cases circumstances
surrounding the culpable homicide may lead to the inference that the accused intended to cause death. Every
sane person must be presumed to intend the result that his action normally produces and if a person hits
another on a vulnerable part of the body and death occurs as a result of the blow or blows inflicted by him, the
intention of the accused was no other than to take the life of his victim and the offence committed by him
amounted to murder.68
A gandasa is deadly weapon and a person who strikes a blow with it on the head of another from the sharp side
with such violence as to cut through the skull and brain and thereby causes his death can be presumed to have
done so with the intention of causing death or an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death.69 Thus the repetition of Barchha blows with violent force on vulnerable and vital parts of the body can
easily, give rise to the presumption that the intention of the assailant was to take away the life of his victim. 70
When a number of injuries are found on the neck of the victim who succumbed to the injuries, from this fact
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alone accused person’s requisite intention and knowledge may be concluded. 71 Accused plunging a big knife
into the chest of deceased without any exchange of words inference of intention to cause death may be
drawn.72 Accused when chasing an unarmed victim kills him by a dagger, the intention to cause death can be
inferred.73
Accused threw chilly powder in the eyes of the deceased and gave blows on his head by sattur. Most of injuries
inflicted were on vital parts of body. Medical evidence corroborated testimony of eye witnesses and testimony of
investigating officer was credit worthy. It was held that guilt of the accused was proved beyond all reasonable
doubt.74
Only a single blow was given which caused cut wound on neck of deceased. Injury had extensively damaged
blood vessels in neck leading to excess bleeding and heart failure. Injury though solitary exhibited intention and
knowledge of attacker to cause death as such injury cannot but be caused by sharp edged weapon. Conviction
of accused under Section 300 was held proper.75
Accused during scuffle stabbed deceased with knife but evidence showed that it was deceased who had first
pulled collar of the appellant’s shirt and tried to press his neck and in order to escape from the clutches of
deceased, accused had inflicted a knife blow. He of course had exceeded his right of defence. Appellant was
held liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part I. 76 Accused persons assaulted deceased by lathi and
evidence showed that they had to some extent exercised the right of private defence to protect and defend their
properties but thereafter they exceeded their right of defence. Their conviction for culpable homicide under
Section 304 was ordered and conviction under Section 302 was set aside. 77 Accused in another case
apprehended danger from deceased who was not only a karate expert but also was armed with a knife. Hence
three injuries were inflicted to the deceased and fatal injury caused on chest had penetrated deep into body.
Accused was held to have exceeded his right of private defence and conviction under Section 302 was to one
under Section 304.78
It is mandatory to impose fine in addition to substantive sentence of imprisonment for offence punishable under
Section 302 and no discretion is left to the Court to levy or not to levy fine as imposition of both imprisonment as
well as fine is imperative.79 In a property related dispute on provocation of complainant party accused persons
assaulted them with blows, lathies and sharp cutting weapons. Fire arms without aiming at any person were
also used and that showed that there was no intention to kill. It was held that conviction under Section 302 was
liable to be altered to one under Section 304 but conviction under Section 307 / 34 was held proper. 80 Accused
was unarmed and tried to outrage modesty of prosecutrix in presence of her parents and when father
(deceased) objected to the accused he hurled a stone at him which proved fatal due to head injury. Since
assault was not made with an intention to cause death, conviction of the accused under Section 302 was
altered to one under Section 304. 81 In a Supreme Court case single injury inflicted on head had caused death
and conviction under Section 302 was altered to one under Section 304. 82
Inference of intention to cause death can be drawn when the fatal shot is fired from a point blank range : thirty
two pellets in the process were found inside the bowel which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death.83 As laid down in a Bombay case a person’s intention can only be inferred from the acts
committed by him; and where a person gives a blow with a dangerous weapon like an axe to another person on
his head and causes a fatal injury, the only reasonable inference, which can be drawn, is that he intended to
cause that person’s death or to cause such bodily injury as would be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death. He may at least reasonably be presumed to have known that his act was so imminently
dangerous that it would in all probability cause death. Under such circumstances it is proper to convict the
accused under Section 302 I.P.C.84 Inference of intention to cause death was spelt in a case from weapons
carried by the accused persons, the relationship with each other as co-villager, their knowledge about the
gravity of the consequence and concerted conduct in the wake of murder and subsequent behaviour coupled
with 10 injuries on the person of the deceased. 85 Where the conduct of eye witness was found to be doubtful,
The Supreme Court refused to interefere with the acquittal. 86
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The accused was chased by police constable as he had not stopped his vehicle for police search. He drove the
vehicle in such a manner that constable was thrown off in the path of a vehicle which ran over him and caused
him fatal injuries. In a trial of murder the accused pleaded that he had no intention of killing or causing serious
injuries. The jury returned the verdict of guilty but Court of appeal quashed the conviction on ground of
misdirection. The Crown appealed to HOUSE OF LORDS who allowing the appeal held that once accused’s
knowledge of the circumstances and nature of his acts have been ascertained the only thing that could rebut
the presumption would be proof of incapacity to form an intent, insanity or diminished responsibility. There was
no need to explain to jury that the presumption was rebuttable. 87
The accused having come to know that deceased had betrayed him in love stabbed her and then to himself.
The eye witness in his evidence had stated the true facts before the High Court. It was held that conviction of
accused for murder was proper as he had clear intention to kill the deceased who had not provided him any
provocation.88 The accused gave a blow with a screw driver on the head of the deceased. The death of
deceased was natural as blow on vital part of the body of deceased was given by the accused with great
velocity. It was held that the accused had intention to kill the deceased and his conviction for offence of murder
was proper but co-accused who had simply caught hold of the deceased was convicted under Section 326 read
with Section 34 instead of Section 302 read with Section 34. 89 The accused was alleged to have inflicted stab
injury on the chest of the deceased by means of lethal weapon. It was held that offence would fall under Clause
(i) of Section 300 as the accused could be said to have done it with the intention of causing the death. The
conviction of accused under Sections 302 and 323 was held proper. 90 The fatal injuries on head of deceased
resulted in extensive fractures of scalp and injury to brain tissues and other injuries on body of deceased had
caused serious fractures. It was held that conviction for offence of murder was proper. 91 The accused gave blow
on vital part of body of deceased with force and with a dangerous and deadly weapons whereas deceased had
not done any wrong to him. It was held that intention of accused to kill the deceased was established beyond
doubt and offence of murder was made out. 92 The accused had given a spear blow on the neck of the deceased
when he had fallen down on the ground. This act of accused clearly showed his intention to cause the death of
the deceased and his conviction for murder required no interference. 93
The deceased and witnesses were unarmed and when they were returning from the Holi festival and reached
the stated place all of a sudden the accused in concert armed with lathies attacked the deceased and caused
injuries on the head and other vital parts of the body. It was held that the mere fact that extensive damage had
not been caused to the deceased did not establish that the offence was not one of murder punishable under
Section 302.94 The two appellants came fully prepared with spears to attack and attacked the two brothers with
spears. The blow that was inflicted on the chest of Shiv Charan pierced his lungs and heart and resulted in
profuse bleeding. Mangat Singh also sustained two incised wounds one on the right arm and the other on the
right side of the chest. It was held that the appellants intended to commit the murders of both the brothers but
fortunately Mangat survived.95
10. Homicide by omission.—
As to homicide by omission G LANVILLE W ILLIAMS states : Omissions resulting in death can be regarded as
either murder or manslaughter according to the fault element. In practice charges are rarely brought, and even
if a charge of murder might technically succeed the indictment is almost invariably for manslaughter.
Lord Macaulay Report.—
in his report he has observed, ‘What we propose is this, that where acts are made punishable on the ground
that they have caused, or have been intended to cause, or have been known to be likely to cause a certain evil
effect, omissions which have caused, which have been intended to cause, or which have been known to be
likely to cause the same effect shall be punishable in the same manner; provided that such omissions were, on
other grounds, illegal. An omission is illegal (see Clause 28) if it be an offence, if it be a breach of some
direction of law, or if it be such a wrong as would be a good ground for a civil action.
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We cannot defend this rule better than by giving a few illustrations of the way in which it will operate. A omits to
give Z food, and by that omission voluntarily causes Z’s death, Is this murder? Under our rule it is murder if A
was Z’s gaoler, directed by the law to furnish Z with food, it is murder if Z was the infant child of A, and had
therefore a legal right to sustenance, which right a Civil Court would enforce against A. It is murder if A was
detaining Z was a bedridden invalid, and A a nurse hired to feed Z. It is murder if Z in unlawful confinement, and
had thus contracted (see Clause 338) a legal obligation to furnish Z, during the continuance of the confinement,
with necessaries. It is not murder if Z is a beggar who has no other claim on A than that of humanity.
A omits to tell Z that a river is swollen so high that Z cannot safely attempt to ford it, and by this omission
voluntarily causes Z’s death. This is murder, if A is a Peon stationed by authority to warn travellers from
attempting to ford the river. It is murder if A is a guide who had contracted to conduct Z. It is not murder if A is a
person on whom Z has no other claim than that of humanity.
A savage dog fastens on Z. A omits to call off the dog, knowing that if the dog be not called off it is likely that Z
will be killed. Z is killed. This is murder in A, if the dog belonged to A, inasmuch as his omission to take proper
order with the dog is illegal. (Clause 273.) But if A be a mere passer by it is not murder.’ 1
If we had a statutory duty to render assistance to specified classes of persons in immediate danger, as there is
in many European countries, it is to be expected that the penalty would be relatively light, reflecting the moral
difference between killing and letting die. The prohibition of killing is the most urgent requirement of any society,
whereas the intervention of the criminal law to promote the giving of assistance to those in distress is little
needed for the general safety. Apart from the upbringing of children, it is only rarely that sick people are left
without necessary assistance by their relatives and acquaintances, at least to the extent of informing the social
services authorities of their plight. The word ‘act’ includes omission as well (Section 33 ). Any omission by
which death is caused will be punishable as if the death is caused directly by an act. Thus, where a person
neglected to provide his child with proper sustenance although repeatedly warned of the consequences and the
child died, it was held to be murder. 2 Where a mistress omitted to supply her servant with proper food and
lodging and so caused her death, the Court remarked : ‘The law clearly is that, if a person has the custody and
charge of another and neglect to supply proper food and lodging, such person is responsible, if from such
neglect death results to the person in custody; but it is also equally clear that, when a person, having the free
control of her actions and able to take care of herself, remains in a service where she is starved and badly
lodged, the mistress is not criminally responsible for any consequences that may ensue.’ 3 The accused set fire
to the cottage in which the deceased was sleeping, locking the door of the cottage from outside so that the
servants of the deceased who were sleeping outside would be of no help. He also took active steps to prevent
the villagers from bringing any succour to the deceased. It was held by the Supreme Court that the accused
had the intention to kill the deceased.4
In a case the accused once called at the house of the deceased and called from the outer gate by the name of
wife of the victim. The victim having heard the call opened the gate and asked as to why the accused was
calling her. To that the accused replied that he had illicit connection with the wife of the victim and that he would
accordingly continue to visit the house of the victim. It was followed by exchange of words and the accused
stabbed the victim to death. Intention to cause death was writ large and he was convicted of murder. 5 In an
Allahabad case the victim was caught from behind and the main accused gave him a blow from behind with a
sharp edged weapon. The victim died. The doctor found a punctured wound with clear cut margin on the back
of the chest left side 11 cm. x 4.5 cm. chest cavity deep. Scapula bone under it was also cut. On internal
examination, muscles of the neck were found cut, the left side of the lungs was also found cut. The pericardium
was full of blood and the pleura was also found cut from left side. According to the Doctor, the death was due to
shock and haemorrhage as a result of the injuries sustained. The accused caused the death with the intention
of killing and was convicted under Section 302 I.P.C.6
In a case a village pathway having been closed by the deceased, an old man the villagers had to resort to a
pathway along the land of the accused who hit the accused on head by a lathi causing grievous hurt as also
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simple hurt. The deceased died two days after, in the hospital. Medical experts admitted that the bones of a
man at very old age become brittle. In prosecution of the accused for offence of murder there was no evidence
of any intention on the part of the accused either to cause death of the deceased or cause such injuries of
which the accused could have the knowledge that they were likely to cause death of the deceased. The
accused was convicted of having caused grievous hurt, neither for murder nor for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.7
Charged for committing murder by stab wound the accused in a case set up a defence that the scuffle started
and it was only in that situation that he took out the knife and inflicted the wound at the abdomen. It was not
disputed that the accused inflicted only one blow. On a review of the evidence it was found that the prosecution
did not clearly establish the manner in which the incident took place and therefore it could not be said that the
incident took place not in the manner suggested by the defence. So, it could not be held that the accused
inflicted the injury with the intention to cause death. At best knowledge could be imputed to him that it might
result in death. In view of this the conviction was altered from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 8
Accused was not paid his salary and this enraged him to assault the deceased. He, otherwise, had no intention
to commit the murder. His conviction was ordered under Section 304 II. 9 Accused and appellant were blood
related and death was caused unintentionally but with knowledge that the death was likely to be caused,
conviction of accused under Section 304 Part II was held proper. 10
The accused due to difference in fixing the price of the fish caused two deep cuts on head of deceased but
himself also received injuries in that fight. The overt acts attributed to accused in evidence of eye witnesses
fully corroborated by medical evidence. The accused escaped from hospital on receipt of information of death of
deceased and this suggested that accused had participated in occurrence. It was held that dangerous weapons
were used with intention to cause death of the deceased. The conviction of accused under Section 300 for
murder was held proper.11 The accused with the intention of causing the death poured petrol on his wife and
then set her ablaze. It was held that accused was guilty of committing the murder of his wife and his conviction
was proper.12 The accused had assaulted the deceased with knife on his chest and caused such bodily injury
that was sufficient to cause the death of deceased. It was held that act of accused was covered by clause
thirdly of Section 300 and his conviction for murder was proper. 13 The accused inflicted axe blows on the head
of deceased and evidence that accused and deceased were last seen together was vague and contradictory.
Other evidences were also not trustworthy. It was held that material claims of evidence was missing and guilt of
accused was not proved beyond doubt. Therefore conviction of accused was not proper. 14 The circumstance of
last seen together does not by itself and necessarily leads to the inference that it was the accused who
committed the crime. There must be something more establishing the connectivity between the accused and
the crime. Mere non-explanation on the part of the accused by itself cannot lead to the proof of guilt against the
accused.15 The death of deceased was caused while she was in custody of the accused who himself had filed
the F.I.R. It was held that conviction of the accused for murder was proper. 16 The accused attacked unarmed
person with a knife which he pierced into his lungs and caused his death. It was held that intention of accused
to cause the death could be gathered and the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 302. 17
The accused had inflicted several injuries on vital parts of deceased with the knife and medical evidence
showed that many injuries were sufficient individually to cause the death. The conviction of accused for murder
was held proper.18 The accused was charged to have committed the murder of the deceased wife and evidence
showed that it was accused only who had inflicted the fatal injuries and his plea of unsoundness of mind or
committing the murder in fit of madness was not established. It was held that act was committed in a
preplanned manner and accused could be imputed with intention to cause the death of deceased. Hence his
conviction for offence of murder was proper. 19 The accused and his family members were possessing all means
to provide the basic necessities to the deceased wife but they ill treated her and did not provide even food to
her and the result was that she died of the starvation. It was held that intention of accused was to cause the
death of deceased and their conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 was proper. However conviction
of accused under Section 342 read with Section 34 was set aside. 20 Person used deadly weapons in such a
manner that it could endanger human life. It was held that it could not be said that there was not specific
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intention to kill.21 The accused had some property related dispute with his brother whom he one day attacked
with a cart-peg resulting in his death. The prosecution witness when asked the accused as to why he was
beating the deceased, the accused said categorically that unless the deceased was killed they could not get rid
of evil in the house. It was held that intention of accused to kill was established and his conviction for murder
under Section 302 was fully warranted. 22 There was group fighting but accused continued firing even when the
complainant party was fleeing from the scene. It was held that death caused in the circumstances was
intentional and conviction of accused for murder would be proper. 23
The accused was alleged to have assaulted the deceased and thereby had caused several injuries to him
resulting in his death. The evidence showed that assault continued even after the deceased had fallen down. It
was held that the conduct of accused was consistent with an intention to kill the deceased and his conviction for
murder was proper.24 The accused in order to take the revenge of murder committed by the deceased
committed the murder of deceased and eye witnesses being inmates of house of incident their presence at the
time of incident was natural and their evidence was reliable as the same was corroborated by the medical
evidence. It was held that conviction of accused for murder was proper. 25
11. Causing injuries on non-vital part.—
There was land dispute between the complainant and the accused who had fired the shots from his licensed
gun one of which hit the deceased. Mere fact that gun shot had hit the deceased on non-vital part of body would
not prove that the accused had no intention to kill the deceased. Conviction and sentence under Section 302
were held proper.26 Accused stabbed deceased on his neck with knife resulting to his death. Delay in lodging
the F.I.R. was explained and prior enmity between the parties was established. Testimony of eye witness was
trustworthy and was corroborated with medical evidence which showed that injury caused was sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death of deceased. Guilt of accused was proved beyond doubt and
conviction was held proper.27 The accused assaulted deceased on vital part of his body with knife. Thus
intention of accused was only limited to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death and this cannot extend to intention of causing death. It was held that in spite of this the
accused will be guilty of committing the offence of murder. Other co-accused were, however, convicted under
Section 304 Part I and under Section 326 respectively. 28
12. Clause 2—‘With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to
cause the death’.—
This Clause applies where the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily
injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused. It applies
in special cases where the person injured is in such a condition or state of health that his or her death would be
likely to be caused by an injury which would not ordinarily cause the death of a person in sound health and
where the person inflicting the injury knows that owing to such condition or state of health it is likely to cause the
death of the person injured. In a case it was proved that several accused had jointly attacked the deceased with
lethal weapons, as a result of which he received as many as 24 incised wounds on the head, shoulders and
forearms, which were of varying degrees of seriousness, and which ‘taken as a whole were fatal’. Of these
injuries one was an incised wound on the neck which had cut the artery and was ‘sufficient to cause death’.
Although it was not established which of the accused had given the blow but on the strength of Section 34
I.P.C. all the accused persons were convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. because it attracted Clause (2) of
Section 300 I.P.C.29
Clause (2) of Section 300 is attracted only when the act is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury
as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm is caused. It includes cases
of special knowledge of the constitution, constitutional defect or ailments of the deceased. 30 Evidence when
shows that the accused wanted to give a beating and had no intention to cause death, but the act was done
with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death, the accused is guilty under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 31
When there is nothing to show that the accused intended to cause the particular injury found on the body of the
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victim, but an accused can be attributed with knowledge that his act is likely to cause death of the victim—the
offence is punishable under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 32 When the accused knew the injury he was going to
inflict was likely to cause death within the meaning of Section 299, he is guilty under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 33
When accused struck the deceased aged fifty by a thenga (stick), on a vital part of the body the accused must
be presumed to have the knowledge that the blow given is likely to cause death although he might not have
intended either to cause his death or to cause any injury which is likely to cause death—conviction under
Section 304 Part-II is correct. 34
13. Intention of causing bodily injury offender knows likely to cause death : inference.—
Section 300 I.P.C. makes the presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his
act irrebuttable to the extent that if it is proved that the particular injury intended to be inflicted by the accused
turned out objectively to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the accused cannot plead
that he had not the intention of causing a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Subjective test is confined to proving that the accused intended to cause such bodily injury as was likely to
cause death and it is not necessary that it must further be proved that the accused intended to inflict bodily
injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death for holding the accused guilty for murder. 35
Accused attacked the deceased with a khanti fitted lathi resulting into his death. It was held that attack could not
be said to be unintended as medical evidence also showed that injury on head was sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature. Conviction under Section 302 was upheld. The accused gave a single stab injury
which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It was held that offence of murder was
made out.36
In a case of murder by poisoning the prosecution must establish (1) that death took place by poisoning, (2) that
the accused had the poison in his possession, and (3) that the accused had an opportunity to administer poison
to the deceased.37 Where, therefore, neither motive nor administration of poison nor its possession by the
accused could be proved, the accused had to be acquitted. 38 Where it is proved that the accused administered
poison, the accused must be presumed to have knowledge that his act was likely to cause death. 39
14. Cases.—
Where the accused several times kicked the deceased, who after having been severely beaten fell down
senseless, it was held that he was guilty of murder as he must have known that such kicks were likely to cause
the death of the deceased.40 Where a man struck another on the head with a stick when he was asleep and
fractured his skull, it was held that knowledge of likelihood of causing death must be presumed and that he was
guilty of murder.41 Where there was an exchange of abuses between the accused and the deceased, and the
accused picked up a rice pounder and hit the deceased with such force as to cause fracture of his skull and he
died a few hours later, it was held that the accused was guilty of murder as he had acted in a cruel and unusual
manner.42 Where a person administered arsenic to a boy of nine years of age with the object of preventing the
father of the boy from appearing as a witness against him, it was held that he was guilty of murder. 43 Where
dacoits indiscriminately fired at their pursuers with firearms with a view to stop their pursuit and cover their
escape and as a result of the shooting one of the pursuers was killed, the dacoits were held guilty of murder. 44
Where a woman of twenty years of age was found to have administered dhatura (a poisonous herb) to three
members of her family, it was held that she must be presumed to have known that the administration of dhatura
was likely to cause death, although she might not have administered it with that intention. 45 Where a person
recklessly administers dhatura to another, he is guilty, if death ensue, of the offence of murder and not merely
of culpable homicide not amounting to murder or of grievous hurt. 46 Where dhatura was administered with the
object of facilitating robbery but in such quantity that the person to whom it was given died in the course of a
few hours, it was held that the person administering dhatura was guilty of murder.47 Where dhatura was
administered by a woman to her husband to save her from the quarrelsome tongue of her husband who
became ill but did not die and she did not know what it was but it was supplied to her by her lover, it was held
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that she was guilty under Section 337 as she administered without care an unknown powder, but that the lover
was guilty under Sections 307 and 109.48
As laid down by the Supreme Court to bring a case under Section 300 Clause thirdly; first, it must establish,
quite objectively that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are
purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular
bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was
intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, fourthly, it
must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and
inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. The learned Judge in the case explaining the
ingredients of Clause thirdly observed : The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious
injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that
he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the
section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it,
the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness or intended
serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not
whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness but whether he intended to
inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be
presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. 49
An Orissa case held that to put a case under the third Clause of Section 300 I.P.C. the prosecution must prove
the following facts : (i) firstly, it must establish quite objectively that a bodily injury is present; ( ii) secondly, the
nature of the injury must be proved; and (iii) thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury
was intended. Once those elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further to see whether it
has been proved (fourthly) that the injury of the type just described made up of the three above mentioned
elements was sufficient to cause the death of the injured in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the
enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once the
above four elements are established by the prosecution; the offence is murder under Clause ‘Thirdly’ of Section
300.50 Reechoing the view of Virsa Singh (ibid). Supreme Court again held that the prosecution should prove
the following facts before it could bring a case under Section 300, thirdly; first, it should be established, quite
objectively, that a bodily injury was present; secondly, the nature of the injury should be proved. These were
purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it should be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular
bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was
intended. Once these three elements were proved to be present, fourthly, it should be proved that the injury of
the type described above made up of the three elements was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. That part of the enquiry was purely objective and inferential and had nothing to do with the intention of
the offender. Once those four elements were established by the prosecution (the burden of which was on the
prosecution throughout), the offence was murder under Section 300, thirdly. It did not matter that there was no
intention to cause death, or even to cause an injury of a kind that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of the nature, or that there was no knowledge that an act of that kind would be likely to cause death.
Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present was proved, the rest of the enquiry
was purely objective and the only question was whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury
was sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death. 51 Supreme Court again held that for the
applicability of Clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C ., the question for consideration is whether, in the
circumstances in which the offence came to be committed, could it ever be said that the accused intended to
inflict that injury which proved to be fatal? If there is an altercation and there is no premeditation and it is
something like hit and run, paragraph 3 of Section 300 I.P.C ., would not be attracted because it cannot be said
that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately found to have been inflicted. It can
only be said that it was an injury which he knew to be likely to cause death and the case would accordingly fall
under Section 304 Part-II I.P.C.52
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Following the case of Virsa Singh the Supreme Court in another case held that for the application of this Clause
it must be first establish that an injury is caused, next it must be established objectively what the nature of that
injury in the ordinary course of nature is. If the injury is found to be sufficient to cause death case test is
satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that very injury and not some other injury
and that it was not accidental or unintentional. If this is also held against the offender the offence of murder is
satisfied.53 In Harjinder’s case there was a free fight between D and H whereon H apparently worsted in the
fight left the place holding out a threat that he would teach a lesson to D, H then sometimes after returned with
his brother A, came to the house of D and gave him beating. The brother of D, K came and tried to intervene
and rescue his brother. At this stage the accused took out a knife and stabbed K to death. Injuries on the part of
accused was as described by the autopsy surgeon were as follows:
1. A stab wound 1? x 1/4? on left thigh upper and below the inguinal ligament.
2. Abrasion 1? x linear on back of left fore-arms middle. He described the other features of the injuries as
follows :
‘The direction of the stab wound was oblique and was going medially. Sartorius muscle was cut
underneath along with femoral artery and vein. Cut over major part of their diameter. There was
effusion of blood in the muscles and around the track over left thigh upper end.......’
He deposed that death was due to shock and haemorrhage from injury to femoral vessels by stab wound of the
thigh. The Supreme Court found that the bodily injury caused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death and convicted the accused accordingly.
Following Virsa Singh, the Supreme Court again affirmed that Clause thirdly of Section 300 requires two things :
(i) that the injury should have been intended to be caused, that is to say, that the accused should have had the
subjective intention of causing the very injury which was caused and (ii) that the injury viewed objectively must
be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 54
As held by a Rajasthan case to bring home Clause thirdly of Section 300 the prosecution in the first place is
required to establish objectively that a bodily injury had been caused. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be
proved. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say,
it was not accidental or unintentional. Once these three elements were proved to be present the enquiry
proceeds further and, fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described, made up of the three
elements set out about, was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The fourth part of the
enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of offender. Once these four
elements are established by the prosecution, the offence was murder under Section 300, thirdly. 55
If a man has caused four injuries by sharp weapon on the upper extremities and the nature of injuries is such
that they are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, it can be said that the case of the
accused is covered under Clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. 56 When the prosecution has established that the
accused went inside the room and brought a sword which was hanging on a peg therein and struck several
blows in quick succession on the vital part i.e., neck of the deceased and thereby caused his instantaneous
death the act of the accused clearly falls within the purview of Clause (3) of Section 300 I.P.C. because the
injuries intended to be inflicted on the neck of the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death.57
In a Rajasthan case the accused during the course of struggle whipped out a knife and stabbed the deceased.
She was hit twice. The stab wounds received by the deceased on the abdomen resulted in the puncturing of the
liver to a depth of half an inch at the interior surface of the right lobe near the hilum of the liver. This was a
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pretty serious injury and the blow must have been given with force. It not only punctured the abdomen put
pierced the liver of the deceased as well to a considerable depth and the blow must have been given with
sufficient force. While the dominant idea of the accused may have been to get himself released, but, in doing
so, he caused this serious injury to the deceased on her vital part and it proved fatal. The injury, in the
circumstances, cannot be said to be an unintentional or accidental one. Therefore, Clause thirdly of Section 300
I.P.C. is fully applicable to the facts of the case and the accused was held guilty for murder. 58
Where the assault was pre-meditated and the accused gave a blow on the head of the deceased with which he
fell down and died instantaneously and there was no prior altercation or exchange of abuses between the
deceased and the accused party, and the blow is not accidental and was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, the case would fall squarely within the ambit of Clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. The
fact that the accused aimed a blow on the head of the deceased with the lathi would go to show that it was the
intention of the accused, to cause the precise injury, which was found on the head of the deceased. He was,
therefore, guilty under Section 302 I.P.C.59
The accused appellant broke into a shop to steal but was seen by occupant of living quarters above i.e. a 72
years old lady. He struck her many blows and kicked her in face, with the result she died. He was convicted of
capital murder. On an appeal it was held that house holder was killed to prevent the recognition and killing was
perpetrated with necessary malice afore thought being implied from the fact that he intended to do grievous
bodily harm. The appeal was dismissed. 60 In another case the accused was running with stolen property when
constable intercepted him but car of accused followed an erratic course and constable fell in front of another car
and was killed. The accused drove on for 200 yards, dumped the property and then returned. He was charged
and convicted for capital murder but Court of Criminal Appeal substituted it for manslaughter. On Crown’s
appeal it was held that restoring the conviction for Capital murder will only meet the end of justice. The Court
observed that it is quite impossible to say that the harm which accused must be taken to have contemplated
could be anything but of a very serious nature coming well within the term of grievous bodily harm. The Court
also said that it is wrong to say that malice afore thought has been abolished by Section 1 of Homicide Act,
1957.61
The accused appellant suspected that the victim was associated with the woman he had planned to marry. The
victim was given blows from chairs and died a week later. He was convicted for murder and against this he
made an appeal contending that to tell the jury that intending really serious harm was sufficient for the murder
was a misdirection. The Court of appeal dismissed his appeal but certified that a point of law of general public
importance was involved in it.
The House of Lords confirming the conviction held that intention to cause really serious injury is sufficient for
murder without any proof that the defendant intended, or even contemplated the possibility that death would
result.62 The House of Lords in a subsequent matter had opined that the grievous harm rule is an out cropping
of old law from which the surrounding strata of rationalisation have weathered away. 63
Where the injury inflicted was a very serious one and was given with very great force on a most vital part of the
body, viz., the chest, as a result of which the left lung was pierced through and through and the Doctor also
opined that both the ventricles were punctured and the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature, the case falls within the four corners of Section 302 I.P.C. as Clause thridly of Section 300
I.P.C. is attracted in the process.64 Where the accused poured acid on the body of the deceased and the
medical evidence was that the injuries were of a dangerous character and were sufficient collectively to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature and though the deceased developed symptoms of malaena and
respiratory failure which also contributed to her death, Clause thirdly of Section 300 is attracted and the offence
answers Section 302 I.P.C.65 Injury when is intentionally inflicted on a vital part of the body penetrating the
depth 1-3/4th inch of chest and fourth rib is also cut through and through, the offence unhesitatingly answers
Clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. and the offence is murder. 66
Doubting the presence of eye witness merely on the ground that though travelling together he did not reach the
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hospital along with the deceased, was not considered proper. The accused in this case had crushed the
deceased under the wheel of their Maruti Car and evidence showed that the accused had intentionally caused
such bodily injuries as were likely to cause the death. It was therefore, held that conviction of accused for
offence of murder was proper and he was liable to be punished under Section 302 of I.P.C. 67 The accused and
deceased quarrelled over the purchase of cinema ticket and accused inflicted fatal knife injury on helpless
deceased who was caught hold by the other accused. It was held that circumstances spoken to by the eye
witness and corroborated by the medical evidence had clearly made out a case attracting Section 300,
punishable under Section 302.68 The accused had a dispute with the deceased for payment of money and had
caused serious injuries to the deceased by hitting him by his mini bus with great speed in middle portion of his
body. It was held that accused was liable to be convicted for murder as he had intentionally caused such bodily
injuries as were to cause the death of the deceased. 69 The accused seeing the face of his new born baby
doubted the fidelity of his wife and attacked her and caused only one tear by hacksaw blade. It was held that
there was intention of accused to cause her death and he was rightly convicted for the murder of his wife. 70 The
injury was caused on head and that had affected his brain. The medical report showed that the injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death. It was held that conviction of accused for murder
was proper.71
So for murder intention to cause death is not only necessity. If it is proved that the accused had the intention to
inflict the injuries actually suffered by the victim and such injuries are found to be sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the ingredients of Clause thirdly of Section 300 are fulfilled and the accused
must be held guilty of murder punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. 72 Where the accused dealt blows on the
head of the deceased who was wearing a cap and the same resulted in the scalp being fractured and the injury
in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, the Clause thirdly of Section 300 was satisfied
and the offence answers murder.73 Where the medical evidence showed that the injuries found on the person of
the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, Clause thirdly of Section 300 is
attracted and the offence answers Section 302 I.P.C. 74 Where the injuries on the deceased were severe bodily
injuries, were not unintentional or accidental and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,
they bring the case under Section 300, thirdly, I.P.C. Where the accused committed the said offence, in
prosecution of the common object of their unlawful assembly, or, at any rate, they knew that offence was likely
to be committed in prosecution of their common object, they were all guilty under Section 302 read with Section
149 I.P.C.75 Where all the three accused persons caused one injury each on each of the deceased with Guptis
and as the injuries caused by them were such as were enough to cause death, in the ordinary course of nature,
they were guilty of murder.76
15. Clause 3—‘With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person...... sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death’.—
In order to bring the case within para 3 of Section 300 I.P.C ., it must be proved that there was an intention to
inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. The
element being absent Section 300 Clause (3) goes out of the way and the offence answer not murder but
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It is fallacious to contend that when death is caused by a single
blow Clause (3) is not attracted and therefore it would not amount to murder. The ingredient ‘intention’ in that
Clause is very important and that gives the clue in a given case whether offence involved is murder or not. For
the purpose of considering the scope of Cl. (3) it is not necessary to embark upon an examination of the entire
scope of Sections 299 and 300 I.P.C ., intention is different from motive or ignorance or negligence. It is the
knowledge or intention with which the act is done that makes difference in arriving at a conclusion whether the
offence is culpable homicide or murder. Therefore, it is necessary to know the meaning of these expressions as
used in these provisions. In Clause thirdly the words intended to the inflicted are significant. When a person
commits an act, he is presumed to expect the natural consequences. But from the mere fact that the injury
caused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death it does not necessarily follow that the
offender intended to cause the injury of that nature. However, the presumption arises that he intended to cause
that particular injury. In such a situation the Court has to ascertain whether the facts and circumstances in the
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case are such as to rebut the presumption and such facts and circumstances cannot be laid down in an
abstract rule and they will vary from case to case.77
Even if none of the injuries by itself was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, cumulatively
such injuries may be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 78 In a Patna case the accused
caused the death of the victim by solitary farsa blow on the head. It could not be said that the accused had
assaulted the deceased with an intention to kill him or to cause such bodily injury which will be sufficient to
cause death in ordinary course of nature. If there would be any intention on the part of the appellant there being
no intervening circumstances, he could have repeated the assault which he did not do. Under these
circumstances the conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. was converted to one under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 79
The accused picked up a stone, in a sudden fight and hurled against the deceased which hit on his head
resulting in fracture of scull. There was no proof that the accused had intended to cause that particular injury. In
the absence of subjective proof of intention, conviction under Clause 3 was also not permissible. The accused,
however, was held to have the knowledge that it was likely to cause death and therefore conviction was altered
to Section 304 Part II of I.P.C.80
In a case the accused used thapi and sua, conventional murder weapon, to cause injuries on the person of
victims. The injuries though caused on the back of deceased were found to be grievous in nature. As the
injuries were sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death, the conviction for murder was affirmed. 81
Accused had pre-existing malice against the deceased and inflicted injury with force on vital parts of body of the
deceased. Injury was neither accidental nor unintentional and was sufficient to cause death. Benefit of
Exception 4 was denied as his case was covered under Section 300, thirdly. 82
The accused inflicted Gupti blows on deceased and as per medical opinion injuries caused were sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Since incident had taken place near the house of deceased the
presence of witnesses, brother and wife of the deceased at spot was natural and their evidence was found
reliable. It was decided that offence of murder was made out and conviction of accused under Section 302 was
proper.83 In another case before the same High Court injuries were caused by deadly weapons and they are
found sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Since accused were five in number conviction
for murder with aid of Section 149 was held proper. 84
When the weapon of offence is a pen knife and injury inflicted is not on vital part but on hand and leg, neither
intention to cause death nor knowledge that the injury is likely to cause death can be spelt out. 85 In a case the
accused, a carpenter by profession caused two injuries on the deceased by his ‘ rukhani’ after entering
deceased’s hut. One of the injuries was found in the normal course to be sufficient to cause death. It was held
that the nature of weapon used, number and nature of injuries and absence of motive showed that the accused,
had neither intention to cause death, nor knowledge that death would be inevitably caused. Conviction under
Section 302 was, accordingly, converted to one under Section 304 Part II. 86 Where an injury is intentionally
inflicted the defence that no proper medical treatment was forthcoming does not exonerate the person who
caused the injury from guilt of murder if he intended that the injury should be sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, or knew that it was likely to cause death to that person. It does not exonerate him from
guilt of culpable homicide if death ensues as a natural or likely consequence. Such a person is deemed to have
caused the death and his degree of criminal responsibility must depend on the knowledge or intention to be
gathered from the proved facts.87
Where in a trial the prosecution has not made out that injury found on the body of the deceased is sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death, nor it is shown that accused had the intention to cause such
bodily injury as he knew to be likely to cause death, then the accused cannot be convicted for murder within the
meaning of Section 300 I.P.C. The offence would, therefore, fall only under Section 304 Part I I.P.C. 88
During course of quarrel lathis and axes blows were given on head and other parts of body of the deceased
and injuries thus caused were not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It was held that
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offence of murder was not made out.89 Where injuries were inflicted on vital part of body by lathies without any
intention to cause death, it was held that offence was punishable under Section 304 and not under Section
302.90 Members of unlawful assembly had caused injuries on person of the deceased which resulted into his
death. As per autopsy surgeon knife injury caused to the accused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death. Intention was clear and offence of murder was made out. 91 All persons came together and
assaulted the deceased but accused had caused injury on chest of the deceased which was sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. Respondent accused alone was held guilty for offence of murder but
co-accused were held guilty for those acts which were committed by them. 92
This case was not applied in another case where the accused on going to the house of deceased caught hold
of him and hit him on cheek and neck and when neighbours had collected there on sight, the accused stated
that he would not leave the deceased alive. Thereafter he gave a kick on his private part due to which he died
of neurogenic shock. Medical report stated that the injury was sufficient to cause the death and accused had
knowledge that his kick was likely to cause death. The Session Court convicted him under Section 304 Part II
and High Court altered it to under Section 323. It was held by Supreme Court that it was clear case of murder
but since State had not gone on appeal against trial Court judgment, the High Court’s findings were set aside
and judgment of Session Court was restored. 93 The accused inflicted head Injury with axe on which blood of
accused’s blood group was found and evidence of eye-witness implicating accused was reliable and
corroborated by medical evidence. The conviction of accused for murder was held proper. 94
In a Supreme Court case the accused squeezed the testicles of the victim resulting in Cardiac arrest and death.
It was held that it cannot be said that the accused had any intention of causing the death of the deceased when
he committed the act in question nor could he be attributed with knowledge that such act was likely to cause his
cardiac arrest resulting in his death. Clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. is not attracted. He is neither guilty of
offence punishable by Section 302 nor Section 304 Part II. The act answers Clause eight of Section 320 and he
is punishable under Section 325 I.P.C. 95 The accused’s tractor hit deceased’s buffalo on road and altercation
followed in which accused gave blows with the handle of tractor on forehead of deceased. Handle was
recovered on the same day and evidence showed that injuries caused were sufficient to cause the death of
deceased. It was held that acquittal order of High Court was illegal and conviction order of Sessions Court was
proper.1
It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict the particular bodily injury actually found to be present,
that is to say, the injury must not have been accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was
intended. Once such intention is proved, the only question is whether as a matter of purely objective inference,
the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. These are the requirements of Clause
thirdly.2 When accused inflicts a stab injury on the chest of unarmed victim and when he falls down the accused
again stabs him, medical evidence showing that stab injury on chest alone is sufficient to cause death, intention
to cause death is writ large. The offence answers Section 302 not Section 304 I.P.C. 3 The accused when is
found to have caused nine incised injuries on the vital part of the person of the victim (here his wife) and the
injuries are in the ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause death, Clause Thirdly illustration (c) of Section
300 is attracted. There is no need to prove further the intention to cause death. The offence becomes
punishable under Section 302 I.P.C.4
It is to be borne in mind that to bring an act within the four corners of Clause thirdly of Section 300, I.P.C. it is
not enough that the injury actually inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is
further necessary that the offender should intend to cause an injury of this nature. From the fact that the injury
caused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, it does not necessarily follow that the
offender intended to cause an injury of that nature. The one does not conclusively prove the other. 5 To attract
the provisions of Clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. the prosecution should prove that the injuries on the
person of the deceased were caused with an intention to inflict those injuries and none of the injuries was
caused unintentionally. It should further be proved that the injuries caused to the deceased were sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause his death.6
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When the prosecution has failed to prove that any of the injuries on the person of the deceased was sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death or that the cumulative effect of the injuries caused to the deceased
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or that cumulatively, the injuries were sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the provisions of Clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C ., 1860 are
not attracted.7 Where the accused in a sudden and unpremeditated quarrel, inflicted injury on the head of
deceased with the blunt side of the axe resulting in fracture of his skull and death, intention to cause death
being absent the Clauses of Section 300 I.P.C ., are not attracted and conviction of accused under Section 304,
Part II is justified.8
Witnesses stated in details about role played by appellant in inflicting farsa blow and mode and manner of
incident. Autopsy surgeon opined that injury was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. Mere
possibility of injury being caused by hard and blunt substance was not considered a ground for holding that
ocular evidence should be disbelieved. Since the accused had come fully prepared conviction and sentence
awarded were held proper.9 Wife had strained relations with her husband and one day during course of verbal
altercation in his house accused caused three injuries and two of them proved sufficient to cause death. It was
held that conviction of the accused under Section 302 was liable to be altered to one under Section 304. 10
Accused seeing his wife sitting in house of witness shot her dead and pleaded that witness had attacked him on
path and wife was killed when she tried to rescue him. Rejecting this plea Court held him guilty and altered
conviction from one under Section 302 to Section 304 as injuries caused were not sufficient in ordinary course
of nature to cause death.11
As per evidence of eye witnesses all accused approached the field armed with lethal weapons where deceased
was cultivating land and objected cultivation of land. Apart from this, the deceased was gheraoed by main
accused who dealt a deadly blow and injuries inflicted upon deceased were found homicidal in nature. It was
held that Clause thirdly of Section 300 was attracted and accused was guilty of committing the murder. 12 Wife of
deceased was waiting for her husband in front of their house when while coming by bicycle he was shot dead
by the accused. The deceased disclosed immediately that he had suffered injuries at the hands of accused.
Conviction of accused for murder was held proper.13
The third Clause of this section views the matter from a general standpoint. Here the emphasis is on the
sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The sufficiency is the high probability of
death in the ordinary way of nature. When this sufficiency exists and death follows and the causing of such
injury is intended, the offence is murder. Sometimes the nature of the weapon used, sometimes the part of the
body on which the injury is caused and sometimes both are relevant. 14 In some cases the sufficiency of injury to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature must be proved and cannot be inferred from the fact that death
has in fact taken place. In such a case it may not be open to argue backwards from the death to the blow, to
hold that the sufficiency is established because death did result. As death can take place from other causes the
sufficiency is required to be proved by other and separate evidence. 15 Deceased after killing sister of accused
was going to marry again when accused got an opportunity and caused his death. Motive was to take revenge.
Conviction of accused was upheld.16
The accused was alleged to have given a chhura blow on the chest of deceased and when she fell down two
more blows were given on abdomen and back. The injuries were grievous in nature and sufficient to cause the
death and this indicated that intention of accused was at least to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause
the death. The conviction of accused for murder was held proper and there was no ground to convict the
accused under Section 324.17 Accused had a tiff with deceased in money related matter. The accused without
any specific intention to kill pushed the deceased who fell on ground and died of injuries suffered by him. It was
held that the accused could only be convicted under Section 323 and not under Section 302. 18 The accused
assaulted his mother when she refused to give him money and when she escaped from his clutches he chased
and killed her by throwing her on the ground. It was held that none of Exceptions to Section 300 will apply and
conviction to murder was proper. 19 The accused in a spur of moment had given a blow as he was enraged by
the provocation and alteration arising out of domestic problems. The evidence of wife of deceased was reliable
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and could not be discarded on account of certain discrepancies. Since intention to cause the death was not
established, the conviction of accused was altered from under Section 302 to one under Section 304. 20 Similarly
deceased was attacked when he was caught hold by one of the accused and one accused hit the deceased on
his head resulting into his death. Since accused knew it that death was likely to be caused, the conviction of
accused was altered from under Section 302 read with Section 34 to one under Section 304 read with Section
34 and sentence of life imprisonment was reduced to imprisonment for five years. 21 The accused in a sudden
fight between two groups attacked the deceased with lathi which resulted in his death. The evidence showed
that he had no intention to cause death. It was held that accused was liable to be convicted under Section 304
and not for murder.22. 23 In the case of Mangesh v. State of Maharashtra ,24 the Supreme Court stated the
circumstances from which it may be gathered as to whether there was intention to cause death. It included
circumstances like; nature of the weapon; on what part of the body the blow was given; the amount of force;
was it a result of a sudden fight or quarrel; whether the incident occurred by chance or was pre - meditated;
prior animosity; grave and sudden provocation; heat of passion; did the accused take any undue advantage; did
he act cruelly; number of blows given, etc.
Injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death and medical report had certified this
fact too. The evidence of eye witnesses also supported the prosecution story. The conviction under Section 302
under the circumstances was held proper.25 The accused had full knowledge that the injuries caused by him
were sufficient to cause the death. The co-accused had loaded the country made pistol and given it to the
accused saying ‘kill’. It was held that common intention to cause death of two children was proved and
conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 was held proper. 26 Injury caused directly and deep into the
stomach of deceased, a very vital part, which had led to death within a short time. It is argued that said injury
caused to deceased would not fall under clause ‘thirdly’ of Section 300 and as such conviction recorded under
Section 304 Part I or II of I.P.C. It cannot, be said that there was no intention to cause that very injury which had
led ultimately to the death of the deceased. 27 Where doctor had clearly established that the injuries sustained by
the deceased were all simple in nature inflicted upon non-vital parts of the body, intention or knowledge cannot
be attributed to the accused.28
16. Attack without any motive and incitement.—
Without any provocation the accused caused knife injury intending thereby to cause death. The motive of the
crime was established as the deceased had cancelled the commission vendor’s license of the accused. Since
injury inflicted was intended and was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the conviction
under Section 302 was held proper.29
17. Injury ‘sufficient in ordinary course of nature’ and ‘likely to cause death’ : distinction.—
It may be found from Clause thirdly of Section 300 that in the said Clause instead of the words ‘likely to cause
death’ occurring in the corresponding Clause (b) of Section 299, the words ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature’ have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily
injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The difference between Clause (b) of Section
299 and Clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily
injury. The words ‘bodily injury ........, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ mean that death
will be ‘most probable’ result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature. 30 Injury on the
deceased found sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is held to be murder punishable under
Section 302, not under Section 304 Part II. 31 When an injury which on objective test has been found to be
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the question is whether the causing of fatal injury was
accidental, or unintentional or some other kind of injury was intended to be inflicted. Ordinarily and generally
once such an injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or circumstances
warrant an opposite conclusion.32 When bodily injury inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, second part of Clause ‘thirdly’ is attracted. But when with regard to cause of death there is
hesitant medical opinion and the deceased died a month after the occurrence, Clause ‘thirdly’ of Section 300 is
not attracted. Then conviction is to be made under Section 304 Part-I I.P.C. 33
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Section 304 I.P.C. applies to cases where the injury caused is not of higher degree of likelihood which is
covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of
likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and such a case does not fall under
Clause 3 of Section 300 I.P.C.34
In a case on a sudden provocation the accused hit the victim by a simple stick in his hand that caused death of
the victim. It could not be said that the accused intended to cause bodily injury which was sufficient in ordinary
course of nature to cause the death. To bring the case within the Clause thirdly, it must be proved that each of
the injuries in ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, namely, the injury found to be present
was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. No doubt, the stick was used with certain amount of force
because there was cerebral haemorrhage and the skull was fractured. But the inference need not necessarily
be that he intended to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the
death. He could only be attributed the knowledge that it was likely to cause the death. 35
The distinction between this Clause and Clause 2 of Section 299 depends upon the degree of probability of
death from the act committed. If from the intentional act of injury committed the probability of death resulting is
high, the finding will be that the accused intended to caused death, or injury sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death; if there was probability in a less degree of death ensuing from the act committed, the
finding will be that the accused intended to cause injury likely to cause death. Where a man intentionally kills
another, or intentionally inflicts bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, his act is
murder.36 The accused dealt several blows with, a fairly heavy lathi on the body of the deceased causing
fracture of two ribs, injury to the pleura, and laceration and puncture of the right lung. It was held that the
accused was guilty of murder.37
If the probability of death is very great then the requirements of the third Clause are satisfied, and the fact that a
particular individual may by the fortunate accident of his having secured specially skilled treatment, or being in
possession of a particularly strong constitution, have survived an injury, which would prove fatal to the majority
of persons subjected to it, is not enough to prove that such an injury is not sufficient ‘in the ordinary course of
nature’ to cause death. It cannot be said that an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
is an injury which inevitably and in all circumstances must cause death. 38
When in pursuance of a premeditated attack the accused hurls a cowbar on head of the victim causing his
death, and the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, Clause thirdly to Section 300
I.P.C. is attracted.39
18. Inference of intention of causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death.—
In order to bring a case under Section 300, thirdly, I.P.C. it must be established quite objectively that a bodily
injury was present and secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These two ingredients are purely
objective investigations. The third ingredient of this Clause is that it must be proved that particular bodily injury
was not accidental or unintentional. If this fact is proved that the injury was intentionally caused then the Court
has to see whether the injury caused was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. 40 In order to bring the
case within the ambit of Section 300, Clause thirdly; it is necessary to establish that the bodily injury intended to
be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The words used in Section 304, which
deals with the punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder are that the act by which the death is
caused is done with the intention of causing death or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 41
In a case the accused wielded a spear inflicting an injury which proved fatal. The question cropped up whether
the accused may be presumed to know that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. The Supreme Court held that the accused must be presumed to know that he was likely to cause an
injury which was likely to cause death. No inference about the applicability of Section 300 Clause thirdly is
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permissible in the circumstances and the offence fell under the purview of Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 42 Where
gun shot injuries were inflicted and death took place after three weeks, it was held that it could not be said that
death was on account of those injuries. 43 The mere fact that deceased was not taken to government hospital
which was quite near cannot be a ground to render prosecution version suspect as it was proved by witnesses
that accused had fired shot at deceased and others hurled bombs on body of fallen deceased. The conviction of
accused for murder was held justified. 44 When the assailant causes death by hitting the deceased with the blunt
side of Gandasah, there is no inference of causing such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. The assailant can only be attributed with the knowledge that it was likely to cause an
injury which was likely to cause the death. The matter therefore, does not fall within Clause Thirdly of Section
300 of the Indian Penal Code.45 Innumerable number of injuries on the body of the victim of death may lead to
the conclusion that there was intention to kill. 46
19. ‘Bodily injury’.—
The expression ‘bodily injury’ in Clause thirdly includes also its plural, so that the Clause would cover a case
where all the injuries intentionally caused by the accused are cumulatively sufficient to cause the death in the
ordinary course of nature, even if none of those injuries individually measures upto such sufficiency. The
sufficiency spoken of in this Clause, as already noticed, is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of
nature, and if such sufficiency exists and death is caused and the injury causing it is intentional, the case would
fall under Clause thirdly of Section 300. All the conditions which are a prerequisite for the applicability of this
Clause have been established and the offence committed by the accused, in the instant case was ‘murder’. 47
What is required for the prosecution to prove to bring the case under Clause thirdly to Section 300 ‘First, it must
be established, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be
proved and these are purely objective investigations; thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to
inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other
kind of injury was intended; and once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds
further; and fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements
set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely
objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four elements are
established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is
murder under Section 300 ‘thirdly’. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not
matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that
there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the
bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only
question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they
must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the
injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional. 48
20. Principle of exclusion.—
Recently, in Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh ,49 after referring to the pronouncements in Rayavarapu
Punnayya (supra), Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of U.P. ,50Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab ,51 and Mohinder Pal
Jolly v. State of Punjab ,52 the Supreme Court opined thus: ‘The evidence led by the parties with reference to all
these circumstances greatly helps the court in coming to a final conclusion as to under which penal provision of
the Indian Penal Code the accused is liable to be punished. This can also be decided from another point of view
i.e. by applying the ‘principle of exclusion’. This principle could be applied while taking recourse to a two - stage
process of determination. Firstly, the Court may record a preliminary finding if the accused had committed an
offence punishable under the substantive provisions of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, that is, ‘culpable
homicide amounting to murder’. Then secondly, it may proceed to examine if the case fell in any of the
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Exceptions detailed in Section 300 of the India Penal Code. This would doubly ensure that the conclusion
arrived at by the court is correct on facts and sustainable in law. We are stating such a proposition to indicate
that such a determination would better serve the ends of criminal justice delivery. 53
Medical evidence produced by the prosecution, does not suitably support the prosecution story, accused
acquitted.54
21. Contradiction between ocular and medical evidence.—
Where there is a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular evidence, the position of law can be
crystallised to the effect that though the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis
medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a relevant
factor in the process of the evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes so far that it
completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved. 55
The opinion given by a medical witness need not be the last word on the subject. Such opinion shall be tested
by the court. If the opinion is bereft of logic or objectivity, Court is not obliged to go by that opinion. After all
opinion is what is formed in the mind of a person regarding a fact situation. If one doctor forms one opinion and
another doctor forms a different opinion on the same facts it is open to the Judge to adopt the view which is
more objective or probable. Similarly if the opinion given by one doctor is not consistent with probability the
Court has no liability to go by that opinion merely because it is said by the doctor. Of course, due weight must
be given to opinions given by persons who are experts in the particular subject. 56 Where the testimony of eye
witnesses totally inconsistent with medical evidence, and suffering from improvements, the rule that ocular
evidence has precedence over medical evidence cannot be applied. 57
22. Discrepancy between the reports of doctor who examined the deceased and the doctor who
conducted autopsy.—
Insofar as fatal injuries are concerned and, for this, there is no discrepancy between the two reports. The
Supreme Court verified both the reports and satisfied that the said discrepancy is not material to the
prosecution case.58 Where the medical certificate showing age of the injuries as 24 hours but in postmortem
report it is mentioned 6 hours. It was held that in post mortem report the determination of precise duration of the
injuries can be possible due to the internal examination of the injuries whereas no such advantage is available
to the doctor when he examines the injuries in the nature of contusions. Plea of inconsistency in medical report
and post mortem report has been rejected by the Supreme Court. 59
23. Construing medical opinion.—
The doctor stated that the cause of death was the incised cut wound on the neck which led to excessive
bleeding and heart failure. The Supreme Court said that the High Court’s observation that the doctor did not
state that the injury caused would in the ordinary course be sufficient to cause death was contrary to the
manner in which medical evidence is to be construed. 60
24. FSL Reports.—
Merely because the FSL report was inconclusive, it is not necessary that the irresistible conclusion is only one
that the accused is not guilty, particularly where the prosecution has been able to establish its case on
circumstantial evidence as also by direct oral evidence. 61 The fact that FSL report does not clearly state or link
the appellants with the commission of the crime is of no consequences in the facts and circumstances of the
case.62 Failure of investigating officer to send the blood stained gunny bags and weapon of the offence to the
Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. 63 Failure of the Investigation
officer in sending the blood stained clothes to the FSL and the empty cartridge to the ballistic expert would not
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be sufficient to reject the version given by the eye witness. 64
25. Cases.—
Two men met each other in a drunken state and commenced a quarrel during which they abused each other.
This lasted for about half an hour, when one of them ran to his own house and came back with a heavy pestle
with which he struck the other a violent blow on the left temple causing instant death. It was held that the
offence fell within Clauses 2 and 3. 65 Where the accused inflicted a stab with a sharp-pointed weapon which
entered the upper part of the deceased’s stomach, causing rupture of it, it was held that this act came under
this Clause.66 Where the joint intention of the accused was to give such a beating as would break the bones of
the legs and arms with reckless disregard of the consequences it was held that even if none of them intended
death, or knew that death would follow the beating, they did intend a beating, the almost inevitable result of
which was death and the case fell under this Clause. 67 Where the accused covered the mouth of the deceased
with adhesive plaster, tied a handkerchief over the plaster, plugged his nostrils with cotton wool soaked in
chloroform, tied his hands and legs with rope and deposited him in a shallow drain with his own shirt put under
his head as a pillow, it was held by the Supreme Court that the acts of the accused were covered by the third
Clause in Section 300 and that they were guilty of the offence of murder. 68 Where injuries were caused by
Guptis by three accused to the two deceased and the injuries were enough to cause death, the accused could
be held guilty of murder under the third Clause of Section 300 I.P.C. 69 Where the plea of self-defence was
totally negatived as the accused was the aggressor who had gone to the house of the deceased and started
punching him and thereafter had snatched a khutal from the hand of the deceased with which the latter was
trying to defend himself and gave two or three heavy blows on the head of the deceased resulting in fracture of
his skull and profuse bleeding inside the brain, it was held that the case squarely fell within Clause 3 of Section
302 I.P.C.70 Intention to kill can be inferred from the number and nature of injuries inflicted. 71 Where the
accused killed a girl being frustrated in his attempt to marry her by pouring acid on her person which caused
burns to the extent of 35% of her body and she died after 12 days due to malaena (passing of old blood in
stool) and respiratory failure, it was held that despite these supervening factors, the extensive acid burns
caused by the accused being sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death, his case fell within Clause 3
of Section 300 I.P.C ., and he was liable to be convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. 72 The victim suspected of
having committed theft was taken in police custody where he was subjected to a third degree method torture by
a police official to extract a confession. The victim having suffered as many as eighteen injuries on his person
(nature of injuries not in the judgment) succumbed to the injuries. Before death he asked for some water to
drink but he was offered urine instead. The offence was held to answer murder and not merely Section 330 or
The deceased S, his son and his grandson N were in the cattle shed of their field to look after the cattle. The
accused and his companions went there armed with spears and launched an assault on S as they suspected
him to be a police informant. When N intervened, he too was belaboured. After S fell down on the ground the
accused gave another blow on his neck. The accused gave to grandson a bachhi blow on his wrist. As a result
S died. The accused was found guilty of murder.74 Accused gave a dharia blow with great force on the head of
the deceased which fractured his skull and resulted in his death. The High Court convicted the accused under
Section 304 -Part II I.P.C. The Supreme Court held that the case squarely fell within Clause 3 of Section 300
I.P.C ., as the accused intended to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to
cause death.75 But in Jagrup Singh’s case76 where the blunt side of the gandhala was used to cause the head
injury to which the deceased succumbed, it was held that the accused could be saddled only with knowledge
that death was likely and not intention to cause such injury as was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to
cause death within the meaning of Clause 3 of Section 300. His conviction was accordingly changed from
Section 302 to one under Section 304 -Part II I.P.C. This case also fell within Exception 4 as the death was
caused in course of a sudden fight and on the spur of the moment. 77
In a sudden quarrel the deceased rebuked accused which enraged him and he gave a blow on the deceased
but unfortunately it landed on the neck of the deceased. The medical evidence also showed that he did not
cause any injury to any vital organ and there was no fracture of the internal bones. The external cartoid artery
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and external jungular vein got injured and that resulted in profuse bleeding. It cannot be said that such an injury,
if caused, would not attract the provisions of Section 302 I.P.C. but circumstances which were peculiar to the
facts of the instant case showed that there was a reasonable doubt whether the accused intended to cause the
particular injury in which case the offence is one punishable under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. since the accused
must be attributed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause the death. The conviction under Section 302
I.P.C. was altered to Section 304 Part II.78
Although the appellant was armed with an axe, every incised injury was simple and some of them were
superficial and they did not cause any damage to the internal organs of the body of the deceased. Further, the
appellant did not join her husband in the attack when it started. She inflicted some injuries on the deceased at a
later stage. The head injury was caused by her husband who started the attack at the stage when the appellant
was not in picture. It was held that the appellant was liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part II and not
under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C.79
The accused had developed illicit intimacy with the deceased which was not liked by the husband of deceased
and he called a panchayat where accused was suitably advised not to meet the deceased again. This was not
liked by the accused and one day while deceased was boarding the bus the accused dragged her out and
assaulted with a chopper and caused her death. It was held that accused could be attributed the knowledge
that chopper blow given by him on neck of deceased was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability
cause death or such bodily injuries as was likely to cause the death. As such offence of murder was made out
and accused was to be convicted under Section 302 and not under Section 304. 80 In Supreme Court case the
accused in a sudden quarrel and inflicted series of injuries on skull and all over the body of deceased. The
evidence showed that there was intention to cause the death as injuries caused by the accused were of serious
nature. It was held that conviction of accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 was proper and Section
304 was not applicable in this case. 81 The explosive substance is quite dangerous and if it is thrown on some-
body the injuries caused thereby shall, as per medical opinion, be sufficient in the ordinary course to cause the
death of the victim and accused causing such injuries would be held liable for the offence of the murder and
under Section 5 of the Explosive Substance Act. 82 The accused had caused injuries to the deceased and his
son with a sword in which death of the deceased was caused. It was shown that injury caused was sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause the death. It was held that conviction under Section 302 for murder was
proper.83 The accused armed with deadly weapons had caused multiple injuries on person of deceased which
were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death. It was held that conviction of accused of
murder was proper.84
The ballistic report said that the death was caused by the shot fired by the seized gun and evidence of eye
witness was found cogent, consistent and reliable. The plea of accused that he being confined to hospital bed
was not present at spot was not tenable as eye witness had seen him going out of the hospital. The medical
report showed that the injuries caused were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death. It was
held that offence of murder was proved and conviction of accused was proper. 85 Medical opinion revealed that
death was caused due to septicaemia secondary injuries caused five days ago and peritonitis. Death occurred
five days after occurrence in hospital. It was held that the offence would be punishable under Section 326 read
with Section 34 and not under Section 302 read with Section 34. Appellant having exchange of words with
deceased, left place and one hour later came back with gupti and inflicted fatal blow near neck besides other
minor injuries on deceased. The deceased died after two days. According to Medical evidence the neck injury
was sufficient to cause death. It was held that considering nature of injuries, death after two days, nature of
treatment, it could not be said that injury was sufficient to cause death and that offence fell under Section 304
Part II.86
Injury was caused to deceased on his testicles with two kicks given by the accused. No immediate medical help
was given and deceased was shifted to the hospital after two days of incident where he died next day. Death
was caused due to no immediate medical help. Accused was held liable to be convicted under Section 323 with
reduction of sentence to 7 months R.I. and payment of fine to heirs of deceased. 87 Death was not the direct
result of the injuries caused to the deceased during the occurrence. The injured died after nearly one and a half
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months later. In between he was operated and for the purpose of surgeries several incised wounds were made.
It was held that conviction for the offence under Section 302 was not sustainable when the death of the injured
could not be said to be a direct result of the injuries caused. 88 The prosecution evidence established beyond all
reasonable doubt that the accused went straight and inflicted injury on the spinal region which proved fatal. The
description of the injury itself showed that the same was inflicted with force with a knife. The injury passed
through peritoneum and penetrating through the interior surface of right lobe of liver. He also inflicted injuries on
the two witnesses with the weapon. It was held that the circumstances of the case would attract Clause III of
Section 300 I.P.C. and that therefore an offence under Section 302 I.P.C. was clearly made out against him. 89
26. Solitary blow entailing death of victim : murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder.—
On the date of occurrence all the accused, some of them armed with Dharia (a stick with a sickle shaped
mental fitted at the top) and others armed with sticks crossed over to the land of the deceased. Some of the
assailants shouted for attacking the deceased. All the accused thereafter showered blows on the deceased with
Dharia or stick which each of them carried. Deceased fell on the ground, bled and died. The only injury which
caused the death of the deceased was the one described as injury no. 4. That was inflicted on the left humerus
which cut the artery and vein. The question was whether any one of the accused would have intended to inflict
that injury even it was assumed that the said injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. In an action described by the eye-witnesses where the deceased sometimes was standing up and at
other times was running and was surrounded by the assailants, one particular injury on the humerus could not
be said to be a wound which was specifically intended by the assailant at whose hand that injury was caused. If
that be so, the offence did not fall within the purview of the Clause (3) of Section 300 of the I.P.C. The
conviction was altered from Section 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. to Section 304 (Part II) I.P.C. read with
Section 34 I.P.C.90 There is no legal basis whatsoever to hold that since the respondent accused gave only one
blow, though found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, Clause (3) of Section 300 is
not attracted. In the instant case the accused shouting ‘you have defamed me. I would not leave you. I will kill’
stabbed on the left side of the chest of the deceased and the deceased fell down and died instantaneously.
There was neither a quarrel nor a fight between the deceased and the accused. The words uttered by the
accused against the deceased followed by the stabbing with the dagger on the left side of the chest of the
deceased, would clearly indicate that he intended to cause that particular injury which was objectively found to
be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It was held that the accused intended to cause that
particular injury on the chest which necessarily proved fatal and, therefore, Clause (3) of Section 300 I.P.C .,
was clearly attracted.91
If as result of a solitary blow by a weapon the victim is done to death, the question as to whether the offence
comes under Section 302 or Section 304 admits of no straight answer. Shortly stated if the facts proved by the
prosecution brings the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of murder contained in
Section 300 I.P.C ., the offence would be murder. If the case cannot be encompassed by any of the aforesaid
four Clauses, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It follows therefore that in every
case of a single blow, stab or cut, the offence would not by the mere fact that it is a single blow reduce itself to
Section 304.1 There is no justification for the assertion that the giving of a solitary blow on a vital part of the
body resulting in the death must always necessarily reduce the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to
murder punishable under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. If a man deliberately strikes another on the head with a
heavy log of wood or an iron rod or even a lathi so as to cause a fracture of the skull, he must, in the absence of
any circumstances negativing the presumption, be deemed to have intended to cause the death of the victim or
such bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death. The whole thing depends upon the intention to cause death,
and the case may be covered by either Clause firstly or Clause thirdly. The nature of intention must be gathered
from the kind of weapon used, the part of the body hit, the amount of force employed and the circumstances
attendant upon the death. The Supreme Court followed two earlier cases. 2 There a single blow on the head,
was held not to fall under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. but to fall under Clause thirdly of the I.P.C. and
consequently, Section 302 I.P.C ., and observed that these decisions are destructive of the theory that a solitary
blow on the head, reduced the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section
304 Part II I.P.C. In the first of the above decisions, the Court observed:
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It is not the case of anyone that the appellant aimed a blow on some other part of the body and because of
some supervening cause, like sudden intervention or movement of the deceased, the lathi struck the head of
the deceased. The fact that the appellant aimed a blow on the head of Ramlal with the lathi, would go to show
that it was the intention of the appellant to cause the precise injury which was found on the head of the
deceased. The Supreme Court in another case held such a case encompassing a Clause of Section 300 and
consequently answer a charge under Section 302 I.P.C. In that case, a single stab in the chest of the deceased,
penetrating to a depth 1-3/4, piercing the left lung, cutting the fourth rib through and through, indicating that
considerable force had been used, was held to fall under Section 302 I.P.C. and not under Section 304. 3
Father came drunk and started abusing his son and beating wife. As a result of this there was a quarrel
between father and son in which son hacked his father. It was held that benefit of Exception 4 was available.
Pointing out difference between Exception I and Exception 4 it was said that in Exception I, there is total loss of
self control while in Exception 4, there is heat of passion which clouds one’s sobriety. 4 The incident had
occurred suddenly without any pre-meditation, at spur of moment and it was not a cold blooded murder secretly
planned and swiftly executed. It was held that case was covered under Section 304 read with Section 34. 5
When accused entered the house he had no intention to cause the death of his brother but it was in the course
of quarrel that accused got annoyed and dealt blows causing death of deceased. Conviction of accused was
altered from one under Section 302 to Section 304 Part I. 6
In an Orissa case single blow on the deceased had such a velocity that the head from the body was cut off. The
intention to cause death could be imputed to the offender and it was held that charge under Section 302 I.P.C.
was proper.7 In a Madras case the relationship between the two families namely the family of the deceased and
that of the accused was estranged. The accused dealt a cow bar on the deceased so hard that the victim died,
the injury being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The attack was premeditated. The
case answered Clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. and the accused was convicted for murder under Section
302 I.P.C.8 Accused when caused bodily injury sufficient in ordinary course to cause death and the accused
comes prepared to commit the offence which was preplanned, and if he causes death by single blow on vital
part, plunging the knife into the abdomen the gravity of the offence is not diminished by reason of his not
repeating the blows and the case is covered by Section 302 I.P.C. and not by Section 304 I.P.C ., the intention
to cause death being patent in the conduct of the accused. 9
It is, however, not correct that in every case of death by a single blow the offence can be made out under
Section 302 I.P.C. It all depends upon the part of the body where the injury has been caused, the nature of
injury and other circumstances.10 In a Supreme Court case, a solitary blow given by the accused on the left
clavicle, a non-vital part caused the death. The accused did not know that superior Venacava would be cut. It
was held although the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, it was one not intended
by the accused who answers Section 304 not Section 302 I.P.C. 11 Solitary lathi blow on the head of the victim
entailed death of the victim. But the evidence and the circumstances betrayed absence of any object or
intention to kill. It was held that not murder but conviction under Section 304 Part II is proper. 12 Solitary injury by
single blow with yoke was caused to the deceased in an incident that had taken place out of enmity. It was held
that the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part I and not for murder. 13
A single stab on the chest of deceased in the absence of premeditation and motive, the incident occurring at the
spur of moment resulting in the death of the victim falls under Section 304 Part II I.P.C ., because the accused’s
meeting with the victim was accidental and he never could intend to cause that particular injury that proved
fatal.14 In an U.P. case death was caused by only one knife blow by accused having no previous enmity with the
deceased : there was no evidence to show that accused intended to cause this type of injury. Knowledge that
such type of injury in ordinary circumstances can cause death at best can be imputed— held offence comes
under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 15 One stick blow on the head of deceased pursuant to a quarrel and accused
being abused by the deceased—held it answers offence under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 16 One stick blow (small
stick weighing 210 grams) pursuant to a quarrel resulted in death, it was held accused had neither the intention
nor knowledge, it is offence under Section 323 I.P.C. only. 17 The accused killed his brother. The cause of killing
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was a sudden and petty quarrel on door leaves owing evidently to poverty and the accused was enraged on the
demand of the deceased for the door leaves. The accused brought out from inside the house a cutting
instrument saying that he would cut some bamboos, but on seeing the deceased nearby in a fit of anger without
any plan or pre-meditation, he dealt only one blow on the neck of the deceased which caused internal injuries
resulting in death. It can be said that the accused had the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to
cause death it was held conviction under Section 304 Part I I.P.C. is proper. 18 On a trivial quarrel accused a
young boy gave only one blow by his pen knife on vital part of the deceased resulting in his death—held not
Section 302 but Section 304 Part II is attracted. 19
When the accused by a single knife blow on abdomen causes death and when there is no previous enmity and
premeditation and there is simply an altercation and quarrel, the accused may be convicted under Section 304
Part II instead of Section 302 I.P.C. 20 In a Bombay case the accused gave one blow on the head by a stick but
the blow was not heavy. The victim fell down and no further blow was given but the victim died. It was held that
the accused was guilty only under Section 325 I.P.C. not under Section 302 I.P.C. 21 In a Supreme Court case
accused inflicted single stab injury on the chest of the deceased, occurrence happening on a spur of moment
and in fit of passion upon sudden quarrel. And there was no pre-meditation in the matter of causing the injury.
No intention to cause death, it was held, could be imputed against the accused. His knowledge can be only
inferred and the offence is punishable under Section 304 Part II and not under Section 302 I.P.C. 22 In a Bombay
case there was a cordial relationship between the two neighbours and relatives namely the deceased and the
accused. As a sequel to a pretty quarrel accused suddenly lost his temper and in hit of moment one blow with
an axe was dealt by the accused on deceased’s head entailing his instantaneous death. Accused himself
thereafter removed the blade of the axe which had struck the head. It was held that the case did not fall within
the ambit of Section 302 or even Section 304 Part I. The only intention which could be attributed to the accused
was that he intended to cause grievous hurt attracting seventh or eight clauses of Section 320 I.P.C. Conviction
under Section 302 was set aside and the accused was convicted under Section 326 I.P.C. 23
The question whether the death due to single knife injury penetrating the heart answers Section 302 or 304
I.P.C. cropped up in an M.P. case the facts of which need a little elaboration to appreciate the ratio of the
judgement. There the quarrel between the deceased and the accused was not anticipated and had taken place
suddenly upon their chance meeting. The immediate case of the quarrel could not be known. The deceased
was not standing away and steady during the quarrel. On the other hand, grappling was taking place between
the accused and the deceased reasonably raising the possibility that the accused could not have aimed his
knife at a particular part of the body of the deceased, namely, the left side of his chest where the blow landed.
The accused did not persist in the assault. He had no particular motive to kill the deceased. The chest injury
was undoubtedly sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. But in the above circumstances it could
not be held with any degree of certainty that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury. The knife blow
was undoubtedly dealt forcibly causing a penetrating wound inside the heart. As such, the accused could safely
be credited with the knowledge that he was likely by the said blow to cause death, attracting third part of
Section 299 I.P.C ., thereby making the act of the accused punishable under Part II of Section 304 I.P.C. The
High Court of M.P. held that the offence committed by the accused was not under Section 302 I.P.C ., but one
under Section 304 Part II I.P.C.24
In an Allahabad case where the accused gave only one Kanta blow in the spur of moment on the head of the
deceased and there was no evidence that accused had any dispute or enmity with the deceased or he came
armed with intention to cause injury sufficient to cause death, the accused would be guilty of offence under
Section 304 I.P.C. and not under Section 300.25
Accused caused solitary injury by knife to the deceased but as per medical report it was not fatal as blow was
not given with an intention to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. It was held that offence will
not fall within the sweep of offence of culpable homicide. Accused was given benefit of doubt. Since in this case
maxilla was cut and victim had suffered fracture superseding the sentence imposed under Section 304(1) the
accused was sentenced under Section 326 but his conviction under Section 324 for causing injury to
prosecution witness 1 was upheld.26 Plea that whenever death is caused by single blow offence is one under
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Section 304 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) is not tenable as nature of weapon used and type of
injury caused are also to be considered. 27 The accused in a case not finding his witness at home assaulted his
brother in law and evidence showed that a single injury on the neck of deceased was caused. Conviction of
accused was altered to one under Section 304 Part I. 28
In a case the accused father-in-law killed her daughter-in-law by a nocturnal dastardly attack. It so happened
that the father-in-law was unemployed and was addicted to drinking arack. He used to demand money from his
son to purchase arack to which the daughter-in-law protested. One night when the daughter-in-law was
sleeping on a mat, the father-in-law stabbed her to death. The reason for which the High Court altered the
conviction from Section 302 to Section 326 I.P.C. should better be described in the words of the Court, ‘it is not
possible in this case to hold that the appellant had committed a murder punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. We
see here that the appellant who is none else than the father-in-law of the deceased had no strong motive or
enmity against the deceased. It is made to appear in this case that the refusal of the deceased to pay money to
the appellant for his drinking liquor was the cause for the appellant to attack the deceased and if that is so, it
must be characterised as a weak and flimsy one. Further, the appellant has dealt only a single stab on the
abdomen of the deceased. The medical opinion on autopsy does not indicate whether the injury was fatal or
whether it was sufficient to cause death of the deceased. The doctor has merely stated that the deceased
would have died of shock and haemorrhage due to the injury on the abdomen. Certainly, this is not enough.’ 29
In final analysis, it may be stated that it is fallacious to contend that when death is caused by a single blow
Clause thirdly is not attracted and therefore it would not amount to murder. The ingredient ‘Intention’ in that
Clause is very important and that gives the clue in a given case whether offence involved is murder or not. For
the purpose of considering the scope of Clause thirdly, it is not necessary for us to embark upon an
examination of the entire scope of Section 299 and 300 I.P.C. ‘Intention’ is different from ‘motive’ or ‘ignorance’
or ‘negligence’. It is the ‘knowledge’ or ‘intention’ with which the act is done that makes difference, in arriving at
a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder. Therefore it is necessary to know the
meaning of these expressions as used in these provisions. In Clause thirdly the words ‘intended to be inflicted’
are significant. When a person commits an act, he is presumed to expect the natural consequences. But from
the mere fact that the injury caused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death it does not
necessarily follow that the offender intended to cause the injury of that nature. However, the presumption arises
that he intended to cause that particular injury. In such a situation the Court has to ascertain whether the facts
and circumstances in the case are such as to rebut the presumption and such facts and circumstances cannot
be laid down in an abstract rule and they will vary from case to case. When intention to cause death is
established and if the intended injury is found objectively to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, Clause thirdly is attracted and it would be murder, unless one of the exceptions to Section 300 is
attracted. If on the other hand this ingredient of ‘intention’ is not established or if a reasonable doubt arises in
this regard then only it would be reasonable to infer that Clause thirdly is not attracted and that the accused
must be attributed the knowledge that in inflicting the injury he was likely to cause death in which case it will be
culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 30
Reviewing all the relevant Supreme Court decisions on the point, an M.P. Division Bench held that when a
single injury is proved fatal, for the applicability of Clause thirdly of Section 300, two conditions are needed to
be satisfied, First, the particular injury sustained by the victim should have been intentionally inflicted by the
accused; and secondly, the particular injury so intended should have been objectively sufficient in ordinary
course of nature to cause death. If these two conditions are satisfied, the offence would be murder. 31
In a case the deceased T and his real brother A went to meet their sister who was married to K. T and A having
found their sister and K absent and having been informed by their nephew that K and the said sister of T had
gone to field proceeded towards the field in search for K. While passing in front of the house of the accused, the
accused asked them if they had come to abduct the daughter of the accused. The said daughter pursuant to an
alleged ill treatment by her husband was residing with her father. K despite being married wanted to have the
said daughter of accused as his mistress to which the accused had strong dissent. In reply to the query T and A
denied that they ever wanted to kidnap the daughter of the accused. Not being satisfied by the reply, the
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accused dealt only blow on T who died three days after. It was held that it cannot be said that the appellant
intended to cause death or cause the particular injury that has resulted in the death of T and it would be just
and proper to convict the appellant under Section 304 Part II instead of Section 302 I.P.C. 32 The accused
inflicted only one pipe blow on head of the deceased and deceased was operated upon but died after 18 days
due to some post operation complications. It was held that the accused did not intend to cause the death and
his conviction was liable to be altered from Section 302 to Section 304. 33 The accused persons were charged
for causing death of deceased but only three of them were convicted. One accused was convicted under
Section 324 who did not prefer an appeal but two other were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34.
On appeal it was held that accused causing single blow injury will only be liable under Section 304 and other
accused was acquitted as he was not a party to the attack. 34 The accused in an M.P. case caused a single
injury by a dagger and the blow was not dealt with such a force so as to cause such a bodily injury sufficient in
ordinary course of nature to cause death. The conviction was altered to one under Section 304 Part I from
27. Clause 4—‘Person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death’.—
Where it is clear that the act by which the death is caused is so imminently dangerous that the accused must be
presumed to have known that it would, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, then unless he can meet this presumption his offence will be culpable homicide, and it would be murder
unless he can bring it under one of the Exceptions. 36 Murder is an aggravated from of culpable homicide. Even
without bringing into the radius of the Exceptions enumerated in Section 300 I.P.C. an offence may still be
culpable homicide if it does not possess the attributes of murder. Of course, Clause (4) of Section 300 I.P.C.
vis-a-vis the limb of Section 299 I.P.C. has presented considerable difficulty to Courts in its practicable
application to concrete cases. The range of probability in the two Clauses relates to causing of death, but in one
it is comparatively not so strong as in the other. Although one may know that the act or illegal omission is so
dangerous that it is likely to cause death, still it is not murder, even if death was caused thereby, if the doer had
no knowledge that in all probabilities it would cause death. 37 In a case there was a serious riot in a village. The
Sessions Judge while convicting the assailants relying upon the case, 38 held that, as injuries were inflicted upon
the limbs of the three men, who died of bleeding, but infliction of injuries on vital parts of the body was
deliberately avoided, an intention of anybody’s murder was not established. Upsetting this view the Supreme
Court held that the Sessions Judge overlooked the various Clauses of Section 300 I.P.C. An intention to kill is
not required in every case. A knowledge that the natural and probable consequences of an act would be death
will suffice for a conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. 39
In a case the accused R was living with his mistress and shortly prior to the occurrence they had a quarrel
between them. As a sequel to that R ordered a van in which he began putting his luggage with a view to leaving
the place where they lived together. The pauches were called by the mistress to intervene, sometimes after a
cry was heard from that mistress to the effect that R had put kerosene oil on her and set her alight. Before the
fire could be extinguished the said mistress suffered from extensive burns and eventually she expired. It was
held that it is difficult to say that R intended causing the death of her mistress although it might well be the truth.
The question arises whether R knew that his act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability
cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, so as to bring the matter within the Clause.
Although Clause fourthly is usually invoked in those cases where there is no intention to cause the death of any
particular person (as the illustration shows) the Clause may on its terms be used in those cases where there is
such callousness towards the result and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that
the act is likely to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In the present case, R poured
kerosene upon the clothes of M and set fire to those clothes. It is obvious that such fire spreads rapidly and
burns extensively. No special knowledge is needed to know that one may cause death by burning if he sets fire
to the clothes of a person. Therefore, it is obvious that R must have know that he was running the risk of
causing the death of her mistress or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. As he had no excuse the
offence fell within Clause fourthly of Section 300 I.P.C. and the accused was guilty of murder. 40
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Thus, a man who strikes at the back of another a violent blow with a formidable weapon 41 or who strikes
another in the throat with a knife42 must be taken to know that he is doing an act imminently dangerous to the
life of the person at whom he strikes and that a probable result of his act will be to cause that person’s death. In
a case the accused without any provocation caught hold the legs of a 7 year-old-child and dashed his head
thrice in quick succession on the floor and caused his death. The Court held that though he might not be having
the requisite intention of causing the death of the deceased, yet it cannot be stated that his act was not one, not
done without any knowledge of the consequences of his actions in the sense of himself having the knowledge
of doing away with the deceased. The act of the accused in such circumstances was imminently dangerous and
the act had been performed by the accused with full knowledge of the consequences of his action without any
excuse for the same. The High Court held it attracts Clause fourthly of Section 300 I.P.C. 43
In a case accused kicked her 9-year-old maid servant to death. Death was caused by asphyxia due to
aspiration of stomach contents as a result of blunt force applied to the abdominal wall which resulted in
regurgitation of stomach contents into the pharynx and consequent aspiration of stomach contents into the
respiratory tract. One of the ingredients for murder (Fourth Clause of Section 300 I.P.C .) is that the act of the
accused should be such that it must in all probability cause death. The aforesaid kicking the maid servant
shows that the accused could not anticipate such a result. The knowledge that in all probability it would cause
death was absent. So, it was a culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 44 This Clause also provides for that
class of cases where the acts resulting in death are calculated to put the lives of many persons in jeopardy
without being aimed at any one in particular, and are perpetrated with a full consciousness of the probable
consequences, e.g., where death is caused by firing a loaded gun into a crowd [vide illustration (d)], or by
poisoning a well from which people are accustomed to draw water. The Supreme Court has held that although
this Clause is usually invoked in those cases where there is no intention to cause the death of any particular
person the Clause may on its terms be used in those cases where there is such callousness towards the result
and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the act is likely to cause death or
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.45
The accused snatched the child while quarrelling with his wife and went away. The child was found dead in a
pond but accused did not return till the child was recovered but there was no evidence to show that the child
was thrown into the pond by the accused. It was held that an inference could be drawn that that the accused
had abandoned the child who died by falling in the pond. Since act was imminently dangerous and attracted
Clause 4 of Section 300, the offence of murder was made out. 46 The accused had burnt the wife by sprinkling
kerosene on her and dying declaration of deceased was cogent and reliable. It was held that the conviction of
accused was proper.47 The accused taking the advantage of loneliness of deceased killed her and locked the
house from outside. The finger prints of accused were found on cassette and key with which door was locked. It
was held that circumstances pointed out the guilt of the accused and his conviction was proper. 48
There was dispute between two groups; accused group alongwith others went to house of deceased and
inflicted dharia blow on head of deceased which caused the death. It was seen that the presence of family
members of deceased at the place of occurrence was natural. Merely because eye witness evidence and
medical evidence differed about the nature of inflicted injury their testimonies could not altogether be discarded.
The dharia blows on deceased were given deliberately and they were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause the death, Clause fourthly of Section 300 was attracted and conviction of accused under Section 302
was held proper.49 Where bodily injury inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death
the conviction of accused under Section 302 was held proper. 50
28. Inference of having knowledge that injury inflicted likely to cause death.—
In a case prosecution evidence established that D bent herself on the body of A when the accused was
inflicting spear blows on A and the blow accidentally struck D on the right side back it could not be said that the
blow was intended to be struck on that part of the body of D where the bodily injury had actually been caused.
In such circumstances the accused could not be fastened with the intention of causing such bodily injury as was
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likely to cause the death of D. But from the fact that the accused struck the blow on the right side back of the
victim with such great force that it penetrated cavity deep and resulted in the rupture of the liver and the
consequent death of D, an inference could reasonably be drawn that the assailant had the knowledge that the
injury caused to D was likely to cause her death. As such the offence made out against the accused was one
covered by Section 304 Part II and not under Section 302 I.P.C. 51
A little comment on this Allahabad decision may not be out of place. The learned Judges said that the accused
had the knowledge that the injury caused was likely to cause death and then placed the offence under the
canopy of Section 304 Part II. Had it been found that the accused had knowledge that the injury was so
imminently dangerous that it must in all probability, cause death, without any excuse to incurring the risk of
causing death or such injury as aforesaid, the offence would have answered Clause fourthly of Section 300
I.P.C. There being no circumstance to invoke any of the Exceptions engrafted in the Exceptions to Section 300
I.P.C ., the offence would have been murder.
In a Supreme Court case when the accused had no intention to cause death but he knew it to be likely that the
injury might prove fatal the Supreme Court held the accused guilty under Section 304, Part I I.P.C. In that case
the accused gave six lathi blows on the person of the deceased and the injury No. 1 was the fatal injury. The
injury No. 1 was kept under observation. The deceased however developed slight symptoms of compression of
brain and these symptoms gradually increased and he became absolutely unconscious on 28.3.52. Extra dural
haemorrhage set in and proved fatal. It was held that it was the accused who was responsible for inflicting the
injuries which ultimately resulted in the death of the deceased. Even though the blows were inflicted by the
accused on the head of the deceased with force, the lathi not being iron shod and the deceased being a young
man and strongly built the accused could not under the circumstances be held to have been actuated with the
intention of causing the death of the deceased, nor despite the medical evidence, was the injury sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause his death, seeing that he survived for three weeks and seeing on the
doctor’s admission that an injury of that kind was not incurable. But the accused no doubt knew that he would
be causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death and the offence committed by him would fall under
Section 304 Part I and not under Section 302. 52
29. Trespassing for assault and murder.—
The accused, due to political rivalry were alleged to have trespassed the house and assaulted deceased
resulting to their death. F.I.R. was lodged promptly and consistent version was given by all the eye witnesses.
Conviction of accused was held proper.53 The accused appellant entered the house of deceased and threw
bomb which exploded and caused death of two persons and injuries to others. Inimical relations between
parties was motive behind the attack. Appellant was identified as member of unlawful assembly and he could
not satisfactorily explain his presence in village at odd hours since he was not residing there. His conviction
under Section 300, and Section 436 read with Section 149 was held proper. 54
30. Act imminently dangerous causing death without any excuse.—
It may be found from Clause fourthly of Section 300 I.P.C. that if death is caused merely by doing an act with
the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death then the act is not
murder as is defined in Clause 4, but is mere culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In order that an act
done with such knowledge should constitute murder, it is essential that it should have been committed ‘without
any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such bodily injury’. The words used in Clause 4 of Section
300 I.P.C. are ‘without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid’. These
words indicate that the imminently dangerous act is not murder if it is done to prevent a greater evil. If the evil
can be avoided without doing the act then there can be no valid justification for doing the act which is so
imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such injury as is likely to cause death.
In the case a woman pursuant to a quarrel with her sister-in-law in a huff left the matrimonial abode along with
her three children-saying that she would jump into a well. Soon after, she went to a well and threw herself into
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the well along with the children who died. The accused was rescued. So far as the death of the children there
was no greater evil to avoid and the woman was found guilty of murder having attracted Clause fourthly of
Section 300 I.P.C.55 In a Bombay case a girl of about 17 years of age who was carrying her baby on her back
jumped into a well because her husband had ill-treated her and had prevented her from returning to her
parents. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court held that when the girl attempted to commit suicide by
jumping into a well she could not be said to have been in a normal condition and was not, therefore, even
aware of the child’s presence and that as she was not conscious of the child, there was not such knowledge as
to make Section 300(4) applicable. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court found the girl guilty under
Section 304-A.56
The M.B. High Court in Gyarsibal’s case (ibid) distinguished the aforesaid Bombay case, for in Gyarsibal’s case
when the evidence showed that the accused left her home saying that she would jumped into a well with her
three children, it could not clearly be held that she was not aware that her children were with her.
In this connection reference may be made to an Allahabad case where a village woman left her home with her
six months old baby in her arms on account of her husband’s ill-treatment; after she had gone some distance
from the home, she turned round and saw her husband pursuing her. She became panicky and jumped down
into a well nearby with the baby in her arms. The baby died, but the woman survived. On this facts, the learned
Judges of the Allahabad High Court held that an intention to cause the death of the child could not be attributed
to the woman, though she must be attributed with the knowledge that such an imminently dangerous act as
jumping down the well was likely to cause the child’s death. But the learned Judges held that considering the
state of panic she was in the culpable homicide did not amount to murder as there was an excuse for incurring
the risk of causing death.57
Where a young man of 25 years old, dealt a severe blow with a bahi on the head of an old man, about 60 years
of age, who was at that time unarmed, and where he committed the act without any excuse for incurring the risk
of causing death or injury, the case falls under Clause fourthly of Section 300 and the offence is murder. 58 The
accused persons while running away were chased by the deceased and other persons who had foiled their
attempt to commit the dacoity. In this process when one dacoit was caught his companion (accused) in order to
ensure his release shot dead the deceased. It was argued that it was not a murder committed during the course
of dacoity as dacoits were running without taking any booty. The accused was convicted u Section 396 and was
awarded death sentence. Upholding the conviction and sentence it was observed by Supreme Court that even
if the conviction of appellant u Section 396 be not perchance sustainable, the murder of deceased having been
committed after the dacoits had taken to their heels without collecting any booty, the case against appellant in
regard to commission of murder is established beyond any shadow of doubt and he could be convicted under
Section 302 Indian Penal Code.59
The accused gave a knife blow on back of deceased but did not repeat it which showed that he had no intention
to cause death but had knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. It was held that the case fell under
Section 304 II and not under Section 300. 60 The blow was dealt by appellant with full knowledge that it might in
ordinary course of nature cause the death. The conviction of appellant under Section 302 was held proper. 61
Similarly the single ballam blow was given on the neck of deceased but it was so forceful that blade remained
inside the neck. Accused was held guilty of murder. 62
31. Cases.—
Where the accused, four in number, all armed with heavy sticks, felled the deceased, who was defenceless and
armless, gave him a prolonged beating and inflicted several blows, completely smashing the skull, it was held
that they were all guilty of murder under this clause. 63 Where the accused unprovokedly stabbed the deceased
in the abdomen and he died as a result of gangrene and paralysis of the intestines, it was held that the accused
was rightly convicted of murder under Section 302. 64 In a case the accused shot an arrow to the victim towards
his thigh cutting the femoral artery there causing death. M.B. High Court rejected the plea that the offence
attracts Clause fourthly of Section 300 I.P.C. The High Court held that as there was nothing established on
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record apart from the act and its consequence to indicate that the accused intended to cause death or to cause
bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, application of Clause IV of
Section 300 to the circumstances of the case is inapt. Shooting an arrow on the lower part of the body cannot
constitute an act so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death. The cutting of femoral artery was an accident and it is difficult to attribute intention of the
accused to bring about the result. High Court further held that the accused intended to cause bodily injury and
that he should be assumed to have knowledge that it is likely to cause death. The arrow struck thigh and not
any vital part of body such as chest, stomach, back or head. There was a single arrow shot. The accused
therefore ought to be convicted under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 65
Where a snake charmer, to show his own skill, placed a venomous snake, whose fangs had not been extracted,
on the head of a spectator, without the intention to cause harm, and the spectator in trying to push off the snake
was bitten and died in consequence, it was held that he was guilty under Clause 3 of Section 299. 66 Where the
accused professed to render a person immune from the effect of snake-bite by tattooing, and afterwards
caused a poisonous snake to bite him and he died, it was held that he was guilty of murder. 67 Where the
accused offered a child to a crocodile under a superstitious but bona fide belief that the child would be returned
unharmed, and it was killed, it was held that he was guilty of an offence punishable under this Clause. 68 A
village woman of twenty was ill-treated by her husband. There was a quarrel between the two, and the husband
threatened that he would beat her. Late that night the woman, taking her six month’s old baby in her arms,
slipped away from the house. After she had gone some distance she heard somebody coming up behind her,
and when she turned round and saw her husband was pursuing her she got into a panic and jumped down a
well nearby with the baby in her arms. The baby died but the woman recovered. She was charged with murder
of the child and with attempt to commit suicide. It was held that an intention to cause the death of the child
could not be attributed to the accused, though she must be attributed with the knowledge—however primitive or
frightened she must have been—that such an imminently dangerous act as jumping down the well was likely to
cause the child’s death; but the culpable homicide did not amount to murder because, considering the state of
panic she was in, there was excuse for incurring the risk of causing death,’ within the purview of the fourth
paragraph of this Section. She was held guilty of culpable homicide. 69
32. Killing child.—
The accused killed his 15 days old child by pressing his neck and buried it. He did so in the presence of his
wife, the mother of the child, who became the natural witness. Conviction followed. 70 Where, the accused
mother killed her 4 year old son, the plea that a mother is not capable of killing her own son, in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary cannot be accepted. 71 Where the appellant and her husband had confined their
child in a bathroom and caused her death by not providing food and water, it was held that they had definite
knowledge that their act of confining deceased in a bathroom would result into her starvation which was likely to
cause her death. The finding of the High Court that the appellant has committed offence punishable under
section 304 Part II I.P.C. is eminently just and well founded. 72
33. Poison causing death by.—
A person who administers a well-known poison like arsenic to another must be taken to know that his act is so
imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
and if death ensue he is guilty of murder, notwithstanding that his intention may not have been to cause death. 73
In the Patna case aforesaid explaining the reason as to why in such an eventuality, Clause fourthly of Section
300 I.P.C. is attracted the Patna High Court said : Where a person administers a poisonous substance to
another which has resulted in his death, he is normally expected to know the effect of the poisonous substance
and, if death has resulted, it must be held that the accused persons intended death or at least knew that death
was the imminent result of the poison administered. 74 The question whether a person knows what he is
administering and knows what its effects will be, is of course a question of fact in the particular case. 75 In a case
the accused supplied aconite to a girl to be administered to her husband with the object of gaining his love and
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affection. The girl cooked food and mixed the aconite powder there with and served the same to her-in-laws as
well. The husband survived but others died the accused was convicted under Section 302 and 115 I.P.C. 76
In a case however the woman gave aconite powder to her husband to make him insane but as a consequence
he died. The Madras High Court held that it was not a case of murder but the offence was under Section 328
I.P.C.77 Explaining the reason the Court observed ‘evidence suggested that what she really wanted to do was
not so much to make her husband love her instead of hating her, but to deprive him of his will power and make
him a kind of doting fool who would do anything she wished and be completely under her domination. That is an
intention of course which cannot possibly result in any conviction for murder. But we consider that Section 328
will apply to the facts of this case. Section 328 renders punishable any one who administers to any person any
poison with intention to cause hurt to such person, and in the view which we have taken there can, we think, be
no doubt that the intention of the appellant was to cause bodily infirmity to the deceased. If the prosecution
failed to prove the cause of death, the fact that the accused failed to explain the cause of death cannot be basis
of conviction. Neither post mortem report nor FSL report show the administration of poison. Accused
acquitted.78 Where the allegation was that the death was caused by poison mixed with alcohol, but no remnants
of poisonous substance were found either in the two bottles or in the steel glass but were found only on the
earth so collected from the place of occurrence. Accused acquitted. 79
34. Murder by poisoning : proof.—
In the matter of proof of culpable homicide not amounting to murder or murder under Section 302 I.P.C ., there
is a peculiarity in the matter of proof of the offence. In murder by poisoning the following only establish the guilt :
(a) clear motive for the accused to administer poison to the deceased; (b) the death of the deceased by poison;
(c) the accused had poison in his possession; (d) accused had an opportunity to administer poison to
deceased.80
The Supreme Court in earlier cases too held that in murder by poisoning the prosecution must establish (1) that
death took place by poisoning; (2) that the accused had the poison in his possession, and (3) that the accused
had an opportunity to administer poison to the deceased.
To prove that the accused committed murder by poisoning, the prosecution must further prove (a) that the
viscera of the deceased contained a poison sufficient to cause death. As per evidence accused gave the
deceased three Peras and within half an hour he became ill and died within two hours. Medical report indicated
that the death was due to arsenic poisoning. It was held that Peras given by accused were poisonous and
conviction of accused for offence of murder was proper. Death penalty awarded by Sessions Court and
confirmed by High Court was not disturbed. 81 In a case of murder by poisoning merely because there was no
corrosion in the oral cavity or the oesophagus the case of the prosecution cannot be discarded when the
viscera report clearly shows that the death was due to Potassium Cyanide poisoning. 82
In murder by poisoning the following only establish the guilt : (a) clear motive for the accused to administer
poison to the deceased; (b) the death of the deceased by poison; (c) the accused had poison in his possession;
(d) accused had an opportunity to administer poison to deceased. 83 Despite failure to isolate the poison and
identify it in case of murder by poisoning it would not throw out the entire prosecution case if the guilt of the
accused is clearly proved by the circumstances. 84 In case of death by poisoning it is only when the motive is
there and it is proved that the deceased died of the poison in question, that the accused had that poison in his
possession and that he had an opportunity to administer the poison to the deceased, the Court can infer that
the accused administered the poison to the accused resulting in his death. When neither the motive nor
administration of poison nor its possession is proved, the accused is liable to be acquitted. 85 Accused was
charged for murdering M, his concubine by Organo Phosphorus poison. The accused and M left the place of
posting of the accused together; the accused alone arrived at the house of the mother of M and misled her by
saying that M had got down from the train on the midway; later the decomposed dead body of M in a gunny bag
was recovered from the Railway track, but it was not proved that the accused ever had the poison with him nor
the motive of murder was proved, it was held that he is to be acquitted. 86 Endrine alleged to have been mixed
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with milk, the medical evidence not showing conclusively that the deceased died due to endrine poison alone, it
was held conviction under Section 304 or 328 I.P.C. not sustainable. 87 Woman giving aconite powder to her
husband to make him insane, but as a consequence he died, it was held no case of murder is made out,
offence may be under Section 328 I.P.C.88
In an M.P. case the accused, the wife of M, the son of first victim and the brother of second victim, a widower
lived in the same house. The second victim was alleged to make indecent gesture to the accused lady insulting
her modesty contemplating sex with her. The prosecution alleged that the appellant brought poison from S and
administered it with vegetable bitter gourd (Momordica Shantia) served along with meals to both the deceased.
Both started vomiting and eventually died in the house. The fatal poison was alleged to be aconite alkaloid. The
doctor who made the autopsy merely stated that the death was due to coma from asphyxia due to suspected
poisoning. In deposition he stated that the death was probably due to the poison. In cross-examination he
stated that a person consuming poison becomes unconscious, suffers from asphyxia and the death is caused
by syncope. He stated that the death can be on account of any one of these caused. The blood vessels in the
brain were lacerated which as per his suspicion was on account of administration of poison. He found the lungs
congested and the nails were blue and therefore, he concluded that the deceased persons died of asphyxia. In
the present case, the death was as a result of coma and asphyxia both. He also admitted that a person may
suffer from coma and asphyxia from causes other than poison as well. The chemical analyst who examined the
viscera and found aconite alkaloid. But there was no evidence to show the quantity of poison found in each of
the dead bodies. In the absence of any such evidence also the appellant could he held guilty of murder. 89
Where the post-mortem report made on the prescribed printed form definitely expresses the opinion that death
was caused by asphyxia due to throttling and the opinion is supported by the evidence of the expert, the High
Court in appeal is not justified in the circumstances of the case in drawing on its own medical knowledge that
asphyxia is also possible in the case of poisoning and that possibility had not been completely eliminated by the
medical evidence including the post-mortem report. In this case against the entry of 22nd paragraph the
Medical Officer gave the definite opinion that the death was caused by throttling. As against column 21, he
indicated that the viscera was not required to be retained. In this perspective the judicial finding that the death
was caused by poison cannot be sustained. 90 The accused was charged for killing husband and mother-in-law
by giving them milk mixed with poison (nitrite). However packet containing poison and tumbler in which
poisonous milk was given to the deceased persons could not immediately be sent to Court after recovery.
Moreover son of accused stated that alleged tumbler was subsequently used by him and his accused mother
for drinking milk and this ruled out the possibility that poison in milk was administered by accused. Considering
these facts accused was given benefit of doubt.91
The prosecution in a case established that the accused husband was residing with his deceased wife at the
relevant time and that the relations between them were far from cordial and strained. It was also established
that the accused had filed a petition against the deceased for obtaining a decree for restitution of conjugal
rights. The prosecution also was able to establish beyond any manner of doubt that the deceased had died a
homicidal death after smothering and administration of Potassium Cyanide. It was also established that the
deceased was having the injuries on her person as noticed by the doctor at the time of the post-mortem
examination. In these established circumstances it would not be a case of suicidal poisoning. Moreso when the
deceased wife was subjected to the physical cruelty by the accused husband and the husband had a clear
motive for getting rid of the deceased and the medical evidence on record duly supported by the opinion of the
Forensic Expert went to show very clearly that the deceased had died because of the potassium cyanide and
the accused had an opportunity to procure lethal dose of the abovesaid poison. Thus the conviction of the
accused for murder was proper.92
But murder by poison is invariably committed under the cover and cloak of secrecy. Nobody will administer
poison to another in the presence of others. He who administers poison in secrecy, will not keep a portion of it
for the investigating officer to come and collect it. The person committing such murder would naturally take care
to eliminate and destroy the evidence against him in such cases. It would be impossible for the prosecution to
prove possession of poison with the accused. The prosecution may, however, establish other circumstances
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consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and the Court, then would not be justified in
acquitting the accused on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove possession of the poison with the
accused. Where the accused had strong motive, to get rid of his wife for her inability to satisfy his demand for
dowry and the death was not accidental or suicidal and there was no reason for her to commit suicide, and it
was also not a death by food poisoning since the accused and the deceased shared common food on the
fateful night and there was none else in the house on that night, except, the deceased and the accused and the
accused had an opportunity to accomplish his design and he must have administered the poison to the victim
and the injuries found on her body, indicated the resistance, she must have offered and the chemical
examiner’s report revealed organo phosphorus compound and that was given as the cause of the death by the
doctor who conducted the autopsy, the circumstantial evidence, including the running away from the house of
the accused at the time when the investigating officer visited his house, the circumstances were all consistent
with the guilt of the accused and not with his innocence. 93
In case of murder by poisoning in which there is no direct evidence to show that the accused has given any
substance to the deceased for eating, the prosecution has to establish facts from which an inference can
reasonably be drawn that the person who administered the poison was the accused, and none else. Further, in
such cases, for the purpose of establishing the identity of the poisoner, the prosecution must prove three things,
namely (a) that the deceased died of a particular poison, (b) that the accused was in possession of that very
poison shortly before the death of the deceased, and (c) that he had the opportunity to administer it to the
deceased.
35. Chemical Examination of vicera.—
A chemical examination of the viscera is not mandatory in every case of a dowry death; even when a viscera
report is sought for, its absence is not necessarily fatal to the case of the prosecution when an unnatural death
punishable under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code or under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code takes
place; in a case of an unnatural death inviting Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (read with the
presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act 1872) or Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (read with
the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act 1872) as long as there is evidence of poisoning,
identification of the poison may not be absolutely necessary. 94] But in In Chhotan Sao and Anr. v. State of Bihar
,95 Supreme Court was dealing with a case involving Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The
allegations were that the deceased was murdered by poisoning her. The viscera report was not on record.
There was no other evidence on record to establish that the deceased was poisoned. The Court distinguished
the case before it from the facts of Bhupendra (Supra) and while acquitting the accused of the charge under
Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code made the following pertinent observations:
‘Before parting with the appeal, we wish to place on record our anguish regarding the inadequacy of investigation, the
failure to discharge the responsibility on the part of the public prosecutor and the Magistrate who took cognizance of
the offence under Section 304B. The Investigating Officer who submitted the charge sheet ought not to have done it
without securing the viscera report from the forensic lab and placing it before the Court. Having regard to the nature of
the crime, it is a very vital document more particularly in the absence of any direct evidence regarding the consumption
of poison by the deceased Babita Devi. Equally the public prosecutor failed in his responsibility to guide the
investigating officer in that regard. Coming to the magistrate who committed the matter to the Sessions Court, he failed
to apply his mind and mechanically committed the matter for trial. Public prosecutors and judicial officers owe a greater
responsibility to ensure compliance with law in a criminal case. Any lapse on their part such as the one which occurred
in the instant case is bound to jeopardize the prosecution case resulting in avoidable acquittals. Inefficiency and
callousness on their part is bound to shake the faith of the society in the system of administration of criminal justice in
this country which, in our opinion, has reached considerably lower level than desirable.’
Though the FSL report is not mandatory in all cases, in cases where poisoning is suspected, it would be
advisable and in the interest of justice to ensure that the viscera is sent to the FSL and the FSL report is
obtained. This is because not in all cases there is adequate strong other evidence on record to prove that the
deceased was administered poison by the accused. In a criminal trial the investigating officer, the prosecutor
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and the Court play a very important role. The Court’s prime duty is to find out the truth. The investigating officer,
the prosecutor and the Courts must work in sync and ensure that the guilty are punished by bringing on record
adequate credible legal evidence. If the investigating officer stumbles, the prosecutor must pull him up and take
necessary steps to rectify the lacunae. The Criminal Court must be alert, it must oversee their actions and, in
case, it suspects foul play, it must use its vast powers and frustrate any attempt to set at naught a genuine
prosecution. Perhaps, the instant case would have been further strengthened had the viscera been sent to the
FSL and the FSL report was on record. These scientific tests are of vital importance to a criminal case,
particularly when the witnesses are increasingly showing a tendency to turn hostile. In the instant case all those
witnesses who spoke about poisoning turned hostile. Had the viscera report been on record and the case of
poisoning was true, the prosecution would have been on still firmer grounds. 96
In a case, the accused was charged with the murder of one R on the following facts which were clearly
established : (1) that while R was working in his field, the accused went up to him and gave him ‘peras’ which
he ate, (2) that shortly before that, R and his sister had partaken of the same food as noon meal, and that she
was not affected by any symptom of poisoning, (3) that R began to feel unwell half an hour after he had eaten
those ‘peras’ as died within two hours, and (4) that the Chemical Analyser had found 28 grains of arsenic in the
viscera of the deceased, which quantity was more than sufficient to kill a normally healthy man, in the ordinary
course of nature.
It was contended that these facts were not sufficient for establishing the charge of murder, because the element
namely the accused’s possession of poison before he gave it to R was not established. The Supreme Court
held that from the above facts it would be quite reasonable to infer that the ‘peras’ which the accused gave to
the deceased contained arsenic, and if that is so, it inevitably follows, that the accused was in possession of the
poison before he gave it to R. Therefore, the second element mentioned in Dharambir Singh’s case was
satisfied in the present case, and it was established beyond any doubt that it was the accused and none else
who had administered the poison which killed the deceased. 97 In another Supreme Court case the deceased
was an elderly widow who was residing in Poona. At the time of her death she was moderately rich and
possessed quite a large sum of money in her bank and several shares and securities. She was suffering from
chronic tuberculosis and diabetes and the accused was her medical adviser. At the time of her death she was
receiving treatment and her ailments were fairly under control. The accused, her medical adviser was charged
for murdering her during a journey by a night train from Poona to Bombay, by administering to her some
unknown poison which was not detected. The evidence in the case was entirely circumstantial and consisted
mainly of items of evidence, regarding his conduct before and after her death which came to light more than a
year after her murder. The Sessions Court convicted the accused, on this evidence under Section 302 and
sentenced him to death, and on appeal the High Court confirmed the conviction and the sentence. On appeal to
the Supreme Court in view of the unusual character of the case, the High Court decided to depart from its
normal practice, and the whole evidence on record was re-assessed by the Court and on consideration of
circumstantial evidence that left no scope for the hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused
convicted the accused of murdering the lady.1
Where, however, neither motive nor administration of poison, nor its possession by the accused could be
proved, the accused had to be acquitted. 2 Where it is proved that the accused administered poison, the
accused must be presumed to have knowledge that his act was likely to cause death. 3 Despite failure to isolate
the poison and identify it is case of murder by poisoning it would not throw out the entire prosecution case if the
guilt of the accused is clearly proved by the circumstances. 4
In case of death by poisoning it is only when the motive is there and it is proved that the deceased died of the
poison in question, that the accused had that poison in his possession and that he had an opportunity to
administer the poison to the deceased, the Court can infer that the accused administered the poison to the
accused resulting in his death. When neither the motive nor administration of poison nor its possession is
proved, the accused is liable to be acquitted. 5 Accused was charged for murdering M, his concubine by Organo
Phosphorus Poison. The accused and M left the place of posting of the accused together; the accused alone
arrived at the house of the mother of M and misled her by saying that M had got down from the train at the
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midway; later the decomposed dead body of M in a gunny bag was recovered from the Railway track, but it was
not proved that the accused ever had the poison with him nor the motive of murder was proved—held he is to
be acquitted.6 When two views are possible on the question whether the accused administered poison, he is to
be acquitted of charge of murder.7 Endrine alleged to have been mixed with milk, the medical evidence not
showing conclusively that the deceased died due to endrine poison alone—held conviction under Section 304
or 328 I.P.C. not sustainable.8
In a case the doctor opined the death by throttling but preserved the viscera as per instruction in the printed
form. The High Court thought it was indicative of death by poisoning. The Supreme Court set aside the finding
holding definite opinion of the medical expert should not be discarded. 9 Even when the medical evidence is
unable to determine the poison, conduct of the accused and other circumstantial evidence may prove the death
by poisoning, the contention that medical evidence alone should be considered to decide if the death is violent
or unnatural cannot be accepted.10
In the Supreme Court case,11 the newly married bride received continuous ill-treatment in her father-in-laws
house and eventually nearly four months after her marriage she was found dead in her bed. The immediate
cause of the death was a strong dose of potassium cyanide which the girl consumed, according to the
prosecution, as the accused, her husband was not at all interested in her and had illicit intimacy with another
girl, Ujvala, he practically discarded his wife and when he found things to be unbearable he murdered her. On
the other hand the plea of the defence was that while there was a strong possibility of Manju having been ill-
treated and uncared for by her husband or her in-laws, being a highly sensitive and impressionate woman she
committed suicide out of sheer depression and frustration arising from an emotional upsurge. After laying down
that murder by administering poison can be proved by circumstantial evidence the Supreme Court held that
where on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and
the other which benefits the accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt. In this view of
the matter the husband was acquitted.
Deceased, a witch, responsible for death of a family member of accused persons was alleged to have been
killed while grazing his cattles. Neither postmortem certificate nor doctor who conducted postmortem was ever
produced before the Court. So there was no evidence on record to show that the deceased died on account of
homicidal violence and accused was acquitted.12 In another case, the deceased was called in panchayat on
suspicion that he was a witch craft player and serious altercation had taken place therein. Suddenly accused
inflicted injuries with sharp edged instrument and co-accused slapped him. Since there was no premeditation
conviction of accused under Section 304 I.P.C ., acquittal of co-accused were held proper. 13
36. Death by Drowning.—
Congestion of lungs implies presence of excess fluids in the lungs, a sign suggesting that the child would have
inhaled excess fluid while in water. In addition, there is a finding by the doctor that there was 200 ml. of watery
fluid even in the stomach of the deceased. According to Modi’s Jurisprudence and Toxicology, the presence in
the stomach of a certain quantity of water is regarded as an important sign of death by drowning. It is almost
impossible for water to get into the stomach, if a body is submerged after death. All this suggests that the death
was caused by taking in water which one usually does while struggling in a drowning situation. Absence of any
other marks on the body of the child also supports the prosecution case that the deceased had indeed died of
drowning.14 Insofar as the first circumstance relating to the disclosure of the accused having committed the
murder and pointing out the corpus delicti is concerned, both the Courts below have held that circumstance as
a proof against the accused on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses. It is a common knowledge that the
body could not have remained under the water for 24 hours. The body was bound to be floating. At least from
the post - mortem report, it is clear that the body was decomposed. Under such circumstances, the body could
not have ever remained underneath the water level for 24 hours. It was certainly expected to be floating. In that
case, it could be seen by anybody. Therefore, such circumstance loses its significance. Accused was
acquitted.15
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37. Exception 1—Provocation.—
What is critical for a case to fall under Exception 1 to Section 300 Indian Penal Code is that the provocation
must not only be grave but sudden as well. It is only where the following ingredients of Exception 1 are satisfied
that an accused can claim mitigation of the offence committed by him from murder to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder:
(1) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused.

(2) The provocation so given must have been grave.
(3) The provocation given by the deceased must have been sudden.
(4) The offender by reason of such grave and sudden provocation must have been deprived of his power
of self-control; and
(5) The offender must have killed the deceased or any other person by mistake or accident during the
continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control. 16
In view of Section 300 I.P.C. even when act of a person entailing death of another is accompanied by any of the
mens rea detailed in any of the four Clauses of Section 300, it is not murder if there is grave and sudden
provocation emanating from the victim. The charge of murder by the presence of grave and sudden provocation
from the victim reduces the charge of murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In English law
manslaughter is more or less akin to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. H ALSBURY lays down :
Provocation may reduce a charge of murder to one of manslaughter. It consists of something done which would
cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the defendant, a sudden and temporary loss of self-
control, making him so subject to passion that he is not the master of his mind. Where on a charge of murder
there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person charged was provoked, whether by things done or
said, to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do
as he did must be left to be determined by the jury. In determining that question the jury must take into account
everything both done and said according to the effect which, in the jury’s opinion, it would have on a reasonable
man.17
38. Meaning of the words ‘grave’ and ‘sudden’.—
The expression ‘grave’ indicates that provocation be of such a nature so as to give cause for alarm to the
accused. ‘Sudden’ means an action which must be quick and unexpected so far as to provoke the accused.
The question whether provocation was grave and sudden is a question of fact and not one of law. Each case is
to be considered according to its own facts.18
Principles relating to ‘grave and sudden provocation’ summarized by the Supreme Court:
(1) The test of ‘grave and sudden’ provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class
of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so
provoked as to lose his self - control.
(2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden
provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the First Exception to Section 300 of the Indian
Penal Code.
(3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in
ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the
offence.
(4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not
after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for
premeditation and calculation.19
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The doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is incapable of rigid construction leading to or stating any
principle of universal application. This will always have to depend on the facts of a given case. While applying
this principle, the primary obligation of the Court is to examine from the point of view of a person of reasonable
prudence if there was such grave and sudden provocation so as to reasonably conclude that it was possible to
commit the offence of culpable homicide, and as per the facts, was not a culpable homicide amounting to
murder. An offence resulting from grave and sudden provocation would normally mean that a person placed in
such circumstances could lose self - control but only temporarily and that too, in proximity to the time of
provocation. The provocation could be an act or series of acts done by the deceased to the accused resulting in
inflicting of injury.20
Provocation is an external stimulus which can result into loss of self-control. Such provocation and the resulting
reaction need to be measured from the surrounding circumstances. Here the provocation must be such as will
upset not merely a hasty, hot-tempered and hypersensitive person but also a person with calm nature and
ordinary sense. What is sought by the law by creating exception is to take into consideration situations wherein
a person with normal behaviour reacts to the given incidence of provocation. Thus, the provocation extended by
the provocation is to the normal man acting normally in the given situation. 21
Lord Macaulay Report.—
The authors of Code have said, ‘We agree with the great mass of mankind, and with the majority of jurists,
ancient and modern, in thinking that homicide committed in the sudden heat of passion, on great provocation,
ought to be punished, but that in general it ought not to be punished so severely as murder. It ought to be
punished in order to teach men to entertain a peculiar respect for human life : it ought to be punished in order to
give men a motive for accustoming themselves to govern their passions; and in some few cases for which we
have made provision we conceive that it ought to be punished with the utmost rigour.
In general, however, we would not visit homicide committed in violent passion which had been suddenly
provoked with the highest penalties of the law. We think that to treat a person guilty of such homicide as we
should treat a murderer would be a highly inexpedient course. A course which would shock the universal feeling
of mankind, and would engage the public sympathy on the side of the delinquent against the law.’ 22
Historically speaking for many centuries past the common law has recognized one situation in which criminal
liability may be reduced, although not entirely removed, namely, if it be proved that the misdeed was done
under the influence of an irresistible impulse. This sole case is that of an intentional homicide committed when
the slayer has been so provoked by an attack made upon him that he has suddenly and temporarily lost his
self-control and has killed another in the ungovernable passion of the moment. Thus Coke drew a distinction
between an intentional killing in hot blood and an intentional killing when the blood was cool (a killing sedato
animo), speaking of the latter as covering a case where ‘one kills the another without any provocation on the
part of him that is slain’. The writers of authority who succeeded Coke continued to treat an intentional killing in
hot blood as a less heinous kind of homicide than one done by a man who was in possession of his self-control.
It was only in the ancient period, when malice aforethought was an expression used to denote a calmly
premeditated killing, that it would be true to say that provocation negatived malice aforethought. The cases in
which it has been held that provocation may reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter have throughout
the ages been those in which the killing was intentional but done by the prisoner when so inflamed by passion
that he was for the moment not the master of his mind. This kind of homicide has been traditionally termed
‘voluntary manslaughter’.23
In Mancini v. DPP ,24 it was held that the retaliation must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation. It
was followed in Kwaku Mensah v. The King 25 where it was held that benefits of provocation will be excluded
where the accused was not in fact deprived of the power of self control and also where after the provocation
such a time elapsed or such circumstances occurred that a person of ordinary character might have recovered
his self control. This rule seemed to be modelled on the proportionality requirement in self defence and was
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criticised as quite unsuitable for cases of provocation where loss of self control intervenes between the
provocation and the retaliation. The Courts, therefore, started giving recognition to the fact that reasonable
relationship rule was no longer a rule of law. This is a settled point that words are not sufficient provocation but
blows are a sufficient provocation to lessen the crime into manslaughter.
Although Provocation is usually raised by the defence the onus of proof, that the situation was not one of
provocation, lies on the prosecution and this must be made clear to the jury. Section 3 of Homicide Act 1957
makes the provision that where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the
person charged was provoked (whether by thing done or by things said or by both together) to lose his self
control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left
to be determined by the jury and in determining that question the jury shall take into account everything both
done and said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man. Thus Section
3 creates a test which leaves two questions for the jury to consider : (a) whether the defendant was provoked to
loose his self control (subjective question) and (b) whether a reasonable man would have been provoked to
loose his self control and do as the defendant did (The objective question). 26 The Court of appeal said in a case,
‘provocation is some act or series of acts done by the dead man to the accused which would cause in any
reasonable person and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self control rendering
the accused so subject to passion as to make him for the moment not master of his mind.’ 27
The appellant in a case was charged with the murder of his 17 day old son and he raised the defence of
provocation based on the baby’s persistent crying and restlessness. The Judge refused to leave this defence to
jury and he was convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal held that Section 3 of Homicide Act is mandatory and
required the learned Judge to leave the issue of the objective test to the jury but it had not been done. Hence
conviction of appellant for murder was quashed and conviction for manslaughter was substituted. 28 In a later
case Court of Appeal observed, ‘In view of express wording of Section 3 .... we find it impossible to accept that
the mere fact that a defendant caused a reaction in others, which in turn led him to loose his self control, should
result in the issue of provocation being kept outside a jury’s consideration. This section clearly provides that the
question is whether things done or said or both provoked the defendant to lose his self control. If there is any
evidence that it may have done, the issue must be left to the jury.’ 29 The accused killed the deceased who had
buggered him inspite of his resistance and had then laughed at him whereupon he had lost his self control. His
plea of provocation was not acceded to and conviction was upheld. 30
L ORD S TEYN in a case observed, ‘there must be some evidence of a specific act or words of provocation
resulting in a loss of self control. ... A loss of self control caused by fear, panic, sheer bad temper or
circumstances (e.g. slow down of traffic in snow) would not be enough. 31
Turning to Section 300 I.P.C ., to obtain the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 I.P.C ., it must be proved : (a)
that the deceased injured the accused by acts or words and thus caused provocation; (b) that the provocation
should be such as to cause a reasonable man to lose his power of self-control and should have actually caused
in the accused a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. 32 Under the Exception engrafted in Section 300
I.P.C. the atrocity of the offence is mitigated if the act is done under the influence of feeling which temporarily
takes away from the offender control over his action. 33 Provocation is an external stimulus which can be
objectively gauged but loss of self-control is a subjective phenomena and can be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances, the manner in which the accused reacted to the circumstances and accused’s own description
of his mind which can be verified with reference to relevant objective facts by the High Court imaginatively
reconstructing the psychological situation in which the accused found himself. 34 Anger is a passion to which
good and bad men are both subject, and mere human frailty and infirmity ought not to be punished equally with
ferocity or other evil feelings.
The act must be done whilst the person doing it is deprived of self-control by grave and sudden provocation.
That is, it must be done under the immediate impulse of provocation. 35 The applicability of the doctrine of
provocation thus rests on the fact that it brings about a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. The test is of
a reasonable person in circumstances which give rise to grave and sudden provocation. 36 What may amount to
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grave and sudden provocation as has been provided for in the Explanation to Exception 1 of Section 300, is a
question of fact. The provocation has to be, not only sudden, but grave and the gravity of the provocation is to
be judged by the fact whether or not the offender is deprived of the power of self-control. Each little provocation
cannot be called grave simply because the consequences ensuing from that provocation at the hands of the
accused have been grave. The provocation must be such as will upset not merely a hasty, hot-tempered and
hyper-sensitive person but would upset also a person of ordinary sense and calmness. 37 When the accused
returned to his house from his field, he saw something lascivious between his wife and another person. The
husband killed his wife. The Supreme Court held that ‘there can be little doubt that if the accused had witnessed
any such scene, his mind would have been deranged. It is not necessary that husband should have been hot
tempered or hyper sensitive to lose his equanimity by witnessing such scenes. Any ordinary man with normal
senses or even sangfroid would be outraged at such a scene. 38
Under Exception 1 of Section 300, the provocation must be grave and sudden and must have by its gravity and
suddenness deprived the accused of the power of self-control. It ought to be distinctly shown not only that the
act was done under the influence of some feeling which took away from the person doing it all control of his
action but that the feeling had an adequate cause. In the absence of such proof the atrocity of the offence will
not be mitigated and the offender will not be able to escape the legal consequences of his act. 39
39. Sexual offence and provocation.—
The provocation, if any, must be not merely sudden nor only grave but must be both grave as well as sudden
which alone gives the benefit to the culprit. The effect of such grave and sudden provocation, if any, must be
the loss of self-control. If there was time enough to cool down and the accused afterwards avenges himself for
the insult or offence given, he can hardly plead the extenuating circumstance as enacted. 40 In this case on a
day prior to the occurrence the accused had a Skirmish with one G over a question on his daughter-in-law. On
the date of occurrence namely on the next date the accused called at the house of G and asked for explanation
as to why he was falsely accusing him for an involvement with the daughter-in-law. G replied that the charge
was true and that he had caught hold of his daughter-in-law’s hand with an evil intention. The accused suddenly
fired a shot at G causing her death. He also tried to hit her with the gun after she fell down, but the gun struck
against the roof of the house and broke. The provocation was held not sudden and further it was found to be
sought by the accused himself. The benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 I.P.C. was denied to him and the
accused was convicted of murder.41
When prosecution case itself was that the deceased used to misbehave with the wife of the appellant and on
the date of occurrence he was actually taking her away by catching hold of her hand, in the normal course it
was bound to cause grave provocation to the appellant because of which the offence was committed. In this
background it was held that the appellant could not be convicted for an offence under Section 302. His case
was covered under Exception I to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, the conviction and
sentence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was set aside and the appellant was convicted under
Section 304 Part I.42
The accused was alleged to have murdered his wife and evidence was sufficiently available to show that
deceased had died of homicidal death. Two adolescent children of accused and deceased were eye-witnesses
of incident and their evidence inspired the confidence and closely showed that on relevant night accused had a
quarrel with deceased and he had assaulted her on provocation. The prosecution had failed to prove that
accused had intentionally murdered his wife. The accused, it was held would be guilty under Section 304 and
there conviction were liable to be altered from under Section 302 to one under Section 304. 43
The deceased had illicit relations with mother of accused and tried to force his sisters also to have relations with
him. Accused when was unable to bear the agony and ill treatment meted out to his mother and sister lost his
temper due to such provocation and beat the deceased to death. His conviction under Section 300(1) read with
Section 304 was held proper. 44 There was heated exchange of words between accused and deceased due to
which accused became so infuriated that immediately he opened fire. The act of accused, it was held,
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amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder because it was done under sudden and grave
provocation. His conviction was, therefore, altered from under Section 302 to one under Section 304 Part I. 45
In a case the deceased tried to commit an unnatural offence against the accused and on his refusal to oblige
him gave him a stick blow. Thereon the accused inflicted injuries on the deceased and even after he fell down
he continued showering the blows, resulting in his death. It was held that the accused lost his temper after the
stick blow and not before. The accused did not say that he lost his temper when the attempt to commit an
unnatural offence was made. A stick blow was not grave provocation. This was therefore, not a case of the loss
of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation. 46 The provocation must be grave and sudden and
of such a nature as to deprive the accused of the power of self-control. It is not a necessary consequence of
anger, or other emotion, that the power of self-control should be lost. 47 The provocation must be such as will
upset, not merely a hasty and hot-tempered or hyper-sensitive person but one of ordinary sense and
calmness.48 It must be shown distinctly not only that the act was done under the influence of some feeling which
took away from the person doing it all control over his actions, but that feeling had an adequate cause. 49 If it
appears that the party, before any provocation is given, intended to use a deadly weapon towards any one who
might assault him, this would show that a fatal blow given afterwards was not to be attributed to the
provocation, and the crime would therefore be murder. 50 If the act was done after the first excitement had
passed away, and there was time to cool, it is murder. 51 The mode of resentment should bear some proper and
reasonable relationship to the sort of provocation that has been given. The test to be applied is that of the effect
of the provocation on a reasonable man, so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious individual is not entitled
to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary person to act as he did. It is important to consider
whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a reasonable person time to cool, and
account must be taken of the instrument with which the homicide had been effected. 52 The mode of resentment
must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation. 53 Deceased, found with the sister of the accused at odd
hours of night, at which the accused got annoyed and stabbed the deceased with a knife. The Supreme Court
held that it was a clear case of loss of self control. 54
40. Provocation : the criterion of reasonable man.—
In order to set up provocation as a defence it is not enough to show that the defendant was provoked into losing
his self-control; it must be shown that the provocation was such as would in the circumstances have caused a
reasonable man to lose his self-control. In determining that question the jury may consider, along with other
factors, the nature of the retaliation by the defendant, having regard to the nature of the provocation. There is
no rule of law that the retaliation must be proportionate to the provocation; it is merely a matter to be considered
by the jury in determining whether a reasonable man would have acted as the defendant did. 55 The test of
whether the defence of provocation is entitled to succeed is a dual one : the alleged provocative conduct must
be as such as (a) actually causes in the accused, and (b) might cause in a reasonable man, a sudden and
temporary loss of self-control as the result of which he kills the deceased. 56 No Court has ever given, nor do we
think ever can give, a definition of what constitutes a reasonable man, or an average man. That must be left to
the collective good sense of the jury.57
In a case the accused B, a youth of eighteen who was sexually impotent, was convicted of murder committed in
a courtyard of a public street by stabbing a prostitute who had jeered at him because of his weakness, and in
addition had assaulted him in a disgusting and painful manner. Counsel for the appellant argued that the
hypothetical reasonable man should be invested with the peculiar physical qualities of the accused, as in the
present case with the characteristic of impotence, and that the question should be asked what would be the
reaction of the impotent reasonable man in the circumstances’ The HOUSE OF LORD srefused to accept the
argument on the grounds, (a) that it would be plainly illogical not to recognize an unusually excitable or
pugnacious temperament, as a matter to be taken into account but yet to recognize for that purpose some
unusual physical characteristic, be it impotence or another; and (b) that it would make nonsense of the
traditional test, for if the reasonable man is then deprived in whole or in part of his reason or the normal man
endowed with abnormal characteristics, the test ceases to have any value. The appeal was accordingly
dismissed.58
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In an English case the victim, a Pakistani labourer, a homo-sexual, used to practice sodomy upon a boy, a
friend of the accused who used to extort money from the victim by blackmail on that account. On the date of
occurrence the accused, a boy of 15 tried to extort money to be refused by the victim who practised sodomy
upon the accused who was laughed at by the victim for the latter’s triumph whereon the accused murdered the
victim. On the question whether the accused is entitled to the defence of grave and sudden provocation, it was
held, he is, because the standard of conduct to be expected of that young person is the standard of a
reasonable person of that age, not the standard of a mature adult. 59
The accused had stabbed the victim to death while one evening both were drinking together and he had
successfully pleaded the defence of provocation. On appeal he contended that victim’s negative attitude
towards him had inflamed his anger but Judge directed the jury not take account of factors personal to accused
when deciding whether the objective element of provocation test had been satisfied. On appeal being preferred
by crown it was held that Judge had erred in his direction to jury in telling them to disregard personal
characteristics of the defendants when considering the plea of provocation. The Court observed that defence of
provocation involves two tests i.e. subjective and objective. Subjective test requires whether person provoked
had temporarily been deprived of the power of self control resulting in the unlawful act causing death and
objective test requires whether the provocation was such that a reasonable man would have lost his self control
and acted in such a way. The common law position had been changed by Homicide Act 1957 which had
widened the circumstances which could amount to provocation. 60 The accused due to grave and sudden
provocation killed the deceased and his conviction was altered from under Section 302 to one under Section
304.61
Although the Indian law relating to grave and sudden provocation which reduces murder to culpable homicide
not amounting to murder is derived from the law evolved by English Courts, the provisions of the Indian Penal
Code represent a later stage in the development of criminal law than that which will be found in most decisions
of English Court on this subject. A greater attention under our law is paid to the subjective condition of the
particular offender and conformity to the standards of an artificial or notional or imaginary reasonable man by
the offender is not required under our law. The Courts under the law in this country have to decide whether a
particular offender, in the circumstances found, could reasonably be held to have been and actually was, so
suddenly and gravely provoked as to be deprived of his power of self-control and, therefore, get the benefit of
Exception 1 to Section 300.62
Whether or not there is grave and sudden provocation is a question of fact. The impact of provocation on
human frailty is to be judged in the context of social position. The restraints expected out of sophisticated
people can hardly be expected in villagers. 63 There may be acts which some people may look on with
equanimity, while they may throw others into a paroxysm of deepest rage. In such cases the fact that
provocation is unreasonable is nothing. If it is an act which is sufficient to provoke a person in the position and
situation of the accused, it is a sufficient extenuation. There a person who entertained a grudge murdered his
mother by a spade having long irony portion hitting her on vital part, it was held there was no grave and sudden
provocation.64 The standard to see whether there was provocation or not is reasonable man’s standard. If it is
not so then a person who is short-tempered who allows himself to be provoked easily will have an advantage in
the eye of law over a person who is not easily provoked and who controls himself and keeps a more equable
temper.65 Court should not be influenced by considerations of exemplary restraint or exceptional, ideal
behaviour of highly cultured people.66 The test of ‘grave and sudden’ provocation is whether a reasonable man,
belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed
would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. Words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances,
cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the Exception. The mental
background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether
the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. The fatal blow should be
clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled
down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation. 67 When the
accused on a grave and sudden provocation brought a dhaura kila and dealt one blow only on his uncle
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resulting in his death—held conviction under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. is proper. 68 When there was a quarrel on
the issue of misappropriation of money and accused all of a sudden brings an axe and deals one blow on the
head of his brother who succumbed to the injury, accused hit him under a grave and sudden provocation, he
had no intention of causing hurt and no intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death— held conviction
under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. is proper.69
In a case pursuant to conversation between two brothers on ownership of land there cropped up a quarrel. One
brother caused a single injury on the other brother without premeditation in sudden fight in heat of passion. No
undue advantage was taken by the accused, nor he acted in cruel manner. The accused was held entitled to
Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. and he was punished under Section 304 Part I and not Section 302 I.P.C. 70 In
another case the accused caused the death of his wife on discovery of tangible prove of indiscretion. The
accused acted in all probability under grave and sudden provocation by the conduct of his wife. Exception I to
Section 300 was held applicable and the accused was convicted not under Section 302 but under Section 304
Part I I.P.C.71 Accused, a villager on hearing about abuses on his father by the victim, goes to the spot and
pursuant to a quarrel between the victim and his associate, causes a single spear injury on the victim causing
his death, it was in consequence of grave and sudden provocation and it is culpable homicide not amounting to
murder.72
In a case the accused and the de facto complainant were residents of the same village where ills of caste
system still prevailed. The accused belonged to a low caste and the complainant belonged to a high caste. The
prosecution case was that the accused who was a medical practitioner gave some medicine to the
complainant’s brother which did not prove effective. The complainant also alleged that the accused had
charged some excess amount. There was some altercation and the complainant asked the accused on a public
road as to how long would this illgotten income continue. There was also exchange of words based on caste.
The accused took out a country made pistol which he was carrying and shot at deceased as a result of which
he died. It was held that the complainant chose a public place for the occurrence in broad day light when others
were having full view of the incident. The intervening factor of altercation may indicate that the accused—
appellant had not resorted for firing at once. The prosecution evidence itself further indicates that the appellant
did so at the asking of his compounder who had been pushed by the neck and floored by the deceased. May be
that the appellant had thought by then that if immediate action is not taken to stop the prosecution side, they
may cause injuries to the appellant. The appellant is thus guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
as he fired the pistol under grave and sudden provocation. He did not intend to cause death but deceased died
of injuries as were likely to cause his death. The accused in the circumstances could be convicted under
Section 304 Part I and not under Section 302.73
In a case the decease and the accused were two brothers and quarrel cropped up over payment made by
accused; there ensued a scuffle and the deceased was done to death, accused hitting the victim without any
premeditation. The case was covered by Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. For a case to be covered under
Exception 4 to Section 300, the cause of the quarrel is not relevant, nor is it relevant as to who offered the
provocation or started assault and the number of wounds caused during the occurrence is also not decisive, but
what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must
have acted in a fit of anger.74
The question whether the provocation was grave and sudden is a question of fact and not one of law. Each
case is to be considered according to its own facts. The Court must decide on the particular circumstances of
that case whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to permit an indulgent view of the crime
committed by the accused. No abstract rule of reasonableness can be laid down by the application of the
doctrine of ‘grave and sudden provocation’. What a reasonable man i.e. a normal person will do in certain
circumstances depends upon the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which the accused
belongs. However, the Court must consider the reaction not of the normal man in the abstract but the normal
man whose impulses are conditioned by the same environment as the accused. 75 In this case the entire incident
took place suddenly. One J who wanted to purchase sugar reached the shop of the accused with R (the
deceased) and enquired about the rate of sugar. The accused gave out that its rate was Rs. 1.70 per Kilo.
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When J gave out that the other shop-keepers were selling it at Rs. 1.60 per Kilo the accused sarcastically
remarked that he had come to make purchases without having any money. On it R became angry and asked
him not to misbehave which resulted in altercation and ultimately in exchange of abuses. The accused
delivered a knife blow on the chest of R which resulted in his death. When J tried to intervene he was also
given a knife blow on his shoulder. Neither party elicited as to who initiated abuses and what were the actual
words. It was held that in the circumstances the accused was entitled to the benefit of Exception 1 to Section
300 and the case fell within the ambit of Section 304, Part I and not under Section 302. 76
The person claiming the benefit of this provision has to show that he received provocation which was grave and
sudden and that he was deprived of the power of self-control and that he caused the death of the person while
he was still in that state of mind. Held in the circumstances of the case that the abuses by their very nature
were not such that the accused was provoked to the extent that he lost self-control and inflicted the fatal injury
on the chest of the deceased. Nor was the provocation sudden. The accused went home, came armed with a
spear and brought his brothers who were armed with lathis. This interval was enough to cool down. 77 When
accused causes death of another without any motive and the crime is committed in a sudden temper, the
offence falls under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. and not under Section 302 I.P.C. 78 When death is caused on
account of injury inflicted by the accused and there was no enmity between the parties and injury was inflicted
in sudden quarrel and the accused takes no undue advantage the case would fall under Section 304 Part I
I.P.C. Number of wounds caused during the occurrence would not be a decisive factor. 79 Incident that occurred
was due to sudden quarrel which ensued between appellant and deceased on issue of going to village to see
ailing appellant’s father. Even according to prosecution, there was no premeditation in commission of crime. On
such conditions, appellants were entitled to get benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 of Indian Penal Code by
altering sentence awarded to under Section 304 Part II of Indian Penal Code.80 In an Orissa case the accused
raised the crops but the deceased removed it by harvesting. The deceased was the aggressor and despite the
protest the deceased first struck a blow on the accused by lathi. Thereon the accused flew into a rage and
chopped off the head of the deceased and carried it with him. In this factual matrix the Orissa High Court held
that the accused temporarily was deprived of the power of self-control and on a grave on a sudden provocation
killed the deceased. The facts attracted Exception 1 to Section 300 I.P.C. and accused was convicted of
Section 304 Part I I.P.C.81 In an almost identical fact situation the Supreme Court invoked Exception 2 to
Section 300 I.P.C. There the deceased trespassed on the land of the accused and assaulted the co-accused
which provoked the accused and he purporting to act in self-defence, assaulted the deceased and caused
death. The Supreme Court held that the accused must be deemed to be guilty only of exceeding the right of
private defence and accordingly convicted the accused under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 82 Reading both the
cases together one may appreciate justly what was stated by K ENNY under the caption ‘under provocation,
easily confused with self-defence’. K ENNY states83 : When provocation takes the form of physical assault of
such a nature as would be expected to arouse overwhelming passing in the person attacked, it will not always
be easy to distinguish the victim’s immediate retaliation from a resistance by way of self-defence. It is therefore
not surprising that the early authorities did not always keep homicide under provocation separate from homicide
in self-defence. In 1917, there was a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal which did not clearly distinguish
the two.84
In a case the accused, the brother of the deceased did not know from before about the arrival of the deceased
at the spot. There was no evidence to prove the premeditation attributable to the appellant. The quarrel arose
all of a sudden after the arrival of the deceased on spot where the appellant was already standing with an axe.
After some altercation ensued, the deceased was alleged to have left the place and upon provocation the
offence was committed as a result of which the victim died. The offence, it was held answers Section 304 Part I
and not Section 302 I.P.C. 85 In a case, a brother by inflicting a knife blow caused the death of his own brother.
There was cordial relation between them and during gossiping, the accused suddenly flew into a rage and
inflicted the knife blow in a heat of passion. Exception four to Section 300 was held applicable and the
conviction was altered to Section 304, Part I from Section 302. 86 When on the date of occurrence the deceased
approached the accused drunk and abused the accused in filthy language, the accused reacted immediately
and gave the blows on the spur of moment with the stick that was in his hand, there being no preparation and
no prior deliberation; the accused obviously acted on sudden provocation and not Section 302 but Section 304
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Part II I.P.C. was applicable.87 In a case the victim and two accused went out for hunting and they were drunk.
The accused persons killed the victim by gun shot and before the occurrence some quarrel took place between
them, it was held the death occurred either because of sudden quarrel or on sudden provocation,—Held the
case attracts Exception I or IV to Section 300. The accused persons accordingly were convicted by the
Supreme Court under Section 304 Part I I.P.C. 88 The evidence produced against the accused does not show
that the accused had any motive to cause death of the deceased or have intended to cause such bodily injuries
which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. Evidence on record
also does not establish that the injuries caused on the body of the deceased must in all probability cause his
death or likely to cause his death. On the spur of the moment, during the heat of exchange of words accused
caused injuries on the body of the deceased which caused his death. Therefore, the ingredients of the murder
as defined in Section 300 Indian Penal Code, have not been established against the accused. Supreme Court
held that the accused was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Indian Penal
Code, and considering the fact that the accused had no intention to either cause the death of the deceased or
cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the deceased, it would be sufficient to impose on accused
a sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment and to impose on him a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of
payment of fine, a further imprisonment of six months. 89
41. Objectional behaviour of wife.—
In a case a witness deposed to the effect that while returning from her school she found the accused and his
wife walking together, and after the witness went some distance ahead the spouses began to exchange words
in raised voice. Thereon the husband caused death of the wife by nine incised wounds on vital parts of her
body. It was held that is not a case of grave and sudden provocation. 90
In a case,91 in course of sudden quarrel leading to an exchange of abuses, the accused gave a solitary blow on
head with a hockey stick in the heat of the moment. The act was held to the amount to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. Where the wife threatened to leave the
accused husband for ever, without any prior reason and removed ‘thali’ from her neck and threw it in his face, it
was held that the accused was entitled to the benefit of this Exception. 92 Where the wife who had already left
her husband’s house with her child due to strained feelings to stay with her father refuses to return with the
husband and further breaks her bangles and throws the child on a cot to express her unwillingness to go back
with him her act being one which is not unexpected would not amount to such sudden and grave provocation as
to be sufficient to deprive the husband of his self-control. Even assuming it could, it would not justify the act of
the husband in stabbing his father-in-law.93
In a case the wife successively refused to cook food in the evening and to spread the beds; she also threatened
the accused, her husband that she would leave the matrimonial home for good next morning. The accused
when began to fondle her and asked why she would give up the home, she kicked him on the chest and having
asked him to get away from bed, told him to have sexual intercourse with his mother and sister. Thereon he
picked up a stone and hit his wife on the head to death. It was held that the circumstances were sufficiently
grave and sudden to provoke a reasonable man and the accused can press into service Exception I to Section
300 and the offence of murder is reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 94 But when on being
asked to cook food the wife declines to do so and says she prefers to die in a sweeper’s house than to cook
food for him, the provocation is not so grave as to entitle the husband to invoke Exception I to Section 300
I.P.C.1 When the accused a treasury guard is on duty inside the verandah in front of treasury room and another
constable from upper storey passes urine that falls in front of the verandah, the provocation is not sufficiently
grave that the constable on duty can shoot the other constable to death. Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. would
not be available to him.2 In this case reliable eye witnesses deposed about the occurrence and conviction
followed despite the inability of ballistic expert to connect the fragment of pellets inside the body of the victim
with the fire arm alleged to be used. The plea of sudden provocation is liable to be rejected when sequence
leading to assaults showed calculated move in the nature of show of bravado. 3
A murdered his wife by stabbing while she was in bed and pleaded provocation in his defence, but at the initial
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stage he had told the police that his wife had committed suicide. Holding him liable for the murder it was held
that by lying and stating that the killing was suicide A had planned the killing.4 In another case the accused lived
on earning of a girl of 17 years of age whom he killed when she cut her wrist in order to save her from his
sexual assault. His conviction for murder was converted into manslaughter as killing was out come of the
provocative conduct of the deceased. 5 The accused had killed the deceased who was a drug dealer and was
supplying to accused’s three sons. The accused lost sudden and temporary loss of control when deceased had
threatened one of his sons who had gone elsewhere for the supply. The appeal of accused was allowed and he
was held entitled to the defence of provocation. 6
The accused attacked his wife with full intention and knowledge and there was not at all an element of sudden
and grave provocation. The conviction of accused for murder was upheld. 7
Deceased wife was having extra marital affair in native town of her husband. This fact led to frequent quarrel
between couple. One day wife wanted to go to native town alone but she was not allowed to do so. When she
insisted accused in fit of rage tried to disfigure her face and hit her on head and reported incident to police
immediately thereafter. It was held that the accused was entitled to benefit of Exception I of Section 300 and
conviction was altered from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 Part I). 8
The accused admitted that he had committed the manslaughter due to sudden provocation and loss of self
control as at that particular time he was suffering form a severe depressive illness. The trial Judge convicted
him for murder as in their opinion whilst a depressive illness was a characteristic which could be attributed to
the reasonable man but it was relevant only to the gravity of the provocation and not to the reasonable man’s
loss of self control. The convict appealed on the ground that the characteristic attributed to the reasonable man
for the present purposes were relevant to the potential loss of self control as well as to the gravity of the
provocation. The defence contention was negatived by the prosecution by arguing that the mental element of a
defendant, causing impairment of his self control should not be attributed to the reasonable man. It was held
that conviction of murder should be substituted for the manslaughter as it is not possible to differentiate
between relevance of defendant’s characteristics of the reasonable man to the gravity of the provocation and
their relevance to the loss of self control resulting from it. However leave to appeal to the prosecution was
granted in this case.9
The accused husband, for whatever reason, had garnered suspicion against the attitude and character of his
wife. The husband was present in the house when the death of the wife occurred. The husband has not come
with any explanation where he was on the fateful night and how the door was locked. He had absconded for
long. He has not taken any step to report the unnatural death of his wife. From the aforesaid aspects, the
circumstances soundly establish that the deceased was with the accused during the night, there was a locking
of the door from outside which could not have been done by anyone else except him and further he absconded
from the scene of the crime and did not report to the police. Thus, the irresistible and inescapable conclusion is
that the accused was the culprit in committing the murder of his wife. 10
42. Sudden provocation : burden of proof.—
Where a person causes the death of another person it is for him to show that his act was removed from the
category of murder by one of the Exceptions to the section. The provocation must be such as will upset not
merely a hasty, hot-tempered and hyper-sensitive person but would upset also a person of ordinary sense and
calmness.11 The question of burden on defence arises only after the prosecution in a criminal trial has proved
that the offence alleged in fact has been committed by some person. As to burden of proof of grave and sudden
provocation, H ALSBURY lays down : There is no burden of proof imposed on a defendant to establish an issue
affording justification or excuse at common law, such as consent, accident, self-defence, duress, non-insane
automatism or drunkenness. So also if provocation is raised as an issue in a trial for murder, or if a defendant
puts forward an alibi as an answer to a charge.
In an appropriate case the defendant should place before the Court, by cross-examination of the prosecution
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witnesses or by evidence called on his own behalf or by a combination of the two, such material as makes
justification or the like a live issue, fit and proper to be placed before the jury. It is then for the prosecution to
eliminate the issue and prove the constituents of the offence charged. 12
Evidence showed that there was grave and sudden provocation due to frequent quarrels between the accused
and the deceased as former suspected later’s fidelity. Wordy quarrel had taken place just prior to occurrence
culminating into death of deceased. Accused was held entitled to Exception I and his conviction was altered
from one under Section 300 to Section 304 Part I. 13 The accused caused head injury with a wooden log to
deceased and also caused injury to the complainant. Evidence of doctor who initially treated him proved that
there was nexus between the injury and death. Fact situation showed that there might have been exchange of
hot words between the complainant and accused prior to moment (i.e. assault by stick). Since it was a case of
sudden provocation it will fall in category of Section 304 Part II. 14 Deceased was found to have provoked the
accused to give a blow on his neck with a sickle. Neither injuries caused were sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death nor there was pre-meditation or pre-plan on part of accused to cause death.
Conviction under Section 300 was altered to one under Section 304 Part II in view of Exception I to Section
300.15
The accused was sitting on the cot of the neighbour which was objected to by the mother and sister of the
accused, they shouted so much on the accused that he assaulted the mother and killed her and tried to kill his
sister also but she hid herself in another’s house. On being prosecuted under Section 302 he pleaded
provocation but the plea was not accepted as there was no occasion for causing the grave and sudden
provocation and conviction of accused under Section 302 was held proper. 16 The deceased administered liquor
to the brother of the accused and that caused his death but when accused enquired about this from deceased
he uttered indecent words and that caused provocation to the accused who picked up a knife lying nearby and
stabbed the deceased. It was held that since accused was deprived of the power of self-control due to grave
and sudden provocation his act would be covered under Exception 1 to Section 300 and he would be guilty
under Section 304 and not under Section 302. 17 The deceased was an anti-social element in society and he
abused the accused in a virulent manner. This caused provocation to the accused who stabbed the deceased
and reported the matter to the police. It was held that accused was liable to be convicted under Section 304 as
his case was covered under Exception I to Section 300. 18 The accused caused serious injuries on vital parts of
the body of deceased and pleaded the defence of sudden and grave provocation. It was held that in view of
serious nature of injuries the intention to cause the death was clear and conviction of accused for murder was
proper.19 There was no evidence of sudden provocation as accused according to the witnesses went inside the
house, brought the gun and fired at the deceased. It was held that intention of accused was to cause such
injury which was to cause the death of the deceased and conviction of the accused for the murder was proper. 20
The accused after the quarrel with deceased went inside the house, brought a knife and stabbed the deceased
to death. It was held that plea of provocation was not applicable and the accused was liable to be convicted for
the offence of murder.21 The accused’s sister was teased and abused and molested and evidence showed that
the accused went with gun to house of deceased and shot two fires, re-loaded the gun again and made third
fire at the deceased. It was held that all the three fires could not be said to have been made in heat of
provocation and act of accused was not covered under Exception I to Section 300 and conviction of accused for
murder was proper.22 The accused as per eye witness had killed the deceased wife by hitting her with stone
and there was no evidence to show that accused was deprived of power of self-control due to the sudden and
grave provocation. It was held that the act of accused was not covered under Exception I to Section 300 and
conviction of accused for murder was proper.23
The incident took place all of sudden and at spur of moment but no regular weapon was carried by any of the
accused. Possibility of accused acting under grave and sudden provocation on account of insistence of
deceased in not permitting accused to take their cart through field was not ruled out. It was not possible to
ascertain that who was author of which injury. The conviction of accused was, therefore, altered from under
Section 302 read with Section 34 to one under Section 304 read with Section 34. 24
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There was history of domestic violence and one day when husband threatened to kill the accused wife she
brought a kitchen knife to frighten the husband but knife some-how entered husband’s stomach and caused his
death. It was held that domestic violence did not cause a sudden loss of control which may amount to
provocation in law. Hence conviction for murder was held proper. 25
The accused killed his classmate as later had raped his (accused) girlfriend. The incident had taken place two
weeks after the rape when he confronted the victim and becoming enraged at the suggestion that the girl was a
willing party stabbed the deceased. He was convicted for murder but on appeal it was substituted by
manslaughter as due to provocation there was sudden and temporary loss of control resulting in the defendant
being unable to restrain himself from doing what he did. 26 The accused was charged of murdering his girlfriend
and pleaded that he had lost the control when girl had taunted him about his sexual inadequacy and her new
boyfriend. Medical evidence showed that he had suffered from brain damage which could interfere with his
control of his impulses. So he pleaded for diminished responsibility and provocation. Rejecting his argument it
was held that he was rightly convicted for murder as his brain damage could not be attributed to the
characteristics of the reasonable man. 27
43. Self-induced provocation.—
The words ‘if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation causes
the death of the person who gave the provocation’ in the Exception I to Section 300 are eloquent enough to
show that if a person induces the provocation himself Exception I will go far away. The Privy Council in a case 28
while dealing with the issue of self-induced provocation in relation to a blackmailer whose conduct had caused
his victim to act in a way which provoked him stated that :
(1) a blackmailer cannot rely on the predictable results of his own blackmailing conduct as constituting
provocation sufficient to reduce his killing of the victim from murder to manslaughter, and the predictable results
may include a considerable degree of hostile reaction by the person sought to be blackmailed, for instance
vituperative words and even some hostile action such as blows with a first; (2) but if the hostile reaction by the
person sought to be blackmailed goes to extreme lengths it might constitute provocation even for the
blackmailer; (3) there would in many cases be a question of degree to be decided by the jury. As stated by H
ALSBURY a person may not assert, as providing a defence of provocation, acts which are the predictable
consequences of his own conduct; but if those acts go beyond what he could have expected or foreseen the
jury is entitled to consider them as evidence of provocation. 29
The accused was convicted for murder after pleading a defence of self defence based on his perception that an
attack was necessary in self defence. Substituting a verdict of manslaughter it was laid down that, (1) where
self induced intoxication gave rise to a mistaken belief on a defendant’s part that force was necessary in self
defence, a plea of self defence fails, (2) generally a defendant’s intention and desire coincided and a direction
on the question of foresight was rarely necessary, (3) the Judge had erred in directing the jury on the possible
effect of intoxication only on O’s capacity to form the necessary specific intent to do grievous bodily harm. He
should have directed jury that self induced intoxication could have prevented O from forming the specific
intent.30 The accused due to self induced intoxication started fire in room where he was alone at the relevant
time and pleaded accident in his defence. It was held that term accident did not apply in the context of an act
done by a person in such a state of self induced intoxication that he failed to appreciate the risk of what he was
doing.31
Intoxication, as such, is not a defence to a criminal charge. At times, it can be considered to be a mitigating
circumstance if the accused is not a habitual drinker, otherwise, it has to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. The question, as to whether the drunkenness is a defence while determining sentence, came up
for consideration before this Court in Bablu alias Mubarik Hussain v. State of Rajasthan ,32 wherein Supreme
Court held that the defence of drunkenness can be availed of only when intoxication produces such a condition
as the accused loses the requisite intention for the offence and onus of proof about reason of intoxication, due
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to which the accused had become incapable of having particular knowledge in forming the particular intention,
is on the accused. Examining Section 85 of the Indian Penal Code, the Supreme Court held that the evidence
of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the
crime should be taken into account with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had the
intention. The Supreme Court held that merely establishing that his mind was affected by drink so that he more
readily gave way to some violent passion, does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural
consequences of his acts. In another case Supreme Court rejected the plea of accussed that since the accused
was under the influence of liquor, he had no intention to kill the deceased wife and, therefore, at best, the
offence would fall either under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code. Assuming that the accused was
fully drunk, he was fully conscious of the fact that if kerosene is poured and a match-stick lit and put on the
body, a person might die due to burns. A fully drunk person is also sometimes aware of the consequences of
his action. It cannot, therefore, be said that since the accused was fully drunk and under the influence of liquor,
he had no intention to cause death of the deceased-wife. 33
In an Allahabad case the accused himself was found responsible for giving provocation. In that case the
accused, an ascetic extolled uttering the words ‘Namo Narayan’ instead of words ‘Sita Ram’ which words were
being uttered by a lady who could not tolerate those disrespectful remarks for Sita and Ram who among the
Hindus are normally regarded as the incarnations of God. She immediately retorted ‘What type of Sadhu you
are, when you are talking in these terms, are you a Sadhu or an imposter. I shall call my men who will take you
to task’. With these words, she got up and came out and while going she also kicked the stick carried by the
accused. The accused enraged took out a knife, jumped upon the lady, sat on her chest and showered a large
number of knife blows on her resulting in her death. It was held that the accused himself induced the
provocation and accordingly was not entitled to the protection of Expection I of Section 300 I.P.C. and
accordingly was guilty of murder.34
44. Time gap between provocation and assault : effect.—
Distance between provocation and assault causing death may render Exception I to Section 300 not
applicable.35 In a school committee meeting one B made remarks that the father and the uncle of the accused
were dishonest, the accused thereon travelled about one furlong to his house, brought a gun, directed other
persons who were near the accused to go away lest bullet should hit them, fired towards B but it hit the
deceased who in an attempt to interfere fell between it was held the provocation was far from sudden and the
offence is one under Section 302 and not under Section 304 Part I I.P.C. 36 Accused, director of physical
education of an institution the students of which were aggressive on an issue against him, the accused went to
his quarters, brought a gun and caused death of a student by two shots, it was held the is guilty under Section
304, Part I I.P.C.37 Provocation on Sunday, murder on Friday next—held defence of grave and sudden
provocation is not available.38
The defence of provocation will not avail the accused, if the fatal acts are done at such a distance of time after
the injury received as should have allowed the mortal resentment to subside, or with such weapons, or in such
a manner, as indicates a desire of unmeasured revenge. 39
In a case the accused was aware of the immoral relationship between his wife and one K. There was no
evidence or even a faint suggestion as to anything happening on the particular morning or the previous night
which might account for the madness with which the accused flew into rage and started assaulting her with a
knife in a brutal manner. It was held that the case as made out in the petition excluded any hypothesis of
sudden provocation and consequently Exception I could not really be called in aid. 40
In a case wife kicked the husband at home and left the home. Later on when the wife was only two furlongs
away from her parents house the husband inflicted injury on the vital part of his body resulting in her death.
Because of the distance of time the accused had sufficient time to cool down. Exception I to Section 300 was
not attracted and it was held to be case of murder. 41
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Similarly where a month’s time had elapsed between the attempted outraging of modesty of the wife of the
accused by the deceased and his death at the hand of the accused, it was held that Exception I to Section 300
I.P.C. did not apply and the case was one of murder under Section 302 I.P.C. 42
In a Bombay case of Panaji Bench, the accused provoked by grave and sudden provocation first threw boiling
water on the victim and thereafter stabbed the victim to death. A brief resume to factual matrix would be
conducive to proper appreciation of the law. One fishing trawler was out in the sea on routine fishing operation
on the night intervening 1st and 2nd November and were returning to the beach at Miramar in the small hours
of 2nd November, 1988 at about 3.00 a.m. There were about fifteen employees or Khalasis on board and some
of them were sleeping in the cabin. At about 3.00 a.m. the accused intended to sleep in the cabin on a bench.
Under the bench, N, the deceased, was also sleeping. In order to destroy the bugs on the bench, the accused
brought hot water and started pouring the same on the bench. The hot water also fell on the person of N who
was sleeping below the bench. This annoyed N and he got up and started abusing the accused. In order to
retaliate the abuses, the accused threw the remaining hot water along with the pot on the deceased N which
resulted in scalding injuries on his face, forehead, etc. The accused is then alleged to have gone out of the
cabin and from somewhere brought a large knife, usually used for cleaning and cutting fish and stabbed N on
his chest only once. The knife had a blade of 8 centimeters length and a sharp edge. The injury was deep
cutting through the pericardium and lungs resulting in profuse bleeding and N died almost instantaneously.
In answer to the plea that this death of N had been caused under grave and sudden provocation, Panaji Bench
held that the anger or heat of passion even if it had aroused when abuses were hurled at the accused yet
accused had immediately retaliated by throwing hot water along with pot on the deceased immediately, it is
thereafter that the accused went out of the cabin, procured a knife and re-entered the cabin with the sole
intention of causing a stab injury on the vital part of his body. This time lag between the provocation and taking
revenge repels the applicability of Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. The conviction under Section 304 Part I
accordingly was not allowed to be reduced to Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 43
In a case the accused, an octogenarian sikh was living in a Gurdwara alone, his wife had deserted him to live a
life of adultery, with the son and the daughter. The old man, six days before occurrence brought his daughter
and lodged her in Gurdwara. In the night he chopped off the head of his daughter by a sword possibly because
he suspected his daughter of bad character. It was held that the mental turmoil led him to commit the crime,
conviction under Section 304 Part I, not one under Section 302, I.P.C. was proper. 44 A little comment on this
decision may not be out of place. If the provocation was there, the provocation was not sudden. The knowledge
of the adultery of the daughter could not be invested in him in that fateful night. Knowing about the adultery of
the daughter if the accused had brought her to Gurudwara, we are afraid the provocation could neither be grave
nor sudden. Delhi High Court, it is respectfully submitted, went completely wrong in reducing the murder to
culpable homicide not amounting to murder with the aid of Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C For, when the
provocation ripens into resentment and malice and person aggrieved deliberately determines to take the life of
the other person, it cannot be said that he acted under grave and sudden provocation. 45
45. Adulterous intercourse.—
Although a confession of adultery by wife to her husband, who in consequence kills her, is such a provocation
as will entitle the jury in their discretion to find a verdict of manslaughter instead of murder, a similar confession
of illicit intercourse by a woman who was not the accused’s wife but only engaged to be married to him cannot,
if he kills her in consequence, justify such a verdict. 46 A man in love with a woman who had repulsed his suit
might be so angry as to lose control of himself at the sight of her engaged in sexual intercourse with another,
but if he kills one or both of them, he cannot plead grave provocation in mitigation of his offence. The law that,
when a husband discovers his wife in the act of adultery and thereupon kills her, he is guilty of manslaughter
and not murder, has no application where the woman concerned is not the wife of the accused. 47 In a case the
deceased on a previous occasion misbehaved with the wife of the accused. On the day of occurrence, the
accused was walking to and fro in front of the house of the accused with a view to catch the eyes of the wife of
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the accused. The accused being provoked by the conduct of the deceased killed him by a spear-head and
bichua (dagger). It was held that as there was no apprehension of death or of grievous hurt of the accused by
the deceased, the accused was not justified in killing the deceased. But it amounts to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder attracting Section 304 Part I I.P.C. 48
In a case, the accused caused the death of his wife for infidelity. The eye-witnesses gave correct narration of
the incident. The medical evidence corroborated the evidence of the ocular witnesses that the death was
caused by injuries to the victim while she was being dragged by the accused. No case was made out that
accused had grave and sudden provocation. The accused was convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. 49
The accused caused the death of deceased (Paramour of his wife) due to sustained provocation which he
harboured in his mind on account of illicit intimacy between deceased and his wife. Held, that case squarely
falls under explanation I to Section 300 Penal Code and his conviction under Section 304 Part I is proper. 50
The accused had strangulated his wife and was arrested by residents of locality while he was trying to run away
from window of room. The testimony of independent witness of fact was trust worthy and left no doubt that
accused committed murder. There was persistent quarrel between husband and wife as he did not like his wife
talking to other persons freely. Therefore possibility could not be ruled out that he suspected her fidelity and on
that day taken by sudden impulse, lost self control and strangulated her. It was held that the case would fall
under Exception 1 of Section 300 and conviction was liable to be altered form under Section 302 to one under
Section 304 Part I.51
In a case, the accused murdered his widower-uncle, both being Adivasis. The mother of the accused was also
widow and one day he found his uncle in compromising position with his mother. This obviously aroused anger
in him. On the second day, his uncle surreptitiously entered his house presumably to remain with his mother
and accused this time killed his uncle by a knife causing instantaneous death. The question cropped up
whether on the second day the accused was impelled by grave and sudden provocation. Orissa High Court
held the sight of his uncle entering surreptitiously the house of the accused caused grave and sudden
provocation and he lost power of self-control. The provocation was very grave because to every son the mother
is sacred. Violation of the mother on the face of a son cannot be tolerated, so much so in such circumstances it
was not unusual to commit murder. The accused, therefore, was given the benefit of Exception I to Section 300
I.P.C. and he was convicted under Section 304 Part I, and not under Section 302 I.P.C. 52
When the accused knew that his wife was leading an immoral life with somebody else in the village, and she
was not listening to his repeated entreaties forbidding her not to indulge in such activities and when in reply to
the husband the wife retorted in causative manner and the husband caused death in such perplexed mood, it
was held there was sudden and grave provocation and the case comes under Exception I to Section 300
I.P.C.53 In another case accused having found his wife lying with his brother in the same bed chased his brother
upto a distance and hit him to death. The accused was found entitled to Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. 54 In
another case the accused having found his wife in compromising position with another hit her by a stick to
death. Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. was made available to him and he was guilty of culpable homicide not
In case of murder of the wife for her adulterous act the mental background created by the previous acts of the
victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining if the subsequent act caused grave and sudden
provocation. The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from the provocation. 56
Unfaithfulness of wife may be a provocation which is grave, but unless there is that suddenness, the accused is
not entitled to benefit.57 Attempt to have intercourse with wife has been held to be a great provocation entitling
the husband to Exception I to Section 300.58
The Madras High Court has held that the rulings to the effect that when a wife, mother or married sister living
under the protection of the husband, son or brother, was caught in the act of having sexual intercourse with a
stranger, the killing of that stranger, before there was time to get over the sudden anger, would make the
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offence punishable under Section 304, should not be extended to first cousins, second cousins and others
killing a woman, especially when the woman was not in the custody or protection of the accused. 59
46. Defence of unsound mind as alternate defence.—
The law is that burden of proving Exception I is on the accused. But the mere fact that accused adopted
another alternative defence during his examination under Section 313 of the I.P.C. without referring to
Exception No. I of Section 300 of I.P.C. is not enough to deny him of the benefit of the Exception, if the Court
can cull out materials from evidence pointing to the existence of circumstances leading to that Exception. It is
not the law that failure to set up such a defence would foreclose the right to rely on the Exception once and for
all. It is axiomatic that burden on the accused to prove any fact can be discharged either through defence
evidence or even through prosecution evidence by showing a preponderance of probability. 60
The accused appealed against the conviction for murder as he was charged of shooting two persons engaged
in burgling his house and in this shooting one was killed and other was wounded. He pleaded the right of self
defence and long standing paranoid personality disorder which had affected his power of self control. Allowing
the appeal it was held that he could for the purposes of provocation rely on the fact that he was suffering form a
Psychiatric disorder which affected the power of self control and that could reasonably be expected of him but
he could not plead that he had used reasonable force in self defence. Therefore defendant’s physical
characteristics could be taken into account and in the light of fresh evidence relating to diminished responsibility
the conviction for murder was quashed and a conviction for manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility
was substituted and period of sentence was also reduced. 61
47. Cases.—
Adulterous intercourse is held, in several cases, to give grave and sudden provocation. The accused and his
wife’s sister’s husband, B, were sleeping on the same cot (charpai) in the verandah, and the accused’s wife
was sleeping in the adjoining room. Some time in the night B got up, and went into the room and bolted the
door behind him. The accused also got up and peeping through a chink in the door saw B and the accused’s
wife having sexual intercourse. The accused returned to his charpai and lay down on it. After some time B
came out of the room and lay down on the charpai by the side of the accused. After a short time, when B began
dozing the accused stabbed him several times with a knife and killed him. There was no evidence that the
accused had to go anywhere to search for the knife, which, apparently, was with him. It was held that the case
came within this Exception, notwithstanding the interval of time between the seeing of the act of adultery and
the killing of B, and the accused having acted under grave and sudden provocation the offence committed was
one under Section 304 and not under Section 302. 62 In a case the accused who had hitherto entertained a
suspicion about his wife’s character saw two persons coming out of the house in the early hours of the day the
accused then killed his wife. It was held that provocation was given by the wife in entertaining strangers during
the absence of the husband, the accused is entitled to the benefit of Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. and he is
to be convicted under Section 304 I.P.C. 63 In another case the accused requested the deceased, his full-brother
to discontinue illicit connection with the widow of their dead brother. It was followed by an exchange of hot
words whereon the accused by piercing blow on the back lower part of the neck caused the death of the
brother. It was held that the accused acted under grave and sudden provocation and he was entitled to
Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C.64
Where an accused seeing another in the act of sleeping with former’s wife with the intention of committing
adultery, kills him instantaneously, he is entitled to the benefit of Exception I to Section 300, the provocation in
such a case being extremely grave. He can be convicted only under Section 304 Part I. 65 In another case wife
of the accused repeatedly found fault with the accused who was obliged to live at his brother’s place. After
about a few months he found his wife carrying for a few months. On enquiry the wife admitted that coitus with a
third person entailed her pregnancy. The accused immediately killed his wife. It was held that he can avail
himself of Exception I to Section 300 and is guilty under Section 304 not under Section 302 I.P.C. 66 Where the
accused found his wife who was six months advanced in pregnancy and her paramour together in his house but
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not in the act of sexual intercourse and killed her on provocation; it was held that taking into account the nature
and temper of these people of the class of the accused, when their honour, or perhaps the possession of their
women was concerned, the case fell within Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. and the accused’s conviction
under Section 302 was reduced to Section 304 Part I. 67
In a case a poor woodcutter had the misfortune of having a wife who lived consistently with her paramour. The
woodcutter drowned the sorrow in liquor. One night after he came back from arack shop about 9.00 p.m., his
wife served him food, spread out his bed in the corridor outside the living room and went into the room to sleep
with her paramour. The woodcutter woke up from sleep and he saw from his own eyes his wife and her
paramour completely naked in his own room. He immediately hacked both of them to death. He was held
entitled to Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. and was convicted under Section 304 Part I I.P.C. 68 A Pathan father
and his son and his son’s wife were living together. The son’s wife had contracted a liaison with a barber. One
day the father seeing the barber entering into his house in his absence called his son who was nearby and both
of them came to the house and found the wife and the barber inflagrante delicto and killed both of them. It was
held that this Exception was applicable to the case. 69 Where the husband entertained the suspicion about his
wife’s character, lost control over himself by grave and sudden provocation on seeing strangers coming out of
his house when his wife was alone during the night and killed her, it was held that this Exception applied. 70 It is
not necessary for the husband to plead seeing of actual intercourse between his wife and the paramour. Thus
where the husband seeing his wife and the paramour lying together in his house almost naked, picked up an
axe and killed both of them, it was held that his case came within this Exception and he was accordingly
convicted under Section 304 Part I I.P.C. 71 Where the accused killed the deceased as he saw the deceased
committing sodomy on his son, the case undoubtedly fell within this Exception and he was liable to be convicted
only under Section 304 Part II and not under Section 302 I.P.C. 72
However, if the death of the adulterer is caused not in a fit of passion but with subsequent deliberation, this
Exception does not apply. Where the accused finding a man intriguing with his wife, beat him and after taking
him to the bank of a river, cut off his head; 73 where the accused’s concubine refused to abandon another
connection and the accused, after remonstrating with the woman and leaving her, followed and killed her with a
dagger which he had purchased with the intention of killing her. 74 where the accused, suspecting infidelity in his
wife, followed her with a hatchet on one night when she stealthily left his house, and finding her talking to her
paramour, there and then killed her; 75 and where the accused, suspecting the widow of his cousin, followed her
one night with a sword in hand, to a considerable distance, and finding her actually having connection with her
lover killed her there and then; 76 it was held in all these cases that the offence of murder was committed. No
doubt in all these cases there was provocation, but the acts were not committed while the accused were
deprived of the power of self-control, they were not the offsprings of the moment, but were the result of cool and
mature consideration after the first excitement had passed away.
Accused in a case was charged for killing his wife by assaulting her by stones and fists on her chest and
forehead being suspicious of her conjugal fidelity. It was an occurrence not at a spur of a moment. The High
Court having considered the evidence and the circumstances held they reveal that the action of the appellant
cannot be said as having been carried out without premeditation or preplanning and on the contrary had
happened just on the spur of moment. The evidence brought on record on the point of the previous strained
relations between the appellant and the deceased and also about the alleged misbehaviour of the deceased
which seems to have disturbed the mind of the appellant is to be deemed as a motivating force and the real
cause of the whole incident which occurred just on the day the deceased decided to go to the police station to
finalise the snapping of the relationship between her and her husband. The High Court held that with the evil
design to cause her death the accused took her to an insolated place where he executed his dastardly plan far
from anybody who could have obstructed him or come on the way of a satisfying his design. 77
The allegation was that the deceased was strangulated to death by accused while being taken in his car.
Witness had clearly identified the appellant as one of the persons who had travelled with the deceased in car
and recovery of dead body was made at the instance of appellant. High Court disregarding evidence on flimsy
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grounds had set aside the conviction. It was held that order of the High Court was liable to be set aside. The
case was remanded to High Court for fresh consideration. 78
In a case however Bombay High Court arrived at a conclusion that if the husband had even 15 days before his
wife is done to death finds her in an adulterous situation, the causing of death may attract Exception I to Section
300. In that case the wife of the accused had gone to her parent’s house. The accused had gone to bring his
wife 15 days before the incident and having learnt that his wife had gone to field also had gone to the field
where he found his wife sleeping with his cousin brother in the field. The accused got annoyed, abused his wife
and also narrated the incident to his mother-in-law and also beat his wife in her presence. His wife was duly
brought to her matrimonial home. On the date of the incident, it was found that the accused early in the morning
at about 4.00 a.m. assaulted his wife while she was asleep, by means of a knife. In all he dealt four knife blows
on the person of his wife. After assaulting his wife, the accused came out of the house and went to the house of
his neighbour A, to whom he called out of house and told that he had killed his wife and that he should look
after his daughter. The accused then went away. Bombay High Court despite there was enough time for the
accused to cool down applied Exception I to Section 300 and held that the offence would be governed by
Section 304 Part I I.P.C.79
The deceased P, in a case went to the house of the appellant who was taking food. P demanded the food to be
served to him but appellant’s wife declined and asked him to go away. Thereon P kicked the plate of the
appellant and challenged the appellant to come out. The appellant accused followed him with a dagger and
caused his death by dagger blow. The Apex Court viewed the whole incident as a continuous sequence and
found that the death was caused on grave and sudden provocation and convicted the accused appellant under
Section 304 Part I I.P.C.80
The accused was alleged to have attempted to outrage the modesty of the niece of the accused who had
inflicted knife blows on vital part of body of deceased who had died instantaneously. The evidence showed that
the crime was committed due to the grave and sudden provocation. It was held that since case was covered
under Exception I of Section 300 the conviction of accused was liable to be altered to one under Section 304
Part I.81 The accused in another case fired the gun shot at his neighbour and his own daughter on finding out
their illicit relations and testimony of eye witnesses was found credible despite their inter se relationship with
deceased. It was held that since offence was committed by accused on learning that his teenage daughter was
ravished by the deceased and they had sexual relations, the provision of Exception I to Section 300 would be
attracted and accused would be convicted for offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under
Section 304.82 The allegation was that accused had attacked the deceased with Gupti and dealt a blow on his
stomach causing his death. The evidence of eye witness was consistent and inspired the confidence as their
presence at the scene of occurrence was found natural. It was held that offence of murder was made out and
non-disclosure of fact by the doctor that injuries were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause the death,
was of no consequence.83 The accused had murdered his wife by strangulating with a leather belt. The extra-
judicial confession of the accused was corroborated by the fact of recovery of belt from possession of accused.
The plea taken by the accused that wife had caused provocation by slapping him on his face was not found
correct. It was held that the accused had committed the offence of murder and his conviction under Section 302
was proper.84
The accused who was hungry for three days, asked for food from deceased, sewadar of Dera where free food
was being supplied. The deceased refused and the accused in a fit of anger attacked the deceased with handle
of a pump. The accused did not run away and surrendered to the witnesses. In view of the circumstances and
conduct of the accused, it was held that the accused had no intention to cause death of the deceased but
caused the injuries on sudden and grave provocation with the knowledge that such injuries were likely to cause
death. He was convicted under Section 304 Part II. 85
48. Misbehaviour of the wife.—
Normally, the husband is entitled to the comfort consortion of the wife. That is the primary obligation of every
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wife who has entered into wedlock. But sometimes for reasons right or wrong wives refuse the husbands their
company and consequently marital pleasure. Whether this refusal on the part of the wife can give rise to a
grave and sudden provocation has been the subject matter in a few cases. As held in a Madras case a husband
is likely to be greatly provoked by the threat of his wife to leave him and to live with someone else; if the wife
brought a broom-stick and used indecent language of abuse during the course of the quarrel, this is likely to
have deprived the husband of all powers of self-control. 86 When the wife who had already left her matrimonial
home with her child due to strained feeling refused to return to her husband, on the other hand breaks her
bangles and throws the child on a cot to express her reluctance to go back to her husband, it was held the act
being not unexpected would not amount to such sudden and grave provocation as was to be sufficient to
deprive the husband of self-control. Even assuming it could, it would not justify her husband’s stabbing his
father-in-law.87
In another case the wife of the accused was taken away by her mother from the company of the husband on a
flimsy pretext and later a suit for declaration that the marriage was void was filed. The accused met his wife and
asked her to come back to the matrimonial home but the wife refused whereon the accused stabbed his wife to
death. It was held that there was grave and sudden provocation and the accused is liable to be convicted under
Section 304 Part I and not under Section 302 I.P.C. 88 In another case wife’s misbehaviour was not one of her
refusal to return to the comfort-consortion of the husband. There the wife inflicted sword injuries on her
husband, the accused at night and when he ran inside she chased him with the sword; the accused moved
himself behind a pillar, snatched the sword from the hand of his wife and inflicted blows on her by the sword;
she having fallen down the accused inflicted one more blow, on her. It was held that accused was entitled to the
benefit of Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. and the offence was culpable homicide and not amounting to
murder.89 In a case a woman was leading a notoriously immoral life which was the common scandal of the
village. She had a young lover who was known to the accused, her husband. On the night previous to the
murder she disappeared from the bed of her husband. Subsequent protest by the husband led her to make
vulgar abuse to the accused, her husband started beating her with a shoe, lost his control, picked up a rough
stick which happened to be lying close by and struck the fatal blow to the erring wife which resulted in her
death. After murder police had no difficulty in finding him out and producing him before the Court. It was held
that whole unfortunate affair should be looked at as one prolonged agony on the part of the husband which
must have been playing upon his mind and eventually led to the fatal assault, and sudden provocation; Section
300, Exception I bringing the case within the purview of Exception I to Section 300. 90
49. Misbehaviour with or by sister.—
One may justly be aggrieved when ones own sister is subjected or subjects herself to some unsocial conduct.
In a case accused found her sister having illicit intercourse with a stranger. The accused flew into a rage and
caused the death of her sister, it was held that Exception I to Section 300, is attracted and the offence is
punishable under Section 304 I.P.C.91
In a case the victim was found in the house about midnight of the accused who visibly was unhappy at such
visit as the victim had contracted liaison with the sister of the accused and was seen by the accused when he
had put his arms round her. It was held that the accused must have lost his power of self-control when he saw a
stranger in the house at midnight taking liberties with his sister, that the culprit had received grave and sudden
provocation, and that he was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 92 In a case the accused
knew that his sister had illicit relationship with the deceased to whom she had gone and the accused followed
her and eventually killed the paramour of his sister. It was held the provocation was grave but not sudden and
he was not allowed the benefit of Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. 93
50. Misbehaviour with or by daughter or son.—
There are cases where the grave provocation has been found to exist for unsocial and indecent behaviour with
son or daughter. In a case the deceased taunted and cast aspersion on chastity of accused’s unmarried
daughter, it was held that grave and sudden provocation exists and Exception I is attracted. 94
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In another case having come to know that his daughter was attempted to be ravished by the deceased the
accused rushed to the house of the deceased and killed him. It was held that the case is covered by Exception I
to Section 300 I.P.C.95 In a Supreme Court case the victim committed sodomy on the son of accused who
caused the death of the deceased. Supreme Court held that it was under grave and sudden provocation and
the accused was to be convicted under Section 304 I.P.C. 96 In that case the occurrence took place while the
deceased was committing sodomy on the son and that gave such a sudden and grave provocation and
annoyance to the appellant which impelled him to assault the deceased.
51. Adulterous misbehaviour of daugther-in-law.—
In a case accused No. 1 the father of accused No. 2 found the deceased who had contracted an illicit
relationship with the daughter-in-law of accused No. 1 entering his house in his absence from a short distance
from his house. Thereupon he informed his son who was about 100 paces from the house and both father and
son came to the house and seeing the daughter-in-law and the deceased in a compromising position killed
them both.
It was held that when the accused No. 1 was at a short distance from the house he must have been provoked
to such a degree as to lose his senses there and then and if he further informed his son of what he had seen
and came to his house accompanied by his son, he had no time to cool down so to say and thus return to his
normal condition. The whole thing formed a series of one transaction and the provocation continued until such
time as the deed was done. The accused No. 1 therefore, was entitled to the benefit of Exception 1 to Section
300. Similarly, when the son was seen going to meet his wife, he too would have at once lost the power of
control and if afterwards he travelled a distance of 100 pace only, it could not be reasonably urged that the act
that he then did smacked of deliberation or that he sought the provocation himself. He too, therefore was
entitled to the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300. 1 The Madras High Court has held that the rulings to the
effect that when a wife, mother or married sister living under the protection of the husband, son or brother, was
caught in the act of having sexual intercourse with a stranger, the killing of that stranger, before there was time
to get over the sudden anger, would make the offence punishable under Section 304, should not be extended
to first cousins, second cousins and others killing a woman especially when the woman was not in the custody
or protection of the accused.2 Madras High Court again relying on Jamaluddin’s case (ibid) reiterated to the
same effect in subsequent cases.3
52. Words and gestures as provocation.—
Words and gestures may also under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to bring the
case under the first Exception to Section 300 I.P.C. 4
There was verbal altercation not so serious which could cause sudden provocation, but in pursuance of that
accused hit the victim cruelly on head and chest causing death, it was heldSection 302 I.P.C. is attracted. 5 If
mere words or gestures can cause grave provocation, there can be no manner of doubt that its possibility will
be all the more if filthy abuses are hurled.6
Utterance of abusive words does not constitute a grave and sudden provocation. 7
53. Quarrel as provocation.—
Where there was sudden quarrel between father-in-law and son-in-law on the issue of not sending daughter to
her matrimonial home and both sides started throwing stones on each other and stone thrown by son-in-law
caused a head injury on his father-in-law which resulted in his death the offence cannot fall under Section 302
I.P.C. but would fall under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 8 There was long standing civil dispute between parties. The
accused and his party assaulted deceased on being enraged by fact that deceased and his family members
had forcibly entered the disputed field and removed paddy therefrom. So murder was not pre-mediated one but
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was outcome of sudden provocation. The conviction of accused under Section 302 was altered to one under
Section 304 II.9 It was a sudden fight in which both parties were more or less to be blamed and accused was
not said to have taken any undue advantage or had acted in cruel or unusual manner. His case was covered
under Exception 4 to Section 300 and conviction was altered from under Section 302 to one under Section
304.10
Deceased father-in-law had refused to send his daughter with the accused and also quarrelled with him. The
wife of accused had deserted not only him but also her child of tender age. Thus out of sudden and grave
provocation accused lost his power of self control and stabbed the deceased father-in-law on his chest. It was
held that Exception I to Section 300 was available and accused could be convicted only under Section 304 and
not under Section 302.11 In another case there was frequent quarrel between the accused and the deceased,
who was evading to settle the dues. On the day of occurrence accused was pushed by the deceased and
accused stabbed him on the left side of his neck. It was held that stabbing was on account of grave and sudden
provocation caused by the deceased. Conviction was altered from one under Section 302 to Section 304 Part
I.12
Where on a certain quarrel, a person in the heat of moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes
injuries one of which proves fatal; he would be entitled to the benefit of Exception four of Section 300 I.P.C. The
cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The
number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the
occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of
course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. 13 In a case in
course of bitter quarrel between the parties over the right to draw water from a well to irrigate their lands, the
accused brought a gun and fired the victim to death. The Supreme Court held, the conviction under Section 302
I.P.C. should be converted to one under Section 304 Part I. 14
Where in pursuance of a certain quarrel and impelled by grave provocation an assault is made resulting in
death of the victim, the case falls under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 15 A quarrel took place amongst the members
of a family. Accused No. 1 and accused No. 2 ran from their field to the scene of the occurrence. Accused No. 2
was so annoyed as the quarrel continued that he took his pitch-fork and struck it on the head of the deceased.
Accused No. 1 immediately struck a heavy stick on the head of the deceased. The deceased fell down and died
on the following day. It was held that each of the accused was responsible for his own act as there was no
common intention; that accused No. 1 was guilty of murder but accused No. 2 was guilty of causing hurt with a
dangerous weapon under Section 324. 16
54. Provocation : Proved.—
The accused suspecting deceased having illicit relations with his sister entered in altercation with him. The
deceased told the accused that he had raped and killed the daughter of co-accused. Hearing this the accused
dragged the deceased out of house and caused his death by stabbing on several parts of body. It was held that
version of deceased was sufficiently enough to cause sudden and grave provocation. Hence, conviction of
accused was altered from Section 302 to one under Section 304 Part I. 17
The accused struck blows from blunt side of Phawara on deceased causing his death but there was no
previous enmity between accused and deceased and the incident had occurred on spur of moment during the
course of altercation which ensued between accused and deceased. It was held that an inference could be
drawn that the accused might have been deprived of his self-control on account of grave and sudden
provocation given by the deceased and had not intended to commit the murder of deceased. As such conviction
of accused under Section 302 was altered to one under Section 304 Part I. 18 The accused picked up quarrel
with deceased over taking of water from tubewell as deceased had prevented them from doing so. The accused
fired shot in exercise of right of private defence and killed the deceased. It was held that conviction of accused
was liable to be altered from Section 302 to that under Section 304i.e. culpable homicide not amounting to
murder.19 There was sudden quarrel in which serious injuries were caused to the deceased. Though it was
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outcome of the sudden fight and injuries were caused knowingly but there was clear intention also to commit
the crime. Therefore conviction of the accused for murder was proper as accused had inflicted knife blow on
spinal region of the deceased.20 There was sudden fight on occasion of Holi in which the accused had given a
single knife blow on chest of deceased resulting in his death. It was held that offence would fall within fourth
Exception of Section 300 and accused would be punishable under Section 304 for offence of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder.21
55. Provocation not proved.—
Accused found that wife had illicit relations with another man and asked her to stop it but she left his house and
went to another man’s house and refused to come back. Accused got enraged thereby and killed the wife with
weapons picked up from the carpenter’s shop. Here grave and sudden provocation was present but the
accused had reasonable time to react. Hence, case was held not covered under Exception I to Section 300 and
conviction of accused for murder was held proper.22
There was sudden fight between two groups in which one person was killed due to gunshot injuries received by
him. It was held that recourse to Section 149 was not permissible. The person causing the death cannot be
convicted unless it is shown that injuries were caused by him only. In this case the shot was fired by appellant
under grave and sudden provocation during the fight, he was convicted under Section 304 part (ii) but sentence
was reduced to the period already undergone. The other appellant was acquitted as serious infirmities and
contradictions found in prosecution case were duly considered by High Court. 23 The shooting incident had
occurred probably due to sudden and grave provocation and conviction of accused was altered from under
Section 302 to one under Section 304 as accused had opened fire when he was chased by deceased and his
family members.24 The accused in another case appealed against conviction of causing grievous bodily harm
and pleaded that Judge had failed to direct the jury (JURY) fully as to self defence. He also contended that he
was provoked by victim by racist remarks. Allowing the appeal it was held that direction on self defence was
incomplete and there was clear breach of the Criminal Appeal Rules 1968. 25
The accused chased deceased and inflicted 19 knife injuries on the deceased who was unarmed. It was held
that 19 injuries caused in quick succession could not be as a result of grave and sudden provocation and
conviction of accused under Section 300 was proper. 26 Accused persons without any cause assembled before
the house of deceased for consuming liquor and on being asked not to create nuisance they struck deceased
on head with blunt portion of axe and also injured the landlady. It was held that it could not be a case of grave
and sudden provocation and accused persons were liable to be convicted. 27 Accused all of sudden returned to
his house and found his wife drunk, naked and in company of a young man in her bed room. So due to grave
and sudden provocation he inflicted fatal injury on her head. It was held that case was covered under Exception
I to Section 300.28
56. Exception 2—Private defence in murder29.—
This Exception provides for the case of a person who exceeds the right of private defence. The authors of the
Indian Penal Code observe : ‘Wherever the limits of the right of private defence may be placed, and with
whatever degree of accuracy they may be marked, we are inclined to think that it will always be expedient to
make a separation between murder and... voluntary culpable homicide in defence. The chief reason for making
this separation is that the law itself invites men to the very verge of the crime which we have designated as
voluntary culpable homicide in defence. It prohibits such homicide indeed; but it authorizes acts which lie very
near to such homicide; and this circumstance, we think, greatly mitigates the guilt of such homicide.’ The death
sentence of accused was confirmed by High Court by ignoring certain relevant pieces of the evidence and
Supreme Court found that disputed land was in possession of accused and death was caused while exercising
the right of private defence of property. Since right of defence was exceeded the conviction of accused was
altered to one under Exception 2 to Section 300 of Indian Penal Code and death sentence was modified to one
of life imprisonment.30 In a Supreme Court case the accused caught hold of hand of deceased who assaulted
the accused. The deceased was then unarmed but accused inflicted axe blow on his face resulting into his
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death. It was held that deceased was not in a position to cause death or grievous hurt so as to exercise right of
private defence to the extent of causing death was not justified and conviction of accused was proper. 31 In
Supreme Court case when deceased threw bricks upon him accused brought gun and fired shots in self
defence. It was held that there was no occasion for accused to use gun and by doing so he had exceeded his
right of private defence. His conviction under Section 304 was upheld. 32
This Exception 2 to Section 300 should be read in the backdrop of Sections 96 to Section 104 I.P.C.
Particularly, it should be read along with Section 100. Section 96 in wide terms declares nothing is an offence
which is done in exercise of the right of private defence. Therefore, if one exercises right of private defence
within the limits of the law he is immune from any penalty whatsoever. Section 100 postulates six situations
when the right of private defence to body may extend to cause death. Clause 3 of Section 300 postulates
exceeding the right of private defence which is punishable. 33 What is required under the relevant Explanation 2
of Section 300, contemplated in terms of Sections 97 and 100, is that right of private defence is exercised in
‘good faith’ and that the act is done ‘without premeditation’. Whether the ‘harm’ done by accused is
commensurate with the necessity of the occasion giving rise to the right of self-defence is a question which is
decided under Section 304 I.P.C. 34 The field belonged to the accused and they had every right to prevent the
complainant from ploughing it. Acquitting the accused it was held that the fact that the accused was acquitted in
respect of offence punishable under Section 447 I.P.C. is not always determinative of question whether right of
private defence has been exceeded.35
‘That a man who deliberately kills another in order to prevent that other from pulling his nose should be allowed
to go absolutely unpunished would be most dangerous. The law punishes and ought to punish such killing; but
we cannot think that the law ought to punish such killing as murder; for the law itself has encouraged the slayer
to inflict on the assailant any harm short of death which may be necessary for the purpose of repelling the
outrage; to give the assailant a cut with a knife across the fingers which may render his right hand useless to
him for life, or to hurl him downstairs with such force as to break his leg; and it seems difficult to conceive that
circumstances which would be a full justification of any violence short of homicide should not be a mitigation of
the guilt of homicide. That a man should be merely exercising a right by fracturing the skull and knocking out
the eye of an assailant, and should be guilty of the highest crime in the Indian Penal Code if he kills the same
assailant; that there should be only a single step between perfect innocence and murder, between perfect
impunity and liability to capital punishment, seems unreasonable. In a case in which the law itself empowers an
individual to inflict any harm short of death, it ought hardly, we think, to visit him with the highest punishment if
he inflicts death’.36 Stabbing the deceased to death on his refusal to sell goods on credit constitutes no grave
and sudden provocation and the accused is not entitled to benefit of Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. 37 In a
case an accused, an allotee of quarters sublet the quarters to the victim. The accused went to the quarters
armed with a knife to evict the sub-tenant. In the resultant quarrel accused stabbed the victim it was held that it
is murder, he cannot invoke Exception 4 to Section 300 (grave and sudden provocation). 38 Elder brother
advising younger not to drink—both abusing each other but eventually the younger brother having brought a
kirpan hit the elder resulting in internal and external carotid vessels and internal jugular vein along with nerves
cut resulting in the death of the victim, it was held that there is no question of grave and sudden provocation
and the accused is guilty under Section 302 I.P.C. 39
If a woman not under the protection of the accused is murdered by him only for the reason that she led an
immoral life, the accused cannot press into service Exception I to Section 300 I.P.C. 40 In a case the deceased
persons who were under influence of alcohol came armed to the flat; forcibly demanded money from the
inmates. As a result thereof there was a commotion with the inmates calling for help. In the course of the
incident whatever came handy including chilli powder was used by the inmates to protect themselves. The use
of chilli powder also shows that the inmates were trying to ward off the intruders. That was a perfectly defensive
action. To find the blood stained articles from the flat is only natural and so also it is natural to find the clothes of
the inmates stained with blood. The deceased persons were armed and some of them pulled the hairs of some
lady inmates of the house. In this perspective, it was held that inmates in causing death of the deceased were
within the bounds of right of private defence.41
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In a Supreme Court case the father of the accused was given lathi blows by the complainant party whereon the
son fired on the complainant party by a gun licence of which stood in the name of his father. Right of private
defence was upheld and the accused (son) was acquitted. The fact whether injuries caused to father by lathi
blow were simple or grievous was not relevant. 42 In a case the deceased armed with a gun climbed to the roof
of a stranger and the accused gave him a solitary farsa blow whereon the deceased fell down dead. In such a
situation the right of private defence was held to have not been improperly exercised and the accused was
acquitted.43 Act of killing in exercise of right of private defence without exceeding the limit, is not punishable. 44
There was dispute between accused and deceased over auction sale and one day accused shot dead
deceased alongwith his two sons while they were in market. Since killing was carried out by only one accused,
the others were considered not to have taken part in killing and were acquitted. The lone appellant was
convicted under Section 304 as he had exceeded the right of private defence which was available to him. 45 The
accused was being chased by deceased with a knife in his hand and when he fell down the accused snatched
the knife from his hand and stabbed him to death. His case was held to be covered under Exception 2 to
Section 300 as he had reasonable apprehension of being killed. 46
All accused were acquitted of charge but fatal blow was given by main accused on head in exercise of right of
private defence. It was held that more harm than necessary was caused and accused was convicted under
Section 304 Part II.47 In another case the accused had caused the injuries in exercise of their right of private
defence. Their conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 was held not proper. 48 Three accused were
acquitted and evidence of eye-witness against the lone accused was unreliable and circumstantial evidence
was not conclusive. He was held entitled to acquittal. 49 Where none of the circumstances relied upon by
prosecution point to probability of accused’s guilt or involvement in murder of deceased Supreme Cout set
aside the Conviction.50
The prosecution failed to establish the nature of injuries sustained by accused person and there was no
material to show the reason for not charging the other accused persons named in the F.I.R. The conviction was
held not proper.51 The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the
accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or
where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one. However,
there may be cases where the non - explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the
prosecution case. This principle would apply to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor
and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, that it outweighs the effect of the omission on part
of the prosecution to explain the injuries. 52 Accused can rely on circumstances and admissions made by a
witness in support of his plea of self-defence without setting up a specific plea. 53
57. Cases - No right of private defence.—
Where a person wilfully killed another whilst endeavouring to escape, after having been detected in the act of
housebreaking by night for the purpose of theft, 54 and where the accused pursued a thief and killed him after a
house-trespass had ceased,55 it was held that the accused were guilty of murder and they did not come under
the Exception. Where the accused finding a feeble old woman stealing his crop, beaten her so violently that she
died from the effect of the attack, it was held that he was guilty of murder. 56 When accused exceeding right of
private defence causes injury on vital part of the body of victim—conviction under Section 304, Part I is
justified.57 Deceased on entering land of accused when beats co-accused whereon accused in purported
exercise of private defence assaults deceased to death, held conviction under Section 304, Part II is justified. 58
In answer to milder form of criminal trespass by victim, accused inflicting fatal injuries— held the accused
exceeded his right of private defence. 59 Deceased when after inflicting knife injury runs away and accused
chases him and inflicts fatal injury, Exception 4 to Section 300 is attracted and it becomes culpable homicide
not amounting to murder.60 Where both sides can be convicted for their individual acts and normally no right of
private defence is available to either party and they will be guilty of their respective acts. 61 There was no
premeditation and the act was committed in a heat of passion and the appellant had not taken any undue
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advantage or acted in a cruel manner. There was a fight between the parties. The case falls under the fourth
Exception to Section 300 I.P.C. 62 The accused were in fact, aggressors and being members of the aggressors
party none of the accused can claim right of self-defence. 63 There is nothing to show that the deceased, his
wife, his son or others had attacked the accused. Nor the surrounding circumstances would indicate that there
was a reasonable apprehension that the death or grievous hurt was likely to be caused to the appellant by them
or others. The plea of private defence rejected. 64 The fact that the accused had gone to the rice mill of the
deceased is a circumstance which needs to be taken into account while considering the plea of right of private
defence and it makes an irreparable dent in the said plea. The High Court was in error in drawing an inference
that A2 stabbed the deceased in exercise of his right of self defence. 65 Running to house, fetching a tabli and
assaulting the deceased are by no means a matter of course. These acts bear stamp of a design to kill and take
the case out of the purview of private defence. 66 Accused fired upon deceased resulting in his death on the
spot. There could not be any reasonable apprehension of death or of grievous hurt at their hands nor the case
attract a righ to private defence since no persons on the prosecution side were armed with any weapon. 67
Merely because there was a quarrel and some of the accused person sustained injuries, that does not confer a
right of private defence extending to the point of causing death. It has to be established that the accused person
were under such grave apprehension about the safety of their life and property that retaliation to the extent
done was absolutely necessary. Right of private defence has been rightly discarded. 68
58. Exceeding Right of Private Defence.—
While exercising his right of private defence of property the accused exceeded his right of private defence and
killed a man. It was held that case fell within Exception 2 of Section 300 and as such he was liable to be
punished under Section 304 -Part I and not under Section 302 I.P.C. 69 To ward off an attack with a stick a stab
wound puncturing the heart is not justified. It is a clear case of offence under Section 304 -Part I I.P.C. 70 The
accused party fired gun which caused the death of three persons as there was a land related dispute between
parties. The evidence showed that informant party armed with deadly weapons had gone to the fields and they
being aggressors the accused was entitled to the right of private defence. The firing of bullets in chest and vital
organs of deceased amounted to exceeding the right of private defence and giving the benefit of Exception 2 to
Section 300, the conviction of accused was altered from under Section 302 to one under Section 304. 71 In an
English case the accused appealed against his conviction for murder on the ground that deceased was shot
dead as he was advancing towards him with an open knife and as such killing was justified. It was held that
verdict of murder was liable to be quashed and verdict of manslaughter substituted as accused was justified in
harming deceased but the harm caused was excessive and had resulted from a loss of self control through fear
of being killed.72
The accused and deceased scuffled with each other with deadly weapon namely knife in broad day light and
deceased stabbed the accused first but injury caused was only simple in nature whereas injuries in turn caused
to deceased by the accused were grievous. It was held that right of private defence was exceeded and accused
was convicted under Section 304 instead of under Section 302. 73
Accused inflicted single knife blow on the chest of deceased resulting to his death. Incident took place because
of some trifling act on asking about earlier quarrel with the mother of accused. No other blow was given to the
deceased or any other injured persons which could prove that there was no intention to cause death. Since
single blow was on vital part, this act of accused exceeding his right of private defence was covered under
Exception 2 and 4 of the later part of Section 300 Indian Penal Code and conviction was altered from Section
300 to one under Section 304 Part I. 74 Genesis of occurrence was not disclosed by prosecution but evidence on
record showed that there was apprehension in the mind of accused that their land was likely to be trespassed.
Material further showed that it was accused persons who were aggressors. Accused also could not show that
threat was such that the co-accused could hit deceased at such place and with such force that he would be
killed on spot. It was held that the accused had exceeded right of private defence and would be guilty of offence
under Section 304 Part I.75 In a case incident had occurred in front of house of accused when the deceased
party, numbering more than five, had come armed with weapons to fill up chal in Panchayat Road in front of the
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house of accused. Genesis of incident was not proved before the Court and version of accused regarding
exercise of right of private defence looked more probable. Conviction of accused was set aside. 76
The accused persons allegedly entered the house of deceased, assaulted him and his three sons with dao
resulting to their death. The nature of injury caused to minor innocent children indicated that accused were
aggressors and no right of private defence was available to them. Defence plea of alibi regarding one of the
accused was also not tenable and conviction of accused was held proper. 77 It is no doubt true that when an alibi
is set up, the burden is on the accused to lend credence to the defence put up by him or her. However the
approach of the court should not be such as to pick holes in the case of the accused person. The defence
evidence has to be tested like any other testimony, always keeping in mind that a person is presumed innocent
until he or she is found guilty. 78 Accused took a plea of alibi by stating that he is practising as an advocate at
Kurukshetra and he was at the office of his Senior, not at the place of occurance. Trial Court has not accepted
the plea of alibi raised by him only on the ground that the Senior Advocate with whom accused was practising
was not examined. The High Court held that evidence of DW-6 (another lawyer in the office) cannot be doubted
as there was no reason to disbelieve him and plea of alibi taken by Accused cannot be rejected on the ground
that his Senior Advocate was not examined; Supreme Court upheld the view taken by the High Court and
acquitted the Accused.79
The accused persons caught hold of deceased who had entered their house in order to commit rape. One of
the accused had caused injuries on his person resulting to his death. It was held that he had exceeded the right
of private defence and his conviction under Section 304 was proper. However, other accused persons were
acquitted.80 Similarly in group freighting over allotment of a piece of land party, in whose favour land was
allotted had exceeded his right of private defence. It was held that provisions of Section 149 were not made out
and accused was liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part I and co-accused were convicted under Section
323.81
Several accused fired at unarmed persons after committing trespass. Both parties were at close quarters and
no reasonable apprehension of danger to accused was apparent. It was held that right of defence of person or
property could not be availed even if injuries upon the persons of accused may be unexplained by the
prosecution. In this case drunkenness was pleaded as a mitigating circumstance but was rejected. 82 The
deceased sitting on chest of accused’s brother was giving him fist blows, seeing no other alternative accused
gave a knife blow at the back of deceased. He had exceeded his right of defence and was convicted for
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.83 When it was not possible to attribute to any individual the injury
caused to deceased and evidence showed that common intention of all was to protect property and not cause
murder, it could not be said that all others had common intention of inflicting injuries which resulted in death.
The appeal was allowed and each of appellant’s conviction was set aside. 84 No right of private defence was
available when deceased was nowhere near about the premises of the accused whose conviction for murder
was upheld.85
The deceased was, as per evidence, in possession of disputed land as co-sharer. As such, plea of accused that
the deceased trespassed into their land and started harvesting the paddy and on protest assaulted him, was not
acceptable. Further, the accused had no right of private defence but using his defence he went on attacking the
deceased even after he had fallen on ground. It was held that even right of private defence was exceeded and
conviction of accused under Section 304 Part II read with Section 149 was proper. 86
So also is the case of killing an unarmed trespasser with chhura blows which punctured both the heart and the
lung.87 Where office of the accused was attacked by his disgruntled workers with brickbats causing damage to
his property and he fired only one shot from his revolver killing a worker on the spot, it was held that he having
exceeded the right of private defence was guilty of an offence under Section 304 -Part II I.P.C. 88
Accused was in possession of disputed land when occurrence took place. However, in defending his property
he fired gun shot at an upper portion of body. It was held that accused had exceeded his right of private
defence. Hence, conviction under Section 304 was held proper. 89 It could not be ascertained as to which party
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was aggressor but voluminous injury certificate produced before the Court proved the fact that there was mutual
fight at spur of moment. Death had not, however occurred instantaneously but after a gap of 24 hours during
treatment in hospital. It was held that they were liable to be convicted under Sections 324, 326 and 323. 90
The field was in possession of the accused party, ‘the prosecution party including deceased trespassed upon
the field, cut earth resulting in damage of vegetable plants, and put the earth on their ridge : a scuffle ensued
and accused inflicted fatal head injury on the deceased, it was held he exceeded right of private defence as he
could have avoided killing the deceased and the accused persons were guilty under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 91
Where the accused used heavy cutting weapon like gandasa causing serious injury to the deceased, right of
self-defence was exceeded by accused attracting Exception II to Section 300. Conviction was modified to
Section 304 Part I I.P.C .. 92 Presence of lathi blows, injuries on head and other parts of accused showed there
was scuffle between him and the deceased. The accused inflicted fatal knife injuries to deceased. It was held
that seeing the nature of injuries on person of accused and possession of knife with him, accused had right of
private defence but he exceeded this right. Hence conviction was altered to one under Section 304 Part I. 93 In a
sudden quarrel the accused caused injuries to the deceased persons by iron pipes and bhaths. It was held that
right of private defence exceeded and the offence was made out under Section 304 Part I I.P.C. 94 Where the
prosecution part carried knife and inflicted incised injuries on the head of the accused, accused persons
exceeded the right of self-defence by giving knife blow on the chest and abdomen of deceased. Conviction was
modified to Section 304 Part I I.P.C ..95 In a scuffle between accused and deceased, one prosecution witness, a
brother of deceased having criminal record armed with dagger attacked accused. The accused apprehending
danger brought dagger from house and in scuffle inflicted injury to deceased. It was held that the acts of the
accused fell within right of private defence, but as he brought dagger from house and caused death, he
exceeded that right. Conviction was altered to Section 304 Part I. 96 Right of private defence cannot however be
weighed in golden scale. Thus when the field is in possession with the accused party who cultivated the same
and the prosecution party attacked the accused, injured him and tried to take away the crop and accused then
inflicted fatal injuries, it was held that the injury on the accused given by the attacking party gives to the
accused a right of private defence and a person is in such a situation cannot modulate his defence step by step
and the blows which the accused gave cannot be weighed in golden scales. Accused was found not guilty. 1
59. Threats of incantations give no right of private defence.—
The accused and the deceased met one day in a liquor shop, and there drank together. They afterwards walked
in company and on their way an altercation took place in respect of the deceased having caused the death of
the accused’s four children by incantations. The deceased admitted that he had so caused their death, and
added that he would also bring about the death of the accused by causing the accused to be taken by a tiger.
The accused, thereupon, killed the deceased with several blows of a heavy stick. It was held that the accused
had no reasonable apprehension of danger to himself from the threats of the deceased and that his case was
not taken out of the category of murder by reason of this Exception. 2 Similarly, threats of witchcraft does not
justify the causing of death.3
The disputed land had come in possession of the accused party during demarcation proceeding but the
complainant party in an unlawful manner had tried to recapture that portion. Therefore accused had right of
private defence to property but main accused had given a single spear blow which caused the death of
deceased. Since he had exceeded the right of private defence to property he was held guilty under Section 304
Part II. Other two accused had caused only simple injuries and they were held not to have exceeded right of
private defence.4 In land related dispute the accused assaulted and killed the deceased who had no right to
enter on the land. The accused was right to exercise his right of private defence but he had exceeded his right
as deceased though armed with weapons did not use them against accused or co-accused. His conviction
under Section 304 read with 34 was confirmed but benefit of doubt was given to the co-accused as he had
simply given a verbal Lalkara.5
The accused when attacked by the deceased inflicted a single knife blow in abdomen of deceased and in the
process accused and his wife also received the stab injuries. The witnesses tried to conceal the injuries
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received by the accused and his wife. It was held that their evidence was not reliable and accused was entitled
to the acquittal as he was well within the right of his private defence. 6 The complainant tried to interfere with
settled possession of deceased in violation of injunction granted to him. The accused thereupon inflicted injuries
on the deceased by hitting with a bamboo. It was held that the case was covered under Exception 2 to Section
300 and conviction was altered from Section 302 to one under Section 304. 7 The death was caused by stabbing
and right of private defence was pleaded in defence but evidence showed that the deceased was unarmed and
was not an aggressor. It was held that offence of murder was made out and conviction of accused under
Section 302 was proper.8 The accused while ploughing the field under the police protection was attacked by the
complainant party. He therefore, in exercise of right of private defence used the force in which death of one
person was caused. It was held that he had exceeded his right of private defence and his act would fall under
Exception 2 to Section 300 which is punishable under Section 304. 9
The accused on instigation of his father fired at and killed the deceased and pleaded the right of private
defence. The High Court accepted his plea which was based on surmises, conjectures and guess work and
held that right of private defence was exceeded. On appeal Supreme Court set aside the conviction under
Section 304 and held the accused guilty under Section 302. 10 Accused persons were first to assault the persons
of deceased party and cause of strained relations between two was grazing of cattle. It was held that right of
private defence was not established as right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive attack
specially when right to defend had ceased to exist. It was held proper to alter the conviction from Section 302
read with Section 34 to one under Section 304 read with Section 34. 11
The deceased had shouted at accused when he found that ridge of their field adjacent to land of accused had
been cut and quarrel ensued in which accused gave a blow of spade on head of deceased who died in hospital
on the same day. Since quarrel was initiated by deceased, the right of private defence was therefore, available
to the accused. However this was not within his right to assault the deceased with the spade causing his death.
He was accordingly convicted of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304
instead of under Section 302. 12
60. Right of defence approved.—
The accused killed the deceased as he had damaged his wheat crop. During the scuffle accused had received
sota blow and other accused in order to save his son had given khandli blow from the reverse side on head of
deceased. Right of private defence thus stood established from evidence of prosecution. It was held that High
Court’s order reversing the conviction from one under Section 304 Part II to one under Section 302 was not
proper.13 Where the deceased had not only scolded the accused but had also thrown him on ground, it was held
that accused had only right of private defence upto the extent of saving himself and by stabbing the deceased
he had exceeded the right of private defence. His conviction under Section 304 was held proper. 14
61. Exception 3—Public servant exceeding his power.—
This Exception protects a public servant, or a person aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of
public justice, if either of them exceeds the powers given to them by law and cause death. It gives protection so
long as the public servant acts in good faith, but if his act is illegal and unauthorized by law, or if he glaringly
exceeds the powers entrusted to him by law, the Exception will not protect him. Where death was caused by a
constable under orders of a superior, it being found that neither he nor his superior believed that it was
necessary for public security to disperse certain reapers by firing on them, it was held that he was guilty of
murder since he was ‘not protected in that he obeyed the orders of his superior officer’. 15 This decision is no
longer a good law after the Supreme Court had held otherwise. In a case Calcutta High Court held that when
subordinates bound to execute orders of superior fired and killed under order of superior, the subordinates are
not guilty.16 Against this decision a special leave petition was filed. 17 The Supreme Court held if firing order by
superior is lawful, its obedience is obviously lawful. But order itself may be unlawful ex facie. Causing death by
the subordinate in pursuance of order of superior officer cannot however be excused. Obedience of an unlawful
order of his superior, does not exonerate or excuse the soldier who commits a murder as a consequence of
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such an order. To plead that he acted in obedience to the order of his superior will not excuse him where the
order is unlawful.18 Exception 3 to Section 300 I.P.C. pre-supposes that a public servant who causes death,
must do so in good faith and in due discharge of his duty as a public servant and without ill-will towards the
person whose death is caused. The positive case set up by the defence that firing was in self defence has been
rejected by the trial Court, High Court as well by the Supreme Court, the question of any good faith does not
arise. The appellants had fired without provocation at the car killing two innocent persons and injuring one. The
obligation to prove an Exception is on the preponderance of probabilities but it nevertheless lies on the
defence.19
In an English case the soldier on patrol duty had killed two occupants of a car by opening fire at them when
their superior officers had asked him to stop the car. It was held that person killing another by use of excessive
and unreasonable force in self defence was guilty of murder and not of manslaughter. There is no general
defence known to English law of acting in obedience to superior orders. 20
In a case a police constable while attempting to rearrest an accused who escaped from his custody fired at him
resulting in his death. The Allahabad High Court pointed out to Section 46 Crpc 1898 which now corresponds to
Section 46 of the new Code also and observed that Section 46 Crpc lays down that when a police officer
arrests a person and such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him or attempts to evade the arrest,
such police officer may use all means necessary to effect the arrest; but this does not give a right to cause the
death of the person unless he is accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In that
case the escaping accused was suspected of having committed a theft and accordingly the offence was not
punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The causing of death of the escaping accused therefore was not
allowed to be brought under the protection of Exception 3 to Section 300 I.P.C. 21
62. Exception 4—Death on a sudden fight without premeditation, accused not taking any undue
advantage.—
Exception 4 to Section 300 Indian Penal Code provides that culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed
without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender
having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation to Exception 4 to the Section
further provides that it is immaterial in such cases which party offers provocation or commits the first assault. 22
A perusal of the provision would reveal that four conditions must be satisfied to bring the matter within
Exception 4:
(i) it was a sudden fight;

1ii) there was no premeditation;
1iii) the act was done in the heat of passion; and; that
1iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. 23
For bringing in operation Exception 4 to Section 300 Indian Penal Code, it has to be established that the act
was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without
the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
The fourth Exception of Section 300 Indian Penal Code covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception
deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first Exception, after which its place would have been more
appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation.
But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is
only that heat of passion which clouds men’s sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not
otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct
consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may
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have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may
have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A
‘sudden fight’ implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not
traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it
were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation
or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It
may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have
taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the
share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused: (a)
without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in
a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within
Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the ‘fight’ occurring in
Exception 4 to Section 300 Indian Penal Code is not defined in Indian Penal Code. It takes two to make a fight.
Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties
have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat
between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general
rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden
or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not
sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown
that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression ‘undue
advantage’ as used in the provision means ‘unfair advantage’. 24
63. ‘Fight’: meaning of.—
The ‘fight’ occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. is not defined in the I.P.C. It takes two to make a fight.
Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties
have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat
between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general
rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden
or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. 25 For the application of Exception 4, it is
not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown
that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression ‘undue
advantage’ as used in the provision means ‘unfair advantage’. 26
The language of Exception 4 to Section 300 is, thus, clear that culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed
without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel provided the offender has
not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. In this case, there is no evidence to show
that the deceased was armed in any manner when he questioned A-1 as to why he had threatened his wife. On
the other hand, the appellants were armed with knives and attacked the deceased on his head and face even
after he fell down. Thus, A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4, who were the offenders, have taken undue advantage and
acted in a cruel and unusual manner towards the deceased who is not proved to have been armed. 27 Accused
did not strike the deceased at the first instance, but he struck him after an interval of time since he left the place
of occurrence, went to his home and then came back armed with a Farsa. In order to bring a case under
Exception (4) to Section 300 I.P.C, the evidence must show that the accused without any premeditation and in
a heat of passion and without having undue advantage and had not acted in cruel manner. Every one of these
circumstances is required to be proved to attract Exception (4) to Section 300 I.P.C. and it is not sufficient to
prove only some of them. None of the ingredients have been proved in evidence to bring the case under
Exception (4) to Section 300 I.P.C. 28 The prosecution evidence sufficiently suggests that a scuffle had indeed
taken place on the dingy where the appellant and his companions were trying to recover the dingy while the
deceased was preventing them from doing so. In the course of this sudden fight and in the heat of passion the
appellant assaulted the deceased and pushed him in the sea eventually resulting his death; case clearly comes
under Exception 4.29 The appellant caused as many as 14 injuries on the neck of the deceased and
strangulated her with enormous force. He had, therefore, taken undue advantage of the fact that he was a male
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and was much stronger physically and the murder had also been committed in a revolting and cruel manner. It
is true that the refusal of a wife to have sexual relations with her husband had led to the quarrel between the
spouses but in the circumstances all the conditions for the applicability of Exception 4 have not been fulfilled. 30
Where there was no pre-meditation and the act was committed in a heat of passion and the appellant had not
taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner and there was a fight between the parties, Supreme
Court found the case falls under the fourth Exception to Section 300 I.P.C. and the conviction altered from
Section 302 I.P.C. to Section 304 Part I I.P.C. 31 Where there is no fight at all, Exception 4 is not attracted. 32
Accused assaulted and caused death of two persons who were dissuading him not to fight with his own brother.
It therefore was not heat of passion or sudden fight between accused and deceased. The Conviction of
accused for murder was held proper. 33 In a recent case Supreme Court found that the occurance was not a
case of ‘fight’ as the deceased side did not cause any assault nor had any weapon. There was time for the
accused to cool down. His conduct in going to his house and bringing the gun and thereafter firing from the said
gun clearly established that neither the firing was accidental, nor unintentional nor in the heat of sudden fight.
Thus the offence was clearly a murder falling under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and not falling in any of the
Exceptions.34 The elements detailed in Exception 4 to Section 300, if proved, reduces murder to culpable
homicide. To invoke Exception 4 to Section 300, the culpable homicide defined in Section 299 I.P.C. must be
committed first, without premeditation, secondly in a sudden fight, thirdly in a sudden quarrel and lastly without
offender’s taking undue advantage or acting with cruelty or in unnatural manner. 35
The deceased died of homicidal death on account of injuries sustained on his right thigh by means of a knife.
There was no prior ill will between deceased and accused who had given a knife blow on non-vital part of body
of deceased during a sudden quarrel. In the same incident the deceased also dealt a stick blow on the head
region of the accused resulting in grievous injury. It was held that act of accused would not amount to the
offence of murder punishable under Section 302 but it would certainly come under the category of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304. 36
The accused and deceased were working together in a restaurant and they suddenly started quarrelling in
which the accused hit him with a bamboo log on head. In such fights there is mutual provocation and it is
different from sudden and grave provocation in which there is total deprivation of power of self control. Cases of
sudden fight are covered under Exception 4 as injury caused in sudden fight is not direct consequence of
provocation as both sides exchange the blows. Since it was sudden fight case conviction of accused was
altered from one under Section 302 to one under Section 304. 37 In a sudden fight between two religious groups
a single knife blow was given by the accused which caused death of deceased. Conviction was ordered under
Section 304 with an observation that single blow does not always rule out the applicability of Section 300. 38
Blow was given by a split Bamboo in heat of passion when deceased was trying to rescue his father. Conviction
of accused was altered from Section 302 to one under Section 304. 39 Accused in a sudden quarrel stabbed his
wife in her belly. Husband and wife both were tribals and conviction was altered from under Section 302 to one
under Section 304.40
Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. will not be attracted every time that a quarrel takes place suddenly; for its
applicability a number of facts are required in addition to the suddenness of the fight, there must be heat of
passion, sudden fight and absence of undue advantage of or cruel or unusual manner. 41 In order to bring a case
under Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. it must be shown that he acted without premeditation in a sudden fight
in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without his having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner. Every one of the circumstances is required to be proved by the prosecution to attract
Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. and it is not sufficient to prove only some of them. 42 To invoke Exception 4 to
Section 300 four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no
premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the
provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor
but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must
have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a
cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is
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handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this Exception
provided he has not acted cruelly. Thus where in case of quarrel between the deceased and the accused
regarding possession of premises, it was reasonable to infer from the facts that the deceased must have
intervened on the side of his brother and in the course of the scuffle he received injuries, one of which proved
fatal, the accused would be entitled to the benefit of the Exception 4 to Section 300. It cannot be inferred that
the accused acted in a cruel manner from his inflicting more than one injuries. 43 The fight should not have been
pre-arranged. A fight is not per se a palliating circumstance, only an unpremeditated fight can be such. 44 The
lapse of time between the quarrel and the fight is, therefore, a very important consideration. If there intervened
sufficient time for passion to subside and for reason to interpose, the killing would be murder. 45 This Exception
was held not to apply to a case where two bodies of men, for the most part armed with deadly weapons,
deliberately entered into an unlawful fight, each being prepared to cause the death of the other, and aware that
his own might follow, but determined to do his best in self-defence, and in the course of the struggle death
ensued.46 An unpremeditated assault (in which death is caused) committed in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel comes within the Exception. 47 Having seen his father being assaulted by the deceased when
the son in a heat of passion inflicts injury on head causing death, his act will be covered by Exception 4 to
Section 300 I.P.C. and he will be guilty under Section 304 Part I I.P.C. 48
64. Sudden fight or sudden quarrel.—
To bring a case under Exception 4 to Section 300 apart from the fact that the culpable homicide must be
without premeditation, the whole occurrence must be on a sudden fight in the heat of passion on a sudden
quarrel. The word ‘fight’ conveys something more than a verbal quarrel. 49 It takes two to make a fight. It is not
necessary that weapons should be used in a fight. In order to constitute fight, it is necessary that blows should
be exchanged even if they do not all find their target. 50 In order to constitute a fight it is necessary that blows
should be exchanged and it is not necessary that weapon should be used. Where the evidence on record
shows that culpable homicide was committed without pre-meditation in a certain fight in the heat of passion
upon a certain quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. is attracted and murder is reduced to culpable homicide not
Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. can be invoked if and only if death is caused (a) without pre-meditation, (b) in
a sudden fight, (c) without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
To bring a case within this Exception all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. 52 The accused got
infuriated when deceased refused to back the tempo and injured him with sword which ultimately resulted in his
death. It was held that it was sudden fight and conviction was altered from under Section 302 to one under
Section 304.53 Accused objected to cutting of trees and wordy duel ensued whereupon accused snatched the
tool from hands of the deceased and inflicted cuts on his neck and shoulders. Since occurrence had taken
place in course of sudden fight, Exception 4 to Section 300 was applied. 54
Eye witness stated that the deceased had abused accused and threatened to report to higher authority about
his absence from duty. The accused thereafter opened fire which hit the deceased. Incident in question had
taken place without pre-meditation and in heat of passion. Accused, member of disciplined force, had
knowledge that firing on vital part of body was likely to cause death. It was held that offence under Section 304
Part III alone was made out.55 A sudden quarrel between two ladies turned into exchange of lathi blows on body
of deceased by the accused but there was no evidence to prove that injuries caused were sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature. Conviction was altered from under Section 302 to one under Section 304
Part II.56
In view of Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. culpable homicide is not murder, if it is committed without
premeditation in a sudden fight. In this context the true import of the word ‘fight’ calls for an elaboration. Though
the term ‘fight’ has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code, it is obvious that it takes two or more to make a
fight; it implies mutual fight in which both parties participate, irrespective of how they fare in it. One-sided attack
cannot constitute a fight. Exception 4 would not be attracted when there was no exchange of physical acts
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between the deceased, who was unarmed, and the accused; and the assault on the deceased by the accused
was deliberate and pressed with determination when the deceased was fleeing for life. 57 In a sudden quarrel the
accused had given three iron-rod blows on non-vital parts of body of deceased and single incised wound was
caused by the knife. The wife was acquitted as it was not proved that she had given knife to accused husband
who was found guilty under Sections 304, 307 and 452 as he had not only caused death of deceased but had
also caused injuries to his parents.58
The complainant objected construction of wall by accused persons who in sudden quarrel that ensued attacked
opposite party with axe and gave only one blow on the head of deceased. It was held that right of private
defence was not available to the accused as he was aggressor. He, however, was held entitled to benefit of
Exception 4 to Section 300 and was convicted for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 59 Similarly
accused had inflicted injuries at spur of moment in which no deadly weapons were used. It was held that
intention to commit the murder cannot be attributed to the accused. His conviction was altered from under
Section 302 to one under Section 304.60
In a sudden fight accused assaulted deceased in which death was caused. Sudden fight implies provocation
and blows on each other. Undue advantage, however, cannot be allowed to be taken by any party. Undue
advantage means unfair advantage but it has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code. Whether undue
advantage was taken or not it depends on circumstances, weapons used or manner of attack by the assailant.
From this point of view assault made in this case was covered under Exception I to Section 300. 61 Accused in a
case took the plea that death was caused in heat of passion but he was carrying deadly weapon and with an
intention to kill had inflicted blows on vital part of body. Since accused had acted cruelly and benefit of
Exception 4 to Section 300 was not available to him, his conviction for murder was held proper. 62 Accused as
per eye witness and extra judicial confession had stabbed the deceased to death due to sudden quarrel which
had arisen on refusal of the deceased to settle the outstanding dues. Conviction of the accused was altered
from one under Section 302 to Section 304. 63 In a Supreme Court case the deceased had thrown rubbish in the
shop of accused and during course of ensuing scuffle the accused stabbed the deceased on his chest. Since
there was possibility of grave and sudden provocation, benefit of Exception 1 and 4 was extended. 64
Before a case can come within the ambit of Exception 4 to Section 300, it must be shown that there was fight,
which implies mutual attack by both the parties, or at least an actual attack by one party and preparation to
attack by the other. Where it was all one-sided affair and only the accused and their companions caused
injuries to their opponents and the latter did not even attempt to retaliate, the Exception can have no
application.65 The fight must be with the person who is killed and not with another person. 66 The sudden fight in
a heat of passion on a sudden quarrel envisaged in Exception 4 may also be a free fight. In a Supreme Court
case there was sudden altercation between the accused and the deceased resulting in free fight between two
parties in which each party assaulted the other with sticks. Accused dealt only one blow on the deceased
entailing his death. Injuries were suffered by both parties and these were evenly distributed. Accused also
received several injuries including injury on the head and fracture of bone. Accused was held entitle to invoke
Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. and the offence was one under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 67
The accused had estranged relationship with his father-in-law. The accused was provoked when his wife
removed the youngest child from him and kept him with some one else. Soon after the removal of the child the
accused went to his father-in-law’s house and the quarrel ensued. The accused and father-in-law again met in
the market the same day. Following a scuffle in which both fell down, the accused stabbed the father-in-law with
a knife causing his death. It was held that as the husband was agitated by the removal of the child and there
was a sudden fight during which he stabbed his father-in-law, Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. was attracted. 68
Where in a sudden quarrel without any premeditation, the accused stabbed deceased in heat of passion
resulting in instantaneous death, Exception 4 to Section 300 was attracted. 69
The accused in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without any premeditation had caused death of
deceased but evidence showed that he had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. This being so Exception 4
to Section 300 I.P.C. was clearly available and accused were convicted under Section 304. The Court
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observed, ‘for application of Exception 4 it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there
was no pre-meditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in
cruel or unusual manner’.70 The accused in a sudden quarrel had fired at decease with his service revolver. The
accused and deceased both were inebriated and accused had taken no advantage in the matter by firing with
service revolver. The accused was convicted under Section 304 II and conviction and sentence passed under
Section 302 were set aside. 71 The occurrence took place at spur of moment and circumstances did not suggest
any repeated assault by accused. The accused had undergone nearly two years and seven months of
imprisonment and sentence was reduced to period already undergone. 72
There was no predetermination and making of mind and accused persons had killed his own brother. One had
assaulted with lathies and other had assaulted with kicks and fists. The incident thus had happened at spur of
moment on sudden quarrel over minor issue. The first accused was convicted under Section 304 while second
was convicted under Section 323 as no common intention was shared by them. 73 Taking note of the fact that
the person in both the groups, namely, complainant and the accused sustained injuries in a free fight and also
of the fact that the appellant A1 alone is before the Court, ends of justice would be met by altering the
conviction from Section 302 to Section 323 I.P.C. 74
There was sudden quarrel in which without pre-meditation or planning a single knife injury was inflicted which
resulted into the death of deceased. It was held that convicting the accused for offence of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder was proper.75 Similarly in sudden quarrel accused received some injuries but killed his
own cousin by hitting on his head. His conviction was altered from under Section 302 to one under Section
304.76 Accused had no intention to kill but had knowledge that death was likely to be caused. Hence case was
covered under Section 300 Exception 4 and accused was convicted under Section 304 II. 77
In an Orissa case both the accused and the deceased came out of their houses fully armed and started
quarrelling with the accused who had a Kati Katoa in his hand and his son had a Kati. The deceased only had a
stick. The son of the accused at first threw the Kati to hit the deceased. The deceased tried to pick up the Kati.
At that particular moment the accused gave a heavy blow on the head of the deceased with the Kati Katoa,
resulting in his death. The contention that the accused exercised his right of private defence was repelled
because right of private defence cannot be exercised in a free fight. That apart, in view of Section 100 I.P.C.
right of private defence could not in such a case extend to right to cause death. But in that case the accused
gave a fatal blow without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. There is
no evidence that the accused took any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. He merely
gave a single stroke on the head of the deceased which ultimately proved fatal. He did not go on assaulting the
deceased despite his falling down unconscious on the ground. All the elements of Exception 4 to Section 300
I.P.C. were found fulfilled and the offence of murder was reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to
murder.78
When the appellant arrived alongwith the cattle at the field there was no premeditation for the assault. At the
spot, there was an altercation between the parties and in the sudden fight, after the deceased objected to the
grazing of the cattle, when possibly hot words or even abuses were exchanged between the parties, the
appellant gave a single blow with the pharsa on the head of the deceased. He did not cause any other injury to
the deceased and, therefore, he did not act in any cruel or unusual manner. Admittedly, he did not assault the
prosecution witnesses who were also present alongwith the deceased and who had also requested the
appellant not to allow his cattle to graze in the field of deceased. The assault on the deceased was made during
a sudden quarrel without any premeditation. In view of the above, Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. was clearly
attracted to the case of the appellant and the offence squarely fell under Section 304 (Part-I) I.P.C. 79
65. Exception not applied.—
The deceased died of grievous injuries which caused death diagnosed to be due to shock and haemorrhage. It
was held that the incident occurred in sudden fight in heat of passion and in the absence of material on record,
it could not be said that the accused did not act in cruel manner so as to be entitled to benefit of Exception IV. 80
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When it is not a case of sudden fight but a case of accused person’s pursuing a victim and then attacking him
there is no question of attracting Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. 81 Accused went to the house of the
deceased armed with deadly weapons in order to teach him a lesson as he had got the accused convicted.
Accused opened fire and killed the deceased. It was held that attack was premeditated and Exception 4 to
Section 300 had no application. Accused was convicted for murder. 82
Where a person during the course of a sudden fight, without premeditation and probably in the heat of passion
took undue advantage and acted in a cruel manner in using a deadly weapon there was no ground to hold that
his act did not amount to murder. Therefore, if the appellant used deadly weapons against the unarmed man
and struck him a blow on the head it must be held that using the blows with the knowledge that they would likely
to cause death and he had taken undue advantage. He did not stop with the first blow, he inflicted two more
blows on the fallen man and the third one proved to be fatal. He acted cruelly with no justification. By his
conduct the appellant denied himself of the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. and he was rightly
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life under Section 302 I.P.C. 83
The accused during the quarrel with his father inflicted dagger blows on deceased step mother and his sister
when they were interfering in their quarrel. It was not a sudden fight and both the victims were unarmed and
had not caused any injury to the accused. It was held that the accused had acted in a cruel manner and had
taken disadvantage. Therefore his case was not covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 and conviction of the
accused for murder was held proper.84 Similarly due to existing enmity the accused inflicted injury on vital part
of body of the deceased as soon as he emerged from his house. It was held that it was not a case of sudden
quarrel and conviction of accused for murder was proper. 85 The accused killed the deceased and attempted to
injure his wife whose testimony was found reliable as it was corroborated by the medical evidence. Extra-
judicial confession made before his own son-in-law was inspiring the confidence. It was held that case is not
covered within the Exception 4 of Section 300 and conviction for murder was proper. 86 In sudden quarrel the
accused became infuriated and set the wife ablaze. There was evidence to show that quarrel was regular
feature of their daily routine. It was held that it was not a case of sudden quarrel and offence of murder was
made out and conviction of accused under Section 302 was proper. 87 The accused in a sudden quarrel on
being attacked by the deceased stabbed him and caused his death. It was held that conviction of the accused
was liable to be altered from Section 302 to Section 304 as his case was covered by Exception 4 of Section
300.88 The accused was alleged to have entered into the complainant’s house and killed the deceased. Alleged
motive that deceased was having illicit relationship with the wife of accused was tenuous weak and insufficient.
The extra judicial confession made to the witness was not disclosed to the investigating officer in cross-
examination. It was held that conviction of accused for murder was proper. 89
The accused in a sudden fight without any premeditation had opened fire at deceased resulting into his death. It
was held that the act of accused was covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 and his conviction was liable to be
altered from Section 302 to one under Section 304. 90 In a case a sudden quarrel took place between the two
brothers without premeditation. It was admitted by the prosecution witnesses that prior to the incident relations
between the two brothers were cordial. The accused caught hold of collar of shirt of the deceased and his son
gave knife blows. It was held that the accused was liable to be convicted underSection 304 Part I refers
Sections 109 and 111 I.P.C ., and his son under Section 304 Part I. 1 The accused inflicted fatal injury on the
head of deceased with an axe when deceased was pulled to the courtyard by the co-accused. There was no
cause for provocation and circumstances showed that provocation was invited by the accused who was not
held entitled to the benefit of Exception I to Section 300. Similarly it was verbal exchange of words and was not
a fight and at no time the accused was assaulted by the deceased. It was held that accused was not entitled to
the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 and his conviction for offence of murder was proper. 2 The accused on
being slapped by deceased ran to his house situated at a considerable distance and brought deadly weapon
and inflicted various injuries on deceased and two of them were fatal. It was held that the accused could be said
to have acted in cruel and unusual manner and he was not entitled to benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300. 3
In a land related dispute sudden quarrel had taken place in which both parties had inflicted injuries on each
other. Parties were closely related to each other and there was no intention to cause the death as attack was
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not pre planned. It was held that conviction of accused under Section 302 was not proper and the same was
altered under Section 304 as case of accused was covered under Exception 4 to Section 300. 4 The accused
killed his younger brother by causing six stab injuries on him and sole eye witness, the widow of deceased,
narrated the true and complete story of the case which was found reliable and there was no evidence to show
that there was sudden fight between the accused and the deceased. It was held that Exception 4 to Section 300
was not applicable here and the accused was guilty of offence of murder. 5
The accused without premeditation in a sudden quarrel had inflicted injury on neck of the deceased with
barber’s knife. The accused had not taken undue advantage and had also not acted in cruel and unusual
manner which indicated that there was lack of intention to cause the death. The conviction of accused was
altered from under Sections 302 and 307 to one under Sections 304 and 324 as case was covered under
Exception 4 to Section 300.6
66. Causing death without premeditation.—
It may be recalled that Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C is attracted only if death is caused without
premeditation. To constitute a premeditated killing it is necessary that the accused should have reflected with a
view to determine whether he would kill or not; and that he should have determined to kill as a result of that
reflection; that is to say, the killing should be a predetermined killing upon consideration and not a sudden
killing under the momentary excitement and impulse of passion upon provocation given at the time or so
recently before as not to allow time for reflection. 7 It further held the premeditation may be established by direct
or positive evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Evidence of premeditation can be furnished by former
grudges or previous threats and expressions of ill feeling; by acts of preparation to kill, such as procuring a
deadly weapon or selecting a dangerous weapon in preference to one less dangerous, and by the manner in
which the killing was committed. For example, repeated shots, blows or other acts of violence, are sufficient
evidence of premeditation. Premeditation is not proved from the mere fact of killing by the use of a deadly
weapon but must be shown by the manner of the killing and circumstances, under which it was done or from
other facts in evidence.8
Accused allegedly killed the deceased by pushing him in valley but it was pleaded that it could not be said that
he had any intention to kill. It was held that though the accused might not had any intention to kill but when he
pushed him from road down the hill he knew that the deceased would suffer injuries which may be fatal to him.
Act on part of the accused was hence found covered under Exception 4 to Section 300. 9
In a Supreme Court case it transpired in evidence that occurrence took place without premeditation in a sudden
fight in the heat of passion without taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel manner, thus bringing the case
within Section 300 Exception 4. The Supreme Court disbelieved the part of the prosecution story that the
accused went back to his own house and fetched the Dharia to inflict injury on the head of the deceased. The
Supreme Court invoked Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. and reduced the murder to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.10 Accused in drunken condition quarrelled with his wife and when their son intervened he
picked up a chopper and inflicted cut injury on leg of son who died of excessive bleeding. It was held that no
conviction for murder could be ordered as offence only under Section 304 was made out. 11
The accused assaulted and killed the deceased and eye witnesses account of wife and son of deceased when
analysed minutely by High Court was found to be credible and cogent. Medical report and postmortem report
showed that there was no discrepancy in medical evidence vis-à-vis ocular evidence. The accused here had
killed the deceased when he was sleeping outside and reason was some altercation they had over a petty issue
on some other day. The plea taken by accused was sudden fight but Court said in sudden fight there is no
premeditation and fight takes place in heat of passion and there is no time for the passion to cool down. There
is mutual provocation and one attacks another. Hence in this case it was held that Exception 4 to Section 300
was not applicable and conviction for murder was proper. For application of Exception 4 it was pointed out that
fight not only be sudden but also it should be shown that offender had not taken undue advantage or acted in
cruel or unusual manner.12
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For premeditation it is not required that previous enmity or motive should be there. When the abuses were
being exchanged and accused had already in his possession a knife (here a spring knife) he naturally
premeditated and intended to give the fatal assault. Therefore the premeditation may be of a few minutes
before the actual assault was made. That apart when the deceased and his companion were unarmed and
when the accused had already abused them, and nevertheless, he whipped out a spring-knife which was by
itself a dangerous weapon and gave the fatal blow. The case goes out of the Exception 4. Then it would be an
assault made with intention of causing bodily injury sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature.
Thereby it would attract Clause thirdly of Section 300 but would not attract Exception 4 to Section 300 and the
offence would be murder under Section 302 I.P.C. 13
67. Accused taking undue advantage.—
Another important ingredient for invoking Exception 4 to Section 300 is that the accused must not take undue
advantage or must not act in a cruel or unusual manner. The word ‘undue advantage’ in Section 300 Exception
3 means ‘unfair advantage’.14 When two contending parties each armed with sharp edged weapons clashed
and in the course of a free fight some injuries were inflicted on one party or the other and when the accused, a
member of the contending party causes death of an opponent by a sharp edged instrument without any
premeditation it cannot be said that either of them acted in a cruel or unusual manner and the accused who has
caused death is entitled to Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. and the murder is reduced to culpable homicide
not amounting to murder.15 In Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana ,16 the accused struck with a gandhala, a
common agricultural implement consisting of a flat, rectangular iron strip, three sides of which are blunt,
embedded in a wooden handle. It was solitary blow dealt in a sudden fight in a spur of a moment without
premeditation. It was held that death occasioned by the secondary blow on the head did not come within
Clause thirdly of Section 300. It was further held therein that inasmuch the accused had assaulted with the blunt
side in the heat of the moment in course of the sudden quarrel, the case was covered by Exception 4 to Section
300 I.P.C.
It may so happen that both the accused and the deceased were armed and there were mutual exchange of
blows and attacks. In such a situation it is easier to invoke Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. In the case, 17 there
was a fight between two parties. In para 4 of the judgment, it has been observed that ‘the prosecution had to
admit that the deceased Lakha Singh had a small ‘lota’ about 4 feet long and Tara Singh had a ‘Dattar’ which
they used against the accused’s party, with the result that Darshu and Jumman received injuries from Lakha
Singh and Tara Singh had wiped off the blood.’ In para 10 of the same judgment, it has been observed as
follows :
‘We may also consider that each one of the parties would have anticipated meeting the rival faction on the road and if
such an eventuality took place, each one of them might have apprehended some trouble. For this purpose, it is but
natural that they would have armed themselves in order to protect themselves.’
In para 25, it is stated as follows :—
‘The matter has to be viewed in this way, it is clear that there was no premeditation and therefore when the contending
factions met accidentally and attacked each other, the conflict resulted in a sudden fight, in the heat of passions, upon
a sudden quarrel and without the accused having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. On
the finding that both the parties had arms, there was no undue advantage taken by either. Hence, Exception 4 to
Section 300 I.P.C. applies with the result that the offence is under Section 304 Part I I.P.C .’
In another case,18 on the accused also several injuries were inflicted and it was assumed that the members of
the party of the deceased had also been armed with dangerous weapons, since otherwise, several injuries
found on the body of the accused could not be explained. But this principle can hardly be applied when the
deceased were unarmed and the accused was armed with dangerous weapons. In such a situation the accused
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must be deemed to have taken undue advantage and Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. would go out of the
way.19
In case any exchange of hard words, at the time of occurrence takes place, would not entitle the accused to
benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300.20 Where the accused had killed deceased without any sufficient reasons
and had continued attack even after the deceased had fallen in gutter and had become completely helpless, it
was held that Exception 4’s benefit was not available and the accused was held guilty of murder. 21 The accused
during the course of quarrel gave a dao blow to the deceased but that was resisted. Then he gave a second
blow on the neck of the deceased which caused his death. It was held that it could not be said that the accused
had killed deceased in heat of passion and his conviction for murder was justified. A stray call given by some
one present on site in a heat of passion during altercation could not be attributed with element of intention to
kill. Appellant could not be convicted for instigating the accused. 22
Where from the words the parties come to blows and if after exchange of blows on equal terms, one of the
parties without any such intention at the commencement of the affray snatches a deadly weapon and kills the
other party with it, such a killing will be only manslaughter. But if a party under colour of fighting upon equal
terms, uses from the beginning of the contest a deadly weapon without the knowledge of the other party and
kills the other party with such a weapon, or if, at the beginning of the contest he prepares a deadly weapon so
as to have the power of using it at some part of the contest and uses it accordingly in the course of the combat,
and kills the other party with the weapon, the killing in both these cases will be murder. Thus when two men
engage suddenly in a fight the death of one of them is not the most natural or inevitable result, nor can it be
said that either of them desires the end of the other. In such a case the Court is not concerned with the origin of
the fight and the guilt or innocence of the accused is not dependent upon the result of an inquiry as to his
conduct. The temper may rise with each exchange of blows and it is not unlikely that the less blameworthy
individual may conduct himself in a more blameworthy manner. As long as the fight is unpremeditated and
sudden, the accused, irrespective of his conduct before the fight, earns the mitigation provided for in the
Exception 4 to Section 300 subject to the condition that he did not in the course of the fight take undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 23
In a case the deceased’s party attacked the accused party. One blow was given on the chest of deceased and
after receiving the blow the deceased leaned down and at that time another blow was given on the back of the
deceased. It was held that it showed that the accused who gave knife blows took undue advantage. Thus the
case would not be covered by Exception 4 to Section 300. 24
In a verbal altercation at the beginning accused suddenly got furious and started giving blows on vital parts of
unarmed persons due to which abdomen of two deceased persons were ripped open. The accused had thus
acted brutally to accomplish the crime. It was held that conviction for murder under Section 302 was proper as
benefit of Section 300 (Exception 4) was not available to the accused. This benefit could only be availed of if no
undue advantage is taken and act is not done in a cruel and shocking manner. 25 The accused attacked
deceased with a stone of 9’ x 6’ in size and had given a single blow on his head which proved fatal. However,
attack was neither premeditated nor intentional and Exception 4 to 300 was applied. The High Court held that
though simple single injury led to death, Sections 323 and 324 did not come into the play. 26
The accused and three others snatched the wrist watch of a boy known to the deceased. At the request of that
boy, he asked the accused and his associates to return the watch. The accused told the deceased to come to
some specified place. On reaching there, they had exchange of hot words and then the three associates of the
accused caught hold of the deceased and the accused gave a knife blow on the chest of the deceased as a
result of which he fell down. The accused also inflicted injuries with knife on another person who rushed to save
the deceased. The stab wound was given on the chest on the left side of the sternum between the castal joint
and the 6th and 7th ribs and both the ribs had been fractured. The truck of the wound had gone through
sternum, pericardium-anterior and posterior after passing the ribs and thereafter entered the stomach and
perforated a portion of the stomach. The impact of the single blow with knife had been disastrous. Therefore, it
could not be said that the accused had not taken undue advantage or not acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
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Exception 4 was held to have no application on the facts of the case. 27
68. Cases : where Exception 4 applied.—
Where the accused seeing the deceased against whom he had a grudge as he suspected that the deceased
had made his unmarried niece pregnant remonstrated the neighbour with whom the deceased was sitting for
having harboured his enemy and thus a sudden quarrel ensued in course of which the accused gave two blows
with a dharia resulting in the death of the deceased, it was held that the case fell within Exception 4 to Section
300 and as such the conviction was changed from one under Section 302 to Section 304, Part I I.P.C. 28 In a
case two agriculturists having lands in the vicinity of each other’s land separated only by a third farmer’s land
came to a sudden scuffle. The lands of both the agriculturists were being irrigated by one stream of water. One
day when the deceased was planting paddy on his land bringing water from the stream of water namely a
canal, the accused felt that the flow of the water going to the field of the accused was blocked or diverted and,
abuses took place between both of them. They also caught hold of the shirts of one another and there was a
scuffle. The accused then caught hold of the deceased and give him two to three blows with the result that the
deceased fell dead. Bombay High Court held that the facts of the case show that the accused had committed
an act without premeditation in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and therefore, the
case of the prosecution is covered squarely by Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. That being so, the accused
could be convicted only for an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section
304 Part II I.P.C. because he had caused such bodily injuries to the deceased as were likely to cause his
death.29
In a Punjab case there was no previous enmity between the parties. The houses of both the parties were
located near the place of occurrence. The location and the nature of injuries on the person of three accused
and their duration were of such a type that led the Court to hold that the accused persons received injuries in
the same transaction wherein the deceased and the eye witnesses were injured. All the eye witnesses who
were related to the deceased tried to minimise their own fault but they magnified that of the accused part. They
also tried to suppress the genesis of the occurrence. The accused did not act in a cruel manner and there was
no evidence that the deceased after he fell down was given further injuries. Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C.
was attracted in the facts of the case and the accused person was convicted of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 30
The accused in fits of anger assaulted his wife with iron rods as a result of which she died. The evidence on
records showed that he had no intention to cause the death as there was absence of premeditation. The
conviction of accused under Section 304 and not under Section 302 was held proper. 31 The accused was
warned not to sing obscene ballad and on his refusal the situation became so serious that it ultimately resulted
in the murder of Malkiat Singh. The evidence showed that both sides had exchanged attacks and counter attack
and both sides had suffered injuries. The conviction of accused was hence altered from Section 302 to under
Section 304 as case was covered within ambit of Exception 4 to Section 300. The conviction of one of accused
whose presence on spot was found uncertain was, however, set aside. 32
Initially there was an assault by the Police inasmuch as its members attempted to catch the supposed gamblers
in some of whom the accused had interest. Whereafter the accused came to the spot and gave a knife injury to
the Head Constable who fell down and ultimately died. The accused pleaded that the offence came to be
committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of the passion upon a sudden quarrel and without
the accused having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. It had been highlighted that
only one injury was given and blow was not repeated. It was held that it could well be that he may have been
attracted to the spot when things were heating up and had an arrival at the spot acted on the spur of moment
and that in view of the circumstances, the offence fell within Exception 4 of Section 300 I.P.C .. 33
Similarly in a case it transpired in evidence that the crime was committed without premeditation on the spur of
moment and the accused had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner as the
accused inflicted only one injury and not repeated the same. Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. was applied and
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the conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. was altered to Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 34 In a Gauhati case it transpired
that accused appellant with a knife and lathi dashed into the kitchen of a lady S to take vengeance on her son
and younger brother-in-law and dragged her out from inside the house, on being resisted by the victim who
some how released her from the clutches of the accused, the victim was assaulted on the abdomen by the knife
and the accused fled away by pulling out the dagger. There was no quarrel between the accused and the
deceased. Every thing happened in a spur of a moment. Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. was applied and the
conviction from Section 302 I.P.C. was altered to Section 304 Part II I.P.C. 35
In a Supreme Court case there was sudden fight between the two parties and the deceased after inflicting knife
injuries on two persons were running away with knife. The accused enraged by this conduct of the deceased
chased him and inflicted fatal injury on him, entire incident taking place within a very short time. The Supreme
Court held that in such a situation Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. is attracted and conviction under Section
302 is to be altered to one under Section 304 Part-I. 36
Quarrel ensued at the spur of moment in which injuries were sustained by both parties and there was no clear
evidence to show that anyone took undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. It was held that
exception 4 of Section 300 was applicable and accused were liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part I
read with Section 34 and not under Section 302 read with Section 34. 37
The appellant had stabbed deceased as a result of quarrel without motive or premeditation. It was held that the
accused was entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300. His conviction was altered from one under
Section 302 to one under Section 304 but conviction under Section 324 was confirmed. 38 There was sudden
fight when landlord demanded rent from the tenant. While nephew of landlord tried to intervene he was given a
knife blow resulting in his death. It was held that it was not premeditated act and Exception 4 to Section 300
was fully applicable and conviction was liable to be altered to Section 304 Part II instead of Section 302. 39 The
benefit of Exception 4 could not be denied merely because the accused had assaulted the deceased first. 40
Accused in a sudden quarrel and without any premeditation stabbed the deceased to death. Since clear
intention to cause death could not be established, the accused was convicted under Section 304 Part II and co-
accused under Section 324.41
The incident was out come of sudden quarrel in which in a spur of moment knife blow was given to the wife.
Since he had intentionally caused injuries his conviction was altered from Section 302 to one under Section 304
Part I.42 In a scuffle between accused and deceased, the former gave a knife blow to the later and wanted to
leave the place but deceased dragged the accused back. Thereafter accused gave a second blow which
proved fatal. It was held that injury caused was not intentional but it was done in heat of passion without any
pre-meditation. The conviction under Section 302 was altered to Section 304. 43 The accused picked up a
quarrel while concealing a knife and gave two blows to victim. Both were pavement dwellers and drug addicts.
Since appellant here had taken undue advantage, the benefit of Exception IV was not extended to him and he
was convicted of murder.44 In a sudden quarrel accused lost his temper and set fire to clothes of deceased. In
the circumstances conviction of accused for offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder was held
proper.45
The accused in a Supreme Court case had called the deceased at a particular point and there three associates
of accused caught hold of deceased and accused gave him a single fatal blow on chest with knife and a wound
of 19 cm was thereby caused. It was proved that the said blow could not be said to be inflicted without
premeditation. The Court drew the conclusion that the accused taking the undue advantage had acted in a cruel
and unusual manner and as such Exception 4 to Section 300 would not be available to him. His conviction
under Sections 302 and 324 was, therefore, held proper. 46 The accused was alleged to have attacked the
deceased with gandasi and lathis and medical evidence stated that injuries caused were sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause the death. It was held that Exception 4 would not apply and accused would
be guilty of offence of murder. 47 The accused assaulted the deceased, his parental aunt, and stamped her to
death and evidence showed that attack was made in a fierce manner at a time when deceased was incapable
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to defend herself. It was held that intention to cause death was thus explicit and conviction of the accused for
murder was proper.48
69. Cases : where Exception 4 not applied.—
In a case the accused returned home drunk to be scolded by his father who asked him for how many days he
would have free feeding like this without doing any work. Without giving him any reply after taking food he was
going out. His father followed him armed with a stick saying ‘What, you are going out without giving any reply?’
Thereupon the accused caught hold of the tuft of his father with his right hand and with his left hand fisted him
while he lay prone on the abdomen. At this stage P.Ws. 1 and 2 intervened and tried to separate them but the
accused rescued himself, picked up two stones lying there and threw them with force on the head of the father
who was lying on the ground, resulting in fracture of the skull with instantaneous death, it was held that the
accused was not entitled to Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. and the offence answers Section 302 I.P.C. 49
In a case the deceased protested against the misconduct and high handedness of accused Nos. 1 and 7,
especially when their act related to the wife of the deceased, who was peacefully and blissfully sleeping in her
bed. Even though, it is nobody’s case that the deceased was out to make any assault on any one, the protest
was counteracted by knife blow forcefully give in chest which proved fatal. It was held that Exception 4 to
Section 300 I.P.C. is not attracted and the offence was murder. 50
In a case the relation between the accused and the deceased were strained because the accused wanted to
build a ghar on a land in dispute and the deceased was not allowing him to do so. There cropped up a sudden
altercation with exchange of abuses between the two over this dispute and the accused gave only one lathi
blow on the head of the deceased who was unarmed, resulting in his death on the spot. The accused was tried
for murder but was convicted under Section 304 I.P.C. On the question whether the accused can invoke
Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C ., it was held that to bring the case within Exception 4 to Section 300, it was
necessary that all the ingredients of that Exception should have been present. Since, the accused was armed
with lathi and the deceased was not, it must be held that the accused took undue advantage of the situation of
his opponent. Further though there was sudden quarrel but there was no fight and there was only one blow
dealt by the accused and he was held not entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. and was
convicted for murder.51
In a case there was no evidence nor it was anybody’s case that the deceased were armed with weapons. The
accused who alone were armed with weapon on a quarrel stabbed the victim to death. The accused being
alone armed got advantage over the deceased and further he caused death in a cruel and unusual manner.
The benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. was denied to him. 52 Where in a quarrel between the accused
and another, the deceased, an old man tried to dissuade them from quarrelling and in the process was hit on
the head by an iron bar by the accused which caused multiple fractures of his skull and damage to the brain
resulting in his death, it was held that the case of the deceased did not fall within this Exception as he acted in a
most cruel manner and caused the death of an innocent intervener. He was, therefore, held guilty under Section
302 and not under Section 304 -Part I I.P.C. 53 In this case it could also be said that as there was no fight
between the deceased and the accused, Exception 4 was not at all attracted. Where though there was a
sudden quarrel between the accused and the deceased there was absolutely no fight between the two as there
was no exchange of blows nor any attack from the side of the deceased who was totally unarmed but
nevertheless the accused attacked the deceased with an axe causing his death, it was held that his case did
not fall either within Exception 4 or Exception-2 and he was squarely liable under Section 302 I.P.C. 54 The
deceased was belaboured mercilessly. There were innumerable contusions on the entire body of the deceased
from head to toe. The wrist, humerus, etc. were fractured and the whole body was full of rod marks. There were
several contused lacerated wounds on the entire face and the left eye was bleeding. The totality of the injuries
caused to the victim clearly supported the finding of both the Courts below that the appellants went on
belabouring the deceased till he died on the spot. It was held that Exception 4 to Section 300 was not attracted
and the conviction of accused under Sections 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. was upheld. 55 The weapon used
and the part of the body aimed at and injured may spell the intention to cause death bringing the case within the
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ambit of Section 302 I.P.C. The fact that it was only one stab injury and it was inflicted at the spur of the
moment would not render it a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 56
There is no principle that in all cases of single blow Section 302 I.P.C. is not attracted. Single blow may, in
some cases, entail conviction under Section 302 I.P.C ., in some cases under Section 304 I.P.C. and in some
other cases under Section 326 I.P.C. The question with regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on
the facts and in the circumstances of each case, the nature of the injury. Whether it is on the vital or non-vital
part of the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in which the injury is caused and the manner in which the
injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the
offender and the offence committed by him. 57
70. Comparison of Exception 1 (provocation) with Exception 4 (sudden fight).—
The Fourth Exception of Section 300 I.P.C. covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a
case of prosecution not covered by the first Exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate.
The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in
the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in the case of Exception 4, there is only that
heat of passion which clouds men’s sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do.
There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that
provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or
some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the
subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A ‘sudden fight’ implies
mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral
provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception
more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight.
A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them
starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did.
There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which
attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation,
(b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the
ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the ‘fight’ occurring in Exception 4 to Section
300 I.P.C. is not defined in the I.P.C. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be
no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on
account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether
with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a
sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon
the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a
sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue
advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression ‘undue advantage’ as used in the provision
means ‘unfair advantage’.58
71. Exception 5—Death caused of the person consenting to it.—
Homicide by unequivocal consent has been excused by Exception 5 to Section 300 I.P.C. Section 88 I.P.C.
postulates an act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person’s benefit. This
Exception 5 however says that when the death of another is caused by consent of the victim the offence is
reduced from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Under Exception 5 to Section 300 Indian
Penal Code ‘culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of
18 years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent’. To attract Exception 5 to Section 300
Indian Penal Code, there must have been free and voluntary consent of the deceased person. The onus of
proving consent of the deceased person is on the accused. Exception 5 of Section 300 Indian Indian Penal
Code must receive a strict and not a liberal interpretation. In applying the said Exception, the act alleged to be
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consented to or authorized by the victim must be considered by a close scrutiny. The Court must in each case
consider the evidence and the surrounding circumstances while considering the question of consent. 59
In a Madras case the accused was living with his concubine and on the night in question, after some talk she
declared that she would sever her connection with him and go away, and, in the alternative, she suggested that
both of them might commit suicide. In the morning he killed her at the place where her body was found. In such
a situation, Exception 5 was applied. 60 In another case from Madras the accused killed his concubine whom he
persuaded to go to her village saying that they had gone about 5 or 6 days in search of a house but found none.
But, she lay down and refused to get up. He tried to persuade her to go on the ground that he was being
scandalised also by his association with her. But she refused, took the knife out of his waist, put it into his hand
and asked him to kill her. He accordingly cut her neck with the knife. The accused was given the benefit of
Exception 5 and the offence of murder was reduced to one under Section 304 I.P.C. 61
Both the cases were criticised in a subsequent Madras case. Husband and wife along with children were living
in extreme poverty. On the day before the occurrence the accused and his wife quarrelled as the accused could
not bring any food for any of them. And that was the day which was an auspicious day for them. Landlord
wanted them to quit firstly because they could not defray the rent for three months which was @ Rs. 3/- per
month only. Frustrated by agony and poverty they both left their abode with their child and when they reached
near a primary school they took shelter there. The accused husband insisted on her wife’s going back to
mother’s house but she refused. She insisted that it was better for him to kill her than to send her anywhere
else. The accused then by knife in his pocket caused the death of his wife by cutting the neck. In the factual
matrics Madras High Court refused to spell out Exception 5 to Section 300 I.P.C. The Court observed on
criticising the earlier Madras decisions as follows : ‘With great respect to the judgments in these two cases, it
appears to us in the first case that the woman did not give her unqualified assent to her life being taken away
as, in our view, Exception 5 to Section 300 I.P.C. requires. In the second case the consent given by the woman
was for her life to be taken simultaneously with the man’s. She gave no consent to be killed by the man who
then was to continue life on this earth. In the present case also, although the wife, taking the confession at its
face value, flatly refused to go back to her mother and said that if her husband insisted on her doing so she
would rather be killed, this, as it appears to us, is not the type of consent which is contemplated by Exception 5
to Section 300 I.P.C. This Exception, again with respect to the two decisions we have referred to, applies to
cases where a person takes the life of another at his or her request and with unequivocal consent which does
not involve the choice of alternatives to which the person taking the life more or less has driven the person. 62
In another case from Patna, the accused husband could not pass from tenth class despite repeated attempt, he
having failed thrice in annual examination. His wife aged 19 however was a literate woman. The accused
frustrated in his attempt to pass the examination when his wife was quite educated decided to put an end to his
own life. The wife thereon requested him to kill her first and then kill himself. The accused killed his wife but was
arrested before he could kill himself. Exception 5 to Section 300 I.P.C. was applied and the accused was
convicted under Section 304 Part-I of the I.P.C.63
The accused after killing his wife attempted to commit suicide. Evidence showed that in pursuance of suicide
pact deceased wife consumed poison and when she felt suffocation accused husband put his hand on her
mouth resulting in her death. So it became clear that deceased had suffered death at hands of accused with her
own consent. It was held that Exception 5 to Section 300 was attracted and conviction of accused was altered
to one under Section 304 Part I.64
Turning to English law on suicide pacts the following passage from H ALSBURY may be relevant : where a
person acting in pursuance of a suicide pact between himself and another, kills the other or is a party to the
other being killed by a third party, he is guilty of manslaughter. A ‘suicide pact’ is a common agreement
between two or more persons having for its object the death of all of them, whether or not each is to take his
own life, but nothing done by a person who enters into a suicide pact is to be treated as done by him in
pursuance of the pact unless it is done while he has the settled intention of dying in pursuance of the pact.
Where a person is charged with the murder of another the burden of proving that the killing was in the
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pursuance of a suicide pact lies on the defendant. 65 The following reasons are given for not punishing homicide
by consent so severely as murder : ‘In the first place, the motives which prompt men to the commission of this
offence are generally far more respectable than those which prompt men to the commission of murder.
Sometimes it is the effect of a strong sense of religious duty, sometimes of a strong sense of honour, not
unfrequently of humanity. The soldier who, at the entreaty of a wounded comrade, puts that comrade out of
pain, the friend who supplies laudanum to a person suffering the torment of a lingering disease, the freed man
who in ancient times held out the sword that his master might fall on it, the highborn native of India who stabs
the females of his family at their own entreaty in order to save them from the licentiousness of a band of
marauders, would, except in Christian societies, scarcely be thought culpable, and even in Christian societies
would not be regarded by the public, and ought not to be treated by the law, as assassins.’ 66
This Exception abrogates the rule of English law that a combatant in a fair duel who kills his opponent is guilty
of murder. Under this Exception the person who is killed in a duel ‘suffers or takes the risk of death by his own
choice?. In applying the Exception it should first be considered with reference to the act consented to or
authorised, and next with reference to the person or persons authorised, and as to each of those some degree
of particularity at least should appear upon the facts proved before the Exception can be said to apply. It must
be found that the person killed with a full knowledge of the facts, determined to suffer death, or take the risk of
death; and that this determination continued upto and existed at the moment of his death. 67 The consent must
have been given unconditionally and without any preservation. 68 The case supposed in the illustration to
Exception 5 is one of the offences expressly made punishable by Section 305.
Exception 5 to Section 300, I.P.C. must receive a very strict and not a liberal interpretation and in applying the
said exception the act alleged to be consented to or authorised by the victim must be considered with a very
close scrutiny. Consent by necessary implication should not be permitted to be raised by way of defence. The
accused at no point of time had spoken about such consent and simply on account of the son not hearing any
shriek or sound of agony, it cannot be held that the deceased wife had consented to or authorised the accused
to cause the murderous assault.69
Where the accused caused a pile to be lighted, and persuaded a sati to re-ascend it, after she had once left it,
and she was burnt;70 where the accused acting upon the express desire of an adult emasculated him and death
ensured owing to the rough manner of the operation; 71 where the accused repeatedly requested by his wife,
who was overwhelmed with grief at the death of her child, to kill her did kill her one night while she was
asleep,72 and where certain snake-charmers by professing themselves able to cure snake-bites, induced
several persons to let themselves be bitten by a poisonous snake, and from the effect of the bite three of such
persons died,73 it was held in all these cases that the accused were protected by this Exception, because the
element of consent was present and the offence amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
72. Death caused by voluntary act of deceased resulting from fear of violence.—
If a man creates in another man’s mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to
escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the
injuries which result.74 If, for instance, four or five persons were to stand round a man, and so threaten him and
frighten him as to make him believe that his life was in danger, and he were to back away from them and
tumble over a precipice to avoid them, their act would amount to murder. 75
The accused was being persuaded to take his meal while standing on the guard duty but he refused to do so
and kicked away the scooter of deceased. The reason was that all other persons were enjoying the dinner in
pandal but accused remained standing on guard duty upto 11.30 p.m. without taking anything and that annoyed
him so much that he shot dead the deceased who had come to persuade him for taking his supper. The eye
witnesses versions were quite clear and cogent and no risk of death was taken by the deceased. The exception
of Section 300 was pleaded in his defence but was not accepted by the Court because deceased had simply
persuaded the accused to take meal and had not taken the risk voluntarily with knowledge that he would die or
incur the risk of losing the life. As such benefit of Exception 5 to Section 300 were not given to the accused and
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he was convicted for the offence of murder and awarded life imprisonment. 76
73. Prosecution for murder but conviction for culpable homicide.—
The accused in his attack had neither taken undue advantage nor had acted in cruel or unusual manner as only
one lathi blow was given and before attack accused was not armed with any weapon. Though conviction was
altered from offence under Section 302 to one under Section 304 but Court observed, “conviction under Section
302 cannot be ruled out on ground that there was only one blow. It will depend upon weapon used and nature
77
of injuries caused.?
74. Absence of Corpus delicti.—
It is well settled law that in a murder case, to substantiate the case of the prosecution it is not required that dead
bodies must have been made available for the identification and discovery of dead body is not sine qua non for
applicability of Section 299 of I.P.C.78
If the prosecution is successful in providing cogent and satisfactory proof of the victim having met a homicidal
death, absence of corpus delicti will not by itself be fatal to a charge of murder. 79
75. Ascertainment of time of death.—
Judging the time of death from the contents of the stomach, may not always be the determinative test. It will
require due corroboration from other evidence.80
Under Section 157 Crpc., the copy of the FIR has to be sent to the Magistrate. This never happened in the
present case. FIR was sent to the Magistrate after 5 days. This was extremely suspicious. 81
76. Motive.—
It is fairly well settled that while motive does not have a major role to play in cases based on eye witness
account of the incident, it assumes importance in cases that rest entirely on circumstantial evidence. 82 Where
other circumstances lead to the only hypothesis that the accused has committed the offence, the Court cannot
acquit the accused of the offence merely because the motive for committing the offence has not been
established in the case.83 If depositions giving the eye witness account of incident that led to death of deceased
are reliable, absence of a motive would make little difference. 84
77. Last seen together.—
The circumstance of last seen does not by itself necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who
committed the crime. It depends upon the facts of each case. There may however be cases where, on account
of close proximity of place and time between the event of the accused having been last seen with the deceased
and the factum of death, a rational mind may be persuaded to reach an irresistible conclusion that either the
accused should explain how and in what circumstances the victim suffered the death or should own the liability
for the homicide.85 But in Arabindra Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal ,86 it was held that once the accused
was last seen with the deceased, the onus is upon him to show that either he was not involved in the
occurrence at all or that he had left the deceased at her home or at any other reasonable place. To rebut the
evidence of last seen and its consequences in law, the onus was upon the accused to lead evidence in order to
prove his innocence. In C. Perumal v. Rajasekaran ,87 there was a time lag of 2 days in last seen together of A2
to A5 with the deceased and Court found it difficult to connect them with the incident.
78. Co-accused.—
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Merely because two persons have been acquitted that benefit cannot be extended to others in view of the direct
evidence establishing their presence and participation in the crime. 88
All accused except appellant acquitted. Plea that appellant cannot be convicted having framed charges against
all the accused and after their acquittal, repelled. Appellant was convicted under Section 302 I.P.C for having
committed the murder.89
Out of seven persons accused of killing by gun shot injuries, only one was convicted because others had not
participated. The circumstances of the case, including the number of shots fired, revealed a different story. Only
the convict appealed to the Supreme Court. His conviction was set aside because it was not sustainable. 90
79. Acquittal on Principle of parity.—
It was argued that the identification of the appellants in the Court is of no consequence as the appellants along
with the other co - accused had been shown to the witnesses in the police station. Their weapons were also
shown to the witnesses. As a result of these infirmities, the co - accused of the appellants have been acquitted.
Therefore, on the principle of parity, the appellants also deserved the benefit of doubt. It was held that it is
always open to a court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted from those who had been
convicted. Both the Courts below have applied the aforesaid principle in distinguishing the case of the
appellants herein from those who have been acquitted. Supreme Court did not find find any substance in the
submission that since all the other co - accused had been acquitted; on the ground of parity the appellants
herein also deserved to be acquitted. 91
67 Santosh, 1975 CrLJ 602 (SC) : (1975) 3 SCC 727 [LNIND 1975 SC 50] : AIR 1975 SC 654 [LNIND 1975 SC 50]; see
also Sehaj Ram, 1983 CrLJ 993 (SC) : (1983) 2 SCC 280 : AIR 1983 SC 614 [LNIND 1983 SC 90].
68 Public Prosecutor v. Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115]: 1959 CrLJ 993 : 1959 Mad WN 215.
When there is eye-witness account on record, the absence of motive pales into insignificance. Ashok Rai v. State of
U.P. and Ors., 2014 (5) SCALE 73 [LNINDU 2014 SC 21] : (2014) 5 SCC 713 [LNINDU 2014 SC 21].
69 Annadurai v. State of T.N., (1989) 2 Crimes 314(319) (Mad). The accused without being questioned seperately on each
and every material circumstances which are to be used against him cannot be convicted for offence of murder and
imposition of death sentence. This was so observed in a case and on appeal High Court instead of confirming the death
sentence had remitted the case for retrial from the stage of examination of the accused under Section 313 Crpc.
However neither prosecution was to be allowed to adduce any fresh evidence nor defence would be allowed to cross
examine the witnesses of the prosecution,Abid Hussain v. State, 1997 CrLJ 4672 (Cal).
70 Suresh Chand v. State (Delhi), 1972 CrLJ 1416 (1420) : ILR (1971) 1 Del 772 .
71 (1951) 3 Pepsu LR 558.
72 R. v. Walker , (1992) 13 Cr Appr (S) 474 (476).
73 Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125]: (1966) 2 SCWR 66 [LNIND 1966 SC
125] : 1966 SCD 659 : 1966 CrLJ 1509; Renta alias Shankar Majhi v. Sunder Majhi, (1971) 37 Cut LT 569 : (1971) 1
Cut WR 770 ; see also Ampuran v. State of Haryana, 1980 CrLJ 951; State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal, 1981 CrLJ 852 :
1980 Raj LW 159 : 1980 WLN 452; P. Veerabbayi v. State of A.P., 1984 CrLJ 440 : (1983) 2 APLJ (HC) 270.
74 Sis v. State of Punjab, (1973) 75 Punj LR 25; State of A.P. v. Rayavarappu Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976
SC 331]: 1977 CrLJ 1 : (1977) 1 SCR 601 [LNIND 1976 SC 331] : (1976) 4 SCC 382 [LNIND 1976 SC 331].
75 Govinda, (1876) 1 Bom 342.

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76 State of A.P. v. Rayavarappu Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976 SC 331]: 1977 CrLJ 1 (SC) : (1976) 4 SCC 382
[LNIND 1976 SC 331]. Culpable homicide is murder if one of the conditions enumerated under Section 300 is satisfied
and all four conditions precedents are not necessary to coexist for the offence of murder, Saleem v. State, 1999 CrLJ
1419 (Raj). In case of custodial death the cause of death should be investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation,
Ajab Singh v. State of U.P., 2000 CrLJ 1809 (SC) : (2000) 3 SCC 521 [LNIND 2000 SC 2011] : 2000 All LJ 946. In
Rajinder v. State of Haryana, 2006 CrLJ 2926 (SC) the principles of Punnayya’s case have been reiterated.
77 Shakti Dan v. State of Rajasthan, 2007 CrLJ 3426 (SC).
78 Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 9 SCC 462 [LNIND 2011 SC 844].
79 Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., 2012 CrLJ 3765 : (2012) 8 SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 425].
80 Richhpal Singh Meena v. Ghasi, AIR 2014 SC 3595 [LNIND 2014 SC 691]: 2014 CrLJ 4339 : (2014) 8 SCC 918
[LNIND 2014 SC 691].
81 State of A.P. v. Ravarappu Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976 SC 331]: 1977 CrLJ 1 (SC) : (1976) 4 SCC 382
[LNIND 1976 SC 331].
82 Anda v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75]: 1966 CrLJ 171.
83 Richhpal Singh Meena v. Ghasi, AIR 2014 SC 3595 [LNIND 2014 SC 691]: 2014 CrLJ 4339 : (2014) 8 SCC 918
[LNIND 2014 SC 691].
84 Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19]: 1958 SCR 1495 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] : 1958
CrLJ 818.
85 Virsa Singh, (ibid) and State of A.P. v. Ravarppu Punnayya , (ibid).
86 Morcha v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1979 SC 80 [LNIND 1978 SC 243]: 1978 CrLJ 1710 : (1979) 1 SCC 161 [LNIND
1978 SC 243].
87 1958 CrLJ 818.
88 (1991) JT (SC) 288.
89 Asa Ram v. State of U.P., 1991 CrLJ 3221 (All).
90 Amjot Ali Munshi v. State of Assam, (1988) 1 Crimes 65 (66) (Gau).
91 State of Kerala v. Daniel Nadar, 1971 Ker LJ 182.
92 Renta alias Shankar Majhi v. State, (1971) 37 Cut LT 565 : (1971) 1 Cut WR 770 relying on Rajwant Singh v. State of
Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125]: (1966) 2 SCWR 66 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] : 1966 SCD 959 [LNIND
1966 SC 125] : 1966 CrLJ 1509.
93 Suresh Chand v. State, 1972 CrLJ 1416 : ILR (1971) 1 Del 712 .
94 Sonaram Jatap v. State of Assam, 1984 CrLJ (NOC) 145 (Gau).
1 Sarabjeet Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 529 : 1983 CrLJ 961 : (1983) 1 SCWR 236 : (1984) 1 SCC 673.
2 Parvesh v. State of U.P., 1982 CrLJ 1821 (All).
3 Hazi Khudu v. Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 57 : 40 CrLJ 375 (2).
4 Ghasi Ram v. State, 1952 CrLJ 1366 (1370) .
5 Reg v. Govinda, ILR (1876) Bom 342.
6 Reg v. Govinda, ILR (1876) 1 Bom 342 .
7 State of A.P. v. R. Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976 SC 331]: 1977 CrLJ 1 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 659 [LNIND 1976
SC 331] : (1977) 1 SCR 601 [LNIND 1976 SC 331] : (1976) 4 SCC 382 [LNIND 1976 SC 331] a J&K case held.
8 Uttam Chand v. State of J&K , (1989) 2 Crimes 626 (630) (J&K).
9 Kishore Singh v. State of M.P,, AIR 1977 SC 2267 [LNIND 1977 SC 288]: (1978) 1 SCR 635 [LNIND 1977 SC 288] :
1977 CrLJ 1937 : (1977) 4 SCC 524 [LNIND 1977 SC 288] : 1977 SCC (Cri) 656 [LNIND 1977 SC 288].
10 State v. Raja Parida , 1972 CrLJ 193 (199- Ori). Acquittals.—

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Varun Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan, 2011 CrLJ 675 : AIR 2011 SC 72 [LNIND 2010 SC 1067]: (2011) 12 SCC 545
[LNIND 2010 SC 1067] ; The recovered knife was never produced before the Court and was never shown to the
accused. Scanty evidence; Conviction set aside; State Through C.B.I. v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, (2011) 3 SCC 109
[LNIND 2011 SC 114] : AIR 2011 SC 1017 [LNIND 2011 SC 114]: 2011 Crl.J. 2177- circumstances relied on do not
connect the accused, accused acquitted; Durbal v. State of U.P, (2011) 2 SCC 676 [LNIND 2011 SC 100] : AIR 2011
SC 795 [LNIND 2011 SC 100]: 2011 CrLJ 1106; Presence of eyewitness doubtful, acquitted; Prahlad Singh v. State of
M.P,, 2011 (8) SCALE 105 [LNIND 2011 SC 1086] : 2011 CrLJ 4366 - Possibility that these three accused roped in on
account of animosity cannot be ruled out and given them the benefit of doubt on that score. State of Rajasthan v.
Chhote Lal, 2012 AIR (SCW) 1159 : 2012 CrLJ 1214-Sole eye witness turned hostle, acquittal confirmed; Javed
Masood v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2010 SC 979 [LNIND 2010 SC 214]: (2010) 3 SCC 538 [LNIND 2010 SC 214] :
(2010) 3 SCR 236 [LNIND 2010 SC 214] : 2010 CrLJ 2020-presence of eye witness doubtful, conviction set aside.
Jiten Besra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 1294 [LNIND 2010 SC 224]: (2010) 3 SCC 675 [LNIND 2010 SC
224] : 2010 CrLJ 2032-All the alleged incriminating circumstances could not be said to have been established, Accused
is entitled to benefit of doubt. Gajula Surya Prakasarao v. State of A.P., (2010) 1 SCC 88 [LNIND 2009 SC 1973] : 2010
CrLJ 2102 : AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 181; eye witness did not name the accused in the statement, accused acquitted;Amit
v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 107 [LNIND 2012 SC 138] : AIR 2012 SC 1433 [LNIND 2012 SC 138]and
State of U.P. v. Iqram, AIR 2011 SC 2296 [LNIND 2011 SC 556]: 2011 8 SCC 80 [LNIND 2011 SC 556] : 2011 CrLJ
3931-Non- recovery of weapon insignificant.
11 Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., 2012 CrLJ 3765 : (2012) 8 SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 425].
12 Abbas Ali v. State, 2007 CrLJ 1667 (SC).
13 H ALSBURY’S Laws of England, 4th Ed., Vol. 11, Article 1161, p. 618.
14 Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994), (1998) AC 245 : (1997) 3 All ER 936 HL.
15 K ENNY on Outlines of Criminal Law, 19th Ed., para 129, pp. 184-185.
16 Mosses v. Trinidad and Tobago, (1996) CLY 1484 : (1987) AC 53.
17 Johnson v. Trinidad and Tobago, (1999) 1 WLR 2000 PC : (2000) CLY 396 (PC).
18 Mani v. State, 2003 CrLJ 2262 (Mad) : 2003 Mad LJ (Cri) 413. The accused stabbed the wife of informant with knife
resulting in her death. The evidence of daughter of deceased was considered useful and reliable and conviction was
held proper, Basu Harizan v. State, 2003 CrLJ 2270 (Ori) : (2003) 95 Cut LT 477.
19 R. v. Antone (a Juvenile), (2001) 1 AC 340 : (2000) 2 WLR 703.
20 R. v. Poulton, (1832) SC p. 339 : 172 ER 997 (Central Criminal Court).
21 K ENNY on Outlines of Criminal Law, 19th Ed., para 130, p. 185.
22 Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, (1935) AC 462.
23 Mohinder Singh v. State, AIR 1953 SC 415 [LNIND 1950 SC 37]: 1953 CrLJ 1761 : 1950 SCR 821 [LNIND 1950 SC
37].
24 Jaidev v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 612 [LNIND 1962 SC 249]: (1963) 1 CrLJ 495.
25 Brajesh Kumar Singh v. State, 2007 CrLJ 2132 (Chh).
26 Shankar Jaiswara v. State, 2007 CrLJ 3271 (SC).
27 Ram Singh v. State, 2007 CrLJ 3052 (Del). However two accused were acquitted by giving them benefit of doubt.
28 Bandarupalli Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P,, AIR 1974 SC 2363 : 1975 CrLJ 21 : (1975) 3 SCC 492 : 1975 SCC (Cri)
84. The wife was as per charge, strangulated to death with shoe lace but only material to incriminate accused was
recovery of shoe lace from the accused. It was held that the offence of culpable homicide was not made out, Fellix
Joannas v. State, 1998 CrLJ 2479 (Kant). The accused as her injured eye witness had inflicted injuries on vital part of
body with the intention to cause the death. It was held that conviction of accused under Section 302 read with Section
149 for murder was proper, Kasara Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1999 CrLJ 1451 (Raj).
29 ILR (1951) All 673 : AIR 1950 All 380 [LNIND 1949 ALL 236]: 51 CrLJ 1040.
30 Badri v. State of U.P,, AIR 1953 All 189 [LNIND 1952 ALL 196]: 1953 CrLJ 450.
31 Dibia v. State of U.P,, AIR 1953 All 373 [LNIND 1952 ALL 63]: 1953 CrLJ 804 : ILR (1954) 2 All 65 .
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32 Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488 [LNIND 1956 SC 34]: 1956 CrLJ 919 (2) : 1956 All LJ 666. The accused
in another case in order to take revenge had killed two persons and injured other. The motive for crime was established
and his conviction for murder and attempt to murder was upheld : Kamaljit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2004 CrLJ 28
(SC) : (2003) 12 SCC 155 : AIR 2004 SC 69 [LNIND 2007 PNH 411].
33 Dhiren Walia v. State, 2008 CrLJ 3117 (HP).
34 Udayveer v. State, 2008 CrLJ 2745 (MP).
35 Dilip v. State, 2004 CrLJ 2684 (Raj).
36 Rawal Penta Venkalu v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 171 : 1956 CrLJ 338.
37 Labhu Ram v. State of Punjab, 1995 (4) Crimes 139 : 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 17 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 15 : 1996 CrLJ 399.
38 Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1803 : 1974 CrLJ 1271 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1093.
39 Pularu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 CrLJ 1809 : AIR 1993 SC 1487 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 1023.
40 State v. Siddappa Satyappa Jagadal, 2002 CrLJ 314 (Kant) : 2001 AIR Kant HCR 3088.
41 Toseswar Chutia v. State, 2002 CrLJ 1465 (Gau). The accused killed 10 year old boy because he had seen accused
outraging the modesty of eye witness. His conviction for murder was held proper, Baleshwar Mahto v. State, 2002 CrLJ
2275 (Jhar) : (2002) 1 BLJR 687.
42 R. v. Lebrun , 1991 CA. (1992) B 61 : (1991) 4 All ER 673 (CA).
43 Khajan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1989 CrLJ 1555 (Punj).
44 Vadia Chandraiah v. State of A.P., 2007 CrLJ 770 (SC).
45 Gajjoo v. State, 2007 CrLJ 1126 (Chh) : AIR 2003 SCW 6692 : 2004 CrLJ 632 was distinguished in this case. Intention
to kill was established in 2007 CrLJ 401 (Del). In Paglu Yadav v. State, 2007 CrLJ 61 (Pat), the intention to kill was
established and conviction was upheld.
46 State of U.P. v. Virendra Prasad, 2004 CrLJ 1373 (SC) : (2004) 9 SCC 37 [LNIND 2004 SC 138] : AIR 2004 SC 1517
[LNIND 2004 SC 138]: 2004 All LJ 673. When accused knew that death could be caused but had no intention to do so,
the conviction was altered from under Section 302 to one under Section 304,Deveppa Keshav Nayak v. State, 2004
CrLJ 1940 (Bom).
47 Shyam Charan Lohar v. State, 2004 CrLJ 1928 (Jhar).
48 Mohd. Idrish v. State, 2004 CrLJ 1724 (Raj). No intention to cause death in sudden fight and liable to be convicted
under Section 304 instead of Section 302,Baldeo v. State, 2004 CrLJ 2686 (All).
49 Himmat Singh v. State, 2004 CrLJ 3207 (MP).
50 Kailash v. State, 2004 CrLJ 3551 (All). A forceful blow caused death and conviction under Section 300(3) was held
proper, Idrish v. State, 2004 CrLJ 4076 (Uttar).
51 Sipai Hamram v. State, 2004 CrLJ NOC 233 (Ori). The accused had killed deceased as false charge of theft was
levelled against him. Conviction was altered from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, Madkami Irma
v. State, 2004 CrLJ NOC 235 (Ori). Unarmed person was stabbed in his abdomen and chest and conviction for murder
was altered to one under Section 304,Sonam Sherpa v. State, 2004 CrLJ 4152 (Sikk).
52 Chano Mochi v. State, 2006 CrLJ 3555 (Jhar).
53 Registrar Gen v. Prakash Jadav, 2006 CrLJ 3393 (Kant). In Mallikarjun v. State, 2006 CrLJ 4298 (Kant) death was
caused in a most cruel and unusual manner and conviction was held proper.
54 Babulal v. State, 2005 CrLJ 2095 (MP). Deceased was chased and then fired from closed range and motive of murder
to take revenge of old enmity. Conviction had proper, Johar Singh v. State, 2005 CrLJ 2035 (Uttar).
55 Hukum Singh v. State, 2005 CrLJ 3486 (All).
56 Sat Narain v. State of Haryana, 2008 CrLJ 1416 (SC).
57 Benjamin v. State of T.N., 2008 CrLJ 1806 (SC).

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58 Jagat Singh v. State, 2008 CrLJ 1744 (Raj). Accused was quarrelling with the nephew of deceased and when he tried
to intervene accused took out knife and stabbed on his chest and he died on spot. It was held that conviction for murder
was proper as intention to kill was large on record, Kailash Thakur v. State, 2008 CrLJ 1668 (Chh).
59 Bavisetti Kameshwara Rao @ Babai v. State of A.P., 2008 CrLJ 2987 (SC).
60 Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta, (2011) 6 SCC 189 [LNIND 2011 SC 2627] : 2011 (6) SCALE 236
[LNIND 2011 SC 2627] : AIR 2011 SC 1945 [LNIND 2011 SC 2627]: 2011 CrLJ 3585.
61 Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2013 CrLJ 1518 : AIR 2013 (SCW) 1149 ; In Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand,
2012 (9) SCALE 291 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 433] : JT 2012 (9) SC 642 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 433]SC - rejected the
case of the complainant that the police are guilty of killing deceased Munna Singh in cold blood in fake encounter.
62 Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) and another v. Union of India & another, AIR 2013 SC
818 [LNIND 2013 SC 9]: (2013) 2 SCC 493 [LNIND 2013 SC 9] : 2013 CrLJ 1084; In Sohrabuddin Sheikh fake
encounter case ie, CBI v. Amit Shah, 2012 (9) SCALE 472 [LNIND 2012 SC 589] : JT 2012 (10) SC 85 : (2012) 10 SCC
545 ; and in Ravindra Pal Singh v. Santosh Kumar Jaiswal and others, 2011 (4) SCC 746 [LNIND 2011 SC 304] : 2011
(3) SCALE 591 [LNIND 2011 SC 304], SC directed for transfer of the case outside State because some of the accused
in the case were policemen.
63 242nd Report Law Commission of India.
64 Lata Singh v. State of U.P. & Anr., (2006) 5 SCC 475 [LNIND 2006 SC 482] : AIR 2006 SC 2522 [LNIND 2006 SC
482].
65 Arumugam Servai v. State of Tamil Nadu , (2011) 6 SCC 405 [LNIND 2011 SC 435]See Dandu Jaggaraju v. State of
A.P., AIR 2011 SC 3387 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 217]: 2011 CrLJ. 4956 - Honour killing, not proved, acquitted the
accused.
66 Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT) of Delhi, AIR 2011 SC 1863 [LNIND 2011 SC 502]: 2011 CrLJ 2903 : (2011) 6 SCC 396
[LNIND 2011 SC 502] ; In the 242nd report the Law Commission of India opined that “we are constrained to say that
such a blanket direction given by the Supreme Court making death sentence a rule in ‘honour killings’ cases, makes a
departure from the principles firmly entrenched in our criminal jurisprudence by virtue of a series of Supreme Court
Judgments.?; In State of U.P. v. Krishna Master, AIR 2010 SC 3071 [LNIND 2010 SC 699]: 2010 CrLJ 3889 : (2010)
12 SCC 324 [LNIND 2010 SC 699] - though the killing of six person and wiping almost the whole family on flimsy
ground of honour saving of the family would fall within the rarest of rare case,keeping in view that incident took place 20
years ago and High Court acquitted them in the year 2002 accused sentenced to RI for life.
67 [http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report242.pdf; (last accessed on 13-11-2015).
68 (1951) 3 Pepsu LR 635.
69 Zora Singh v. State, 1954 CrLJ 362 : AIR 1954 Pepsu 51 : ILR 1953 Patiala 123.
70 Sarwan Singh v. State, 1953 CrLJ 1748 : AIR 1953 Pepsu 186 .
71 Digendranath Roy v. State of W.B ., 74 Cal WN 231 (244) : 1970 CrLJ 529; Davasia Yohannan v. State, AIR 1958 Ker
207 [LNIND 1958 KER 20]: 1958 CrLJ 1021; (abdominal injury) P. Rangaraju v. Muthukrishna, AIR 1962 MP 244
[LNIND 1961 MP 49]: 1961 Jab LJ 1414.
72 Satish v. State of Gujarat, 1979 CrLJ (Guj) 334 : 20 Guj LR 638.
73 Md. Mytheen v. State of Kerala, AIR 1980 SC 108 : 1980 CrLJ 192 : 1979 Cr LR (SC) 585 : (1979) 4 SCC 708 : 1979
SCC (Cri) 1010.
74 Rajendra Prabhu Chikane v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 CrLJ 3410 (SC). Neither there was premediation nor prior
meeting between parties and conviction was altered from Section 302 to Section 304,Keshaba Naik v. State, 2007 CrLJ
3596 (Ori).
75 State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh, 2004 CrLJ 931 (SC). The accused gave a knife blow on abdomen of deceased
resulting in her death. His conviction for murder was upheld, Mahesh v. State, 2004 CrLJ 1087 (MP).
76 Raman v. State of Kerala, 2008 CrLJ 4695 (SC).
77 Madan v. State of M.P., 2008 CrLJ 3950 (SC).
78 Uday Kumar Pandharinath Jadhav alias Munna v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 CrLJ 2627 (SC).
Page 103 of 133
79 Tinna v. State, 2008 CrLJ 3230 (All).
80 Shib Prasad Mahato v. State, 2008 CrLJ 3347 (Jhar).
81 State v. Jethu, 2008 CrLJ 3113 (Utt). Accused struck only once but it proved fatal. Conviction under Section 302 was
altered to one under Section 304,Angada Khatua v. State, 2008 CrLJ 3484 (Ori).
82 Daya Nand v. State of Haryana, 2008 CrLJ 2975 (SC).
83 Shivasahai Singh v. State of M.P,, 1985 CrLJ 730 : (1984) 1 Crimes 933 [LNIND 1983 MP 84].
84 State of Maharashtra v. Bhairu Sattu Berad, AIR 1956 Bom 609 [LNIND 1956 BOM 55]: 1956 CrLJ 1066.
85 Dulu Gogoi v. State of Assam, 1991 CrLJ 199 (Gau). The accused gave a lathi blow on head of the deceased which
resulted in his death. The manner in which assault had taken place clearly exhibited the intention of accused to kill the
deceased. The conviction for murder was held proper and fact that death occurred little later could not disprove the
intention on part of the accused, Jeeva v. State, 1995 CrLJ 3300 (Raj).
86 Shivasharanappa v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705 [LNIND 2013 SC 495] : 2013 CrLJ 2658 (SC).
87 D.P.P. v. Smith, (1961) AC 290 (HL) : (1960) 3 All ER 161 (HL). This decision was criticised intensely which led to the
passage of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967.
88 J.P. Lal v. State, 1995 CrLJ 1715 (Del). The accused inflicted injuries with razor in order to cause the death of
deceased. It was held that offence of murder was made out, Mukesh alias Muki v. State, 1995 CrLJ 1769 (Del).
89 Dalip Kumar alias Pinki v. State, 1995 CrLJ 1742 (Del).
90 Sellamuttu v. State, 1995 CrLJ 2143 (Mad).
91 Juthel v. State, 1995 CrLJ 2909 (SC) : (1996) 11 SCC 282 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 190.
92 Abdul Hamid v. State, 1995 CrLJ 2594 (Del).
93 Inder Singh v. State, 1995 CrLJ 2627 (SC) : 1995 Supp (2) SCC 124. The accused gave an axe blow on the head of
deceased and he was convicted for causing his death intentionally, Kheta v. State, 1995 CrLJ 3302 (Raj). The
altercation took place over the payment of bill and accused having a knife in his possession attacked the deceased and
killed him. It was held that offence of murder was made out, Sanjay Ram Chandra Tarure v. State, 1995 CrLJ 713
(Bom).
94 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lakhan, 1997 (9) SCC 679 [LNINDORD 1997 SC 53] : 1997 (2) Crimes 67 (SC) : 1997 SCC
(Cri) 747.
95 Rohtas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 2444 [LNIND 1997 SC 772]: 1997 (2) Crimes 74 (SC) : 1997 SCC (Cri)
627.
1 Note M-P-54-55.
2 Gunga Singh, (1873) 5 NWP 44.
3 Smith’s Case, (1865) L & C 607, 624.
4 R. Venkalu, AIR 1956 SC 171 : 1956 CrLJ 338.
5 Mohinder Singh v. State (Delhi), 1991 CrLJ 739 (SC) : 1991 Supp (2) SCC 715 : AIR 1991 SC 1045 [ LNIND 1991 SC
426].
6 State of U.P. v. Ram Kishan, 1991 CrLJ 895 (All). Also see Ram Pal v. State, 1996 CrLJ 2374 (HP) where accused
was charged under Section 300 and pleaded that he attacked the deceased as he was beating his father. The occasion
was such that he got provoked and committed the crime. It was held that there was no occasion for grave and sudden
provocation and accused was convicted under Section 304 as there was nothing on record to establish the pre-
meditation on the part of the accused. Where co-accused was acquitted and there was discripancy in evidence of the
eye witness, the conviction of accused was altered from under Section 302 to under Section 326,see also, Ashok v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, 1995 CrLJ 2861 (AP).
7 Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P., 1989 CrLJ 2520 (HP).
8 Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 2122 : 1989 CrLJ 115 : (1988) 1 SCJ 279 : (1988) 2 Cr LC 188 : 1988
SCC (Cri) 264.
Page 104 of 133
9 Motilal Chouthiprasad Varma v. State, 2007 CrLJ 561 (Bom).
10 Dharam v. State of Haryana, 2007 CrLJ 791 (SC). There was no intention to cause death and accused was convicted
under Section 304 Part II, Motilal v. State, 2007 CrLJ 837 (Bom) ; Raj Kumar Chaudhary v. State, 2007 CrLJ 1186
(Gau).
11 Kitherian v. State, 1999 CrLJ 2405 (Mad) ; also see Velu alias Chima Veerakumaran v. State, 1997 CrLJ 433 (Mad)
where intention to kill was established and accused was convicted.
12 Hassan Murtaza v. State of Haryana, 1999 CrLJ 3446 (P&H).
13 Baban Ramaji Choudhary v. State, 1999 CrLJ 4338 (Bom).
14 Khyala Meena v. State, 1997 CrLJ 567 (Raj) ; also see Pyare v. State, 1999 CrLJ 1065 (Raj) where death was caused
intentionally and accused was held guilty of the murder.
15 Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715 [LNIND 2014 SC 253] : 2014 (3) SCALE 598 [LNIND 2014 SC
253] ; Ashok v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 CrLJ 2036 : 2015 (3) 530 : (2015) 4 SCC3 93; See Raghuvendra v. State of
M.P. 2015 CrLJ 1159 : 2015 (1) SCALE 61 [LNINDU 2015 SC 2] : (2015) 2 SCC 259 [LNINDU 2015 SC 2] where
Supreme Court accepted the last seen theory and conviction of accused upheld. See also Revutappa v. State of
Karnataka, AIR 2014 SC 1262 [LNIND 2014 SC 52]: 2014 CrLJ 1460 : 2014 (1) SCALE 591 [LNIND 2014 SC 52] ;
Tara Singh v. State thr. Home Secretary, Uttarakhand, 2014 (3) SCALE 367 [LNINDU 2014 SC 18] : 2014 CrLJ 2154;
Mahavir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2014 CrLJ 3228 : 2014 (7) SCALE 477 : (2014) 6 SCC 716 [LNIND 2014 SC 1079].
16 Laxman Das Mangal Das Manik Puri v. State, 1997 CrLJ 950 (Bom).
17 Appadurai v. State, 1997 CrLJ 2349 (Mad).
18 Ramakrishnan Nair alias Raju v. State, 2000 CrLJ 416 (Ker).
19 Foja Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1993 CrLJ 2657 (Raj).
20 Mithailal v. State of Maharashtra , 1993 CrLJ Bom (3580).
21 Shivaji Dattu Patil v. State, 1994 CrLJ 1189 (Bom).
22 Chinnam Chandrai v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1994 CrLJ 1210 (SC) : AIR 1994 SC 959 . The accused was acquitted
of charge of murder where only witness was his own 5 years old daughter, Arbind Singh v. State of Bihar, 1994 CrLJ
1227 (SC) : AIR 1994 SC 1068 : 1995 Supp (4) SCC 416.
23 Abdul Ise Suleman v. State of Gujarat, 1995 CrLJ 464 (SC). Also see Devaramni Bhllmanna v. State of Karnataka,
1995 CrLJ 1534 (SC), where several injuries found on body of deceased including incised injury clearly indicated
intention of accused to cause the murder, the conviction of accused was held proper.
24 M. Labhu Ram v. State of Punjab, 1996 CrLJ 399 (SC) : 1996 AIR SCW 4172 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 15; also see Sri Sat
Pal v. State of Punjab, 1996 CrLJ 406 (SC) : AIR 1996 SC 201 [LNIND 1995 SC 888].
25 Panney Singh v. State, 1996 CrLJ 3931 (Raj).
26 Gopal Singh v. State, 2006 CrLJ 2743 (HP).
27 Jayanand Nautiyal v. State, 2006 CrLJ 2823 (Utt). In Pema Tamang v. State, 2006 CrLJ 2999 (Sikk) The accused after
beheading placed the head on rooftop of hencoop. Intention was clear and none of the Exceptions to Section 300 could
be applied in his case and conviction for murder was held proper.
28 Settu v. State of T.N., 2006 CrLJ 3889 (SC). Almost on similar ground benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 was not
applied and conviction for murder was upheld, Pulicherla Nagaraju Alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P., 2006 CrLJ
3899 (SC).
29 B.N. Srikantiah v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 672 [LNIND 1958 SC 49]: 1958 CrLJ 1251 : 1958 SCJ 918 [LNIND
1958 SC 49]. Also see Chilamakur v. State of A.P., AIR 1977 SC 1998 : 1977 CrLJ 1602.
30 State v. Raja Parida, (1971) 37 Cut LT 667.
31 Narendra Nath Panigrahi v. State of Orissa, 1985 CrLJ (NOC) 8 (Ori).
32 Laxman Prasad v. State of M.P,, (1987) 2 Crimes 514 (MP).
33 State of M.P. v. Shaligram, 1971 MPLJ 450.

Page 105 of 133
34 Bhaskar Mallick v. State of Orissa, 1970 CrLJ 1196 : (1968) 10 Ori JD 157.
35 Ram Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1970 Raj 60 [LNIND 1969 RAJ 152]: 1970 CrLJ 486 : ILR (1969) 19 Raj 626
[LNIND 1969 RAJ 152]: 1969 Raj LW 610.
36 Guleshwar Pasban v. State, 2007 CrLJ 4588 (Pat).
37 Anant Chintaman Lagu, (1959) 62 Bom LR 371 (SC); Mohan, AIR 1960 SC 659 : 1960 CrLJ 1011 : (1960) 2 Ker LR
14 ; Kaushalya Dei, AIR 1965 Ori 38 [LNIND 1964 ORI 72].
38 Ramgopal, 1972 CrLJ 473 (SC) : (1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC 656 .
39 Arundhati, 1968 CrLJ 848.
40 Nilmadhub Sircar, (1865) 3 WR (Cr) 22.
41 Sheikh Choollye, (1865) 4 WR (Cr) 35.
42 Muniandi Servai, (1944) Mad 818.
43 Gauri Shankar, (1918) 40 All 360.
44 Hukum Singh, (1961) 11 Raj 134; Pran Krishna, AIR 1935 Cal 580 SB dissented from.
45 Tulsha, (1897) 20 All 143; Minai, (1940) Nag 125.
46 Nanhu, (1923) 45 All 557.
47 Gutali, (1908) 31 All 148; Shetya, (1926) 28 Bom LR 1003; Bhagwan Din, (1908) 30 All 568, in which under similar
circumstances it was held that the act amounted to grievous hurt, not followed.
48 Bhagava, (1916) 19 Bom LR 54.
49 Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19]: 1958 SCR 1495 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] : 1958
CrLJ 818; Jayaraj v. State of T.N,, AIR 1976 SC 1519 : 1976 CrLJ 1186 : (1976) 2 SCC 788, followed in re,
Thunicharan, 1991 CrLJ 1318 (1323).
50 State of Orissa v. Ratnakar Sahu, (1979) 47 Cut LT 439 (445).
51 Morcha v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1979 SC 80 [LNIND 1978 SC 243]: 1978 CrLJ 1710 : 1978 Mad WN 253 : 1979
SCC (Cri) 241 [LNIND 1978 SC 243] : (1979) 1 SCC 161 [LNIND 1978 SC 243].
52 Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 126 : (1981) 4 SCC 245 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 826;Chenda @ Chanda Ram v.
State of Chhatisgarh, 2014 CrLJ 172 : 2013 (10) SCALE 637 [LNIND 2013 SC 773] : (2013) 12 SCC 110 [LNIND 2013
SC 773].
53 Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125]: 1966 CrLJ 1509 : 1966 Supp SCC 230 ;
Harjinder Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 867 [LNIND 1967 SC 324]: 1968 CrLJ 1023 : (1968) 2 SCR 246
[LNIND 1967 SC 324].
54 Hanumappa Vimappa v. State of Mysore, 1966 Cr App R 381 (SC).
55 State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal, 1980 Crlr (Raj) 574 : 1980 Raj LW 159.
56 State of Rajasthan v. Hukma, 1980 Crlr (Raj) 237.
57 Bhartia v. State of Rajasthan, 1980 Crlr (Raj) 476.
58 Laxman v. State of Rajasthan, 1975 WLN 243.
59 Gurdar Dusadh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 952 : 1972 CrLJ 587 : 1972 SCD 799 : 1972 Mad LJ (Cr) 608 : (1972) 3
SCC 118.
60 R. v. Vickers, (1957) 2 QB 664 CA. English Homicide Act 1957 has (vide Section I) brought changes in this respect and
if person commits murder in furtherance of other offence he will not be guilty of murder.
61 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, (1960) 3 All ER 161 HL : (1961) AC 290. The Court explained that express
malice means intention to kill and implied malice means an intention to cause grievous bodily harm which in turn means
really serious bodily harm. The Court also said that R. v. Vickers , ibid was wrongly decided.
Page 106 of 133
62 R. v. Cunningham, (1982) AC 566 (HL), (1981) 2 All ER 863. This was the case in which it was finally settled beyond
doubt that an intention to cause grievous bodily harm to another constitutes malice afore thought.
63 Attorney General’s ref. (No. 3 of 1994), (1998) AC 245 : (1997) 3 All ER 936 HL : (1997) 3 WLR 421.
64 Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1978 SC 1420 : 1978 CrLJ 1413 : 1978 SC Cr R 217 : 1978 Cr LR (SC) 150 :
1978 Cr App R (SC) 200 : (1979) 1 SCC 135.
65 Sudershan Kumar v. State of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2328 [LNIND 1974 SC 333]: 1975 CrLJ 16 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 250
[LNIND 1974 SC 333] : (1975) 3 SCC 831 [LNIND 1974 SC 333].
66 Aditya Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 2110 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 133 : (1979) 4 SCC 563 : 1980 CrLJ 1475.
67 State of Haryana with Col. A.S. Saharan v. Manoj Kumar, 1993 CrLJ 3839 (SC) : 1993 AIR SCW 3785 : (1994) 1
Crimes 102 : (1994) 1 SCC 495 [LNIND 1993 SC 927] : AIR 1994 SC 147 [LNIND 1993 SC 927].
68 Kamta Prasad v. State of U.P., 1994 CrLJ 1202 (SC) : AIR 1994 SC 1519 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 290.
69 Sreedharan Satheesan Kuzhivila Veedu v. State, 1995 CrLJ 1782 (Ker).
70 Thamilarsan v. State, 1996 CrLJ 274 (Mad).
71 Sawinder Singh v. State, 1996 CrLJ 3205 (P&H).
72 Bakhtawar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1979 SC 1006 [LNIND 1978 SC 289]: 1979 CrLJ 883 : (1979) 4 SCC 698 [LNIND
1978 SC 289] : (1979) 2 SCJ 267.
73 Bharwad Bhikha v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1977 SC 1768 : 1977 CrLJ 1160 : (1977) 3 SCC 221 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 492.
74 Mohon Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1800 : 1977 CrLJ 1447 ; Narayanan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1977 SC
2308 [LNIND 1977 SC 278]: 1977 CrLJ 1946 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 578 [LNIND 1977 SC 278] : (1977) 4 SCC 301 [LNIND
1977 SC 278] : 1977 Cr LR (SC) 460 : 1977 Cr App R (SC) 337.
75 M.G. Badawans v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1756 : 1977 CrLJ 1148 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 470 : 1977 SC Cr R
380 : (1977) 3 SCC 264 : 1977 UJ (SC) 376.
76 State of Bihar v. Pashupati Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2699 [LNIND 1973 SC 284]: 1973 CrLJ 1832 : (1974) 3 SCC 376
[LNIND 1973 SC 284].
77 Jai Prakash v. State Delhi Admn., (1991) 1 Crimes 474 (SC) : (1991) 2 SCC 32 [LNIND 1991 SC 963] : 1991 SCC (Cri)
299; Kallu v. State of M.P., 1991 (3) Crimes 787 (MP) : 1992 CrLJ 2380.
78 Brij Bhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 474 : 1957 CrLJ 591.
79 Bishwanath Dusadh v. State of Bihar, 1991 CrLJ 108 (Pat).
80 Zala Chandubha Hematsinh v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 242 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 52 [LNIND 1996 SC 1081].
81 Kashmiri Lal v. State of Punjab, 1996 CrLJ 4452 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1345 : 1996 (3) Crimes 212 (SC) : 1996 (10) SCC
471 [LNIND 1996 SC 1356].
82 Suchand Bouri v. State of W.B., 2009 CrLJ 2840 (SC) : 2009 (5) SCALE 478 [LNIND 2009 SC 797].
83 Mahendra Alias Malio Bachubhai v. State, 2006 CrLJ 4797 (Guj). In Dineshbhai Alias Diliyo Harmanbhai Chauhan v.
State, 2006 CrLJ 4789 (Guj) injuries were caused by knife blows and conviction was upheld.
84 Tapubhai Ravatbhai Kathi v. State, 2006 CrLJ 4443 (Guj).
85 Sait v. State of T.N,, 1989 CrLJ 2050 (Mad) : (1989) 2 Crimes 616 [LNIND 1988 MAD 500].
86 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Indrajeet, (2000) 7 SCC 249 [LNIND 2000 SC 1148] : 2000 (3) Crimes 184 : 2000 CrLJ 4663 :
AIR 2000 SC 3158 [LNIND 2000 SC 1148].
87 Abor Ahmed, (1937) Ran 384 (FB).
88 Ummen Chacko v. State of Kerala, 1989 CrLJ NOC 76 : (1988) 18 Law Reports 339.
89 Kanriya Dangi v. State, 2007 CrLJ 3073 (MP).
90 Basant Singh v. State, 2007 CrLJ 3477 (MP).
91 Ram Singh v. State, 2007 CrLJ 3052 (Del).

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92 State (Delhi Adm.) v. Narain Singh, 2007 CrLJ 3346 (Del).
93 State of Karnataka v. Mohd. Nazeer, 2003 CrLJ 1240 (SC).
94 Shankarrao Bhimrao Sarnaik v. State, 2003 CrLJ 2425 (Bom) : 2003 All MR (CW) 251. The co-accused were acquitted
as they had not shared intention to cause death.
95 State of Karnataka v. Shivalingaiah, AIR 1988 SC 115 [LNIND 2012 DEL 2078]: 1988 CrLJ 394 : 1988 Supp SCC 533.
1 Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 628 [LNIND 1988 SC 65]: 1988 CrLJ 866 : (1988) 1 SCC 712 [LNIND
1988 SC 65].
2 Virsa Singh, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19]: (1958) SCR 1495 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] ; Rajwant Singh, AIR 1966
SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125].
3 Narendran Nair v. State of Kerala, 1989 CrLJ NOC 182 (Ker) : (1989) 2 Crimes 526 : (1989) 2 Ker LJ 98.
4 State of Maharashtra v. Arun Savalram Pagare, 1989 CrLJ 1918 (Bom) : (1989) 1 Bom Cr 210.
5 Faquira v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 All 321 [LNIND 1954 ALL 153]: 1955 CrLJ 884.
6 Shiv v. State of M.P,, (1988) 3 Crimes 8.
7 Shiv v. State of M.P,, (1988) 3 Crimes 8.
8 Hardev Bhanji Joshi v. State of Gujarat, 1992 SCC (Cri) 482 [LNIND 1992 SC 322] : 1992 Suppl (2) SCC 561. Where in
a sudden quarrel injury was inflicted which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, conviction of
accused under Section 302 was attested to one under Section 304 Part II as case was covered under Exception 4 to
Section 300,Raj Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2005 CrLJ 3883 (Del).
9 Hari Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2008 CrLJ 821 (SC).
10 Gurdev Raj v. State of Punjab, 2008 CrLJ 382 (SC).
11 Bhagat Ram v. State, 2008 CrLJ 3276 (HP).
12 Brihaspati Mahali v. State, 2008 CrLJ 3659 (Cal).
13 Bijoy Das v. State of West Bengal, 2008 CrLJ 1808 (SC).
14 Anda, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75]: 1966 CrLJ 171.
15 Rajwant Singh, supra.
16 Vijay Bhagvan Jadhav v. State, 2005 CrLJ 4210 (Bom). Mere injuries caused were sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death.
17 Karu Marik v. State of Bihar, 2001 CrLJ 2615 (SC) : (2001) 5 SCC 284 [LNIND 2001 SC 1221] : 2001 SCC (Cri) 852
[LNIND 2001 SC 1221] : AIR 2001 SC 2266 [LNIND 2001 SC 1221]; also see Chander Mohan v. State, 2001 CrLJ
2636 (Del), where accused was convicted for committing the murder of his wife as eye-witness account was found
reliable and trustworthy.
18 Chakali Sreenu v. State, 2005 CrLJ 4406 (AP).
19 Gajanan v. State, 2001 CrLJ 3592 (Kant). The accused were charged under Sections 304 and 323 but genesis of
occurrence was suppressed by the prosecution and conviction was set aside, Gul Lone v. State, 2001 CrLJ 3518
(J&K).
20 Madhu Rana v. State, 2001 CrLJ NOC 56 (Ori).
21 Bashapaka Laxmaiah v. State, 2001 CrLJ 4066 (AP). The conviction of accused was altered from under Section 302 to
one under Section 304 where accused had committed murder without any pre-meditation, Chhala Munda v. State, 2001
CrLJ NOC 111 (Ori).
22 Addha v. State of M.P., 2001 CrLJ 4675 (SC) : (2001) 9 SCC 488 [LNIND 2001 SC 2184] : AIR 2001 SC 3973 [LNIND
2001 SC 2184].
23 Babulal Beharilal, (1945) Nag 931; State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu, 1995 CrLJ 1432 (Bom), attack on head with blunt
side of pick- axe, fracture of skull bone, instant death, murder under Clause ‘Thirdly’ to Section 300. Another similar
conviction under this Clause was in Philip Bhimsent v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 CrLJ 1694 (Bom), four injuries in
Page 108 of 133
head region, extensive internal damage and fracture of all the main bones of the head. Bharat Singh v. State of
Rajasthan, 1995 CrLJ 841 (Raj), repeated sword blows with great force, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. The accused inflicted dagger blows on the chest and abdomen of a man resulting in his death, injuries
caused were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course, knowledge and intention to cause death could be inferred
in view of the weapon used and the vital part of the body selected for assault and the force used without any
provocation, rightly convicted for murder. Yunus v. State, 1995 CrLJ 3205 (Del). The accused armed with axes and
‘lathis' caused multiple injuries on the vital parts of the body of the deceased resulting in the fracture of his skull and the
brain oozing out and his face disfigured, injuries were held to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature, rightly convicted for murder. Prabhudas v. State of Maharashtra, 1996 CrLJ 618 (Bom), distinguishing Chultan
v. State of M.P,, 1994 (1) Crimes 230 : AIR 1994 SC 1398 : 1994 CrLJ 2097 : 1994 AIR SCW 816. State of Karnataka
v. Madagal Sab, 2002 CrLJ 3992 (Kant) : 2003 (2) Karlj 358 [LNIND 2002 KANT 283], where the doctor did not state
whether injuries were necessarily fatal, the Court said that the fact that the victim died on the spot on sustaining injuries
was sufficient to hold that the injuries were necessarily fatal. In this case there was group fight errupting suddenly. Both
sides sustained injuries, but only one side multiple injuries. Punishment was awarded under Section 304 Part I.
24 Mangesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 123 [LNIND 2011 SC 20].
25 Arjun Naik v. State, 2002 CrLJ 2785 (Ori). Injuries caused with iron gupti were sufficient to cause death and conviction
was upheld; Bipin Bihari Nand Tiwari v. State, 2002 CrLJ 2501 (Jhar) : 2002 AIR HCR 496.
26 Mahesh Tewari v. State, 2002 CrLJ 2711 (All) : 2002 (44) All Crim C 834 : 2002 (3) Crimes 172. Also See Ranbeer
Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors, 2015 CrLJ 2311 : 2015 (4) SCALE 31
27 Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, 2011 (6) SCALE 322 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 397] : 2011 AIR (SCW) 6754 : 2012 CrLJ
665; In Arun Nivalaji More v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2006 SC 2886 [LNIND 2006 SC 591]: JT 2006 (7) SC 299
[LNIND 2006 SC 591]: 2006 (12) SCC 613 - where the injury had been caused in the stomach which was a vital part of
the body, it could be said that the injury had been caused with the intention of causing death in the background of the
facts that preparations for the attack on the deceased had earlier been made.
28 State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal, (2012) 4 SCC 564 [LNIND 2012 SC 199] : AIR 2012 SC 1595 [LNIND 2012 SC 199]:
2012 CrLJ 2084.
29 Arun Nivalaji More v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 CrLJ 4057 (SC).
30 State of A.P. v. R. Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976 SC 331]: (1977) 1 SCR 601 [LNIND 1976 SC 331] : 1977
CrLJ 1 : (1976) 4 SCC 382 [LNIND 1976 SC 331].
31 Mohon Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1800 ; Mahadeo Ganpat Badwans v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977
SC 1756 : 1977 CrLJ 1148 ; Bharwad Bhika Nath v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1977 SC 1768 : 1977 CrLJ 1160 : (1977) 3
SCC 221; Mariadashan v. State of T.N,, AIR 1980 SC 573 : 1980 CrLJ 412 : (1980) 3 SCC 68 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 523 :
1980 SC Cr R 178 : 1980 Cr Ap R (SC) 115 : 1980 Cr LR (SC) 177 .
32 Hardev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 179 : 1975 CrLJ 243 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 188 : (1975) 1 SCJ 159 [LNIND
1973 SC 367] : (1975) 3 SCC 731 : (1975) Mad LJ (Cr) 369.
33 Kishore Singh v. State of M.P,, AIR 1977 SC 2267 [LNIND 1977 SC 288]: (1977) 4 SCC 524 [LNIND 1977 SC 288] :
1977 CrLJ 1937.
34 Faquira v. State, AIR 1955 All 321 [LNIND 1954 ALL 153]: 1955 CrLJ 884.
35 Jammu Majhi v. State of Orissa, 1989 CrLJ 753 (Ori).
36 Bhola Bind, (1943) 22 Pat 607.
37 Babulal Beharilal, (1945) Nag 931.
38 Singaram, (1944) Mad 763.
39 Re, Thunnicharam, 1991 CrLJ 1318 (Mad).
40 Pyara Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1976 WLN 729.
41 Gulab Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1974 WLN 168 : 1974 Raj LW 130.
42 Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1466 : (1982) 3 SCC 185 : 1982 CrLJ 1946 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 680.
43 Moti Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 900 [LNIND 1963 SC 14]: (1964) 1 CrLJ 727.
Page 109 of 133
44 Rama Nand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha, 2004 CrLJ 640 (SC) : (2003) 12 SCC 606 [LNIND 2003 SC 932] : AIR 2004 SC
1053 [LNIND 2003 SC 932]. Similarly accused was convicted for murder where act of accused was not covered under
any one of exceptions to Section 300,Ankula Sadananda Behara v. State, 2004 CrLJ NOC 24 (AP).
45 Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1552 [LNIND 1981 SC 280]: 1981 CrLJ 1136 : (1981) 3 SCC 616
[LNIND 1981 SC 280] : 1981 SCC (Cri) 768 [LNIND 1981 SC 280].
46 Prabhu v. State of M.P., 1991 CrLJ 1373 (SC) : 1991 Supp (2) SCC 725 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 56.
47 Atmaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 5 SCC 738 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 403] : 2012 CrLJ 2882 : 2012 (5)
SCALE 300 [LNIND 2012 SC 309]relied on Anda & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC
75]: 1966 CrLJ 171; Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr., (1976) 4 SCC 382 [LNIND 1976 SC 331] : AIR
1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976 SC 331].
48 Virsa Singh, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19], (1958) SCR 1495 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] ; Rajwant Singh, AIR 1966
SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125]: 1966 CrLJ 1509. Khachar Dipu v. State of Gujarat, 2013 (4) SCC 322 [LNIND 2013
SC 278] : 2013 (5) SCALE 337 [LNIND 2013 SC 278].
49 Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2012 (8) SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 425] : [2012] 7 SCR 160.
50 Rayavarapu Punnayya (supra), Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of U.P., 2007 (14) SCC 660 [LNIND 2007 SC 1509] :
AIR 2008 SC 780 [LNIND 2007 SC 1509].
51 Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2011 (9) SCC 462 [LNIND 2011 SC 844].
52 Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab, 1979 (3) SCC 30 : AIR 1979 SC 577 .
53 Khachar Dipu v. State of Gujarat, 2013 (4) SCC 322 [LNIND 2013 SC 278] : 2013 (5) SCALE 337 [LNIND 2013 SC
278].
54 Madhu v. State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399 [LNIND 2012 SC 25] : AIR 2012 SC 664 [LNIND 2012 SC 25]: 2012 CrLJ
1230.
55 Umesh Singh v. State of Bihar, 2013 (4) SCC 360 [LNIND 2013 SC 227] : 2013 CrLJ 2116 : AIR 2013 SC 1743
[LNIND 2013 SC 227]; Gajoo v. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 CrLJ 88 : 2012 (9) SCC 532 [LNIND 2012 SC 566] ; Kuria
v. State of Rajasthan, 2012 CrLJ 4707 : (2012) 10 SCC 433 [LNIND 2012 SC 678] ; Darbara Singh v. State of Punjab,
2012 CrLJ 4757 : 2012 (8) SCALE 649 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] : (2012) 10 SCC 476 [LNIND 2012 SC 545].
56 Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 10 SCC 259 [LNIND 2010 SC 872] : (2010) 3 SCC(Cri) 1262, Ram
Narain Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1727 [LNIND 1975 SC 210]: (1975) 4 SCC 497 [LNIND 1975 SC 210] ;
State of Haryana v. Bhagirath & Ors., (1999) 5 SCC 96 [LNIND 1999 SC 541] : AIR 1999 SC 2005 [LNIND 1999 SC
541]; Thaman Kumar v. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh, (2003) 6 SCC 380 [LNIND 2003 SC 507] : AIR 2003 SC
3975 [LNIND 2003 SC 507]; and Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56 [LNIND 2003 SC 587] : AIR 2003 SC 2978
[LNIND 2003 SC 587]; Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 484 [LNIND 1983 SC 69]: (1983)
2 SCC 174 [LNIND 1983 SC 69] ; Mani Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P., 1994 Supp (2) SCC 289 : 1994 (2) SCALE 970;
Khambam Raja Reddy & Anr. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 239 [LNIND 2006 SC 753] : AIR
2006 SC 3236 [LNIND 2006 SC 753]; and State of U.P. v. Dinesh, (2009) 11 SCC 566 [LNIND 2009 SC 454] : [2009] 3
SCR 1175 [LNIND 2009 SC 454]. State of U.P. v. Hari Chand, (2009) 13 SCC 542 [LNIND 2009 SC 1039] : 2009 (6)
SCALE 605 [LNIND 2009 SC 1039] ; In Sayed Darain Ahsan v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 4 SCC 352 [LNIND 2012
SC 197] : AIR 2012 SC 1286 [LNIND 2012 SC 197]: 2012 CrLJ 1980, it is found the medical evidence does not go so
far as to rule out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true and hence the ocular evidence cannot be disbelieved.
57 Sunil Kundu v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 4 SCC 422 [LNIND 2013 SC 1135] : 2013 CrLJ 2339 (SC). In Anjani
Chaudhary, (2011) 2 SCC 747 [LNIND 2010 SC 1048] : AIR 2011 SC 292 [LNIND 2010 SC 1048], where the medical
evidence did not support the appellant’s presence as there was no injury on the deceased which could be caused by a
lathi and the appellant was stated to be carrying a lathi. Since the eye-witnesses therein were not found to be reliable,
Supreme Court acquitted the appellant therein. See Ganesh Datt v. State of Uttarakhand AIR 2014 SC 2521 [LNIND
2014 SC 186]: 2014 CrLJ 3128 - Where ocular testimony with respect to the assault is inconsistent with the medical
evidence, Accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. In Kapildeo Mandal, (2008) 16 SCC 99 [LNIND 2007 SC 1390] : AIR
2008 SC 533 [LNIND 2007 SC 1390], all the eye-witnesses had categorically stated that the deceased was injured by
the use of firearm, whereas the medical evidence specifically indicated that no firearm injury was found on the
deceased. Court held that, when the evidence of the eye-witnesses is totally inconsistent with the evidence given by the
medical experts then evidence is appreciated in a different perspective by the courts. It was observed that when
medical evidence specifically rules out the injury claimed to have been inflicted as per the eye-witnesses’ version, then
Page 110 of 133
the Court can draw adverse inference that the prosecution version is not trustworthy. Dayal Singh v. State of
Uttaranchal, (2012) 8 SCC 263 [LNIND 2012 SC 458] : 2012 CrLJ 4323 : AIR 2012 SC 3046 [LNIND 2012 SC 458],
where the eye witness account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities
may not be accepted as conclusive; Lallan Chaubey v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 241 [LNIND 2010 SC 1064]: 2011
CrLJ 280 : (2011) 3 SCC(Cri) 854, on facts, no inconsistency between ocular and medical evidence.
58 Rahalad Patel v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 4 SCC 262 [LNIND 2011 SC 250] : AIR 2011 SC 961 [LNIND 2011
SC 250].
59 Bhagwati Prasad v. State of M.P., (2010) 1 SCC 697 [LNIND 2009 SC 2058] : 2009 (14) SCALE 314 [LNIND 2009 SC
2058] : AIR 2010 SC 349 [LNIND 2009 SC 2058]: 2010 CrLJ 528.
60 State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh, (2004) 12 SCC 546 [LNIND 2003 SC 1120] : AIR 2004 SC 1264 [LNIND 2003 SC
1120]: 2004 CrLJ 931.
61 Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 4 SCC 37 [LNIND 2012 SC 158] : AIR 2012 SC 1377
[LNIND 2012 SC 158]: 2012 CrLJ. 1917.
62 Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 404] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 1917 : AIR 2012
SC 1357 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 404]: 2012 CrLJ. 1898.
63 Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 CrLJ 3825 : AIR 2012 SC
3539 [LNIND 2012 SC 397]; See Maqbool v. State of A.P., (2010) 8 SCC 359 [LNINDORD 2010 SC 129] ; 2011 CrLJ
655 : AIR 2011 SC 184 [LNIND 2010 SC 588], in which it is held that failure of investigating officer to collect bood
stained earth, emptied from the place of occurrence is not fatal.
64 Sheo Shankar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 3 SCC 654 [LNIND 2011 SC 180] : AIR 2011 SC 1403 [LNIND
2011 SC 180]: 2011 CrLJ 2139.
65 Dasser Bhooyan, (1867) 8 WR (Cr) 71.
66 Hamid, (1903) 2 LBR 63; Sunnumuduli, (1946) 25 Pat 335.
67 Rahman, (1938) 20 Lah 77.
68 Rajwant Singh, supra.
69 State of Bihar v. Pasupati Singh, 1973 CrLJ 2699 (SC) : (1974) 3 SCC 376 [LNIND 1973 SC 284] : 1973 SCC (Cri)
1026.
70 Kishan, 1974 CrLJ 324 (SC) : (1974) 3 SCC 623 [LNIND 1973 SC 345] : AIR 1974 SC 244 [LNIND 1973 SC 345].
71 Laxman, 1974 CrLJ 1271 (SC) : (1974) 3 SCC 490 : AIR 1974 SC 1803 .
72 Sudarshan Kumar, 1975 CrLJ 16 (SC).
73 V. Shekhar v. State of Karnataka, 1991 CrLJ 1100 (Kant).
74 Banta Singh v. State of Punjab, 1991 CrLJ 1342 (SC) : AIR 1991 SC 1379 .
75 Bharwad Bhikha, 1977 CrLJ 1160 (SC); see also Mohan Singh, 1977 CrLJ 1447 (SC); Rajinder Singh, 1978 CrLJ 1413
(SC); Bakhtawar, 1979 CrLJ 883 (SC); Aditya Mohapatra, 1980 CrLJ 1475 (SC).
76 Jagrup Singh, 1981 CrLJ 1136 (SC) : AIR 1981 SC 1552 [LNIND 1981 SC 280]: (1981) 3 SCC 616 [LNIND 1981 SC
280].
77 Jagrup Singh, 1981 CrLJ 1136 (SC) : AIR 1981 SC 1552 [LNIND 1981 SC 280]: (1981) 3 SCC 616 [LNIND 1981 SC
280]. Similarly sudden fight between accused and deceased was unpremeditated and conviction was altered from
Section 302 to one under Section 304,Arun Kumar v. State, 2005 CrLJ 4704 (P&H).
78 Patel Rasiklal Becharbhai v. State of Gujarat, 1993 Suppl (1) SCC 217 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 252 : AIR 1992 SC 1150 .
79 Ankeri v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 CrLJ 947 : AIR 1994 SC 842 [LNIND 1993 SC 678]: 1994 Supp (2) SCC 697.
80 Venkatachalaiah v. State, 2001 CrLJ 1433 (Kar).
81 Ramashraya v. State of M.P., 2001 CrLJ 1452 (SC) : (2001) 3 SCC 439 [LNIND 2001 SC 533] : AIR 2001 SC 1129
[LNIND 2001 SC 533].
82 Lakha Singh v. State, 1994 CrLJ 2952 (Raj).

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83 Bharat Singh v. State, 1995 CrLJ 841 (Raj) ; also see Chunni Lal v. State, 1995 CrLJ 1046 (Raj) where accused was
not convicted under Section 302 as injuries caused to the deceased were not sufficient to cause his death.
84 Prabhu Das alias Babu v. State, 1996 CrLJ 618 (Bom). The accused gave a blow on head of deceased with the axe
and medical evidence showed that injuries to brain were sufficient to cause the death of deceased and eye witness
account was reliable and proper. The conviction of accused for murder was held proper, Meleka Nidi v. State, 1996
CrLJ 3304 (Ori).
85 George v. State, 1996 CrLJ 3868 (Bom).
86 Harish Kumar v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1994 SCC (Cri) 581 : AIR 1993 SC 973 [LNIND 1992 SC 100]: 1993 CrLJ 411 :
1994 Supp (1) SCC 462.
87 Pirthi v. State of Haryana, 1994 SCC (Cri) 402 : AIR 1994 SC 1582 : 1994 CrLJ 2187 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC 498.
88 Devraj v. State of Punjab, 1992 (1) Crimes 980 : AIR 1992 SC 950 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 519 : 1992 CrLJ 1292.
89 Ranchhodbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 1994 CrLJ 2099 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 265.
90 Chanda Jivanji Chelaji v. State of Gujarat, 2001 CrLJ 3299 (SC) : (2002) 9 SCC 576.
91 State of Karnataka v. Vedanayagam, 1995 (1) SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 231 : 1994 (3) Crimes 1017; Jai Prakash v.
State (Delhi Admn.), (1991) 2 SCC 32 [LNIND 1991 SC 963] : 1991 SCC (Cri) 299 : 1991 (1) Crimes 474.
1 Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1552 [LNIND 1981 SC 280]: 1981 CrLJ 1136 : (1981) 3 SCC 616
[LNIND 1981 SC 280]observed.
2 Gudur Dosadh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 952 : 1972 CrLJ 587 : (1972) 3 SCC 118; Chahat Khan v. State of
Haryana, AIR 1972 SC 2574 : 1973 CrLJ 36 : (1972) 3 SCC 408.
3 Aditya Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 2110 : 1980 CrLJ 1475 : (1979) 4 SCC 563.
4 Byvarapu Raju v. State of Andhar Pradesh, 2007 CrLJ 3204 (SC).
5 Mahendra Meena v. State, 2007 CrLJ 3495 (Raj). Same was the position in Bhadai Bari v. State, 2007 CrLJ 3287 (Pat)
and accused were convicted under Section 304.
6 Guru Manjhi v. State, 2007 CrLJ 3071 (Ori).
7 Kana Majhi v. State of Orissa, 1985 CrLJ 1876 (Ori).
8 In re, Thunichan, 1991 CrLJ 1318 (Mad).
9 Ashok Kanaujiya v. State of U.P,, 1989 CrLJ (NOC) 79 (All).
10 Bishnu Charan Das v. State of Orissa, 1985 CrLJ 1118 : (1985) 1 Crimes 1069 : (1985) 59 Cut LT 193 : (1985) 1 Ori LR
148.
11 Gokul Parashram v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1441 [LNIND 1981 SC 267]: 1981 CrLJ 1033 : 1981 SCC
(Cri) 731 [LNIND 1981 SC 267] : 1981 Cr LR (SC) 491 : 1981 Cr AP R (SC) 214.
12 Abdul Qadir v. State of Bihar, 1985 CrLJ 1735 (Pat) : 1985 BLJ 552.
13 Ram Chandra Dhondiba Kaware v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 CrLJ 1739 (SC) : AIR 2009 SC 1835 [LNIND 2009 SC
177].
14 Tholan v. State of T.N., 1984 CrLJ 478.
15 Sheo Prosad v. State of U.P,, 1985 CrLJ (NOC) 17 (All) : (1985) 2 Crimes 594 : 1984 All Cr C 318 : 1985 All Cr R 81 :
(1985) 1 All Cr LR 139 : 1984 UP Cr R 240.
16 Babu v. State of Maharashtra, 1980 CrLJ 378 : 1979 Cr LR (Mah) 451 : (1980) 2 Mah LR 96.
17 Dhanyeswar v. State of Maharashtra, 1982 CrLJ 1870.
18 Mangal Hansda v. State of Orissa, 1985 CrLJ 1589 : (1985) 1 Crimes 1032 : (1985) 59 Cut LT 246.
19 Babul Sarkar v. State of Assam, (1987) 1 Crimes 672 (Gau) ; Vinodrai Ramniklal Soni v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1
Crimes 300 (Guj).
20 Chanmu v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 Crimes 205 (All).

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21 State of Maharashtra v. Suresh Bhalchandra Gavade, 1989 CrLJ 1709 (Bom).
22 Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Administration), 1990 CrLJ 2665 (SC) : AIR 1990 SC 2252 : 1990 Supp SCC 291.
23 Kashinath Kisan Bhoye v. State of Maharashtra, 1991 CrLJ 1909 (Bom) : (1991) 2 APLJ 70.
24 Narayan v. State of M.P,, 1992 CrLJ 1157 (MP).
25 Indra Jeet v. State of U.P,, 1992 CrLJ 1179 (All).
26 Shatrughan v. State, 2006 CrLJ 1466 (Chh). In Ram Gopal v. State, 2006 CrLJ 362 (Raj) accused had given single
blow in heat of passion without premeditation as a result of sudden fight. Exception 4 to Section 300 was made
applicable.
27 Pulicherla Nagaraja Alias Nagaraju Reddy v. State of A.P., 2006 CrLJ 3899 (SC). This has been held in Nagaraj v.
State, 2006 CrLJ 3724 (Mad) that intention to kill could be gathered by looking into the circumstances of the case.
28 Abdul Karim Mohd. Shaban v. State, 2006 CrLJ 3658 (Bom).
29 Periyanna Gounder v. State of T.N., (1992) 1 Crimes 157 (Mad).
30 Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi), (1991) 1 Crimes 476 (Del).
31 Kallu v. State of M.P,, (1991) 3 Crimes 787 (MP) : 1992 CrLJ 2380.
32 Uttam Singh v. State of U.P,, 1992 CrLJ 708 (All).
33 Ganga Das alias Godha v. State of Haryana, 1994 CrLJ 237 (SC) : 1994 Suppl (1) SCC 534 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 592.
34 Ramesh Vithal Rao Thakre v. State, 1995 CrLJ 2907 (SC).
35 Md. Salam v. State of M.P,, 1992 CrLJ 1612 (MP).
36 Lakshman, (1888) Unrep Cr C 411.
37 State of Kerala v. Mani alias Chandan, 1992 CrLJ 1682 (Ker).
38 Kapur Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 654 : 1956 CrLJ 1265.
39 Santosh v. State of M.P,, AIR 1975 SC 654 [LNIND 1975 SC 50]: 1975 CrLJ 602 : (1975) 3 SCC 727 [LNIND 1975 SC
50] : 1975 SCC (Cri) 182 [LNIND 1975 SC 50].
40 State of M.P. v. Ram Prasad, AIR 1968 SC 881 [LNIND 1967 SC 358]: 1968 CrLJ 1025.
41 Nga Maung, (1907) 13 Burma LR 330.
42 Judagi Mallah,(1929) 8 Pat 911.
43 Arumugham v. State of T.N,, (1989) 2 Crimes 597 (Mad).
44 Jothi Begum v. State of T.N ., (1989) 3 Crimes 551 (554-555) (Mad) relying on Mani alias Subramanian v. State of
T.N., 1986 Mad LW (Cr) 275.
45 State of M.P v. Ram Prasad, AIR 1968 SC 881 [LNIND 1967 SC 358]: 1968 CrLJ 1025.
46 Pawan Kumar v. State of M.P., 1999 CrLJ 2329 (MP).
47 Rajendra Kumar v. State, 1997 CrLJ 1120 (All) ; Anjanappa v. State of Karnataka, 2014 CrLJ 368 : 2013 (13) SCALE
608 [LNIND 2013 SC 981] : (2014) 2 SCC 776 [LNIND 2013 SC 981].
48 Sunil Kumar v. State, 1997 CrLJ 1081 (Raj).
49 Fatesinh Jehsinh Parmar v. State, 2003 CrLJ NOC 230 (Guj). Medical and eye witness evidence were consistent
showing no difference, the conviction was held proper; Raj Daler v. State, 2003 CrLJ NOC 228 (P&H) : 2003 (2) All Crlr
489.
50 Atrup v. State, 2003 CrLJ 4031 (Raj) : 2003 (3) Raj LR 62.
51 Shiv Singh v. State of U.P., 1975 CrLJ 704.
52 Inder Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC 439 : 1955 CrLJ 1014.
53 Gonchi Rajshekhar Reddy v. State of A.P., 2006 CrLJ 2378 (SC).

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54 Mohd Wahalo Mian v. State, 2006 CrLJ 3938 (Jhar).
55 Gyarsibai v. State of M.B,, 1953 CrLJ 588 : AIR 1953 Madh B 61 : ILR (1953) MB 43.
56 Supadi Lukada v. Emperor, AIR 1925 Bom 310 : 26 CrLJ 1016.
57 Emperor v. Dhiragia, ILR (1940) All 647.
58 Halder v. Crown, AIR 1950 Lah 169 : 51 CrLJ 1368 : Pak Cas 1950 Lah 385.
59 Shyam Behari v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 320 : 1957 CrLJ 416 (SC).
60 Bhola Singh v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1149 (Pat). Neither motive nor intention proved and accused was convicted for
culpable homicide not amounting to murder; Bijjo v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1296 (Raj) : 2005 (1) Crlr (Raj) 601.
61 Krushna Naik v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1343 (Ori) : 2005 (2) Crimes 361.
62 Rakesh Kumar v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1483 (MP) : 2004 (4) MPLJ 502.
63 Kanhai, (1912) 11 ALJR 752; Lati, (1937) Nag 388.
64 Salebhai, (1948) Nag 435.
65 Nanbu v. State of M.B,, AIR 1956 MB 207 : 1956 CrLJ 1078.
66 Gonesh Dooley, (1879) 5 Cal 351.
67 Nga Ba Tu, (1921) 11 LBR 56 : 23 CrLJ 59.
68 Bharat, (1920) 33 CLJ 179.
69 Dhirajia, (1940) All 647.
70 Syed Gani v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 CrLJ 3557 : AIR 2002 SC 2726 [LNIND 2002 SC 454]; Rajan Johnsonhai
Christy, v. State of Gujarat, 1997 CrLJ 3702 (Guj), killing of step-son by accused properly proved.
71 Satni Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 646 [LNIND 2010 SC 121] : 2010 CrLJ 1459.
72 Sau Panchashila Dada Messhram v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 CrLJ 1919 : AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 514 : (2009) 17 SCC
81 [LNIND 2009 SC 2000].
73 Bhagava Giriyappa, (1916) 19 Bom LR 54; Basu, Tanti, AIR 1957 Pat 462 .
74 State v. Basu Tanti, AIR 1957 Pat 462 : 1957 CrLJ 990 followed in Himachal Pradesh v. Shiv Devi, AIR 1959 HP 3
[LNIND 1958 HP 1]: 1959 CrLJ 448.
75 Minal v. Emperor, AIR 1938 Nag 318 : ILR 1940 Nag 125 : 174 IC 286 : 39 CrLJ 405.
76 Amode Ali Sikder v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Cal 757 : 33 CrLJ 79.
77 In re, Kuruba Chinna Hanukukha, AIR 1943 Mad 396 [LNIND 1942 MAD 354]: 44 CrLJ 550 : ILR 1943 Mad 679.
78 Joydeb Patra & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, 2013 CrLJ 2729 (SC) : AIR 2013 SCW 2744 .
79 Nanhar v. State of Haryana, 2010 CrLJ 3450 : (2010) 11 SCC 423 [LNINDORD 2010 SC 229].
80 Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 [LNIND 1984 SC 359]: 1984 CrLJ 1738 :
(1984) 4 SCC 116 [LNIND 1984 SC 359] : (1984) 2 Crimes 235 [LNIND 1984 SC 359] : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487 [LNIND
1984 SC 359] : (1984 Cr LR (SC) 296; State of Kerala v. Sanku, (1987) 2 Crimes 577 (Ker).
81 Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1960 SC 659 : (1960) 2 Ker LR 14 : 1960 CrLJ 1011. This was followed Anand
Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500 [LNIND 1959 SC 223]: (1960) 2 SCR 460 [LNIND 1959 SC
223] : 1960 CrLJ 682 where accused doctor was convicted for causing death of victim by poisoning.
82 Prakash Kumar Jayantilal Gandhi v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 3 Crimes 135 (Guj) : 1992 CrLJ 462 (Guj).
83 Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 [LNIND 1984 SC 359]: 1984 CrLJ 1738 :
(1984) 4 SCC 116 [LNIND 1984 SC 359] : (1984) 2 Crimes 235 [LNIND 1984 SC 359] : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487 [LNIND
1984 SC 359] : 1984 CrLJ (SC) 296 ; State of Kerala v. Sanku, (1987) 2 Crimes 577 (Ker) : 1988 CrLJ 1377.
84 Mahabir Mondal v. State of Bihar, (1973) 1 SCJ 576 : (1972) 1 SCC 748 [LNIND 1972 SC 135] : 1972 SCD 533 : 1972
CrLJ 860 : 1973 Mad LJ (Cr) 291 : AIR 1972 SC 1331 [LNIND 1972 SC 135].
Page 114 of 133
85 Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 656 : 1972 Cr 473 (SC) : (1972) 4 SCC 625; State of Orissa v.
Shantilata, (1978) 46 Cut LT 175 : 1978 CrLJ (NOC) 267 (Ori) ; Balaram Roy v. State of W.B., 88 CWN 238.
86 Vilas Maruti Sutar v. State of H.P., (1987) 3 Crimes 147 (HP).
87 Santosh v. State of M.P., 1980 CrLJ (NOC) 167 (MP) : 1980 MPLJ 712 : 1980 Jab LJ 727.
88 Chinna Hanumukha, In re, AIR 1943 Mad 396 [LNIND 1942 MAD 354]: 44 CrLJ 550 : ILR 1943 Mad 679.
89 Budhwari Bai v. State of M.P,, (1991) 3 Crimes 227 [LNIND 1991 MP 20] (MP).
90 State of Maharashtra v. Manglya, 1972 CrLJ 570 (SC) : AIR 1972 SC 1797 : (1972) 3 SCC 46.
91 Nagammal v. Inspector of Police, 2003 CrLJ 4677 (Mad).
92 Prakash Kumar Jayantilal Gandhi v. State of Gujarat, 1992 CrLJ 462 (Guj) : (1991) 3 Crimes 135 (Guj).
93 Bhupindar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 1011 [LNIND 1988 SC 211]: 1988 CrLJ 1097 : (1988) 3 SCC 513
[LNIND 1988 SC 211] ; Tara Singh v. State thr. Home Secretary, Uttarakhand, 2014 (3) SCALE 367 [LNINDU 2014 SC
18] : 2014 CrLJ 2154 : Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of U.P ., 2014 (4) SCALE 730 [LNIND 2014 SC 395] : (2014) 5
SCC 509 [LNIND 2014 SC 395].
94 Bhupendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2013 (13) SCALE 52.
95 Chhotan Sao and Anr. v. State of Bihar, 2013 (15) SCALE 338 [LNIND 2013 SC 1080] : AIR 2014 SC 907 [LNIND
2013 SC 1080].
96 Joshinder Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 2014 SC 1043 [LNIND 2014 SC 34]: 2014 CrLJ 1175 : (2014) 4 SCC 42
[LNIND 2014 SC 34].
97 Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1960 SC 659 : 1960 CrLJ 1011.
1 Anant Chintamoni Lagu v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500 [LNIND 1959 SC 223]: 1960 CrLJ 682 : 1960 SCJ 779
[LNIND 1959 SC 223] : (1960) 2 SCA 62 : (1960) 2 SCR 460 [LNIND 1959 SC 223] : 1960 Mad LJ (Cr) 493 : 62 Bom
LR 371.
2 Ramgopal, 1972 CrLJ 473 (SC) : (1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC 656 .
3 Arundhati, 1968 CrLJ 848.
4 Mahabir Mondal v. State of Bihar, (1973) 1 SCJ 576 : (1972) 1 SCC 748 [LNIND 1972 SC 135] : 1972 SCD 533 : 1972
CrLJ 860 : 1973 Mad LJ (Cr) 291 : AIR 1972 SC 1331 [LNIND 1972 SC 135].
5 Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 656 : 1972 CrLJ 473 (SC) : (1972) 4 SCC 625; State of Orissa v.
Shantilata, (1978) 46 Cut LT 175 : 1978 CrLJ (NOC) 267 (Ori) ; Balaram Roy v. State of W.B,, 88 Cal WN 238.
6 Vilas Maruti Sutar v. State of H.P,, (1987) 3 Crimes 147 (HP).
7 Phino v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1327 : 1975 CrLJ 1103 : 1975 Cut LJ 255 : (1975) 4 SCC 119 : 1975 SCC (Cri)
376 : (1975) 1 SCWR 368.
8 Santosh v. State of M.P., 1980 CrLJ (NOC) 167 (MP) : 1980 MPLJ 712 : 1980 Jab LJ 727.
9 State of Maharashtra v. Manglya, AIR 1972 SC 1797 : 1972 CrLJ 570.
10 Palani Swami v. State, AIR 1968 Bom 127 [LNIND 1966 BOM 8]: 68 Bom LR 941 : 1967 Mah LJ 25 [LNIND 1966
BOM 8] : 1968 CrLJ 453.
11 Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 [LNIND 1984 SC 359]: 84 CrLJ 1738 : (1984) 4
SCC 116 [LNIND 1984 SC 359].
12 State v. Lal Singh Mau Say, 2006 CrLJ 1878 (Jhar). In their judgment Court also directed prosecution agency to be
vigilant while conducting trial for grave offences like murder.
13 Madhusudan v. State, 2006 CrLJ 4190 (Jhar) ; In Bhawani Mahto v. State, 2006 CrLJ 3931 (Jhar) blow was given in
heat of passion and conviction was altered to one under Section 304 Part I.
14 Kuppusamy v. State, 2013 (3) SCC 322 [LNIND 2013 SC 134] : 2013 CrLJ 1513 (SC) ; Shanti Bhai Vaghela v. State of
Gujarat, 2013 CrLJ 390 : AIR 2013 SC 571 [LNIND 2012 SC 1562]; Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of
Maharashtra, JT 2012 (9) SC 147 : 2012 (8) SCALE 684 : (2012) 10 SCC 373 [LNIND 2012 SC 588] ; In Abdul Nawaz
Page 115 of 133
v. State of West Bengal, JT 2012 (5) SC 339 : 2012 AIR (SCW) 3180 : 2012 CrLJ 2901 : (2012) 6 SCC 581 [LNIND
2012 SC 307] : 2012 (5) SCALE 357 [LNIND 2012 SC 307]- the victim had died of drowning. The prosecution case
itself suggested that there was a sudden fight between the deceased and the appellant and his companions and it was
in the course of the said fight that an injury was sustained causing the death of the deceased thereby bringing the case
under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the I.P.C. The prosecution evidence sufficiently suggests that a scuffle had indeed
taken place on the dinghy where the appellant and his companions were trying to recover the dinghy while the
deceased was preventing them from doing so. In the course of this sudden fight and in the heat of passion the
appellant assaulted the deceased and pushed him into the sea eventually resulting in his death. The act of the
appellant is more appropriately punishable under Section 304 (1) of the I.P.C. instead of Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code invoked by the Courts below.
15 Roopsena Khatun v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2011 SC 2256 [LNIND 2011 SC 468]: 2011 CrLJ 3597 : (2011) 13
SCC 303 [LNIND 2011 SC 468] ; In Madhu v. State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399 [LNIND 2012 SC 25] : AIR 2012 SC
664 [LNIND 2012 SC 25]: 2012 CrLJ 1230 : (2012) 1 SCC(Cri) 892 - another case of death by drowning, the accused
was acquitted giving benefit of doubt; Sahebrao Mohan Berad v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 4 SCC 249 [LNIND 2011
SC 311] : 2011 CrLJ 2157 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 201 [LNIND 2011 SC 311]- death by drowning ruled out.
16 B.D. Khunte v. Union of India (UOI), 2015 CrLJ 243 : (2015) 1 SCC 286.
17 H ALSBURY’S Laws of England, 4th Ed., Vol. 11, para 1163, p. 619.
18 Sukhlal Sarkar v. Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 703 [LNIND 2012 SC 364] : 2012 CrLJ 3032.
19 K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362]: 1962 CrLJ 521 (SC).
20 Budhi Singh v. State of H.P, 2013 CrLJ 962 (SC) : AIR 2013 (SCW) 547 .
21 Arun Roy v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 457 [LNIND 2010 SC 506], 463 (para 16).
22 Note M P-59.
23 K ENNY on Outlines of Criminal Law, 19th Ed., para 117, pp. 171-172.
24 Mancini v. DPP , 1942 A.C.I. (1941) 3 All ER 272.
25 Kwaku Mensah v. King, 1946 AC 588. Section 233 of Criminal Code provides that intentional homicide shall be
manslaughter only if lawful assault was such as to be likely to deprive a person being of ordinary character of the power
of self control. Where such person is not infact deprived of power of self control or due to lapse of time he recovers his
self control then benefits of provocation be denied. The provocation can help the accused only when it is sudden
temporary loss of control; R. v. Thornton , The Independent July 30, 1991 (CA) also see R. v. Clarke, (1991) Cr LR 383
CA.
26 Michael J Allen, Elliott and Wood’s cases and material son Criminal Law, Eighth Ed. p. 531-532, where R. v. Cascoe ,
(1970) 2 Alll ER 833 is cited. The case of R. v. Johnson , (1989) 1 WLR 740 also states the same view.
27 R. v. Duffy, (1949) 1 All ER 932. In concluding remarks it was stated, ‘‘Indeed, circumstances which induced a desire
for revenge are inconsistent with provocation, since the conscious formula of a desire for revenge means that a person
has had time to think, to reflect, and that would negative a sudden temporary loss of self control, which is essence of
provocation.’’
28 R. v. Doughty, (1986) 83 Cri App R 319 (CA) : (1986) Crim LR 625. In R. v. Davies , (1975) QB 691 the Court of Appeal
accepted that provocation may emanate from some person other than the victim.
29 R. v. Johnson, (1989) 1 WLR 740 : (1989) 2 All ER 839 (CA).
30 R. v. Camplin, (1978) AC 705 : (1978) 2 All ER 168 HL. The Court observed that accused was, for whatever reason,
exceptionally excitable or pugnacious should continue to be ignored because this was not policy of law to allow this to
excuse loss of self control.
31 R. v. Acott, (1977) 1 WLR 306 : (1997) 1 All ER 706 (p. 712-13).
32 Chand Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1971 CrLJ 1501; see also Bala Saheb v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 CrLJ 1014
(Bom).
33 Krishnan Udayan v. State of Kerala, 1971 Ker LT 604.
34 Re, Vadivel Pandavchi, 1972 CrLJ 1641 (Mad).

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35 Nokul Nushyo, (1867) 7 WR (Cr) 27.
36 Yusuf v. State of U.P., 1973 CrLJ 1220 : 1973 All LJ 111 : 1973 All Cr R 148 : 1973 All WR (HC) 251.
37 Dhanno Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 All 317 [LNIND 1956 ALL 217]: 1957 CrLJ 498.
38 State of U.P. v. Lakhmi, 1998 (1) Crimes 179 [LNIND 1998 SC 197] (SC) : AIR 1998 SC 1007 [LNIND 1998 SC 197]:
(1998) 4 SCC 336 [LNIND 1998 SC 197] : 1998 CrLJ 1411.
39 Hafijuddin v. State, AIR 1957 All 377 [LNIND 1957 ALL 27]: 1957 CrLJ 617. See Chaitu and Ors. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, 2014 CrLJ 3802 : 2014 (5) SCALE 699, on facts Supreme Court held that it was case of grave and sudden
provocation and would fall under first exception to Section 300 of Code and offence would come within second part of
Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code.
40 Kanchayalal v. State, 1952 CrLJ 946.
41 Kanahayalal v. State , (ibid).
42 Bonda Devesu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1996 (7) SCC 115 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 187.
43 State v. Yenkappa, 2003 CrLJ 3558 (Kant) : 2003 AIR Kant HCR 2045.
44 Shiva Kumar v. State, 2003 CrLJ 3690 (Mad) : 2003 (1) Mad LW (Cri) 139 [LNIND 2003 MAD 166].
45 Sheo Chandra Singh v. State, 2003 CrLJ 4087 (All) : 2003 All LJ 2034 : 2003 (2) Crimes 233.
46 Guriya Bucha v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1962 Gujarat 39 [LNIND 1961 GUJ 134]: (1962) 1 CrLJ 324.
47 Devji Govindji, (1895) 20 Bom 215; Kesar Singh, (1877) PR No. 10 of 1878; Ghausar Singh, (1884) PR No. 33 of 1884.
48 Sohrab, (1924) 5 Lah 67; Khadim Hussain, (1926) 7 Lah 488; Des Raj, (1937) 20 Lah 345.
49 Huri Giree, (1868) 10 WR (Cr) 26.
50 Thomas, (1837) 7 C & P 817.
51 Lochan, (1886) 8 All 635.
52 Laikhan, (1955) Cut 625.
53 Kundarapu, (1962) 1 CrLJ 261.
54 Mangesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 123 [LNIND 2011 SC 20] : 2011 CrLJ 1166; Yomeshbhai
Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 6 SCC 312 [LNIND 2011 SC 546] : AIR 2011 SC 2328 [LNIND 2011 SC
546]: 2011 CrLJ 3125; On the basis of the post-mortem report, semen was found in the vaginal swabs of
deceased/sister of accused persons, concluded that it was deceased who himself sneaked into the house of accused
persons and must have had sexual intercourse with deceased sister and on seeing them in a compromising position,
accused persons must have killed them. It was held that it is a case of grave and sudden provocation and as such it
could not be a case of murder and would come under Section 304 Part-I. State of Punjab v. Jagtar Singh, AIR 2011 SC
3028 [LNIND 2011 SC 691]: 2011 CrLJ 4368.
55 H ALSBURY’S Laws of England, 4th Ed., Vol. 11, para 1164, p. 620; see also Jangeer Singh v. State of Rajasthan,
AIR 1998 SC 2791 [LNIND 1998 SC 796]: 1998 CrLJ 4087 : 1998 (3) Crimes 209 (SC) : (1998) 7 SCC 372 [LNIND
1998 SC 796].
56 C ROSS & J ONES on Introduction to Criminal Law, 9th Ed., para 8.23, p. 154.
58 Bedder v. D.P.P., (1954) 1 WLR 1119.
59 R. v. Camplin, (1978) 1 All ER 1326.
60 R. v. Smith, (2001) 1 AC 146, (2000) CLY 397 (HL).
61 Suresh Kanagraj Nadar v. State, 2003 CrLJ 2668 : 2003 (2) Guj LH 547 (Gujarat) since here accused was only 20
years of age, in the interest of justice his sentence was reduced to the period already undergone, Suresh Kanagraj
Nadar v. State, 2003 CrLJ 2668 (Guj). The independent witness was not produced but it was proved that accused had
lost self control since deceased had used filthy language. The conviction was altered from under Section 302 to one
under Section 304,Ram Narain Singh v. State, 2003 CrLJ 3160 (All) : 2003 All LJ 1530.
Page 117 of 133
62 Akhtar v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND 1963 ALL 180]: (1964) 1 CrLJ 617.
63 Gandaram v. State of Orissa, 1982 CrLJ 1229 (Ori) : 1981 Cut LT (Cr) 229 : 53 Cut LT 520 ; Khageswar Ketaki v. State
of Orissa, (1985) 1 Crimes 192.
64 Tangaraju, In re, 1981 Mad LW (Cr) 227 : 1983 CrLJ (NOC) 95 (Mad).
65 Sankappa Rai v. State of Kerala, AIR 1969 Ker 120 [LNIND 1968 KER 44]: 1969 CrLJ 494 : 1968 Ker LJ 643 : 1968
Mad LJ (Cr) 485 : 1968 Ker LT 511.
66 K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362]: (1962) 1 CrLJ 521 : 1962 Mad LJ (Cr)
531 : (1962) 2 SCA 434 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] : (1962) 2 SCJ 347 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] : 64 Bom LR 488.
67 K.M. Nanavati, (1962) Bom LR 488 (SC) : AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362]; Akhtar, AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND
1963 ALL 180].
68 State of Orissa v. Prahallad Gadnayak, (1987) 1 Crimes 236.
69 Mandangi Krusa v. State of Orissa, (1987) 3 Crimes 799.
70 Surajmal v. State of Punjab, 1992 CrLJ 520 (SC) : 1993 Supp (1) SCC 639.
71 Madaiah v. State of Yelandur Police, 1992 CrLJ 502 (Kant).
72 Jhamman v. State of U.P,, 1991 CrLJ 2970 (All).
73 Ram Prit v. State of U.P,, 1991 CrLJ 3069 (All).
74 Golbadan Majhi v. State of Orissa, 1991 CrLJ 3261 (Ori). Also see Sheo Dularey v. State, 1997 CrLJ 269 (All) where
accused came armed with axe and started assaulting the deceased and the injured witness. His plea of provocation
caused by abuses of two woman was not accepted and conviction under Sections 302 and 324 was held proper. The
deceased had abducted the wife of accused previously and was trying to do it again when accused inflicted injuries by
striking with blunt side of iron rod. It was held that act was done due to sudden provocation given by the deceased.
Hence conviction was altered from Section 302 to under Section 304,Rajendran v. State, 1997 CrLJ 4344 (Mad).
75 Mansa Ram v. State of U.P., 1975 All Cr C 288.
76 Mansa Ram v. State of U.P. , (Ibid).
77 Dwarika Yadav v. State of U.P., 1976 CrLJ 239 : 1975 All LR 451 : 1975 All WC 472.
78 Ganga Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1989) 3 Crimes 306 [LNIND 1989 DEL 269] (Del).
79 Sucha Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), 1990 (1) Crimes 222 [LNIND 1989 DEL 307].
80 K. Ravi Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2015 CrLJ 553 : (2015) 2 SCC 638 [LNIND 2014 SC 976].
81 Akhila Parida v. State of Orissa, 1987 CrLJ 609 (Ori). The deceased abused the accused and suggested him to ask his
daughter to go for the prostitution. Hearing this accused gave seven blows with a knife on his body and caused his
death. It was held that number of injuries were not crucial determinative factor in matter of sentence in such cases as
person due to sudden and grave provocation had lost the power of self-control. The conviction under Section 304 was
held proper, Baba alias Ghulam Raja v. State, 1999 CrLJ 4618 (Bom).
82 Keshoram Bora v. State of Assam, AIR 1978 SC 1096 [LNIND 1978 SC 32]: (1978) 2 SCC 407 [LNIND 1978 SC 32] :
1978 SCC (Cri) 219 [LNIND 1978 SC 32] : 1978 CrLJ 1089 : 1978 BLJR 8 [LNIND 1978 SC 32] (SC).
84 R. v. Letenock, (1917) 12 Cr App R 221 ; see also R. v. Cobbet, (1940) 28 Cr App R 11.
85 Uttam Chand v. State of J & K, (1989) 2 Crimes 626 (J&K).
86 Patel Choutubhai v. State of Gujarat, (1990) CrLJ (NOC) 20 (Guj).
87 Jamma Majhi v. State of Orissa, 1989 CrLJ 753 (Ori).
88 Tarsem Ali v. State of Haryana, 1978 CrLJ 713 (SC) : AIR 1978 SC 768 [LNIND 1978 SC 22]: (1987) 1 Supreme 103 :
(1987) 1 Crimes 479.
89 Manjeet Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2014 CrLJ 3970 : 2014 (5) SCALE 648 [LNIND 2014 SC 607] : (2014) 5
SCC 697 [LNIND 2014 SC 607].
Page 118 of 133
90 State of Maharashtra v. Arun Savalram Pagare, 1989 CrLJ 1918 (Bom) : (1989) 1 Bom CR 210. The accused after
loosing all his money in gambling was not allowed to play free cards and was asked to go out by the winning party.
Thereupon he got provoked and stabbed the deceased. It was held that conviction will be altered from Section 302 to
one under Section 304 as his case was covered under Exception I to Section 300,V. Raja v. State, 1999 CrLJ 3918
(Mad). The accused stabbed the wife without any provocation caused to him. It was held that conviction of accused
under Section 302 was proper, Mohan v. State, 1999 CrLJ 22 (Mad).
91 Willie (William) Slaney v. State of M.P,, AIR 1956 SC 116 : 1956 CrLJ 291.
92 Parameswara v. Krishna Pillai, AIR 1966 Ker 264 [LNIND 1966 KER 11].
93 Suresh Chand v. State (Delhi), 1972 CrLJ 1416 (Del).
94 Chetram v. Union of India, (1963) 1 CrLJ 120 (HP).
1 Dhula v. State of M.B,, AIR 1956 MB 94 : 1956 CrLJ 241 : ILR 1956 MB 46.
2 State of H.P. v. Ram Singh, 1973 CrLJ 150 (HP).
3 Benember Mallick v. State of Orissa, 1992 CrLJ 1856 (Ori).
4 R. v. Goulding (Ivan William) Trans. Ref. 95/2834/W4, Nov. 14, 1995 (CA, Crim Div).
5 R. v. Humphreys (EMMA) , (1995) 4 All ER 1008 Hirst LJCA (Crim Div). This case was considered and appeal of
accused was allowed in R. v. Thornton, (1996) 1 WLR 1174 : (1996) 2 All ER 1023 L ORD T AYLOR of G OSFORTH
LJCA (Crim Div).
6 R. v. Baillie (John Dickie Spellace) , (1996) 2 Cri App R 31 Henry LJCA (Crim Div).
7 Jagannath Ramchandra Sakpal v. State, 2005 CrLJ 970 (Bom) : 2005 (1) Bom CR (Cri) 753.
8 Ashok Soma Misal v. State, 2006 CrLJ 1528 (Bom) ; In Subbiah v. State, 2006 CrLJ 3501 (Mad) offence committed
owing to sudden and grave provocation and conviction was upheld.
9 R. v. Smith (Morgan James), (1998) 4 All ER 387 (CA) : (1998) CLY 9340 (CA) : (1999) 2 WLR 610; Luc Thiat Thuan v.
Queen, (1996) 2 All ER 1033; R. v. Thomton, (1996) 2 ALL ER 1023 : (1996) CLY 1456 were followed.
10 Sooguru Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P, AIR 2013 SC 1643 [LNIND 2013 SC 280]: (2013) 4 SCC 244 [LNIND 2013
SC 280] ; Brajendrasingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 159] : 2012 AIR (SCW)
1865 : AIR 2012 SC 1552 [LNIND 2012 SC 159]: 2012 CrLJ 1883; Bhajju v. State of M.P, (2012) 4 SCC 327 [LNIND
2012 SC 1242] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 1963 : 2012 CrLJ 1926; Where it has come on record that the accused was an
alcoholic and he was in the habit of beating his wife regularly after consuming enough and more liquor and concurrent
finding by High Courts below that on the date of the incident there was quarrel between the accused and the deceased
and the accused caused injury on the neck of the deceased with a knife, conviction under Section 302 is held proper;
Aradadi Ramudu @ Aggiramudu v. State, 2012 CrLJ 2098 : (2012) 5 SCC 134 [LNIND 2012 SC 140] : AIR 2012 SC
1664 [LNIND 2012 SC 140]; Arvindkumar Anupalal Poddar v. State of Maharashtra, 2012 (7) SCALE 1 [LNIND 2012
SC 447] : 2012 CrLJ 4007. Also see Stateof Rajasthan v. Thakur Singh 2014 CrLJ 4047 : 2014 (8) SCALE 82 [LNIND
2014 SC 441].
11 Shyama Charan v. State of U.P,, AIR 1969 All 61 [LNIND 1968 ALL 24]: 1969 CrLJ 129. The accused in a grave and
sudden provocation had given gun shot injury on the deceased without displaying earlier any aggressive or dangerous
posture. It was held that intention of accused to shoot the deceased could not be inferred and conviction of accused
was altered from Section 302 to one under Section 304 but conviction under Sections 448 and 506 was maintained,
A.M. Chengappa v. State, 2000 CrLJ 612 (Kant).
12 H ALSBURY’S Laws of England, 4th Ed., 11th Vol., para 358, p. 196.
13 N. Nagarajan v. State, 2008 CrLJ 4625 (Mad).
14 Shyam Chhaganbhai Dhoria v. State, 2008 CrLJ 761 (Guj).
15 Chinnathaman v. State, 2008 CrLJ 1372 (SC).
16 Bichi Munda v. State, 1993 CrLJ 145 (Ori).
17 Dayal v. State of M.P., 1994 CrLJ 10 (SC) : AIR 1994 SC 30 .

Page 119 of 133
18 Shri Murli alias Denny v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 CrLJ 1114 (SC) : AIR 1994 SC 610 [LNIND 1993 SC 104]: 1995
Supp (1) SCC 39.
19 Kaira Munda v. State, 1994 CrLJ 1445 (Ori), also see Pappachan alias Joseph v. State, 1994 CrLJ 1765 where plea of
sudden fight and grave provocation was rejected and same had happened in Dhandayutham v. State, 1994 CrLJ 1584
(Mad), where accused was convicted as his action was not due to the sustained provocation.
20 Kartik Harijan v. State, 1995 CrLJ 2019 (Ori).
21 State v. Surendra alias Sony, 1995 CrLJ 3824 (Kant).
22 Amarjeet Singh v. State, 1996 CrLJ 185 (Raj).
23 Ramarao v. State, 1996 CrLJ 112 (Bom).
24 Jamuna Prasad v. State, 2002 CrLJ 2073 (All) : 2002 All LJ 656 : 2002 (2) Crimes 1. The defence of provocation is to
be left to the jury to decide wherever there was evidence capable of supporting the defence; R. v. Rossiter, (1992) 95
Cri App R 326 CA : (1994) 2 All ER 752.
25 R. v. Thornton, (1992) 1 All ER 306 CA : (1992) Cr LR 54. It is well established that it is correct for a Judge to define
provocation for the purpose of a defence to a charge of murder, ‘as conduct causing a sudden and temporary loss of
self control, any change in law was a matter for Parliament to decide. Here the Asian wife due to repeated abuses from
her husband had set him to afire. She was convicted but her appeal for retrial was allowed; R. v. Ahluwalia, (1992) 4 All
ER 889 (CA) : (1993) Crim LR 63.
26 R. v. Richens, (1993) 4 All ER 877 (CA) : (1993) Crim LR 384. The accused was 17 and had abnormal mentality with
immure explosive and attention seeking traits. One day she killed her boyfriend who had cut her writs by taunting that
she had not done a good job. She had lost control as she felt provoked. It was held that offence of murder was liable to
be reduced to manslaughter as provocative behaviour of deceased had affected the mental condition of young lady with
an immature personality; R. v. Humphries (EMMA), (1995) 4 All ER 1008 CA. The Independent July 11, 1995 CA.
27 Luc Thiet Thuan v. Queen, (1996) 3 WLR 45 : (1997) AC 131 : (1996) 2 All ER 1033 Lord G OFF of C HIEVELEY. The
defence was provocation was also not accepted and accused was convicted for murder in R. v. Dryden, (1995) 4 All
ER 987 CA.
28 Edwards v. R, (1973) AC 648 : (1973) 1 All ER 152.
29 H ALSBURY’S Laws of England, 4th Ed., Vol. 11, Art. 1164, p. 620.
30 R. v. O’ Connor, (1991) Cr LR 135 (CA) : (1997) AC 131 : (1996) 2 All ER 1033 in which R. v. O’Grady, (1987) CLY 824
: (1987) 3 WLR 321 : (1987) 3 All ER 420. R. v. Garlick, (1981) CLY 485 : (1981) Crim LR 178 were applied and R. v.
Moloney , (1985) CLY 642 distinguished and R. v. Nedrick , (1986) CLY 651 considered. The self induced glue-
sniffing addiction was not a characteristic which could raise the defence of provocation in a murder trial as it was
inconsistent with the concept of reasonable man. The House of Lords on appeal, however, quashed the verdict of Court
of appeal and substituted manslaughter for murder; R. v. Morhall, (1995) 3 WLR 330 HL : (1995) 3 All ER 659 AC.
31 R. v. Cullen, (1993) Crlr 936 (CA).
32 Bablu alias Mubarik Hussain v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 13 SCC 116 [LNIND 2006 SC 1134] : AIR 2007 SC 697
[LNIND 2006 SC 1134].
33 Bhagwan Tukaram Dange v. State of Maharashtra, 2014 (3) SCALE 603 [LNIND 2014 SC 309] : (2014) 4 SCC 270
[LNIND 2014 SC 309] : 2014 CrLJ 1875.
34 Shyama Charan v. State of U.P,, AIR 1969 All 61 [LNIND 1968 ALL 24]: 1969 CrLJ 129.
35 Ghelabhai alias Jairam v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 1 Crimes 73 [LNIND 1985 BOM 209] (Bom).
36 Ganayendra Kumar v. State of U.P,, AIR 1972 SC 502 : 1972 CrLJ 308 : (1972) 1 SCJ 601 : 1972 Mad LJ (Cr) 371 :
(1972) 4 SCC 819.
37 Jagat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 2619 : 1976 CrLJ 2002 : 1976 Cr LR (SC) 525 : (1976) 1 SCC 225.
38 R. v. Ibrams & Gregory, (1982) 74 Cr App R 154 (CA).
39 A LISONS : Principles of Criminal Law of Scotland, (1832), p. 8.
40 Panchu Kumar Sarder v. State of W.B,, 1984 CrLJ NOC 142 (Cal).
Page 120 of 133
41 Balerain Minj v. State of M.P,, 1985 CrLJ 1394 (MP).
42 Dattu Genu v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 387 [LNIND 1973 SC 357]: 1974 CrLJ 446 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 208 :
(1974) 3 SCC 678 [LNIND 1973 SC 357]. The accused was removed from the service and he repeatedly requested the
deceased to reinstate him but he refused to do so. After few days he came again and stabbed the deceased who died
on the spot. It was held that under these circumstances he was not entitled to the plea of grave and sudden
provocation, Abdul Gafarsab v. State, 1998 CrLJ 2488 (Kant).
43 Anthony Fernandes v. State of Goa, (1991) 1 Crimes 327 (Bom).
44 Santa Singh v. State (Delhi), 1987 CrLJ 342 : 1986 Rajdhani LR 303 : 1986 Chand Cr C 332 : (1986) 2 Rec Cr R 538.
45 Maiga v. State, (1972) 1 Mys LJ 306 : 1972 Mad LJ (Cr) 191.
46 Palmer, (1913) 2 KB 29; C. Narayan, AIR 1958 AP 235 [LNIND 1957 AP 37], (confession of adultery by wife).
47 Murgi Munda, (1938) 18 Pat 101.
48 Thangaswamy v. State of T.N,, (1989) 2 Crimes 412 (Mad).
49 State of Kerala v. Velayudhan, 1990 CrLJ (NOC) 12 (Ker).
50 Ganesan v. State, 2007 CrLJ (NOC) 10 (Mad).
51 Uttam Kumar v. State , 2003 CrLJ 2&25 (All).
52 Markus Bilung v. State of Orissa, (1989) 1 Crimes 536 [LNIND 1988 ORI 74].
53 Gouranga Dora v. State of Orissa, (1971) 37 Cut LT 170.
54 Re Govindan, 1975 CrLJ 114 : 1974 Mad LW Cr 157.
55 Ramchandra Rangi v. State of Orissa, 1984 CrLJ (NOC) 12 (Ori). The accused saw wife committing sexual intercourse
with another man and advised her to withdraw from the wrong path but when she did not heed to his advice he axed
the wife to death. It was held that exception of grave and sudden provocation was available to him and his conviction
was altered from under Section 302 to under Section 304,Sukka v. State, 1998 CrLJ 3118 (MP). The accused in grave
and sudden provocation had killed his wife and his conviction under Section 304 and not under Section 302 was held
proper, Sukh Lal v. State, 1998 CrLJ 3187 (MP).
56 Guru Prosad v. State of U.P,, 1978 CrLJ (NOC) 220 (All).
57 Panchu Sardar v. State of W.B,, 1984 CrLJ (NOC) 142 (Cal).
58 Faquira v. State, 1973 All LJ 571 ; Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1978) 80 Punj LR 331.
59 Jamaluddin, (1955) Mad 1227.
60 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lakhmi, 1998 (4) SCC 336 [LNIND 1998 SC 197] : AIR 1998 SC 1007 [LNIND 1998 SC 197]:
1998 (1) Crimes 179 [LNIND 1998 SC 197] : 1998 CrLJ 1411.
61 R. v. Marth, (2001) EWCA Crim 2245 (CA) : (2001) Current Law December, digest p 37-38 (CA).
62 Balku, (1938) All 789; Hussain, (1938) 20 Lah 278.
63 Lalu Mukhi v. State of Orissa, 1969 CrLJ 1172 : 35 Cut LT 94.
64 Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1972) 80 Punj LR 408.
65 Hussein v. Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 471 : ILR 1939 Lah 278 : 41 CrLJ 15.
66 Nga Saw Manng v. Emperor, AIR 1937 Rang 466 : 172 IC 395 : 39 CrLJ 137.
67 Naukar Mouledino v. Emperor, AIR 1937 Sind 212 : 170 IC 827 : 38 CrLJ 968.
68 Re, V.Padavchi, 1972 CrLJ 1641 (Mad).
69 Chanan Khan, (1942) 25 Lah 72.
70 Latu Mukhi, 1969 CrLJ 1172.
71 In re, V. Padayachi, 1972 CrLJ 1641 (Mad).
72 Hansa Singh, 1977 CrLJ 1448 (SC) : (1976) 4 SCC 255 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 589 : AIR 1977 SC 1801 .
Page 121 of 133
73 Yasin Sheik, (1869) 12 WR (Cr) 68.
74 Ghuntappa, (1882) 1 Weir 306.
75 Mohan, (1886) 8 All 622.
76 Lochan, (1886) 8 All 635.
77 Bandu Santu Kumbar v. State of Goa, (1991) 3 Crimes 346 (Goa).
78 State of Himachal Pradesh v. Uttam Kumar, 2007 CrLJ 2946 (SC).
79 Changdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (1991) 3 Crimes 489 (Bom).
80 V. Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, 1992 CrLJ 701 (SC) : AIR 1992 SC 754 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 952 : 1992 Supp (3) SCC
21. The accused husband was perverted in sexual habits and used to satisfy his lust on helpless wife who was forced
to kill the deceased under grave and sudden provocation. It was held that the conviction could be under Section 304
and not under Section 302 as the case was covered under Exception I of Section 300,Girja Devi alias Gita Devi v.
State of Himanchal Pradesh, 2000 CrLJ 1528 (HP).
81 Tarachand v. State of Maharashtra, 2000 CrLJ 2667 (Bom).
82 Riyazat Ali v. State, 2000 CrLJ 3055 (All).
83 Kashinath v. State, 2000 CrLJ 3091 (Bom).
84 Bagda Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 CrLJ 2129 (Raj), also see Dharmender alias Chiniya v. State of Haryana, 1995
CrLJ 319 (P&H), where accused had come to molest the sister-in-law of accused and she along with her mother had
inflicted injuries and this fact was found trustworthy and reliable. The conviction of accused was set aside as he had
given iron pipe blows in order to save his sister-in-law's modesty.
85 Madanlal v. State of Punjab, 1992 SCC (Cri) 674 : 1992 Suppl (2) SCC 233.
86 (1964) 1 Mad LJ 145 : 1964 Mad LJ (Cr) 121.
87 Suresh Chand v. State, 1972 CrLJ 1416 : ILR (1971) 1 Del 772 .
88 Krishnan Udayan v. State of Kerala, 1971 Ker LT 604 : 1971 Ker LR 550.
89 Chand Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1971 CrLJ 1501.
90 Jan Mohammad v. Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 861 : 30 CrLJ 1044 : 119 IC 323.
91 State of Mysore v. Ramaji Ramappa, (1972) 2 Mys LJ 6.
92 Manmohon Yar v. Crown, AIR 1924 Lah 62 : 81 IC 173 : 25 CrLJ 685.
93 Mehra Mistak v. Emperor, AIR 1934 Lah 103 : 151 IC 751 : 35 CrLJ 1378.
94 Elumalai, In re, 1977 CrLJ (NOC) 20 (Mad).
95 Kartar Chand v. State of J & K, (1987) 1 Crimes 23 [LNIND 1986 JNK 41] (J&K).
96 Hansa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1801 : 1977 CrLJ 1448 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 589 : (1976) 4 SCC 255.
1 Chanan Khan v. Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 123 : 45 PLR 162 : 44 CrLJ 595.
2 Jamaluddin ILR (1955) Mad 1227.
3 Re, Fakirappa Yellappa Tukappanwar, 1971 Mad LJ (Cr) 394 referring to ILR 1955 Mad 1227 : (1957) 2 Mad LJ 9 :
AIR 1957 Mad 541 [LNIND 1957 MAD 52]: (1953) 1 Mad LJ 180.
4 State of Karnataka v. Kamalaksha, 1978 CrLJ 290; State of Gujarat v. B. Jasub, 1982 CrLJ 1961 (Guj) : 1982 Cr LR
(Guj) 211 : 1982 Guj LH 320.
5 Vasanta v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 361 [LNIND 1983 SC 58] (1) : 1983 CrLJ 693 : 1984 Supp SCC 648.
6 Hansa Ram, 1975 CrLJ 1772 (All), see also Nanavati, 1962 (1) CrLJ 521 (SC); State of Karnataka v. Kamalaksha,
1978 CrLJ 290 (Kant) ; Taiman Rana, 1982 CrLJ NOC 25 (Gau); Bhand Jusal Mamad, 1982 CrLJ 1691 (Guj).
7 Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 CrLJ 1423 : 1984 Raj LR 447 : 1984 Raj LW 533.
8 Rama Nago Kumbhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1989) 3 Crimes 597 [LNIND 1989 BOM 138].
Page 122 of 133
9 Gainthabuda v. State, 2004 CrLJ 1569 (Ori). Death caused without Premeditation and convicted under Section
304,Siva Kumar v. State, 2004 CrLJ 3805 (Mad).
10 Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa, 2004 CrLJ 3875 (SC) : (2004) 11 SCC 395 [LNIND 2004 SC 758] : AIR 2004 SC
4100 [LNIND 2004 SC 758]. The accused was provoked by deceased by calling his mother as DAKAN (bad spirit) and
conviction was altered from under Section 302 to one under Section 304,Govoardahn Lal v. State, 2004 CrLJ 3966
(Raj).
11 Murugesan v. State, 2007 CrLJ 1949 (Mad).
12 Sangiah v. State, 2007 CrLJ 1409 (Mad).
13 Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory (Chandigarh), (1989) 1 Crimes 658 [LNIND 1989 SC 140] (SC) : (1989) 2 SCC 217
[LNIND 1989 SC 140] : AIR 1989 SC 1094 [LNIND 1989 SC 140].
14 Sunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 2136 : 1989 CrLJ 122 : (1988) 1 All Cr LR 830 : (1988) 1 RCC Cr R
617.
15 Sheoprasad v. State of U.P,, (1988) 3 Crimes 762 : 1988 Supp SCC 557.
16 Chenchuramayya, (1946) Mad 809.
17 Pamandi Satish v. State, 2007 CrLJ 942 (AP).
18 Makhan Lal v. State, 2000 CrLJ 3895 (All).
19 Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993 CrLJ 301 (SC) : 1993 Supp (2) SCC 760 : AIR 1993 SC 968 .
20 Babubhai Ranchadbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 1994 CrLJ 2099 (SC) : AIR 1994 SC 1400 [LNIND 1993 SC 1000].
21 Prakash v. State, 1994 CrLJ 3019 (Raj) ; also see Pitchaimani v. State, 1994 CrLJ 2606 (Mad) where accused in a
sudden fight had caused the death of deceased and was convicted under Section 304 by giving the benefit of
Exception 4 to Section 300.
22 Namala Subba Rao v. State of A.P., 2007 CrLJ 47 (SC).
23 Kanwar Lal v. State of M.P., 2003 CrLJ 62 (SC) : AIR 2002 SC 3690 [LNIND 2002 SC 558].
24 Narendra Singh. v. State, 2003 CrLJ 703 (Raj) : 2003 (2) Raj LW 1098.
25 R. v. Richards (Jason), (1997) Cr LR 48 (CA).
26 Sheikh Rafi v. State, 2007 CrLJ 2746 (SC).
27 Ambaram v. State, 2007 CrLJ 2743 (SC). Admission of wife that she had slept with other man one day angered the
man so much that he killed her by hitting with an axe. Accused had lost power of self control due to grave and sudden
provocation. Exception I to Section 300 was applied, Kusumbar Buragohain v. State, 2007 CrLJ (NOC) 647 (Gau).
28 Parma Ram v. State, 2007 CrLJ 2668 (HP).
29 See note ‘Exceeding right of Private defence’ under Section 96. In a free fight accused had exceeded the right of
private defence. It was held that he will be convicted under Section 304 Part II, Sampath Singh v. State of Rajasthan,
AIR 1969 SC 956 [LNIND 1969 SC 3]: (1969) CrLJ 1430.
30 Nathan v. State of Madras, AIR 1973 SC 665 : 1973 CrLJ 608 : (1973) 3 SCC 803.
31 Paladugula v. State, 2004 CrLJ 1093 (AP).
32 Shinghara Singh v. State of Haryana, 2004 CrLJ 828 (SC) : (2003) 12 SCC 758 [LNIND 2003 SC 945].
33 For detail discussion on this point see Notes under Section 95.
34 Amar Singh v. State of M.P., 1991 CrLJ 1077 (1080) (MP).
35 Laxman Singh v. Pooran Singh, 2003 CrLJ 4478 (SC) : AIR 2003 SC 3204 [LNIND 2003 SC 767]: 2003 (4) Crimes 1.
Here the act was done without pre-determination.
36 Note M p. 147.
37 Abdul Waheed v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 1828 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 651 : (1979) 3 SCC 477 : 1979 Cr LR
(SC) 450 : 1979 CrLJ 1196.
Page 123 of 133
38 Majin v. State of M.P., 1978 CrLJ 578 : 1978 MPLJ 164 [LNIND 1977 MP 64] : 1978 Jab LJ 62.
39 Sadhu Singh v. State of Punjab, 1969 CrLJ 1183.
40 Re, Fakirappa Yellappa Tukkappanawer, 1971 CrLJ 1511 (Mys).
41 Kishore v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 1173 : 1989 CrLJ 895 : 1989 Supp (1) SCC 399 : 1989 CrLJ 1149.
42 Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of M.P,, 1992 CrLJ 777 (SC) : (1992) 2 SCC 406 [LNIND 1992 SC 112] : AIR 1992 SC 675
[LNIND 1992 SC 112].
43 Amar Singh v. State of M.P,, 1991 CrLJ 1077 (MP).
44 Harendra Chandra Nath v. State of Assam, (1991) 2 Crimes 451 (Gau).
45 State of U.P. v. Suresh Chandra Shukla, AIR 1991 SC 968 : AIR 1991 SCW 267 : 1991 CrLJ 604. Accused received
injuries during course of occurrence and was convicted under Section 304,Chuhar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991
SC 1052, 1991 Crlr 885 (SC) : 1991 Supp (2) SCC 455.
46 Mitra Pd. Rai v. State, 2004 CrLJ 3294 (Sik).
47 Kajod Singh v. State, 2005 CrLJ 197 (Raj) : 2005 (1) Raj LW 552.
48 Sheikh Bashir v. State, 2005 CrLJ 73 (MP). No evidence to connect the accused with crime, acquittal held proper; Deo
Pujan Thakur v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1263 (Pat) : 2005 (1) Pat LJR 446 : 2005 (1) BLJR 281.
49 Ballala Venkateswarlu v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1577 (AP) : 2004 (3) LS (AP) 184. Similarly accused were acquitted on
ground of benefit of doubt; Ravinder v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1589 (Del). FIR late conviction set aside; Sambat Singh v.
State, 2005 CrLJ 1776 (Jhar) ; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raj Kumar, AIR 2014 SC 1929 : 2014 CrLJ 2480.
50 Prakash v. State of Karnataka, 2014 CrLJ 2503 : 2014 (5) SCALE 83 [LNIND 2014 SC 472] ; Dhan Raj @ Dhand v.
State of Haryana 2014 (6) SCALE 620 [LNIND 2014 SC 130] : (2014) 6 SCC 745 [LNIND 2014 SC 130].
51 Badruddin v. State, 2005 CrLJ NOC 20 (Raj) : (2005) 1 Raj LR 323.
52 Dr. Mohammad Khalil Chisti v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., 2013 CrLJ 637 (SC) : 2013 (1) MLJ (Crl) 198 [LNIND 2012
SC 801] : (2013) 2 SCC 541; Waman and Others v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (7) SCC 295 [LNIND 2011 SC 564] :
AIR 2011 SC 3327 [LNIND 2011 SC 564]: 2011 CrLJ 4827; Lakshmi Singh and Others v. State of Bihar, 1976 SCC
(Cri) 671 : AIR 1976 SC 2263 : 1976 CrLJ 1736 - Non explanation of simple injuries of the nature suffered by the
accused would not be fatal; Ram Vishambhar v. State of UP, 2013 CrLJ 1131 : (2013) 2 SCC 71 [LNINDU 2013 SC 5] ;
Hari v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 96 [LNIND 2009 SC 642] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1254 [LNIND 2009 SC
642].
53 Bahadur Singh v. State of Punjab, (1992) 4 SCC 503 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 94 : AIR 1993 SC 70 .
54 Durwan Geer, (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 73.
55 Balakee Jolahed, (1868) 10 WR (Cr) 9.
56 Gokool Bowree, (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 33; Mammun, (1916) PR No. 35 of 1916.
57 Prabhu Prosad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 704 ; Saheb Singh v. State of M.P,, 1986 CrLJ 128 : 1986 MPLJ 17 :
1986 Jab LJ 393 : 1985 Cur Cr J (MP) 122 (here conviction was under Section 304 Part II I.P.C .); Lala Ram v. State of
U.P ., (1986) 3 Crimes 215 (All) (here also the conviction was under Section 304 Part II I.P.C .); Sambhu Bora v. State
of Assam, 1987 CrLJ 1027 (Gau) ; Kumar Naik v. State of Orissa, (1987) 1 Crimes 307 (Ori).
58 Keshoram v. State of Assam, AIR 1978 SC 1096 [LNIND 1978 SC 32]: (1978) 2 SCC 407 [LNIND 1978 SC 32] : 1978
SCC (Cri) 219 [LNIND 1978 SC 32] : 1978 BLJR 8 [LNIND 1978 SC 32] (SC) : 1978 CrLJ 1089 : 1978 Cr LR (SC) 109 :
1978 Cr AP R (SC) 124.
59 Karamjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1984 CrLJ 1124 : (1983) 10 Cr LT 464.
60 Amrithalinga v. State of T.N,, AIR 1976 SC 1133 : 1976 CrLJ 348 : (1976) 2 SCC 194.
61 Dr. Mohammad Khalil Chisti v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., 2013 CrLJ 637 (SC) : 2013 (1) MLJ (Crl) 198 [LNIND 2012
SC 801] : (2013) 2 SCC 541; Gopal and another v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 2 SCC 188 [LNIND 2013 SC 37] : 2013
CrLJ 1297.
Page 124 of 133
62 Arjun v. State of Maharashtra, JT 2012 (4) SC 447 : 2012 (5) SCALE 52 : AIR 2012 SC 2181 [LNIND 2012 SC 283]:
(2012) 5 SCC 530 [LNIND 2012 SC 283] : 2012 CrLJ 2641See also Mohammad Iqbal v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
2012 CrLJ 337 (Chh) : 2011 (3) CG.L.R.W. 58.
63 Sikandar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2010) 7 SCC 477 [LNIND 2010 SC 603] : (2010) 8 SCR 373 : AIR 2010 SC 3580
[LNIND 2010 SC 603]: 2010 CrLJ 3854 : (2010) 3 SCC(Cri) 417.
64 Arjun v. State of Maharashtra, JT 2012 (4) SC 447 : 2012 (5) SCALE 52 : AIR 2012 SC 2181 [LNIND 2012 SC 283]:
(2012) 5 SCC 530 [LNIND 2012 SC 283] : 2012 CrLJ 2641; There is nothing on record to suggest that the deceased
had at any stage either assaulted the accused or otherwise caused any injury to him to justify infliction of gunshot injury
upon him in defence. Narinder Kumar v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (2010) 9 SCC 259 [LNIND 2010 SC 629] : AIR
2010 SC 3015 [LNIND 2010 SC 629]: 2010 CrLJ 3905.
65 Ranjitham v. Basavaraj, (2012) 1 SCC 414 [LNIND 2011 SC 1185] : 2012 CrLJ 2135 : AIR 2012 SC 1856 [LNIND
2011 SC 1185]: (2012) 1 SCC(Cri) 454; Double murder of his brother and sister-in- law. Accused went to the house of
the brother, armed with a kulhari and hacked both of them to death one after another. Plea of self defence not tenable :
State of U. P. v. Chatur Singh, AIR 2006 SC 745 : (2005) 13 SCC 360.
66 Hanumantappa Bhimappa Dalavai v. State of Karnataka, 2009 (5) SCALE 142 [LNIND 2009 SC 722] : 2009 CrLJ
3045 : (2009) 11 SCC 408 [LNIND 2009 SC 722] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1407 [LNIND 2009 SC 722] ; Arun v. State of
Maharashtra, (2009) 4 SCC 615 [LNIND 2009 SC 566] : JT 2009 (4) SC 78 [LNIND 2009 SC 566]: 2009 CrLJ 2065 :
(2009) 2 SCC(Cri) 536; Raghbir Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2009 SC 1223 [LNIND 2008 SC 2228]: JT 2008 (12)
SC 254 [LNIND 2008 SC 2228]: 2009 AIR (SCW) 499 : (2008) 16 SCC 33 [LNIND 2008 SC 2228] ; Mohd. Asif v. State
of Uttaranchal, 2009 CrLJ 2789 : (2009) 11 SCC 497 [LNIND 2009 SC 558] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1457.
67 Dinesh Singh v. State of U.P., JT 2008 (8) SC 684 [LNIND 2008 SC 1565]: 2008 AIR (SCW) 5715 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)
1186 [LNIND 2008 SC 1565] : (2008) 15 SCC 745 [LNIND 2008 SC 1565] ; There were no circumstances giving rise to
reasonable apprehension to the accused that either death or grievous hurt would be caused to accused if he does not
exercise the right of his private defence- Multiple tangia blows were given by accused when deceased fell down on
ground; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nivedanlal, 2010 CrLJ 2647 (Chh) : 2010 (2) CGLJ 473; Krishna Kant Chaturvedi
v. State of U.P., 2013 (2) ALJ 716 [LNIND 2012 ALL 159] : 2013 CrLJ 1491 (All).
68 Raj Pal v. State of Haryana, (2006) 9 SCC 678 [LNIND 2006 SC 282] ; JT 2006 (11) SC 124 [LNIND 2006 SC 282]:
(2006) 4 SCALE 456 [LNIND 2006 SC 282] : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 361 [LNIND 2006 SC 282].
69 P.P. Sah, 1977 CrLJ 346 (SC).
70 Rafiq, 1979 CrLJ 706 (SC) : AIR 1979 SC 1179 .
71 In the matter of Ram Pravesh Sharma etc., 2003 CrLJ NOC 80 (Jhar).
72 Smith v. Queen, (2001) 1 WLR 1533 (PC) ; Hall v. R , (1977) 2r WLR 547 was considered. Similarly in Shaw v.
Queen , (2001) 1 WLR 1619 (PC) the accused in a confrontation had snatched gun from rival party and shot him
and his companion from the close range. It was held that there was subjective evidence of threat to the accused whose
sentence was quashed and matter was remitted for consideration of whether a re-trial would be appropriate.
73 Rajan v. State, 2003 CrLJ NOC 161 (Mad).
74 Madan Gopal Alias Pappu v. State, 2006 CrLJ (NOC) 184 (MP).
75 Jalaram v. State of Rajasthan, 2006 CrLJ 528 (SC). In Noushad v. State, 2006 CrLJ 1089 (Ker) the accused had
inflicted knife injuries on stomach and neck of deceased due to old enmity where as no assault was made by the
deceased.
The accused was held guilty as no right of self defence was available to him. In Parbati Marandi v. State, 2006 CrLJ 355
(Jhar) right of private defence was not available and the accused was convicted for the offence charged.
76 Siddique v. State, 2006 CrLJ 1109 (Ker). In Krishnan v. State of T.N., 2006 CrLJ 3907 (SC) the accused when attacked
by the deceased and his son picked up a thorny stick and gave a blow on the head of deceased who died
subsequently. His conviction was held not proper and he was acquitted.
77 Prafulla Halder v. State, 2006 CrLJ 3966 (Cal).
78 Jumni and Ors. v. State of Haryana, 2014 CrLJ 1936 : 2014 (3) SCALE 588 [LNIND 2014 SC 222] in this case the plea
of Alibi was rejected.
Page 125 of 133
79 Dilawar Singh v. State of Haryana, 2014 CrLJ 4844 : 2014 (10) SCALE 548 [LNIND 2014 SC 823] : (2015) 1 SCC 737
[LNIND 2014 SC 823].
80 Ram Kishan v. State, 2007 CrLJ 2865 (Raj).
81 Abdul Khan v. State, 2007 CrLJ 2671 (Raj).
82 GPL Narsimha Raju v. State of Andhra, AIR 1971 SC 1232 : 1971 CrLJ 1066 : (1970) 3 SCC 481.
83 Munney Khan v. State of M.P., AIR 1971 SC 1491 [LNIND 1970 SC 338]: 1971 All LJ 1299 : (1970) 2 SCC 480
[LNIND 1970 SC 338] : 1971 All LJ 1299.
84 Joginder Ahir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1834 : 1971 CrLJ 1258. The assault continued even after the deceased
had fallen down and was rendered harmless. It was held right of private defence was exceeded, Patil Hari Maghji v.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 488 [LNIND 1983 SC 52]: 1983 CrLJ 826.
85 Raza Pasha v. State of M.P., AIR 1983 SC 575 [LNIND 1983 SC 79]: 1983 CrLJ 977 : 1980 Supp SCC 354.
86 Ananta Deb Singh Mahapatra v. State, 2007 CrLJ 1705 (Cal).
87 Ghansham Dass, 1979 CrLJ 28 (SC) : (1978) 3 SCC 391 : AIR 1979 SC 44 .
88 Mohinder Pal, 1979 CrLJ 584 (SC) : (1979) 3 SCC 30 : AIR 1979 SC 577 .
89 State v. Kuldip Singh, 2007 CrLJ 4059 (P&H) others not exceeding their right of private defence were acquitted.
90 State v. Kusha Bari K alias Dattari Barik, 2007 CrLJ 4096 (Ori).
91 Parameshwar Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1986 CrLJ 1968 (Pat) ; see also K. Ramakoteswara Rao v. State of A.P,, 1986
CrLJ 680 (AP).
92 Bahadur Singh v. State of Punjab, 1992 CrLJ 3709 : 1992 (3) Crimes 573 : 1992 (4) SCC 503 : AIR 1993 SC 70 .
93 Nizamuddin v. State of M.P., 1995 SCC (Cri) 699 : AIR 1994 SC 1041 . Deceased peacefully cutting crop was killed in
furtherance of common intention. Held that benefit of this Exception 2 is not available to him, Gurdatta Mal v. State of
U.P., AIR 1965 SC 257 [LNIND 1964 SC 30]: (1965) CrLJ 242.
94 Dev Raj v. State of H.P., 1994 SCC (Cri) 1489 : AIR 1994 SC 523 : 1994 Supp (2) SCC 552.
95 Kanwarjeet Singh v. State of Punjab, 1992 CrLJ 3781 : 1992 (2) Crimes 657 : AIR 1992 SC 2199 : 1993 SCC (Cri)
248 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC 331.
96 Trilok Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1994 SC 654 : 1994 CrLJ 639 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 158.
1 Laxmi Narayan v. State of Orissa, 1982 CrLJ NOC 72 (Ori).
2 Gobaaur Bhooyan, (1870) 13 WR (Cr) 55.
3 Ganduva Nayako, (1882) 1 Weir 305.
4 Amar Gond v. State, 2002 CrLJ 1234 (All) : 2002 All LJ 76 : 2001 (43) All Crc 992.
5 State v. Shishu Pal Singh, 2002 CrLJ 4642 (P&H).
6 Ramchandran alias Vethu v. State, 1994 CrLJ 2741 (Mad).
7 Bhamar Lal v. State, 1998 CrLJ 3489 (Raj).
8 Kuduvakuzinyil Sudhakara v. State, 1995 CrLJ 721 (Ker).
9 Abhimoolam v. State, 1995 CrLJ 1051 (Mad). Similarly accused was convicted under Section 304 for causing murder in
exercise of right of his private defence, Harchand Singh v. State, 1995 CrLJ 1606 (P&H).
10 State of M.P. v. Ramesh, 2005 CrLJ 652 (SC) : 2004 (4) Crimes 310 : 2004 AIR SCW 6663 : 2004 (9) SCALE 435
[LNIND 2004 SC 1151]. In Ramswaroop v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1066 (Raj) accused was convicted under Section 304 as
he had exceeded the right of private defence.
11 V. Subramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2005 CrLJ 1727 (SC) : 2005 (1) Crimes 379 : AIR 2005 SC 1983 [LNIND 2005
SC 224]: 2005 (2) SCALE 546.
12 Minaketanbhoi v. State, 2003 CrLJ 3256 (Ori).

Page 126 of 133
13 Ranbaj Singh v. State of Punjab, 2007 CrLJ 295 (SC) order of High Court was reversed.
14 Ravishankar v. State, 2007 CrLJ 261 (Chh).
15 Subba Naik, (1898) 21 Mad 249.
16 Shew Mangal v. State, 1981 CrLJ 84 : (1980) 2 Cal HN 286.
17 State of W.B. v. Shew Mangal Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1917 [LNIND 1981 SC 355]: 1981 CrLJ 1683 : (1981) 4 SCC 2
[LNIND 1981 SC 355] : 1981 BBCJ (SC) 239 : 1981 All WC 729 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 782 [LNIND 1981 SC 355].
18 AIR 1950 EP 321 : ILR 1950 Punj 354 : 52 Punj LR 331.
19 Satyavir Singh Rathi v. State Thr. C.B.I., AIR 2011 SC 1748 [LNIND 2011 SC 475]: (2011) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2011 SC
475] : 2011 CrLJ 2908.
20 R. v. Clegg, (1995) 1 All ER 334 HL : (1995) 2 WLR 80 : (1995) 1 AC 482.
21 Dakhi Singh v. State of U.P,, AIR 1955 All 379 [LNIND 1955 ALL 14]: 1955 CrLJ 905.
22 Sanjeev v. State of Haryana, 2015 (2) SCALE 591 [LNIND 2015 SC 104] : (2015) 4 SCC 387 [LNIND 2015 SC 104] :
2015 CrLJ 1669.
23 Vijender Kumar v. State of Delhi, 2010 CrLJ 3851 : (2010) 12 SCC 381 [LNIND 2010 SC 413] : (2011) 1 SCC(Cri) 29.
24 Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa, 2004 CrLJ 3875 (SC) : (2004) 11 SCC 395 [LNIND 2004 SC 758] : AIR 2004 SC
4100 [LNIND 2004 SC 758]; Dilip Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal, 2015 CrLJ 1321 : 2015 (1) SCALE 441
[LNIND 2015 SC 25] : (2015) 3 SCC 433 [LNIND 2015 SC 25];See also Rajinder Singh v. State of Haryana, 2015 CrLJ
1330 : 2015 (1) SCALE 95 [LNINDORD 2014 SC 19863], in which Supreme Court found that the death was committed
without any pre-meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and that the offender did not
take undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, which would normally fall under Exception 4 of Section
300 Indian Penal Code. Consequently, at best, conviction of the appellant can only be under Part-II of Section 304
Indian Penal Code for which he could have been inflicted with a punishment of ten years.
25 Santokh Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 1923 [LNIND 2009 SC 328]: (2009) 11 SCC 197 [LNIND 2009 SC
328] ; Arumugam v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police T.N, AIR 2009 SC 331 [LNIND 2008 SC 1994]: (2008) 15 SCC
590 [LNIND 2008 SC 1994].
26 Murlidhar Shivram Patekar & ANR. v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 CrLJ 139 (SC) : (2015) 1 SCC 694 [LNIND 2014 SC
857].
27 Babu and another. v. State represented by Inspector of Police, Chennai, (2013) 4 SCC 448 [LNIND 2013 SC 267] :
2013 CrLJ 2176; Babulal Sahu v. State, AIR 2011 SC 2530 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 399]: (2011) 14 SCC 399 [LNIND
2011 SC 417] (Infra).
28 State of Rajasthan v. Islam, (2011) 6 SCC 343 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 309] : AIR 2011 SC 2317 [LNINDORD 2011 SC
309]: 2011 CrLJ 3110; Plea that only one injury of small dimension had been caused by appellant to the deceased in
the abdomen and he had himself taken the deceased to hospital, an inference be drawn that there was no intention to
kill the deceased repelled;The case of the appellant cannot fall within Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC. Vijender Kumar
v. State of Delhi, 2010 CrLJ 3851 : (2010) 12 SCC 381 [LNIND 2010 SC 413] : (2011) 1 SCC(Cri) 291. Also see
Ahmed Shah v. State of Rajasthan, 2015 (1) SCALE 222 [LNIND 2015 SC 21] : (2015) 3 SCC 93 [LNIND 2015 SC 21] :
2015 (2) SCJ 182 [LNIND 2015 SC 21],
29 Abdul Nawaz v. State of West Bengal, 2012 CrLJ 2901 : (2012) 6 SCC 581 [LNIND 2012 SC 307] : 2012 (5) SCALE
357 [LNIND 2012 SC 307] ; Chinnathaman v. State, 2007 (14) SCC 690 [LNIND 2007 SC 1485] ; Muthu v. State, 2009
(17) SCC 433 [LNIND 2007 SC 1303] : AIR 2008 SC 1 [LNIND 2007 SC 1303]; Arumugam v. State, 2008 (15) SCC
590 [LNIND 2008 SC 1994] : AIR 2009 SC 331 [LNIND 2008 SC 1994]; Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2011 (9) SCC
462 [LNIND 2011 SC 844] ; Vijay Ramkrishan Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, 2012 (2) SCALE 631 : 2012 (2)
SCALE 631; Sayaji Hanmat Bankar v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 AIR (SCW) 4502 : 2011 (7) SCALE 710 [LNIND
2011 SC 653] : 2011 CrLJ 4338 : (2011) 8 SCR 234 [LNIND 2011 SC 653] ; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ram Pal,
AIR 2005 SC 4058 .
30 Babulal Sahu v. State of Chhatisgarh, 2011 CrLJ 3131 : AIR 2011 SC 2530 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 399].
31 Arjun v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 5 SCC 530 [LNIND 2012 SC 283] : 2012 CrLJ 2641- where the accused
appeared and entered the house and had some quarrel with his deceased wife. He threw water pot and thereafter a
Page 127 of 133
kerosene lamp. Burning seems to be more because lady was wearing nylon sari - She burnt to the extent of 70% -
Supreme Court held that it was a case clearly falling under Exception 4 of Section 300 of I.P.C. Sayaji Hanmat Bankar
v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (7) SCALE 710 [LNIND 2011 SC 653] : 2011 CrLJ 4338.
32 Jaswant Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1998 SCC (Cri) 1344.
33 Bagga alias Kachru v. State, 2005 CrLJ 3766 (Raj).
34 State of M.P. v. Shivshankar, 2015 CrLJ 155 : 2014 (10) SCALE 608 [LNINDU 2014 SC 86] : (2014) 10 SCC 366
[LNINDU 2014 SC 86] ; B.D. Khunte v. Union of India 2015 CrLJ 243 : (2015) 1 SCC 286.
35 Sikander v. State (Delhi Administration), (1999) 3 SCC 569 [LNIND 1999 SC 351] : AIR 1999 SC 1406 [LNIND 1999
SC 351]: 1999 CrLJ 2098 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 451 [LNIND 1999 SC 351].
36 Prem Nepali v. State, 2003 CrLJ 3301 (MP) : (2003) 2 MPLJ 600.
37 Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 CrLJ 1023 (SC).
38 Shaikh Majid v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 CrLJ 1062 (SC). In a sudden fight the accused dragged the deceased to
spot of occurrence and without acting in a cruel manner gave a solitary blow on his neck to which deceased
succumbed. He was held guilty under Section 304,Kulesh Mondal v. State of W.B., 2008 CrLJ 325 (SC).
39 Avina alias Abhimanyu Mangraj v. State, 2008 CrLJ 1823 (Ori).
40 Iswar Juanga v. State, 2008 CrLJ 2752 (Ori).
41 Bashir v. State of U.P,, 1953 CrLJ 1505.
42 Suresh Chand v. State (Delhi), 1972 CrLJ 1416.
43 Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory Chandigarh, AIR 1989 SC 1094 [LNIND 1989 SC 140]: 1989 CrLJ 883 : (1989) 2
SCC 217 [LNIND 1989 SC 140].
44 Rohimuddin, (1879) 5 Cal 31.
45 Foster, 296.
46 Nayamuddin, (1891) 18 Cal 484 (FB).
47 Zalim Rai, (1864) 1 WR (Cr) 33; Ameera, (1866) PR No. 12 of 1866.
48 State of M.P. v. Mohondas, 1992 CrLJ 101 (MP).
49 Sunnumuduli, (1946) 25 Pat 335.
50 Atma Singh, AIR 1955 Punj 191 .
51 Public Prosecution v. Soma Sundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115]: 1959 CrLJ 993.
52 Kirpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 52 CrLJ 1517 (Punj).
53 Harvinder Singh v. State, 2005 CrLJ 3892 (P&H).
54 A. Maharaja v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2009 CrLJ 315 (SC).
55 Amolok Singh v. State, 2007 CrLJ 4599 (Gau).
56 Ratiram v. State, 2007 CrLJ 3955 (MP).
57 Ashok Kumar Barik v. State of Orissa, 1992 CrLJ 1849 (Ori), the case of Mohammad Mythen Shahul Hamid v. State of
Kerala, AIR 1980 SC 108 : 1980 CrLJ 192 : 1980 Supp SCC 18 was relied on.
58 Kapoora Ram v. State, 2001 CrLJ 2359 (Raj).
59 Bagdi Ram v. State of M.P., 2004 CrLJ 632 (SC) : (2004) 12 SCC 302 [LNIND 2003 SC 1047] : AIR 2004 SC 387
[LNIND 2003 SC 1047]: (2004) 98 Cut LT 225.
60 Purru v. State, 2004 CrLJ 870 (Chhatisgarh).
61 Iqbal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2008 CrLJ 4679 (SC) and Kulesh Mondel v. State, 2008 CrLJ 325 (SC).
62 Nalavar Singh Bhalsingh Bhabhor v. State, 2008 CrLJ 4074 (Guj). In Panchu Jadav v. State, 2008 CrLJ 4467 (Chh)
Lathi blows given in heat of passion and conviction under Section 304 Part II was held proper.
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63 K. Palraj v. State, 2008 CrLJ 4236 (Mad).
64 Muthu v. State, 2008 CrLJ 442 (SC). Occurrence had taken place in sudden quarrel and conviction was altered to one
under Section 304,D. Sailu v. State of A.P., 2008 CrLJ 686 (SC) and Gali Venkataiah v. State, 2008 CrLJ 690 (SC).
65 (1950) 2 Pepsu LR 288.
66 Narayanan, AIR 1956 SC 99 [LNIND 1955 KER 138]: 1956 CrLJ 278. The accused entered the house of deceased
and inflicted two knife blows on vital part of body that is chest and stomach. It was held that it was not a case of sudden
fight and Exception 4 was not attracted, Hence offence of murder was made out, Lekh Raj v. State, 1997 CrLJ 3663
(H&P).
67 Pran Das v. State, 1954 CrLJ 331 (SC) : AIR 1954 SC 36 .
68 Mathew v. State of Kerala, (1992) 1 SCC 74 : 1991 CrLJ 1679 : AIR 1991 SC 1376 [LNIND 1991 SC 159].
69 Chonadan Karunan v. State of Kerala, 1994 SCC (Cri) 501.
70 Champoo Yadava v. State of M.P., 2003 CrLJ 1536 (SC) : AIR 2003 SC 1620 [LNIND 2003 SC 214]: 2003 (2) Crimes
172. On similar facts Orissa High Court altered the conviction of accused from under Section 302 to one under Section
304,Manas Kumar v. State, 2003 CrLJ NOC 68 (Ori).
71 Manka Ram v. State of Haryana, 2003 CrLJ 2328 (SC) : AIR 2003 SC 4147, when case of sudden quarrel between
parties is not proved but accused had caused undoubtedly the fatal blow on head the accused will be convicted under
Section 302 for murder and Exception 4 to Section 300 will not apply, Shankar Rao Bhiimrao Sarnaik v. State, 2003
CrLJ 2425 (Bom).
72 Desa Singh v. State, 2003 CrLJ 2986 (P&H) : 2003 (4) All Cr LR 220.
73 State v. Hari Ram, 2004 CrLJ 1895 (All).
74 Jagat Singh v. State of H.P., (2011) 2 SCC 234 [LNIND 2011 SC 4] : 2011 CrLJ 949 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 671 : AIR
2011 SC (Supp) 442.
75 State of U.P. v. Qamar, 2004 CrLJ 2390 (All). Similar things had happened in Ganesh v. State, 2004 CrLJ 2327 (MP).
76 Ramadhar v. State, 2004 CrLJ 2378 (All). In sudden quarrel woman was thrown on Jaal on roof of first floor. There was
no pre-meditation no enmity and motive to kill the victim. Clause thirdly of Section 300 was not applied and conviction
was altered from Section 302 to one under Section 304,Ghanshyam v. State, 2004 CrLJ 2578 (Delhi).
77 Sanjay Subba v. State, 2004 CrLJ 3285 (Sikkim).
78 Somnath Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1969 Ori 138 [LNIND 1968 ORI 4]: 1969 CrLJ 922.
79 Mahesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1996 (10) SCC 668 [LNIND 2013 SC 587] : 1996 (3) Crimes 258 : AIR 1996 SC
3513 [LNIND 2013 SC 587].
80 Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 2590 [LNIND 1996 SC 1198]: 1996 (10) SCC 274 [LNIND 1996 SC
1198] : 1996 (3) Crimes 112 : 1996 CrLJ 3583 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1252 [LNIND 1996 SC 1198].
81 State v. Kolis Hira, 1961 CrLJ 54 (2) : AIR 1961 Guj 8 [LNIND 1960 GUJ 29].
82 Hawa Singh v State of Haryana, 2009 CrLJ 1146 (SC) : JT 2009 (1) SC 361 [LNIND 2009 SC 87].
83 Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1993 CrLJ 3255 : AIR 1993 SC 2426 [LNIND 1993 SC 456]: (1993) 2 Crimes 487 :
(1993) 4 SCC 238 [LNIND 1993 SC 456] : 1993 SCC (Cri) 1156 [LNIND 1993 SC 456].
84 Sikandar alias Mohd. Safiq v. State, 1999 CrLJ 2098 (SC) : AIR 1999 SC 1406 [LNIND 1999 SC 351]: (1999) 3 SCC
569 [LNIND 1999 SC 351].
85 Vikas Bari v. State, 1997 CrLJ 320 (P&H).
86 Babloo Das v. State, 1997 CrLJ 1025 (Cal).
87 Rawel Singh v. State, 1997 CrLJ 1195 (Del).
88 Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, 2000 CrLJ 973 (Ker).

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89 Raja Ram v. State, 2000 CrLJ 926 (All). In a sudden fight the accused persons wielded pharsa in heat of passion and
caused death of two deceased persons. It was held that their case would be covered by Exception 4 to Section 300 and
he would be convicted under Section 304,Rama Shankar v. State, 2000 CrLJ 3830 (All).
90 Amarjeet Singh v. State, 1995 CrLJ 2886 (J&K).
1 Krishna Tiwary v. State of Bihar, 2001 CrLJ 3277 (SC) : (2003) 11 SCC 285.
2 Shiodas v. State, 1995 CrLJ 2854 (Bom), the co-accused in this case was acquitted as his sharing of common intention
was not proved.
3 Bati Kunzami v. State, 1996 CrLJ 1431 (Ori).
4 Jora Singh v. State, 1996 CrLJ 2915 (P&H).
5 Badnayina Bheemanna v. State, 1996 CrLJ 3095 (AP).
6 Azizullah. v. State, 2003 CrLJ 663 (All) : 2002 All LJ 2669.
7 Kirpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 52 CrLJ 1517.
8 Kirpal Singh v. State of Punjab , (ibid). The accused caused the death of the deceased during a sudden quarrel in
which he dealt two axe blows on the head of the deceased. It was held that case could not be covered under Exception
IV to Section 300 and conviction of accused for murder was proper, Kanhu Majhi v. State, 1998 CrLJ 3729 (Ori).
9 Girish Singh v. State, 2007 CrLJ 4446 (Uttar).
10 Thakurda Lalaji v. State of Gujarat, 1974 CrLJ 612..
11 Thankachan v. State of Kerala, 2005 CrLJ 3130 (SC).
12 Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat, 2003 CrLJ 3723 (SC) : AIR 2003 SC 2855 [LNIND 2003 SC 585]:
(2003) 3 Crimes 219 : (2003) 9 SCC 322 [LNIND 2003 SC 585]. The firearm injury sustained by deceased was
sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature and death was not due to accidental firing, the conviction of
accused was held proper as case was not covered under fourth Exception to Section 300 : Deewan Singh v. State,
2003 CrLJ 4586 (Uttra).
13 ILR (1975) HP 132.
14 Sarjug Prosad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1959 Pat 66 .
15 Dharman v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 324 : 1957 CrLJ 420.
16 AIR 1981 SC 1552 [LNIND 1981 SC 280]: 1981 CrLJ 1136.
17 Dharman v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 324 : 1957 CrLJ 420.
18 Mohamad Ghouse v. State of Mysore, (1975) 2 CrLJ 288 : (1964) 1 Mys LJ 543.
19 In re, Thippanna, 1971 CrLJ 1640 : (1971) 1 Mys LJ 473 : 1971 Mad LJ (Cr) 200.
20 Daso Mian v. State, 2006 CrLJ 2520 (Jhar).
21 Subhash Shamrao Pachunde v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 CrLJ 546 (SC). Similarly in Ayyappan alias Appu v. State,
2006 CrLJ 661 (Ker). Taking undue advantage of situation accused went on stabbing his own brother even after he had
fallen down. He was convicted for murder.
22 Muzammil Hussain v. State, 2006 CrLJ 2971 (Gau).
23 Public Prosecutor v. Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] (327) : 1959 CrLJ 993 (997) : 1959
Mad WN 215.
24 Memon Yakubbhai v. State of Gujarat, 1989 CrLJ 1843 (Guj).
25 Naveen Chandra v. State of Uttaranchal, 2007 CrLJ 874 (SC). In a sudden fight death was caused due to injuries
inflicted on head and chest of deceased. Accused was convicted under Section 304 Part II instead of Section 302. 2007
CrLJ (NOC) 141 (AP).
26 State v. Prabhu, 2007 CrLJ 580 (Kant).

Page 130 of 133
27 Mahesh Balmiki v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1999 SC 3338 [LNIND 1999 SC 755]: 1999 (4) Crimes 109 : 1999
CrLJ 4301 : (2000) 1 SCC 319 [LNIND 1999 SC 755].
28 Thakarda Lalaji, 1974 CrLJ 612 (SC) : (1974) 3 SCC 639 [LNIND 1996 SC 908] : 1974 SCC (Cri) 169 : AIR 1974 SC
1351 ; see also Om Prakash, 1981 CrLJ 30 (SC) : AIR 1981 SC 642 .
29 Ashok Rajaram Deshmukh v. State of Maharashtra, (1991) 2 Crimes 290 (Bom).
30 Laxminarayan alias Poodan v. State of Punjab, (1992) 2 Crimes 496 (Punj).
31 Shankar Bag v. State, 2002 CrLJ NOC 151 (Ori) : 2001 (2) Crimes 433 : 2001 (1) Ori LR 183. The accused had
committed murder without any pre-planning upon a sudden fight and in heat of passion. The conviction was altered
from under Section 302 to one under Section 304 read with Section 34,Azad Ali v. State, 2002 CrLJ 2085 (Cal) : 2001
Cal Crlr 427 : 2002 (1) Crimes 402.
32 Resham Singh v. State of Punjab, 2002 CrLJ 3506 (SC) : AIR 2002 SC 2625 .
33 Abdulkadar Mansurmeya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 1998 SCC (Cri) 569 : 1999 CrLJ 5027.
34 Madha v. State of Rajasthan, (1991) 2 Crimes 322 (Raj).
35 Babrubahan Jal v. State of Assam, 1991 CrLJ 278 (Gau).
36 Amritha Linga Nadar v. State of T.N,, AIR 1976 SC 1133 : 1975 Cr LR (SC) 632 : 1976 CrLJ 848 : (1976) 2 SCC 194 :
1976 SCC (Cri) 249 : 1975 BBCJ 834. The quarrel ensued at the spur of moment in Subhash Kumar v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2005 CrLJ 4399 (Del) and offence was committed in heat of passion. Conviction for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder was held proper.
37 Ram Karan v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 1185 : 1982 CrLJ 1253 : 1982 All LJ 397 : (1982) 2 SCC 184.
38 Shasti Dhakaro v. State, 2006 CrLJ 1690 (Jhar).
39 Sandhya Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 CrLJ 2111 (SC). In Madavan v. The State, 2006 CrLJ 38 (Mad). There
was no previous enmity and occurrence had taken place out of sudden quarrel and heat of passion. So intention to kill
could not be established and accused was convicted under Section 304.
40 Sudhar v. State, 2006 CrLJ 4541 (Mad).
41 Mansoor Alam v. State, 2006 CrLJ 4485 (Jhar).
42 Jagdish v. State, 2005 CrLJ 816 (Uttar).
43 Arbind Chettri v. State, 2005 CrLJ 984 (Sikk) : 2005 (1) Crimes 553. In Sasi Kumar v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1088 (Mad) no
motive or pre planned attack, conviction altered from Section 302 to one under Section 304.
44 Razab Ali v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1870 (Del) : 2005 (1) Crimes 394. Accused acquitted due to missing link, State v. Okram
Jiten Singh, 2005 CrLJ 1646 (Gau).
45 State v. Mugutsab Khasimsab, 2005 CrLJ NOC 1 (Kant) : 2004 AIR Kant HCR 1351. Prosecution instead of examining
witnesses named in FIR examined chance witnesses, conviction was set aside, Mohd. Haider v. State, 2005 CrLJ 1653
(Pat).
46 Mahesh Balmiki v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1999 CrLJ 4301 : AIR 1999 SC 3338 [LNIND 1999 SC 755]: (2000) 1
SCC 319 [LNIND 1999 SC 755]. About single blow Court observed that single blow according to its nature will entail
conviction under Sections 302, 304 or 326. Similar was the case of Ram Singh v. State, 1995 CrLJ 3838 (Del) where
accused was acquitted.
47 Jai Pal v. State of Haryana, 2000 CrLJ 1778 (SC) : AIR 2000 SC 1271 [LNIND 2000 SC 448]: 2000 (3) Crimes 93 :
2000 SCC (Cri) 699 : (2000) 3 SCC 436 [LNIND 2000 SC 448]. Also see Rajendra Singh v. State of Bihar, 2000 CrLJ
2199 (SC) where prosecution party was ploughing their land and accused tried to prevent them from doing so and then
brought some weapon from their land and caused the death of the deceased. It was held that conviction of the accused
was liable to be altered from Section 302 read with Section 34 to under Section 324 as he had not shared the common
intention with other accused but Exception 4 certainly could not apply to such cases.
48 Devassykutty v. State, 1996 CrLJ 3156 (Ker).
49 Re, Abbu alias Katti alias Muniswami, 1954 CrLJ 1443 (Mad).
50 Jakir Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra, 1991 CrLJ 527 (Bom).

Page 131 of 133
51 Thanoo v. State of U.P,, AIR 1959 All 131 [LNIND 1958 ALL 118]: 1959 CrLJ 158.
52 Re Thippanna, 1971 CrLJ 1640.
53 Pandurang, 1978 CrLJ 995 (SC) : AIR 1978 SC 1082 : (1979) 1 SCC 132 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 573; see also Upendra
Mahakud, 1985 CrLJ 1767 (Ori).
54 Bhagwan Munjaji, 1979 CrLJ 49 (SC) : (1978) 3 SCC 330 [LNIND 1978 SC 151] : AIR 1979 SC 33 .
55 Prabhu v. State of M.P., AIR 1991 SC 1069 : 1991 CrLJ 1373 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 56 : 1991 Supp (2) SCC 725.
56 Raghavan Pillai v. State of Kerala, 1989 CrLJ 188 (Ker).
57 Mahesh Balmiki v. State of M.P., (2000) 1 SCC 319 [LNIND 1999 SC 755] : 2000 SCC (Cri) 178 : 1999 CrLJ 4301 : AIR
1999 SC 3338 [LNIND 1999 SC 755].
58 Santokh Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 1923 [LNIND 2009 SC 328]: (2009) 11 SCC 197 [LNIND 2009 SC
328] ; Arumugam v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police T.N., AIR 2009 SC 331 [LNIND 2008 SC 1994]: (2008) 15 SCC
590 [LNIND 2008 SC 1994] ; D. Sailu v. State of A.P., AIR 2008 SC 505 [LNIND 2007 SC 1347]: (2007) 14 SCC 397
[LNIND 2007 SC 1347].
59 Narendra v. State of Rajasthan, 2014 CrLJ 4396 : 2014 (10) SCALE 62 [LNINDU 2014 SC 77] : (2014) 10 SCC 248
[LNINDU 2014 SC 77].
60 Re, Naina Mathu Kannappan, AIR 1940 Mad 138 .
61 Kanaya Kosvan v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Mad 436 .
62 Re, Thangavelu Mudali, 1956 CrLJ 244 : AIR 1956 Mad 97 : (1955) 2 Mad LJ 383 : 1955 Mad WN 605 (2).
63 Dasrath Paswan v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 Pat 190 : 58 CrLJ 548.
64 Prabhat Uppal v. State, 2006 CrLJ 4716 (Del). Re Naina Muthu Kannappan AIR 1940 Mad 13, (1940) 4 CrLJ 322 and
Dasrath Paswan v. State, AIR 1958 Pat 190, 1958 CrLJ 548 were followed and relied on.
65 H ALSBURY’S Laws of England, 4th Ed., Vol. 11, para 1167, p. 623.
66 Note M, p. 145 of Lord M ACAULAY R EPORT.
67 Nayamuddin, (1891) 18 Cal 484 (FB).
68 Ambalathil, AIR 1956 Mad 97 .
69 Vijay v. State of M.P., 1994 (3) Crimes 279 : (1994) 6 SCC 308 [LNIND 1994 SC 775] : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1755.
70 Sahebloll, Reetloll, (1863) 1 RJPJ 174.
71 Baboolun Hijrah, (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 7.
72 Anunto Rurnagat, (1866) 6 WR (Cr) 57.
73 Poonai Fattemah, (1869) 12 WR (Cr) 7.
74 Halliday, (1889) 16 LT 701, 702. A killed B while intending to kill C. He will be guilty of murder, Hari Shanker v. State,
AIR 1979 NOC 157 (SC).
75 Towers, (1874) 12 Cox 530, 533.
76 Rajendra Kumar Sharma v. State of Delhi, 1996 CrLJ 2810 (Del).
77 Pappu v. State of M.P., 2006 CrLJ 3640 (SC).
78 Lal Bahadur. v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 4 SCC 557 [LNINDORD 2014 SC 18806] : 2013 CrLJ2205 : 2013 (2) SCC
(Cr) 516.
79 Rishipal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 CrLJ 1534 (SC) : 2013 AIR (SCW) 1167 ; Lakshmi. v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
2002 (7) SCC 198 [LNIND 2002 SC 534] : AIR 2002 SC 3119 [LNIND 2002 SC 534]; State of Karnataka v. M.V.
Mahesh, 2003 (3) SCC 353 [LNIND 2003 SC 270].
80 Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2012 CrLJ 3085 : AIR 2012 SC 2488 [LNIND 2012 SC 331]: (2012) 6 SCC 204
[LNINDORD 2012 SC 412] ; The state of the contents of the stomach found at the time of medical examination is not a
safe guide for determining the time of the occurrence because that would be a matter of speculation, in the absence of
Page 132 of 133
reliable evidence on the question as to when the deceased had his last meal and what that meal consisted of. Masjit
Tato Rawool v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 3 SCC 416 : (1971) SCC (Cri) 664; Gopal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
AIR 1979 SC 1822 : 1980 CrLJ 832 : (1978) 3 SCC 327; Sheo Darshan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1972) SCC (Cr) 394.
[The presence of faecal matter in the intestines is not conclusive, as the deceased might be suffering fromconstipation.
Where there is positive direct evidence about the time of occurrence, it is not open to the court to speculate about the
time of occurrence by the presence of faecal matter in the intestines; Sheo Dershan v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (1972)
SCC (Cr.) 394. The question of time of death of the victim should not be decided only by taking into consideration the
state of food in the stomach. That may be a factor which should be considered along with other evidence, but that fact
alone cannot be decisive; R. Prakash v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1969) 1 SCC 48, Also see Shivappa v. State of
Karnataka, (1995) 2 SCC 76 [LNIND 1994 SC 1111] : AIR 1995 SC 980 [LNIND 1994 SC 1111].
81 Arun Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar , 2010) 1 SCC 108 [LNIND 2009 SC 1866] : 2010 CrLJ 428.
82 Rishipal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 CrLJ 1534 (SC) : 2013 AIR (SCW) 1167 ; Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra,
2007 (7) SCC 502 [LNIND 2007 SC 969] ; Sunil Clifford Daniel (Dr.) v. State of Punjab, 2012 CrLJ 4657 : (2012) 11
SCC 205 [LNIND 2012 SC 551] : 2012 (8) SCALE 670 [LNIND 2012 SC 551] ; Pannayar v. State of Tamil Nadu by
Inspector of Police, 2009 (9) SCC 152 [LNIND 2009 SC 1687].
83 Sanaulla Khan v. State of Bihar, (2013) 3 SCC 52 [LNIND 2013 SC 120] ; 2013 CrLJ 1527; Ujjagar Singh v. State of
Punjab, 2007 (13) SCC 90 [LNIND 2007 SC 1486] : 2007 (14) SCALE 428 [LNIND 2007 SC 1486].
84 Gosu Jairami Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 2011 SC 3147 [LNIND 2011 SC 2666]: 2011 CrLJ 4387 : (2011) 11 SCC 766
[LNIND 2011 SC 2666] ; Abu Thakir v. State, (2010) 5 SCC 91 [LNIND 2010 SC 366] : AIR 2010 SC 2119 [LNIND
2010 SC 366]: 2010 CrLJ 2840.
85 Rishipal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 CrLJ 1534 (SC) : 2013 AIR (SCW) 1167 ; Mohibur Rahman. v. State of Assam,
2002 (6) SCC 715 : AIR 2002 SC 3064 ; in Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 372 : 1994 (1) SCALE
821, Supreme Court reiterated that the solitary circumstance of the accused and victim being last seen will not
complete the chain of circumstances for the Court to record a finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused. No conviction on that basis alone can, therefore, be founded. So also in Godabarish Mishra v.
Kuntala Mishra 1996 (11) SCC 264 : AIR 1997 SC 286 [LNIND 1996 SC 1719], Supreme Court declared that the
theory of last seen together is not of universal application and may not always be sufficient to sustain a conviction
unless supported by other links in the chain of circumstances; State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, 2007 (3) SCC 755
[LNIND 2007 SC 274] : [2007] 3 SCR 507 [LNIND 2007 SC 274]; Bodh Raj alias Bodha v. State of Jammu and
Kashmir, 2002 (8) SCC 45 [LNIND 2002 SC 539] : AIR 2002 SC 3164 [LNIND 2002 SC 539]; Jaswant Gir v. State of
Punjab, 2005 (12) SCC 438 : 2006 (3) ACR 3405 (SC) ; See Manthuri Laxmi Narasaiah v. State of A.P., 2012 CrLJ
2172 : AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 73 in which the evidence of last seen rejected by the SC.
86 Arabindra Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, 2012 AIR (SCW) 1032 : 2012 CrLJ 1207; Also see Shyamal Ghosh v.
State of West Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 CrLJ 3825 : AIR 2012 SC 3539 [LNIND 2012
SC 397]; Inspector of Police Tamil Nadu v. John David, (2011) 5 SCC 509 [LNIND 2011 SC 441] : 2011 CrLJ 3366 :
(2011) 2 SCC(Cri) 647- ‘last seen alive theory accepted’ See also Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 317 [LNIND
2011 SC 440] : 2011 CrLJ 3380 : (2011) 2 SCC(Cri) 626.
87 C. Perumal v. Rajasekaran, 2012 AIR (SCW) 3641 : 2012 CrLJ 3491; State Through C.B.I. v. Mahender Singh Dahiya,
(2011) 3 SCC 109 [LNIND 2011 SC 114] : AIR 2011 SC 1017 [LNIND 2011 SC 114]: 2011 CrLJ 2177-last seen
evidence would not always mean that the accused had killed the deceased.
88 Bikau Pandey v. State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 997 [LNIND 2003 SC 1027]: (2003) 12 SCC 616 [LNIND 2003 SC
1027] ; Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2008 SC 2389 [LNIND 2008 SC 1218]: (2008) 11 SCC 425 [LNIND 2008
SC 1218] ; Nishan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2008 SC 1661 [LNIND 2008 SC 2718]: (2008) 17 SCC 505 [LNIND
2008 SC 2718].
89 Balraje v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673 [LNIND 2010 SC 487] : 2010 CrLJ 3443; Satvir v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 1741 [LNIND 2009 SC 124]: 2009 CrLJ 1586 : (2009) 4 SCC 289 [LNIND 2009 SC 124].
90 Om Prakash v. State of U.P., AIR 2009 SC 944 [LNIND 2008 SC 2418]: (2008) 17 SCC 249 [LNIND 2008 SC 2418] :
(2009) 1 All LJ 657 : 2009 CrLJ 782.
91 Prathap v. State, AIR 2010 SC 3526 [LNIND 2010 SC 800]: 2010 CrLJ 4442 : (2010) 12 SCC 79 [LNIND 2010 SC
800].
Page 133 of 133
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(In) Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Indian Penal Code, 33e

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Date and Time: 06 May 2021 15:00:00 IST

Job Number: 143188472

THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)

CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY

OF OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE

When culpable homicide is not murder.

The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—

Exception 4. —Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden

3. Culpable homicide and murder distinguished.—

The factors which reduce murder to culpable homicide are :

(a) it should have been committed without premeditation;

Section 299 Section 300

(3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person

(i) Is there a homicide?

6. Assaulting innocent person.—

9. Intention : inference of, from proved circumstances.—

10. Homicide by omission.—

Lord Macaulay Report.—

11. Causing injuries on non-vital part.—

16. Attack without any motive and incitement.—

19. ‘Bodily injury’.—

20. Principle of exclusion.—

21. Contradiction between ocular and medical evidence.—

23. Construing medical opinion.—

24. FSL Reports.—

be sufficient to reject the version given by the eye witness. 64

29. Trespassing for assault and murder.—

30. Act imminently dangerous causing death without any excuse.—

32. Killing child.—

33. Poison causing death by.—

34. Murder by poisoning : proof.—

35. Chemical Examination of vicera.—

36. Death by Drowning.—

37. Exception 1—Provocation.—

(1) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused.

38. Meaning of the words ‘grave’ and ‘sudden’.—

Lord Macaulay Report.—

39. Sexual offence and provocation.—

40. Provocation : the criterion of reasonable man.—

41. Objectional behaviour of wife.—

42. Sudden provocation : burden of proof.—

43. Self-induced provocation.—

44. Time gap between provocation and assault : effect.—

45. Adulterous intercourse.—

46. Defence of unsound mind as alternate defence.—

48. Misbehaviour of the wife.—

49. Misbehaviour with or by sister.—

50. Misbehaviour with or by daughter or son.—

51. Adulterous misbehaviour of daugther-in-law.—

52. Words and gestures as provocation.—

53. Quarrel as provocation.—

54. Provocation : Proved.—

55. Provocation not proved.—

56. Exception 2—Private defence in murder29.—

57. Cases - No right of private defence.—

58. Exceeding Right of Private Defence.—

59. Threats of incantations give no right of private defence.—

60. Right of defence approved.—

61. Exception 3—Public servant exceeding his power.—

(i) it was a sudden fight;

63. ‘Fight’: meaning of.—

64. Sudden fight or sudden quarrel.—

65. Exception not applied.—